

# **General Assembly**

Distr. GENERAL

A/52/505 7 October 1997 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Fifty-second session Agenda item 112 (c)

> HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS AND REPORTS OF SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS AND REPRESENTATIVES

> > Situation of human rights in Burundi

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to members of the General Assembly a brief interim report on the human rights situation in Burundi prepared by Mr. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to Economic and Social Council decision 1997/280 of 22 July 1997.

## ANNEX

## Interim report on the human rights situation in Burundi submitted by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to Economic and Social Council decision 1997/280

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/77, adopted on 18 April 1997 at the Commission's fifty-third session, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burundi is submitting to the General Assembly an interim report, covering the period from 15 April to 31 August 1997.

2. By resolution 1997/77, the Commission extended the mandate of the Special Rapporteur for an additional year and requested him to submit a report to it at its fifty-fourth session. By a letter dated 26 May 1997, the Special Rapporteur informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Burundi that he wished to make a fourth visit to the country from 30 June to 14 July 1997. The Minister replied, by a letter dated 13 June 1997, that because of a very full schedule, he regretted to inform the Special Rapporteur that the Government of Burundi was not in a position to grant his request. The Special Rapporteur's visit would have to be postponed to a later date, to be agreed upon through the diplomatic channel.

On 27 June 1997, the Special Rapporteur again wrote to the Minister for 3. Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, recalling his obligation to report to the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights at their next sessions. He also stated that he wished to pursue actively the dialogue initiated with the authorities and the population, by gathering specific information on recent developments in the country's human rights situation. His visit was essential for enabling him to prepare, with complete independence and objectivity, the fullest possible report on the latest developments. The Special Rapporteur added that he had no intention of taking sides with respect to Burundi's current political, ideological or social situation. He wished only to bear witness, in solidarity, to the sufferings of the victims of human rights violations in Burundi. The Special Rapporteur then proposed two new time-frames for his visit to Burundi: from 14 to 28 July or from 21 July to 4 August 1997. He indicated, however, that if those dates were not convenient for the Burundian authorities, he remained open to the possibility of setting new dates, insofar as the latter could be reconciled with his professional activities.

4. The Special Rapporteur is well aware of the importance of the ongoing peace process in Burundi, which is taking up most of the Burundian authorities' time. He would like to recall, however, the flexibility he showed in his second communication concerning the choice of new dates for his visit. Unfortunately, the Special Rapporteur has thus far received no specific proposal from the Burundian authorities.

5. The Special Rapporteur was surprised to learn from the media that the Burundian authorities had asked the representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for human rights to end his mandate, whereas the designation of the Special Rapporteur is the sole prerogative of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Since the Special Rapporteur's mandate was extended for an additional year at the Commission's fifty-third session, his request to visit Burundi and the present report to the General Assembly are perfectly consistent with the terms of that mandate.

6. The Special Rapporteur discusses recent developments in the Burundian crisis in section II of this report, puts forward his observations in section III, and presents his recommendations in section IV.

#### II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BURUNDIAN CRISIS

#### A. The overall situation

## 1. Evolution of the Burundi conflict since mid-April 1997

7. During the first half of 1997, the trends which the Special Rapporteur has already described in the addendum to his second report to the Commission on Human Rights were confirmed.<sup>1</sup>

8. The Government in power has had to meet challenges on various fronts, <u>inter alia</u> by relying on the armed forces, negotiating with representatives of the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD) and coming to terms with the demands of neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda. The partial lifting, on 16 April 1997 at the Fourth Regional Summit on the Burundi conflict, of some of the sanctions against Burundi has given a new impetus to political life in that country, although democracy has yet to be restored.

9. On 13 May 1997 Major Buyoya confirmed, in a televised interview, that a delegation from his Government had met with representatives of CNDD over the previous four weeks. He also announced that the talks had concerned possible steps for the restoration of peace. During that period, the Burundian authorities had undertaken a wide-ranging awareness and information campaign, via television, to try to convince various sectors of civil society throughout the country of the validity of the negotiations undertaken and of the need to pursue them. This campaign was based on the three main items which Major Buyoya included in his initial government agenda: pursuit of the national debate within the country with a view to the rapprochement and reconciliation of the people of Burundi; organization of peace conferences involving nationals of Burundi from both inside and outside the country; and early initiation of negotiations open to all parties concerned with the Burundi conflict in the Great Lakes region, mediated by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere.<sup>2</sup>

10. Secret talks held in Rome beginning in September 1996, under the auspices of the Sant'Egidio Community, between the Government of Burundi and CNDD led to the signing, on 10 May 1997, of a framework agreement between the parties concerning the negotiations to be held with a view to restoring peace and democracy.

11. On 16 May 1997, the second hearing took place, before the Supreme Court of Bujumbura, in the trial of the 53 military officers accused of having participated in the failed <u>coup d'état</u> of 1993. The officers include a former Minister of Defence, Colonel Charles Ntakije; the former Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel Jean Bikomagu; and a former member of the National Assembly, François Ngeze, a member of the Union pour le progrès national (UPRONA) party. Reportedly, 16 of the accused officers are still in detention, while 36 others have been released.

12. Colonel Pascal Ntako, who was arrested in the context of the March 1997 assassination attempt against the head of State and held in Muyinga prison in the province of the same name, where conditions of detention are particularly poor, died on 15 May 1997, probably as a result of a fever. A diabetic, he urgently needed medications and an appropriate diet. The Observer Mission to monitor human rights had already visited him on 10 April, had transmitted recommendations to the prison authorities and had sent a delegation to visit him again; unfortunately, the latter did not arrive until shortly after Colonel Ntako's death.

13. The willingness of the Government of Burundi to hold peace negotiations with all parties to the conflict, including armed factions, and the talks held in Rome set off a wave of discontent and protest, especially among the students of the University of Burundi in Bujumbura. An attempted demonstration on 19 May 1997, which was dispersed by the forces of law and order, prompted the Rector's office to suspend classes for about two weeks.

14. Also in May, the Kinama, Kamenge and Kinindo districts of the capital were shaken by gunfire, which, according to the Ministry of Defence, was due to criminal acts. At the end of May, soldiers and rebel groups clashed in the commune of Kanyosha, Rural Bujumbura. In the provinces of Bururi, Makamba, Bubanza and Cibitoke, confrontations between rebels and soldiers continued, resulting in dozens of civilian deaths. On 19 May, a rebel attack in Cibitoke left 63 dead, mostly women, children and elderly persons.

15. During this period, the situation became particularly alarming in the Nyanza-Lac region of southern Burundi as a result of violent clashes between military and rebel forces and army sweeps of the <u>collines</u>. At least 50,000 people were moved to <u>regroupement</u> camps, where they were cut off from all humanitarian assistance and exposed to cholera, malaria and dysentery epidemics.

16. At the institutional and political level, the National Assembly concluded its parliamentary session on 6 June 1997 without having been able to pass a single law for lack of a quorum. Many members of the Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) went into voluntary exile, while some members of the Union pour le progrès national (UPRONA) reportedly chose not to participate in the work of the National Assembly.

17. On 7 June 1997, the Government of Burundi authorized the former President of the Republic, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, to leave the residence of the United States Ambassador, where he had taken refuge just before the <u>coup d'état</u> of 25 July 1996, and to go to a villa placed at his disposal by the present authorities. This was a concession on their part towards Burundi's former head of State.

18. In mid-June and in the last week of June, Major Buyoya visited the provinces in the northern and southern parts of the country to try to convince his interlocutors of the validity of the talks being held with CNDD. At a press conference held in Bujumbura on 26 June 1997, he requested the help of the international community in ensuring the success of the peace process in Burundi, while regretting that the partial lifting of sanctions had not yet had any

tangible effects. Major Buyoya reaffirmed his willingness to accept the good offices of a mediator.

19. Between 1 May and 14 July 1997, frequent military operations took place in the provinces of Rural Bujumbura, Bubanza, Cibitoke, Bururi and Makamba, during which dozens of civilians were killed and houses were looted or burned. However, in June, confrontations between soldiers and rebel groups seemed to become less intense in the southern provinces, in a reversal of what had happened in April and May 1997. Nonetheless, explosions of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines caused many deaths and injuries among both civilians and soldiers in the provinces of Rural Bujumbura and Bubanza. On 30 June 1997, an anti-tank mine exploded under a vehicle carrying the wife of the Speaker of the National Assembly on the <u>colline</u> of Kiriri in Bujumbura. She escaped with minor injuries, but her bodyguard was killed and her driver injured. Mines were also a danger in Cibitoke province and along the bank of Lake Tanganyika between Bujumbura and Makamba.

20. In June the Burundi authorities launched an initial operation to return displaced populations to their <u>collines</u> of origin, and announced that the <u>regroupement</u> camps would be dismantled by September 1997. Thus, 16,000 people from the township of Gatara who had been moved to the Gisyo camp in Kayanza province benefited from the government programme to return them to their homes.

21. On the occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of Burundi's independence (1 July 1997), Major Buyoya reaffirmed his willingness to pursue peace talks with all the political parties and armed factions concerned, despite the reservations expressed by some components of Burundian society. He also indicated that he would increase the army's troop strength and improve its logistical support. On 15 July 1997, the Burundian authorities reopened the frontier separating Burundi from the new Democratic Republic of the Congo as a first step in normalizing relations between the two countries. However, no trace has yet been found of some 35,000 Burundian nationals who reportedly took refuge in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

22. Notwithstanding these developments, as noted in the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council of 15 July 1997,<sup>3</sup> the country's main political forces, FRODEBU and UPRONA, are still torn by internal divisions, while the extremist groups at both ends of the political spectrum are extending their influence. The same is true of the rebel groups, as confrontations between members of the Front pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD), the armed wing of CNDD, and the Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu (PALIPEHUTU) have been frequent, especially in the northern provinces.

23. Throughout the month of July, disturbances undermined security in the provinces of Cibitoke and Bubanza. The Governor of Bubanza said on television that several incidents involving anti-personnel and anti-tank mines had occurred in his region. Clashes between FDD and PALIPEHUTU members reportedly left at least 200 dead in the same province. Other confrontations were said to have taken place between soldiers and rebels in the provinces of Cibitoke, Rural Bujumbura and Bubanza, with many civilian casualties. Various incidents involving anti-tank mines occurred in the latter two provinces at the end of the month.

24. At the political level, in the last week of July Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, Joint United Nations/Organization of African Unity (OAU) Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, Ambassador Howard Wolpe, United States Special Envoy for Burundi, and Ambassador Aldo Ajello, Special Envoy of the European Union, came successively to Burundi to discuss, with the authorities, political parties and other actors concerned, the preparations being made for the peace negotiations to be held in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, on 25 August 1997.

25. Also towards the end of July, the community of humanitarian organizations in Burundi was concerned that the policy of population <u>regroupement</u> initiated by the authorities might lead, not to the return of these populations to their <u>collines</u> of origin but to their transfer and resettlement along some of the country's major roads in an attempt at enforced "villagization", as appeared to be the case in the province of Kayanza. New roads would supplement the recently built villages, making the army's task of protecting the populations concerned easier.

26. At dawn on 31 July 1997, six people under sentence of death were executed by hanging at Mpimba prison, in Bujumbura. In his communiqué of 1 August 1997, the Rapporteur noted that these executions were all the more disturbing and serious since they concerned people who had not had the benefit of due guarantees during their trials, notably the presence of a lawyer. It subsequently emerged that two of those sentenced to death had submitted pleas for clemency shortly before they were executed.

27. During the same period, serious breaches of the right of prisoners to physical integrity were brought to the notice of the Special Rapporteur. These mostly concerned people detained at the Third Rapid Deployment Battalion in Kamenge, in the municipality of Bujumbura, who were allegedly tortured or ill-treated. Several of these prisoners are said to have died as a result of their ill-treatment.

28. It is alleged that on 2 August 1997 a representative of the National Assembly and member of FRODEBU, Mr. Paul Sirahenda, disappeared with his driver on his way to the province of Makamba to go to the United Republic of Tanzania and visit his family. After leaving Bujumbura the day before and spending the night in a town near the Tanzanian border, he was apparently arrested by soldiers and taken to the town of Mugina, while his driver was forced to drive his vehicle to another place. Eyewitnesses said they had seen this vehicle burned out beside the road. Subsequently, the body of the driver was also said to have been recovered. However, no other evidence has yet led to any trace of the parliamentarian, who is feared to have been murdered.

29. In the week of 4 to 11 August 1997, the Minister of the Interior, Colonel Bayaganakandi, expressed in a letter with the President of UPRONA, Mr. Musaki, his opposition to the holding of an extraordinary congress of his party announced by the latter. The Minister claimed, to the indignation of Mr. Musaki, that only the central committee had the power to convene a national congress. In the week that followed, while the former Tanzanian President and mediator in the Burundi crisis, Mr. J. Nyerere, announced that he had invited all the parties concerned to the next phase of negotiations, due to be held in

Arusha on 25 August 1997, the President of UPRONA announced that he refused to go there to talk to "terrorist and genocidal groups".

30. It is significant that the decision by CNDD to take part in the Arusha negotiations caused considerable rifts among opposition groups. Violent clashes in the provinces of Cibitoke and Bubanza during the second week of August claimed over 600 victims among the armed factions of the PALIPEHUTU and CNDD, according to some sources. This fighting reportedly forced some 13,000 people to flee their homes and, completely destitute, to take refuge in the main towns of the two provinces, as later confirmed by a joint mission of United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations that visited the places to assess their needs. Almost 9,000 of these people were able to receive food aid.

31. As for the security situation in the country, the provinces affected by the violence are still Makamba, in the east of the country, Bururi, in the south, Bubanza and Cibitoke in the north, and Rural Bujumbura. On 4 August, following the ambush of a lorry by rebels on the Bujumbura-Rumonge road, two people reportedly disappeared. Other incidents caused by rebel groups are said to have been reported on this major road in the towns of Muhuta and Kabezi. On 7 August, in a rebel attack on a minibus going from Rumonge to Bururi, three of the passengers were reportedly wounded. Another rebel incursion in Maramvya, in the province of Bururi, allegedly left one person dead and three missing. In the capital, it is reported that shots heard in parts of Ngagara and Cibitoke on the evening of 10 August ended in two deaths.

32. In their search for a solution to the Burundian crisis, the authorities began a second phase of national discussions in Burasira, in the province of Ngozi, on 19 and 20 August 1997, and set up a new ministry, with special responsibility for the peace process. Unfortunately, the Burasira meeting ended without a final joint declaration being adopted by the participants, in the absence of consensus. Moreover, the discussions were impeded by the question of whether or not there had been acts of genocide during the events of 1993. Lastly, the Ministry of Institutional Reform and Relations with the National Assembly now has responsibility for human rights, which had hitherto come under the Ministry of Social Action and Promotion of Women.

33. On 22 August 1997, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation announced to representatives of the diplomatic community and United Nations agencies in Bujumbura that he was postponing his participation in the Arusha negotiations of 25 August because of the tensions that had recently arisen in relations between the United Republic of Tanzania and Burundi, including on the question of the Burundian rebels allegedly being trained in camps in Tanzanian territory, not far from the Burundi border, on the dispatching of Burundian troops as reinforcements to the Tanzanian border, and on the issue of maintaining economic sanctions against Burundi.

34. With the Arusha meeting postponed, the Special Representative of the United Nations and OAU entered into intense consultations in the ensuing days with the Burundian authorities, the main political parties, the President of the National Assembly and representatives of the diplomatic community, as well as with their Tanzanian contacts, in an attempt to get the peace process back on track. Other diplomatic steps were undertaken in Bujumbura after 30 August 1997, particularly

by the United States Special Envoy, Ambassador H. Wolpe, to support the efforts of the former Tanzanian President J. Nyerere.

35. At another level, Burundi received a visit from the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. The latter went to the province of Kayanza on 25 August 1997 to visit <u>regroupement</u> camps and camps for displaced persons, accompanied by representatives of United Nations agencies, the human rights observer mission and various humanitarian non-governmental organizations, and to observe the extremely precarious living conditions of the populations concerned as well as the extent of their needs.

36. It was in this tense political context that seven political parties, including FRODEBU, the Parti pour la réconciliation du peuple (PRP), Solidarité Jeunesse pour la défense des minorités (SOJEDEM) and the Parti pour le redressement national (PARENA), issued a press release on 29 August 1997 in a local newspaper, <u>Azania</u>, requesting that stronger sanctions be adopted with regard to Major Buyoya, to force him to resign.

37. In the second fortnight of August, the lack of security remained disturbing in Burundi, with the explosion of several anti-tank mines, especially in the province of Rural Bujumbura, causing dozens of deaths. In the commune of Buyengero, in the province of Bururi, a van was blown up by one of these mines. The explosion killed two and injured six people. Another similar incident took place on 31 August in the province of Bubanza, when a vehicle of the national electricity and water company ran over a mine, killing two of its occupants. However, at the end of August a certain calm was reported in the commune of Nyanza-Lac, allowing an assessment mission, consisting basically of United Nations agencies, to visit and get an idea of the situation of the population, who were mostly victims of attacks by rebels or pursuit operations carried out by the army.

38. The Special Rapporteur took note of the joint statement issued by the Fifth Arusha Regional Summit on the Burundi conflict, held in Dar Es Salaam on 4 September 1997, which maintains the existing sanctions against Burundi, with the creation of a special secretariat to supervise their implementation, reconfirms the former President of the United Republic of Tanzania in his role as mediator, and urges the Burundi Government to take part in the next phase of talks, when these are convened by former President Nyerere.<sup>4</sup>

39. The Burundian authorities are also requested to suspend trials in progress until a negotiated solution has been worked out to deal in an appropriate way with the crimes committed; to allow, without preconditions, the President of the National Assembly, Mr. L. Ngendakumana, former President S. Ntibantunganya and former President J.-B. Bagaza to travel to and take part in the next peace talks; and, lastly, to begin immediately to demolish the <u>regroupement</u> camps.

#### 2. Effects of the war and the embargo on living conditions

40. It is now estimated that 600,000 Burundians are living far from their homes, scattered around the country. More than half of these people are thought to be gathered in <u>regroupement</u> camps, called "protected sites" by the Burundi authorities. The other 300,000 are displaced persons taking refuge in camps because of the fighting that is tearing apart their villages, or are recent returnees unable to return to their <u>colline</u> of origin because of the lack of security. Furthermore, over 100,000 displaced children receive no assistance whatsoever, according to the representative of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Bujumbura, speaking at a press conference in New York on 20 June 1997.

41. The vast majority of these populations do not have the minimum foodstuffs to avoid malnutrition and diseases, according to a spokesperson for the World Food Programme (WFP), speaking on 15 August 1997. Malnutrition rates are reported to be particularly high in the provinces of Karuzi, Bubanza and Kayanza. In the province of Bubanza, the lack of security has forced many undernourished people to turn to public health outlets for medical assistance and food aid, often after living for months in hiding in forests.

42. On analysing the information made available to him, the Special Rapporteur has been struck by the fact that the level of foodstuffs remains precarious, despite the easing of economic sanctions in certain spheres to aid humanitarian organizations. It has been directly affected by the poor harvests this year and the continuing civil war. The average cost of foodstuffs has risen by 40-50 per cent as compared to the beginning of 1996, according to estimates of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in its May 1997 report.

43. According to recent estimates by the World Health Organization (WHO), some 600,000 people in 10 of the 16 provinces in Burundi are threatened with typhus, following the appearance of the first cases in the province of Bururi in the first fortnight of July 1997. Moreover, more than 20,000 cases of typhus had already been registered between January and March 1997 in the provinces of Ngozi, Muramvya and Kayanza, according to a WHO study, indicating that it is the most serious typhus epidemic to hit Burundi since the Second World War.

44. The most tangible effect of the sanctions on Burundi can be seen in the substantial overall increase in the prices of goods and services, which nonetheless vary from one region of the country to another. Agricultural products have practically doubled in price. Following the embargo, the increase in transportation costs, particularly petrol, has led to higher prices in the shops. Moreover, the increase in petrol prices at first seriously hampered the mobility of the population, and to some extent that of the army, inside the country, until petrol imports from the United Republic of Tanzania and Rwanda resulted in lower prices.

45. Despite the good harvests this year, both wholesale and retail prices are still very high. In Bujumbura, an average family's spending on food was 10,425 Burundian francs at the end of June 1997, compared with 5,228 Burundian francs before sanctions.

46. The sanctions have also had a direct impact on education, since almost all school materials are imported. The cost of textbooks has almost doubled throughout the country, and in some cases has even tripled. The cost of pens and uniforms has also doubled. Also, the prices of building materials have rocketed following the embargo, which totally cut off the flow of imports. School infrastructures have suffered very seriously because of the crisis: of the 10 secondary schools that existed before 1993 only 8 are still open, while in the primary sector, of the 56 schools in operation before the crisis, barely 14 are in a position to carry on with their teaching activities.

47. One of the consequences of the dramatic increase in prices has been to drive rural and semi-urban populations out of the monetary economy. Those who own a patch of land have been forced to fall back on subsistence farming, while those with no land have been compelled to reduce their consumption. It is extremely difficult to find supplementary jobs to earn some extra income, partly because of existing unemployment. While it would be an exaggeration to speak of a famine caused by the price rises, the pockets of malnutrition found among the population continue to increase in number as sanctions are maintained.

48. In fact, the embargo is, together with the war, the major factor in the deterioration of subsistence farming conditions. The war led to the displacement or <u>regroupement</u> of several hundred thousand people, for the most part small farmers. The latter have in many cases managed to cultivate their fields, albeit in a limited fashion, despite the conflict. The appearance of <u>regroupement</u> camps and their proliferation in areas of the country considered unsafe further damaged agricultural production in the first quarter of 1997. While in some <u>regroupement</u> sites the assembled populations have, with the agreement of the local and military authorities, been able to retain some independence and cultivate their fields, in many other cases access to plots of land has been subject to various restrictions that reduce the efficiency of the farmers. The distance that the latter have to travel, together with the loss of motivation to produce more, owing to the lack of sufficient outlets for their products, all contribute to weakening the agricultural capacity of the country.

49. Imports of fertilizer were hard-hit by the embargo, which also seriously hampered the Government and humanitarian organizations in the distribution of seed. The obstacles encountered by those organizations in gaining access to their stocks of equipment, food, medicines and petrol have had a lasting disruptive effect on their ability to make up for the deficiencies in agricultural production in the country.

50. Apart from agriculture, industry in Burundi, which depended on many external supplies for its operation, has suffered greatly as a result of the embargo. The manufacture of beer and the processing of products such as sugar, flour, milk and cotton-seed oil, as well as the production in limited quantities of soap, paint, steel, oxygen and bricks, and the textile industry (in which the CODEBU company has a near-monopoly) have all been strongly affected by the embargo. Between July and September 1996, industrial production fell by around 8 per cent, particularly in the building and chemical sectors. The situation in these sectors has further worsened since then. The effects on employment have been very worrying. 51. The embargo has also had a disastrous effect on health services in the country, making a situation that had been precarious since 1993 even worse. Government expenditures in this sector, concentrated especially in the capital, are very restricted and do not exceed 4 per cent of the budget. Of the 320 doctors in Burundi, 199 live in Bujumbura. While there is one doctor for every 2,520 people in the capital, the proportion is only one doctor for every 75,000 in the rest of the country. Stocks of medicines are always higher in Bujumbura than elsewhere. On account of the sanctions, the concentration of these resources in the capital has become even more pronounced. Of the country's 29 hospitals outside Bujumbura, 13 are operating most of the time without a stock of medicines.

52. Lastly, the balance of payments, which was already very heavily in the red before the imposition of economic sanctions, has subsequently become still more so. The deficit increased by about 20 per cent during the period from July to September 1996. The 25 July <u>coup d'état</u> associated with the sanctions induced many of the donor countries which still had assistance or cooperation programmes in Burundi to suspend them. Despite these developments, the Government of Burundi continued to pay its foreign debt servicing, thus reducing the country's hard currency reserves.

53. As the Rapporteur has already explained in his second report to the Commission on Human Rights,<sup>5</sup> the Government of Burundi is to a certain extent counting on the United Nations system and humanitarian organizations to fill the gaps in medical services, the share of the budget allocated to which is only 4 per cent, according to certain information transmitted to the Special Rapporteur, by reason of the concomitant effects of the economic sanctions and military and internal security expenditures, the latter being estimated at 38 per cent of the State budget.

## 3. The policy of regroupement

54. The policy of <u>regroupement</u> perceived by the Burundian authorities started in February 1996 in Karuzi province and was stepped up from October 1996 onwards. While it is true that this policy applies above all to populations of Hutu origin who remained on the <u>collines</u>, the displaced persons' camps which since October 1993 have been housing populations of Tutsi origin must not be forgotten. More recently, surveys conducted in Burundi have shown that in some cases, displaced persons' camps were also housing returnees who had come back to Burundi, or, conversely, that <u>regroupement</u> camps also included Tutsis who had come to seek refuge.

55. A preliminary evaluation based data provided by various United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Burundian authorities which was made public on 4 June 1997 indicates that about 10 per cent of Burundi's total population are currently living away from their homes in 259 camps for displaced or regrouped persons. A statistical table of this state of affairs, province by province, appears as an appendix.

56. The Burundian authorities have always claimed that the policy of <u>regroupement</u> was designed to ensure better protection of the population in the

unsafe areas, and was a temporary measure aimed at the eventual return of the regrouped persons to their <u>collines</u> of origin once security was restored there. In July the authorities launched in Kayanza province an operation for the return of some of the population, indicating that similar measures would follow in other provinces where there were <u>regroupement</u> sites, with a view to dismantling the camps by September 1997. Thus about 16,000 people left the Gishio camp in Gatara commune to return to their <u>collines</u> of origin. At a tripartite meeting held in Bujumbura on 3 September 1997, which brought heads of United Nations agencies, representatives of international NGOs, diplomats and representatives of donors, the Government of Burundi stated its intentions regarding the return of regrouped populations from Karuzi, Kayanza and Muramvya provinces to their communes of origin.

57. According to many accounts which have reached the Special Rapporteur, <u>regroupement</u> of the population has taken place in fairly different circumstances depending on the provinces concerned and the level of insecurity in the regions where the <u>regroupement</u> camps were established. Some of them have been the result of a coercive policy by the authorities towards the population; others, on the contrary, were formed more spontaneously, in a reaction by the population to protect itself against incursions by rebel groups or reprisals by soldiers.

58. At certain <u>regroupement</u> sites, the small farmers can freely go and cultivate their fields and their children attend the local schools. Elsewhere, the precarious security conditions impede people's movements, and the magnitude of the destruction caused to surrounding infrastructures deprives them of the health care their condition requires and prevents their children from attending school. Typhus epidemics were reported last May in two camps in Kayanza province. While there can be no doubt that the people regrouped at sites have to a large extent been sheltered from the attacks provoked by rebels and the army sweeps of the <u>collines</u>, they have sometimes been used as targets and subjected to reprisals in or around the camps both by the rebels and by the army, when the former or the latter considered that they were colluding with the other side. In many cases, civilians have lost their lives, while others have lost their homes and everything they possessed, either through fire or as a result of looting.

59. Even though he has heard allegations of massacres said to have taken place in some <u>regroupement</u> camps, the Special Rapporteur believes it would be incorrect to assert that the policy of <u>regroupement</u> pursued by the authorities is aimed specifically at perpetrating massacres or systematically exterminating certain components of the population of Burundi.

#### B. <u>The human rights situation</u>

60. Without seeking to be exhaustive in the present interim report, the Special Rapporteur would nevertheless like to bring to the attention of the General Assembly a number of allegations of human rights violations transmitted to him during the period under consideration, particularly as regards the right to life and physical integrity, arrests and arbitrary detentions and torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

#### 1. <u>Violations of the right to life and physical integrity</u>

61. At dawn on 30 April 1997, large numbers of rebels reportedly attacked the small seminary at Buta, breaking into the pupils' dormitories. Some 40 of them are said to have been massacred, while 26 others were wounded. One soldier and a night watchman were also allegedly killed during the incident. According to information which reached the Special Rapporteur, the attackers were armed with knives, machetes, clubs, rifles, machine-guns, mortars and grenades. Several groups of assailants reportedly killed the pupils who refused to divide into ethnic groups. They also allegedly looted the dormitories, stripped the bodies and set fire to the building. The priests who were on the scene are said to have been saved thanks to the intervention of soldiers stationed inside the seminary.

62. On 11 May 1997, during an incident involving a clash between soldiers and civilians, at least 15 people, most of them women and children, were reportedly shot down on Nyamaboko <u>colline</u>, Kanyoshu commune, Rural Bujumbura province, while they were trying to escape. According to some information, this <u>colline</u> was again attacked by several hundred soldiers firing bullets and shells on 27 May 1997. The following day, returning to the scene, they allegedly bayoneted about 100 people to death, looted houses and stole cattle. Some of the inhabitants who had tried to escape to the nearby Kibazo and Musagaka <u>collines</u> were also reportedly massacred by soldiers stationed at those places. Other scenes of looting and destruction of houses are said to have been reported.

63. On 15 May 1997, 45 civilians were allegedly surprised and killed by soldiers in the Pentecostal Church at Mugendo, Rural Bujumbura province, while 3 other people were wounded. Some accounts indicate that soldiers had come to set up a position in a neighbouring church before massacring the people who were praying in the other church.

64. During the night of 18-19 May 1997, groups of rebels reportedly attacked, <u>inter alia</u> with machetes, knives, grenades and firearms, three sites housing disaster victims at Murwi, Ndava and Kigazi in Cibitoke province. At Ndava, 19 people were reportedly killed and 11 others wounded, while 39 civilians and one soldier were allegedly killed and 36 persons were wounded at Murwi. At least a dozen maisonettes are said to have been destroyed at Ndava. Following the intervention of soldiers stationed there, 11 rebels reportedly lost their lives and several were wounded.

65. On 24 May 1997, in the course of an attack by soldiers from the positions at Remba, Cinkona and Gitezi on Nyambuye <u>colline</u>, Isari commune, Rural Bujumbura province, dozens of civilians who were fleeing towards the Tahangua valley, are said to have been bayoneted to death.

66. On 6 June 1997, following clashes with rebels a few days before, soldiers from the Mugindo position allegedly shot to death 17 people from Magara <u>colline</u>, Muhutu commune, in Rural Bujumbura province, as they were emerging from their hiding places and returning home once calm had returned.

67. On the night of 6-7 June 1997, a very large number of rebels reportedly attacked the Mitakataka <u>regroupement</u> camp at Bubanza commune in the province of the same name, set fire to houses and above all took away with them some 200 persons. The following day they allegedly returned to the scene, where they are said to have killed one civilian and one soldier. According to some reports, it was the following morning that the soldiers intervened, when the attackers had already slipped away. Meanwhile the attacked camp had completely emptied of its inhabitants and many shelters had been burned.

68. On 11 July 1997, at Gasenyi market in the Kamenge district of Bujumbura, soldiers from the Camp Johnson and Abagera positions, in the belief that they were being attacked by rebels, reportedly killed six persons and wounded two others by firing in the direction of the market. According to other reports, the attacks were rather the work of rebel groups who had allegedly come to the market with the intention of stealing. The soldiers from Nyabagera position are said to have intervened, and the incident reportedly ended in several deaths.

69. On the night of 12-13 July 1997, a woman and her three children reportedly died as a result of an attack by rebels and bandits wearing camouflage clothing during which the door of their home on Kabezi <u>colline</u>, in the commune of the same name, Rural Bujumbura province, was allegedly smashed down. After looting the house, the rebels reportedly also killed an old couple and elderly person not far from there, on Kinama <u>colline</u> and at Tyazo.

70. On 17 July 1997, six persons reportedly lost their lives at Ramba, and on the following day, four at Mena, two locations forming part of Kabezi commune in Rural Bujumbura province, as a result of reprisals conducted by the Kabezi gendarmes after an attack by rebels the same day which led to the death of seven persons. On 14 July, these same gendarmes allegedly returned and killed traders proceeding to the market near Mena, and then set fire to about 40 houses. Inhabitants reportedly sought refuge in other places such as Mubune, Ruziba and Kimina. The following day, gendarmes are said to have killed two deputies to a sector chief, early in the morning on the road leading to Mena.

#### 2. Arbitrary arrest and detention

71. On 16 May 1997, a number of young men were allegedly arrested by the military in the Buyenzi district of Bujumbura and taken to the public security police for an identity check. Several of them were reportedly released following interrogation and payment of a fine, while the rest were taken by truck back to their home provinces of Gitega and Kayanza.

72. At the beginning of June 1997, 13 persons claiming to be former FRODEBU militants and suspected of involvement in the 1993 massacres were reportedly arrested on the <u>collines</u> of Makebuko and Bukirasazi communes, Gitega province, and taken to the unit at Mwanzari, where they were ill-treated. After several days there, they are said to have been transferred to Gitega prison.

73. On 19 June 1997, 12 schoolchildren were allegedly arrested by law and order forces for failure to produce their identity cards: they continue to be held at the Kamenge camp of the Third Rapid Deployment Battalion, in Bujumbura.

According to information received by the Special Rapporteur, three of these schoolchildren were subjected to ill-treatment. A gendarme reportedly beat one of the four girls in the group, using a rifle butt; another girl is said to have been confined to bed for some time.

#### 3. <u>Torture and cruel</u>, inhuman or degrading treatment

74. Several persons are said to have been arrested by the military between 16 and 25 April, and to have been detained at the Kamenge camp of the Third Rapid Deployment Battalion, in Bujumbura. The Special Rapporteur has received reports that some detainees are being ill-treated, have wounds on their arms and backs, have difficulty walking and occasionally have bloodstains on their clothes. Others suffering from malaria are said to have been denied the treatment they needed. Former detainees have testified to beatings of fellow prisoners with rifle butts, stones or sticks. Prisoners were reportedly given electric shocks, using an electric device with a crank attached. Several people are said to have died as a result of this ill-treatment, and fellow prisoners reportedly had to bury them in a pit close to the camp.

#### III. OBSERVATIONS

75. Despite efforts by certain sections of the Government and the country's elite to "de-ethnicize" the conflicts within Burundi society, the ethnic issue is sewn into the very fabric of political and social life, and is reflected in the ranks of Government and all echelons of the civil service. The ethnic dimension holds sway over both the Burundi army and the rebels, and the capital and provincial capitals also reflect the concentration of one ethnic group, as the Special Rapporteur had already noted in his first report to the Commission on Human Rights.<sup>6</sup>

76. However, the ethnic division aspect which characterizes Burundian society should not obscure the fact that clashes between the military and rebels in rural areas are often the result of an underlying conflict between a privileged urban minority and a largely minority small farmer class, which is mostly Hutu in origin, but includes some Tutsis as well. It is useful to recall that this rural population lives in the <u>collines</u> and is spread throughout the country.

77. As a result of the State's agricultural policy, based on coffee cultivation, small farmers were turned into second class citizens, forced to obey orders from on high, without ever being represented in any consultative or decision-making body. The ultimate expression of this form of discrimination can be found in the Burundi authorities' "villagization" policy and the <u>regroupement</u> camps begun in 1996. Small farmers were forced to leave their land, to move a long way away from cultivated plots and banana plantations, and to accept more onerous water and wood collection tasks, without benefiting in return from a social infrastructure that would mitigate the destructive effects of disrupting the production process.<sup>7</sup>

78. The gap referred to above has continued to widen, given that access to the channels capable, since independence and particularly after the failed

democratization process of 1993, of creating an ethnic mix among the elite, has been blocked. It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority of the small farmer population views the current conflict as a struggle between urban elites, with Bujumbura as its main theatre.

79. What might be termed the "<u>colline</u> culture" has exacerbated the tendency of the urban elites to tighten their grip on the State apparatus and public sector jobs, leaving the majority of Burundians cut off from the centres of decision-making. As long as democratization efforts fail to provide wider access to power and to close the gap between urban and <u>colline</u> society, rigid hierarchization of Burundian society will persist. Burundi is not the only country in the world where urban and rural societies are polarized as a result of a rigid social hierarchy and the concentration of income and all kinds of resources. Many societies in Latin America are facing the same kinds of problems.

80. Smallholders, particularly women and young people, have very few opportunities to make their voice heard. It is not surprising, then, that they resort to violence or that they collaborate with rebel groups. Moreover, these are the people who suffer most from the destructive consequences of compulsory <u>regroupement</u>, against which they have no democratic recourse. However laudable the public awareness campaigns seeking to explain this policy, they always come from on high and are the product of the urban elites.

81. Consequently, according to various accounts given to the Special Rapporteur, Burundian peasant farmers have a strong feeling of isolation, are afraid to leave their villages or to contact regional and national political, economic and administrative structures, which they do not understand. The civil war exacerbates these feelings and is hastening the breakdown of social cohesion, which had already been severely weakened since independence.

82. With regard to the <u>regroupement</u> policy, even taking account of present social realities and the various circumstances which led to the opening of the camps, the Special Rapporteur remains of the view, as stated in his previous report, that <u>regroupement</u> offers very few advantages in terms of security. The policy adds to the suffering of the populations concerned notwithstanding the original objectives of the Burundi authorities, and leads to serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.

83. Article 17 of Protocol II of 1997 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibits the forced displacement of populations during internal conflicts. Unfortunately, two exceptions are provided to this rule. In the first case, as a State Party to the Geneva Convention and the two additional Protocols, Burundi must prove that the <u>regroupement</u> is voluntary and is not connected with the conflict. In the second case, the <u>regroupement</u> must be judged as indispensable for the security of the civilians involved or for imperative military reasons. The Government must therefore prove that its reasons are military and not political. However, if the Government decides that the displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures have to be taken, according to the article in question, in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. As

the Special Rapporteur has indicated above, the conditions of shelter and survival in the <u>regroupement</u> camps vary considerably from region to region.

84. In view of this, the Special Rapporteur wonders whether the Government has a real reassimilation policy. If this is not the case, the international community would be entitled to ask how far the continued use of <u>regroupement</u> policy is adding to the burden of humanitarian assistance. The Special Rapporteur fears that this policy will ultimately weaken the populations in the camps and make them more vulnerable, since the army has insufficient resources to offer civilians permanent protection.

85. The Special Rapporteur wishes to stress that only a peaceful negotiated settlement involving all parties to the conflict can offer an appropriate framework for resolving the crisis which is still in the country. Developments since the appearance of his last report to the Commission on Human Rights seem to confirm that ongoing clashes between the Burundi army and rebel forces will only increase and prolong the sufferings of the Burundi population.

86. The Special Rapporteur reiterates his deep concern and dismay at the announcement of the hanging, in Bujumbura, on 31 July 1997, of six persons who had been condemned to death. These persons had appealed for a pardon, but were denied the judicial guarantees to which they had a right, whatever crimes they are supposed to have committed: specifically, the assistance of counsel and of a lawyer during their trial.

87. The Special Rapporteur commends the decision of UNDP to provide \$1.8 million in assistance to the Ministry of Reintegration and Resettlement of repatriated, displaced or regrouped refugees, as part of a project to help the Burundi Government fund aid programmes to allow various sections of these populations to return to their districts of origin.

88. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the appointment of a minister with special responsibility for the peace process, who should be able to help create the conditions for a ceasefire and for peace. However, he deplores the unexpected absence of representatives from the Burundian authorities at the Heads of States Summit at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, on 25 August. He believes that a unique opportunity was lost to assess the most recent developments in the Burundian crisis and the effects of sanctions, which weigh very heavily on the most vulnerable and least protected elements of the Burundian population. He therefore hopes that the recommendations made at the Fifth Regional Summit on the Burundi conflict<sup>4</sup> will allow all parties involved in the Burundian conflict to take a decisive step towards peace and reconciliation.

#### IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

89. In submitting the present report to the General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur hopes to draw attention to certain recommendations relating to recent developments in Burundi, which also recall some of the recommendations in his last report to the Committee on Human Rights, in order to underscore the recurrent themes in the Burundian crisis.

## A. Action at the national level

90. Although his previous requests have remained unanswered, the Special Rapporteur is still waiting for the existing Government to carry out an independent, neutral, objective and complete investigation into the exact circumstances of the murder of three delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross on 4 June 1996, near Mugina, Cibitoke province, to establish clearly who was responsible, and to publish the results without further delay. The Special Rapporteur will not be satisfied unless those responsible for this heinous crime are prosecuted and appropriately punished. He also awaits accurate information from the Burundian authorities on the circumstances surrounding the tragic murder of the Archbishop of Gitega, Mgr. Ruhuna, on 9 September 1996, and of the two nuns accompanying him, and asks that those responsible for these crimes be found and arrested without delay.

91. Having received no response to the request he made in his previous report, the Special Rapporteur reiterates the urgent request he made to the existing Government to provide, as promised earlier by Major Buyoya, the results of the investigation into allegations of the expulsion <u>manu militari</u> of 392 Burundian refugees in Rwanda to Cibitoke province, on 30 September 1996, by soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, at a time when numerous violations of human rights were being reported in that region. The joint appeal on their behalf by the Special Rapporteur and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, of 24 October 1996, has received no reply from the Burundian authorities.

92. The Special Rapporteur requests the Burundian authorities to carry out an impartial investigation into the attack committed by rebel elements on the small seminary at Buta, in Bururi province, at dawn on 30 April 1997, so that those responsible for the massacre of some 40 students and 7 members of the staff of the educational institution are prosecuted and brought to justice.

93. The Special Rapporteur requests the Burundian authorities to open an investigation into the death of Colonel Pascal Ntako, who died on 15 May in Muyinga prison, after having been accused of participating in a plot to assassinate Major Buyoya, and who was denied drugs for the treatment of his diabetes.

94. The Special Rapporteur urges the implementation of the reforms which he proposed in his previous reports concerning the reconstruction of the country's judicial apparatus and the formulation of adequate strategies for putting an end to impunity; the reorganization of the functions of the army and security forces along quite separate lines; and unimpeded access by the majority of the people, who are currently excluded from the country's elite, to the major State institutions such as education, justice and the army.

95. The Special Rapporteur reiterates his solemn and urgent appeal to the Burundian authorities to defer the 38 death sentences and 19 sentences of life imprisonment handed down during the February-March, April-May and July-August sessions of the criminal chambers, as well as the previous 133 death sentences and 54 sentences of life imprisonment, at least until the peace negotiations have been completed and a reformed judicial system, capable of playing its role

with complete independence and impartiality, has been established. Until the minimal conditions of a State ruled by law have been established, the execution of capital sentences will neither contribute to national reconciliation nor assure the families and friends of the condemned and of the victims that justice has been done.

96. The Special Rapporteur therefore once again urgently draws the attention of the existing Government to the need for respect for articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stipulate that every accused person is entitled to a fair trial, including the right to be guaranteed legal assistance for his defence. He reminds it that it is its duty, as a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to comply with articles 6 (para. 2), 14 and 15, which stipulate that sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of commission of the crime, following a fair trial, and to pay all necessary attention to United Nations resolutions establishing guarantees for the protection of the rights of persons liable to the death penalty.

97. The Special Rapporteur urgently appeals to the Burundian authorities to suspend the opening of new <u>regroupement</u> camps and to take appropriate measures without delay to enable the population gathered in those camps to return to their homes without hindrance.

98. The Special Rapporteur requests the Burundian authorities to protect the physical security of those regrouped, to refrain from using constraints against them, to ensure that they are treated with humanity and respect, and to prevent them from being subjected to enforced or involuntary disappearances, arbitrary detention or extrajudicial or summary execution. He also requests them to prosecute and bring to justice without delay the perpetrators of such acts.

99. The Special Rapporteur strongly encourages the Burundian authorities to undertake independent investigations into all allegations of violations of human rights committed during the process of <u>regroupement</u>, in particular into cases brought to light to date by the United Nations human rights observers. In this connection, he deems it essential that the Government should afford the observers all the freedom of movement they need to have access to all the <u>regroupement</u> camps and displaced persons camps and to investigate, with full independence, the alleged incidents reported to them. The Special Rapporteur wishes to commend the willingness repeatedly expressed by the Burundian authorities to accept a considerable increase in the number of observers in Burundi over the 35 initially set by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as the spirit of collaboration shown by those authorities towards the Human Rights Observer Mission.

100. The Special Rapporteur urgently requests the Burundian authorities to ensure that respect for human rights is at the heart of the peace talks and of any settlement relating thereto.

101. The Special Rapporteur reiterates that rebel groups must see to it that their armed forces fully respect the principles of international humanitarian law and, in particular, article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions. He draws

their attention, in particular, to the provisions relating to the physical security of the civilian population, non-combatants and prisoners.

102. The Special Rapporteur therefore appeals to the rebel groups to refrain from perpetrating attacks against civilians both within and outside the <u>regroupement</u> camps or displaced persons camps and to give instructions to that effect to their men.

## B. Action at the international level

103. The Special Rapporteur urges that the economic sanctions should be eased as soon as the Government of Burundi provides tangible proof that it is committed to effective negotiations with a view to achieving peace and national reconciliation.

104. The Special Rapporteur urgently appeals to the Burundian authorities to participate of their own free will in the next peace talks meeting and to refrain from any step which might delay the peace process which has been initiated.

105. With regard to the policy of <u>regroupement</u> pursued by the Burundian authorities, the Special Rapporteur believes that it is not for the international community to support the <u>regroupement</u> of the population along the main road routes, but rather to help them to reach their homes, despite the military criteria invoked by the authorities to justify their policy.

106. The Special Rapporteur therefore appeals to the international community to adopt a clear position firmly linking the question of humanitarian aid to the regrouped population to an explicit undertaking and a specific plan on the part of the Burundian authorities to introduce a policy for the proper reintegration of that population. The international community must also support reintegration strategies which promote the reconstruction of housing in the places of origin of the population, provided that those strategies form part of a well-planned effort on the part of the authorities.

107. From this standpoint, the Special Rapporteur is convinced that the programmes of the United Nations agencies should continue their support for the local communities through revenue-generating activities, increased participation of women in the economic and social life of their communities, and increased food security. Such support should, <u>inter alia</u>, be extended by activities which promote a spirit of tolerance with a view to national reconciliation and the emergence of a culture of peace within Burundian society, as was done with remarkable persistence and perseverance by the United Nations Centre for Human Rights at Bujumbura.

108. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the establishment of the legal assistance programme under the auspices of the High Commissioner, with the participation of the Burundian Bar and authorities, the main purpose of which is to assist those suspected of participation in the attempted putsch which led to the death of President Ndadaye. He recommends that the programme should be pursued

assiduously and expanded to remedy the deficiencies in the Burundi judicial system and eradicate impunity in the country once peace has been restored.

109. As he stated in his previous report to the Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur requests an immediate embargo on the sale of arms to Burundi. Such an embargo should be directed at both the existing Government and the rebel forces to prevent all arms flows towards the parties to the conflict in Burundi. Moreover, the Special Rapporteur would like very strong measures to be taken against those who ordered the crimes and those benefiting from the arms traffic. He requests that their bank accounts abroad should be frozen, fellowships withheld from the members of their families and visas for travel abroad refused them.

110. States Members of the United Nations should be encouraged to take legal measures against their citizens who are involved in the arms traffic, in violation of the embargo declared by the United Nations, even when such individuals are operating in a third country. If national legislation does not contain the provisions required to punish such offences, the Governments of the Great Lakes region should be strongly urged to enact internal legislation for the prosecution of those responsible for such offences. Priority should be given to preventing, by all available means, any unsupervised distribution of arms shipments in the Great Lakes region, in order to avoid a disastrous escalation of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (see E/CN.4/1997/12, para. 113).

<u>Notes</u>

 $^{\rm 1}$  E/CN.4/1997/12/Add.1 and Corr.1.

<sup>2</sup> Libre Belgique, 15 May 1997.

<sup>3</sup> S/1997/547.

<sup>4</sup> See S/1997/687.

<sup>5</sup> E/CN.4/1997/12 and Corr.1.

<sup>6</sup> E/CN.4/1996/16, paras. 130 and 131. The comments of Mr. Ryk Samyn of the National Centrum voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking in Brussels were particularly useful with respect to this aspect of the Burundian crisis. See also the report of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 1996, and Hubert Cochet, "Burundi, la paysannerie dans la tourmente. Eléments sur les origines du conflit ethnico-politique", <u>Série Dossier pour un débat</u>, No. 60, Paris, Librairie FPH, 1996.

<sup>7</sup> Cochet, op. cit., <u>passim</u>.

## <u>Appendix</u>

Province	Total population	Number of sites	Site populatior	Percentage of total population
Bubanza	250 210	22	65 184	26
Bujumburaª	660 498	35	35 338	5
Bururi	435 240	16	44 564	10
Cankuzo	157 535	4	3 254	2
Cibitoke	313 137	13	57 428	18
Gitega	625 017	15	20 997	3
Karuzi	334 213	25	125 262	37
Kayanza	491 506	21	109 523	22
Kirundo	448 195	16	20 072	5
Makamba	266 732	10	13 812	5
Muramvya	487 736	23	46 017	10
Muyinga	427 119	30	35 852	8
Ngozi	535 978	14	21 530	4
Rutana	219 360	3	3 977	2
Ruyigi	281 524	12	4 118	2
Total	5 934 000 <sup>b</sup>	259	606 938°	10

# Internally displaced persons

<u>Source</u>: Department of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network, 4 June 1997.

<sup>a</sup> Including Rural Bujumbura and Mairie de Bujumbura.

 $^{\rm b}$  Total population figures according to the 1990 census.

 $^\circ$  This total comprises displaced, repatriated and regrouped persons. Of the total, some 275,846 are living in regroupment camps.

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