



Security Council

Distr.: General
17 July 2012

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that country

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2030 (2011), by which the Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and requested me to report every six months on the situation in Guinea-Bissau and progress made in the implementation of the resolution and the mandate of UNIOGBIS. The report covers major developments since my report of 21 October 2011 (S/2011/655). It does not include the events from 12 to 30 April 2012, which are contained in my Special Report on the situation in Guinea-Bissau of 30 April 2012 (S/2012/280).

II. Major developments in Guinea-Bissau

A. Political and security/military developments

1. Political developments

2. The period under review was marked by mounting political tensions between the ruling party and the opposition, increased distrust between the political and military leadership in the country, preparations for early presidential elections following the death of President Malam Bacai Sanha on 9 January 2012, and the 12 April 2012 coup d'état and its aftermath.

3. The death of President Sanha exacerbated the already heightened political tensions and led to demands from the opposition for a transitional arrangement outside the constitutional provisions. On 9 January, the Democratic Opposition Group, which is an alliance of several key opposition parties in the country, expressed lack of confidence in the Interim President, Raimundo Pereira, who assumed the role following President Sanha's death. In a meeting with UNIOGBIS on 13 January, Sory Djaló, interim leader of the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), informed the mission that the opposition was seeking urgent consultations with the Government on the transitional arrangements, and in particular, as to when the presidential election would take place.



4. On 15 January, Interim President Pereira held consultations with a wide range of political parties, as well as military and civil society organizations, aimed at reaching consensus on the timing of presidential elections, bearing in mind the constitutional provision for the holding of elections within 60 days following the death of the President. The discussions lacked the collaborative spirit that had prevailed in similar discussions on the early holding of elections following the assassination of President João Bernardo Vieira in March 2009. With the exception of the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and the parliamentary New Democracy Party, the remaining political parties insisted on holding the elections within 60 days in compliance with the Constitution, despite concerns raised by the National Electoral Commission that more preparatory time was needed, including for the conduct of a comprehensive voter registration process aimed at updating the voter register. The National Electoral Commission estimated that 55,000 eligible voters would be excluded from the electoral process if the 2008 voter register were not updated. An agreement was eventually reached to conduct the presidential election on 18 March.

5. At the request of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior, the United Nations, through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), assisted the national authorities in mobilizing funds and provided technical assistance to the National Electoral Commission for the conduct of the election. The election budget, which was estimated at \$4.9 million, included allocations for a first round and a run-off election. A separate budget for election security amounted to \$600,000. Brazil, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Commission, Japan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, Turkey and the United Kingdom provided financial contributions through the UNDP basket fund to support the National Electoral Commission in the conduct of the election, while China and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) provided direct support to the Government. UNIOGBIS facilitated coordination meetings between international electoral observation missions to Guinea-Bissau before and after the 18 March presidential election.

6. On 4 February, the Central Committee of the PAIGC endorsed the party's leader, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior, as its candidate for the presidential election. The other two PAIGC candidates contesting for the position of the party's standard-bearer, the First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Serifo Nhamadjo and the Minister of Defence, Baciro Djá, subsequently decided to contest the presidential election as independent candidates. The decision of the PAIGC leader to hold an endorsement vote through an open ballot, as opposed to a secret ballot, gave rise to a bitter controversy within the party and contributed to increasing internal divisions. On 9 February, Mr. Gomes Júnior suspended his functions as Prime Minister in order to campaign for the election. He designated Maria Adiatu Djaló Nandinga, Minister of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Communication, to act as Prime Minister during this period. On 13 February, the Democratic Opposition Group announced that it had filed a motion in the Supreme Court to invalidate Mr. Gomes Júnior's candidacy on the ground that he was not constitutionally permitted to contest the presidential elections.

7. On 20 February, a group of approximately 200 young people, led by the presidential candidate for the African National Congress, Braima Djaló, protested in front of the offices of the National Electoral Commission over their inability to vote because they had not been registered. The protesters were dispersed with tear gas by

members of the Rapid Intervention Police. However, immediately following the incident, members of the Rapid Intervention Police were assaulted and disarmed by members of the armed forces. On 21 February, my Special Representative met with the Armed Forces Chief of General Staff, General António Indjai, to discuss the incident. He reminded him of the respective legal competencies of the police and the armed forces and underscored the need for collaboration between both entities in securing the electoral process. UNIOGBIS subsequently provided technical support for a Joint Command on Security and Public Order, comprised of police and military officers, which was established to secure the electoral process.

8. On 22 February, in a meeting with my Special Representative, presidential candidate Koumba Yalá requested the assistance of the United Nations in facilitating dialogue among the political parties with a view to postponing the election. He argued that it was necessary to ensure the participation of all eligible voters in the electoral process so as to guarantee a free and transparent election. He warned that rushing to hold the election might lead to the creation of an unstable political and security environment. My Special Representative reminded him that the decision to hold the election on 18 March was made by all key national actors, including the party supporting him in the presidential election, the PRS, following intensive consultations that took into account the possible disenfranchisement of unregistered young voters. Following the meeting, my Special Representative informed Interim President Pereira of Mr. Yalá's request and encouraged him to engage in dialogue with political stakeholders on the issue.

9. On 29 February, the Supreme Court announced that it had approved 10 of the 14 presidential candidates who had applied to contest the elections, including Koumba Yalá (Independent), Carlos Gomes Júnior (PAIGC), Serifo Nhamadjo (Independent), Henrique Pereira Rosa (Independent) and Minister of Defence Baciro Djá (Independent). Braima Djaló, of the African National Congress, dropped out of the race on 5 March, claiming lack of conducive conditions for a free and fair election.

10. Despite mounting tensions, the election campaign, which ran from 2 to 16 March, was peaceful and incident-free. The first round of the presidential election held on 18 March was also conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner. However, the killing of a former military intelligence chief, Samba Djaló, outside his home in Bissau by uniformed individuals, after the polls had closed, marred the election day. Suggestions that the killing was linked to the electoral process were dismissed by the President of the National Electoral Commission and the Armed Forces Spokesperson. Following the incident, the former Chief of General Staff, Vice-Admiral Zamora Induta, sought refuge at the European Union premises on 21 March, claiming that he feared for his life.

11. The international electoral observation missions, including the African Union, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), ECOWAS, Nigeria and the United Kingdom, were unanimous in their assessment that the election held on 18 March was credible, democratic and transparent. However, on 20 March five candidates, Koumba Yalá, Serifo Nhamadjo, Henrique Rosa, Afonso Té and Serifo Baldé, claimed that the polls had been fraudulently conducted and called for their annulment. They also demanded that fresh elections be held following a voter registration process. My Special Representative immediately met with key national

and international stakeholders with a view to defusing tensions and encouraging an early resolution of the electoral impasse.

12. On 28 March, the President of the National Electoral Commission announced the final results of the election, which showed Carlos Gomes Júnior as having obtained the highest number of votes (48.97 per cent) and Koumba Yalá with the second highest number of votes (23.36 per cent). The National Electoral Commission announced that a run-off election between the two candidates would be conducted on 22 April. On 29 March, the five candidates who had claimed that the 18 March polls were rigged filed an appeal with the Supreme Court aimed at invalidating the first-round election results, on the basis of “generalized fraud”. On the same day, following a meeting convened by the Interim President with national stakeholders, an inter-faith mediation committee, led by the Bishop and Imams of Bissau, was created to assist in resolving the electoral impasse and enabling the completion of the electoral process.

13. Regional, continental and international stakeholders also intervened to assist in resolving the post-election crisis. On 31 March, a tripartite African Union/ECOWAS/United Nations mission, led by the President of the ECOWAS Commission and including my Special Representative, held meetings with national stakeholders in Bissau. The mission stressed that there would be no compromise on the basic principles of the rule of law and reinforced their joint view that obtaining power through unconstitutional means would not be tolerated. Following the appointment by ECOWAS of President Alpha Condé of Guinea as its Mediator for the electoral impasse in Guinea-Bissau, on 4 April my Special Representative travelled to Conakry to brief President Condé on the stabilization efforts being undertaken by the United Nations and other international partners in the country. On 6 April, ECOWAS issued a statement stressing its zero-tolerance policy with respect to unconstitutional seizures of power and called on all political actors to facilitate the completion of the electoral process.

14. On 11 April, following the Supreme Court rejection of the appeal by the five contesting candidates, the National Electoral Commission announced that the second round of the election would take place on 29 April and that the electoral campaign would run from 13 to 27 April. In the early evening of 12 April, Mr. Yalá, speaking on behalf of the five presidential candidates contesting the results, warned that there would be no second round and that any person caught campaigning would “face the consequences”. Later that evening, the military carried out a coup d’état, during which they arrested and detained Interim President Pereira and Prime Minister Gomes Júnior.

15. As indicated in my Special Report of 30 April 2012, immediately following the coup, ECOWAS took the lead in mediating between the military junta, political parties and civil society in Guinea-Bissau, with a view to ensuring the full restoration of constitutional order in the country.

16. On 3 May, ECOWAS held an extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government in Dakar, during which it reiterated its demand for the return to constitutional rule in the country and the release of all those illegally detained. It also recalled its earlier recommendation for the establishment of a 12-month transition that would allow for the review of legal texts, commencement of reforms, including security sector reform, and the conduct of fresh presidential elections. It further recommended that the National Assembly should elect a new leadership,

following which the newly elected Speaker would assume the role of Interim President, while the Deputy Speaker would take up the role of Speaker of Parliament. In addition, it recommended that the tenure of parliamentarians should be extended to cover the transitional period. In response, on 5 May, the PAIGC issued a statement, which commended ECOWAS efforts but stated that some of its recommendations were incompatible with the Constitution.

17. On 3 May, the European Union Council imposed a travel ban and an assets freeze on six members of the military junta, including General António Indjai and the Armed Forces Spokesperson, Lieutenant-Colonel Daba Na Walna. On 10 May, the European Union added 15 more names to the list of individuals banned from entering European Union territory and subject to an assets freeze. On 5 May, the CPLP issued a resolution following an extraordinary ministerial meeting in Lisbon, in which it reiterated its demand for the restoration of constitutional order, including the reinstatement of the Interim President and the Prime Minister and the conclusion of the 18 March electoral process.

18. On 10 May, an ECOWAS delegation led by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Nurudeen Mohammed, and comprised of the Minister of Defence of Côte d'Ivoire, a Special Adviser to President Ouattara, as well as the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria, arrived in Bissau to continue the ECOWAS mediation effort. They met with the PAIGC, the military junta, the Democratic Opposition Group, the five dissenting presidential candidates, civil society representatives and the inter-faith mediation committee. At a press conference on 11 May, Mr. Mohammed ruled out the return of Interim President Raimundo Pereira and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior to their positions. Later that day, following a plenary meeting with all national stakeholders, he announced that it was the will of the majority of parties that the Interim Speaker of the National Assembly, Serifo Nhamadjo, should lead the transition. He requested Mr. Nhamadjo to conduct immediate consultations with relevant national actors, including with the military junta, to agree on the appointment of a consensual Prime Minister who would have the responsibility of forming a Government of National Unity. He also called for the National Assembly to conduct elections for a new leadership. The civil society delegation, representatives of former combatants and the PAIGC delegation rejected the arrangement, with the head of the PAIGC delegation, Augusto Olivais, stating that it was "unconstitutional" and rewarded the coup leaders.

19. On 16 May, 17 political parties signed a Political Transition Pact. Among the signatories were the PRS, which is the main opposition party in Parliament, with 28 of the 100 seats, and the Republican Party for Independence and Development, which holds 3 seats. However, the PAIGC, which is the largest parliamentary party, with 67 seats, did not sign the agreement. The Pact, which was presented as the legal framework to lead the country to constitutional rule, provided for a one-year transition period. It also provided for the designation of a Transitional President of the Republic with full powers, except for the dismissal of the Prime Minister, and extended by one year the mandate of the National Assembly that was due to end in November 2012. On 18 May, the Interim Speaker of the National Assembly, the military junta and the signatories to the Pact signed another agreement, in which they agreed to remove obstacles towards reform of the security sector and to collaborate with the authorities in clarifying the "killings since the last amnesty law" in 2008. They also agreed that the military would "return to the barracks" and that they would seek National Assembly approval for an amnesty for the

perpetrators of the 12 April coup. Finally, they agreed that Cabinet appointments would be subject to consultations with the political signatories of the Pact and the military junta.

20. On 18 May, the Transitional President swore in Rui Duarte de Barros, a member of the PRS, as Transitional Prime Minister. A cabinet of 15 Ministers and 13 Secretaries of State, drawn from technocrats and supporters of the transitional arrangements, were sworn in on 23 May. Despite Transitional President Nhamadjo's call for 30 per cent of posts to be assigned to women, only two women were appointed to the Cabinet at the level of Secretary of State. On the same day, the Transitional President stated that the immediate challenges facing the Government included the payment of civil servants' salaries and ensuring that schoolchildren completed the full school year, which had been disrupted by a combination of teachers' strikes and the 12 April coup d'état. The Transitional President also expressed his commitment to shedding light on the March and June 2009 political assassinations and to performing an international audit into the affairs of the ousted Government. In addition, he identified combating organized crime and drug trafficking as a key objective of the Transitional Government. On 22 May, the spokesperson of the junta announced the dissolution of the "Military Command", which had taken responsibility for the 12 April coup.

21. In a public memorandum dated 14 June, the PAIGC noted that it should be allowed to form a new Government and that the National Assembly should function according to its rules of procedures, which included the election of a new leadership for the National Assembly. On 15 June, at a meeting convened by my Special Representative with representatives of the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and the PAIGC, the party's delegation reiterated these views.

2. Military/security developments

22. On 26 December 2011, elements from the military attacked the General Staff armoury and reportedly removed weapons. Following the incident, 24 military officers, including the Navy Chief of Staff, José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, the Deputy Army Chief of Staff, Gletche Na Gana, a former Army Chief of Staff, General Watna Na Laie and a civilian were arrested. Rear Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto denied any knowledge or involvement in the incident. He was eventually released on 20 June 2012. Although the Guinea-Bissau Government initially denied that this had been a coup attempt, on 30 December the Prime Minister announced that there had been a plot at the time to assassinate him and General António Indjai. International reactions to the 26 December events were swift. On 27 December, I condemned the use of force and called for the application of due process in the investigations. The African Union, ECOWAS and the European Union also condemned the military actions.

23. In a related event, on 26 December, members of the police and armed forces conducted a joint police-military search on the home of PAIGC parliamentarian Roberto Cachéu, who had been a vocal critic of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior. During the search, in which arms were allegedly found, an exchange of gunfire resulted in the wounding and subsequent death of a member of the Rapid Intervention Police. Members of the Rapid Intervention Police, who were present during the incident, accused Major Yaya Dabó, brother of the late Minister of Territorial Administration and presidential candidate Baciro Dabó, who was killed

on 4 June 2009, of having killed their peer. On 27 December, members of the Rapid Intervention Police shot dead Major Dabó as he was travelling on his way to surrender to authorities. The Minister of Interior opened an inquiry into the killing, which has yet to be completed.

24. On 29 December, the Democratic Opposition Group called for an independent inquiry into the 26 December events and described the Angolan technical security sector reform mission, which was in Bissau as part of the bilateral cooperation agreement between the Governments of Angola and Guinea-Bissau, as a “praetorian guard” and “foreign military presence”. According to General Indjai, the security sector reform mission had contravened its agreement with the Government by deploying personnel and military equipment beyond the levels authorized in the agreement. On 3 April, the Government dismissed General Indjai’s claims and reiterated that the reform mission would remain in the country and that its presence would be strengthened. Nevertheless, on the same day, an Angolan delegation to Guinea-Bissau, led by the Minister of Defence, Cândido Van Duném, conveyed a message from President Eduardo dos Santos to the Interim President that the security sector reform mission would be immediately withdrawn. In this regard, he stated that Angola wished to assist in the modernization of the armed forces and not become a destabilizing factor linked to internal disagreements among national stakeholders.

25. Following the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government decision to deploy a military force to Guinea-Bissau, the first contingent of the Economic Community Mission in Bissau (ECOMIB) Force, composed of 73 members of the Burkina Faso formed police unit, arrived in Bissau on 17 May. As of 2 July, 611 personnel of the Force’s authorized strength of 629 had been deployed. The Force is mandated to provide security for the departure of the Angolan security sector reform mission, secure the transitional period, and support efforts in the area of security sector reform within the terms of the ECOWAS-CPLP road map. On 9 June, the Angolan mission completed its withdrawal from the country under the facilitation of ECOMIB.

B. Economic and social developments

26. The 12 April coup and the ensuing political crisis had immediate negative repercussions on the socioeconomic conditions in the country, including on the cashew-nut campaign. As a result, the 4.5 per cent economic growth initially forecasted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in January will probably not be achieved in 2012. The United Nations, including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), UNDP and the World Food Programme (WFP), has been working with key national stakeholders to support the increased trade in cashew nuts in the country.

27. The confidence of donors and investors in the economy, progressively built up by the deposed Government, has also been significantly affected. The African Development Bank, IMF and the World Bank, which provide important budgetary support to the country, have all suspended their programmes with Guinea-Bissau. The uncertainties with respect to the country’s internal and external revenues, as well as its impact on the Government’s ability to meet its expenses, including public sector salaries, remains an issue of great concern.

28. During the 2011/2012 school year, a series of teachers' strikes resulted in the closure of over 70 per cent of schools and an estimated loss of 50 out of 175 school days. The 12 April coup also led to a disruption in the school schedule. As a result, UNICEF and other international partners have initiated emergency interventions to assist in accelerating the curriculum and extending the school year.

29. During the reporting period, the Municipal Council of Bissau went on strike and provided only minimum basic services, including limited waste collection. In the light of recent cholera outbreaks in several countries across West and Central Africa, there is a real threat of an outbreak in Guinea-Bissau, which has been cholera-free since 2008. In response, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the European Union are supporting national non-governmental organizations to strengthen epidemiological surveillance with a view to promptly identifying and responding to cases as they arise.

30. The United Nations, including UNICEF, UNIOGBIS, WFP and WHO, supported the Ministry of Health in organizing a campaign from 1 to 4 November 2011 for the distribution of more than 879,000 mosquito nets to over 209,000 households. In addition, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) continued to assist the Ministry of Health in promoting community-based health insurance cooperatives to address maternal health complications.

31. During the period under review, UNFPA supported activities for the promotion and protection of the sexual and reproductive health of adolescents and youth within the framework of a memorandum of cooperation with Brazil. In addition, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), in coordination with other international partners, provided technical support to national authorities in developing a National HIV Strategic Plan.

III. Implementation of UNIOGBIS mandate

A. Strengthening the capacities of national institutions and support for inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation

32. Owing to the death of President Sanha, the national conference on peace consolidation entitled "Towards Peace Consolidation and Development: causes, prevention, resolution and consequences of conflict in Guinea-Bissau", scheduled for 14 to 18 January 2012 under the aegis of the President, could not take place. Prior to President Sanha's death, UNDP and UNIOGBIS provided technical support to the National Conference Organizing Commission, which was established to prepare for the national conference. In preparation for the conference, UNDP provided administrative and radio production support to the Commission from December 2011 to January 2012. UNIOGBIS also mobilized a multidisciplinary team coordinated by the National Research Institute to prepare documentation for the national conference.

B. Support for the police, internal security and criminal justice systems

33. On 25 October, UNDP signed an agreement with the Speaker of Parliament to provide support for the strengthening of the legislative capacity of Parliament through training and through the creation of a pool of legislative experts which would serve the parliamentary specialized committees. Furthermore, on 28 October, UNDP and the Minister of Justice signed an agreement to support the National Judicial Training Centre in launching and implementing training courses for judges and public prosecutors. This is the first time that Guinea-Bissau has had a professional training school, mandated by law, to certify the training and selection of magistrates.

34. The Ministry of Justice, supported by the United States State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and UNIOGBIS, organized a National Forum on Criminal Justice from 15 to 17 November. The Forum allowed actors in the justice sector to discuss national strategies for preventing and combating national and international crime, especially those crimes directed at vulnerable groups, such as women, youth and children.

35. As part of its efforts to support national actors in combating impunity and strengthening the criminal justice system, UNIOGBIS provided support for the establishment of a witness protection programme in Guinea-Bissau. This led to the approval of draft legislation on the protection of witnesses and special persons by the Council of Ministers on 29 December 2011.

36. In December 2011, UNIOGBIS established regional offices in Bafatá and Mansoa to strengthen cooperation and coordination with the national policing institutions in the regions and to provide training and mentoring to personnel who will be working in the Model Police Stations funded by the Peacebuilding Fund. Meanwhile, with the support of UNIOGBIS, approximately 4,000 individuals have been registered as part of the vetting and certification process of police and security personnel in the country. The success of this exercise prompted the Ministries of Defence and Public Service to use a similar framework for reforms in the defence and public administration sectors. On 16 May, the rehabilitation of the National Defence Institute of the Ministry of Defence, which was funded by UNIOGBIS, was successfully completed.

37. During the reporting period, UNDP, UNIOGBIS and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations established a partnership to develop and implement a specialized training programme on human rights and prison operations for prison directors and guards. A team of experts from UNDP, UNIOGBIS, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Ministry of Justice, and the non-governmental organizations Manitesse and Comissão Justiça e Paz was established to conduct a training needs and capacity assessment of the national prison staff. In addition, on 17 April, a Protection Team was created with members from UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIOGBIS, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, WFP, WHO, the European Union, Manitesse, Comissão Justiça e Paz and Plan International to identify the problems and critical needs of the national prison sector and coordinate the necessary responses.

38. In the period under review, the four Access to Justice Centres, established in Bissau, Cacheu and Oio regions with UNDP financial and technical support,

provided legal aid, counselling and information to more than 1,300 cases, of which about 20 per cent were women. It also provided legal awareness sessions on children's rights, women's rights, gender equality, illegal detentions, and traditional justice to more than 4,000 citizens. The majority of the cases handled relate to land and property, labour law, family issues, abuse and domestic violence.

C. Security sector reform coordination

39. During the reporting period, my Special Representative held consultations with various national and international stakeholders to facilitate the implementation of security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau. He convened a meeting on 25 October 2011 to review international support for security sector reform with the participation of international security sector reform partners and an ECOWAS Commission delegation, which was visiting Bissau to discuss with the national authorities the draft memorandum of understanding on modalities to operationalize the implementation of the ECOWAS/CPLP security sector reform road map. On 29 November, my Special Representative briefed the Cape Verde Prime Minister in Bissau on the status of the pension fund system and emphasized the need for the international community's support to the pension fund to sustain momentum in the security sector reform process. At the meeting, Cape Verde pledged to contribute \$4.5 million to the pension fund.

40. UNIOGBIS continued to provide support to the national authorities in their security sector reform coordination efforts through participation in the national security sector reform coordination mechanisms. Through its participation in a technical working group on security sector reform, UNIOGBIS provided technical assistance to the defence sector legislative package and the internal regulations of the Pension Fund Follow-up Commission. It also contributed to the harmonization of the overall national legal framework relating to security sector reform.

41. On 4 January, the Prime Minister announced that 23 January 2012 would mark the beginning of the implementation of the security sector reform demobilization process. However, the death of President Sanha on 9 January delayed the planned demobilization schedule, including the identification of eligible personnel. In late January, the Government provided UNIOGBIS with the approved list of the first 100 police and 142 military candidates eligible to benefit from the pension fund. However, since that time, no further progress has been made in advancing the demobilization process.

D. Humanitarian mine action

42. In January, Guinea-Bissau became the tenth State party in Africa to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction to declare that it has cleared all known mine areas, in keeping with its obligations under the Convention. International support, in particular from UNDP and other donors throughout the 11-year programme implementation was critical for the achievement of this goal. Over 5.8 million m² of mined or suspected hazardous areas in seven regions have been assessed, while some 3,724 anti-personnel mines, 318 other mines and over 182,000 explosive hazards have been destroyed.

E. Human rights and gender monitoring, protection, promotion, capacity-building and mainstreaming

43. Following the 26 December 2011 military attack on the General Staff armoury, the Office of the Prosecutor General established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the incident. On 2 March, 16 detainees were charged with attempting to subvert the rule of law and criminal association. They are currently awaiting trial. Investigations by the Judiciary Police into the killing of Yaya Dabó on 27 December 2011 and into the killing on 18 March of the former military intelligence chief, Samba Djaló, are ongoing.

44. With regard to other outstanding investigations of political violence, on 24 February, three suspects were charged with homicide, damage and grave physical offences for the killing of the Armed Forces Chief of General Staff, General Tagme Na Waie, in March 2009. They are currently awaiting trial. With regard to the case of President João Bernardo Vieira in March 2009, the Office of the Prosecutor General has yet to conclude hearings of key witnesses who reside abroad, despite the UNIOGBIS and UNDP expressed readiness to sponsor the trips of Guinea-Bissau's magistrates to Lisbon. In addition, there have been no developments in the investigations into the June 2009 killings of the former Minister of Territorial Administration, Baciro Dabó, and Parliamentarian Helder Proença, nor the 1 April 2010 breach of constitutional order.

45. During the period under review, UNIOGBIS and UNICEF provided support for the dissemination of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Maputo Protocol, and laws on female genital mutilation and human trafficking. UNIOGBIS also contributed to the final draft law on domestic violence, as well as to the training of members of the Public Order Police on human rights and the rule of law.

46. After extensive consultation, on 20 February representatives of the Government and civil society organizations validated the National Policy on Gender Equality and Equity, which was prepared with the support of UNIOGBIS, UNFPA and UN-Women. However, approval by the Council of Ministers is still pending. UN-Women also provided support to the parliamentary specialized commission that organized eight regional consultation workshops on the draft bill against domestic violence. Public hearings on the draft bill have been on hold since the 12 April coup d'état.

47. In preparation for the presidential election, UNIOGBIS and UN-Women provided support to the Women's Political Platform in developing a political declaration on the needs and aspirations of Guinea-Bissau women for the election. The declaration was signed by seven out of nine presidential candidates on 9 March during the International Women's Day celebrations. The Platform also collaborated with the National Electoral Commission in developing and disseminating specific messages targeting women as part of the voters' education programme.

48. The 12 April coup d'état resulted in a variety of human rights violations, including illegal and arbitrary detentions, looting and damage to State and private property, persecution of former members of Government and national institutions, mistreatment during arrest and detention, violation of the rights to freedom of movement, expression, peaceful association and assembly, and the unlawful dismissal of civil servants.

F. Support for national efforts to combat illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and human trafficking

49. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Executive Director, accompanied by my Special Representative for West Africa, visited Guinea-Bissau on 27 October 2011 to reaffirm United Nations support and commitment to the fight against drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. During the visit, the Executive Director opened the first West Africa Coast Initiative Programme Advisory Committee meeting in Bissau.

50. Three pilot training courses, on road traffic policing, police personnel defence and State intelligence were conducted for 70 trainees with the support of the Government of Brazil and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime between 14 November and 9 December 2011.

51. From 15 to 21 February, the Ministry of Interior and the National Secretariat responsible for combating HIV/AIDS, designed and implemented an awareness-raising campaign on drug abuse, with the support of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNIOGBIS, UNDP, the United Nations Volunteers programme and the Millennium Development Goals Fund. The campaign reached out to 7,172 beneficiaries, 3,375 of whom were women.

G. Support for the work of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund

52. The National Peacebuilding Fund Joint Steering Committee met three times during the reporting period and approved a joint programme costing \$5 million to promote employment and revenue generation, as well as implementation plans for two joint programmes costing \$10 million in support of security sector reform and the strengthening of the internal security and justice systems. On 10 February, the United Nations and the Government signed a National Peacebuilding Fund Grant Agreement for the allocation of \$2,803,738 to support security sector reform and the socioeconomic reintegration of demobilized personnel. The first tranche of 40 per cent was transferred to the Government on 25 February.

53. On 14 February, following a request made by the Chair of the Guinea-Bissau Configuration for increased support for the presidential elections, Member States generously agreed to contribute approximately \$8 million. On 11 May, the Chair convened a meeting of the Guinea-Bissau Configuration to identify ways in which the Configuration could best support Guinea-Bissau following the 12 April coup. The discussion focused on key political, security, and economic developments and outstanding peacebuilding challenges in Guinea-Bissau, such as security sector reform, economic revitalization and transnational organized crime, in particular drug trafficking.

54. Following a request for international support by the Government of Guinea-Bissau, on 5 June, the Chair convened an informal meeting of the Configuration to discuss the situation in Guinea-Bissau and to listen to a briefing by deposed Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior. During the meeting, a number of participants noted that the transitional arrangements in Guinea-Bissau did not meet the requirements of legitimacy, did not comply with the principle of zero tolerance concerning forcible

seizure of power and was not conducive to stability as it excluded the main political party in Guinea-Bissau. On 7 June, during the ninth working session of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau, which took place in Abidjan, the Chair issued a statement on behalf of the Configuration, calling on all key international partners to agree on a joint strategy aimed at addressing the multidimensional peacebuilding challenges in Guinea-Bissau and at addressing the root causes of the current crisis.

55. Following the 12 April coup, the Peacebuilding Support Office approved an allocation of \$390,000 to FAO to enable the provision of seed distribution to 8,000 families, mostly female-headed households, in rural areas. This intervention will contribute to community stabilization by improving the conditions of the beneficiary population.

H. Regional cooperation, partnerships and resource mobilization

56. On 28 November, the WAEMU announced the disbursement to the Guinea-Bissau Government of CFAF 1 billion (\$2 million) to support security sector reform. On 9 December, my Special Representative met with President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, in his capacity as Chairperson of the African Union, to discuss ways of enhancing African Union support towards the implementation of the pension fund and other security sector reform priority projects in the country. President Obiang Nguema expressed his readiness to organize a resource-mobilization event for Guinea-Bissau on the margins of the January 2012 African Union Summit.

57. In the first week of January, the Angolan Minister for External Relations visited Accra and Abuja for consultations with his Ghanaian and Nigerian counterparts and to advocate for coordination of efforts between the CPLP, ECOWAS and the United Nations to speed up the stabilization process in Guinea-Bissau. While visiting Guinea-Bissau from 5 to 8 January, the Angolan Minister of Defence signed an agreement with the Minister of Economy of Guinea-Bissau to provide \$16.5 million for improving conditions in the military barracks.

58. On 30 January, a resource-mobilization meeting for Guinea-Bissau, chaired by the President of the African Union Commission, was convened on the margins of the African Union Summit. The Chair highlighted the need for partners to remain committed to supporting Guinea-Bissau in overcoming its multiple challenges in attaining peace and development. Guinea-Bissau's partners at the meeting, including the CPLP, ECOWAS, the European Union and the United Nations, reiterated their support to Guinea-Bissau. At the meeting, ECOWAS confirmed that it had deposited \$23 million into a transit account in Bissau, which would be made available following the finalization and signature of the memorandum of understanding between the Government of Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS and the CPLP. To date, the memorandum of understanding has not been signed.

I. Integration of the United Nations system joint strategic workplan

59. On 22 February, the Government and the United Nations system signed a United Nations Integrated Strategic Framework for 2013 through 2017, which

provides a coherent response to the priorities outlined in the second national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

60. During the period under review, the United Nations country team and UNIOGBIS prepared an annual implementation report on its joint strategic workplan, highlighting progress made and challenges encountered. The report noted that political and military developments in the first half of 2012 had slowed implementation of all planned programmes and activities, thus significantly impacting on deliverables in 2012.

J. Public information

61. As outlined in my Special Report, following the 12 April coup d'état, several restrictions were imposed by the military junta on media freedom and on the freedom of expression and assembly. In the aftermath of the coup, Reporters Without Borders denounced these and other grave violations of the right to information, including threats to journalists, news blackout and media censorship, and urged the military junta to restore the media's right to freely report news.

62. During the reporting period, the United Nations Communication Group produced 18 radio programmes on dialogue and reconciliation, respect and promotion of human rights and gender, and development, including the Millennium Development Goals.

IV. Observations

63. The 12 April coup d'état was a serious setback for national and international efforts to support peace, stability and development in Guinea-Bissau. It happened at a time when the country was beginning to show signs of economic recovery and the deposed Government was only seven months away from completing its term in office. While I commend the international community for its unanimous reaction in condemning the unconstitutional seizure of power in Guinea-Bissau and supporting the full return to constitutional rule in the country, and ECOWAS for taking the lead in finding a peaceful solution to the crisis, there is an urgent need for regional and international partners to agree on a harmonized response to developments in the country. In order for normalcy to return to the country, it is imperative that efforts be made by all of Guinea-Bissau's partners to work together to develop a united response to the problems facing the country, particularly the full and effective restoration of constitutional order consistent with Security Council resolution 2048 (2012).

64. At the root of the cycle of instability in Guinea-Bissau lies the failure of the political and military leaders to engage in serious and genuine dialogue aimed at national reconciliation. Instead, the resort to force for political ends seems deeply entrenched in the political culture. I urge national stakeholders to embark on a path that moves the country away from unconstitutional seizures of power towards a democratic dispensation. In order to achieve this, there must be a genuine and inclusive national dialogue aimed at finding agreed solutions to the problems facing the country.

65. The latest coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau adds to the long list of illegal or unconstitutional acts committed since 2009, epitomizing the culture of violence and impunity that prevails in the country. Political stability in Guinea-Bissau will remain an elusive goal if impunity is not rooted out of the society. Thus far, efforts to ensure credible, transparent and effective investigations, consistent with international standards, into the March and June 2009 political assassinations, the 1 April 2010 military events, the incident of 26 December 2011, as well as the killings of 27 December 2011 and 18 March and the prosecution of those responsible for criminal acts have borne little fruit. The United Nations stands ready to explore possible options to facilitate and support the investigations and prosecution of those responsible for these events, including the 12 April coup.

66. The current crisis has also affected the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security. The abolition of the Ministry for Women, Family, Social Cohesion and Fight against Poverty in the current transitional cabinet is a substantial setback to progress made in the establishment of a legal framework for the pursuit of gender equality, particularly with respect to the adoption and effective implementation of the widely consulted National Gender Policy. I support national efforts, especially of key women advocacy groups in the country, to press for the adoption and implementation of this policy.

67. The humanitarian situation in Guinea-Bissau has worsened as a result of the coup d'état. It is critical that international partners respond in an appropriate manner to address the urgent needs of the people of Guinea-Bissau. In this regard, I commend those partners who have already generously contributed to activities aimed at improving the conditions of the most vulnerable population.

68. UNIOGBIS is in the process of reviewing its security sector reform priorities for 2012 and 2013 in the light of the 12 April coup and subsequent developments. In this regard, the Mission will work closely with national stakeholders and international security sector reform partners, including ECOMIB to clarify plans for the implementation of reforms in the defence, security and justice sectors, including the ECOWAS/CPLP security sector reform road map adopted by the Government of Guinea-Bissau, the CPLP and ECOWAS in 2011.

69. Since the 12 April coup, drug trafficking activities have reportedly increased. The country's fragile political situation has significantly reduced the capacity of law enforcement agencies and provided a window of opportunity to intensify transnational organized crime and drug trafficking. I call upon the international community to support efforts to fight this phenomenon through financial, infrastructural, logistical and operational support. The international community must remain committed to tackling this threat not only in Guinea-Bissau, but also in the countries of origin, transit and destination.

70. I commend the staff of UNIOGBIS, under the leadership of my Special Representative, Mr. Joseph Mutaboba, and the entire United Nations country team, as well as national and international non-governmental organizations and other partners, for their continued contribution to peacebuilding efforts in Guinea-Bissau.