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مجلس حقوق الإنسان

الدورة الثانية والثلاثون

البند ٣ من جدول الأعمال

تعزيز وحماية جميع حقوق الإنسان، المدنية والسياسية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية والثقافية، بما في ذلك الحق في التنمية

تقرير المقرر الخاص المعني بحالات الإعدام خارج القضاء أو بإجراءات موجزة أو تعسفاً، عن متابعة بعثته إلى المكسيك

مذكرة مقدمة من الأمانة

تشرف الأمانة بأن تحيل إلى مجلس حقوق الإنسان تقرير المقرر الخاص المعني بحالات الإعدام خارج القضاء أو بإجراءات موجزة أو تعسفاً، السيد كريستوف هاينز، عن تحليل التقدم الذي حققته المكسيك في تنفيذ التوصيات المقدمة عقب زيارته الرسمية إلى المكسيك في الفترة من ٢٢ نيسان/أبريل إلى ٢ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٣ (الوثيقة A/HRC/26/36/Add.1). وكان الهدف من التوصيات المقدمة في تقرير المقرر الخاص عن بعثته هو تحسين حماية الحق في الحياة وتعزيز المساءلة عن انتهاكات هذا الحق.

وأثناء الفترة المشمولة بالاستعراض، استمرت أعمال القتل خارج نطاق القضاء واستخدام القوة بشكل مفرط من جانب أفراد الأمن. وظلت الجماعات الضعيفة عرضة لاستهدافها بالعنف وأعمال القتل كما ظلت تفتقر إلى الحماية من حيث القانون والواقع العملي. وقد أخذت حكومة المكسيك بتدابير لمحاولة الحد من أعمال القتل، وللتصدي للإفلات من العقاب، وللحد من عسكرة الأمن العام، ولتحسين التنسيق وجمع المعلومات المؤسسين في معرض أعمال التحقيق في انتهاكات حقوق الإنسان، ولتوفير الحماية القانونية للجماعات الضعيفة؛ بيد أن يلزم تكثيف الجهود المبذولة وتنفيذها على نحو سليم في مجال الممارسة العملية. وما زال سلب الحياة بشكل تعسفي هو والإفلات من العقاب يشكلان تحديين خطيرين في المكسيك، شأنهما شأن تقديم تعويضات إلى الضحايا، الأمر الذي يتطلب توافر الإرادة السياسية وبذل جهود متضافرة.

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الرجاء إعادة الاستعمال



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Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in follow-up to his mission to Mexico*

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* Circulated in the language of submission and Spanish only.

I. Introduction

1. The present report contains an analysis of the progress made by Mexico in implementing the recommendations made by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, following his visit to the country from 22 April to 2 May 2013. The mission report (A/HRC/26/36/Add.1) was submitted to the Human Rights Council at its twenty-sixth session in June 2014.

2. During his visit to Mexico, the Special Rapporteur observed that the right to life was under serious threat in the country as a result of various factors, including deficiencies in the legal system, increased organized crime activity and drug trafficking, militarization of policing, unwillingness or lack of capacity of police and prosecutors to investigate, distrust in the judicial system by citizenry and lack of accountability for violations.

3. The Special Rapporteur made recommendations in the following broad areas: legal and policy framework for the protection of the right to life; promoting accountability for past and present human rights violations; ending militarization of public security; ensuring civilian jurisdiction for human rights violations; adopting comprehensive standards on the use of force by law enforcement officials; protecting human rights while combating organized crime; and protecting the right to life of vulnerable groups.

II. Methodology

4. In paragraph 8 of its resolution 26/12, the Human Rights Council urged States to, inter alia, cooperate with and assist the Special Rapporteur in the performance of his or her tasks, supply all necessary information requested by him or her and ensure appropriate follow-up to his or her recommendations and conclusions, including by providing information to the Special Rapporteur on the actions taken on those recommendations.

5. In follow-up to his mission to Mexico, the Special Rapporteur requested information from the Government of Mexico and other actors on the steps taken to implement his recommendations. The Government responded on 28 September 2015 and a draft of the present follow-up report was submitted to the Government for comments on 15 March 2016. The Government submitted its comments on 13 April 2016.

6. The Special Rapporteur thanks the Government of Mexico for providing information on the measures taken to implement the recommendations contained in his mission report and for its response to the present report. He also expresses his gratitude to all who contributed to the present report.

III. General observations

7. In his mission report, the Special Rapporteur highlighted the disturbing levels of violence in Mexico and the widespread extrajudicial executions perpetrated by security forces and members of cartels, while underscoring the prevalence of impunity for those crimes. He recommended that the protection of the right to life, including the issue of accountability, should have a central place in the national human rights plan, under development (para. 120).¹ In responding to that recommendation, the Government of

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, paragraph numbers in parentheses refer to the paragraphs of the mission report (A/HRC/26/36/Add.1).

Mexico indicated that all actions envisaged in the National Human Rights Programme 2014-2018 were aimed at achieving the conditions in which human rights violations could be prevented and human rights for all realized. Non-governmental sources observed that the Programme did not include objectives or strategies to promote accountability for unlawful killings; nor did it set out indicators for recording the number of prosecutions for human rights violations. The Special Rapporteur regrets not having received specific information about the measures provided for in the Programme to protect the right to life and ensure accountability for the violation thereof.

IV. Legal and policy framework for securing the right to life

A. Constitutional and international law bases

8. The Special Rapporteur observed in his previous report that Mexico had instituted important legal and policy changes and commended it for the 2011 constitutional reform that granted human rights enshrined in international treaties equal status to the Constitution; however, he stressed that more needed to be done at the structural and implementation levels to prevent the unlawful loss of life. He recommended that pending federal and state legislation should be enacted to ensure the effective implementation of the reform on human rights. Proposals submitted to the Federal Congress that could weaken the reform's progressive clauses should be rejected. The *pro homine* principle should be retained and protected and the parity between international and national law should be reinforced (para. 93).

9. The Government, in its reply, informed the Special Rapporteur about the activities undertaken to bring the reform into effect, including efforts to strengthen the implementation process, the training of public servants and the dissemination of information on the reform. The National Human Rights Programme 2014-2018 had entered into force and a permanent round table for the revision of the administrative normative framework and harmonization with the human rights constitutional reform has been established. In its reply, the Government's did not specify whether legislation had been enacted to implement the reform. Other reports indicate that the harmonization of federal and state legislation with the 2011 constitutional reform remains insufficient. With regard to the parity between international and national human rights law, the Government reported that the Supreme Court of Justice had adopted decision 293/2011,² according to which the human rights enshrined in the Constitution and those ratified in international treaties have equal legal standing and together constitute the parameters for ensuring constitutional regularity. In the decision, the Supreme Court also noted the binding character of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Special Rapporteur welcomes those developments; however, it should be noted that the decision proceeds to establish that, if the Constitution provides for an express restriction of the exercise of human rights, the constitutional restriction will prevail, effectively overriding the application of the *pro homine* principle. The Special Rapporteur notes with concern the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the issue, which has the effect of re-establishing the regime of constitutional supremacy.

10. The Special Rapporteur welcomed the reforms aimed at transforming the country's semi-inquisitorial system into an oral, adversarial system of criminal justice. Nonetheless, he noted the slow progress made in its implementation and recommended its acceleration at the federal and state levels (para. 94). The Government reported on the initiatives

² Mexico, Supreme Court of Justice, Contradicción de Tesis 293/2011, 3 September 2013, p. 96.

undertaken to implement the reform of the criminal system, including: (a) the provision of training to the judiciary and police; (b) the adoption of a national agreement to assist with harmonizing the normative framework; (c) the agreement on collaboration between several government, judicial and police departments to coordinate capacity-building activities on the new criminal system; and (d) the creation in 2012 of the unit for the implementation of the accusatory criminal procedural system within the Office of the State Attorney General, which was further strengthened under agreements A/068/12 (Official Journal, 17 April 2012), A/182/14 (12 February 2015), A/032/15 (15 May 2015) and A/037/15 (1 June 2015). The National Criminal Procedure Code was published in March 2014 to govern the accusatory system and harmonize criminal procedures at the federal and state levels. With regard to the rate of implementation, the system operated fully in 6 federal entities and partially in the other 25. At the local level, the new system was operational in eight states. The Government expected the accusatory system to have entered into force across the country by June 2016. Non-governmental sources observed that the federal entities that had implemented the system had not yet comprehensively reformed their inquiry and justice administration practices, as required. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the progress made and notes the need for the full implementation of the new criminal system.

B. Problems of continued militarization

Moving away from the military paradigm in law enforcement

11. In his previous report, the Special Rapporteur had criticized Mexico for the fact that the armed forces were tasked with public security functions, observing the risk of abuse by agents unable to relinquish the military paradigm and the lack of accountability for such abuses in the military justice. He recommended that all necessary steps be taken, with immediate effect, to ensure that public security was upheld by civilian rather than military security forces (para. 103).

12. The Government indicated that the participation of the army, navy and air force in upholding public security was in accordance with article 129 of the Constitution and legal opinion 38/2000, under which the military is constitutionally empowered to exercise public security functions to support competent authorities. Non-governmental sources reported that, in some federal entities, military officials had been placed in charge of public security.

13. The Special Rapporteur regrets the lack of progress in the implementation of the recommendation and points to a series of tragic events that recently placed the armed forces at the centre of accusations of extrajudicial executions. In June 2014, 22 civilians were killed in Tlatlaya, State of Mexico, in a confrontation between armed civilians suspected of being involved in organized crime and the army. While Mexican authorities stated that all the deaths had occurred as part of a “shoot-out”, military documents revealed that there was a standing order to “kill the criminals”.³ The National Human Rights Commission later established that at least 12 of the victims, and possibly as many as 15, were extrajudicially killed following their capture.⁴ Other cases reportedly involving military officials include the enforced disappearance and killing of seven individuals in the municipality of Calera, State of Zacatecas, in July 2015, and the killing of a 12-year-old boy in Santa María Ostula, State of Michoacán, in July 2015.⁵

³ See

www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16198&LangID=E.

⁴ National Human Rights Commission, recommendation No. 51/2014 of 21 October 2014, paras. 226 and 229.

⁵ See report of the hearing, “Denuncias sobre ejecuciones extrajudiciales en México”, p. 4 (available at http://centroprodh.org.mx/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_

14. In his mission report, the Special Rapporteur took note of the government plan to create a national gendarmerie as part of its strategy to reduce violence. He noted the need for the gendarmerie to function within a human rights framework and recommended that it be created by law, that its officers be properly trained to conduct public security tasks according to international human rights standards and that they be subject to effective civilian accountability measures and directed by civilian personnel without military backgrounds (para. 106). The Government reported that a gendarmerie consisting of 5,000 officers had been established within the Federal Police in August 2014 and was mandated to prevent crime and ensure public security and governed by principles of respect for individual and human rights. While the gendarmerie was a division of the Federal Police, officers had also received military training. The Special Rapporteur views as a positive development the fact that the gendarmerie was established outside the military jurisdiction and that human rights, among other principles, govern its mandate. However, its mandate is not regulated by law, as he had recommended. The Special Rapporteur regrets not having received information on whether gendarmes receive specific training on human rights or on the measures in place to ensure accountability for possible abuses.

Ending military jurisdiction in cases involving crimes against civilians and human rights violations

15. The Special Rapporteur voiced concern that military courts were used in Mexico to try military personnel for homicides involving civilians. He recommended that the Code of Military Justice be amended to ensure that all human rights violations allegedly perpetrated by the military were fully investigated, prosecuted and tried by civilian authorities; that the immediate transfer of all such cases to civilian jurisdiction be ensured; and that military investigators not initiate investigations into human rights violations (para. 105).

16. The Government replied that article 57 of the Code of Military Justice had been amended in 2014 to ensure that military courts had no competence to investigate and punish human rights violations committed by military personnel. Between 2012 and August 2015, 1,592 inquiries, 19 of which were into human rights violations, and 349 criminal proceedings were transferred to civilian jurisdiction. Other sources observed that the reform excluded human rights violations committed against military personnel by military personnel. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the reform did not fully comply with international human rights standards.⁶ Other sources raised concerns regarding how military investigations could affect civilian investigations. While the Special Rapporteur acknowledges the amendment of article 57 and the transfer of relevant cases to civilian courts, he regrets to learn about the exceptions retained in the reform that conflict with his recommendation.

C. Further legislative needs

Legal framework for the use of force

17. The Special Rapporteur expressed concern at reports of the disproportionate use of force by law enforcement officials during protests or arrests and noted the absence of a coherent legal framework in that field. He recommended that the Constitution be amended

details&gid=204&Itemid=57&lang=es); www.jornada.unam.mx/ultimas/2015/07/20/abre-cndh-pesquisas-sobre-aquila-y-calera-7819.html; and www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/estados/2015/07/20/indagan-militares-por-desaparecidos-en-zacatecas .

⁶ See www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/radilla_17_04_15.pdf.

to approve a general law on the use of force — including during demonstrations and arrest — that applies to all federal, state and municipal security forces according to the highest international human rights standards (para. 107).

18. The Government responded that National Security Commission's agreements 04/2012 and 05/2012 established general guidelines for the use of force by public security officials. In 2014, the Ministry of Defence had issued a manual on the use of force for the armed forces. The Office of the State Attorney General had issued guidelines for the detention of persons by its officials (A/079/12) and for the use of force by Ministerial Federal Police (A/080/12). Security forces were also guided by the relevant international instruments. However, according to non-governmental sources, the 2013 Mexico City Police crowd control protocol contained problematic provisions, such as those allowing for a restrictive approach to assemblies and prioritization of the right to transit over the right to assembly, granting broad powers for police intervention during protests and giving ambiguous descriptions of situations in which the use of force was allowed. The implementation of that protocol had reportedly resulted in several persons being arbitrary detained and injured.

19. The Special Rapporteur was informed about recent cases of the excessive use of force by the police during demonstrations or gatherings. In July 2014, the police fired bullets towards demonstrators in the community of San Bernardino Chalchihuapan, State of Puebla, killing a child and injuring six persons. The police had reportedly based its actions on the 2014 Act to Protect Human Rights and Regulate the Legitimate Use of Force by Police Officers of the State of Puebla, which granted broad powers for police intervention and the use of lethal force during protests.⁷ In September 2014, 3 persons had been killed and 43 students disappeared in Iguala, State of Guerrero, following joint operations by the municipal police and armed men against 80 students from the Raúl Isidro Burgos rural teacher-training college.⁸ In January 2015, 10 persons had died and 21 had been injured during a protest in Apatzingán, State of Michoacán. While officials indicated that the victims had died in a confrontation between self-defence groups, the National Human Rights Commission established that serious human rights violations were committed by police agents resulting in five cases of deprivation of life and one extrajudicial execution.⁹

20. The Special Rapporteur regrets the lack of implementation of the recommendation and the ensuing episodes of excessive use of force and extrajudicial killings by the army and the police.

Homicide and the organized crime law

21. The Special Rapporteur stressed the lack of clarity regarding who is empowered to investigate and prosecute homicides linked to organized crime, which often results in federal authorities failing to take action. He recommended that the Federal Act on Combating Organized Crime be amended to include homicide as one of the offences that could be connected to organized crime (para. 108). The Special Rapporteur regrets that he has not received official information on whether that recommendation has been implemented; other sources reported that it had not.

⁷ See National Human Rights Commission, recommendation No. 2VG/2014 of 11 September 2014, and

www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Comunicados/2015/Com_2015_195.pdf.

⁸ See www.oas.org/es/cidh/decisiones/pdf/2014/MC409-14-ES.pdf.

⁹ "Denuncias sobre ejecuciones extrajudiciales en México", p. 5; see also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, *Situación de los derechos humanos en México*, paras. 224-229 (available at www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Mexico2016-es.pdf); and www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Comunicados/2015/Com_2015_356.pdf.

22. The Special Rapporteur recommended that homicide cases allegedly linked to organized crime be transferred to federal jurisdiction by reforming the federal law to allow federal authorities to investigate, prosecute and try such cases where the state authorities were not in a position or are unwilling to do so (para. 109). The Government replied that, while article 73 (XXI. b) of the Constitution empowered the Union Congress to enact laws relating to organized crime, until such law was enacted the Federal Act on Combating Organized Crime continued in effect; thus, the federal entities retained their jurisdiction in the field. Other sources indicated that the authorities had not implemented the requested reform. The Special Rapporteur regrets the lack of progress in connection to the recommendation.

D. Need to ensure a more robust legal and law enforcement system

Ensuring proper investigations

23. The Special Rapporteur noted that federal and state authorities had regularly been accused of failing to properly investigate cases of alleged killings, dismissing homicide cases suspected of links with organized crime and manipulating the crime scene or planting evidence to incriminate others, particularly when a State actor was implicated. With regard to the latter accusation, he recommended that all necessary steps be taken to ensure that the authorities did not alter crime scenes and to guarantee that authorities who obstructed investigations were held accountable, if need be through criminal prosecution (para. 104).

24. The Government replied that the National Criminal Procedure Code regulated the chain of custody and the responsibilities for evidence seized in connection to a crime. Under article 225 of the Federal Criminal Code, it was an offence against the administration of justice for public officials to manipulate the investigation, evidence or scene of a crime, or enable others to do so. The Office of the State Attorney General had issued agreement A/009/15 (Official Journal, 12 February 2015) laying down guidelines to be observed by public servants in relation to chains of custody, evidence and crime scenes. In November 2015, the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System had published the National Guide on the Chain of Custody, which aimed to guarantee the authenticity of material evidence to be used in criminal proceedings.¹⁰ The Office of the State Attorney General had also signed agreements on collaboration with 19 federal entities for the standardization of regulatory criteria in this field.

25. Other sources observed that the manipulation of the crime scene remained a recurrent factor in cases involving extrajudicial killings. The Tlatlaya massacre and the May 2015 killing of 42 civilians and a policeman in Tanhuato, State of Michoacán, following a police raid against an alleged organized crime cell¹¹ were two recent examples where security forces have been accused of having manipulated the crime scene. Past incidents of crime scene manipulation or falsification also remained unpunished, as in the extrajudicial killing of two college students by military personnel in Monterrey in March 2010 (see A/HRC/26/36/Add.1, para. 45). The Special Rapporteur regrets that, despite the regulatory framework, the authorities continue to engage in such practices with impunity.

26. The Special Rapporteur raised the alarm about the number of cases where the investigative authorities failed to adequately preserve and transfer remains, making them inadequate for victim identification and court proceedings. While he was impressed by the work of the forensic services in Mexico City and Chihuahua, he noted a lack of expertise

¹⁰ See http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5417232&fecha=26/11/2015.

¹¹ “Denuncias sobre ejecuciones extrajudiciales en México”, p. 5, and Situación de los derechos humanos, para. 230.

and independence in other states and insufficient coordination of forensic services across states. He recommended the creation of a national forensic services institution with autonomous status, which would provide its services to all parties and authorities that took part in federal and/or state trials, to the human rights commissions and to civilians. He also recommended that it should have adequate infrastructure, sufficient human and financial resources and standardized protocols that applied nationally (para. 98).

27. The Government gave information about the work of the Directorate General of Forensic Medicine Services, the General Office for the Coordination of Expert Witness Services, which provides support to local prosecutor offices, and the Criminal Investigation Agency of the Office of the State Attorney General (A/101/13: Official Journal, 25 September 2013). Furthermore, all forensic services in the country must follow the protocol for forensic treatment and identification. In November 2014, all the High Courts of Justice in the country had agreed to promote the National Programme to Enable and Support Forensic Medical Services as a programme of national priority. In November 2015, the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System had published the national protocol for police with prosecuting capacity, which provided guidelines for the implementation of the forensic methodology. While the Special Rapporteur welcomes these initiatives, he notes that they should not aim to replace the establishment of a much needed independent and autonomous national forensic services institution. He learned through other sources that proposals had been submitted to the Senate for the establishment of a national forensic services institution.¹²

28. The Special Rapporteur underlined in his mission report the importance of creating digital and interlinked databases inter alia in the areas of fingerprinting, DNA, genetics, unidentified remains and missing persons. As violence in Mexico had an important regional component, he emphasized the need to seek collaboration in that area. He recommended that Mexico work with countries in Central America to establish shared databases on fingerprints, DNA, genetics, missing persons and unidentified remains (para. 110).

29. The Government responded that the Office of the State Attorney General had concluded cooperation agreements with the Jalisco Institute of Forensic Sciences and the prosecutor offices of 11 states to exchange genetic data that would update the National Genetic Database (Official Journal, 20 November 2014). It had also created the Special Prosecutor for the Search for Disappeared Persons (A/094/15; Official Journal, 10 September 2015), issued the protocol for the search for disappeared persons and investigation of the crime of enforced disappearance (Official Journal, 23 September 2015) and signed an agreement with the International Committee of the Red Cross for the licensing and use of software for the Ante Mortem and Post Mortem database, which facilitated the search for disappeared persons and the identification of remains (although other sources noted that the database was not yet complete). Furthermore, the state prosecutor offices had met to draft the protocol for forensic treatment and identification. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the steps taken to improve the search for and identification of disappeared persons and the collection of genetic data at the domestic level. He regrets to learn that no regional database fulfilling the requirements spelled out in the recommendation exists.

30. The Special Rapporteur recommended the creation of a consolidated public database containing information on homicides disaggregated by state, county, gender, age and other relevant criteria in order to facilitate the design of effective public policy strategies and to

¹² See www.senado.gob.mx/sgsp/gaceta/63/1/2015-09-22-1/assets/documentos/Inic_PAN_Pilar_Ortega_CPEUM.pdf and www.senado.gob.mx/sgsp/gaceta/63/1/2015-09-22-1/assets/documentos/Inic_PRD_Vianey_otros_Servicios_Periciales_Autonomos.pdf.

promote accountability (para. 99). The Government replied that the National Institute of Statistics and Geography, in collaboration with the National Public Security System, collected national statistics on public security, including in a public database containing information on homicidal deaths, which allowed for searches disaggregated by federal entity, municipality, sex, age, civil status, nationality and indigenous language, *inter alia*.¹³ Furthermore, the Institutional System of Statistical Information (created by agreement A/018/12; Official Journal, 7 February 2012)¹⁴ collected statistical information regarding the investigations and criminal proceedings of the Office of the State Attorney General. The Special Rapporteur takes note of this comprehensive database.

Enhancing institutional independence

31. The Special Rapporteur voiced concern at accusations of the lack of independence of the judiciary, contributing to impunity and insufficient sentences against prosecuted state actors or members of organized criminal groups. He also observed the fear of intimidation, threat and attack against prosecutors or other judicial authorities.

32. With regard to the Office of the State Attorney General, the Special Rapporteur recommended that secondary legislation be adopted in order to make the Office fully independent of the executive branch according to the new constitutional framework (para. 95). The Government replied that the Chamber of Deputies had approved a decision in 2014 establishing the Act on the Attorney General of the Republic, which grants it constitutional autonomy. The Act was presented to the Senate in March 2016, where it is pending approval.

Assisting witnesses, victims and their families

33. The Special Rapporteur noted with dismay the accounts received of witness intimidation, as well as of reprisals and threats against families of victims by state authorities or organized criminal groups. He also observed that witnesses and families were reluctant to trust public officials or protection programmes, often seeing them as ineffective or susceptible to corruption. The Special Rapporteur emphasized that the Government should provide greater protection for families of victims and welcomed the adoption of the Victims Act and the National Criminal Procedure Code, which included protective measures for victims. He recommended the prompt and effective implementation of the Victims Act, including at the local level, and the full and representative participation of civil society and victims in the implementation and functioning of the Act (para. 122).

34. The Government reported that the Act had been published in 2014 (Official Journal, 28 November 2014) and had established the National Victim Support System to coordinate and formulate public policy and the Executive Commission for Victim Support as an operative organ thereof. In May 2015, the National Victim Support System had approved the Programme for Comprehensive Victim Support, which coordinated measures to protect victims' rights. In November 2014, the Executive Commission for Victim Support had established the Fund for Comprehensive Assistance and Reparation to deliver assistance and reparation to victims. The Fund received by law 0.014 per cent of programmed authorized expenditure under the national budget. The Fund assets as of December 2015 amounted to 985.1 million pesos. In 2015, 47 million pesos had been used to provide assistance and reparation for 130 direct and indirect victims of federal crimes and human rights violations committed by federal authorities. Seven states had created executive commissions for victim support, with technical, operational and resource autonomy. Six

¹³ See www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad/defuncioneshom.asp?s=est.

¹⁴ Reformed under agreement A/084/15 (Official Journal, 5 October 2015).

other states had state commissions that were dependent on the state's government. The laws of the States of Guerrero and Michoacán were harmonized with the Victims Act, but they had not yet established a state commission. The State of Chihuahua had adopted the Act to Assist and Protect Victims of Crime, as well as a fund devoted to the same purpose. The remaining states were in the process of harmonizing their legislation with the Victims Act.

35. Non-governmental sources observed that the Victims Act was in its initial stages of implementation and had not substantially improved access to truth, justice and reparations for violations of the right to life. One of the main factors hampering its effectiveness was the requirement of a court ruling or a recommendation from a human rights institution for a person to be considered a victim of a human rights violation.¹⁵ The Special Rapporteur welcomes the various steps taken at the federal and state level to implement the Act but notes the remaining obstacles hampering victims' access to assistance and reparation.

36. The Special Rapporteur recommended that a stigmatization of victims of violence never occur and that public statements by government officials on the legality of killings not be made without proper consideration of the facts (para. 121). The Government replied that the Victims Act included the principle of non-criminalization, according to which authorities should not stigmatize or treat victims as suspects or express judgment about their possible connection to a crime. Furthermore, the official circular C/004/2009 of the Office of the State Attorney General instructed its personnel not to disclose information about possible perpetrators of federal crimes or the *modus operandi* of organized criminal groups. Other sources pointed to the continued practice of the criminalization and stigmatization of victims who had been deprived of their lives. The Special Rapporteur regrets that the government reply relates to activities that predate the country visit and is insufficient to update him on the status of the implementation of the recommendation. He also regrets to learn that instances of stigmatization and criminalization of victims continue to occur.

E. Human rights institutions

37. The Special Rapporteur stressed the need to strengthen the capacities and autonomy of the National Human Rights Commission and 32 state human rights commissions, and noted the insufficient commitment from the authorities and the unsatisfactory rate of compliance with the Commission's recommendations. He recommended that the human rights commissions made more use of their powers granted by law to follow up on their recommendations where prosecutions for homicide were at stake (para. 97).

38. The Government responded that the Commission was to conduct an administrative and operative redesign in 2015 to strengthen its work, although it did not give details of the status of that restructuring. The Special Rapporteur regrets that he did not receive sufficient information to assess compliance with the recommendation. Information received from civil society indicates a lack of progress thereon.

39. The Special Rapporteur also recommended that the public defender system be made independent from the executive branch at the federal level and in all states, that its infrastructure be improved and that sufficient human and financial resources be allocated in order to uphold the principle of equality of parties within the criminal justice system (para. 96). The Government replied that the 2008 constitutional reform mandated the Federation, states and Mexico City to guarantee the existence of a quality public defender system and a professional career for public defenders. On resource allocation, it noted the

¹⁵ Victims Act, arts. 65, 67, 69 and 110. The Act can be interpreted so as to allow the Executive Commission for Victim Support to recognize a person's status as victim.

proposed cooperation agreement between the Council of the Federal Judiciary and the Office of the State Attorney General for the allocation of Council resources to the federal public defender offices located within the buildings of the Office of the State Attorney General. Other sources stressed the continuing scarcity of resources and the poor quality of representation provided by the public defender system in Mexico. The Special Rapporteur regrets the insufficient progress made in that field.

F. Legacy of the “Dirty War”

40. The Special Rapporteur expressed dismay at the total absence of effective prosecutions following the so-called “Dirty War”, in which a large but unknown number of persons had been executed. He recommended that the extrajudicial executions and massacres committed during that period be duly investigated, prosecuted and tried, that the perpetrators be punished and that the victims and their relatives receive adequate reparation (para. 100). The Government replied that the General Investigation Coordination Office of the Office of the State Attorney General was processing 247 inquiries for crimes committed during that period, including homicides, arbitrary detentions and disappearances. The Office of the State Attorney General specific agreement A/089/15 offered a reward for information on enforced disappearances (Official Journal, 12 October 2015). To ensure transparency, the Office of the State Attorney General allowed the families of the disappeared, civil society organizations and public human rights institutions access to prosecution proceedings. Concerning reparations, the Victims Act provided for comprehensive reparation for victims, including measures of restitution, rehabilitation, financial compensation and guarantees of non-recurrence.

41. Non-governmental sources observed the lack of progress in investigations and prosecution of extrajudicial executions committed during the Dirty War. While noting the information about inquiries conducted by the Office of the State Attorney General, the Special Rapporteur regrets that they have not yet resulted in effective prosecution and sanctioning of perpetrators and redress for victims.

42. The Special Rapporteur stressed his concern that many of these crimes were considered to have expired as a result of the statute of limitations imposed by the country’s interpretative declaration to the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, under which the Convention only applies to crimes committed after 2002. He recommended withdrawing the interpretative declaration as it undermined the effectiveness of efforts to investigate, prosecute and try the extrajudicial executions and massacres committed during the so-called Dirty War (para. 102). The Special Rapporteur regrets not having received updates from the Government regarding the recommendation, while other sources indicated that it had not been implemented.

43. The Special Rapporteur observed that the work of the Truth Commission in the State of Guerrero, established in 2012 to investigate violations committed there during the Dirty War, had been hampered by its lack of access to information compiled by the Office of the State Attorney General. He recommended that the Truth Commission receive all the support needed to ensure that it succeeded and that the documentation assembled by the Office of the State Attorney General regarding executions during the Dirty War be made available, if not publicly, then at least to the members of the Truth Commission (para. 101). The Government recalled that, according to existing norms, the power to investigate those crimes fell solely to the public prosecutor and that the information stemming from its investigations was considered confidential. The National Criminal Procedure Code only allowed access to such investigations to the parties relevant to the case. Despite confidentiality and data protection requirements, the Office of the State Attorney General

had lifted the restrictions on disclosure of information in order to furnish the Truth Commission of Guerrero with a list of inquiries initiated by the defunct Office of the Special Prosecutor for Social and Political Movements of the Past, 16 of which were now in the hands of the General Investigation Coordination Office of the Office of the State Attorney General.

44. Non-governmental sources observed that the information collected by the Office of the State Attorney General on crimes committed during that period could not be accessed by citizens unless they filed a public information request, which seldom resulted in access to complete records. Moreover, in 2015, the National Archives restricted public access to records on the Dirty War, limiting the scope of a decision adopted in 2001 to declassify Dirty War files. While the Special Rapporteur is pleased to learn that the Office of the State Attorney General has shared relevant information with the Truth Commission of the State of Guerrero, he regrets to hear of the restrictions placed on public access to records on the Dirty War.¹⁶

V. Vulnerable and frequently targeted groups and individuals

45. The Special Rapporteur observed with concern the high number of killings of vulnerable persons and recommended that full, prompt, effective, impartial and diligent investigation of homicides perpetrated against women, migrants, journalists and human rights defenders, children, inmates and detainees and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals be ensured (para. 111). The Government replied that, in addition to the implementation of the new adversarial accusatory system, eight protocols had been issued by the Supreme Court to facilitate the judiciary's compliance with human rights obligations, including with regard to: (a) children and adolescents; (b) indigenous peoples; (c) the gender perspective; (d) sexual orientation and gender identity; (e) persons with disabilities; (f) migrants and persons subject to international protection; (g) torture and ill-treatment; and (h) development and infrastructure.

46. With regard to femicides, the Office of the State Attorney General had established the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Violent Crimes against Women and Trafficking in Persons and published a protocol for ministerial, police and expert investigations with a gender perspective for the crime of femicide (Official Journal, 3 March 2015), which established minimum rules for undertaking investigations in connection to that crime. In addition, the National Commission for the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women monitored the Comprehensive Programme to Prevent, Care, Sanction and Eradicate Violence against Women.

47. The following entities of the Office of the State Attorney General prosecuted crimes against migrants: the Special Prosecutor for the Search for Disappeared Persons; the Special Unit for the Investigation of Trafficking of Persons, Children or Organs; the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Violent Crimes against Women and Trafficking in Persons; the Special Unit for the Investigation of Kidnapping; the General Coordination Office for the Investigation and Prosecution of Crimes relating to Trafficking; the Unit for the Investigation of Crimes against Migrants; and the Mexican External Support Mechanism for Search and Investigation.

48. Concerning journalists, the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Offences Committed against Freedom of Expression (FEADLE) had expanded its response capacity through a series of reforms published in May 2013. The Mechanism for the Protection of Human

¹⁶ See www.jornada.unam.mx/2015/03/11/politica/009n2pol.

Rights Defenders and Journalists coordinated work in that field in collaboration with the Office of the State Attorney General, the Ministry of the Interior, the Secretariat Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Human Rights Commission, non-governmental organizations and federal entities.

49. Regarding lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons, in June 2015, the Office of the State Attorney General published an action protocol to be followed by its personnel who intervened in cases involving sexual orientation or gender identity.

50. While noting these positive steps, the Special Rapporteur regrets not receiving information on prosecutions effectively carried out for violations against members of vulnerable groups. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted in 2015 that vulnerable groups continued to be disproportionately subject to violence and human rights violations, particularly migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, women, children, and persons living in poverty. It also observed worrying levels of violence against families of victims, human rights defenders and journalists, and noted that their lack of access to justice fostered structural impunity for these violations.¹⁷

A. Women

51. While the Special Rapporteur noted the legislative and institutional reforms adopted in Mexico to address femicide and the implementation of the Cotton Field ruling of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, he warned about the persistence of violence against women, often resulting in death and followed by impunity. He recommended that the Government consider codifying femicide in all relevant criminal codes based on objective characteristics, standardize police investigation protocols for femicide across the country and adopt measures to fully implement the ruling of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Cotton Field case (para. 112). The Government replied that the crime of femicide was codified in 31 of the 32 federal entities. The 32 federal entities had enacted the Act on Access of Women to a Life Free of Violence and 28 of them had adopted regulations implementing the Act. In addition, each of the 32 entities had established a system to prevent, sanction and eradicate violence against women and care for the victims. In March 2015, the Office of the State Attorney General published two protocols for conducting ministerial, police and expert investigations, with a gender perspective, one for cases of sexual violence and the other for crimes of femicide. Regarding the ruling of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Sub-commission for Coordination and Liaison to Prevent and Eradicate Violence against Women in Ciudad Juárez was established in 2013 to facilitate compliance with the ruling, and the Alba protocol was adopted in 2012 establishing the Technical Collaboration Group to Search for Disappeared Women and Girls. Other sources indicated that, despite those measures, the codification of femicides had not been homologated at all levels, investigations were not effective and the work of relevant authorities lacked compliance with the standards set out in the ruling. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the study on femicide undertaken by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and several Federal Government agencies. He notes the progress made and the challenges remaining in the implementation of the recommendation.

¹⁷ See www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2014/146A.asp.

B. Migrants

52. The Special Rapporteur stressed that undocumented migrants transiting through Mexico faced the risk of killing and disappearance, and noted the reported link between these crimes, police complicity and organized crime. He recommended that: a safe corridor be created for migrants in transit, including better protection while in transit; a package of protection and accountability measures be adopted to prevent attacks in migrant shelters; cooperation be strengthened between state departments and community organizations that provided humanitarian assistance to migrants; adequate redress be provided to victims of violence committed in the country; consideration be given to following an approach whereby undocumented migrants could exercise rights such as the right to report crimes to the authorities without fearing arrest; and the dignified repatriation of corpses be ensured in coordination with the State of origin (para. 113).

53. The Government responded that the National Institute of Migration had established 22 migrant protection groups, or “Beta Groups”, mandated to provide orientation, humanitarian assistance, rescue services and legal aid to transiting migrants, regardless of their nationality and legal status. The Institute also created 461 child protection officer posts in 32 federal delegations to assist unaccompanied migrant children. The Office of the Special Prosecutor for Violent Crimes against Women and Trafficking in Persons had set up a shelter to protect and assist victims of trafficking. Agreement A/117/15 (Official Journal, 18 December 2015) of the Office of the State Attorney General had established the Unit for the Investigation of Crimes against Migrants and the Mexican External Support Mechanism for Search and Investigation. In the States of Chiapas and Tabasco, strategic locations for migrant transit, the offices of the State Attorney General provided special care for migrant victims of crime. At the regional level, the Office of the State Attorney General promoted the regional cooperation initiative for prosecutors and attorneys-general from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and the United States of America to develop strategies to protect migrants and combat trafficking networks. In July 2014, the Coordination Office for Comprehensive Assistance for Migration in the Southern Border Area had been established to coordinate regional action and strengthen state presence, in response to security and human rights challenges posed by migration flow. It was intended to establish a more efficient and secure border and combat crime against migrants.

54. Other reports pointed to the inconsistency between the stated objective of the Southern Border Plan to “protect and safeguard the human rights of migrants transiting through Mexico” and one of its strategic lines of action aimed at managing migration flows. The measures adopted to strengthen border control since the implementation of the plan had reportedly resulted in increased vulnerability for transiting migrants, who were now faced with multiple checks and sometimes extortion from police, military and National Institute of Migration agents, while continuing to be victims of organized criminal groups. The Special Rapporteur notes the measures adopted at the local, federal and regional levels to assist transiting migrants but regrets to learn about the situation of migrants affected by the Southern Border Plan.

C. Journalists and human rights defenders

55. During his visit, the Special Rapporteur had been informed about the alarming number of journalists and human rights defenders who were victims of threats, attacks and killings, sometimes even at the hands of authorities. He recommended that special investigation protocols be adopted for crimes committed against journalists and human rights defenders, requiring full examination of the possibility that the crime was committed because of the victim’s profession (para. 114). The Government replied that, under

agreement A/145/10 creating FEADLE, all persons opining or informing through a media outlet were to be considered as journalists and human rights defenders when victims of crimes. FEADLE provided assistance and protection to victims, systematized data collection on investigations carried out pursuant to abuses and granted protection measures in coordination with the Unit for the Reception of Cases and Rapid Response within the Ministry of the Interior's National Executive Coordination Office. The Office of the State Attorney General had developed several protocols in these field, including: (a) agreement A/118/2003, establishing institutional guidelines for the protection of journalist's sources of information who appeared as witnesses (Official Journal, 11 December 2003); (b) agreement A/136/05, adopting guidelines for the Office of the State Attorney General delegates to address crimes against journalists (Official Journal, 29 July 2005); (c) a cooperation agreement between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the State Attorney General and the National Human Rights Commission for the adoption of preventive and protection measures for journalists (Official Journal, November 2010); and (d) the operating rules for the trust fund for the protection of human rights defenders and journalists (Official Journal, 5 November 2013).

56. Non-governmental sources reported that FEADLE had no special investigation protocols for crimes against journalists in place at the federal level. In Mexico City, the Attorney General thereof issued agreement A/11/2010 in 2010, establishing an investigation protocol for crimes committed against journalists owing to their profession, and agreement A/04/2010, establishing an agency specialized in crimes against journalists. However, the same sources noted that the protocols' implementation was discretionary and results were scarce,¹⁸ and pointed to the fact that Mexico City had become the state with the highest number of documented attacks against the press in 2014, most of which remained unpunished. In April 2015, the offices of the prosecutor in Morelos and Sinaloa had also adopted protocols for the investigation of crimes against freedom of expression. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights observed the persistence of acute violence against journalists, especially in areas suffering from organized crime and collusion with state agents, and the killing of 12 journalists between 2014 and 2015.¹⁹ The National Human Rights Commission recently reported that 80 per cent of homicides against journalists were unsanctioned.²⁰ It also noted the increase in the number of human rights defenders killed since 2011.²¹ The Special Rapporteur regrets that the information received relates mostly to regulations adopted prior to his mission and fails to update him on the implementation of the recommendation. He also regrets to learn about the continued violence suffered by journalists and the related impunity.

57. The Special Rapporteur noted in his mission report the measures adopted to enhance protection for journalists and defenders and the legal reforms established to enable investigation and prosecution of crimes against journalists at the federal level. He observed, however, that implementation was insufficient and recommended that the reform allowing federal authorities to exercise jurisdiction over offences committed against freedom of expression be effectively implemented and that the office of the special prosecutor be endowed with appropriate legal status, autonomy and sufficient resources (para. 115). In its previous response, the Government had indicated the functions carried out by FEADLE, but did not give information about its resources, legal status and autonomy. In its present response, it recalled that article 73 (XXI) of the Constitution allows federal authorities to

¹⁸ See www.articulo19.org/la-procuraduria-del-df-viola-protocolos-de-investigacion-en-el-homicidio-multiple-de-la-colonia-narvarte.

¹⁹ Situación de los derechos humanos, paras. 374-376; and www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2014/146A.asp.

²⁰ See www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Recomendaciones/generales/RecGral_024.pdf.

²¹ See www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Recomendaciones/generales/RecGral_025.pdf.

exercise jurisdiction over offences committed against freedom of expression and that the conditions to exercise this jurisdiction were set forth in article 21 of the Criminal Procedure Code, including where: (a) offences severely affected freedom of expression or information; (b) offences were committed or manifested in states where these rights were seriously jeopardized; and (c) a decision from an international body established the State's responsibility in the restriction of these rights. In September 2015, the authorities started working on rules of procedure to implement the Organic Law of the Office of the State Attorney General and establish a specialized unit for crimes against freedom of information and freedom of expression.

58. Other sources indicated that FEADLE exercised its jurisdiction on a discretionary basis, as it investigated crimes against journalists but not against freedom of expression and adopted a restrictive definition of journalism, which often excluded persons who exercised this profession from non-conventional platforms or for whom journalism was not the main profession or source of income. For example, in the murder of Moses Sanchez, director and editor of the newspaper *La Union* of Medellin de Bravo, the Office of the State Attorney General qualified him only as a taxi driver and dismissed his case as unrelated to his journalism.²² In addition, FEADLE often procrastinated in deciding to exercise its jurisdiction, leaving it to local entities to initiate inquiries, which meant that investigations could be partial or incomplete. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted the reticence of FEADLE to exercise its jurisdiction over serious crimes and the lack of complete results in its investigations.²³ The National Human Rights Commission noted delays and deficiencies in some FEADLE investigations,²⁴ as well as difficulties in accessing information and figures on cases investigated by it.²⁵ The Special Rapporteur regrets to learn about the delays and the restrictive approach used by FEADLE in exercising its jurisdiction.

59. The Special Rapporteur also recommended that consideration be given to ensuring the full implementation of the Act on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists, providing the necessary financial and human resources for the effective and transparent implementation of the Mechanism for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists, guaranteeing close coordination between the bodies responsible for preventive and protective measures and ensuring the full participation of journalists, human rights defenders, civil society and beneficiaries in the implementation and functioning of the Mechanism. He also recommended raising awareness about the existence of the mechanism, especially at the local level (para. 116). The Government reported that the Mechanism had received 297 applications by July 2015, of which 239 had been admitted. Efforts were made to improve the functioning of the Mechanism, including: (a) collaborating with Freedom House to improve the methodology for analysing applications and to overcome the backlog; (b) increasing the effectiveness of protection measures and incorporating a gender and a collective perspective into risk analyses; (c) creating a prevention unit; and (d) working towards the implementation of the annual operative plan with a strategic vision. The Mechanism's trust fund for the protection of human rights defenders and journalists had received 267 million pesos for the provision of protection measures by March 2015. A civil society report published in July 2015 observed a number of challenges in the implementation of the Mechanism, including: (a) a lack of political support at the highest level; (b) insufficient coordination with state and municipal

²² See www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Recomendaciones/generales/RecGral_024.pdf, para. 91; and <http://www.articulo19.org/pgr-niega-que-moises-sanchez-fuera-periodista/>.

²³ See www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2014/146A.asp; Situación de los derechos humanos, paras. 388 and 418-427.

²⁴ See www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Recomendaciones/generales/RecGral_024.pdf, paras. 91 and 111.

²⁵ Ibid.

authorities; (c) inefficient functioning of the prevention unit; (d) insufficiently trained staff who rotate frequently; (e) an unclear methodology for risk assessment and errors made in risk analyses; (f) insufficient implementation of measures ordered; (g) protection measures focused on police protection and excluding root causes; (h) over-reliance on privatization of protection measures (panic buttons and private security); and (i) ineffective awareness-raising.²⁶ The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights observed the improvement of the Mechanism's internal procedures, while pointing to administrative and operative deficiencies, delays in the implementation of measures, a lack of follow-up to measures ordered and deficiencies in the panic button.²⁷ The Special Rapporteur is concerned about the numerous remaining challenges to the implementation of the recommendation and welcomes the recent measures adopted to overcome some of them.

D. Children

60. The Special Rapporteur noted with concern the high number of children unlawfully killed and the steady increase in deaths of youths, as well as the situation of children who were recruited by organized criminal groups and were subsequently killed in intercartel violence or confrontations with the police. He recommended that appropriate measures be taken to protect the right to life of children, particularly during public security actions, and that regulations be established for the armed forces, police and justice personnel on how to ensure the rights of children during the investigations of homicides. Data on the number of children killed should be collected and effective public policies should be introduced to prevent adolescents from being recruited by organized crime (para. 117). The Government recalled the existence of a general law and rules of procedure on the rights of children and adolescents, the agreement and protocol to assist children and adolescents in the context of organized crime, and agreement A/323/06 of the Office of the State Attorney General, entrusting an agent in each unit with all criminal cases involving children. Other sources indicated that children continued to be killed during security operations, as had been the case recently in Santa María Ostula, and in Tamaulipas where two babies had been injured when their mothers' car had been shot at by soldiers who had mistakenly taken them for criminals.²⁸ The Special Rapporteur regrets the lack of progress in the implementation of this recommendation, particularly with regard to the collection of data and the adoption of mechanisms to protect children from violence by criminal groups or during public security operations.

E. Inmates and detainees

61. The Special Rapporteur expressed concern at the total lack of comprehensive and reliable information on deaths in places of detention. Such deaths were often the result of prison riots, mass escapes, targeted assassinations and torture. He recommended that conditions for all detainees be improved in compliance with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, and the right to life of all inmates be ensured (para. 118). The Government reported that federal prisons had increased their capacity by 22 per cent between 2012 and 2015 and that nine new federal social readaptation centres were under construction. A pilot project had been implemented to provide highly specialized

²⁶ See <http://redtdt.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/272758468-Segundo-diagnostico-Espacio-OSC.pdf>.

²⁷ See www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2014/146A.asp; Situación de los derechos humanos, paras. 431-451.

²⁸ The incident took place in late October 2015.

examinations through telemedicine. Furthermore, the Senate was drafting an opinion with a view to issuing the National Criminal Enforcement Act, which was intended to benefit inmates and focus on improving their social inclusion. The Special Rapporteur acknowledges the measures adopted to increase the structural capacity of prisons and to improve access to health care and social engagement. He regrets that he did not receive information on measures adopted to protect prisoners from threats to their life and physical integrity. In that regard, he is dismayed to learn about the deaths of 49 people during a quarrel between inmates in Topo Chico prison, an institution that has been denounced for its deficits in security and governance by the National Human Rights Commission and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.²⁹

F. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals

62. The Special Rapporteur noted the alarming pattern of grotesque homicides of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals and the broad impunity for these crimes, sometimes with the suspected complicity of investigative authorities. He recommended that police and other authorities be trained on gender-identity and sexual-orientation awareness, that protective and precautionary measures be ensured and that societal tolerance be encouraged (para. 119). The Government replied that the 2014 reform of the Federal Act for the Prevention and Elimination of Discrimination included homophobia and violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation as acts of discrimination. Fifteen federal entities had adopted constitutional provisions prohibiting discrimination on these grounds. The Government had instituted the National Day for the Fight against Homophobia and adopted the National Programme on Equality and Non-Discrimination for 2014-2018, which included several lines of work to combat violence and discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. The Government also recalled the July 2015 protocol of the Office of the State Attorney General in this field. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights observed that 42 homicides of transsexual persons and 37 homicides of homosexual men had been reported between January 2013 and March 2014.³⁰ While the Special Rapporteur takes note of the measures adopted to combat violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons, he is dismayed to learn about the recurrence of violence against them. He observes the lack of information concerning training initiatives.

VI. Conclusions

63. **In the two years since the country visit, Mexico has made progress in addressing some of the concerns and recommendations in the report, and various other reforms are under way. The Government has implemented a number of positive measures to tackle impunity, reduce the militarization of public security, improve institutional coordination and information gathering in investigations of human rights violations and provide legal protection to vulnerable groups.**

64. **However, Mexico continues to face various challenges in relation to the protection of the right to life. Violence at the hands of State and non-State actors continues to affect lives, particularly of vulnerable persons. Protective measures for**

²⁹ See www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Comunicados/2016/Com_2016_040.pdf and www.ohchr.org/SP/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17045&LangID=S.

³⁰ Situación de los derechos humanos, para. 261.

groups at risk remain insufficient and ineffective. Despite a series of legal and institutional reforms, the lack of accountability for violations of the right to life remains a serious challenge, fostering the public perception of impunity and feeding into the cycle of violence. Adequate reparations to victims are still pending. Additional measures are still required to fully implement the Special Rapporteur's previous recommendations in order to better ensure the protection of the right to life.

VII. Summary of follow-up to each recommendation³¹

A. Legal and policy framework

65. The recommendations contained in paragraphs 94, 95, 99, 101 and 104-106 have been partially implemented.

66. The recommendations contained in paragraphs 93, 96, 98, 100, 102, 103, 107, 109 and 110 have not been implemented.

67. Insufficient information has been provided to enable assessment of progress in implementing the recommendations contained in paragraphs 97 and 108.

B. Vulnerable persons

68. The recommendations contained in paragraphs 111-113, 115, 116 and 119 have been partially implemented.

69. The recommendations contained in paragraphs 117 and 118 have not been implemented.

70. Insufficient information has been provided to enable assessment of progress in implementing the recommendations contained in paragraph 114.

C. General

71. The recommendations contained in paragraph 122 have been partially implemented.

72. The recommendations contained in paragraphs 120 and 121 have not been implemented.

³¹ See A/HRC/26/36/Add.1, paras. 93-122.