



ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION

MODULE 4 – ATD implementation models



UNHCR
The UN Refugee Agency





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
LEARNING OBJECTIVES AND MODULE STRUCTURE

✓ **BY THE END OF THIS MODULE, YOU WILL BE ABLE TO:**

- List the different implementation models of ATDs;
- Demonstrate specialized knowledge of the different ATD implementation models; and
- Describe the standards for ATD implementation.

Please read the following screens carefully and complete the assignments and a self-check.

This module should take you about 60 minutes to complete.



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THE PRINCIPLE OF MINIMUM INTERVENTION

As described in Module 2, when designing alternatives to detention States should observe the principle of 'minimum intervention' and pay close attention to the needs of people in situations of vulnerability/risk such as children, pregnant women, the elderly, people with disabilities or who have experienced trauma (see [Detention Guidelines, Guideline No. 4, para. 39](#)). In this context, minimum intervention means that any condition or restriction placed with the alternative to detention must be the least intrusive or restrictive option available in consideration of the vulnerability or risk factors particular to that individual case.

Alternatives can involve more or fewer restrictions on freedom of movement, and may not be equal in this regard. While phone reporting and the use of other modern technologies can be good practice, especially for individuals with mobility difficulties, other forms of electronic monitoring – such as wrist or ankle bracelets – are considered harsh, not least because of the criminal stigma attached to their use. They should be avoided as much as possible (see [Detention Guidelines, Guideline 4, para. 40](#)).

Please read these documents:

- The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures ([The Tokyo Rules](#)), adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/110 of 14 December 1990, para. 2.6
- UNHCR, [Global Roundtable Summary Conclusions](#), para. 21

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CHAPTER 3

VARIETY OF ATDs

We will examine a range of alternatives to detention in this module. Some can be combined for use with a single person, depending on the individual situation, the stage of the immigration process and the degree of compliance with obligations. Some ATDs impose greater restrictions on liberty or freedom of movement than others. The list of alternatives to detention covered in this module is non-exhaustive. States may use other types, and they also remain free to create measures that best fit the local context.

Most existing alternatives to detention are applicable to all groups of people (genders, ages, asylum-seekers at the border, people in return procedures). However, specific alternatives to detention are increasingly being developed to avoid the detention of children in both asylum and return procedures. See Unit 6 of the Fundamentals of Immigration Detention e-Learning and Module 5.

You may also want to read the International Detention Coalition's [handbook](#) on ATDs, *There are Alternatives: A handbook for preventing unnecessary immigration detention* (revised edition).



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
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TYPES OF ATD MODELS – INTRODUCTION

The ATDs examined in this module fall into the following categories:

1. Reporting conditions;
2. Community supervision;
3. Deposit or surrender of documentation;
4. Bails, financial and other guarantees;
5. Directed residence; and
6. Other measures (e.g. electronic tagging).

The wide range of available ATDs should not lead to the conclusion that there is a simple menu of options for governments and other decision makers. Rather, these measures entail varying degrees of coerciveness, and decision makers must only use means that are necessary, reasonable and proportionate to the particular legitimate aim being pursued.



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ATD MODELS – REPORTING CONDITIONS

This is one of the most common alternative to detention States (e.g. 'Hong Kong, China', Canada, Lithuania, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States) apply in practice. This is also the case for some regional instruments (e.g. the [EU Reception Conditions Directive, Article 8.4](#)). Reporting conditions can be attractive to the individual and to the State, because of their cost-efficiency and minimum intervention with regard to people's freedom of movement.

This model of ATD entails an obligation to report regularly to the authorities by presenting oneself to them at specified times (see Odysseus Network's report on Alternatives to Detention). Reporting acts as a monitoring mechanism. It ensures that asylum-seekers remain known to and in contact with the authorities. When reporting, an asylum-seeker may be required to sign a register documenting his or her presence (see the [IDC's handbook on ATDs](#)). As done in some countries, a good practice is to couple this reporting requirement with case management and other support services, which contribute to further ensuring compliance with the asylum-migration process.



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
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
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See some elements that are relevant for implementation of a reporting ATD:

Elements to consider	Explanation	Examples
Authorities to report to	Authorities to report to could include local migration authorities, police or social workers, among others, or sometimes NGOs or private contractors in community supervision models. Reporting to social workers (e.g. instead of to police) can prevent traumatization.	Local migration authority (in Sweden and the United Kingdom) At police stations, under the authority of the regional federal police directorates (in Austria). Social workers: this practice exists in the United Kingdom and is sometimes applied for unaccompanied minors; the Home Office contacts the social worker to check that the child is living at a designated address and maintaining contact with the social worker (see the IDC's handbook on ATDs)
Method of reporting	Physical appearance (in person) or via telephone (electronic voice recognition), or in writing to the authorities. Telephone reporting might be relevant for people with restricted mobility or specific personal circumstances (e.g. pregnancy), or for those living far from reporting locations.	In its policy, the United Kingdom Home Office uses telephone reporting when risk of non-compliance is low and combines it with in-person reporting (see the IDC's handbook on ATDs).
Frequency of reporting	Frequency can vary greatly: daily, weekly or even monthly. It could be periodic, or scheduled around asylum hearings and/or other official appointments. Frequency is typically at the discretion of the body determining the ATD. It might be reduced over time (this is considered good practice, with restrictions minimized based on the compliant behaviour).	People released to the Toronto Bail Program (TBP) are initially required to report twice weekly to TBP offices in downtown Toronto. Reporting requirements are loosened as trust develops between the two parties and if there are no lapses in reporting (see Alice Edwards' article).
Elements to consider	Explanation	Examples
Sanctions for non-compliance	Sanctions might come in the form of more frequent reporting or more restrictive measures. Reasons for non-compliance need to be properly assessed and flexibility shown where there are good reasons for any delays.	The authorities in Sweden show some flexibility in applying sanctions if a person has a valid explanation for not reporting. In the United Kingdom, a person may contact the Home Office if unable to report. Valid reasons include medical needs and asylum interviews (see the IDC's handbook on detention).

Reporting requirements can be combined with a designated residence or surrender of documents. See some examples of how reporting is regulated in national rules:

Example: [Detailed general instructions](#) on how to apply reporting in the United Kingdom: Home Office, General Instructions: Immigration Removals, Enforcement and Detention, Reporting and Offender Management section)



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
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Possible constraints in applying reporting as an ATD

- It is important to ensure that reporting requirements are necessary and proportionate and do not impose an excessive burden on a person in terms of time and cost, either on its own or on a cumulative basis with other forms of ATDs. Thus, reporting should be assigned after considering an individual's situation and needs.
- The level of coerciveness related to a reporting requirement can vary considerably depending on how the requirement is applied. For example, reporting at a police station is not the best way to establish trust with the person and ensure engagement with the migration and asylum process. If reporting frequency is intense (for example, daily) reporting poses greater challenges than if it were weekly or monthly. Reasons for non-compliance also need to be properly assessed and flexibility shown when imposing any sanctions in relation to this factor (see Odysseus Network's [report](#)).
- Reporting that requires an individual or his or her family to travel long distances or to travel at their own expense can lead to non-cooperation due to inability to fulfil the conditions. This can unfairly discriminate based on economic status (see UNHCR [Options Paper 2](#)).
- Specific reporting sessions may not be necessary if the asylum-seeker has regular contacts with the administration through a procedure (e.g. renewing documentation, conducting the asylum interview or receiving financial allowances). Adding reporting requirements to regular appointments could constitute an unnecessary burden. This is particularly the case where the asylum-seeker or migrant is in a reception centre managed by the State (see Odysseus Network's [report](#)).



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
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INTERIM ASSIGNMENT

Please consult the UNHCR ATD Evaluation criteria (Annex 1 to this module) and fill in the chart below to see if reporting conditions are an alternative to detention available in your country.

Questions	Situation in your country	Complies or not with the standard?	Comment (if you have any that do not fit within the first two columns)
Is the information provided to the asylum-seekers and migrants about reporting requirements sufficiently clear and available in multiple languages?			
Are modalities of reporting adapted to specific needs (e.g. telephone reporting, reporting to social workers instead of police to avoid re-traumatization)?			Explain these modalities and how they are adapted for use in your country
Is the frequency of reporting, either automatically or upon request, reduced over time?			



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Are reporting conditions periodically reviewed?

Are the frequency and location for reporting established with consideration for the person's circumstances (including specific needs)?

Are travel expenses related to reporting covered by the authorities, and if so, by which authorities?

Are reasons for non-compliance with reporting requirements properly assessed? Is flexibility shown by the authorities where there are good reasons for any delays in reporting?


What are the consequences of non-compliance with reporting requirements?

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ATD MODELS – COMMUNITY SUPERVISION

Community supervision arrangements refer to a wide range of practices in which individuals and families are released into the community, with a degree of support and guidance (supervision). Supervision may be by the State or a designated representative, such as a non-governmental organization or a community or religious organization. Supervision can take place via periodic home visits or check-ins by supervisors, and can also include providing support for access to work, accommodation, education, legal assistance, and other services or direct provision of goods. Community supervision should be distinguished from reporting obligations, where the responsibility is on the individual to report to a designated State agency (see [Council of Europe's analysis on ATDs](#); see also UNHCR Detention Guidelines, Annex A (vii)).



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
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
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See some elements that are relevant for implementation of a community supervision ATD:

Elements to consider	Explanation	Examples
Place of supervision	Community facilities or the offices of the relevant service provider while the individual lives freely in the community.	Emergency housing and shelters for vulnerable migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees – run by civil society organizations, government agencies, or both in partnership – are in use in Egypt, Kenya and Zambia (see IDC’s publication on ATDs in Africa).
Supervisory body/ official	Although it can be done by migration authorities or delegated bodies, good practice is supervision without a law-enforcement nature and done by NGOs and other organizations (e.g. religious or community organizations). Supervision may also be carried out by a family member, or a relative. There could be an agreement between the NGO in charge of the supervision and the authorities (with agreement for the NGO to report if the person fails to comply with supervision).	<p>In Sweden, asylum-seekers are followed by both a reception and a procedure case officer, who are representatives of the Migration Board, until their case is resolved (see Odysseus Network’s report).</p> <p>In the United States, the Vera Institute of Justice was contracted by the Government to undertake a three-year test of community supervision for people in removal proceedings between 1997–2000 (see the IDC’s handbook on ATDs).</p> <p>In Libya, some local level officials have shown initiative in creating safe release-to-work schemes and allowing the occasional release of vulnerable individuals into the care of NGOs who can provide housing and medical care (see IDC’s publication on ATDs in Africa).</p> <p>In Australia, community and church-based organizations have been contracted to provide so called ‘community detention’ services. These allow asylum-seekers to live in a specified residence in the community where they are placed by these organizations and provided with residential, health and welfare services as well as intensive casework support. Although community detention is a form of detention, asylum-seekers are not monitored by detention guards as they would be in detention. They can move around in the community, engage in activities and social events in the community, and experience some semblance of normalcy in their lives. It gives them the ability to stay in closer contact with friends, family members and support networks (see article by Catherine Marshall, Suma Pillai and Louise Stack).</p>



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Possible constraints in applying supervision as an ATD

Using supervision could have human rights implications, because it can, depending on the supervision type and enforcement approach, be an intrusive measure to ensure compliance. Thus, supervision as an ATD needs to be assigned based on the situation and needs of each individual and as much as possible integrating its non-enforcement nature through community engagement.


Elements to consider	Explanation	Examples
Supervision activities	Direct observation of the location and activities of the asylum-seeker; periodic home visits or check-ins by the supervisors; communication and contact with the asylum-seeker (e.g. home visits); supporting asylum-seekers to participate actively in the procedures.	In Australia, Hotham Mission is one of several NGOs that operate a programme for those who are not covered by the formal programmes. HM staff accompany clients to interviews and meetings at Department of Immigration and Border Protection and provide immigration advice, assistance in finding housing in the community, and referral to other services (see Alice Edwards' article).
Sanctions for non-compliance	Guarantors may be required to pay a penalty for non-compliance of the individual.	

Supervision could also be optional, with individuals informed about services available but not obligated to participate in them. Please refer to the [UNHCR Detention Guidelines, Annex A](#).

INTERIM ASSIGNMENT

Please consult the UNHCR ATD Evaluation criteria (Annex 1 to this module) and fill in the chart below to check if community supervision is an alternative to detention available in your country.

Questions	Situation in your country	Complies or not with the standard?	Comment (if you have any that do not fit within the first two columns)
What does the supervision entail, and who provides the supervision?			
Is supervision enforcement- or community-based?			
Are measures of supervision intrusive or not with respect to the person's privacy?			
Does supervision include provision of services, or observation only?			
What type of services are available? What is their quality?			



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



ATD MODELS – DEPOSIT OR SURRENDER OF DOCUMENTATION

Asylum-seekers may be required to deposit or surrender identity and/or travel documentation (such as passports) as a guarantee of their future compliance with immigration or asylum procedures. In such cases, individuals need to be issued with substitute documentation that authorizes their stay in the territory and/or their release into the community. They also need to be granted access to basic care arrangements such as education, housing and health care.

To learn more, please refer to the [UNHCR Detention Guidelines](#), Annex A.

Surrender of documentation is a soft measure that many States use as a routine procedure for people in immigration procedures, rather than as an alternative to detention as such (see [Council of Europe’s analysis on ATDs](#)). For example, the obligation to surrender a passport or other identity or travel document to the authorities as an alternative to detention exists in 14 EU Member States (see EMN’s [report](#) on ATDs). This obligation can be imposed alone or together with other alternatives, such as the duty to stay in a particular location or area.





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See some elements that are relevant to implementation of the deposit or surrender of documentation ATD:

Elements to consider	Explanation	Examples
Depositing authorities	The documents are deposited with asylum/migration authorities, police.	In Latvia, the asylum-seeker deposits travel documents and other personal identification documents to an official of the State Border Guard.
Requirements for deposit or surrender of documentation	ID documents, such as travel document, passport, ID cards, sometimes travel tickets (in case of return procedures) and others. Substitute document shall be issued and provide access to various services that asylum-seekers would be able to access with their ID documents.	In Finland, the obligation concerns the travel document (e.g. passport) and person's ticket to their country of destination until the order can be enforced. In France, it covers the passport or other identity or travel documents and can go hand in hand with residence requirements. In Sweden, when a refusal-of-entry or return order is issued, the enforcing authority can retain the alien's identity document or their ticket to their country of destination until the order can be enforced (see EMN's report on ATDs).
Sanctions for non-compliance	Documents would not be returned for the entire asylum/return procedure	Cypriot Refugee Law allows for the possibility of detention for the purpose of establishing a person's identity, if a person refuses to hand over their personal documents (see EMN's ad-hoc query).



Possible constraints in applying the deposit/surrender of documentation ATD

- This ATD may have human rights implications, because it could hamper realization of basic human rights by limiting access to services, such as education, housing and health care, if the substitute documents are not recognized by officials in these other sectors.
- This ATD may lead to arrest and detention if police and other enforcement officials fail to recognize the substitute documents, which could put asylum-seekers in a more precarious situation (see [Council of Europe's analysis on ATDs](#)). Therefore, it is essential that proper substitute documents that are recognized by non-migration authorities in the country are issued as a replacement while personal documents are deposited or surrendered.





ATD MODELS – BAIL/FINANCIAL AND OTHER GUARANTEES

There are several possibilities related to using financial guarantees or sureties as ATDs:

a) Provision of a guarantor/surety. Asylum-seekers may be allowed to provide a guarantor/surety who would be responsible for ensuring their compliance with the requirements of asylum procedures (e.g. attendance at official appointments and hearings, reporting under the conditions of release). Please refer to the [UNHCR Detention Guidelines](#), Annex A.

Sureties are financial guarantors who agree to be bound by a sum of money that could be forfeited in entirety or in part if the detainee fails to report as required. Because the surety is usually combined with the obligation for the sponsor to take charge of all expenses related to the applicant, sponsorship is a cost-free measure for States (see [Odysseus Network's report](#)).





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
See some elements that are relevant for implementation of guarantor/surety ATD:

Elements to consider	Explanation	Examples
Guarantor/surety	Family member, NGO or a community group.	In Lithuania, there were a few cases when non-relatives, namely the Caritas Shelter and the Orthodox monastery, took responsibility for sponsoring and accommodating asylum-seekers.
Requirements for guarantor/surety	May need to hold the nationality of the host country, be a long-term resident or have a residence permit. The existence of family ties between the applicant and the 'sponsor' might be taken into account. May need to be able to demonstrate that they can provide accommodation and daily subsistence for the asylum-seeker.	In the United Kingdom, the surety must have immigration status, regular address, means of subsistence or knowledge of the applicant (see Odysseus Network's report).
Sanctions for non-compliance	Failure to appear could lead to the forfeiture of a sum of money – being levied against the guarantor/surety. Reversely, the sum of money is returned if the individual appears as required.	



Possible constraints in applying the guarantor/surety ATD


Research has shown the risks of exploitation inherent in the dependency between the asylum-seeker and the 'sponsor', especially when there is no pre-existing link between the parties (see [Alice Edwards' article](#)). Furthermore, newcomers may have fewer community ties and thus at a disadvantage when looking for a guarantor.



b) Release on bail/bond. This alternative allows for asylum-seekers already in detention to apply for release on bail (payment of a financial deposit by themselves or a by guarantor) or bond (written agreement between the authorities and the individual, often alongside a deposit of financial surety). This ATD is easier to apply in countries with large immigrant communities, and for individuals who have lived long periods in the country, because established community ties and sufficient financial resources are more likely. The benefit for the government is that release on bail/bond is a cost-saving measure since the guarantor usually has the obligation to cover the asylum-seeker's expenses (see [Council of Europe's analysis on ATDs](#)).

See some elements that are relevant for implementation of the release on bail/bond ATD:

Elements to consider	Explanation	Examples
Source of bail/bond	Individual funds of the asylum-seeker, third-party funds (family members, friends, community, NGOs). In some cases, bond may be government-funded.	<p>In several countries that operate a system of finance-related ATDs, NGOs have funds available for eligible detainees who may otherwise be unable to afford to apply to the bond program (e.g. in Canada, Hong Kong SAR and the United States) (see IDC's handbook on ATDs).</p> <p>In Canada, the Toronto Bail Program (TBP), a non-profit entity, supports the release of asylum-seekers from detention via bail. The TBP has a contract with the Canadian Border Services Agency and acts as the 'bondsman' for those asylum-seekers who have no family or other eligible guarantors to pay bond. In this way, the TBP removes the financial discrimination inherent in other bail systems. Under the TBP, no payment is made. Instead, asylum-seekers are released based on the TBP's guarantee. As per the contract signed between the asylum-seeker and the TBP, they agree to appear for all appointments, notify the TBP of a change of address and participate in meaningful activities (e.g. education, vocational training, work) while in Canada. Reporting requirements generally reduce as trust is established between TBP and the asylum-seeker. The TBP may organize unannounced visits to the asylum-seeker's residence (see UNHCR Options Paper No. 2).</p> <p>In Canada, bail is automatically considered an option to enable release. A significant factor in favour of release is if the detainee's application is supported by a 'bondsman'. This person agrees to pay a monetary bond up front, held in trust and then returned if the individual complies with the conditions of release (see IDC's handbook on ATDs).</p>



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Elements to consider	Explanation	Examples
		<p>In the United Kingdom, bail is available upon request within the first eight days of detention by making an application to an immigration officer. Later on, the application for bail can be submitted to an immigration judge. There are some exceptions. Detained asylum-seekers may be required to produce a surety, an individual who agrees to be held responsible for ensuring compliance with bail conditions. This requirement is not automatic: due regard is given to the fact that people recently arrived in the country may have nobody to stand surety for them. If there are no reasonable grounds for concluding that the applicant will abscond, a surety is unnecessary (see UNHCR Options Paper No. 2).</p> <p>In Jordan, nationals are permitted to act as bailor/guarantor for released detainees.</p>
Nature and amount of the bail/bond	<p>Bail/bond could be financial or non-financial. If financial, the amount must be reasonable given the situation of the asylum-seeker. It cannot be so high as to render bail system merely theoretical. Individual assessment is needed. Non-financial bail/bond does not require handing over any funds (e.g. the asylum-seeker is bailed to an NGO). Amounts may be required up front or in case of non-compliance only.</p>	<p>In the United States, bonds are set at very high levels for most asylum-seekers, but this has been challenged. Even in countries where bond amounts are very low, asylum-seekers often do not have funds and are thus not able to benefit from low-level bonds.</p> <p>In the United Kingdom, the bail guidance and its annexes describe bail conditions that can be imposed. They make clear that stringency of the conditions should vary according to the circumstances of the applicant and the level of monitoring required. There is also guidance on setting the amount of any financial bond (see UNHCR Options Paper No. 2).</p>



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
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Elements to consider	Explanation	Examples
Conditions	Information to asylum-seekers about availability; accessibility; legal assistance.	The United Kingdom provides asylum-seekers with a leaflet about what to expect from the asylum process, and their rights and responsibilities. The Swedish Migration Agency web site has information in 15 languages; however, this requires internet access by asylum-seekers (see IDC's handbook on ATDs).
Sanctions for non-compliance	Negative financial consequences – usually financial surety is forfeited in case of absconding or non-compliance by the asylum-seeker.	Failure to comply with reporting obligations under the Toronto Bail Program (TBP) may result in the TPB informing the provincial authorities, in which case the person would be placed under a Canada-wide arrest warrant. TBP makes it explicit that failure to report may result in return to detention. In 2012–2013, 95.1 per cent of a total of 415 supervised individuals complied fully with the programme (see UNHCR Options Paper No. 2).



Possible constraints in applying the release on bail/bond ATD

- Bail/bond and guarantor/surety systems tend to discriminate against people with limited funds and those who do not have previous connections in the community.
- Systematically requiring asylum-seekers to pay a bond or designate a guarantor/surety, with any failure to do so resulting in detention (or its continuation), suggests that the system is arbitrary and not tailored to individual circumstances. Please refer to the [UNHCR Detention Guidelines](#), Annex A.



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
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INTERIM ASSIGNMENT

Please consult the UNHCR ATD Evaluation criteria (Annex 1 to this module) and fill in the chart below to check if the bail/bond and guarantor/surety is an alternative to detention available in your country.

Questions	Situation in your country	Complies or not with the standard?	Comment (if you have any that do not fit within the first two columns)
Where the provision of a guarantor/surety or bail/bond is a condition of release, has there been an assessment of whether this measure is proportionate to individual circumstances (reasonable amount, capacity of the person to provide a guarantor, etc.) to ensure compliance in this individual case?			
Are individuals informed of the possibility of providing a guarantor/surety?			
Are NGOs or community groups authorized to act as a guarantor/surety? Are asylum-seekers informed about this?			



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Are guarantors and sureties vetted/checked to avoid exploitation of asylum-seekers or migrants? If so, how are they vetted/checked?

Where release on bail/bond is possible, are asylum-seekers informed of this possibility? How?

Do people in detention receive support (from lawyers, NGOs, social workers) to access bail or bond?

Are bail hearings automatic (when in detention) and available on a regular basis (e.g. every month)?




Asylum-seekers may be directed upon arrival or released from detention on condition they reside at a specific address or within a specific administrative region until their status has been determined. This can involve various options including private and community accommodations, open or semi-open reception or asylum centres, publicly run centres with or without a coaching component, centres for unaccompanied minors, etc. In assigning such measures, efforts should be made to approve residency that facilitates family reunification or closeness to relatives and/or other support networks. Please refer to the [UNHCR Detention Guidelines](#), Annex A.

Private accommodation or other community-based options (living in the community – having a specific administrative region assigned) is usually less intrusive than residence in an open or semi-open centre. The advantage of private accommodation or community-based options is that they are a relatively low-cost alternative, and they allow people to live near family and other support networks (see [Council of Europe’s analysis on ATDs](#)). Designated residence in a specific region may be attractive to the authorities, because it could more evenly distribute responsibility among different regions of the country for reception of asylum-seekers.

Placement of the asylum-seeker in open or semi-open facilities is one of the most common ATDs for asylum-seekers. In these types of centres, people can leave the facility during the day but have to return at night. These centres must fully respect human rights, in particular, the right to liberty and freedom of movement. In open centres, general freedom of movement within and outside the centre should be observed to ensure that residence in the centre does not become a form of detention. While setting up open structures is costlier than establishing a reporting obligation or a sponsorship system, it is cheaper than detention and respectful of rights. It can also be more effective (see [Odysseus Network’s report](#)).

In Belgium, for example, there are 27 so-called ‘return houses’ in four locations, for families in return procedures. These houses differ greatly in size: some are big houses, while others are small apartments or studios. The total capacity of all ‘return houses’ is 169 beds. There are coaches, a coordinator, a logistical support and a logistical supervisor in the houses and no guards. The cost of this arrangement averages 90€ per person per day, compared with detention, which costs 186€ per person per day. You may want to consult [Odysseus Network’s report](#) and [this article](#).





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
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Elements to consider	Explanation	Examples
Place of residence	Private and community accommodations, open or semi-open reception or asylum centres, publicly run centres with or without a coaching component, centres for unaccompanied minors.	<p>Lithuania runs a semi-open Foreigners' Registration Centre, where asylum-seekers can leave any time during day and night but need to report to the authorities within certain deadlines. The ATD element here is in restrictions applied to the asylum-seekers in comparison to those in reception, who can move freely in and out of the centre.</p> <p>In Austria, asylum-seekers subject to this ATD are placed in ordinary reception centres, which can be small housing units managed by NGOs such as Diakonie. NGOs run the centres and provide services, while the asylum-seekers placed under ATD are under the responsibility of the police. Asylum-seekers who are living in private accommodation can be subject to ATD with the obligation to report at regular intervals to a nearby police station (usually 24 hours, Article 77 (6) of the Aliens Police Act). As a consequence, prolonged absence (usually three days) of someone under an alternative to detention has to be reported to the police, which is not the case for other asylum-seekers (see Odysseus Network's report).</p> <p>The Belgian authorities have expressed willingness to allow families to stay in their own homes during asylum procedures, with coaches meeting the families in a neutral place (see Odysseus Network's report).</p> <p>In Canada, temporary shelter for homeless individuals called FCJ Refugee Centre provides housing for women and children. FCJ has a 99.9 per cent compliance rate. When detainees are homeless but are required to provide an address upon release, they can be placed in a temporary shelter programme, Matthew House, that does not supervise residents or impose curfews. Over five years 300 immigrants in proceedings were housed there, with only three absconding. A similar homeless shelter, Sojourn House, took in 3,600 over a period of six years, with only two absconding (see IDC's interactive map of ATD practices).</p>



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Possible constraints in applying directed residence in accommodation centres


- In cases of residence in open or semi-open reception or asylum centres, where curfews and/or signing into and out of the centre may be required, the degree of freedom of movement allowed should be sufficient to qualify the alternative as a 'real alternative to detention', as opposed to a form of detention.
- Because asylum-seekers do not have the choice to live in a place other than the one designated, flexibility needs to be ensured related to changing the designated residence (with certain justifications). People's needs may evolve (family members may be assigned another residence, and therefore one would need to change address, etc.), thus a lack of flexibility in applying this ATD might result in human rights violations.

Elements to consider	Explanation	Examples
Content of obligations	<p>In case of private accommodation, conditions include prior approval for moving out of the designated administrative region, and informing the authorities of a change of address if moving within the same administrative region.</p> <p>In case of residence at a designated open reception or asylum facility, the asylum seeker is subject to the rules of those centres, with some rules and regulations for the good administration of the centre (e.g. curfews and/or signing into or out of the centre).</p>	<p>In Austria, designated residence can be in centres run either by the State or by private actors such as NGOs or private companies. The latter are paid per person housed. If the person leaves the place of accommodation, the NGO or the owner of the facility must report this to the authorities, usually after three days (see Odysseus Network's report).</p>
Sanctions for non-compliance	<p>Not respecting the rules of a centre may result in applying more restrictive measures or, as a last resort, in placement in detention. However, flexibility needs to be ensured, because people may have good reasons for non-compliance.</p>	<p>In Belgium, if families do not respect the internal rules of housing units, this does not lead immediately to detention. Few sanctions are implemented. The coaches can be stricter in the distribution of food (for example, by distributing vouchers only day by day). In extreme circumstances (e.g. domestic violence, putting children in danger, or threatening the coach), one of the parents could be transferred to a closed centre (see Odysseus Network's report).</p>

INTERIM ASSIGNMENT

Please consult the UNHCR ATD Evaluation criteria (Annex 1 to this module) and fill in the chart below to check if directed residence is an alternative to detention available in your country.

Questions	Situation in your country	Complies or not with the standard?	Comment
Are efforts made to assign and to approve a change in residency that facilitates family reunification or closeness to relatives or other support networks?			
If the needs of asylum-seekers evolve, is flexibility ensured for a change in directed residence?			
In cases of residence at open or semi-open reception or asylum centres, where curfews and/or signing into and out of the centre may be required, is the degree of freedom of movement allowed sufficient to qualify the alternative as a 'real alternative to detention', as opposed to a form of detention?			
In situations of residence at open or semi-open centres, is full respect for human rights ensured?			
Is flexibility ensured if asylum-seekers have good reasons for non-compliance, and are their explanations considered before assigning ta more restrictive measure for non-compliance?			



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


ATD MODELS – ELECTRONIC TAGGING

One of the most coercive alternative to detention currently in place is electronic monitoring. This has been used extensively in the criminal justice system, but so far only seldom in the migration context. This is the least preferred option in the asylum context.

How does electronic tagging work?

For example, in the United Kingdom, electronic tagging is a form of electronic monitoring applied to asylum-seekers and migrants. Tags are linked to a nearby sensor or monitored via satellite tracking. However, the Home Office rarely uses satellite tracking. In most cases, a receiver is placed in the individual's home and an electronic bracelet is fitted around the individual's ankle to report whether the person is home at specific times (see [Odysseus Network's report](#)).



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
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See some elements that are relevant for implementation of electronic tagging


Elements to consider	Explanation	Examples
Place of monitoring	Home of the individual or a certain restricted area.	
Monitoring body/ official	Electronic monitoring by migration authorities	
Monitoring activities	Intensive monitoring by migration authorities or outsourced organizations to directly observe an individual's location and activities through a bracelet placed on the ankle of the person and a sensor placed at their home; this may also include curfew at certain times of the day or night.	In the United States, the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP) includes in-person office visits, unannounced home visits, reporting non-compliance, employment verification, etc.
Content of the measure	Define long the person shall remain at his/her home every day for electronic monitoring.	In the United States, ISAP is administered by a private contractor, The Geo Group, which has the discretion to determine the frequency of office visits and home visits.
Sanctions for non-compliance	Not respecting the rules may result in applying more restrictive measures or, as a last resort, in placement in detention.	



Possible constraints in applying electronic tagging

- The cost is high and difficult to manage for the state, because this ATD requires special equipment/infrastructure that is usually expensive.
- Electronic tagging has been criticized widely for its detrimental effect on people, especially for the psychological distress it creates.
- Electronic tagging has also been criticized for its stigmatizing effect, because it visually associates migrants and asylum-seekers with criminality. It can lead States to breach their human rights obligations in certain situations, for example:
 - a) The prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment, by the pain or psychological harm the device can cause an individual (especially one with vulnerabilities) and by the prospect of constant surveillance.
 - b) Depending on how it is implemented, tagging can become an alternative form of detention, depriving individuals of their right to liberty, if it forces the individual to remain at a specific place all or most of the time.
 - c) It can violate protection of privacy and family life if it enforces restrictions that interfere with the individual's ability to carry out the normal activities of a family life or that reveal private information (see Odysseus Network's report).

For these reasons, UNHCR recommends avoiding this ATD as far as possible.



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
Examples of testimonies of asylum-seekers subject to electronic tagging

Detrimental effect on children

From parents: “We could not attend school sports games or birthday parties with our children, and could not take their children outside the vicinity of their home because we had to stay nearby so as ‘to be in the house at certain hours.’” Parents also reported that the stigma and restrictions of electronic tagging contributed to their social isolation [and] that they suffered from stress and anxiety as a result of being tagged” (Odysseus Network’s [report](#)).

Physical discomfort caused by the bracelet

“[w]hen I was released, I had to wear a tag. I was supposed to be indoors from 6:00pm to 6:00am – twelve hours. The tag really hurt. You can see the black spot here [he shows the interviewer evidence of skin rash on his left ankle as a result of the tag]. That’s from the tag. It wasn’t tight, but if you’re walking it causes friction. It rubs against the skin from the sweat. Most of the time I had to wear something to keep it up high on my ankle, but it still affected my blood circulation” (Odysseus Network’s [report](#)).




The previous chapters looked at various models of ATDs, including the slight variations in terms of their application in practice. Here we will explore some of the good practices of these ATD models in more detail. Some of them include or combine elements from several ATD models.

Belgium: Directed residence in ‘open houses’ or ‘return houses’

In Belgium, families with children below the age of 18 years arriving at the border as well as undocumented families intercepted on Belgium territory are accommodated in return houses, also called “open family units”, state-owned community based houses or apartments, albeit considered under Belgian law as a “place of detention”. Accommodation conditions respect privacy and are adapted to family life and children’s needs. Families have to stay within the unit between 9 p.m. and 9 a.m. but otherwise enjoy freedom of movement. Children are enrolled in local schools and families are free to receive visitors at the units. During their stay, families are supported by a “coach” from the Immigration Office. The daily presence of the coach accompanies families towards the resolution of their asylum or immigration case or their preparation for return. The coach facilitates all necessary appointments (doctor, school, pro-bono lawyer, etc.) and gives or facilitates daily logistical, administrative and medical support to the families. Related costs, including coupons to buy food and other items from the local supermarkets are borne by the Immigration Office and are partially subsidized through the EU funds (see [UNHCR Options Paper No. 2](#)).

How does it work?





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
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United States: Reporting by telephone

change the whole text to: In the United States of America, reporting obligations imposed on asylum-seekers may be satisfied via telephonic reporting. The technology is owned and administered by a private contractor to the US Government. Individuals can “check-in” with U.S. immigration enforcement authorities over the phone via the contractor’s biometric voice recognition software. The frequency of the call-in is based on an assessment of risk and may be increased or decreased depending on the stage of an individual’s case. If the individual does not call-in at the appropriate intervals, reporting may be escalated or they may subject to re-detention (see [UNHCR Options Paper No. 2](#)). Compared with regular reporting at the offices of migration authorities, reporting by telephone addresses several issues: a) mobility, in particular when asylum-seekers are far from reporting entities or have other mobility difficulties; b) financial aspects, because asylum-seekers do not need to spend funds for travel; and c) efficiency, by saving time through reducing the need to travel physically to a reporting entity. However, an essential pre-condition for applying this ATD is perfectly operating technologies.

How does it work?





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
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
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Sweden: Reporting to police

In Sweden, under a supervision order, the person is obliged to report to the police authority or to the Swedish Migration Agency at certain times. To make it as convenient as possible for the person subject to the supervision order, the reporting may be at the police station/Swedish Migration Agency office situated closest to where he/she is residing. An individual may also be required to surrender his/her passport or other identity document. The decision on supervision or detention can be appealed at any time (see [UNHCR Options Paper No. 2](#)).

How does it work?





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
Canada: Bail programme

The Toronto Bail Program (TBP) is a non-profit entity supporting immigration detainees, including asylum-seekers and people awaiting removal, to be released from detention via bail. TBP acts as the 'bondsperson' for people who have no family or other eligible guarantors to pay bond. In this way, TBP removes the financial discrimination inherent in other bail systems. Asylum-seekers agree voluntarily to cooperate with TBP and all immigration procedures, including any reporting conditions set by the TBP. They also agree to depart Canada in the event of a final negative decision on their asylum or immigration application. Failure to comply with reporting obligations may result in TBP informing the provincial authorities, in which case the person would be placed under a Canada-wide arrest warrant. TBP makes it explicit that failure to report may result in return to detention. In 2012–2013, 95.1 per cent of a total of 415 supervised individuals complied fully with the programme (see [UNHCR Options Paper No. 2](#)).

The main benefits of this programme as identified by the Canadian Council for Refugees are:

- a) It provides significant support to individuals post-release (with housing, addiction programmes, mental health resources, support to apply for work permits and health coverage, accompaniment to appointments and Canada Border Services Agency reporting, etc.).
- b) It is able to provide referral and community connections in relevant areas such as addiction and mental health, which that can be extremely valuable for people with those needs.

At the same time, CCR notes some risks of this programme: It should not contribute to real or perceived criminalization of migrants, and should remain an exception and not the norm. You may wish to consult this [web site](#).



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Main elements:

Contract with authorities

Between Border Services Agency, and Toronto Bail Program (TBP)

TBP interviews

TBP carries out interviews to assess suitability of candidates for their supervision

TBP guarantee, no payment

Asylum-seeker released on the basis of this guarantee – TBP acts as the 'bondsperson'

Contract with asylum-seeker


Between TBP and asylum-seeker on appearing, notification of address, participation in meaningful activities (e.g. education)

Unannounced visits by TBP

May be carried out at asylum-seeker's residence

Case management

- One of the keys to programme success
- Initial orientation
- Information on access to legal, psychosocial and healthcare services



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
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
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
See IDC's [interactive map](#) of ATD practices for more examples:





Best practice indicates that alternatives are most effective when certain elements are present in their implementation. Read about different factors that contribute to the success of ATDs in terms of cost, compliance and well-being outcomes:





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Safeguards

Implementing ATDs starts by having all safeguards in place to ensure that detention is truly a measure of last resort. As described in the Fundamentals of Immigration Detention e-Learning and then in Module 2, these fundamental safeguards include regular review, having a maximum time limit, being documented to avoid being detained and others.

Screening and assessment

Understanding individual circumstances and using screening and assessment to make informed decisions about management and placement options is very important for the effectiveness of ATDs. It helps to tailor management and placement decisions (see [UNHCR-IDC Vulnerability Screening Tool](#)). While secondary movements cannot always be prevented, screening and assessment can assist in understanding motivating factors and facilitating registration with authorities (see IDC's [handbook](#) on ATDs).

Examples:

Libya: By conducting intake screening that looks not only at the vulnerabilities but also at strengths of individuals, some detention centre managers in Libya have created innovative release-to-work programmes whereby migrants are issued ID cards and released under the protection of an employer, whose treatment of the migrants is regularly reviewed (see Danish Refugee Council and IDC's [report](#)).

United States: The Risk Classification Assessment tool requires immigration officers to screen at the outset for the existence of family ties, immigration history including compliance with previous immigration decisions, and for medical, mental health and other vulnerability triggers. This tool includes prompting questions for several vulnerability triggers including disability, advanced age, pregnancy, nursing mothers, sole caretaking responsibilities, mental health issues and victimization. It helps identify asylum-seekers who may be eligible for relief under the Violence against Women Act, or who are survivors of crime or victims of trafficking (see IDC's [interactive map of ATD practices](#)).

Zambia: Protection Assistance to Vulnerable Migrants Policy Guidelines developed in partnership among various stakeholders and launched in 2014 aim to help first-line officials screen and refer vulnerable migrants and asylum-seekers to relevant government ministries, civil society organizations and UN agencies (see UNHCR's [progress report](#)).



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Case management

ATDs cannot function if they are not accompanied by a range of approaches and strategies, such as regular follow-up by social workers to support individuals in complying with administrative obligations. Thus individualized ‘coaching’ or case management services are essential for making alternatives work (see [UNHCR Options Paper No. 2](#)). Good case management has been identified as an important component in several successful alternatives, and as an aspect of good asylum systems (Please consult [UNHCR Detention Guidelines](#), Annex A.) The most successful alternatives use case management across all stages to ensure a coordinated and comprehensive approach to each case. Case management focuses on understanding and responding to the unique needs and challenges of the individual and their context (see [IDC’s handbook on ATDs](#)). Individualized support mechanisms and structures are necessary to enable the individual to work with authorities towards case resolution. If people understand the options available to them, they trust the system more. At the same time, UNHCR’s Progress Report mid-2016 on implementation of the global strategy Beyond Detention reveals that only eight countries covered by the strategy (Canada, Indonesia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, the United Kingdom, the United States and Zambia) apply case management in ATDs (see [UNHCR’s progress report](#)).

Case management is a strategy for supporting and managing individuals and their asylum or other migration claims while their status is being resolved, with a focus on informed decision making, timely and fair status resolution and improved coping mechanisms and individual well-being (see [UNHCR Options Paper No. 2](#)). Case management is carried out by social workers who engage with asylum-seekers and all other stakeholders (asylum authorities, health, legal professionals and others). It takes into account not only the legal case regarding an individual’s migration status, but also each person’s specific circumstances (such as family reunification options) and basic needs (such as shelter, health care, etc.). (See [IDC’s information](#) about alternatives to immigration detention in Africa.)

Case management involves:

- Appointment of case managers, who may be social workers, at an early stage of the asylum process, continuing until status is resolved;
- Active sharing of information with the asylum-seeker; and
- Code of conduct and other regulations on staff behaviour to guard against abuse (see [UNHCR Options Paper No. 2](#)).

Staff skill sets and personalities can contribute to the success or failure of case management. Staff recruitment and training need to be well managed, including through tailored training, courses and/or certification. There should be clear regulations and codes of conduct relating to staff behaviour. Please consult [UNHCR Detention Guidelines](#), Annex A.



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
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Examples:

Sweden: Asylum-seekers are appointed two caseworkers after registration. The first caseworker is responsible for the asylum process: he/she conducts interviews with the applicant to investigate his/her claim for asylum and prepare the decision that will be taken by the executive officer of the Swedish Migration Agency (SMA). A second caseworker supports the applicant in solving everyday life questions (daily allowance, special allowance, schooling, housing, etc.), referring him/her to medical care, counselling or other services where required. Located at a reception unit near the residence of the applicant, this caseworker also informs the asylum-seeker about decisions by the SMA or migration courts. This second caseworker also provides 'motivational counselling' to prepare the asylum-seeker for all possible migration outcomes and assesses the risk of absconding after a negative asylum decision. In the return process, this case worker organizes formal contacts to discuss return.

Belgium: As part of the 'open houses/units' for families with children, case management is provided in the form of a 'coach'. The assigned coach is from the Aliens Office and is on-site daily to help resolve their asylum or immigration case. Coaches also consider all legal avenues for the asylum-seeker to remain in Belgium. They assist with preparing for return and facilitate access to legal advice. The coach also arranges appointments (doctor, school, pro-bono lawyer, etc.) and provides or facilitates logistical, administrative and medical support to the families.

United States: In 2015, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the private company GEO Care, launched a pilot project where vulnerable asylum-seeking families are released from custody to community care in five U.S. cities, with the presence of at least one ICE manager as well as social workers and administrators from GEO Care. The programme involves case management for access to services and legal aid, as well as assistance with compliance with immigration hearings. In each location, GEO Care partners with NGOs to provide additional social and case management support to participants and to identify services and legal assistance (see [UNHCR's progress report](#)).



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
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Information and legal assistance

Key to the success of ATDs is providing asylum-seekers with clear and concise information about rights and duties under the ATD and consequences of non-compliance. Another important factor for success is referring asylum-seekers to legal advice, including on all legal avenues to stay (see [UNHCR Options Paper No. 2](#)). Ensuring individuals are well informed early on is important for building their trust in the process. Decisions on alternatives to detention should be explained to the person subjected to them in a language they understand. For example, individuals should have a clear understanding of the asylum or migration process at the beginning stages of the procedure, and also understand why a particular alternative to detention has been chosen, why any restrictions or negative consequences for non-compliance have been deemed necessary, and any other relevant information as circumstances change throughout the process. Such knowledge has been found to be a key factor in strengthening the efficiency of alternative to detention systems (see [Council of Europe's analysis on ATDs](#)). Individuals are more likely to accept and comply with a negative decision on their status determination if they believe they have been through a fair process – and informed and supported in this process – and if they have explored all options to remain in the country legally and all avenues for voluntary or independent departure. Access to legal advice throughout the asylum procedure is essential for this purpose (see [IDC's handbook on ATDs](#)).

Respect for human rights and access to basic services

Alternatives work when asylum-seekers are treated with dignity, humanity and respect throughout the asylum procedure. Their rights must be respected and their basic needs met. It is important that all asylum-seekers are provided with adequate material support, accommodation and other reception requirements, or access to means of self-sufficiency (including the right to work), so they are able to meet their basic needs. Those subjected to an alternative to detention, even if they are living in the community, should have access to services and support by the State. Without minimum standards in place, alternatives are less likely to achieve desired rates of compliance, case resolution and respect for human rights. Individuals are better able to remain in compliance with authorities if they can meet their basic needs while in the community. For example, individuals living in stable accommodation appear to be in a better position to remain in contact with authorities and handle the complexities of immigration procedures than those who become impoverished or homeless (see [IDC's handbook on ATDs](#)).



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Trust

Evidence shows that building trust and respect through a spirit of fairness and cooperation, rather than an exclusive focus on control or punishment for non-compliance, is one of the key factors in the success of ATDs. Compliance is closely linked to the level of trust built between the individual and the administration (see Cathryn Costello and Esra Kaytaz's [article](#)).

Authorities can promote a sense of procedural fairness and legitimacy by ensuring that many of the key aspects of effective alternatives to immigration detention are respected and implemented in practice, such as the early provision of clear and accessible information, free access to legal advice and support, and provision of case management support (see [Council of Europe's analysis on ATDs](#)).

Stakeholder engagement:

the involvement of independent third parties, such as NGOs, ensures more transparency in the implementation of alternatives to detention and asylum-seekers' proper access to rights and better understanding of the process. In such joint programmes, the clear delineation of roles and responsibilities is elementary, especially between the support, case management and service provision functions and any compliance or enforcement aspects. To maintain the high level of trust essential for NGOs to conduct their work, asylum-seekers also need to know the division of roles (see UNHCR Second Global Roundtable on Reception and Alternatives to Detention, Summary Deliberation, Odysseus Network's report).

CHAPTER 13

INTERIM ASSIGNMENT: ASSESSING SUCCESS FACTORS OF ATD MODELS



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
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Assess the success factors of a selected ATD or ATDs in your country by answering the questions in the checklist below. Please read [UNHCR Options Paper No. 2: Options for governments on open reception and alternatives to detention](#).

Questions	Situation in your country	Complies or not with the standard?	Comment
Is case management or individualized coaching available? Please describe how it is organized, in particular the specific role of the case manager and how this individualized coaching relates with asylum proceedings.			
Are beneficiaries of ATDs provided with clear and concise information about rights and duties under the alternative to detention, and information on the consequences of non-compliance?			
Are beneficiaries of ATD options provided with legal advice, including advice on all legal avenues to stay and possible voluntary return options?			



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Questions	Situation in your country	Complies or not with the standard?	Comment
Assess whether this ATD enables access to the following basic rights: right to education, right to family life, right to psychosocial or medical assistance, non-food items and legal advice, and right to work.			
Does your ATD provide for an adequate standard of living (compared to the situation of other non-detained asylum-seekers, refugees, etc.)? Please describe what support or material reception conditions are provided (housing, food, cash allowance or allowances in kind, etc.).			
Is there any complaint mechanisms in place to protect the human rights of the person in ATDs? Please describe.			
Is there any monitoring mechanism or oversight implemented by the authorities to regularly monitor the ATDs? Is it subject to regular evaluation? Please describe the main actors and scope of this monitoring/evaluation (including frequency).			

CHAPTER 14

SELF-CHECK

Match the main feature of ATDs on the left to the type of ATD on the right that you think fits best, and then see the correct answers.

Main feature	ATD type
1. Physical movement restricted at certain times, no intense control because individuals are under the control of the authorities	1. Electronic tagging
2. Involves assurances by a third party (a person or organization), not necessarily requiring financing, cost-effective	2. Supervision in the community
3. Allows limited physical movement, intense control, might interfere with the right to privacy or family life, expensive	3. Accommodation in semi-open reception centre
4. Obligation of appearing before the authorities at certain times, frequently requiring no funds, unless technologies are used, range of appearance frequency may be very wide	4. Bail
5. Restrictions relate to financial aspects, risks being discriminatory if assigned without consideration of individual circumstances, derived from a criminal law system, require no funds on the part of the authorities	5. Guarantee by NGO
6. Run by stakeholders who report to the authorities and help arrange support for asylum-seekers	6. Directed residence
7. Specific geographical limitation in private or other accommodation	7. Reporting



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
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In designing ATDs, States should respect the principle of minimum intervention.

Successful ATDs include individual coaching or a case management approach and are designed so that asylum-seekers trust the system.

Human rights standards apply to ATDs.

Successful ATDs are implemented in partnership with a wide range of stakeholders, and effective community-based ATDs are implemented in coordination with NGOs.



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FURTHER READINGS

- UNHCR, Options Paper 1: Options for governments on care arrangements and alternatives to detention for children and families, 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5523e8d94.html>
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- Alternatives to Immigration and Asylum Detention in the EU. Time for Implementation, January 2015, p. 21-27, <http://odysseus-network.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/FINAL-REPORT-Alternatives-to-detention-in-the-EU.pdf>
- IDC, Alternatives to immigration detention in Africa, 2017, <http://idcoalition.org/publication/view/alternatives-to-immigration-detention-in-africa/>, pp. 10–14.
- UNHCR ATD Assessment criteria, UNHCR Beyond Detention Toolkit, Guiding Questions for the assessment of Alternatives to Detention, May 2018.



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The views expressed herein can in no way be taken to reflect the official opinion of the European Union.