

**Seventy-first session**

Item 109 of the provisional agenda\*

**Measures to eliminate international terrorism****Measures to eliminate international terrorism****Report of the Secretary-General***Summary*

The present report has been prepared pursuant to paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 50/53, as read together with Assembly resolution 70/120 on measures to eliminate international terrorism. In sections II.A and B, the report contains information on measures taken at the national and international levels, based on submissions from Governments and international organizations. Section III contains a list of relevant international legal instruments.

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\* A/71/150.



## **I. Introduction**

1. The present report has been prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 50/53, as read together with Assembly resolution 70/120.
2. The attention of all States was drawn to General Assembly resolution 49/60 and the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism annexed thereto, and they were requested to submit, by 1 June 2016, information on the implementation of paragraph 10 (a) of the Declaration. Section II.A below contains a summary of the replies received.
3. Relevant specialized agencies and other relevant international organizations were also invited to submit, by 1 June 2016, information or other pertinent material on the implementation of paragraph 10 (a) of the Declaration. Section II.B below contains a summary of the replies received.
4. The summaries of the replies focus on matters referred to in paragraphs 10 (a) and (b) of the Declaration, namely: (a) collection of data on the status and implementation of existing multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements relating to international terrorism, including information on incidents caused by international terrorism and criminal prosecutions and sentencing; and (b) national laws and regulations on counter-terrorism.

## **II. Measures taken at the national and international levels regarding the prevention and suppression of international terrorism, and information on incidents caused by international terrorism**

### **A. Information received from Member States**

#### **Albania**

5. Albania had already ratified 12 out of the 19 universal counter-terrorism instruments. Furthermore, it adhered to all 16 regional conventions and protocols of the Council of Europe against terrorism and organized crime. In particular, Albania had signed and ratified the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism with a view to boosting its efforts to prevent terrorism and its negative effects on the full enjoyment of human rights, particularly the right to life. It had also signed and ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. The implementation of that Convention had led to changes in the domestic law of Albania, including the Albanian Criminal Code. Furthermore, in March 2015 Albania had signed (pending ratification) the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, which was a particularly important instrument in the international legal framework against terrorism because it contained additional elements related to the treatment of foreign terrorist fighters.

6. Albania had also closely cooperated with other countries on the basis of many bilateral agreements, including those with Bosnia and Herzegovina (24 March 2009), Bulgaria (29 January 2007), Croatia (14 December 1993), Egypt (24 October

1995), France (15 May 2008), Germany (31 May 2013), Hungary (February 1999), Latvia (16 December 2009), Montenegro (31 October 2003), Romania (7 June 2002), Serbia (11 March 2010), Slovenia (24 November 1993), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (17 June 2004) and the United States of America (14 April 2016). It had also cooperated with Kosovo on the basis of a bilateral agreement (23 March 2015).

7. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent relevant resolutions, Albania had adopted a full legal framework criminalizing the financing of terrorism, as well as the collection, transfer and concealment of funds that finance terrorism. In that regard, Albania had adopted and was implementing Law No. 157/2013, entitled “On measures against the financing of terrorism” and aimed at preventing and combating the financing of terrorism through the detection, referral, blocking and seizure of funds and assets of persons suspected of financing terrorism. Albania had also been among the first countries to implement Security Council resolution 2178 (2014), by amending its Criminal Procedure Code through Law No. 98/2014, which provided for the criminalization of the recruitment and participation of Albanian citizens in military operations in a foreign country.

8. Albania had criminalized terrorism in article 230 of the Criminal Legal Code, which defined terrorism as “those acts of unlawful violence against the life or health of humans, their personal freedom, etc., performed by fault, in order to seriously disturb public social order, the resurrection of panic and massive fear”. Since 2003, Albanian procedural law had established the Severe Crimes Court and the Severe Crimes Appeal Court as distinct primary judiciary institutions in matters and acts of terrorism.

9. In March 2014, the Albanian State Police had acted against an alleged Syrian fighter recruitment ring, resulting in the arrest of nine people for inciting acts of terrorism. Two of the arrested persons had been imams at mosques on the outskirts of Tirana who had allegedly promoted violent extremism. In 2016, after a two-year trial, the Severe Crimes Court had found guilty and sentenced to a total of 126 years in prison nine individuals accused of the criminal offences of recruitment of persons for the purpose of committing terrorist acts, promotion of, public incitement of and propaganda for the commission of offences with terrorist purposes, and promotion of hatred or disputes between nationalities, races and religions, as provided by articles 231, 232/a and 265 of the Criminal Legal Code.

10. In 2015, by virtue of the cooperation agreements and joint efforts mentioned above, Albania had successfully conducted four joint police operations against internationally wanted persons with assistance from international partners such as the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Italian police forces (two operations) and the Norwegian police.

### **Armenia**

11. Armenia was a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. It was also a party to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing

of Terrorism, and the Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism.

12. Terrorism and terrorist financing were criminalized pursuant to articles 217 and 217.1 of the Armenian Criminal Code, in line with the requirements of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

13. Pursuant to article 217 of the Criminal Code, terrorism was defined as any action, or threat of action, intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict when the purpose of such action, by its nature or context, was to intimidate a population or to exert pressure on a government body, an international organization or an official to make a decision or to carry out an act, or to abstain therefrom; as well as any other action recognized as terrorism by international treaties to which Armenia was party except those specified under article 218 (“Taking hostages”) of the Armenian Criminal Code. The punishments provided ranged from 5 to 15 years in prison, with or without confiscation of property, depending on the circumstances and consequences of the offence.

14. According to article 217.1 of the Criminal Code, terrorist financing consisted of any natural person providing or collecting property by any means, directly or indirectly, with the knowledge that it was to be used or might be used, in full or in part, for committing terrorism or any acts referred to in article 218, or by a terrorist organization or an individual terrorist. The provision or collection of funds need not be committed in a wilful manner. The punishment provided ranged between 3 and 12 years, with or without confiscation of property, depending on the circumstances. In addition, under article 103.1 of the Code, certain property connected to the financing of terrorism would be subject to forfeiture for the benefit of the State. As for the liability of legal persons for the financing of terrorism, article 31 of the Armenian Law on Combating Money-Laundering and Terrorism Financing established administrative liability for involvement in terrorist financing. Sanctions included fines, liquidation and revocation, suspension or termination of a licence, and liability measures were imposed by the Board of the Central Bank of Armenia.

15. Armenia had also established effective mechanisms for implementing targeted financial sanctions regimes to comply with the Security Council resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing. Reporting entities were obliged to freeze all funds, financial assets or economic resources owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by terrorism-related persons included in the lists published by or in accordance with Council resolutions, as well as in the national lists established pursuant to Council resolution 1373 (2001), without delay and without prior notice to the persons involved. Upon the freezing of the property of terrorism-related persons, reporting entities were obliged to proceed without delay to recognize the transaction or business relationship as suspicious and file a report on it. Freezing would be imposed for an indefinite term and might be revoked only by the Financial Monitoring Centre of the Central Bank of Armenia if the property had been frozen by mistake, or when the person with frozen property had been removed from the lists of terrorism-related persons. Any designations made under the Security Council regime would apply automatically within the territory of Armenia: for that purpose, the Central Bank would check designations on the Council website on a daily basis and communicate them through news releases, circulars and direct updates to databases of financial institutions through an

algorithm installed within their information technology systems. Furthermore, the Central Bank was authorized to propose, either at its own initiative or at the request of competent foreign authorities, persons or entities for designation under resolution 1373 (2001). Certain instruments had recently been adopted by the Chair of the Bank of the Republic of Armenia and by its Board to facilitate the effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions, including listing rules (2015), delisting and unfreezing rules (2014) and freezing guidance (2015). The mechanisms of enforcement in the event of non-compliance or inadequate compliance by financial institutions with the legal requirements (including freezing requirements) adopted on the basis of those provisions included warnings, orders to eliminate the violation, and fines.

16. In recent years, the Financial Monitoring Centre of the Central Bank of Armenia had received a small number of suspicious transaction reports related to the Security Council resolution lists, which had resulted in false positives because there were no actual matches with persons or entities designated by the Council. In addition, the Centre systematically monitored threshold transaction reports in order to identify transfers of funds from countries and territories identified as posing a higher risk of a potential terrorist financing link. Furthermore, the Centre had supported the investigative effort by providing intelligence obtained from its foreign counterparts to law enforcement authorities after being authorized to do so by the foreign counterparts.

17. Currently, there were no designations under national lists, and no requests from foreign countries had been made to Armenia to designate a person or an entity. Furthermore, no cases with indications of terrorism or terrorism financing had ever been investigated or prosecuted in Armenia, and no convictions had been made. This, according to Armenia, was commensurate with the country's risk profile, given the lack of conflicts on religious, ethnic and other grounds, breaches of minority rights and promotion of extremism in Armenia; in addition, the effective preventive mechanisms that had been implemented had made the misuse of financial and non-financial systems for terrorist financing purposes practically impossible.

### **Brazil**

18. Brazil was party to 13 universal counter-terrorism instruments and 2 regional counter-terrorism instruments. It was also party to a large number of multilateral and bilateral treaties that facilitated requests for international cooperation on criminal matters. In addition, the Brazilian Federal Police and the Terrorist Screening Centre of the Government of the United States of America had signed a bilateral instrument for the exchange of information with a view to fighting terrorism.

19. From a procedural perspective, the jurisdiction and application of Brazilian law were recognized for crimes that "by treaty or convention, Brazil has committed itself to punish", as long as (a) the alleged perpetrator entered the national territory; (b) the act was also punishable in the country in which it had been perpetrated; (c) the crime was among those extraditable under Brazilian law; (d) the alleged perpetrator had not been acquitted or had not served the sentence abroad; and (e) the alleged perpetrator had not been pardoned abroad nor, for other reasons, had the criminal liability been extinguished, according to the most favourable applicable law (article 7, 11 a, e §2 of the Brazilian Penal Code).

20. Brazilian domestic law also included substantive criminal provisions regarding terrorism (legislation that criminalized the conduct proscribed by counter-terrorism instruments). The most significant progress recently achieved had been the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Law (Law 13 260 of 16 March 2016). In addition to conceptualizing “terrorism” and updating the concept of “terrorist organization”, Law 13 260/16 criminalized the following conduct: commission of acts of terrorism; promotion and creation of terrorist organizations and provision of assistance to terrorist organizations; preparatory acts, recruitment and training for terrorist purposes; and financing of terrorism. It also established the jurisdiction of the Federal Police over investigations of such crimes and of the Ministry of Justice to prosecute and punish criminals with respect to such crimes. Moreover, another recently enacted law (Law 13 170 of 26 October 2015) regulated the freezing of assets of individuals and entities listed under a Security Council sanctions regime.

21. No incidents of international terrorism had occurred in Brazil. Because no international terrorist acts had been perpetrated in Brazilian territory and the crime of terrorism had been defined in domestic law only in March 2016, there was no record of judicial proceedings initiated in Brazil regarding international terrorist acts. Hypothetically, such acts would have been prosecuted under other crimes as defined under its criminal law.

22. It was also difficult to establish accurate statistics on requests for international cooperation made to Brazil regarding judicial proceedings initiated abroad that could have been related to international terrorist acts. However, the absence of a law criminalizing terrorism in domestic legislation before March 2016 did not mean Brazil had not cooperated with other countries that had requested legal assistance or extradition in cases in which the crimes could have been defined as terrorism by the requesting State but had been otherwise classified in the request to Brazil in order to comply with the principle of double criminality. According to the Ministry of Justice, which acted as the central authority with respect to most international cooperation agreements on criminal matters, there had been eight requests for legal assistance (four active and four passive) in which terrorism or the financing of terrorism were mentioned, although those requests had been based on other crimes.

23. As regards criminal investigations, the Anti-Terrorism Division of the Brazilian Federal Police had initiated six such operations in 2015 and 2016. In the absence of specific legislation on terrorism, the investigations concerned accessory crimes such as money-laundering and the financing of terrorism, as well as the promotion of and propaganda related to religious discrimination. All such investigations were classified as secret in the interest of justice, which meant that no further information on the investigations was available.

### **Bulgaria**

24. Bulgaria was a party to 15 universal counter-terrorism instruments and had also signed but not ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. It had also ratified 13 regional counter-terrorism instruments adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe. Moreover, in November 2015 it had signed the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.

25. The Bulgarian Criminal Code had been amended in 2002 to establish special regulations for the punishment of terrorist acts and related crimes, including the

financing of terrorism, and in 2011 to implement requirements of European Union framework decisions 2002/475/JHA and 2008/919/JHA. The 2011 amendments punished the recruitment or training of individuals or groups for the purpose of committing a terrorist act, and increased the number of crimes that should be treated as terrorism. In addition, the Criminal Code proscribed setting up, leading or participating in organized terrorist groups, as well as using Bulgarian territory for the preparation of terrorist acts abroad. It also contained specific provisions for the punishment of open incitement to terrorism and threatening to commit terrorist acts. In September 2015, in order to implement Security Council resolution 2178 (2014), article 108a (“Terrorism”) had again been amended to criminalize receiving training and travelling for terrorism. Paragraph 2 (“Terrorist financing”) had also been further developed to meet the definition of “terrorist financing” recommended by the Financial Action Task Force.

26. The resulting Bulgarian legal framework provided that the crime of terrorism could be punished with 5 to 30 years of imprisonment, life imprisonment or life imprisonment without the possibility of commutation, depending on the circumstances and consequences. As for the crime of terrorist financing, the punishment could range from 3 to 15 years and a fine of up to 30,000 leva. The preparation of terrorist acts, terrorist recruitment and self-training were also punishable by imprisonment, as were entry or exit through the national borders to participate in a terrorism-related offence. Participation in terrorist groups was also proscribed by the Bulgarian Criminal Code, and provisions existed for cooperation with the police and judicial authorities to prevent terrorist acts or collect evidence. In particular, paragraph 5 of article 109 of the Code provided that a participant in an organized terrorist group would not be punished if he or she voluntarily surrendered to the authorities and reported on the group before a crime had been committed. Likewise, any participant in such a group who surrendered voluntarily and disclosed any information about the group that would substantially facilitate the detection of and collection of evidence of the committed offences, would be sentenced on the basis of mitigating circumstances. The Code also provided for the confiscation of certain property of the perpetrators of such crimes. As for the modes of participation in such crimes, financing terrorist offences, recruiting and training terrorists and leading, organizing and participating in terrorist groups were all punished under criminal law, as were the aiding and abetting of terrorism. Furthermore, inciting the perpetration of terrorism was punishable with up to six years of imprisonment, and threatening to commit terrorism was punishable with up to two years. Other punishable offences included employing false documents to facilitate acts of terrorism.

## **Cuba**

27. Cuba was a party to 18 universal counter-terrorism instruments and complied strictly with the obligations arising from relevant Security Council resolutions.

28. In the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Cuba systematically informed the Ministry of the Interior, the consulates and other competent authorities on the updates of the sanctions lists concerning terrorist organizations.

29. With regard to judicial and executive cooperation with other countries and with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Cuba had signed

11 extradition treaties, 26 agreements on mutual assistance in criminal matters and 21 prisoner transfer agreements. In December 2012, Cuba had joined the South American Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering, now the Latin American Financial Action Task Force (GAFILAT). In line with GAFILAT mechanisms, Cuba participated in the Inter-agency Asset Recovery Network. In June 2015, Cuba had formally joined the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, thereby becoming part of a worldwide financial intelligence network.

30. Cuba reiterated information previously provided on counter-terrorism measures taken at the national level (see [A/70/211](#), para. 18; [A/69/209](#), para. 12; [A/68/180](#), para. 13; [A/67/162](#), paras. 10 and 11; and [A/66/96](#), paras. 17-19). In particular, it recalled the 2001 Act adopted by Parliament against terrorism, the criminal provisions concerning money-laundering and terrorist financing as amended in 2013. At the institutional level, Cuba had established a general directorate for the investigation of financial operations, which functioned as a financial intelligence unit charged with receiving, transmitting and disseminating reports on suspicious financial transactions and maintaining liaison with the competent authorities. In 2015, 279 reports of suspicious financial transactions had been received, of which 111 had led to reports to the competent authority for the determination of potential crimes.

31. Cuba had been the victim of hundreds of terrorist acts, which had claimed the lives of 3,478 persons and incapacitated 2,099, and acknowledged as correct the decision of the United States of America to remove Cuba from the list of sponsors of international terrorism.

### **El Salvador**

32. El Salvador was a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force.

33. Since 2006, El Salvador had had in place a Special Law against Acts of Terrorism as a legal tool for ensuring the investigation and prosecution of such acts. National institutions had various resources at their disposal to address this problem, including the training school established by the Attorney General, which was responsible for instructing financial staff and advising other institutions, such as the National Civil Police, on how to address, prevent and investigate acts of terrorism.

34. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of El Salvador had issued a ruling on acts of domestic terrorism on 22 August 2015. The Court had held that the terrorist gangs known as Mara Salvatrucha (or MS-13) and Gang 18 (or Mara 18) and other gangs or criminal organizations were seeking to usurp the exercise of powers within the scope of State sovereignty, territorial control and the monopoly on the legitimate exercise of force by criminal justice institutions, terrorizing, placing at serious risk or systematically and indiscriminately affecting the fundamental rights of part or all of the population; consequently, their leaders, members, collaborators, apologists and financiers were included in the concept of terrorism in its various degrees and forms of participation, whether such armed groups or criminal organizations had political, criminal, economic (including extortion, money-laundering and drug trafficking) or other objectives. As a result of that decision, the Attorney General had undertaken a variety of measures to investigate acts of terrorism in various territorial constituencies nationwide, which had led to the capture and subsequent judicial detention of several of the persons



involved. While relevant legal proceedings had already begun, it was important to note that these matters had been only national in scope.

### **Finland**

35. On 18 May 2016, Finland had signed the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.

36. The newest Finnish legislation related to the provisions of the Penal Code regarding terrorist offences had entered into force on 1 January 2015. The scope of the criminalization of terrorist financing had been expanded, and receiving training for the commission of a terrorist offence had been criminalized with punishments of fines and imprisonment of up to three years.

37. In the implementation of Security Council resolution 2178 (2014), a government bill to amend the provisions contained in chapter 34a of the Criminal Code had been submitted to Parliament on 2 June 2016. The bill would criminalize travelling to another country to commit a terrorist offence, as well as financing such travel. The proposals included expanding the applicability of relevant coercive measures and secret intelligence-gathering for the purposes of preventing, detecting and investigating the proposed new criminal offences.

38. Furthermore, since 27 January 2015 Finnish police had been provided with access to passenger information in order to prevent and detect crime. In practice, this meant that the police had the same access to passenger data as that already provided to customs officials and the Border Guard.

39. Finland's action plan to prevent violent extremism had been adopted in 2012 and reviewed in April 2016. It included a national network to prevent violent radicalization and extremism.

40. According to the threat assessment made by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service in November 2015, the terrorist threat against Finland had increased in scope and complexity. Although the threat of structured attacks by terrorist organizations was still considered low, the risk posed by individual terrorist actions had risen since the previous assessment by the Service, made in June 2014. Finnish citizens might also become targets of anti-Western attacks abroad. It was estimated that at least 70 persons from Finland had travelled to the conflict zones in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic.

41. On 19 December 2014, the Helsinki district court had found one accused man guilty of financing terrorism, planning to commit terrorist acts and recruitment to commit terrorism, for which he had received a suspended prison sentence of one year and four months. Three other men had also been found guilty of funding terrorism, for which they had received a suspended prison sentence of five months. The accused had appealed the verdict, and the Court of Appeal had annulled it in March 2016. Furthermore, in October 2014 Finland's National Bureau of Investigation had begun a pretrial investigation into suspected terrorist offences against four men; it was still under way. In 2015 and 2016, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service had handed over several terrorism-related cases for pretrial investigation, which was the responsibility of the Bureau.

**Greece**

42. On 27 January 2016, Greece had signed the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, which concerned, inter alia, the issue of foreign terrorist fighters. It had also ratified an agreement with Bulgaria and Turkey on the establishment of a common contact centre on police and customs cooperation. In addition, Greece had been in compliance with the European Union framework decision on information exchange and was cooperating with INTERPOL, the European Police Office and equivalent authorities of other States on the movements of foreign fighters and other terrorism-related issues.

43. With regard to incidents, the Hellenic Coast Guard authorities had reported their conduct of necessary investigations whenever suspicious vessels or cargo had arrived from or sailed towards or through countries associated with the terrorist threat. The Hellenic Police authorities had reported three cases in which individuals had been arrested for reasons associated with terrorism, which had materialized as a response to requests for judicial assistance submitted by partner countries on the basis of European arrest warrants issued against the individuals. In two of the three cases, the individuals had been extradited to the requesting country.

**Italy**

44. The ratification process concerning the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was under way in Italy, as was the ratification process for four regional Council of Europe instruments relating to terrorism (the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005; the Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 2003; the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism of 2005; and the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2015).

45. Italy had also entered into a bilateral agreement with the United Arab Emirates in September 2015. Furthermore, in November 2014 and April 2015 the National Anti-Mafia and Counter-Terrorism Prosecutor's Office of Italy had signed bilateral protocols of understanding and mutual judicial assistance with the Albanian and Egyptian public prosecution offices, respectively. In May 2016, 12 public prosecution offices of various countries, including the National Anti-Mafia and Counter-Terrorism Prosecutor's Office of Italy, had agreed on a common declaration in Belgrade concerning cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.

46. The bill currently before the Italian Parliament concerning the ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism would also include amendments to the Criminal Code intended to complement the reforms of national legislation already undertaken by Italy in April 2015. In addition, proposed pieces of legislation at the European Union level would ensure compliance with international obligations and standards, as well as the taking of appropriate measures to address the new threats posed by international terrorism and facilitate investigation and prosecution.

**Jordan**

47. Jordan was a party to nine universal counter-terrorism instruments, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which it had ratified in 2015, and three regional counter-terrorism instruments, including the Arab Convention on Combating Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, which it had ratified in 2012. It was also a party to three relevant bilateral conventions, with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania and Hungary.

48. Jordan had also established a technical committee to ensure the implementation of Security Council resolutions on combating terrorism and the financing of terrorism, including those on foreign terrorist fighters. The committee was charged with circulating the name of any individual or entity included in the sanctions list as soon as the listing notification had been received, as well as with sending requests to the Sanctions Committees to list any natural or legal person determined by the competent authorities to have contributed in any way to financing or supporting any acts or activities of Al-Qaida or associated entities.

49. Jordan had recently amended its Penal Code to establish a definition of terrorism, as follows: the use or threat of violence, regardless of its motives or purposes, to carry out an individual or collective criminal enterprise aimed at disturbing public order or endangering public safety and security where such action is liable to spread alarm or terror among the public, or jeopardize their lives and security, or cause damage to the environment, public facilities or property, private property, international facilities or diplomatic missions, or where it is aimed at occupying or taking over such premises, endangering national resources or compelling a Government or an international organization to carry out or abstain from carrying out any act. Furthermore, the Counter-Terrorism Act of 2006 had been amended in 2014 to stem the flow of foreign fighters and prevent terrorists from travelling through Jordanian territory to fight in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, by explicitly proscribing joining or attempting to join any armed group or terrorist organization or recruiting for such groups. In addition, the Anti-Money-Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act of 2007 had established an Anti-Money-Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Unit to receive notices of suspected money-laundering or terrorist financing transactions and to seek out, analyse and investigate relevant information and, where necessary, provide such information to the competent agencies.

**Morocco**

50. Morocco had adopted a series of measures to eliminate international terrorism, including increased vigilance by relevant authorities and the operational exchange of information between the various security services, reinforced by the establishment of coordination entities at the national and local levels. Furthermore, Morocco had increased controls at border posts by setting up mechanisms and measures to detect suspicious individuals or objects, and had raised the awareness of border officials about the need for greater vigilance, including with regard to persons who might be linked to terrorist groups. Morocco had also strengthened the professional capacity of security services through training and other activities, and had reinforced international cooperation in the exchange of operational terrorism-related information with the various focal points of foreign countries assigned to Morocco (military liaison officers, security attachés, etc.).

**Panama**

51. Panama was a party to 18 universal counter-terrorism instruments. In 2011, it had created a Committee for the Coordination of the Fight against Terrorism with a view to implementing its obligations under those instruments. It had also implemented the relevant Security Council resolutions.

52. With regard to terrorist financing, Panama had adopted relevant legislation and regulations in March, April and August 2015, which had amended its Criminal Code and introduced specific rules on the implementation of the Security Council listing procedures. It had also created an online system for the real-time sharing of information on the Council's consolidated lists of persons and organizations linked to international terrorism.

53. In terms of international cooperation, the Panamanian National Customs Authority participated in the joint Global Container Control Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Customs Organization. The Joint Port Control Units established thereunder facilitated the exchange of information concerning the transit of weapons, drugs and chemical and radioactive materials. Panama had also increased its use of the INTERPOL database to carry out investigations into matters relating to international terrorism.

54. Panama's border control activities included aspects of terrorism prevention. In particular, it employed modern technologies such as facial recognition and advance passenger information systems, and border authorities had been empowered to cancel the right of residence of anyone found to be connected with terrorist organizations. Panama had also achieved compliance of the passports and individual and ship documents that it issued with modern standards, which facilitated the exchange of information.

**Serbia**

55. Serbia was a party to 15 universal counter-terrorism instruments and 6 regional counter-terrorism instruments. On 30 March 2016, it had ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In 2016, it had also become a party to the Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe. Furthermore, Serbia was a party to eight relevant bilateral agreements, with Austria (2004), Romania (2007), Italy (2008), Cyprus (2009), Israel (2009), Albania (2011), Turkey (2011) and, most recently, Germany (2016). In addition, several joint statements of cooperation between its relevant ministries and those of other countries had been adopted.

56. Since the adoption of chapter 34 of the Criminal Code of Serbia, concerning international terrorism, amendments had been introduced to harmonize provisions with international standards in that area. At the end of 2014, Serbia had adopted specific provisions on money-laundering and terrorist financing. During the same period, a law on the export and import of arms and military equipment had been adopted, as well as a law on the export and import of dual-use goods. The monitoring and control of trade in those areas was crucial in preventing persons involved in terrorism from acquiring means to carry out attacks. Furthermore, the Criminal Code had been amended in 2014 to criminalize the participation of Serbian nationals in armed conflicts abroad, as well as the organization of such participation. In 2015, a law on arms and ammunition had been adopted, which

would also help to prevent persons involved in terrorism from acquiring means. In March 2015, a law on freezing assets to prevent terrorism had been adopted, providing for a temporary administrative ban on the transfer, conversion, disposal and relocation of the property of persons designated on official lists of individuals connected to international terrorism. The law was implemented through regulatory provisions, and a list of designated persons had been adopted by the Government in July 2015 and subsequently updated on the basis of information arising from the Security Council regime. On 4 February 2016, a law on international freezing measures had been enacted by the National Assembly of Serbia to further comply with its international obligations.

57. Serbia had created a separate counter-terrorism division within the Crime Investigation Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2013 and an inter-agency Bureau for Security Services Coordination in 2015, both aimed at improving the horizontal and vertical intersectoral linkage between the branches of government concerned with, inter alia, terrorism prevention. Coordination mechanisms also existed in the Office of the Prosecutor. With regard to terrorist financing and money-laundering, Serbia had carried out the relevant risk assessments in response to the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and had adopted a relevant strategy in December 2014.

58. Two court proceedings were under way against seven Serbian nationals indicted for engaging in terrorism as foreign terrorist fighters; four of those individuals were being tried in absentia.

### **Singapore**

59. Singapore was a party to 14 universal counter-terrorism instruments and had adopted implementing legislation for each of them. In October 2014, it had acceded to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted on 8 July 2005, and had enacted the Radiation Protection Act as implementing legislation. In respect of regional counter-terrorism instruments, Singapore had acceded to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Convention on Counter-Terrorism of 2007 on 31 October 2007.

60. Singapore's Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act had been introduced in 2002 to counter terrorist financing. It gave effect to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. It also gave effect to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), in which the Council called upon States to work together to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism, including the financing of such acts. The Act had been amended in 2013 to make it an offence to provide or collect property for terrorist acts, provide property and services for terrorist purposes, use or possess property for terrorist purposes or deal with property of terrorists. The maximum financial penalties for terrorist financing offences had been raised from S\$100,000 to S\$500,000 for individuals and up to S\$1million for entities. Owing to the serious nature of terrorist financing offences, the Act had also been amended to criminalize the disclosure of information likely to prejudice an investigation of a terrorism financing offence under the Act.

### **Sweden**

61. Sweden had ratified 15 universal counter-terrorism instruments. It had also signed 18 Council of Europe instruments and had ratified 13 of them. Most recently,

it had signed the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.

62. On 30 October 2015, one individual had been prosecuted in Sweden for providing training intended to be used for particularly serious crimes in the Syrian Arab Republic, including terrorist offences; the trial at the Attunda district court had not yet taken place. On 14 December 2015, two individuals had been sentenced by the Gothenburg district court to life imprisonment for terrorist offences committed in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the court of appeal had affirmed the judgment on 30 March 2016; the judgment had subsequently been appealed to the Supreme Court. On 7 April 2016, one individual had been prosecuted for preparing to commit a terrorist offence and the trial had taken place at the Attunda district court, but the judgment had not yet been announced. In addition, on 26 May 2016 one individual had been prosecuted for travelling to the Syrian Arab Republic for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence, but the trial at the Attunda district court had not yet taken place.

### **Tunisia**

63. Tunisia was a party to 14 universal counter-terrorism instruments. It had sought to harmonize national legislation with those instruments and to adopt the provisions set out therein regarding criminalization, penalties and procedures for terrorist offences, as evidenced by Basic Law No. 26 (2015) on combating terrorism and money-laundering. Furthermore, Tunisia had bilateral counter-terrorism relations in place with numerous States and was a party to many multilateral security cooperation mechanisms aimed at fostering ongoing coordination with neighbouring States and the countries of North and Central Africa in order to counter the threat of terrorism, transnational organized crime and the illegal trafficking of drugs and weapons.

64. Basic Law No. 26 expanded the criminalization of terrorism to cover all the acts set out in international instruments and the relevant Security Council resolutions, including the most recent manifestations of international terrorism, such as the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and persons travelling to conflict areas. The Law also introduced special investigative methods with a view to increasing the efficiency of investigations, and reinforced existing powers related to the centralization of security and justice functions. The Law also explicitly incorporated the principle of *aut dedere aut judicare*, thereby strengthening special and judicial cooperation mechanisms. Furthermore, pursuant to article 66 of the Law, a National Counter-Terrorism Committee had been established within the Office of the Prime Minister. Its functions included following up on and evaluating the implementation of resolutions adopted by United Nations counter-terrorism structures with a view to ensuring that Tunisia complied with its international obligations, as well as putting forward recommendations and formulating relevant guidance. The Committee also cooperated with its counterparts in foreign countries in the context of the bilateral, regional and international conventions that Tunisia had ratified.

65. In order to develop national mechanisms to address international terrorism, the National Counter-Terrorism Committee had responsibility for implementing the relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly with regard to freezing financial assets (resolution 1373 (2001)) and addressing international terrorism, particularly

Al-Qaida and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015)). A national counter-terrorism strategy had been formulated in 2015 in cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Furthermore, Tunisia had joined the Security Governance Initiative, announced during the United States-Africa Leaders Summit held in August 2014. In March 2016, Tunisia had joined the Arab judicial cooperation network on combating terrorism and organized crime that had been adopted at the initiative of the League of Arab States.

66. Two national units, from the Police and the National Guard, had been assigned to investigate terrorism offences. A counter-terrorism judicial unit had been established as of the judicial year 2015-2016 and pursuant to Basic Law No. 26. The National Committee on Nuclear Safety had been established in 2003 in coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), internal regulations had been put in place to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, acquisition, possession, transport, transfer or use for the purposes of terrorism. The regulations also provided for the monitoring of suspicious activities at land, sea and air borders and of laboratories and factories from which dangerous chemical substances could be stolen. The Tunisian Financial Analysis Committee had been established pursuant to Order No. 1865 of 11 August 2004.

67. Various joint military and security units had been allocated from the National Guard and the Army, and patrols along all borders had been intensified. In particular, a military no-man's land had been demarcated along the southern Tunisian border. A sand barrier had been erected on the border with Libya to prevent terrorist infiltration and smuggling of various materials, including weapons. Furthermore, coordination among security and military units had been strengthened, particularly with regard to monitoring and securing land and sea borders. A crisis unit and cross-sectoral regional and central committees had been established and met regularly to exchange intelligence and assessments. The competent government agencies coordinated with the General Secretariat of INTERPOL to complete the introduction of the I-24/7 system and connect it with border posts and crossing points, thereby allowing access to INTERPOL databases. With a view to combating electronic terrorism, *takfirist* websites were monitored and judicial authorization was sought for preventing access to them.

68. The monitoring of border crossings had been strengthened, and the movements of suspicious individuals were reported. Action had been taken to tighten the monitoring of the funding sources of travel networks, close them down and uncover the connections of suspicious associations used by jihadists as a cover to fund the travel of young people to conflict zones. Measures were also in place to prevent such associations from receiving funds, particularly from foreign sponsors of terrorism. Furthermore, action was taken to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) concerning foreign terrorist fighters. Cooperation with international organizations had been intensified to prevent young people from travelling to conflict zones. Lists were maintained of Tunisians shown to have travelled to conflict zones. Those lists were forwarded to appropriate counterparts, who provided information on the individuals. Tunisia also coordinated with the INTERPOL regional office in Tunis to include their identities on the INTERPOL databases and green notices. In addition, lists were maintained of individuals who had returned from conflict zones for inclusion on a specific database. Those lists

made it possible to monitor the individuals' movements and communications on Tunisian territory. The aim was to follow them on the ground where technically possible, after coordinating with the Office of the Public Prosecutor, and to establish a database containing their vital statistics and DNA samples. On returning to Tunisia from conflict zones, especially the Syrian Arab Republic, all persons were placed under routine security service investigation. If the investigation raised a suspicion that an individual could have joined an armed group and fought alongside it, or that such a group could be connected to the individual's travel to the area, the case was brought before the judicial authorities for appropriate action.

## **B. Information received from international organizations**

### **Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations**

69. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations reiterated that it was not a depositary of any multilateral, regional or bilateral agreements relating to international terrorism and that it had not been informed of any incident relating thereto.

### **International Civil Aviation Organization**

70. As of May 2016, there were 186 parties to the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft; 185 parties to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; 188 parties to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation; 173 parties to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation; and 153 parties to the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. The Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation and the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft had been ratified by 14 States and acceded to by 15. The Protocol to amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, adopted in 2014, *inter alia*, extended jurisdiction for offences committed on board civil aircraft to the State of landing and the State of the operator of the aircraft. It had been signed by 29 States and had been ratified or acceded to by 3.

71. Ten acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation had been recorded in 2015, including four attacks on facilities, three acts of attempted sabotage and three unlawful seizures of aircraft. Attacks on facilities had highlighted the landside areas of airports as available aviation targets, given that they were generally accessible to the public with minimal restrictions and were therefore vulnerable to the conveyance of weapons and selection of targets by perpetrators. Such vulnerability had been further evidenced by the attacks at the Brussels Airport on 22 March 2016. In this regard, the swift response by authorities had proved to be an important mitigating measure to limit, and sometimes prevent, civilian casualties and to ensure little or no damage to infrastructure. The organization was committed to strengthening its aviation security regulatory framework in this regard. Other recent events such as the crash of Metrojet flight 9268 in Egypt (31 October 2015) and the explosion on board Daallo Airlines flight



159 in Somalia (2 February 2016) had also demonstrated the reality of the threats posed by improvised explosive devices and by aviation staff. The aviation security global Risk Context Statement updated by the Organization in early 2016 was aimed at providing States with useful information on the threat and risk environment.

72. Member States were considering a new amendment to Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: Security — Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference, which would incorporate new and updated standard and recommended procedures for mitigating the risks associated with man-portable air defence systems, the landside areas of airports and cyberattacks. In addition, new guidelines and best practices were being developed on security testing, in-flight supplies and the mitigation of threats posed by insiders.

73. Furthermore, the continuous monitoring approach of the Universal Security Audit Programme had identified deficiencies in States' aviation security oversight systems, and the Implementation Support and Development security programme provided assistance to States in aviation security and capacity-building activities.

74. In the context of its active participation in the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the organization had carried forward the Canadian project "Travel Document Security and Identification Management in the Sahel and Neighbouring States", aimed at enhancing travel document and border security with particular emphasis on combating terrorism.

#### **International Maritime Organization**

75. As at 27 May 2016, the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation had 166 contracting parties, while the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf had 155. The Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation had 40 contracting States, and the Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf had 35.

76. In 2002, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) had also adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, which focused on the protection of port facilities and ships through preventive measures to deter and detect unlawful acts, addressing primarily physical security, control of access and security procedures. The Code included mandatory requirements set out in amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, the 162 signatories to which represented approximately 99 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant fleet. In addition, IMO had developed and implemented a comprehensive global technical cooperation programme in support of its maritime security regulations and guidance.

77. IMO had also collaborated with a number of United Nations and international and regional partners in the delivery of technical cooperation projects for maritime and border security, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. It had also participated in numerous in-country needs assessment missions with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate related to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). In these

contexts, the organization had served as the maritime component of a multi-agency United Nations law enforcement team, composed also of representatives from other agencies. In 2014, IMO had also established a new partnership with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean to promote a whole-of-government approach to maritime security and maritime law enforcement issues.

### **United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization**

78. In the area of education, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was focused on helping Member States to develop comprehensive education-related responses to violent extremism, with a view to strengthening national efforts to prevent violent extremism. Priority areas included the advocacy of an international consensus on the need for increased and appropriate engagement of the education sector in preventing violent extremism and providing technical guidance to Member States on that issue. In line with the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (see [A/70/674](#)), the Executive Board had adopted a decision (197 EX/46) to strengthen the role of UNESCO in implementing global citizenship education, as well as in promoting education as a key tool for preventing violent extremism. In that regard, in November 2015 a high-level side event had been organized at the margins of the organization's General Conference on preventing and countering violent extremism. Furthermore, the organization was working to develop technical guidance to help policymakers within ministries of education to prioritize, plan and implement effective and appropriate education-related actions that could contribute to national efforts to prevent violent extremism. UNESCO had also produced a practical reference guide for teachers and educators of upper primary and lower/upper secondary students on preventing violent extremism and radicalization. Together with the Asia-Pacific Centre of Education for International Understanding and other partners, the organization was developing a capacity-building programme on education on the prevention of violent extremism, and it was expanding its Clearing House on Global Citizenship Education to provide stakeholders with access to relevant education resources. In February 2016, 34 Member States had established the group UNESCO Friends of Preventing Violent Extremism.

79. In terms of the culture sector, the organization's efforts to eliminate international terrorism had been developed through the fight against the illicit trafficking of cultural property, which was used as a source of terrorist financing. In that regard, UNESCO had played an important role in including the prevention of trade in illegally removed Iraqi and Syrian cultural property in the scope of Security Council resolution 2199 (2015). The activities undertaken in support of those efforts had been formalized in a strategy to strengthen the organization's actions to protect culture and promote cultural pluralism in the event of an armed conflict, which had been adopted in November 2015 by the General Conference. Under the strategy, UNESCO had been engaged in a series of capacity-building activities in partnership with various entities for the benefit of cultural heritage professionals, law enforcement authorities and custom officers from the most affected States and their neighbouring countries. In 2015, following the adoption of Security Council resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015) and General Assembly resolution 69/281, the organization had been requested to submit a report to the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1526 (2004)

and 2253 (2015), which had included, among other recommendations, a series of measures adopted by Member States to mitigate the financing of terrorism through the trafficking of cultural objects. Furthermore, the Meeting of States Parties to the UNESCO 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property had adopted resolution 3.MSP/9 (2015), which had highlighted the obligation of Member States to adopt appropriate measures for the implementation of resolution 2199 (2015) and encouraged them to apply the same measures in Libya and Yemen. In respect of antiquities, the organization had designed and provided a reporting tool to its Member States in May 2016 with a view to collecting information on Syrian, Libyan, Yemeni and Iraqi artefacts seized in the territories of other States and facilitating their eventual safe return to their countries of origin, in the spirit of paragraph 17 of resolution 2199 (2015).

80. UNESCO had also organized initiatives to increase awareness about the trafficking of cultural property, both in the private sector and at the United Nations, where a series of expert meetings had been organized together with the Permanent Missions of Italy and Jordan to the United Nations, as well as INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. In Paris, the organization had held a series of expert meetings at which the participants had considered emergency action plans for the safeguarding of Yemen (UNESCO headquarters, Paris, July 2015), Libya (Tunis, May 2016) and the Syrian Arab Republic (Berlin, June 2016). Furthermore, UNESCO had sent a rapid assessment mission to the World Heritage Site of Palmyra and its museum (Syrian Arab Republic, 24-26 April) to identify emergency measures for the safeguarding of movable and immovable heritage, including collections stored at the museum. In partnership with the European Union and with the support of the government of Flanders, Belgium, the organization had held a high-level meeting and technical conference in Brussels in June 2016 to underline the links between culture and international security and promote their integration into relevant policies.

81. UNESCO had continued to fight against impunity by cooperating with the International Criminal Court, pursuant to article 8 (2) (e) (iv) of the Rome Statute of the Court, in the context of its investigation opened on 16 January 2013 regarding the destruction of cultural heritage that had occurred in northern Mali. The organization had facilitated the investigation by providing technical information about cultural heritage that had been targeted in Timbuktu. The charges held against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi for directing attacks against a number of shrines, monuments and mosques in Timbuktu had been confirmed, and the trial phase would commence on 22 August 2016. Furthermore, the 14 mausoleums that had been destroyed by armed groups in Timbuktu had been rebuilt by the organization with the support of numerous financial and technical partners.

82. In the field of communication, UNESCO had considered that preventing processes that could lead to radicalization and extremism must involve efforts to promote the Internet as a force for human rights and fundamental freedoms in order to increase opportunities for dialogue on the basis of mutual understanding and respect. To that end, the organization was leading efforts with a special focus on supporting young women and men, through new forms of media and information literacy as well as opportunities for civic engagement, to strengthen critical thinking skills and enhance social inclusion. An international conference entitled “Youth and the Internet: fighting radicalization and extremism” had been held at the

organization's Paris headquarters in June 2015. This had provided a stage for the launch of the UNESCO cross-sectoral, integrated framework of action entitled "Empowering Youth to Build Peace — Youth 2.0: Building Skills, Bolstering Peace". In addition, another international conference of high-level experts, entitled "Internet and the radicalization of youth: preventing, acting and living together", would be held in Quebec City, Canada, on 31 October and 1 November 2016.

#### **International Atomic Energy Agency**

83. As at 30 May 2016, there were 153 parties to the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which had entered into force in 1987. Furthermore, there were 103 parties to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which had entered into force on 8 May 2016.

84. The regular session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency held in September 2015 had adopted a resolution on nuclear security that, *inter alia*, encouraged States to ratify, accept or approve both the 1979 Convention and the 2005 Amendment thereto, as well as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The Agency had also organized workshops and initiatives promoting adherence to and the implementation of the Amendment to the Convention, including a technical meeting of points of contact and central authorities of States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

#### **Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons**

85. Significant progress in universal adherence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction had been achieved in 2015, with Angola and Myanmar becoming States parties, which had brought the number of States parties to 192, covering 98 per cent of the world's population. Four States remained outside the Convention regime.

86. Since the entry into force of the Convention, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had verified the destruction of 91.41 per cent of the declared global amount of stockpiles of category 1 chemical weapons. In 2015, OPCW had carried out 356 inspections, and many chemical weapon production facilities had been either destroyed or converted to purposes not prohibited by the Convention. Furthermore, the organization had cooperated with the United Nations through the Joint Investigative Mechanism established by Security Council resolution 2235 (2015) in relation to the alleged use of toxic chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

87. The organization had also continued to provide assistance to States parties in their national implementation of the Convention. By the end of 2015, 145 States parties had relevant implementing legislation, of which 116 had legislation that covered all the initial measures required for the implementation of the Convention. Capacity-building and other support activities were also described in detail.

88. In addition, the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism of the OPCW Executive Council had held three meetings in 2015 and established a sub-working group to discuss in greater detail the legal accountability of non-State actors under

the Convention, measures to prevent the hostile use of toxic chemicals and an effective response to the use thereof.

89. OPCW had been a member of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force since its creation in 2005, and had continued to serve as Co-Chair of the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorist Attacks. The organization had also cooperated with other United Nations entities, including the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), as well as other entities such as the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction under the German and Japanese presidencies of the Group of Seven, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

### **Council of Europe**

90. The Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism had been adopted in May 2015 and, as of March 2016, had been signed by 22 Member States and the European Union. The Protocol would enter into force when ratified by six parties thereto. The European Union had also signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, in October 2015. Furthermore, terms of reference had been adopted by the Committee of Ministers to initiate the drafting of a new Council of Europe convention on offences relating to cultural property, which would address the illicit trafficking in cultural property as a major source of funding for criminal groups, including terrorist organizations.

91. The Committee of Experts on Terrorism of the Council of Europe was working to draft a recommendation on terrorists acting alone, which would provide guidelines to Member States on how to prevent and suppress that form of terrorism. Within the framework of the implementation of the Council of Europe strategy on Internet governance for the period 2016-2019, the Council's secretariat would also focus on developing a strategy to counter violent extremism and radicalization on the Internet that covered all levels of government, carried out in synergy with the Council of Europe action plan for 2015-2017 and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, including the Additional Protocol thereto.

92. The Council of Europe was also engaged in activities concerning education on democratic culture and the building of inclusive societies. It had organized, in partnership with other entities, the 2015 World Forum for Democracy, which concerned the balance between security and the right to privacy and freedom of expression, as well as the building of trust in societies. Furthermore, the Council of Europe had carried out activities relating to policy and practice for teaching about religions and non-religious world views, as well as initiatives on hate speech, freedom of expression, radicalization at the grass-roots level and the restriction of Internet content.

### **Shanghai Cooperation Organization**

93. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) had developed a package of international legal instruments with a view to providing the legal framework necessary for the full cooperation of the competent authorities of the States members of SCO, and a range of measures had

been carried out to harmonize national legal systems in that regard. In particular, the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism of 2001 and the subsequent and complementary SCO Convention against Terrorism of 2009, which had been drafted in the light of practical experience in anti-terrorism cooperation, provided harmonized legal definitions of such key concepts as “terrorism”, “terrorist act” and “terrorist organization”. In particular, article 9 of the 2009 Convention obliged SCO member States to categorize as criminal offences the following intentional acts: (a) terrorist acts; (b) any acts recognized as offences in one of the international counter-terrorism treaties to which all SCO member States were party; (c) the creation and use of a legal entity to plan, organize, prepare and commit one of the offences set out in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4-10 of the Convention, or the formation of a criminal group, an illegal armed group, a gang or a criminal conspiracy for the same purposes; (d) public incitement to terrorism or public justification of terrorism, that is, the dissemination of a message to the public with the intention of inciting people to commit any of the offences referred to in paragraphs 1-3 and 5-10 of the Convention, or public statements in which terrorism was deemed to merit support and emulation; (e) the recruitment of persons or their involvement in other ways in the preparation or perpetration of any of the offences referred to in paragraphs 1-4 and 6-10 of the Convention; (f) the training of persons for the perpetration or assistance in the perpetration of any of the offences referred to in paragraphs 1-5 and 7-10 of the Convention; (g) membership in a terrorist organization; (h) the financing of terrorism through the collection or provision of funds or financial services knowingly intended to finance activities to organize, prepare and commit any of the offences set out in paragraphs 1-7, 9 and 10 of the Convention, or to support the activities of a terrorist organization; (i) providing individuals with weapons, explosives and other means of committing the offences referred to in paragraphs 1-8 and 10 of the Convention; and (j) providing individuals suspected or accused of having committed any of the offences referred to in paragraphs 1-9 of the Convention with shelter and financial assistance, helping them to escape and giving false testimony relating to them.

94. Furthermore, a number of instruments had been concluded under the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, including those referred to in section III.B below under the heading “Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, along with a number of other legal and regulatory instruments. In addition, a memorandum of understanding had been signed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, and a protocol on cooperation in combating terrorism and extremism had been agreed upon with the National Counter-Terrorism Coordination Council of Mongolia.

95. Measures carried out by the competent national authorities under a three-year cooperation programme adopted for the period 2013-2015 by the Council of Heads of State of SCO had led to the halting of more than 500 planned acts of terrorism and religious extremism, the elimination of more than 440 terrorist training camps, the suppression of criminal activities by more than 1,050 members of international terrorist organizations, and the seizure of 489 improvised explosive devices, more than 5,000 firearms, 46 tons of explosives and more than 500,000 items of ammunition. In particular, in the Russian Federation in 2015, eight Uzbek citizens had been arrested and extradited to Uzbekistan for criminal prosecution on the basis of information provided by the National Security Service of Uzbekistan, and another four individuals belonging to international terrorist organizations had been indicted for terrorism. Furthermore, thanks to joint efforts with the law enforcement

authorities of Tajikistan, 50 members of various terrorist organizations had been tracked down and detained. Cooperation with Kyrgyz partners had led to the suppression of the activities of 20 citizens of Kyrgyzstan belonging to international terrorist organizations. Through cooperation with the authorities of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, it had been possible to put a stop to recruitment activities carried out by members of international terrorist organizations on long-distance trains, travelling to the Russian Federation from the above-mentioned countries and transiting through Kazakhstan. The competent authorities of China had put in place a system to keep their partners promptly informed about the plans and intentions of the leaders of international terrorist organizations such as the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union stationed in northern Afghanistan regarding incursions into the Central Asian region, thereby contributing to the timely prevention and suppression of crimes of a terrorist and extremist nature. Weapons and extremist literature had been seized from activists belonging to the aforementioned organizations who had been detained by the Uzbek National Security Service and subsequently convicted. Border control cooperation activities and counter-terrorism exercises had also been carried out jointly.

96. In addition, joint measures had been developed and implemented to identify the channels used by individuals to travel to regions of heightened terrorist activity in order to join international terrorist organizations in fighting in internal armed conflicts, and to detect and bring to justice individuals returning to the territory of SCO member States after participating in such armed conflicts on the side of international terrorist, separatist and extremist organizations. Operations by the competent authorities of SCO member States had made it possible to detain a large number of persons who were planning to travel to the Syrian Arab Republic to take part in international terrorist organizations, and also to prevent terrorist acts being planned by nationals of SCO member States on their return from the armed conflict in that country. A list had been compiled of persons travelling to areas with heightened terrorist activity and planning to join international terrorist organizations fighting in armed conflicts, and of those returning from the conflicts to SCO member States, with the aim of exchanging operational information and thereby preventing the problems and threats posed by such persons. On the basis of information gathered by the competent authorities of SCO member States, details about 1,314 persons had been included in the list by the Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure.

97. The Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure systematically updated a consolidated register of persons identified by the security services and law enforcement agencies of SCO member States as having committed or suspected of having committed crimes of a terrorist, separatist or extremist nature (the register contained a total of 1,587 names), together with a list of terrorist, separatist and extremist organizations (the list included a total of 78 terrorist organizations).

98. Cooperation activities between SCO member States also included measures to address criminal activities carried out by international terrorist organizations on the Internet, such as the identification of a large number of online resources used to promote terrorism and incite terrorist acts. Following established procedure, the competent authorities of SCO member States had blocked such Internet resources and the perpetrators had been brought to justice.

### **III. International legal instruments relating to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism**

99. Currently, there are 48 instruments pertaining to international terrorism. Of those, 19 are universal and 29 are regional.

#### **A. Universal instruments**

##### *United Nations*

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973  
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979  
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997  
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999  
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005

##### *International Atomic Energy Agency*

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1979  
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 2005

##### *International Civil Aviation Organization*

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963  
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970  
Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 2010  
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971  
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1988  
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 1991  
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, 2010  
Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 2014

##### *International Maritime Organization*

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988



Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988

Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf

## **B. Regional instruments**

### *African Union*

Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999

Protocol of 2004 to the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism

### *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Convention on Counter-Terrorism, 2007

### *Commonwealth of Independent States*

Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, 1999

Protocol of 2002 approving the procedure for organizing and conducting joint counter-terrorism activities in the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 2002

Treaty of States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Combating the Legalization (Laundering) of Proceeds from Crime and the Financing of Terrorism, 2007

### *Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf*

Convention of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf on Combating Terrorism, 2004

### *Council of Europe*

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1977

Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 2003

Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 2005

Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, 2005

Additional Protocol of 2015 to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism

*Eurasian Group on Combating Money-Laundering and Financing of Terrorism*

Agreement on the Eurasian Group on Combating Money-Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, 2011

*League of Arab States*

Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1998

Amendment of 2008 to the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism

Arab Convention on Combating Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, 2010

*Organization of American States*

Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, 1971

Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, 2002

*Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation*

Additional Protocol on Combating Terrorism to the Agreement among the Governments of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Participating States on Cooperation in Combating Crime, in particular in its Organized Forms, 2004

*Organization of Islamic Cooperation*

Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 1999

*Shanghai Cooperation Organization*

Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, 2001

Agreement on the procedure for organizing and conducting joint anti-terrorist measures in the territory of the States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2006

Agreement on cooperation in identifying and blocking the entry routes to Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States of persons involved in terrorist, separatist and extremist activities, 2006

Agreement on the procedure for organizing and conducting joint counter-terrorism exercises by Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States, 2008

Agreement on cooperation among the Governments of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States in combating the illicit traffic in weapons, ammunition and explosives, 2008

Agreement on training for counter-terrorism units of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States, along with a number of other legal and regulatory instruments, 2009

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention against Terrorism, 2009

*South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation*

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Regional Convention on  
Suppression of Terrorism, 1987

Additional Protocol of 2004 to the Regional Convention on Suppression of  
Terrorism

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