



International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of
Former Yugoslavia since 1991

Case No. IT-98-33-T
Date: 02 August 2001
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IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER

Before: Judge Almiro Rodrigues, Presiding
Judge Fouad Riad
Judge Patricia Wald

Registrar: Mr. Hans Holthuis

PROSECUTOR

v.

RADISLAV KRSTIC

JUDGEMENT

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The events surrounding the Bosnian Serb take-over of the United Nations (“UN”) “safe area” of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in July 1995, have become well known to the world.¹ Despite a UN Security Council resolution declaring that the enclave was to be “free from armed attack or any other hostile act”, units of the Bosnian Serb Army (“VRS”) launched an attack and captured the town. Within a few days, approximately 25,000 Bosnian Muslims,² most of them women, children and elderly people who were living in the area, were uprooted and, in an atmosphere of terror, loaded onto overcrowded buses by the Bosnian Serb forces and transported across the confrontation lines into Bosnian Muslim-held territory. The military-aged³ Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica, however, were consigned to a separate fate. As thousands of them attempted to flee the area, they were taken prisoner, detained in brutal conditions and then executed. More than 7,000 people were never seen again.

2. The events of the nine days from July 10-19 1995 in Srebrenica defy description in their horror and their implications for humankind’s capacity to revert to acts of brutality under the stresses of conflict. In little over one week, thousands of lives were extinguished, irreparably rent or simply wiped from the pages of history. The Trial Chamber leaves it to historians and social psychologist to plumb the depths of this episode of the Balkan conflict and to probe for deep-seated causes. The task at hand is a more modest one: to find, from the evidence presented during the trial, what happened during that period of about nine days and, ultimately, whether the defendant in this case, General Krstic, was criminally responsible, under the tenets of international law, for his participation in them. The Trial Chamber cannot permit itself the indulgence of expressing how it feels about what happened in Srebrenica, or even how individuals as well as national and international groups not the subject of this case contributed to the tragedy. This defendant, like all others, deserves individualised consideration and can be convicted only if the evidence presented in court shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty of acts that constitute crimes covered by the Statute of the Tribunal (“Statute”). Thus, the Trial Chamber concentrates on setting forth, in detail, the facts surrounding this compacted nine days of hell and avoids expressing rhetorical

¹ See e.g., Prosecution exhibit (hereafter “P”) 30, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica, UN Doc. A/54/549, 15 November 1999 (hereafter “Secretary-General’s Report”).

² See Mr. Nesib Mandzi}, Transcript at page (hereafter “T.”) 963 (testifying that some 25,000 Bosnian Muslim refugees had gathered in Poto-ari); P 404/88 (Report of Karremans dated 12 July 1995 stating that, as of that date, 17,500 people had gathered in and around Poto-ari); P 77/26 (UNMO fax dated 13 July 1995 reporting that 10,000 refugees had been already transported with a further 20,000-25,000 to follow).

³ Throughout this Judgement, the term “military aged” is used to describe the group of men who were captured and executed following the take-over of Srebrenica. It is a misnomer to the extent that some boys who were several years younger and some men who were several years older than would generally be considered “military aged” were included

indignation that these events should ever have occurred at all. In the end, no words of comment can lay bare the saga of Srebrenica more graphically than a plain narrative of the events themselves, or expose more poignantly the waste of war and ethnic hatreds and the long road that must still be travelled to ease their bitter legacy.

3. In July 1995, at the time the atrocities occurred, General Krstic was first the Chief of Staff and, subsequently, the Commander of the Drina Corps, a formation of the Bosnian Serb Army (hereafter "VRS"). All of the crimes committed following the take-over of Srebrenica were committed in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps. The Prosecution has charged General Krstic with genocide (or alternatively, complicity to commit genocide). General Krstic is further charged with crimes against humanity, including extermination, murder, persecution and deportation (or alternatively, inhumane acts (forcible transfer)) and murder, as a violation of the laws or customs of war. The Indictment charges General Krstic with responsibility for these acts, as a result of his individual participation (pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the Statute). The Prosecution also seeks to attribute criminal responsibility to General Krstic for these acts, pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility (under Article 7(3) of the Statute) because, allegedly, troops under his command were involved in the commission of the crimes.

4. The Trial Chamber draws upon a mosaic of evidence that combines to paint a picture of what happened during those few days in July 1995. In all, the Trial Chamber heard more than 110 witnesses over 98 days of trial and viewed in the vicinity of 1,000 exhibits. A large number of former residents of Srebrenica who survived the events came to The Hague to testify. The Trial Chamber considers that the essence of their testimony was highly credible. The accounts given by the survivors of the execution sites are corroborated by forensic evidence (such as shell casings and explosive and tissue residues) at some of the execution sites, expert analysis of the contents of mass graves and aerial reconnaissance photographs taken in 1995. The Trial Chamber has also considered the testimony of UN military personnel who were in Srebrenica, records of VRS radio communications that were intercepted by the Army of Bosnia Herzegovina ("ABiH") in July and August 1995, records seized from the ABiH, records seized from the VRS, the analysis of military experts called by both the Prosecution and the Defence and the testimony of General Krstic himself, as well as other witnesses who testified for the Defence. In addition, the Trial Chamber called two witnesses of its own accord, both of whom formerly held senior positions in the ABiH and were closely monitoring the unfolding events in Srebrenica in July 1995.

within this group. Consequently, the term should be understood in its broadest, non-technical sense as including the men and boys who were broadly defined by the Bosnian Serb authorities as being within the vicinity of military age.

5. The Judgement is divided into five Parts, Part I being the Introduction. The factual findings of the Trial Chamber begin in Part II with a narrative overview, the purpose of which is to briefly orient the reader with the events leading up to the take-over of Srebrenica and its aftermath. The Trial Chamber then moves on to consider the aftermath of the take-over of Srebrenica in much greater detail and, in particular, considers the role of the Drina Corps in the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of the former enclave, as well as in the capture, detention and execution of the Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica. Finally, the Trial Chamber considers the role played by General Krstic in these events. Part III of the Judgement provides a legal framework for analysing the facts set out in Part II. The Chamber considers the requisite elements of genocide and the other crimes with which General Krstic has been charged, as well as the general principles regulating the attribution of criminal responsibility. Then, based on this legal framework and on the findings of fact in Part II of the Judgement, the Chamber presents its findings about the criminal responsibility of General Krstic. Part IV of the Judgement covers matters relating to sentencing and, finally, Part V sets forth the disposition.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The Take-Over of Srebrenica and its Aftermath

1. 1991-92: The Break-Up of the Former Yugoslavia

6. The history of the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been described in previous judgements of this Tribunal and will not be repeated in detail here.⁴ However, some minimal background material is necessary to understand the specific case of Srebrenica.

7. From 1945 until 1990, Yugoslavia was composed of six Republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Certain Republics were populated predominantly by one ethnic group: for example, Serbs in Serbia and Croats in Croatia. The region under consideration, in the present case, formed part of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Bosnia”), which was the most multi-ethnic of all the Republics, with a pre-war population of 44 percent Muslim, 31 percent Serb, and 17 percent Croat.⁵

8. The territory of Yugoslavia has been shared for centuries by these and other ethnic groups, with periods of peaceful co-existence interspersed with conflict. The Second World War was a time of particularly bitter strife, with accusations of atrocities emanating from all quarters. Marshal

⁴ See e.g., *Prosecution v. Tadić*, Case No.: IT-94-1-T, (hereafter “The *Tadić* Judgement”) paras. 53-126.

Tito's post-war government discouraged ethnic division and nationalism with a focus on the unity of the communist state. Thus, relative calm and peaceful inter-ethnic relations marked the period from 1945 until 1990. Nevertheless, the various groups remained conscious of their separate identities.

9. In the late 1980s, economic woes and the end of communist rule set the stage for rising nationalism and ethnic friction. The Republics of Slovenia and Croatia both declared independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in June 1991. Slovenia's status was secured after a mere ten days of fighting with the predominantly Serb forces of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), but the armed conflict in Croatia stretched on for some months. Macedonia broke off successfully in September 1991.

10. Bosnia began its journey to independence with a parliamentary declaration of sovereignty on 15 October 1991. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised by the European Community on 6 April 1992 and by the United States the following day. International recognition did not end the matter, however, and a fierce struggle for territorial control ensued among the three major groups in Bosnia: Muslim, Serb and Croat. The international community made various attempts to establish peace, but these attempts met with limited success. In the Eastern part of Bosnia, which is close to Serbia, the conflict was particularly fierce between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims.

2. 1992-1993: Conflict in Srebrenica

11. The town of Srebrenica is nestled in a valley in eastern Bosnia, about fifteen kilometres from the Serbian border. Before the war, many of Srebrenica's residents worked in the factories at Potocari, a few kilometres north of Srebrenica, or in the zinc and bauxite mines to the south and northeast of the town. In 1991, the population of the municipality was 37,000, of which 73 percent were Muslim and 25 percent were Serb.⁶ Prior to the war, the standard of living was high and members of the different ethnic groups, for the most part, lived comfortably together.⁷

12. During the conflict the Central Podrinje region, which included Srebrenica,⁸ was an area of significant strategic importance. For the Bosnian Serbs, control of this region was necessary in

⁵ *Tadi*}, paras. 56-57; Secretary-General's Report, paras. 17-18.

⁶ Secretary-General's Report, para. 33. The term "municipality" is an expression used to describe the larger area around a town and is equivalent to a "county" or a "canton".

⁷ See e.g., Witness S, Transcript, pages (hereafter "T.") 3282-3283.

⁸ General Radovan Radinovi} (hereafter "Radinovi}"), T. 8108.

order to achieve their minimum goal of forming a political entity in Bosnia. As stated by General Radovan Radinovic, the Defence military expert:

Serbs intended to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as a component part of the former state. That was indeed their fundamental, long-term, and political objective in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Why? I don't think it is very difficult to understand that. They wanted to live in the same state with other Serbs, and the only state that could guarantee that was the former Yugoslavia... the Serbs realised that the area of Central Podrinje had a huge strategic importance for them. Without the area of Central Podrinje, there would be no Republika Srpska, there would be no territorial integrity of Serb ethnic territories; instead the Serb population would be forced to accept the so-called enclave status in their ethnic territories. The territory would be split in two, the whole area would be disintegrated, and it would be separated from Serbia proper and from areas which are inhabited almost 100 per cent by Serb populations.⁹

General Sefer Halilović (the Commander of the Main Staff of the ABiH from June 1993 until November 1993 and, prior to that, Chief of Staff of the Main Staff of the ABiH) also emphasised the strategic importance of the Central Podrinje region for the Bosnian Serbs. In his view the political agenda of the Serbs was to eliminate the Drina River as a border between "Serb states".¹⁰

13. Despite Srebrenica's predominantly Muslim population, Serb paramilitaries from the area and neighbouring parts of eastern Bosnia gained control of the town for several weeks early in 1992. In May 1992, however, a group of Bosnian Muslim fighters under the leadership of Naser Orić managed to recapture Srebrenica. Over the next several months, Orić and his men pressed outward in a series of raids. By September 1992, Bosnian Muslim forces from Srebrenica had linked up with those in Žepa, a Muslim-held town to the south of Srebrenica. By January 1993, the enclave had been further expanded to include the Bosnian Muslim held enclave of Cerska located to the west of Srebrenica. At this time the Srebrenica enclave reached its peak size of 900 square kilometres, although it was never linked to the main area of Bosnian-held land in the west and remained a vulnerable island amid Serb-controlled territory.¹¹

14. In January 1993, Bosnian Muslim forces attacked the Bosnian Serb village of Kravica. Over the next few months, the Bosnian Serbs responded with a counter-offensive, eventually capturing the villages of Konjevic Polje and Ćerška, severing the link between Srebrenica and Žepa and reducing the size of the Srebrenica enclave to 150 square kilometres. Bosnian Muslim residents of the outlying areas converged on Srebrenica town and its population swelled to between 50,000 and 60,000 people.¹² During this military activity in the months following January 1993,

⁹ Radinović, T.7812-7813.

¹⁰ General Sefer Halilović (hereafter "Halilović"), T. 9459-9451.

¹¹ Secretary-General's Report, paras. 33-38. The Trial Chamber has relied upon the Secretary-General's Report as an accurate recounting of the events leading up to the take-over of Srebrenica, at least on matters where no contrary evidence has been presented at trial.

¹² *Ibid*, para. 37.

there were reports of terror inflicted by Muslims on Serb civilians and by Serbs on Muslim civilians.¹³

15. The Commander of the UN Protection Force “UNPROFOR”, General Philippe Morillon of France, visited Srebrenica in March 1993. By then the town was overcrowded and siege conditions prevailed. The advancing Bosnian Serb forces had destroyed the town’s water supplies and there was almost no running water. People relied on makeshift generators for electricity. Food, medicine and other essentials were extremely scarce. Before leaving, General Morillon told the panicked residents of Srebrenica at a public gathering that the town was under the protection of the UN and that he would never abandon them.¹⁴

16. Between March and April 1993, approximately 8,000 to 9,000 Bosnian Muslims were evacuated from Srebrenica under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”). The evacuations were, however, opposed by the Bosnian Muslim government in Sarajevo as contributing to the “ethnic cleansing” of the territory.¹⁵

17. The Bosnian Serb authorities remained intent on capturing the enclave, which, because of its proximity to the Serbian border and because it was entirely surrounded by Serb-held territory, was both strategically important and vulnerable to capture. On 13 April 1993, the Bosnian Serbs told the UNHCR representatives that they would attack the town within two days unless the Bosnian Muslims surrendered and agreed to be evacuated.¹⁶

3. April 1993: The Security Council Declares Srebrenica a “Safe Area”

18. On 16 April 1993, the UN Security Council responded by passing a resolution, declaring that “all parties and others treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a “ safe area ” that should be free from armed attack or any other hostile act.”¹⁷ At the same time, the Security Council created two other UN protected enclaves, Žepa and Goražde.¹⁸

19. The UNPROFOR command in the field was sceptical about the value of the Security Council resolution. UNPROFOR commanders therefore negotiated a cease-fire agreement signed by General Halilovic and General Ratko Mladic (the Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS). This agreement called for the enclave to be disarmed under the supervision of UNPROFOR

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.* para. 38.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* para. 39.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* para. 54.

¹⁷ UN Doc. S/RES/ 819 (1993).

¹⁸ UN Doc. S/RES/ 824 (1993).

troops.¹⁹ However, there was discord about the precise boundaries of the territory subject to the agreement. General Halilovic testified before the Trial Chamber that the agreement covered only the urban area of Srebrenica.²⁰ This view appears to have been shared by UNPROFOR. The Bosnian Serb authorities, on the other hand, did not consider the agreement to be limited to the urban areas of Srebrenica.²¹

20. On 18 April 1993, the first group of UNPROFOR troops arrived in Srebrenica. Fresh troops were rotated approximately every six months after that. The peacekeepers were lightly armed and at any one time numbered no more than 600 men (a much smaller force than had been originally requested).²² They established a small command centre (the "Bravo Company compound") in Srebrenica itself and a larger main compound about five kilometres north of the town in Potocari. In addition, the UNPROFOR peacekeepers manned thirteen observation posts ("Ops") marking the perimeter of the enclave. Most of the time, groups of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim soldiers also maintained shadow positions near these outposts. In January 1995, a new set of UNPROFOR troops (a battalion from the Netherlands, colloquially referred to as "Dutch Bat") rotated into the enclave.

21. Generally, the Bosnian Serb forces surrounding the enclave were considered well disciplined and well armed.²³ The VRS was organised on a geographic basis and Srebrenica fell within the domain of the Drina Corps. Between 1,000 and 2,000 soldiers from three Drina Corps Brigades were deployed around the enclave.²⁴ These Bosnian Serb forces were equipped with tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and mortars. The unit of the ABiH that remained in the enclave – the 28th Division – was not well organised or well equipped. A firm command structure and communications system was lacking,²⁵ some ABiH soldiers carried old hunting rifles or no weapons at all and few had proper uniforms.²⁶ However, the Trial Chamber also heard evidence that the 28th Division was not as weak as they have been portrayed in some quarters.²⁷ Certainly the

¹⁹ Secretary-General's Report, paras. 59-65. A preliminary agreement was signed on 18 April 1993, followed by a more comprehensive agreement on 8 May 1993. See *id.* See also Halilovi}, T. 9445, 9448.

²⁰ Halilovi}, T. 9465.

²¹ Secretary-General's Report, para. 60.

²² See Secretary-General's Report, para. 226.

²³ See Secretary-General's Report, para. 230.

²⁴ See Secretary-General's Report, para. 230.

²⁵ See *e.g.*, Secretary-General's Report, para. 230; Colonel Joseph Kingori (hereafter "Kingori"), T. 1813-1814; Major Robert Franken (hereafter "Franken"), T. 2008-2009; Captain Vincentius Egbers (hereafter "Egbers"), T. 2207; Witness C, T. 1150-1151; and General Enver Had`ihasanovi} (hereafter "Had`ihasanovi}"), T. 9509.

²⁶ See, *e.g.*, Kingori, T. 1813-1814; Franken, T. 2007; Egbers, T. 2206-22094; and Witness C, T. 1150-1151. See also Had`ihasanovi}, T. 9513-9516 and Court Witness Exhibit (hereafter "C") 2, and C 3.

²⁷ General Radislav Krstic (hereafter "Krsti}") T. 6054.

number of men in the 28th Division outnumbered those in the Drina Corps²⁸ and reconnaissance and sabotage activities were carried out on a regular basis against the VRS forces in the area.²⁹

22. From the outset, both parties to the conflict violated the "safe area" agreement. The Trial Chamber heard evidence of a deliberate Bosnian Serb strategy to limit access by international aid convoys into the enclave.³⁰ Colonel Thomas Karremans (the Dutch Bat Commander) testified that his personnel were prevented from returning to the enclave by Bosnian Serb forces and that equipment and ammunition were also prevented from getting in.³¹ Essentials, like food, medicine and fuel, became increasingly scarce. Some Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica complained of attacks by Bosnian Serb soldiers.³²

23. Insofar as the ABiH is concerned, General Halilovic testified that, immediately after signing the "safe area" agreement, he ordered members of the ABiH in Srebrenica to pull all armed personnel and military equipment out of the newly established demilitarised zone.³³ He also ordered that no serviceable weapons or ammunition be handed over to UNPROFOR. He said this was prompted by bad experiences with the international community in the past.³⁴ Accordingly, only old and dysfunctional weapons were handed over and anything that was still in working order was retained.³⁵ In General Halilovi}’s view, the agreement on demilitarisation did not oblige the ABiH to surrender anything and the Bosnian Muslims wanted to preserve their weaponry.³⁶

24. The Trial Chamber heard credible and largely uncontested evidence of a consistent refusal by the Bosnian Muslims to abide by the agreement to demilitarise the "safe area".³⁷ Bosnian

²⁸ The Trial Chamber heard varying estimates of the number of men in the 28th Division. The military expert called by the Defence, General Radinovic, made several estimates: Radinovic, T. 7913 (10,000 men (including about 8,000 armed men); Defence Exhibit (hereafter "D") 160, (hereafter "Radinovic Report"), para. 2.9, (stating that the 28th Division consisted of between 10,000 and 12,000 men); and Radinovic, T. 8188-8189 (referring to intelligence information from the Mili}i Brigade suggesting there were between 5,000 and 7,500 men in the 28th Division). . General Enver Had` ihasanovi}, who in July 1995 was the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff of the ABiH, testified that the 28th Division in Srebrenica had 5,803 men, which was 102 % of the actual requirement according to military doctrine. See Had` ihasanovi}, T. 9513; and C 1.

²⁹ See e.g. Defence Witness DF, T. 8507, and T. 8507-8508; and D 30, D 33, D 34, D 35, D 37, D 51, D 54, D 60, D 59, D 62, D 93, and D 94 See also Krstic, T. 7557 (regarding the ABiH’s Operation Skakavac ("grasshopper"), involving sabotage activities within a broader area of Bosnia under the control of the VRS, and including the Srebrenica and @epa "safe areas").

³⁰ See eg. P 122, p. 63, (testimony of Colonel Thomas Karremans (hereafter "Karremans") at the Rule 61 Hearing, stating that after 26 April no convoy came at all); Karremans, T. 3299-3306, 3322-3325; and Captain Johannes Rutten (hereafter Rutten), T. 2104-2107.

³¹ Karremans, T. 3301-3302.

³² See, e.g., Kingori, T. 1811-1812.

³³ Halilovi}, T. 9467.

³⁴ Halilovi}, T. 9466. See also Secretary-General’s Report, para. 61.

³⁵ Halilovi}, T. 9466 and Secretary-General’s Report, para. 61.

³⁶ Halilovi}, T. 9466-9467.

³⁷ See generally, Krsti}, T. 6033 and Radinovi}, T. 7836 ff.

Muslim helicopters flew in violation of the no-fly zone;³⁸ the ABiH opened fire toward Bosnian Serb lines and moved through the "safe area";³⁹ the 28th Division was continuously arming itself⁴⁰; and at least some humanitarian aid coming into the enclave was appropriated by the ABiH.⁴¹ To the Bosnian Serbs it appeared that Bosnian Muslim forces in Srebrenica were using the "safe area" as a convenient base from which to launch offensives against the VRS and that UNPROFOR was failing to take any action to prevent it.⁴² General Halilovi} admitted that Bosnian Muslim helicopters had flown in violation of the no-fly zone and that he had personally dispatched eight helicopters with ammunition for the 28th Division. In moral terms, he did not see it as a violation of the "safe area" agreement given that the Bosnian Muslims were so poorly armed to begin with.⁴³

25. Despite these violations of the "safe area" agreement by both sides to the conflict, a two-year period of relative stability followed the establishment of the enclave, although the prevailing conditions for the inhabitants of Srebrenica were far from ideal.

4. Early 1995: The Situation in the Srebrenica "Safe Area" Deteriorates

26. By early 1995, fewer and fewer supply convoys were making it through to the enclave.⁴⁴ The Dutch Bat soldiers who had arrived in January 1995 watched the situation deteriorate rapidly in the months after their arrival. The already meagre resources of the civilian population dwindled further and even the UN forces started running dangerously low on food, medicine, fuel and ammunition. Eventually, the peacekeepers had so little fuel that they were forced to start patrolling the enclave on foot. Dutch Bat soldiers who went out of the area on leave were not allowed to return and their numbers dropped from 600 to 400 men.

27. There were other ominous signals from the VRS. In March and April, the Dutch soldiers noticed a build-up of Bosnian Serb forces near two of the observation posts, OP Romeo and OP Quebec. The new Bosnian Serb soldiers seemed better equipped and more disciplined.⁴⁵ One of

³⁸ Radinovi}, T. 7840-7842. See also D 123, D 124, D 125, and D 126 (regarding helicopter flights, and landings in the "safe areas" by the ABiH). Mr. Butler, accepted that Bosnian Muslim military units continued to operate out of the safe area " after its establishment. Butler, T. 5374. See also Had` ihasanovi}, T. 9518.

³⁹ Defence Witness DA, T. 6874-6875, 6877; and Krstic, T. 6088-6089.

⁴⁰ Krstic, T. 5984. See also: D 27, D 47, D 49, D 48, D 74, and D 52 (regarding the procurement of weapons and materiel by the ABiH in the "safe areas"); D 70 (regarding the arrival of soldiers from the 28th Division in @epa); D 44, and D 45 (regarding the use of helicopters to bring in arms to the "safe areas"); and Krstic, T.6008-6013 and D 39, (regarding the ABiH plan to disarm UNPROFOR and take their weapons).

⁴¹ Krstic, T. 5993-5994. See also D 55, and D 33.

⁴² Radinovi}, T. 7840-7842.

⁴³ Halilovi}, T. 9467-9468.

⁴⁴ P 122, pp. 62-66, 67 (testimony of Colonel Karremans).

⁴⁵ Captain Leendert van Duijn (hereafter "van Duijn"), T. 1772-1773.

the Bosnian Muslim commanders told a Dutch Bat soldier that the Bosnian Serbs had plans to take-over these two OPs.⁴⁶

5. Spring 1995: The Bosnian Serbs Plan To Attack the Srebrenica "Safe Area"

28. In March 1995, Radovan Karadžić, President of Republika Srpska ("RS"), reacting to pressure from the international community to end the war and ongoing efforts to negotiate a peace agreement,⁴⁷ issued a directive to the VRS concerning the long-term strategy of the VRS forces in the enclave. The directive, known as "Directive 7", specified that the VRS was to:

[C]omplete the physical separation of Srebrenica from Žepa as soon as possible, preventing even communication between individuals in the two enclaves. By planned and well-thought out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica.⁴⁸

Blocking aid convoys was also a part of the plan:

The relevant State and military organs responsible for work with UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through planned and unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our good will while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the international community and international public opinion.⁴⁹

Just as envisaged in this decree, by mid 1995, the humanitarian situation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians and military personnel in the enclave was catastrophic. In early July 1995, a series of reports issued by the 28th Division reflected the urgent pleas of the ABiH forces in the enclave for the humanitarian corridor to be deblocked and, when this failed, the tragedy of civilians dying from starvation.⁵⁰

29. On 31 March 1995, the VRS Main Staff issued Directive 7.1, signed by General Mladic. Directive 7.1 was issued "on the basis of Directive No. 7" and directed the Drina Corps to, *inter alia*, conduct "active combat operations...around the enclaves"⁵¹

⁴⁶ Van Duijn, T.1774.

⁴⁷ P 425.

⁴⁸ P 425, p. 10.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁵⁰ P 898 (Requesting that constant efforts be made to deblock the humanitarian corridor); P 899 (dated 6 July 1995, reporting that "The situation continues to be exceptionally difficult. The food convoy announced for today has not arrived. The first people to die of hunger in the area of Srebrenica after the demilitarisation were registered today."); P 900 (dated 7 July 1995, reporting that "The humanitarian situation is worrying. Today more civilians have been registered as having died from hunger..."); P 901 (dated 8 July 1995 reporting that "This situation is also dramatic and practically hopeless. The civilian population is dying of hunger...we will very soon be forced to abandon this area because of a lack of food."); P 902 (dated 9 July 1995, reporting that the "humanitarian situation is catastrophic...").

⁵¹ P 426.

30. On 31 May 1995, Bosnian Serb forces captured OP Echo, which lay in the Southeast corner of the enclave. In response to this aggression, a raiding party of Bosniacs attacked the nearby Serb village of Višnjica, in the early morning of 26 June 1995. Although a relatively low intensity attack, some houses were burned and several people were killed.⁵² Following this, the then-commander of the Drina Corps, General-Major Milenko @ivanovi}, signed two orders, on 2 July 1995, laying out the plans for the attack on the enclave and ordering various units of the Drina Corps to ready themselves for combat. The operation was code-named "Krivaja 95"⁵³

6. 6-11 July 1995: The Take-Over of Srebrenica

31. The VRS offensive on Srebrenica began in earnest on 6 July 1995.⁵⁴ In the following days, the five UNPROFOR observation posts, in the southern part of the enclave, fell one by one in the face of the Bosnian Serb forces advance. Some of the Dutch soldiers retreated into the enclave after their posts were attacked, but the crews of the other observation posts surrendered into Bosnian Serb custody.⁵⁵ Simultaneously, the defending ABiH forces came under heavy fire and were pushed back towards the town.

32. Once the southern perimeter began to collapse, about 4,000 Bosnian Muslim residents, who had been living in a Swedish housing complex for refugees nearby, fled north into Srebrenica town. Dutch Bat soldiers reported that the advancing Bosnian Serbs were "cleansing" the houses in the southern part of the enclave.⁵⁶

33. By the evening of 9 July 1995, the VRS Drina Corps had pressed four kilometres deep into the enclave, halting just one kilometre short of Srebrenica town. Late on 9 July 1995, emboldened by this military success and the surprising lack of resistance from the Bosnian Muslims as well as the absence of any significant reaction from the international community, President Karadžić issued a new order authorising the VRS Drina Corps to capture the town of Srebrenica.⁵⁷

34. On the morning of 10 July 1995, the situation in Srebrenica town was tense. Residents, some armed, crowded the streets. Colonel Karremans sent urgent requests for NATO air support to defend the town, but no assistance was forthcoming until around 1430 hours on 11 July 1995, when NATO bombed VRS tanks advancing towards the town. NATO planes also attempted to bomb VRS artillery positions overlooking the town, but had to abort the operation due to poor visibility.

⁵² Secretary-General's Report, para. 225.

⁵³ P 428.

⁵⁴ P 428, and Radinovi}, T. 7916.

⁵⁵ Witness B, T. 844-847.

⁵⁶ Witness B, T. 854.

⁵⁷ P 432.

NATO plans to continue the air strikes were abandoned following VRS threats to kill Dutch troops being held in the custody of the VRS, as well as threats to shell the UN Poto-ari compound on the outside of the town, and surrounding areas, where 20,000 to 30,000 civilians had fled.⁵⁸

35. The Trial Chamber heard that, although the Bosnian military and political authorities in Srebrenica requested help from the ABiH and the President of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic, their pleas went unanswered. In the view of General Halilovi}, the ABiH as a whole was capable of preventing the take-over of Srebrenica, but ABiH forces in the area could not defend Srebrenica without outside assistance.⁵⁹ However, military operations in the Sarajevo area were given a higher priority at the critical time.⁶⁰ The Defence presented evidence of a "deal" allegedly made between the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb leaderships whereby Srebrenica was sacrificed by the former in exchange for territory in the Sarajevo area.⁶¹ Undeniably, the enclave was not defended in the manner that would have been anticipated. However, the existence of such a "deal" is hotly contested and does not have a direct bearing on the present case. Any possible territorial exchange agreed upon by the opposing governments neither justifies the atrocities that occurred following the take-over of Srebrenica, nor impacts upon the responsibility of General Krstic for those acts.

36. Late in the afternoon of 11 July 1995, General Mladic, accompanied by General @ivanovi} (then Commander of the Drina Corps), General Krstic (then Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps) and other VRS officers, took a triumphant walk through the empty streets of Srebrenica town. The moment was captured on film by Serbian journalist, Zoran Petrovi}.⁶²

7. The Bosnian Muslim Civilians of Srebrenica

(a) The Crowd at Poto-ari

37. Faced with the reality that Srebrenica had fallen under Bosnian Serb forces control, thousands of Bosnian Muslim residents from Srebrenica fled to Poto-ari seeking protection within the UN compound. By the evening of 11 July 1995, approximately 20,000 to 25,000 Bosnian Muslim refugees were gathered in Potocari. Several thousand had pressed inside the UN compound itself, while the rest were spread throughout the neighbouring factories and fields. Though the vast

⁵⁸ P 77/18 (UNMO report-containing the threat made by the Bosnian Serbs that, if NATO action continued, everything inside the enclave would be bombed); and P 403, Mr. R. Butler, *Srebrenica Military Narrative-Operation "Krivaja 95"*, 15 May 2000, (hereafter "Butler Report"), para. 3.17.

⁵⁹ Halilovi}, T. 9495.

⁶⁰ Halilovi}, T. 9453, 9492.

⁶¹ The Trial Chamber viewed a film made by Dutch television about the circumstances surrounding the take-over of Srebrenica suggesting such an agreement. See T. 9479 ff.

⁶² P 145.

majority were women, children, elderly or disabled,⁶³ witnesses estimated that there were at least 300 men inside the perimeter of the UN compound and between 600 and 900 men in the crowd outside.⁶⁴

(i) The Humanitarian Crisis in Poto-ari: 11-13 July 1995

38. Conditions in Poto-ari were deplorable. There was very little food or water available and the July heat was stifling.⁶⁵ One of the Dutch Bat officers described the scene as follows:

They were panicked, they were scared, and they were pressing each other against the soldiers, my soldiers, the UN soldiers that tried to calm them. People that fell were trampled on. It was a chaotic situation.⁶⁶

39. One of the fleeing Srebrenica residents settled for the night in the area near the Zinc Factory in Potocari:

I found a cover of a container that they used . . . in that factory, so we used that, covered it, and that was our bed. The baby had its pram, and we left our belongings in the pram or simply lied down on the ground As we sat there, snipers would fire every now and then, and all this throng would then move to one side or the other, screaming. Above us was the Pecista village where the Serb soldiers were firing at houses. The sound of that shell, again we would simply dodge to one side or the other with frightened cries, and that is how we spent the night. . . . People were all frightened, people were all hungry, people were scared out of their wits. They didn't know what would happen next, so that those were people who were terrified.⁶⁷

40. On 12 July 1995, the situation in Potocari grew steadily worse. General Mladic appeared accompanied by television crews who filmed him handing out sweets to children. Other than this one televised gesture,⁶⁸ General Mladic and his men made no attempt to alleviate the suffering of the refugees who were desperate for food and water.

(ii) 12-13 July: Crimes Committed in Poto-ari

41. On 12 July 1995, as the day wore on, the already miserable physical conditions were compounded by an active campaign of terror, which increased the panic of the residents, making them frantic to leave. The refugees in the compound could see Serb soldiers setting houses and haystacks on fire:⁶⁹

⁶³ Van Duijn, T. 1741; P 127, pp. 34-35; Witness G, T. 1643.

⁶⁴ Franken, T. 2048, 2085.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., Captain Eelco Koster (hereafter "Koster"), P 127/A, p. 35-36; Vaasen, T. 1397; Kingori, T. 1833; Karremans, T. 3330-3331.

⁶⁶ Van Duijn, T. 1748.

⁶⁷ Ms. Camila Omanovi} (hereafter "Omanovi}"), T. 1090-911093.

⁶⁸ Witnesses testified that once the television cameras were switched off, the sweets were taken away from the children. See Vaasen, T. 1414; Rutten, T. 2125; Witness F, T. 1521.

⁶⁹ Rutten, T. 2115; **Mandzi}, T.994**; Omanovi}, T. 1091-93; van Duijn, T. 1779-1780; Witness G, T. 1638-1642; Ms. Hava Hajdarevi} (hereafter "Hajdarevi}"), T. 2581.

We could see nearby houses on fire. They also torched the houses in a selective manner, with the purpose of frightening the population and also so as to prevent them from coming back. It was a very clear message, very clear sign that Srebrenica – that is, that there would be no life for Bosniaks in Srebrenica anymore.⁷⁰

42. Throughout the afternoon of 12 July 1995, Serb soldiers mingled in the crowd. One witness recalled hearing the soldiers cursing the Bosnian Muslims and telling them to leave; that they would be slaughtered; that this was a Serb country.⁷¹ Another witness testified that a soldier cut him in the face.⁷²

43. Killings occurred.⁷³ In the late morning of 12 July 1995, a witness saw a pile of 20 to 30 bodies heaped up behind the Transport Building in Potocari, alongside a tractor-like machine.⁷⁴ Another testified that, at around 1200 hours on 12 July, he saw a soldier slay a child with a knife in the middle of a crowd of expellees. He also said that he saw Serb soldiers execute more than a hundred Bosnian Muslim men in the area behind the Zinc Factory and then load their bodies onto a truck, although the number and methodical nature of the murders attested to by this witness stand in contrast to other evidence on the Trial Record that indicates that the killings in Poto-ari were sporadic in nature.⁷⁵

44. As evening fell, the terror deepened. Screams, gunshots and other frightening noises were audible throughout the night and no one could sleep.⁷⁶ Soldiers were picking people out of the crowd and taking them away: some returned; others did not.⁷⁷ Witness T recounted how three brothers – one merely a child and the others in their teens – were taken out in the night. When the boys' mother went looking for them, she found them with their throats slit.⁷⁸

45. That night, a Dutch Bat medical orderly came across two Serb soldiers raping a young woman:

[W]e saw two Serb soldiers, one of them was standing guard and the other one was lying on the girl, with his pants off. And we saw a girl lying on the ground, on some kind of mattress. There was blood on the mattress, even she was covered with blood. She had bruises on her legs. There was even blood coming down her legs. She was in total shock. She went totally crazy."⁷⁹

⁷⁰ Mr. Nesib Mandzi (hereafter "Mandzi"), T. 994.

⁷¹ Mr. Bego Ademovi, (hereafter "Ademovi") T. 1589.

⁷² Witness H, T. 1683-87.

⁷³ Franken, T. 2052; Witness B, T. 908; Witness G, T. 1642-1648; Witness H, T. 1688-92; Ademovi, T. 1590-97.

⁷⁴ Witness H, T. 1688-89.

⁷⁵ Ademovi, T. 1590-1591, 1593-96.

⁷⁶ See, e.g. Mandzi, T. 995; Omanovi, T. 1109-1110; Ms. Mirsada Malagi (hereafter "Malagi") T. 1957-1958; Witness H, T. 1692-95, Hajdarevi, T. 2585-2586.

⁷⁷ Mandzi, T. 994; Ademovi, T. 1598-99; Malagi, T. 1954-1955; Witness H, T. 1692-1695.

⁷⁸ Witness T, T. 3432-3434.

⁷⁹ Lance Corporal David Vaasen (then-Private First Class) (hereafter "Vaasen"), T. 1429-30.

46. Bosnian Muslim refugees nearby could see the rape, but could do nothing about it because of Serb soldiers standing nearby.⁸⁰ Other people heard women screaming, or saw women being dragged away.⁸¹ Several individuals were so terrified that they committed suicide by hanging themselves.⁸² Throughout the night and early the next morning, stories about the rapes and killings spread through the crowd and the terror in the camp escalated.⁸³

47. On the morning of 13 July 1995, refugees searching for water came upon clusters of corpses next to a nearby stream. Finding dead bodies in such a prominent place strengthened their resolve to flee as soon as possible.⁸⁴

(iii) 12-13 July 1995: The Transport of the Bosnian Muslim Women Children and Elderly from Potocari

48. On 12 and 13 July 1995, the women, children and elderly were bussed out of Potocari, under the control of VRS forces, to Bosnian Muslim held territory near Kladanj. When the first group of buses pulled into Potocari in the early afternoon of 12 July 1995, the Srebrenica refugees rushed to board them.⁸⁵ Most of the residents did not even know where they were headed. One survivor recounted her experience before the Trial Chamber:

[N]obody asked us They simply brought the buses. And they knew, because such chaos reigned in Srebrenica, so they knew if they brought those five buses, or any number of vehicles, that people (would) simply set off. Because before that, they had passed such horrible nights We simply wanted to get away, to get away, only not to stay there. And we didn't even have any other possibility. . . . We had no say in the matter."⁸⁶

Some soldiers were hitting and abusing the refugees as they boarded the buses.⁸⁷

49. Witnesses said the buses were overcrowded and unbearably hot. Along the road, some village residents taunted the passengers with the three-fingered Serb salute. Others threw stones at the passing buses. Most of the women, children, and the elderly, however, arrived safely at Tišca.⁸⁸

⁸⁰ Vaasen, T. 1431.

⁸¹ Omanovi}, T. 1132; Ademovi}, T. 1588.

⁸² Malagi} T. 1959-1960; Omanovi}, T. 1113, 1117-1119; Witness B, T. 914-915.

⁸³ Omanovi}, T. 1113; Mandzi}, T. 997.

⁸⁴ Omanovi}, T. 1114; Witness E, T. 1349; Rutten, T. 2139-2140; see also Franken, T. 2052; Koster, P 127, p.44.

⁸⁵ Witness B, T. 894-98.

⁸⁶ Omanovi}, T. 1129-30; see also, e.g., Ademovi}, T. 1603 (expellees were not given a choice about whether to stay or where to go).

⁸⁷ Witness G, T. 1643-1648; see also Kingori, T. 1881-85 (it was forced transport with the destination determined by the Bosnian Serbs).

⁸⁸ One witness testified about unconfirmed information that suggests approximately 1,000 women, most of them young, did not arrive in Kladanj from Poto-ari. See Malagi}, T. 1991. Fragments of the Trial Record suggest that, at various points throughout the journey, women, particularly young attractive women, were pulled off the buses by Bosnian Serb forces, their ultimate fate unknown. e.g. Witness D, T. 1279-1280. However, the Prosecution did not pursue this matter and did not seek to include this in the criminal conduct for which the defendant was alleged to be responsible.

After disembarking, they were forced to continue on foot for several kilometres through the “no-man’s land” between the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim lines to Kladanj.⁸⁹

50. Dutch Bat soldiers attempted to escort the buses carrying the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Poto-ari. They succeeded in accompanying the first convoy of refugees on 12 July 1995,⁹⁰ but thereafter they were stopped along the way and their vehicles were stolen at gunpoint.⁹¹ When Major Robert Franken, the Deputy Commander of Dutch Bat, was asked, during his testimony, why the Serbs were seizing the UNPROFOR vehicles, he answered:

Because they didn’t want anybody to be around; that’s obvious...they didn’t want us to witness whatever would happen.⁹²

51. The removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilian population from Poto-ari was completed on the evening of 13 July 1995 by 2000 hours.⁹³ When UN soldiers visited the town of Srebrenica on 14 July 1995, they said they did not find a single Bosnian Muslim alive in the town.⁹⁴

52. The Trial Chamber finds that, following the take-over of Srebrenica, in July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces devised and implemented a plan to transport all of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of the enclave.

(iv) The Separation of the Bosnian Muslim Men in Poto-ari

53. From the morning of 12 July, Bosnian Serb forces began gathering men from the refugee population in Poto-ari and holding them in separate locations.⁹⁵ One Dutch Bat witness saw men being taken to a location in front of the Zinc Factory and, subsequently, that evening, driven away in a lorry.⁹⁶ Further, as the Bosnian Muslim refugees began boarding the buses, Bosnian Serb soldiers systematically separated out men of military age who were trying to clamour aboard.⁹⁷ Occasionally, younger and older men were stopped as well. These men were taken to a building in Potocari referred to as the “White House”.⁹⁸

⁸⁹ Malagi}, T. 1981-82.

⁹⁰ Witness C, T. 1187.

⁹¹ Franken, T. 2031 (testifying that Dutch Bat lost about 15-16 jeeps); Rutten, T. 2130, 2131, 2154; Witness G, T. 1650-59.

⁹² Franken, T. 2031.

⁹³ P 459 (Report prepared by Colonel Jankovi} of the VRS Main Staff, dated 13 July 1995).

⁹⁴ Vaasen, T. 1478.

⁹⁵ Witness H, T. 1685, 1695, 1716-1717; Omanovi}, T. 1130-1131.

⁹⁶ Van Duijn, T. 1761-1762.

⁹⁷ Vaasen, T. 1418-1419; Franken, T. 2038-2039; Witness C, T. 1182; Witness F, T. 1511; Witness G, T. 1643-1644; Omanovi}, T. 1105-1106; Witness E, T. 1350; Malagi}, T. 1966; and Mand` i}, T. 992, 1005-1006. Witness B recalled that the separation process may not have begun until after the first few buses had already been filled up. Witness B, T. 898.

⁹⁸ See, e.g., Witness B, T. 898; Kingori, T. 1844-1849, 1857.

54. The way in which the separations were conducted was traumatic for the Bosnian Muslim families involved. Witness I, for example, testified:

I was carrying water to have for my children so that on the road they could have some refreshment, because there were people who were passing out. A Serb soldier grabbed me by the shoulder and said, "Here." I said, "Let me see off my children, at least, to the trucks." He says "You can't." So I gave that canister to a grandchild. And the Serb soldier grabbed me by the shoulder, and I had to go into the house there.⁹⁹

55. Witness DD recalled seeing her young son for the last time as her family tried to board the buses:

[F]rom the left column one of their soldiers jumped out, and he spoke to my child. He told us to move to the right side, and he told my son, "Young man, you should go to the left side." . . . I grabbed him by his hand . . . And then I begged them, I pleaded with them. Why are you taking him? He was born in 1981. But he repeated his order. And I held him so hard, but he grabbed him . . . [A]nd he took my son's hand, and he dragged him to the left side. And he turned around, and then he told me, "Mommy, please, can you get that bag for me? Could you please get it for me? . . . That was the last time I heard his voice."¹⁰⁰

56. As the buses carrying the women, children and elderly headed north towards Bosnian Muslim-held territory, they were stopped along the way and again screened for men. Witness D, for example, managed to steal aboard a bus in Potocari, but was separated from his family once the bus stopped in Tišca:

I got off the bus too with my child in my arms. My wife had her backpack on her back, and she was supporting my mother because she was old and very frail. My child was five years old. After we had got off the bus and had made just a few steps, I noticed several Serb soldiers. One of those Serb soldiers pulled me by the shoulder and said, " Give the child to your wife and you come with us." I had to do that. So I gave the child to my wife. I tried to turn once again, because I knew that was the last time I would see my child. As a matter of fact, I was about to say something. I wanted to say anything, but then I couldn't. At that moment, the Serb soldier pushed me with his rifle and said, "Move on."¹⁰¹

57. As early as the evening of 12 July 1995, Major Franken heard that no men were arriving with the women and children at their destination in Kladanj.¹⁰²

58. On 13 July 1995, the Dutch Bat troops witnessed definite signs that the Bosnian Serbs were executing some of the Bosnian Muslim men who had been separated. For example, Corporal Vaasen saw two soldiers take a man behind the White House. He then heard a shot and the two soldiers reappeared alone.¹⁰³ Another Dutch Bat officer, saw Serb soldiers execute an unarmed man with a single gunshot to the head. He also heard gunshots 20-40 times an hour throughout the

⁹⁹ Witness I, T. 2371.

¹⁰⁰ Witness DD, T. 5754-55.

¹⁰¹ Witness D, T. 1261.

¹⁰² Franken, T. 2046-2047.

¹⁰³ Vaasen, T. 1438.

afternoon.¹⁰⁴ When the Dutch Bat soldiers told Colonel Joseph Kingori, a United Nations Military Observer¹⁰⁵ (“UNMO”) in the Srebrenica area, that men were being taken behind the White House and not coming back, Colonel Kingori went to investigate. He heard gunshots as he approached, but was stopped by Bosnian Serb soldiers before he could find out what was going on.¹⁰⁶

59. Beginning on the afternoon of 12 July 1995 and continuing throughout 13 July 1995, men detained in the White House were placed on separate buses to the women, children and elderly and were taken out of the Poto-ari compound to detention sites in Bratunac.¹⁰⁷

(b) The Column of Bosnian Muslim Men

60. As the situation in Poto-ari escalated towards crisis on the evening of 11 July 1995, word spread through the Bosnian Muslim community that the able-bodied men should take to the woods, form a column together with members of the 28th Division of the ABiH and attempt a breakthrough towards Bosnian Muslim-held territory in the north. At around 2200 hours on the evening of 11 July 1995, the “division command”, together with the Bosnian Muslim municipal authorities of Srebrenica, made the decision to form the column.¹⁰⁸ The young men were afraid they would be killed if they fell into Bosnian Serb hands in Potocari and believed that they stood a better chance of surviving by trying to escape through the woods to Tuzla.¹⁰⁹

61. The column gathered near the villages of Jaglici and Šušnjari and began to trek north. Witnesses estimated that there were between 10,000 and 15,000 men in the retreating column.¹¹⁰ Around one third of the men in the column were Bosnian Muslim soldiers from the 28th Division, although not all of the soldiers were armed.¹¹¹ The head of the column was comprised of units of the 28th Division, then came civilians mixed with soldiers and the last section of the column was the Independent Battalion of the 28th Division.¹¹² A small number of women, children and elderly

¹⁰⁴ Corporal Groenewegen testimony, P 32, .62. See also Kingori, T. 1852; Franken, T. 2052; and Witness G, T. 1642-48.

¹⁰⁵ The role of UNMOs was to monitor violations of cease-fire agreements and also to provide humanitarian support. Unlike UNPROFOR, the UNMOs were unarmed. See Kingori, T. 1799-1800.

¹⁰⁶ Kingori, T. 1850-51; see also Franken, T. 2040 (UN soldiers not allowed to investigate sounds emanating from the White House).

¹⁰⁷ See the further discussion on the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim men from Poto-ari *Infra* paras. 156-161.

¹⁰⁸ Had` ihasanovi}, T. 9527-9528.

¹⁰⁹ Witness L, T. 2654; Mr. Enver Husic (hereafter “ Husic ”), T.2640. See also Had` ihasanovi}, T. 9594-9595.

¹¹⁰ Had` ihasanovi}, T. 9528 (putting the number of men in the column at between 12,000 and 15,000 people and the length of the column at between 12 and 15 kilometres).

¹¹¹ See, e.g., Butler, T. 5318 (one-third were soldiers, but only 1,000 had weapons);. Cf. Witness P, T. 2944 (one-third of the men were armed); Witness S, T. 3240 (about one third of the men were armed with hunting rifles and similar weapons).

¹¹² Had` ihasanovi}, T. 9528.

travelled with the column in the woods. When subsequently captured by Bosnian Serb forces, they were put on passing buses from Potocari heading towards Kladanj.¹¹³

62. At around midnight on 11 July 1995, the column started moving along the axis between Konjevic Polje and Bratunac. On 12 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces launched an artillery attack against the column that was crossing an asphalt road between the area of Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba *en route* to Tuzla. Only about one third of the men successfully made it across the asphalt road and the column was split in two parts.¹¹⁴ Heavy shooting and shelling continued against the remainder of the column throughout the day and during the night. Men from the rear of the column who survived this ordeal described it as a " man hunt ".¹¹⁵

63. By the afternoon of 12 July 1995, or the early evening hours at the latest, the Bosnian Serb forces were capturing large numbers of these men in the rear.¹¹⁶ Witnesses reported a variety of techniques used to trap prisoners. In some places, ambushes were set up¹¹⁷ and, in others, the Bosnian Serbs shouted into the forest, urging the men to surrender and promising that the Geneva Conventions would be complied with.¹¹⁸ In some places, Bosnian Serb forces fired into the woods with anti-aircraft guns and other weapons¹¹⁹ or used stolen UN equipment to deceive the Bosnian Muslim men into believing that the UN or the Red Cross were present to monitor the treatment accorded to them upon capture.¹²⁰ In fact, Bosnian Serb forces stripped the captured Muslim men of their personal belongings¹²¹ and, in some cases, carried out random summary executions.¹²²

64. The largest groups of Bosnian Muslim men from the column were captured on 13 July 1995; several thousand were collected in or near the Sandi}i Meadow and on the Nova Kasaba football field. The Trial Chamber heard from men held captive on these fields¹²³ and from witnesses who passed by them on the buses heading to Kladanj.¹²⁴ Aerial reconnaissance photos tendered into

¹¹³ Witness K, T. 2503, 2509.

¹¹⁴ Had` ihasanovi}, T. 9528-9529.

¹¹⁵ Had` ihasanovi}, T. 9530.

¹¹⁶ Butler, T. 5453-5454.

¹¹⁷ See, e.g., Witness J, T. 2450.

¹¹⁸ Witness P, T. 2946.

¹¹⁹ Witness K, T. 2504; Egbers, T. 2224-2225.

¹²⁰ Witness M, T. 2766; Witness P, T. 2292-93.

¹²¹ Witness Q, T. 3018; Witness R, T. 3198; Witness O, T. 2866; Witness S, T. 3246-3247.

¹²² Witness R, T. 3192-3193, 3198-3202; Witness P, T. 2957; Husic, T. 2634-2635. See also Mr. Andere Stoelinga, T. 2299-2300.

¹²³ See, e.g., Witness J, T. 2439-2497; Witness K, T. 2497-2571; Witness L, T. 2647-2731; Witness O, T. 2860-2938; Husi}, T. 2598-2646; Witness P, T. 2940-3014; Witness Q, T. 3015-3051.

¹²⁴ See, e.g., Ademovi}, T. 1607 (1,000 men at the Nova Kasaba football field); Malagi}, T. 1974-75 (long column of prisoners between Sandi}i and Kravica, and a large group in a meadow, with their belongings heaped by the road); Hajdarevi}, T. 2587-2588 (many prisoners with their hands behind their heads near Kravica and Sandi}i); Egbers, T. 2226 (football field at Nova Kasaba was entirely filled with men, sitting on their knees with their hands behind their heads, surrounded by soldiers); Witness Q, T. 3025 (saw crowd of prisoners in Sandi}i from bus); Witness E, T. 1354,

evidence by the Prosecution confirm the presence of masses of people in these locations on 13 July 1995.¹²⁵

65. The head of the column waited to see what would happen to the second part of the column. Heavy shooting and shelling continued throughout the day of 12 July 1995 and into the night, and ultimately the head of the column abandoned hope. On 13 July 1995, they continued their journey up along the Kalesija-Zvornik road, where they too were caught in ambushes and suffered further casualties.¹²⁶ After one unsuccessful attempt to move forward to the Bosnian Muslim front lines on 15 July 1995, the head of the column finally managed to break through to Bosnian Muslim-held territory on 16 July 1995. ABiH forces attacking from the direction of Tuzla assisted by piercing a line of about one-and-a-half kilometres for the emerging column.¹²⁷

8. The Execution of the Bosnian Muslim Men from Srebrenica

66. The Bosnian Muslim men who had been separated from the women, children and elderly in Poto-ari (numbering approximately 1,000) were transported to Bratunac and subsequently joined by Bosnian Muslim men captured from the column. No discernible effort was made to keep the prisoners from Potocari and the men captured from the column in woods separate. These men were held in various locations, such as an abandoned warehouse,¹²⁸ an old school¹²⁹ and even in the buses and trucks that had brought them there.¹³⁰ During the nights, individual prisoners in Bratunac were called out, and cries of pain and gunfire could be heard.¹³¹ After being detained in Bratunac for between one and three days, the prisoners were transported elsewhere, as the buses used to evacuate the women, children and elderly from Poto-ari became available.

67. Almost to a man, the thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners captured, following the take-over of Srebrenica, were executed. Some were killed individually or in small groups by the soldiers who captured them and some were killed in the places where they were temporarily detained. Most, however, were slaughtered in carefully orchestrated mass executions, commencing on 13 July 1995, in the region just north of Srebrenica. Prisoners not killed on 13 July 1995 were subsequently bussed to execution sites further north of Bratunac, within the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade. The large-scale executions in the north took place between 14 and 17 July 1995.

1356 (a total of approximately 300-400 prisoners at Kravica and in a meadow between Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba).

¹²⁵ P 12/2; P 12/4; Butler, T. 4925-4928; P 490; P 491; P 492; P 493; P 494; P 495; P 496; P 497; and P 498.

¹²⁶ Had' ihasanovi}, T. 9529.

¹²⁷ Had' ihasanovi}, T. 9529-9530.

¹²⁸ Witness N, T. 2801.

¹²⁹ Witness I, T. 2374.

68. Most of the mass executions followed a well-established pattern. The men were first taken to empty schools or warehouses. After being detained there for some hours, they were loaded onto buses or trucks and taken to another site for execution. Usually, the execution fields were in isolated locations. The prisoners were unarmed and, in many cases, steps had been taken to minimise resistance, such as blindfolding them, binding their wrists behind their backs with ligatures or removing their shoes. Once at the killing fields, the men were taken off the trucks in small groups, lined up and shot. Those who survived the initial round of gunfire were individually shot with an extra round, though sometimes only after they had been left to suffer for a time.¹³² Immediately afterwards, and sometimes even during the executions, earth moving equipment arrived and the bodies were buried, either in the spot where they were killed or in another nearby location.

69. At several of the sites, a few wounded people survived by pretending to be dead and then crawled away. The Trial Chamber heard from some of these survivors about their ordeals. It also heard from a member of the VRS who participated in one of the largest executions, which took place on 16 July 1995.¹³³

70. In addition to being an unspeakable human evil, the decision to execute these Bosnian Muslim men is unfathomable in military terms. As Mr. Richard Butler (Chief Warrant Officer Three All Source Intelligence Technician with the United States Army), the Prosecution's military expert, pointed out:

...it is hard to envision a better bargaining chip in dealing with the political authorities of certainly the BiH government and of the International Community than having 10,000 to 15000 Muslim men in the middle of Poto-ari in a legitimate prisoner of war facility under the control or under the supervision of certainly the UN troops that were there and the ICRC at a point in time. That is the ultimate bargaining chip, to be able to get significant political leverage from people, one would think, and this chip was thrown away for another reason.

9. Forensic Evidence of the Executions

71. The extensive forensic evidence presented by the Prosecution strongly corroborates important aspects of the testimony of survivors from the various execution sites. Commencing in 1996, the Office of the Prosecutor (hereafter "OTP") conducted exhumations of 21 gravesites associated with the take-over of Srebrenica: four in 1996 (at Cerska, Nova Kasaba, Orahovac (also known as Lazete 2) and Branjevo Military Farm (Pilica)); eight in 1998 (Petkovci Dam, Can-ari

¹³⁰ Witness N, T. 2802; Witness I, T. 2374 (old school).

¹³¹ Witness L, T. 2668; Witness N, T. 2804; Witness Q, T.2957; Witness I, T. 2377.

¹³² See, e.g., Witness Q, T. 3033, 3035-3036 ; Witness L, T. 2690 (when a wounded man at the Orahovac site asked to be finished off, the Serb soldier replied "slowly, slowly").

Road 12, ^an-ari Road 3, Hod` i}i Road 3, Hod` i}i Road 4, Hod` i}i Road 5, Lipje 2, Zeleni Jadar 5); five in 1999 (Kozluk, Nova Kasaba, Konjevi} Polje 1, Konjevic Polje 2, and Glogova 2);¹³⁴ and four in 2000 (Lazete 1, Lazete 2C,¹³⁵ Ravnice and Glogova 1). Of the 21 gravesites exhumed, 14 were primary gravesites, where bodies had been put directly after the individuals were killed. Of these, eight were subsequently disturbed and bodies were removed and reburied elsewhere, often in secondary gravesites located in more remote regions.¹³⁶ Seven of the exhumed gravesites were secondary burial sites.¹³⁷ The OTP retained ballistics, soil analysis and materials analysis, experts to comparatively examine materials and residues found in the primary and secondary gravesites.¹³⁸ As a result of these analyses, links were discovered between certain primary gravesites and certain secondary gravesites and these are considered in further detail below.

72. The Prosecution called eight witnesses to give evidence before the Trial Chamber about the exhumations and the resulting forensic findings.¹³⁹ In addition, the Trial Chamber received volumes of written reports prepared by the experts who conducted the OTP investigations. In response, the Defence filed two reports by a forensic expert, Dr. Zoran Stankovic.¹⁴⁰

73. The forensic evidence supports the Prosecution's claim that, following the take-over of Srebrenica, thousands of Bosnian Muslim men were summarily executed and consigned to mass graves. Although forensic experts were not able to conclude with certainty how many bodies were in the mass-graves, due to the level of decomposition that had occurred and the fact that many

¹³³ See generally the discussion *Infra* paras. 195-253.

¹³⁴ See P 140 D. Manning, *Srebvenica Investigation: Summary of Forensic Evidence-Execution Points and Mass Graves*, 16 May 2000 (hereafter "Manning Report") p. 00950906

¹³⁵ This gravesite is part of the Lazete 2 site exhumed in 1996, but is treated as a separate site for present purposes.

¹³⁶ Manning Report, p. 00950925 and D. Manning, *Srebrenica Investigation: Summary of Forensic Evidence-Mass Graves Exhumed in 2000*, February 2001(hereafter "Additional Manning Report") p 7601. The Additional Manning Report was filed as part of the "Motion to Reopen the Prosecutor's Case for the Limited Purpose of Introducing Four Expert Reports and a Summary Report of Fresh Exhumations Evidence" dated 15 March 2001. The Trial Chamber issued an oral order that these four expert's reports be admitted into evidence on 4 April 2001. See T. 9423. The Report was subsequently tendered as P 897.

¹³⁷ Additional Manning Report, p. 7601.

¹³⁸ See P 144 (Laboratory Report on Automated Ballistic Comparison, prepared by United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Forensic Science Laboratory, 24 February 2000); P 179 (Statement of Antony G. Brown, Palynologist 6 January 1998); P 180 (Statement of Antony G Brown, Palynologist 26 February 1999); P 143 (Report on Textile Investigation, prepared by Ing. S.E. Maljaars, Ministry of Justice, Netherlands Forensic Institute, 11 February 2000). See also Mr. Dean Manning (hereafter "Manning"), T. 3593.

¹³⁹ Professor Jose Baraybar (hereafter "Baraybar") T. 3781-3895; Professor Helge Brunborg, (hereafter "Brunborg") T. 4036-4100; Dr. John Clark, (hereafter "Clark") T. 3896-3972; Professor William Haglund, (hereafter "Haglund") T. 3723-3780; Dr. Christopher Lawrence, (hereafter "Lawrence") T. 3974-4034 ; Manning, T. 3542-3626, 4141-4150; Mr. Jean-Rene Ruez, (hereafter "Ruez") T. 3465-3541; and Professor Richard Wright, (hereafter "Wright"), T. 3632-3721.

¹⁴⁰ D 172 (*Forensic Opinion* dated 17 October 2000, by Doc. Dr. sc. Med. Zoran Stankovi}, Specialist in Forensic Medicine, permanent Expert for the area of Forensic Medicine pursuant to Ruling No. 740/0373/98 of the Ministry of Justice of Serbia, Institute of Forensic Medicine-VMA (hereafter "Stankovi} Report") and D 172 (*Forensic Opinion* dated 18 April 2001 by Doc. Dr. sc. Med. Zoran Stankovi}, Specialist in Forensic Medicine, permanent Expert for the area of Forensic Medicine pursuant to Ruling No. 740/0373/98 of the Ministry of Justice of Serbia, Institute of Forensic Medicine-VMA, (hereafter "Additional Stankovi} Report").

bodies were mutilated in the process of being moved from primary to secondary graves by mechanical equipment, the experts were able to conservatively estimate that a minimum of 2,028 separate bodies were exhumed from the mass-graves.¹⁴¹

74. Identity documents and belongings, found in most of the exhumed graves, suggest that the victims were linked with Srebrenica. Among the items found were license cards and other papers with references to Srebrenica.¹⁴² In some cases, investigators were able to positively identify bodies in the graves as former Srebrenica residents on the basis of distinctive personal items found with the bodies such as jewellery,¹⁴³ artificial limbs¹⁴⁴ and photographs.¹⁴⁵ Other artefacts found at the majority of the gravesites, such as verses from the Koran, suggest the presence of victims with Muslim religious affiliation.¹⁴⁶ It is also of note that the sex distribution of the persons listed as missing from Srebrenica, on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) list (cross-referenced with other sources), correlates with the sex distribution of the bodies exhumed from the graves.¹⁴⁷ Professor Helge Brunborg, a Prosecution demographics expert, testified that the overwhelming majority of people registered as missing from Srebrenica are men.¹⁴⁸ The forensic examinations of the gravesites associated with Srebrenica reveal that only one of the 1,843 bodies for which sex could be determined was female.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, there is a correlation between the age distribution of persons listed as missing and the bodies exhumed from the Srebrenica graves: 26.4 percent of persons listed as missing were between 13-24 years and 17.5 percent of bodies exhumed fell within this age group; 73.6 percent of persons listed as missing were over 25 years of age and 82.8 percent of bodies exhumed fell within this age group.¹⁵⁰

75. The results of the forensic investigations suggest that the majority of bodies exhumed were not killed in combat; they were killed in mass executions. Investigators discovered at least 448 blindfolds on or with the bodies uncovered during the exhumations at ten separate sites.¹⁵¹ At least

¹⁴¹ Additional Manning Report p. 7614.

¹⁴² Manning, T. 3579-3580, 3588-3592. Identification items uncovered during the exhumations conducted in 2000 further revealed the presence of individuals listed as missing by the ICRC list cross-referenced with other sources. See Additional Manning Report, p. 7600-7597.

¹⁴³ P 132/95, and P 132/95A. See also Manning T. 3580-3582.

¹⁴⁴ P 132/93, and P 132/93A. See also Manning, T. 3583-3584.

¹⁴⁵ P 132/1, and P 132/18. See also Manning, T. 3589-3590, and 3592.

¹⁴⁶ P 132/110. See also Manning, T. 3588-3589. Artefacts demonstrating Muslim religious affiliation were also identified in three of the gravesites exhumed in 2000. Additional Manning Report pp. 7600-7597.

¹⁴⁷ Brunborg, T. 4071.

¹⁴⁸ Brunborg, T. 4070.

¹⁴⁹ Baraybar, T. 3811-3812. Additional Manning Report, p. 7613.

¹⁵⁰ P 276 (H. Brunborg and H. Urdal, The Report on the Number of Missing and Dead from Srebrenica), p. 00926384, Figure 3. This figure only includes exhumations conducted up to the year 2000.

¹⁵¹ The sites were: the primary grave at Branjevo Military Farm and the related secondary grave of Can-ari Road 12; the primary grave at Orahovac (known as Lazete 2), and the three connected secondary graves at Hod` i}i Road 3, Hod` i}i Road 4 and Hod` i}i Road 5 ; and the Kozluk grave and the associated secondary grave at Can-ari Road 3. Manning T.3569-3570. In addition, during the exhumations conducted in 2000, blindfolds were found at Lazete 2C and Lazete 1. Additional Manning Report, p. 7601.

423 ligatures were located during exhumations at 13 separate sites.¹⁵² Some of the ligatures were made of cloth and string, but predominately they were made of wire.¹⁵³ These ligatures and blindfolds are inconsistent with combat casualties. The Prosecution also relied on forensic evidence that the overwhelming majority of victims located in the graves, for who a cause of death could be determined, were killed by gunshot wounds.¹⁵⁴ The exhumations also revealed that some of the victims were severely handicapped and, for that reason, unlikely to have been combatants.¹⁵⁵

76. Upon reviewing the Prosecution's forensic evidence, the Defence forensic expert, Dr. Zoran Stankovi}, argued that "some mass graves originated from the bodies of the persons who lost their lives in mutual armed conflicts of the warring sides, and that in some graves, where the cases of sure execution were registered, there were also...bodies killed in combat...".¹⁵⁶ He particularly criticised the methodology employed during some of the Prosecution's forensic investigations into cause of death.¹⁵⁷ Certainly, at those sites where no blindfolds or ligatures were found during exhumations, the evidence that the victims were not killed in combat was less compelling.¹⁵⁸ Significantly, some of the gravesites located in the Nova Kasaba and Konjevic Polje area, where intense fighting took place between the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim forces, on 12 and 13 July 1995, were amongst those where very few blindfolds and ligatures were uncovered.¹⁵⁹ The Defence expert, Dr. Stankovi} did not however, fundamentally challenge the substantive findings of the Prosecution experts and accepted that the exhumations were conducted by experts with "substantial professional experience and adequate technical, scientific and moral integrity."¹⁶⁰

77. The Trial Chamber cannot rule out the possibility that a percentage of the bodies in the gravesites examined may have been of men killed in combat. Overall, however, the forensic evidence presented by the Prosecution is consistent with the testimony of witnesses who appeared

¹⁵² The sites were: the primary grave at Cerska; the primary grave of Nova Kasaba exhumed in 1996; the primary grave of Orahovac (Lazete 2) and its related secondary site of Hod`i}i Road 5; the primary grave of Branjevo Military Farm, and the related secondary grave at Can-ari Road 12; the primary site of Petkovci Dam and its related site of Liplje 2; the primary grave of Kozluk and its associated secondary grave of Can-ari Road 3; and the secondary site of Zeleni Jadar 5. Manning, T. 3579-3576. In addition, during the exhumations conducted in 2000, ligatures were found at Lazete 2 C, and Glogova 1. Additional Manning Report, p 7601.

¹⁵³ Manning, T. 3576.

¹⁵⁴ Manning, T. 3565. The results of the additional exhumations conducted in 2000 continued to reflect this pattern. See Additional Manning Report.

¹⁵⁵ See e.g. P 219 (an individual with a prosthetic leg and his hands tied behind his back). See generally, Lawrence, T. 3987-3989; and Clark, T. 3912-3913, 3939-3940.

¹⁵⁶ Stankovi} Report, p 13. See also Additional Stankovi} Report, p 8174.

¹⁵⁷ Stankovi} Report, p 10-11.

¹⁵⁸ Clark, T. 3958.

¹⁵⁹ Manning Report, T. p. 00950924. See also the Additional Manning Report p. 7606 (regarding the Ravnice primary grave, which is also located close to the Konjevic Polje to Bratunac Road, and in which no ligatures or blindfolds were uncovered. In addition, this is an undisturbed primary gravesite, which further suggests that the victims may have been combat casualties. See the discussion *Infra* para. 78).

¹⁶⁰ Stankovi} Report, at p. 11.

before the Trial Chamber and recounted the mass execution of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men at ^erska Valley, Kravica Warehouse, Orahovac, Branjevo Farm, Petkovci Dam and Kozluk.¹⁶¹

78. Most significantly, the forensic evidence presented by the Prosecution also demonstrates that, during a period of several weeks in September and early October 1995, Bosnian Serb forces dug up many of the primary mass gravesites and reburied the bodies in still more remote locations.¹⁶² Forensic tests have linked certain primary gravesites and certain secondary gravesites, namely: Branjevo Military Farm and Can-ari Road 12; Petkovci Dam and Liplje 2; Orahovac (Lazete 2) and Hod`i}i Road 5; Orahovac (Lazete 1) and Hod`i}i Road 3 and 4; Glogova and Zeleni Jadar 5; and Kozluk and Can-ari Road 3.¹⁶³ The reburial evidence demonstrates a concerted campaign to conceal the bodies of the men in these primary gravesites, which was undoubtedly prompted by increasing international scrutiny of the events following the take-over of Srebrenica. Such extreme measures would not have been necessary had the majority of the bodies in these primary graves been combat victims. The Trial Chamber also notes that General Krstic himself did not contest the exhumation evidence presented by the Prosecution about the existence of the mass graves containing the bodies of "victims of Srebrenica".¹⁶⁴

79. Overall the Trial Chamber finds that the forensic evidence presented by the Prosecution provides corroboration of survivor testimony that, following the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995, thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica were killed in careful and methodical mass executions.

10. The Number of Men Executed by the Bosnian Serb Forces Following the Take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995

80. It is impossible to determine with precision the number of Bosnian Muslim men killed by Bosnian Serb forces following the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995. During the course of the exhumations conducted by the OTP, the process of identifying the number of bodies was complicated by the fact that, in the course of being removed from primary gravesites to secondary gravesites, the corpses were broken up and body parts became intermingled. However, as already noted, experts were able to conservatively determine that the minimum number of bodies in the graves exhumed was 2028.¹⁶⁵ Although the Trial Chamber cannot dismiss the possibility that some

¹⁶¹ The statistics relating to the forensic examinations conducted at these individual gravesites will be considered more closely in the Part IIB.

¹⁶² Ruez, T. 3534.

¹⁶³ Manning, T. 3614-3615 and see also Additional Manning Report p. 7601.

¹⁶⁴ Krstic, T. 6489.

¹⁶⁵ As Baraybar (a Prosecution forensic expert) pointed out, the minimum number of individuals within the grave is a very conservative estimate. Baraybar, T. 3811.

of the exhumed bodies were killed in combat, it accepts that the majority of the victims were executed. Eighteen additional graves linked with Srebrenica have been located but not yet exhumed. Based on preliminary examinations conducted by the OTP, all of these sites contain human remains and it is expected that the total number of bodies found and linked with Srebrenica will significantly increase as these sites are exhumed.¹⁶⁶

81. The number of people still listed as missing from Srebrenica in July 1995 provides further guidance as to the likely number of men executed. Professor Brunborg testified that, conservatively estimated, a minimum of 7,475 persons from Srebrenica are still listed as missing, based on the cross-referencing of ICRC lists and other sources and that it is likely that the vast majority of these missing people are deceased.¹⁶⁷ In determining the number of people missing following the take-over of Srebrenica, checks were made to ensure that people who were listed as missing prior to July 1995 were excluded. In particular, steps were taken to exclude ABiH soldiers who were reported as killed, wounded, captured or missing in action prior to July 1995 to the extent that was possible. In over 180 cases, however, this could not be done with certainty due to a lack of adequate personal data about the missing persons.¹⁶⁸

82. Nonetheless, the evidence given by witnesses, as corroborated by the forensic and demographics evidence presented by the OTP, strongly suggests that well in excess of 7,000 people went missing following the take-over of Srebrenica. The correlation between the age and sex of the bodies exhumed from the Srebrenica graves and that of the missing persons support the proposition that the majority of missing people were, in fact, executed and buried in the mass graves.

83. There are other indications on the Trial Record that Bosnian Serb forces executed thousands of Bosnian Muslim men following the take-over of Srebrenica. Estimates of the number of prisoners detained and killed at diverse locations throughout the Drina Corps zone of responsibility between 13 and 16 July 1995 will be considered in Part II B. There are also fragments of information from VRS communications about the possible magnitude of the executions. An intercepted conversation, at 1730 hours on 13 July 1995, indicates that about 6,000 men had been captured from the Bosnian Muslim column by that time.¹⁶⁹ Consistent with this, around 14 July,

¹⁶⁶ Baraybar, T. 3844. Four additional gravesites were exhumed in 2,000, reducing the number of unexhumed sites from 22 to 18. Prosecution experts estimate that a minimum of 2,571 further bodies are located in probed, but as yet, unexhumed gravesites. On the basis of their investigations to date, the Prosecution estimates that the total number of bodies detected in the mass graves is 4,805. See Additional Manning Report, p. 7614. This estimate was, however, contested by the Defence. See Additional Stankovi} Report, p. 8179.

¹⁶⁷ Brunborg, T. 4067. The final list prepared by the OTP refers to 7,481. This discrepancy is explained by the fact that information from the International Committee of the Red Cross revealed that six people on the list have been found alive, but the ICRC was not at liberty to disclose the names.

¹⁶⁸ Brunborg, T. 4078-4079.

¹⁶⁹ P 523.

Colonel Radislav Jankovi} (from the VRS Main Staff), during a conversation with a Dutch Bat officer about the attempted breakthrough by the 28th Division, stated that the VRS had already taken 6,000 prisoners of war.¹⁷⁰ Other intercepted VRS conversations reveal that, on 15 July 1995, midway through the executions, at least 3,000-4,000 Bosnian Muslim prisoners were being detained by the VRS.¹⁷¹ Further, on 18 July 1995, two unidentified Bosnian Serbs were heard in an intercepted conversation reflecting on the recent events in Eastern Bosnia, including matters relating to the Bosnian Muslim column.¹⁷² One participant said that of the 10,000 military aged men who were in Srebrenica, "4,000-5,000 have certainly kicked the bucket". Mr. Butler pointed out that this number was too high to refer only to combat casualties and concluded that this figure must include the men who were executed in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade.¹⁷³

84. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that, in July 1995, following the take-over of Srebrenica, Bosnian Serb forces executed several thousand Bosnian Muslim men. The total number is likely to be within the range of 7,000 -8,000 men.

11. A Plan to Execute the Bosnian Muslim Men of Srebrenica

85. A concerted effort was made to capture all Muslim men of military age. In fact, those captured included many boys well below that age and elderly men several years above that age that remained in the enclave following the take-over of Srebrenica. These men and boys were targeted regardless of whether they chose to flee to Poto-ari or to join the Bosnian Muslim column. The operation to capture and detain the Bosnian Muslim men was well organised and comprehensive. The Trial Chamber did, however, hear evidence of some exceptions to this general plan. In particular, on 15 and 16 July 1995, during intensive combat between the Bosnian Muslim column and the Zvornik Brigade, the Commander of that Brigade, Colonel Pandurevi}, without consultation with his superiors, made a decision to let a portion of the men in the armed head of the Bosnian Muslim column through to Tuzla.¹⁷⁴ However, this decision was apparently made out of desperation and in light of the Zvornik Brigade's inability to contain the column.

86. There is also evidence that some wounded Bosnian Muslim men were accorded proper treatment and evacuated under medical supervision.¹⁷⁵ This, argued the Defence, was evidence that the Bosnian Serb forces did not intend to kill all of the military aged Bosnian Muslims of

¹⁷⁰ Franken, T. 2050.

¹⁷¹ P 478 (A conversation intercepted at 1000 hours in which Colonel Beara stated he still had 3,500 "parcels" to distribute.); P 675 (Interim Combat Report dated 18 July 1995, sent by the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade stating that "someone brought in 3,000 Turks of military age and placed them in schools in the municipality").

¹⁷² P 684.

¹⁷³ Butler, T. 5205.

¹⁷⁴ Butler, T. 5105, 5128-5120, 5520-5522.

¹⁷⁵ Butler, T. 5513.

Srebrenica, but rather only those who posed a potential military threat.¹⁷⁶ The treatment accorded to these men stands out as an anomaly in the treatment of the Bosnian Muslim men following the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995. It may perhaps be explained, to some degree, as a strategy on the part of the Bosnian Serbs to avoid attracting international suspicion, especially given that UN personnel were present in the enclave watching the treatment accorded to some of these wounded men in the first few days after the take-over of Srebrenica. For example, on 13 July, a report prepared by Colonel Janković of the Main Staff noted that over 50 wounded Bosnian Muslims had been placed in the Bratunac hospital and that an UNPROFOR officer had stayed at the hospital to ensure the men were accorded proper treatment. Colonel Janković, however, was determined to “send him away tomorrow, under the pretext that his help is not necessary.”¹⁷⁷ The evidence that a small number of wounded Bosnian Muslims were accorded proper treatment does not diminish the overwhelming evidence showing that the Bosnian Serb forces went to great lengths to seize Bosnian Muslim men at virtually every opportunity, whether or not they posed a military threat,¹⁷⁸ collected them together in detention centres and subsequently executed them.

87. The Trial Chamber finds that, following the take over of Srebrenica in July 1995, the Bosnian Serbs devised and implemented a plan to execute as many as possible of the military aged Bosnian Muslim men present in the enclave.

12. Widespread Knowledge of the Crimes

88. As early as 14 July 1995, reports of missing Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica began to surface in the international media.¹⁷⁹ Around 15 July 1995, Witness DE, a Drina Corps officer, saw a television film clip showing captured men on a football pitch, presumably Nova Kasaba, while visiting Belgrade.¹⁸⁰ By 18 July 1995, news of the missing Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica had

¹⁷⁶ Final Submissions of the Accused, 21 June 2001 (hereafter “Defence Final Brief”), para. 140.

¹⁷⁷ P 459. Colonel Janković further noted “I think if we want to take over the enclaves of Žepa and Goražde in the same way, it will be necessary to present the operation in Srebrenica in the media, so as to show that we had rendered adequate treatment to the civilians, and even to soldiers who surrendered their weapons.” There is evidence that, following the period of the mass-executions, wounded Bosnian Muslim men, who were in VRS custody, were properly treated. In a communication on 17 July 1995, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade sought assistance from the Drina Corps Command to arrange for the removal of wounded Bosnian Muslim prisoners from the Bratunac health centre to Bijeljina. See P 370. Mr. Butler also testified that, by 22 July 1995, the policy of executing the Muslim prisoners had been abandoned. See Butler, T. 5233-5234, 5340, 5525-5526. Such a policy change is not surprising. By this time, word that the Bosnian Serbs had orchestrated mass executions of Bosnian Muslim men following the take-over of Srebrenica had been widely publicised.

¹⁷⁸ See for example, the discussion *Infra* para. 216 about the capture of Bosnian Muslim men from buses at Tišaja.

¹⁷⁹ See e.g. P 113-3, dated 14 July 1995 (story from China); P 114/1, dated 17 July 1995 (story from Banja Luka entitled “Zametnica Denies Maltreatment of Srebrenica Muslims”); P 113/5, dated 24 July 1995, (story entitled “Mazowiecki on Serb Human Rights Abuses re Srebrenica Missing”); P 113/6 dated 27 July 1995 (story regarding Mazowiecki’s resignation as UN envoy on the grounds that he could no longer take part in the “fictional” defence of human rights in the former Yugoslavia).

¹⁸⁰ Defence Witness DE, T. 7736.

become so widespread that the UN Secretariat wrote to the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Bosnia stating:

You will, no doubt, have read and heard the extensive reports of atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serbs during their recent take-over of Srebrenica. While many of these reports emerge from refugees, they are widespread and consistent, and have been given credence by a variety of international observers, including UNHCR.¹⁸¹

89. Shortly thereafter, the missing Bosnian Muslim men became a factor in the negotiations between the VRS and the ABiH at @epa, the other UN "safe area" that had come under attack by the VRS on 14 July 1995, following the take-over of Srebrenica. During the course of negotiations between the opposing parties at @epa, Bosnian Muslim representatives wanted guarantees that the men who were evacuated would be transported in safety and specifically cited the missing men of Srebrenica as an example of why the Bosnian Serb authorities could not be trusted.¹⁸² The Bosnian Muslim representatives refused Bosnian Serb demands for an "all for all" prisoner-exchange until the Bosnian Serbs accounted for the 6,800 men they believed were missing from Srebrenica at that time.¹⁸³

13. The Impact of the Crimes on the Bosnian Muslim Community of Srebrenica

90. The impact of these events on the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica has been catastrophic. Most families were dismembered and irreparably rent. In the words of one former Srebrenica resident:

With the fall of Srebrenica . . . from the face of the earth were wiped off three generations of men in the cruellest way possible. I can corroborate it by a fresh example from my family. My father-in-law, Omer Malagi}, born in 1926, his three sons, one of whom was my husband, Salko Malagi}, born in 1948. His two brothers, Osman Malagi}, born in 1953 ; Dzafer Malagi} born in 1957. His three grandsons, that is my two sons Elvir Malagi} born in 1973 ; Admir Malagi} born in 1979; and my brother-in-law's son, Samir Malagi}'s son, born in 1975. There are hundreds of such families in Srebrenica...¹⁸⁴

91. In a patriarchal society, such as the one in which the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica lived,¹⁸⁵ the elimination of virtually all the men has made it almost impossible for the Bosnian Muslim women who survived the take-over of Srebrenica to successfully re-establish their lives. Often, as in the case of Witness DD, the women have been forced to live in collective and

¹⁸¹ Secretary-General's Report, para. 390.

¹⁸² Secretary-General's Report, para. 416.

¹⁸³ Secretary-General's Report, para. 400.

¹⁸⁴ Malagi}, T. 1983-84.

¹⁸⁵ Witness DD, T. 5778 (testifying that her husband was the head of the household and was responsible for decision making on most matters, including the financial affairs of the family. Witness DD also testified that this system was typical of all families living in her community); Ms. Jasna Zecevi}, (hereafter "Zecevi}"), T.5776, 5778-5779. (The witness, the director of Vive Zene (a non-governmental organisation that provides psychosocial support for many Bosnian Muslim women and children who survived the take-over of Srebrenica) described the pre-war Srebrenica community as having a traditional patriarchal structure.)

makeshift accommodations for many years, with a dramatically reduced standard of living.¹⁸⁶ The pain and fear associated with having so many loved ones torn away makes it very difficult for those who survived to think of returning home (even if that were possible in practical terms) or even to exist as a cohesive family unit. In Witness DD's words:

...sometimes I also think it would be better if none of us had survived. I would prefer it.¹⁸⁷

The director of Vive Zene, a non-governmental organisation that provides psychosocial support for many women and children who survived the take-over of Srebrenica, testified that the vast majority of Bosnian Muslim women refugees have been unable to find employment.¹⁸⁸ Further, women forced to become the head of their households following the take-over of Srebrenica have great difficulties with the unfamiliar tasks of conducting official family business in the public sphere.¹⁸⁹

92. Similarly, the adolescent survivors from Srebrenica face significant hurdles as they enter adult-hood. Few are employed¹⁹⁰ and returning to Srebrenica is not something these young people even talk about. As the Director of Vive Zene explained:

...their dream is just to go outside, far away from Bosnia. Just that.¹⁹¹

Younger children who survived the take-over of Srebrenica have also developed adjustment problems, such as low levels of concentration, nightmares and flashbacks.¹⁹² The absence of male role models is another factor that will inevitably have significant implications for Bosnian Muslim children from Srebrenica in years to come.¹⁹³

93. The Trial Chamber heard that the survivors of Srebrenica have unique impediments to their recovery and staff members at Vive Zene speak of the "Srebrenica Syndrome" as a new pathology category.¹⁹⁴ One of the primary factors giving rise to the syndrome is that, with few exceptions, the fate of the survivor's loved ones is not officially known: the majority of men of Srebrenica are still listed as missing. For Bosnian Muslim women it is essential to have a clear marital status, whether widowed, divorced or married: a woman whose husband is missing does not fit within any of these categories.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, on a psychological level, these women are unable to move forward with the process of recovery without the closure that comes from knowing with certainty what has

¹⁸⁶ Witness DD, T. 5759-5760; Zecevi}, T. 5779-5784.

¹⁸⁷ Witness DD, T. 5761. See also Zecevi}, T. 5791-5793.

¹⁸⁸ Zecevi}, T. 5783-5784

¹⁸⁹ Zecevi}, T. 5787.

¹⁹⁰ Zecevi}, T. 5791.

¹⁹¹ Zecevi}, T. 5797.

¹⁹² Ms. Teufika Ibrahimfendi} (hereafter "Ibrahimfendi}"), (co-ordinator of the Vive Zene multidisciplinary team), T. 5820-5826.

¹⁹³ Zecevi}, T. 5797.

¹⁹⁴ Ibrahimfendi}, T. 5817-5818.

happened to their family members and properly grieving for them.¹⁹⁶ The Trial Chamber also heard of the collective guilt experienced by women because they survived the events in Poto-ari and their husbands, brothers and fathers did not.¹⁹⁷ The level of trauma experienced by the women and children who were transported out of Srebrenica was assessed by Vive Zene as being “exceptionally high” and this, in large part, was attributed to the fact that the women and men had been separated following the take-over of Srebrenica.¹⁹⁸ This heartbreak and anguish is no better reflected than in the words of Witness DD whose young son was torn away from her in Poto-ari:

...I keep dreaming about him. I dream of him bringing flowers and saying, “Mother, I’ve come” I hug him and say, “Where have you been, my son?” and he says, “I’ve been in Vlasenica all this time”.¹⁹⁹

94. When asked why he thought the mass executions of Bosnian Muslim men took place following the take-over of Srebrenica, General Halilovic suggested that:

Methodologically speaking, Srebrenica is no different from some other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is true that it is significantly different in terms of the numbers of people that were executed. As to why it took place in the Drina River valley, I think the reasons can be found in the decisions issued by the Serbian Assembly in Banja Luka...I think that today there are more than 60 settlements of Bosniak population mainly who wish to go back to their homes, but those who were executed no longer have any chance of going back home, and that area was removed from the face of the earth. It was cleansed... and [it was] an area which was between two Serb states.²⁰⁰

14. Conclusions

95. Almost without exception, the witnesses who appeared before the Trial Chamber did not seriously contest that, following the take-over of Srebrenica, the mass killings described above actually occurred outside of combat activities and on the basis of orders given by high level Bosnian Serb officers or officials.²⁰¹ Nonetheless, in the words of Nuremberg Prosecutor Telford Taylor, it is “important that these incredible events be established by clear and public proof, so that no one can ever doubt that they were fact and not fable...”.²⁰² It is therefore imperative to document these “incredible events” in detail.

¹⁹⁵ Zecevi}, T. 5785-5786.

¹⁹⁶ Zecevi}, T. 5792.

¹⁹⁷ Zecevi}, T. 5793; Ibrahimfendi}, T. 5841.

¹⁹⁸ Teufika Ibrahimfendi}, T. 5814-5815.

¹⁹⁹ Witness DD, T. 5769.

²⁰⁰ Halilovi}, T. 9500.

²⁰¹ Cf. however, the comments of the Defence military expert, General Radinovic, “Mass casualties on the Muslim side are a result of actions which should be classified as combat activities, and not violence against civilians” D 160 (Prof. Dr. Radovan Radinovic, *Military Expert Testimony of Srebrenica*, 17 October 2000. (hereafter “Radinovi} Report”), para. 5.9.

²⁰² Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949, Volume I, p. 27.

96. However, the central issue in this case is the role that one man, General Krstic, played in the criminal acts and whether he is legally responsible for conduct that amounts to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. The Trial Chamber now turns to the evidence linking, first, the Drina Corps as a whole to the criminal acts committed following the take-over of Srebrenica and, then, to the precise role that General Krstic played in these events.

B. The Role of the Drina Corps in the Srebrenica Crimes

1. Preliminary Matters

97. Prior to examining the role the Drina Corps played in the events following the take-over of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber will first address preliminary matters relating to the formation and operation of the Drina Corps, as well as the nature of the evidence presented by the Prosecution linking the Drina Corps to the crimes in this case. This analysis will provide an important backdrop to the remainder of the Judgement, which addresses the central issue in this case: the criminal responsibility of General Krstic, both individually and as a senior officer of the Drina Corps, for the Srebrenica crimes.

(a) Background to the Drina Corps

98. The Drina Corps of the VRS was formed in November 1992, with the specific objective of "improving" the situation of Bosnian Serb people living in the Middle Podrinje region, of which Srebrenica was an important part.²⁰³ It was organised along the lines of the former JNA Corps²⁰⁴ and, as was the case with the VRS generally, JNA operating methodologies were almost completely adopted.²⁰⁵ The Drina Corps Headquarters was established first in Han Pijesak and later moved to Vlasenica.²⁰⁶ A map depicting the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps is annexed to this Judgement.

99. General Živanovic assumed the role of Drina Corps Commander at the time of its formation. In addition to the Commander, the Drina Corps also had a Chief of Staff and three Assistant Commanders. As will be discussed further below, in July 1995, General Krstic was the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps until his appointment as Corps Commander. Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic was Assistant Commander for Security; Colonel Slobodan Cerovic was Assistant Commander for Moral, Legal and Religious Affairs; and Colonel Lazar Acamovic was Assistant

²⁰³ Radinovi} Report, para. 2.3.

²⁰⁴ Butler Report, para. 1.

²⁰⁵ Butler T. 4746.

²⁰⁶ Radinovi}, T. 7830, 7854.

Commander for Rear Services (or Logistics).²⁰⁷ A chart showing relevant Drina Corps personnel as of July 1995 is annexed to this Judgement.

100. In July 1995, the Drina Corps was composed of the following subordinate Brigades: Zvornik Brigade; 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade ("Bratunac Brigade"); 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade ("Vlasenica Brigade"); 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade ("2nd Romanija Brigade"); 1st Bira} Infantry Brigade ("Bira} Brigade"); 1st Mili}i Light Infantry Brigade ("Mili}i Brigade"); 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade ("1st Podrinje Brigade"); 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade ("5th Podrinje Brigade") and the 1st Skelani Separate Infantry Battalion ("Skelani Battalion").²⁰⁸ These Brigades had combat capabilities and were supported by the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment, the 5th Engineers Battalion, 5th Communications Battalion and the 5th Military Police battalion.²⁰⁹

101. The Drina Corps came under the Command of the Main Staff of the VRS, along with the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, the East Bosnia Corps, the Hercegovina Corps and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Two units were also directly subordinated to the Main Staff: the 10th Sabotage Detachment (a unit primarily used for wartime sabotage activities) and the 65th Protective Regiment (a unit created to provide protection and combat services for the Main Staff.)²¹⁰ In July 1995, the Commander of the Main Staff was General Mladic. In turn, the Main Staff was subordinate to President Karad`i}, the Supreme Commander of the VRS.²¹¹

(b) Codes and Numbers Used by the Drina Corps in July 1995

102. Much of the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber took the form of military orders and reports issued by the VRS during July and August 1995, as well as conversations between Drina Corps and other VRS personnel that were intercepted by members of the ABiH during that period. Code-names and numbers were frequently employed throughout this documentary and intercept evidence. Some explanation of these codes is necessary before proceeding to analyse the evidence.

103. There was no dispute between the parties about the code names used to refer to relevant Drina Corps subordinate Brigades, as well as the Drina Corps Headquarters. Specifically: "Palma"

²⁰⁷ Butler Report para. 2.3.

²⁰⁸ D 149.

²⁰⁹ Radinovi}, T. 7858-7859.

²¹⁰ Radinovi}, T. 7827.

²¹¹ D 147.

was the Zvornik Brigade;²¹² "Badem" was the Bratunac Brigade;²¹³ and "Zlatar" was the Command of the Drina Corps.²¹⁴

104. Examination of the evidence as a whole reveals that "Zlatar 385" was a telephone number associated with General Krstic during July 1995. In an intercepted telephone conversation at 0954 hours on 14 July 1995, General @ivanovi} advised Colonel Ljubisa Beara, the head of Security of the VRS Main Staff, to contact Zlatar 385 about some assistance that Colonel Beara was seeking.²¹⁵ A few minutes later, a conversation was intercepted between Colonel Beara and General Krstic in which Colonel Beara raised the same request with General Krstic.²¹⁶ In addition, on 18 July 1995 at 0716 hours, General Krstic called and asked for Colonel Cerovi} to be connected to extension 385. This was done and General Krstic and Colonel Cerovi} subsequently conversed,²¹⁷ further confirming that "385" was General Krstic's telephone extension during July 1995.

(c) Reliability of Intercepted Communications

105. Prominently featured in the evidence presented by the Prosecution in this case, were transcriptions of conversations between VRS personnel in July and August 1995 that were intercepted by intelligence officers from the ABiH. These documents were handed over to the OTP by the Bosnian government. Monitoring enemy communications was a standard military practice, employed by both parties to the conflict, the objective being to discover the plans and movements of the opposing side in order to take pre-emptory action.²¹⁸ Although the VRS did have secure means of sending communications, the Trial Chamber heard evidence that these systems were not always functional and that often unsecured lines were used for expediency; secured communications took much longer to prepare and send.²¹⁹ The Prosecution relied upon intercept evidence as proof of key elements of its case. The reliability of these intercepted conversations, however, was the subject of strenuous debate between the parties.

106. A former employee from the OTP, who worked on compiling the intercept database, testified about the procedures established to test the accuracy of the intercept evidence received by

²¹² Krstic, T. 6668.

²¹³ Krstic, T. 6841.

²¹⁴ Defence Witness DB, T. 7108.

²¹⁵ P 472.

²¹⁶ P 478.

²¹⁷ P 680.

²¹⁸ Witness U, T. 4159 and Defence Witness DC, T7518-7519.

²¹⁹ Butler, T. 5190-5192. Krstic, T. 6673, P 750 (VRS document from 1992 referring to security problems caused by frequent use of Motorolas); P 825 (also referring to problems caused by the use of Motorolas within the VRS); Defence Witness DB, T. 7202-7203 (agreeing that lack of attention to security concerns in communications was a problem within the VRS).

the OTP from the Bosnian Government.²²⁰ The “intercept project”, as it became known, was handled by a team of analysts, investigators, translators and others with language skills, who collected, assembled, analysed and translated the material that had been provided to the OTP in its original Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (hereafter “B/C/S”) form. Both the ABiH and the State Security Services of Bosnia provided intercept material to the OTP.²²¹

107. Additionally, a number of Bosnian Muslim witnesses, who were involved in intercepting and transcribing the VRS conversations, testified before the Trial Chamber about the methods employed.²²² The contents of the conversations were first recorded on tape by Bosnian Muslim interceptors, then transcribed onto a piece of paper or into a notebook and finally typed out on a computer and sent to Headquarters.²²³ Although the transcribers generally made a note of the time at which the conversation commenced, the date was not always recorded for each conversation. However, dates could usually be ascertained by looking back through the notebooks to find the last recorded date and then tracking the times at which the subsequent conversations occurred, to determine when a new day had begun.²²⁴ The Trial Chamber viewed several of the original notebooks in which intercepted conversations were transcribed.

108. Very often the participants in the conversations identified themselves by name, or their identities could be ascertained from the context of the conversation. In addition, the Bosnian Muslim interceptors became familiar with the voices of the VRS participants in the conversations over the course of time. Witness U said that he had been monitoring conversations for almost two years prior to July 1995 and was very familiar with the voices of the participants in the conversations he was intercepting.²²⁵ When participants could not be identified, they were referred to as “X” and “Y”.²²⁶ On some occasions a single conversation was monitored by different intercept operators working in different locations which, in the Trial Chamber’s view, is a factor supporting the authenticity of these communications.²²⁷

109. The Trial Chamber was told that all possible measures were taken to ensure the accuracy of the transcribed conversations. According to Witness W:

²²⁰ Ms. Stephanie Frease (hereafter “Frease”), T. 8925-8927.

²²¹ Frease, T. 8926.

²²² Witness U, T. 4154-4206; Witness V, T. 4206-4253; Witness W, T. 4254-4324; Witness X, T. 4325-4383; Witness Y, T. 4394-4447; Witness Z, T. 4447-4484, 8755-8774; Witness AA, T. 4487-4560; Witness BB, T. 4573-4670, 8710-8748; Witness CC, T. 4689-4713.

²²³ Witness U, T. 4169; Witness V, T. 4210-4212; Witness W, T. 4261; Witness Y, T. 4398-4399; Witness Z, T. 4455; Witness AA, T. 4494-4495; Witness BB, T. 4576.

²²⁴ Witness AA, T. 4499-4505.

²²⁵ Witness U, T. 4169-4170. See also Witness X, T. 4333; Witness Y, T. 4400; Witness AA, T. 4496-4497.

²²⁶ Witness W, T. 4270.

²²⁷ Witness AA, T. 4550.

It was essential that every word, literally every word be recorded and that it should be audible, properly heard. You couldn't guess because these were serious matters, and anything that was not sufficiently clear ... any word not heard well enough was not recorded.²²⁸

Nonetheless, Witness Z conceded:

We did our best to be as precise as possible. However, there are many, many reasons why that was very difficult to achieve.²²⁹

110. In the event that a particular word could not be understood, the transcriber rewound the tape until it became clear and, if necessary, sought assistance from a colleague. If this was unsuccessful, the missing words were indicated with three dots or a question mark.²³⁰ These gaps in conversation reflected the fact that, usually, one of the participants in the conversation could be heard more clearly than the other one.²³¹ On some occasions the version of a conversation recorded in the notebook differed from the typewritten text. Witness Z explained that the person doing the typing may have requested clarification of some portion of the conversation and, accordingly, the tape would be replayed.²³² The typist could only change the contents of a conversation with the approval of the original transcriber or after personally listening to the tape.²³³

111. The Defence objected that the Bosnian Muslim interceptors were not properly trained for the work that they were doing and had inadequate technology at their disposal. As a result, it was argued, the intercepts were filled with assumptions as to what had been said during the course of the conversation.²³⁴ Prosecution Witness Y conceded that some of the soldiers intercepting conversations for the ABiH were better trained than others.²³⁵

112. General Radinovic testified that, although the VRS used intercepted radio communications in their intelligence work, he did not consider them to have a high degree of reliability.²³⁶ There was, however, evidence to the contrary. A VRS document dating back to 1993 indicates that radio reconnaissance platoons, or intercepting groups, had provided the VRS command structure with about 70 percent of all intelligence data gathered, which shows how heavily they relied upon the interception procedure.²³⁷ Indeed the Trial Chamber heard evidence that the VRS was relying on information obtained from intercepted ABiH communications during the events in Srebrenica. For example, a Daily Combat Report of the Zvornik Brigade on 14 July 1995 refers to information

²²⁸ Witness W, T. 4269.

²²⁹ Witness Z, T. 4472.

²³⁰ Witness Y, T. 4400; Witness Z, T. 4456; Witness AA, T. 4495.

²³¹ Witness Y, T. 4442.

²³² Witness Z, T. 4466. See also Witness BB, T. 4577-4578.

²³³ Witness Z, T. 4470.

²³⁴ Defence Witness DB, T. 7113-7114

²³⁵ Witness Y, T. 4435

²³⁶ Radinovi}, T. 8485, T. 9369.

about the Bosnian Muslim column (which at that time was fleeing the enclave towards Tuzla) obtained from intercepted conversations between the military leaders of the column and personnel from the 2nd Corps located in Tuzla.²³⁸

113. The Trial Chamber also heard evidence that the VRS was constantly concerned about the possibility of their communications being overheard. In 1992, the VRS noted:

So far we have registered nine enemy interception groups, exceptionally well manned and equipped.²³⁹

Defence Witness DB (who in July 1995 was a communications officer in the Drina Corps) agreed that the lack of attention paid to securing communications in the VRS was a problem and he did not dispute that the ABiH did intercept communications being made during the Srebrenica and @epa operations.²⁴⁰ Defence Witness DC, who was also an officer in the Drina Corps in July 1995, agreed that intercepted communications, although not always trustworthy and reliable, could be useful sources of information.²⁴¹

114. General Radinovi} argued that, in order to be considered a reliable source of information, the intercepts would have to be collated, cross-checks made between the tapes and the notebooks, and military experts, linguists and so on called in to assess them.²⁴² The Trial Chamber accepts that the OTP did in fact diligently check and cross-reference the intercept material as part of the "intercept project". In order to determine whether the material was reliable and genuine, the OTP looked at the internal consistency between the notebooks and the printouts of each conversation. Transcripts of a single conversation, which was recorded by two or more interceptors, were also compared. The OTP also embarked on a process of corroborating the intercepts with information obtained from other sources, such as documents acquired from the VRS, the RS Ministry of Defence and UNPROFOR, as well as aerial images.²⁴³ A former OTP employee assigned to the "intercept project" testified that, as a result of this corroboration process, she became convinced that the intercepts were "absolutely reliable".²⁴⁴ Although, at times, the OTP was unable to determine the significance of some aspects of the conversations, there was no information in the intercepted

²³⁷ P 750 (Analysis of combat readiness of RS Army in 1992). See also P 827 (dated 23 July 1995, intelligence report on electronic surveillance.)

²³⁸ P 548

²³⁹ P 750, 1992. Also P 825.

²⁴⁰ Defence Witness DB, T. 7201-7203.

²⁴¹ Defence Witness DC, T. 7519-7520.

²⁴² Radinovi}, T. 9339-9341.

²⁴³ Frease, T. 8931-8932, T. 8938-8939.

²⁴⁴ Frease, T. 8939.

conversations that was completely at odds with the other evidence uncovered by the OTP.²⁴⁵ Meticulous procedures were used by the OTP for tracking the dates of the intercepted conversations and the former OTP employee who appeared before the Trial Chamber testified with “absolute certainty” that the dates ascribed to the individual conversations were accurate.²⁴⁶

115. The testimony of Mr. Butler provided corroboration of the careful consideration given to the intercept evidence during the course of the OTP’s investigation. Initially, in the course of preparing his expert military report, Mr. Butler viewed the intercepts with some scepticism.²⁴⁷ However, after detailed examination of the complete body of intercept evidence, he was convinced that they were reliable and, to the extent that he was able to draw firm conclusions from the individual conversations, he incorporated them into his military analysis.

116. On the whole, the Trial Chamber considers the intercepted communications to be a reliable source of evidence. All possible measures were taken by the Bosnian Muslim interceptors to ensure the accuracy of the recorded conversations, as would be expected in any prudent army. This fact was reinforced by the measures taken by the OTP to verify the reliability of the intercepted evidence as part of the “intercept project”. The Trial Chamber accepts that, often, aspects of the intercepted conversations can be corroborated by other evidence of events occurring at the time and it is impossible for the Chamber to imagine that this level of documentable detail could have been completely manufactured by the Bosnian Muslim interceptors. For example, on 16 July 1995 a conversation was recorded regarding a request made by Colonel Popovi} for 500 litres of diesel fuel.²⁴⁸ Written records obtained from the Zvornik Brigade confirm that 500 litres of diesel fuel were in fact released to Colonel Popovi} on 16 July 1995.²⁴⁹ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the intercept evidence is a reliable source of information. The weight and meaning attributable to each intercepted conversation will be considered on a case by case basis and in light of the wider context in which the conversation took place. Certainly, several of the intercepts tendered by the Prosecution were extremely fragmented, with numerous gaps where transcribers were unable to determine what was being said with precision. In those specific cases, the Trial Chamber has obviously not been able to draw any firm conclusions from the intercepts.

117. Having considered preliminary matters relating to the establishment and formation of the Drina Corps, as well as the nature of the evidence presented in this case, the Trial Chamber now

²⁴⁵ Frease, T. 8993.

²⁴⁶ Frease, T. 8939-8944, T. 8947.

²⁴⁷ Butler, T. 5207.

²⁴⁸ P 620.

²⁴⁹ P 619.

considers the Drina Corps' role in the commission of the crimes that occurred following the takeover of Srebrenica in July 1995.

2. Krivaja 95

118. The Drina Corps was the VRS military formation tasked with planning and carrying out operation Krivaja 95, which culminated in the capture of Srebrenica town on 11 July 1995. However, the Indictment against General Krstic does not allege that the military invasion of the Srebrenica "safe area" was itself a violation of international law. Rather, it is the events that followed the military assault, namely the bussing of the women, children and elderly out of the Srebrenica enclave and the wholesale slaughter of the military aged men from Srebrenica that are the focus of this case. Nonetheless, the role of the Drina Corps in Krivaja 95 provides an important backdrop to the Trial Chamber's consideration of the acts that followed.

(a) The Objective of Krivaja 95

119. The precise objective of Krivaja 95 was the subject of argument between the parties during the course of the trial. There was no dispute that the initial plan did not include taking the town of Srebrenica.²⁵⁰ Despite the fact that Srebrenica was a "to be or not to be" issue for the VRS, an assessment had been made by the VRS command that conditions were not right at that moment for capturing Srebrenica town.²⁵¹ The Defence, however, argued that the plan for Krivaja 95 was limited to effectively separating the two enclaves of Srebrenica and @epa (with no significant modification of the "safe area" boundaries) and represented a direct response to the military offensives being conducted by the ABiH in the area of the enclave.²⁵² The Prosecution disputed this, claiming that the objective of Krivaja 95 was not only to split Žepa and Srebrenica, but also to reduce each enclave to its urban core. Shrinking the enclaves, the Prosecution contended, would undoubtedly trigger a humanitarian crisis and force the UN to abandon the " safe area " concept, which had proved such a thorn in the side of the Bosnian Serbs.²⁵³

²⁵⁰ Butler, T. 4811.

²⁵¹ Radinovi}, T. 8467-8468, Radinovic Report, para. 2.7.

²⁵² Krstic, T. 6124-6125, and Defence Witness DC, T. 7436. A "Spring Offensive", the aim of which was to militarily defeat the VRS, was planned and implemented by the ABiH prior to the takeover of Srebrenica, See Krstic, T 6049, 6054, Radinovi}, T. 7844-7846, and D 66, D 67, D 88, D 89, D 90. Operation Skakavac (" grasshopper ") was implemented by the ABiH in the lead up to the Spring Offensive, and involved planning and executing sabotage activities within the broader area of Bosnia under the control of the VRS, including eastern Bosnia. Krstic, T. 7557, and 6013.

²⁵³ Butler, T. 4804-18; and Dannatt, T. 5576-5577, 5614. In its Final Brief, the Defence appears to have accepted that this was in fact the goal of Krivaja 95. See Defence Final Brief, para. 149.

120. The Prosecution's argument is supported by reference to the documentation prepared by the Drina Corps Command for Krivaja 95.²⁵⁴ The plan specifically directed the Drina Corps to "split apart the enclaves of @epa and Srebrenica and to reduce them to their urban areas". The plan also refers to "reducing the enclaves in size" and specified that the Drina Corps was to "improve the tactical positions of the forces in the depth of the area, and to create conditions for the elimination of the enclaves".²⁵⁵ The Defence argued that the reference to eliminating the enclaves was directed to a separate and future operation and not to the immediate campaign.²⁵⁶ Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber is persuaded that, although the initial aim of Krivaja 95 was limited, it was an important step towards ultimately establishing Bosnian Serb control over Srebrenica. The Trial Chamber has no doubt that, consistent with the March 1995 directive issued by President Karad`i} mandating the blocking of aid convoys into the enclave,²⁵⁷ plunging the Bosnian Muslim residents into a humanitarian crisis was an integral component of the long-term VRS strategy for Srebrenica. On its face, however, the plan for Krivaja 95 certainly did not include a VRS scheme to bus the Bosnian Muslim civilian population out of the enclave, nor to execute all the military aged Bosnian Muslim men, as ultimately happened following the take-over of Srebrenica.

121. The Trial Chamber finds that the plan for Krivaja 95 was aimed at reducing the "safe area" of Srebrenica to its urban core and was a step towards the larger VRS goal of plunging the Bosnian Muslim population into humanitarian crisis and, ultimately, eliminating the enclave.

(b) The Shelling of Srebrenica: Terrorisation of the Civilian Population

122. Numerous witnesses gave evidence that, during Operation Krivaja 95, the VRS shelled the Srebrenica enclave intensively with the apparent intent to terrify the populace.²⁵⁸ Evidence suggests that shelling commenced on 6 July 1995, as Krivaja 95 got under way.²⁵⁹ On 8 July 1995, an eyewitness saw columns of refugees coming under VRS (Drina Corps) artillery fire.²⁶⁰ On 9 July 1995, a Dutch Bat platoon commander saw VRS tanks firing in the direction of Srebrenica town, even though there were only refugees and a UN base in the vicinity.²⁶¹ Again on 10 July 1995, despite the military success that had already been achieved by the VRS, shelling continued all that day and the next. Shells fired by the VRS hit a hospital where 2,000 civilians had gathered for

²⁵⁴ P 428.

²⁵⁵ P 428.

²⁵⁶ Krstic, T. 6394 and Radinovi}, T. 7896-7897.

²⁵⁷ P 425

²⁵⁸ Kingori, T. 1914-1916; Egbers, T. 2214; Witness B, T. 852; Witness C, T. 1152-53. See also P 77/1, P 77/3, P 77/6, P 77/8, P 77/12, Secretary-General's Report, para. 283.

²⁵⁹ Witness B, T. 841; Kingori, T. 1826-1829; Karremans, T. 3317, 3327-3328.

²⁶⁰ Mandzic, T. 949-950.

²⁶¹ Egbers, T. 2215. See also van Duijn, T. 173101733.

refuge and six of them were killed.²⁶² An UNMO who witnessed the unfolding events that day remarked upon the intensity of the shelling:

[a]t times we could count over a hundred shells landing in the same place. You know, a continuous shelling of up to a hundred shells in the same area, and this is quite high intensity, considering the size of those villages.²⁶³

123. Thousands of residents, desperate for protection, crowded around the UNPROFOR Bravo Company compound in Srebrenica, eventually forcing their way inside. The chaotic scene was exacerbated when mortar shells landed inside the compound around noon, wounding several people.²⁶⁴ Following the shelling of Bravo Company and with the encouragement of the Dutch Bat troops, Bosnian Muslim residents from Srebrenica began to move north towards Potocari. Shells fell alongside the road and VRS forces were seen bringing up the rear of the crowd. Many witnesses believed this was a deliberate attempt to “herd” the crowd out of Srebrenica.²⁶⁵ The VRS also embarked upon a campaign of burning Bosnian Muslim houses to ensure there would be no possibility of their former occupants returning.²⁶⁶ Further evidence that Srebrenica town was extensively shelled and that civilians came under fire was provided in combat reports filed by the 28th Division of the ABiH in the days immediately following the commencement of Krivaja 95.²⁶⁷

124. General Krstic²⁶⁸ and several other Defence witnesses who took part in Krivaja 95,²⁶⁹ denied that Srebrenica was shelled, or that civilians were deliberately targeted by the Drina Corps during Krivaja 95. One Defence witness stated that:

The town of Srebrenica was not shelled at all. Not a single shell fell on the urban part of town, not a single building was damaged when we entered the town on the 11th of July.²⁷⁰

Mr. Richard Butler, the Prosecution’s military expert, expressed the view that shells did not target the civilians of Srebrenica.²⁷¹ However, he subsequently clarified his position, stating there was no

²⁶² See P 77/12, (UNMO report from 10 July 1995) ; Secretary-General’s Report para. 283.

²⁶³ Kingori, T.1827, P 77, 989-903.

²⁶⁴ Witness B, T. 855-857 ; Mandzi}, T. 958-960; Witness C, T. 1159-61.

²⁶⁵ Witness B, T. 858; Mandzi, T. 980; Omanovi}, T. 1082; Vaasen, T. 1392; Egbers, T. 2220; Witness C, T. 1161.

²⁶⁶ Witness B, T. 854-855; Mandzi}, T. 949, 957.

²⁶⁷ P 899 (report dated 6 July 1995 stating that “hundreds of shells have fallen on the lines of defence and civilian targets”); P 900 (report dated 7 July 1995, stating that “the aggressor has subjected the line of defence...to strong sniping and fire... and had frequently engaged in random tank artillery fire against both the line of defence and civilian targets...”); P 901 (report dated 8 July 1995 stating that “An enemy tank from the Kula is destroying the centre of Srebrenica on a daily basis and at 1300 hours the enemy fired three guided missiles from that position on the town centre, causing enormous material damage.”); P 902 (report dated 9 July 1995 stating that “the aggressor is conducting an infantry attack...and the whole “safe area” came under fierce fire from all calibre. The town centre itself is being constantly shelled.”); P 903 (report dated 10 July 1995, stating that civilian targets in the area were being attacked and that “the centre of town is being continually ravaged by artillery fire...”).

²⁶⁸ Krstic, T. 6462-6464 (denying that Srebrenica was shelled on 11 July 1995).

²⁶⁹ Radinovi}, T. 821, T. 8232-8234, 8237-8238; Defence Witness Mr. Zeljko Borov-anin, (hereafter “Borov-anin”) T. 7011-7022, T. 7028-7029; Defence Witness DB, T. 7080; Defence Witness DC, T. 7441- 7442.

²⁷⁰ Defence Witness DC, T. 7441-744.

evidence that shells were fired directly at civilians by the VRS, and he did not dispute the testimony of the Dutch Bat soldiers and other witnesses about the impact of the shelling upon the civilians.²⁷² Mr. Butler did, however, say that there is little evidence of the calibre of shells fired or the extent of the damage caused.²⁷³

125. While the Prosecution may not have conclusively established the precise number of shells fired, or the type of artillery used, the Trial Chamber finds that the shelling of Srebrenica carried out by the Drina Corps, on 10 and 11 July 1995, by which time the original objectives of Krivaja 95 had already been achieved, was calculated to terrify the Bosnian Muslim population and to drive them out of Srebrenica town.

3. Involvement of Drina Corps Personnel in the Events at Poto-ari: 11-13 July 1995

(a) Transport of the Bosnian Muslim Civilians out of Poto-ari

(i) Meeting at Hotel Fontana on 11 July 1995 at 2000 Hours

126. As the humanitarian crisis in Poto-ari escalated, at around 2000 hours on 11 July 1995, General Mladic summoned UNPROFOR leaders for the first of three meetings with VRS officials at the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac.²⁷⁴ General Mladic led the meeting, which lasted approximately one hour. General @ivanovi}, then-Commander of the Drina Corps, was present along with other Drina Corps officers, including Lieutenant Colonel Svetozar Kosoric, the Drina Corps Chief of Intelligence, and Captain First Class Momir Nikoli}, the Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security of the Bratunac Brigade.²⁷⁵ Colonel Karremans stated that there were about 10,000 women and children within the Poto-ari compound and sought assurances that Dutch Bat and the Bosnian Muslim population would be allowed to withdraw from the area. General Mladic stated that the Bosnian Muslim civilian population was not the target of his actions and, subsequently, asked whether UNPROFOR would be able to provide any buses for their transportation out. Colonel Karremans replied that he thought that could be arranged.²⁷⁶

127. During the meeting, General Mladic asked the UNPROFOR leaders to put him in contact with a representative of the ABiH, as well as Bosnian Muslim civilian representatives. At this point, the VRS appeared to have no idea where the ABiH was. The 28th Division had disengaged

²⁷¹ Butler, T. 5318.

²⁷² Butler, T. 5480-5481.

²⁷³ Butler, T. 5317.

²⁷⁴ Witness B, T. 860, 881.

²⁷⁵ Butler Report, para. 4.3.

²⁷⁶ P 39 (transcript of Hotel Fontana meeting on 11 July 1995 at 2030 hours).

from the VRS in the southern part of the enclave and the VRS had not yet realised that ABiH troops were rallying in the column to make a push towards Tuzla. Like General Mladic, however, Colonel Karremans had no idea how to get in contact with military or civilian leaders of Srebrenica. The meeting concluded with General Mladic telling Colonel Karremans to return later that same evening at 2300 hours for a second meeting.

(ii) Meeting at the Hotel Fontana on 11 July 1995 at 2300 Hours

128. As General Mladic had directed, the second meeting convened at the Hotel Fontana took place around 2300 hours that same evening. General Mladic again presided at the meeting. This time General @ivanovi} was not present but General Krstic was.²⁷⁷ Colonel Kosori} and Major Nikoli} from the Drina Corps were also in attendance at this meeting. The Dutch Bat representatives arrived with a schoolteacher named Nesib Mandzi}, an unofficial Bosnian Muslim representative who was plucked from the crowd in Poto-ari.²⁷⁸ The consensus of the UN and Bosnian Muslim participants in the meeting was that General Mladic was putting on a show calculated to intimidate them. As the meeting began, the death cries of a pig being slaughtered just outside the window could be heard in the meeting room. The Prosecution witnesses all thought this grisly interruption was deliberately designed to frighten them.²⁷⁹ General Mladic then placed the broken signboard from the Srebrenica Town Hall on the table. Mr. Mandzi} thought this too was meant to symbolise the fact that the Bosnian Serbs had taken Srebrenica and the Bosnian Muslims could no longer stay there.²⁸⁰

129. Plans to transport the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of the enclave crystallised at this second meeting. The Dutch Bat officer present stated that between 15,000 and 20,000 refugees, mostly women, children and elderly, had gathered in and around Poto-ari by that time and recounted the developing humanitarian crisis.²⁸¹ General Mladic stated that he would provide the vehicles to transport the Srebrenica refugees out of Poto-ari.²⁸²

130. Although General Mladic said that the population had to choose whether to stay or, if they were not staying, where to go, he used threatening language. He demanded that all ABiH troops within the area of the former enclave lay down their arms and made it clear that, if this did not happen, the survival of the Bosnian Muslim population would be in danger. General Mladic said he

²⁷⁷ Witness B, T. 884-885; Mandzi}, T. 973-974.

²⁷⁸ Mandzi}, T. 964-966.

²⁷⁹ Witness B, T. 885; Witness C, T. 1169; Mandzi}, T. 976.

²⁸⁰ Mandzi}, T. 975-976. See also Witness C, T. 1169-1170.

²⁸¹ P 40 (transcript of the Hotel Fontana Meeting on 11 July 1995 at 2300 hours).

²⁸² Witness B, T. 887.

wanted a clear position on whether the Bosnian Muslims wanted to “survive, stay, or disappear”. Turning to Mr. Mandzi}, General Mladic said:

Do you understand me Nesib...And the future of your people is in your hands...not only in this territory.²⁸³

Mr. Mandzi} was in an untenable position. He pleaded with General Mladic that he did not know where the 28th Division was and, in any event, had no power to commit the ABiH to any course of action. Nor did he have the authority to negotiate on behalf of the civilian population. His explanations, however, fell on deaf ears. General Mladic concluded the meeting, saying:

That is your problem, bring people who can secure the surrender of weapons and save your people from destruction.²⁸⁴

To those present at the meeting that night it seemed clear that staying would not be an option for the Bosnian Muslim civilians of Srebrenica.²⁸⁵ General Mladic scheduled a follow-up meeting for the next morning.

(iii) Meeting at the Hotel Fontana on 12 July 1995 at 1000 Hours

131. On 12 July 1995 at about 1000 hours, General Mladic convened the third and final meeting to discuss the fate of the Srebrenica Muslims. Once again, General Mladic dominated the meeting, with General Krstic sitting at his side.²⁸⁶ In addition, Colonel Popovi} joined Colonel Kosori} as a representative of the Drina Corps at the meeting. By this time, the VRS had obtained information about the existence of the Bosnian Muslim column attempting to break out of the former enclave.²⁸⁷ The Dutch Bat representatives, still unable to contact the official Bosnian Muslim military or civilian leaders of Srebrenica, had again brought Mr. Mandzi}, along with two more unofficial representatives from the Potocari refugees: Ms. Camila Omanovi}, an economist; and Mr. Ibro Nuhanovi}, a businessman.

132. General Mladic again made it clear that survival of the Srebrenica Muslims was conditional upon a military surrender. He said:

...you can either survive or disappear...For your survival, I request: that all your armed men who attacked and committed crimes-and many did-- against our people, hand over their weapons to the Army of the Republika Srpska...on handing over weapons you may...choose to stay in the

²⁸³ P 40.

²⁸⁴ P 40.

²⁸⁵ Witness B, T. 887; Mandzi}, T. 970, Krstic, T. 6295.

²⁸⁶ Mandzi}, T. 987-989.

²⁸⁷ See the discussion *supra* para. 162.

territory...or, if it suits you, go where you want. The wish of every individual will be observed, no matter how many of you there are.²⁸⁸

General Mladic stated that he would provide the vehicles, but that the fuel would have to be provided by someone else and suggested that UNPROFOR assume responsibility for this.²⁸⁹

133. Mr. Mandzi} and Ms. Omanovi} both testified before the Trial Chamber that the clear message conveyed by General Mladic in this meeting was that the Bosnian Muslim refugees could only survive by leaving Srebrenica.²⁹⁰

134. General Mladic also informed those present that all men between the ages of about 17 and 70 would have to be separated and screened to separate out possible "war criminals".²⁹¹

(iv) Organisation of the Buses

135. After the meeting at the Hotel Fontana on the morning of 12 July 1995, two of the Dutch Bat soldiers went back to Bratunac to meet with VRS officials to work out an evacuation plan. As it turned out there was no need for such a meeting. By around noon on 12 July 1995, dozens of buses and trucks were arriving in Potocari to collect the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly. The VRS had already made all the necessary arrangements.²⁹²

136. The Defence argued that Drina Corps personnel were not involved in the removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Poto-ari following the take-over of Srebrenica. However, there is abundant evidence showing the participation of the Drina Corps in this operation.

137. Early in the morning of 12 July 1995, General @ivanovi} signed an order addressed to all the subordinate units of the Drina Corps directing that "all buses and mini-buses belonging to the VRS be secured for use by the Drina Corps," arrive at the Bratunac stadium by 16.30 hours and follow instructions about locations for fuel distribution.²⁹³ The order further stated that the Drina Corps Command had sent a message to the RS Ministry of Defence asking for private buses to be mobilised. The same morning, the RS Ministry of Defence sent three orders to its local secretariats directing them to procure buses and send them to Bratunac.²⁹⁴

²⁸⁸ P 49 (transcript of Hotel Fontana meeting on 12 July 1995 at 10.00 hours).

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁰ Mandzi}, T.1043; Omanovi}, T. 1129-1130, 1135.

²⁹¹ Mandzi}, T.899; Witness C, T. 1174-1175; Karremans, P 122, p. 13.

²⁹² Witness B, T. 894-895.

²⁹³ P 436 (which is stamped as having been received by the command of the Zvornik Brigade at 0835 hours on the morning of 12 July 1995).

²⁹⁴ P 404/126, P 404/127, P 404/128.

138. Intercepted conversations throughout 12 and 13 July 1995 reveal that other Drina Corps officers were also working on matters relating to the transportation. These include the Drina Corps Chief of Transportation, Lieutenant Colonel Rajko Krsmanovi},²⁹⁵ and Major Momir Nikoli}, the Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security Affairs of the Drina Corps Bratunac Brigade.²⁹⁶ The specific involvement of General Krstic in the organisation of the buses is considered below in Part II C.

139. Logs seized from the Bratunac Brigade show that this Brigade was monitoring fuel disbursements to buses and trucks on 12 and 13 July 1995.²⁹⁷ The Trial Chamber accepts that the Drina Corps command must have been informed about the enormous quantities of fuel being disbursed given the scarcity of this precious commodity in Eastern Bosnia at the time.

140. Although the Drina Corps ultimately managed to find enough buses it was a scramble. Up until the evening of 11 July 1995, General Mladic had appeared to be working on the assumption that the buses to move the civilians out of Poto-ari would be provided by the UN. This was logical given the limited resources of the VRS and particularly the scarcity of buses and fuel in Eastern Bosnia at the time. The Drina Corps, after requesting buses from the Ministry of Defence in the early morning hours of 12 July 1995, succeeded in gathering the number of vehicles required for the transport of the entire population of women, children and elderly within a 48 hour period. The Prosecution expert, Mr. Butler, testified that an operation of this size –moving in the vicinity of 25,000 people – would normally have to be planned days in advance.²⁹⁸

141. On the evening of 13 July 1995, Colonel Jankovi}, a VRS Main Staff officer, prepared a “wrap-up” report about the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Poto-ari, which was sent to the Drina Corps Intelligence Department, further confirming that the Drina Corps was an interested party in the transportation operation.²⁹⁹

142. The Trial Chamber finds that the Drina Corps was instrumental in procuring the buses and other vehicles that were used to transport the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of the Poto-ari compound on 12 and 13 July 1995, as well as the fuel needed to accomplish this task.

²⁹⁵ P 435 (intercepted communication from 0735 hours on 12 July 1995 relating to the procurement of buses); P 440 (intercept at 12.10 hours on 12 July 1995 in which General Krstic ordered Colonel Krsmanovi} to start the buses moving.); P 441 (intercept dated 12 July 1995 at 12.12 hours in which Colonel Krsmanovi} is involved with trailer trucks); P 452 (intercepted conversation at 11.10 hours on 13 July 1995, showing Colonel Krsmanovi} monitoring the movement of the bus fleet out of Poto-ari).

²⁹⁶ P 450, Butler, T. 4849-4851.

²⁹⁷ P 404/159; P 404/160.

(v) The Presence of Drina Corps Officers in Poto-ari on 12 and 13 July 1995

143. On 12 and 13 July, as the evacuation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly proceeded, many witnesses saw General Mladic in and around the compound in Poto-ari, as well as other Main Staff officers.³⁰⁰ Although it appeared that General Mladic was in charge of the transportation operation during the time he was there,³⁰¹ there is also compelling evidence that Drina Corps personnel were present in Poto-ari, on 12 and 13 July 1995, to assist with moving the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of the enclave. The presence of General Krstic in Poto-ari on 12 and 13 July 1995 is considered in Part II C below. However, among the other Drina Corps Command Staff identified by witnesses in Poto-ari, on 12 and 13 July 1995 were: the Corps Commander, General @ivanovi},³⁰² the Assistant Commander for Security, Colonel Popovic,³⁰³ the Assistant Commander for Rear Services, Colonel Lazar Acamovic,³⁰⁴ and the Chief of Intelligence, Colonel Kosoric.³⁰⁵ On 12 July 1995, a Dutch Bat soldier spoke to Colonel Kosori} about arranging for Dutch Bat troops to accompany a convoy of Bosnian Muslim refugees from Poto-ari.³⁰⁶ Eyewitnesses also identified six persons, all of whom appear on the roster of the Drina Corps' Bratunac Brigade, as being present in Poto-ari at the time when the women, children and elderly were moved out.³⁰⁷ One of these, Major Momir Nikoli} (the Bratunac Brigade Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security), was known to Dutch Bat/UNMOs in the area as a

²⁹⁸ Butler, T. 5396.

²⁹⁹ P 459.

³⁰⁰ Witness B, T. 901 (presence of General Mladic and Colonel Jankovi}, an intelligence officer from the VRS Main Staff); Mandzi}, T. 990 (presence of General Mladic on 12 July 1995); Omanovi}, T. 1104 (presence of General Mladic on 12 July 1995); Witness C (presence of General Mladic on 12 July 1995); Witness E (presence of General Mladic on 13 July 1995); Vaasen T. 1417, 1437, 1465 (presence of General Mladic on 12 July 1995 and presence of Colonel Jankovi} on 12 and 13 July 1995); Witness F, T. 1520, 1540 (presence of General Mladic on "first" and "second" days); Witness H, T. 1708 (presence of General Mladic on 12 July 1995); van Duijn, T. 1749-1750 (presence of General Mladic and Colonel Jankovi} on 12 July 1995); Kingori, T. 1841 (presence of General Mladic on 12 July 1995); Malagi}, T. 1964, (presence of General Mladic on 12 July 1995); Franken, T. 2049 (presence of Colonel Jankovi} on 13 July 1995); Karremans, T. 3355-3356 (presence of General Mladic in Poto-ari on 12 and 13 July 1995 along with Colonel Jankovi}).

³⁰¹ Karremans, T. 3372-3373.

³⁰² Van Duijn, T. 1749-1750 (General @ivanovi} was with General Mladic in Poto-ari on 12 July 1995); Kingori, T. 1846-1847 (presence of General @ivanovi} in Poto-ari with a group of other officers); Rutten, T. 2128, 2161 (presence of General @ivanovi} in one of the cars accompanying General Mladic near the compound and presence of General @ivanovi} in front of the compound on 13 July 1995.)

³⁰³ Kingori, T. 1880; Rutten, T. 2152. P 58 (a still photograph taken from the footage of an interview filmed by a television crew in Poto-ari on 12 July 1995) also confirms the presence of Colonel Popovi}.

³⁰⁴ Franken, T. 2028, 2084 (presence of Colonel A}amovi} outside the gate of the compound on 12 July 1995, his involved in the co-ordination and logistics of the transportation, and his presence in the company of General Krstic around 2-3pm on 12 July 1995); Witness B, T. 911-914 and Kingori, T. 1875-1876 (presence of Colonel A}amovi} on 13 July 1995).

³⁰⁵ Witness C, T. 1187. P 136 (video of an interview given by Zoran Kovacevic, the Commander of one of the companies in the Bratunac Brigade, in Poto-ari on 12 July 1995), shows Colonel Kosori} in the background. See also Butler, T. 4845-4846.

³⁰⁶ Witness C, T. 1187.

³⁰⁷ The individuals are: Steten Petrovi}, Captain Nikoli}, Sergeant Zoran Milosavljevi}, Slavoljub Grujici}, Goran Raki}, and Zoran Spaji}. See P 454 and Butler, T. 4861-4865.

liaison officer prior to the take-over of Srebrenica.³⁰⁸ Major Nikoli} was seen in Poto-ari on both 12³⁰⁹ and 13 July 1995.³¹⁰

144. The Trial Chamber finds that Drina Corps Command officers and units were present in Poto-ari monitoring the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of the area on 12 and 13 July 1995.³¹¹

(vi) A Forced or Voluntary Movement?

145. General Radinovi} testified for the Defence that the flight of the women, children and elderly from Poto-ari was voluntary and could in no way be viewed as a forced movement.³¹² He acknowledged that fear was a factor in their decision to leave, but insisted this was the case in all wars. During the war in Bosnia, as elsewhere, the mass movement of civilian populations was a regular occurrence whenever enemy forces captured territory.³¹³ Mr. Butler, the Prosecution's expert, agreed that the flight of civilians from conflict zones is a recognised phenomenon of war and often represents a rational choice on the part of the civilians.³¹⁴ Indeed, as already noted, in 1993 the UNHCR had assisted the evacuation of many thousands of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica.

146. Certainly, faced with the reality of their disastrous situation by the evening of 11 July 1995, the Srebrenica refugees in Poto-ari were clamouring to get out of the enclave. As Colonel Karremans said at the first meeting held at the Fontana Hotel at 2030 hours on 11 July 1995, many of the Bosnian Muslim women in the compound had already told Dutch Bat that they were waiting for buses to arrive so they could escape.³¹⁵

147. Overwhelming evidence presented during the course of the Trial, however, demonstrates that, in July 1995, the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica was not faced with a genuine choice as to whether to leave or to remain in the area. The shelling of Srebrenica, particularly on 10 and 11 July 1995, and the burning of Bosnian Muslim homes was calculated to terrify the population and make them flee the area with no hope of return. Further, it was General Mladic who initiated the meetings at the Hotel Fontana when he made it abundantly clear that he wanted the

³⁰⁸ Kingori, T. 1804; Franken, T. 2012.

³⁰⁹ Witness F, T. 1525 (presence of Major Nikoli} on "the day that Serb soldiers came in" to Poto-ari); Kingori, T.1836-1837, 1883; and Rutten, T. 2119-2121 (presence of Major Nikoli} in Poto-ari on 12 July 1995, as the buses were coming in); Koster, T. 3403.

³¹⁰ Kingori, T. 1874; Karremans, T. 3356.

³¹¹ See also the further discussion of the activities of these officers in Poto-ari, *Infra* paras. 352-353.

³¹² Radinovi}, T. 7962-7963.

³¹³ Radinovi}, T. 7962-7963.

³¹⁴ Butler, T. 5507-5508.

³¹⁵ P 39, p. 11.

Bosnian Muslims out of the area. On 12 July 1995, as the bus convoys were being organised, General Mladic was heard to say during an intercepted conversation:

They've all capitulated and surrendered and we'll evacuate them all – those who want to and those who don't want to.³¹⁶

Certainly, the Bosnian Muslim refugees were not consulted or given a choice about their final destination. An UNMO in the Srebrenica area testified to an incident he witnessed in which Serb soldiers threatened to shoot an elderly woman if she did not leave Srebrenica, despite her pleas to remain. As a result of this threat and to ensure her safety, the UNMO physically removed the woman from the Srebrenica hospital where she had been and took her to Poto-ari.³¹⁷ All of these factors, against the backdrop of the terror campaign waged by the VRS against the refugees in Poto-ari, make it clear that the Bosnian Serbs wanted the area cleansed of Bosnian Muslims.

148. Yet the VRS sought to make the flight of the Srebrenica residents look like a voluntary movement. On 14 July 1995, the UN Security Council expressed concern about the forced relocation of civilians from the Srebrenica "safe area" by the Bosnian Serbs, asserting it was a clear violation of their human rights.³¹⁸ On 17 July 1995, in the face of growing international condemnation, Major Franken, the Deputy Commander of Dutch Bat, met with a VRS delegation to discuss the situation of wounded Bosnian Muslims in the area of the former enclave. During the meeting, he and the unofficial Bosnian Muslim representative Mr. Mandzi}, who was also present, were told to sign a declaration specifying that the transfer of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Poto-ari was voluntary, supervised and escorted by UNPROFOR and carried out by the VRS without any irregularities.³¹⁹ VRS officers made it clear to Major Franken that he was required to sign the declaration in order to ensure that 59 wounded patients could be promptly evacuated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).³²⁰ When he testified before the Trial Chamber, Major Franken described his forced assent to the declaration as "worthless".³²¹ In reality, he said General Mladic "ordered the population to go to Kladanj, period".³²² General Krstic, during an

³¹⁶ P 445 (conversation intercepted by the ABiH between General Mladic and an unidentified person).

³¹⁷ Kingori, T. 1886-1887.

³¹⁸ P 113 (press release from Security Council). See also P 113/1 (statement by UNHCR referring to the wholesale removal of Srebrenica residents as "one of the most blatant examples of ethnically motivated forced displacement seen yet in the war.")

³¹⁹ P 47, Franken, T. 2054-2056, 2059-2062, Mandzi}, T. 1007-1016.

³²⁰ Franken, T. 2062.

³²¹ Franken, T. 2062.

³²² Franken, T. 2060.

interview with the OTP shortly after his arrest, acknowledged that it was a forced movement of the population, although he denied that he was involved.³²³

149. The Trial Chamber finds that, on 12 and 13 July 1995, the Bosnian Muslim civilians of Srebrenica who were bussed out of Poto-ari were not making a free choice to leave the area of the former enclave. The Drina Corps personnel involved in the transportation operation knew that the Bosnian Muslim population was being forced out of the area by the VRS.

(b) The Crimes Committed in Poto-ari on 12-13 July 1995

150. On 12 and 13 July 1995, upon the arrival of Serb forces in Poto-ari, the Bosnian Muslim refugees taking shelter in and around the compound were subjected to a terror campaign comprised of threats, insults, looting and burning of nearby houses, beatings, rapes, and murders.³²⁴ Drina Corps officers were present in Poto-ari on 12 and 13 July 1995³²⁵ and, in addition, Drina Corps units were seen in the vicinity of Poto-ari on 12 and 13 July 1995.³²⁶ The Petrovic video of the Poto-ari area, filmed on 13 July 1995, shows an armoured personnel carrier with a military registration number matching that of a vehicle assigned to the Command of the Bratunac Brigade.³²⁷

151. There was also an array of non-Drina Corps Serb forces present in Poto-ari on 12 and 13 July 1995. There were VRS Main Staff officers reporting directly to General Mladic.³²⁸ Some eyewitnesses also reported seeing members of the paramilitary group Arkan's Tigers in Potocari.³²⁹ Other witnesses said that some of the Bosnian Serb soldiers appeared to be "irregulars" or "Rambo types".³³⁰ Serb military police wearing blue uniforms with black belts and driving police vehicles were identified,³³¹ as well as a person who identified himself as Captain Mane from the police and his commander who went by the code name of "Stalin".³³² Witnesses spoke of soldiers dressed in black who appeared to be operating under their own command structure,³³³ a unit that had dogs with

³²³ P 399, p. 32. During his testimony before the Trial Chamber, however, General Krstic maintained that the movement of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Poto-ari was an "evacuation". Krstic, T. 6217 and 6295-6296.

³²⁴ See *supra* paras. 41-47.

³²⁵ See *supra* paras. 143-144.

³²⁶ See generally Butler, T. 4855-4866.

³²⁷ P 460 (still photo from the video) and Butler, T. 4856.

³²⁸ See *supra* para. 143 (regarding the activities of Major Jankovi} from the VRS Main Staff).

³²⁹ Vaasen, T.140-5-06; Kingori, T.1918-19.

³³⁰ Franken, T. 2030, 2034, 2064 (both regular and irregular troops); Witness F, T. 1562 (separate group of disorganised soldiers arrived later and were smoking, drinking, and looting); Rutten, T. 2116 (the first Serb soldiers who entered the compound were "Rambo types").

³³¹ Witness F, T. 1505; Kingori, T.1836,

³³² Van Duijn, T. 1742-1744. "Stalin" was identified as a person known as Jevic from the MUP Reserve Battalion. See P 73 and van Duijn T. 1764. See also Rutten, T. 2123.

³³³ Witness F, T. 1544; Witness H, T. 1684, Kingori, T. 1836. Kingori speculated that the soldiers in black were from "Arkan's brigade". Kingori, T. 1919.

them³³⁴ and soldiers dressed in a combination of camouflage and civilian clothing.³³⁵ Numerous witnesses, who reported the presence of “VRS soldiers” in green camouflage uniforms in Potocari, were not able to identify them as belonging to any particular unit.³³⁶ These disparate groups all appeared to have their own commanding officers.³³⁷ While Bosnian Muslim witnesses were sometimes able to recognise individual Serb soldiers, suggesting that at least some units were from the local area,³³⁸ there was evidence that Serb forces from outside the Srebrenica area had also been brought in.³³⁹ Colonel Karremans, the Commander of Dutch Bat recalled hearing that General Mladic brought new troops into the enclave, including militia and Arkan’s Brigade, a few days prior to the commencement of Krivaja 95.³⁴⁰

152. Not surprisingly, given the chaos that enveloped the Poto-ari compound on 12 and 13 July 1995, most witnesses were unable to specify which units were responsible for the crimes committed during those days. Many witnesses heard screams, gunshots and stories of murder, without directly observing the crimes themselves.³⁴¹

153. The Trial Record suggests that non-Drina Corps troops were highly visible perpetrators of the opportunistic crimes committed as part of the terror campaign in Poto-ari. One witness saw “Rambo types” burning houses and crops on the hillside around Poto-ari on 12 July and, later that night, threaten to slit the throat of a young wounded Bosnian Muslim man.³⁴² Only one witness directly implicated the Drina Corps in any of the mistreatment. A Dutch Bat soldier testified that members of the Drina Wolves, a sub-unit of the Zvornik Brigade, went inside houses in the vicinity of the compound and “started to plunder those houses”. He identified the men as belonging to the

³³⁴ Witness H, T. 1689; Franken, T. 2036. See also Egbers, T. 2263 (testifying about the presence of a unit with German Shepherd dogs at a school where he was detained by Bosnian Serbs after being stopped at a road block south of Nova Kasaba on 13 July 1995; and Corporal Martin Van der Zwan (hereafter “Van der Zwan”), T. 2327, 2336-2338 (who was also detained by a special purpose unit with German Shepherd dogs following the capture of OP Uniform. One of the dog handlers came from Sarajevo.)

³³⁵ Van Duijn, T. 1739.

³³⁶ See, e.g., Mandzi}, T.1006; Omanovi}, T.1103-05, 1127; Rutten, T.2149; Egbers, T.2150; Witness N, T.2787; Ademovi}, Malagi}, T.1966-67, T.1957; Hajdarevi}, T.2575; Witness H, T.1683-87.

³³⁷ Vaasen, T. 1407.

³³⁸ Witness D, T. 1263 (soldiers spoke with the usual accent from the region); Witness E, T. 1346, 1372 (recognised a policeman he knew prior to the war); Ademovi}, T. 1586-7 (recognised a former colleague and an acquaintance); Witness H, T. 1684 (recognised an acquaintance); Malagi}, T. 1953, 1963, 1969 (recognised several people she knew from the area, including a former policeman and soldiers dressed in camouflage.)

³³⁹ Mandzi}, T. 1013 (many young soldiers he had not seen in the area before); Witness D, T. 1250 (the soldiers dressed differently from soldiers around Srebrenica, and spoke with an accent similar to Montenegrins. See also Egbers, T. 2263 (who, while being detained by Bosnian Serbs near Nova Kasaba on 13 July 1995, spoke to a person named Milanic who said he had been deployed to Srebrenica from Sarajevo with his unit); and Van der Zwan, T. 2319-2320 (who, during the time the OP Uniform was taken over, identified four soldiers wearing the badge of the Krajina Serbs, one of whom said he was from Knin).

³⁴⁰ Karremans, T. 3378-3379.

³⁴¹ Mandzi}, T. 995; Omanovi}, T. 1104, 1117, 1125; Witness C, T. 1183; Vaasen, T. 1433.

³⁴² Rutten, T. 2116-2117. See also Witness F, T. 1499 (soldiers in black were “cleansing” all the houses very thoroughly.)

Drina Wolves because he saw them wearing the Drina Wolves insignia depicting a wolf's head.³⁴³ The witness heard screams from inside one of the houses and a burst of fire from an AK-47. The witness concluded that the Bosnian Muslim refugees inside the house were being killed.³⁴⁴ Although this witness was confident about his identification of the Drina Wolves in this criminal activity, the Trial Chamber heard no other evidence corroborating the participation of this unit in the crimes. Furthermore, the same witness testified that he saw soldiers wearing HVO (*i.e.* Bosnian Croat forces) insignia in Poto-ari and there is no other support for the notion that these forces played any part in the events in Srebrenica.³⁴⁵ Accordingly, the Trial Chamber cannot discount the possibility that this witness, although on the whole credible, was mistaken in his identification of the unit involved in the crimes he described. Indeed, upon cross-examination, the witness accepted that he was not close enough to directly observe whether the unit plundering the houses was from the Drina Corps. He merely thought it was the unit of the Drina Wolves that he had seen earlier.³⁴⁶

154. In the absence of direct identification evidence, the Prosecution was left to rely on the fact that regular soldiers in green camouflage uniforms, of the type usually worn by the Drina Corps including General Krstic,³⁴⁷ were involved in the commission of crimes in Poto-ari.³⁴⁸ However, the Trial Chamber cannot discount the possibility that there were also non-Drina Corps troops in Poto-ari wearing this standard military uniform.³⁴⁹

155. The evidence suggests that the various Serb units who entered Poto-ari had each been assigned a designated role in the well co-ordinated Serb campaign waged there between 12 and 13 July 1995. A Dutch Bat soldier recounted before the Trial Chamber that Poto-ari:

... was a well-prepared stage. Everybody had been assigned a task, everybody knew his position. There were people who had to guard the compound, who had to guard the surroundings. There were units who had to clear out the houses, and there were other units who had to do the interrogations... It was indeed well organised...³⁵⁰

³⁴³ Vaasen, T. 1407.

³⁴⁴ Vaasen, T. 1408 *ff.*

³⁴⁵ Vaasen, T. 1457.

³⁴⁶ Vaasen, T. 1470.

³⁴⁷ Kingori, T. 1839; Franken, T. 2064-2065.

³⁴⁸ Witness F, T. 1503 (soldiers in camouflage uniforms were looting houses); Ademovi}, T. 1589 (soldiers wearing camouflage (but without insignia) threatening to slaughter the Bosnian Muslim refugees and a soldier wearing camouflage killed a baby with a knife); Witness G, T. 1647-1648 (soldiers in green camouflage kicking Bosnian Muslim men who were boarding buses); Rutten, T. 2137-2138, (as the witness, a Dutch Bat soldier, tried to enter a room where Bosnian Muslim men were being interrogated, he had a weapon put to his face by a Serb soldier wearing green camouflage), T. 2152 (saw soldiers in green camouflage taking Deutsche marks from Bosnian Muslims), T. 2196-2197 (saw a Serb soldier in camouflage uniform chasing a woman who had run out of a house).

³⁴⁹ Indeed, one witness encountered Serb soldiers in green camouflage uniform near Nova Kasaba on 13 July 1995 and was told by their commander (Major Zoran Malini) that he and his unit had been deployed from Sarajevo. Egbers, T. 2241.

³⁵⁰ Witness F, T. 1513.

Although the Trial Chamber cannot conclude with certainty the extent of the assignment given to the Drina Corps within this well-planned operation, the record does establish that Drina Corps officers were heavily involved in organising and monitoring the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Poto-ari. This appears to have been one of the more disciplined aspects of the Poto-ari operation. One witness recalled that:

...during the deportation of the Muslim refugees, there was some kind of discipline. But for the rest of it, there was no discipline.³⁵¹

The absence of any substantial direct evidence showing the involvement of Drina Corps troops in the opportunistic crimes committed against Bosnian Muslim civilians in Poto-ari, tends to suggest that the majority of these crimes were committed by irregular Serb forces that had entered the area on 12 July 1995. Nonetheless, as Prosecution witnesses testified, Drina Corps officers present in and around the Poto-ari compound could not but have been aware of the deteriorating situation of Bosnian Muslims who had gathered there and the mistreatment occurring at the hands of other Serb forces who were present in the area.³⁵² By all accounts, the harassment of the Srebrenica refugees by the Serb forces was too widespread and pervasive to be overlooked. These Drina Corps officers did nothing to prevent the criminal conduct.³⁵³ Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that Drina Corps officers and units present in Poto-ari on 12 and 13 July 1995 must have been aware of the catastrophic humanitarian situation confronting the Bosnian Muslim refugees, as well as the general mistreatment being inflicted by Serb forces, but took no action in response.

(c) The Separation of the Men in Poto-ari

156. At the Hotel Fontana meeting on 12 July 1995, General Mladic had said that military-aged men in the crowd at Potocari would be screened for war crimes.³⁵⁴ The Prosecution's military experts accepted that it was not inherently unreasonable or criminal for the Bosnian Serbs to conduct such screening given widespread and plausible allegations that Bosnian Muslim raiders from Srebrenica had committed war crimes against Bosnian Serb villages.³⁵⁵ Indeed, the Drina Corps Bratunac Brigade had prepared a list, dated 12 July 1995, of 387 suspected Bosnian Muslim war criminals in the Srebrenica enclave.³⁵⁶ Throughout the war, large-scale prisoner exchanges were conducted between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims and a new infusion of Bosnian

³⁵¹ Vaasen, T. 148.

³⁵² Witness F, T. 1564.

³⁵³ Witness F, T. 1912-1913.

³⁵⁴ See the discussion *supra* para. 134.

³⁵⁵ Butler, T. 5397-5398.

³⁵⁶ Butler Report para. 5.19.

Muslim prisoners would have been a potentially useful bargaining tool for the Bosnian Serbs in future exchange negotiations.³⁵⁷

157. Consistent with this, the men and boys in Potocari were separated from the women, children and elderly and taken to the White House for interrogation. Contrary to the claims made by General Mladic and other Serb soldiers that these men would be screened and ultimately exchanged for Bosnian Serb prisoners of war,³⁵⁸ when they were taken to the White House they were forced to leave their belongings, including their wallets and identification papers, in a large pile outside the building prior to entering.³⁵⁹ The Trial Chamber also heard evidence that some of the men detained at the White House were killed and mistreated in sporadic attacks³⁶⁰ and, more generally, that all of the Bosnian Muslim men who were separated were held in appalling conditions.³⁶¹

158. Again, the Trial Record is not clear as to which Serb units were involved in the separation and detention of the Bosnian Muslim men in Poto-ari. One witness recalled that police with dogs were involved in the process of separating the men, which may suggest the involvement of the 65th Protection Regiment.³⁶² Another implicated the bodyguards of General Mladic in a shooting incident in the vicinity of the White House.³⁶³ More generally, witnesses reported well-organised and well-dressed soldiers in and around the White House.³⁶⁴ Some witnesses specifically recalled that all the soldiers around the White House wore green camouflage uniforms³⁶⁵ although, again, the Trial Chamber is unable to thereby conclude that they were Drina Corps troops. Certainly though, Drina Corps Officers were involved in procuring the buses and overseeing their journey out of the enclave, giving rise to an inference that they also played a part in boarding the Bosnian Muslim refugees onto the buses. Drina Corps officers were also seen in the vicinity of the White House during the time the separated men were detained there.³⁶⁶ They must have been aware that the Bosnian Muslim men's belongings had been taken from them and piled out in front of the White House, as well as the terrible conditions in which these men were kept. By the late afternoon of 12 July 1995, terror in the Poto-ari compound had developed to such intensity that Major Franken was prompted to draw up a list containing the names of the men in and around the compound. In his view, the conduct of the VRS signalled to all who were present that the survival of the men was at

³⁵⁷ Dannatt, T. 5616-5617; Butler, T. 5389.

³⁵⁸ Kingori, T. 1854; Rutten, T. 2195-2196; Franken, T. 2051; van Duijn, T. 1769-70, 1780, 1786.

³⁵⁹ Kingori, T. 1850-53; Witness F, T. 1511-1512; Malagi, T. 1974; Franken, T. 2039.

³⁶⁰ See the discussion *supra* para. 58.

³⁶¹ Kingori, T. 1844.

³⁶² Witness T. 3437, and Defence Final Brief, para. 292.

³⁶³ Witness C, T. 1183.

³⁶⁴ Witness C, T. 1183.

³⁶⁵ Rutten, T. 2153; Witness N, T. 2797.

³⁶⁶ Kingori, T. 1846-1849 (identifying Major Nikoli}, Colonel Popovi}, and General @ivanovi} as present at the White House) and Rutten, T. 2152 (identifying General @ivanovi} as present at the White House). The presence of General Krstic at the White House is considered *Infra* paras. 365-367.

risk and Major Franken made his list in an effort to safeguard their lives by establishing a record of their presence in the compound.³⁶⁷ The Drina Corps officers present must have also known that there was a terrible uncertainty about what was going to happen to the separated men. One Dutch Bat witnesses summed it up in this way:

[Y]ou could see the total fear, and I never thought that it really existed, but you could even smell death there because it was total fear, what you saw on the faces of the men and the young boys.³⁶⁸

159. Beginning on the afternoon of 12 July 1995 and continuing throughout 13 July 1995, men detained in the White House were bussed out of the Poto-ari compound to detention sites in Bratunac.³⁶⁹ Colonel Kingori testified that:

...the men who were being taken from that white building, the ones who had been put together earlier. They were put on their own buses, different from the ones carrying the women and children and we did not know where their destination was...³⁷⁰

[the men who had been separated] could [sic] shout and say, 'You know these people are going to kill us, and then you are not doing anything about it.' ...Something bad was actually going to be done to them. You know we could see it...you could see there was a lot of fear. They were crying, You know, men -you can imagine men crying in front of you and seeking assistance from you, assistance which you cannot give--it had gone beyond my control.³⁷¹

Drina Corps officers present in the compound, particularly those in the vicinity of the White House, must have known that the separated men from Poto-ari were bussed out to detention sites in Bratunac. Indeed, the fact that the buses transporting the Bosnian Muslim men from Poto-ari were diverted from the transportation of the women, children and elderly, which the Drina Corps was overseeing, to carry out this task made that knowledge on their part inevitable.³⁷²

160. Later, after all of the Bosnian Muslim civilians had gone from Poto-ari, the piles of personal effects, including identity cards, that had been taken from the Bosnian Muslim men and boys were set on fire.³⁷³ At that point Dutch Bat soldiers were certain that the story about screening for war criminals could not be true: something more ominous was afoot.³⁷⁴ The Chamber accepts that, at the stage when the Bosnian Muslim men were divested of their identification *en masse*, it must have been apparent to any observer that the men were not being screened for war crimes. In the absence of personal documentation, these men could no longer be accurately identified for any purpose. Rather, the removal of their identification could only be an ominous signal of atrocities to come. However, the evidence suggests that the destruction of the identity documents did not occur until

³⁶⁷ Franken, T. 2096-2097

³⁶⁸ Rutten, T. 2149-2150.

³⁶⁹ Witness G, T. 1646; Kingori, T. 1855; Egbers, T. 2233.

³⁷⁰ Kingori, T. 1855

³⁷¹ Kingori, T. 1856-1857.

³⁷² Vaasen, T. 1439-1440; Witness L, T. 2662; Witness P, T. 2956.

³⁷³ Rutten, T. 2136; Witness F, T. 1541-1542; van Duijn, T. 1786.

the late afternoon or evening of 13 July 1995. On the basis of the evidence presented, the Trial Chamber is unable to positively conclude that any Drina Corps personnel were still in the compound at the time the personal belongings taken from the Bosnian Muslim men detained in the White House were burned.

161. The Trial Chamber finds that Drina Corps personnel present in the Poto-ari compound, on 12 and 13 July 1995, knew that the Bosnian Muslim men, who were separated from the women, children and elderly, were not treated in accordance with accepted practice for war crimes screening and that there was a terrible uncertainty about what the fate of these men would be. The Drina Corps Command also knew that the separated men from Poto-ari were bussed out to detention sites in Bratunac using busses that had been diverted from the transportation of the women, children and elderly, which the Drina Corps was overseeing.

4. Involvement of the Drina Corps in Action against the Bosnian Muslim Column

162. Immediately following the take-over of Srebrenica, the whereabouts of the 28th Division of the ABiH were unknown.³⁷⁵ This was of great concern to the VRS, as was the possibility that forces of the 2nd Corps of the ABiH attacking from the direction of Tuzla and Kladanj would link up with elements of the 28th Division.³⁷⁶ Radio intercepts indicate that the VRS first became aware of the formation of the column around 0300 hours on 12 July 1995.³⁷⁷ At the Hotel Fontana meetings on 11 and 12 July 1995, General Mladic had attempted to secure the surrender of the ABiH forces in the area of the former enclave. He was, however, unsuccessful and, in the ensuing days, VRS units, including units of the Drina Corps that were not engaged in the @epa campaign, were assigned to block the column.³⁷⁸ In addition to these Drina Corps units, non-Drina Corps units, including a Special Brigade of the police units of the RS Ministry of the Interior (*Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova*, or MUP), elements of the Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment and subsequently elements of the municipal police, also took action to block the column.³⁷⁹ Over the course of 12 and 13 July 1995, a series of intercepted conversations track the developing knowledge of the Drina Corps,³⁸⁰ and the VRS generally,³⁸¹ about the column.

³⁷⁴ Rutten, T. 2195; Franken, T.2051; van Duijn, T. 1769-70, 1780, 1786.

³⁷⁵ Radinovi}, T. 7951-7952.

³⁷⁶ Radinovic Report, paras. 4.17-4.18.

³⁷⁷ Butler, T. 4929-4930; P 500; P 501; P 502; and P 503.

³⁷⁸ Radinovic Report, para. 3.26.

³⁷⁹ D 98, P 830, P 507, P 503, P 404/2/114, P 878, P 502, P 404/2/115, D 165, P 508, P 487, P 404/61, P 504, P 507; also P 511, and generally Butler, T. 4871-4872. See also Radinovic Report, para. 3.26.

³⁸⁰ P 507 (intercepted conversation on 12 July 1995 involving an officer at the Drina Corps Headquarters and discussing MUP involvement in the operations relating to the column). See also Butler T. 4944-4945; P 508 (intercept dated 12 July 1995 at 11.56 hours involving officers from the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, and the Drina Corps

163. About one third of the Bosnian Muslim column was comprised of soldiers from the 28th Division, and about two-thirds were Bosnian Muslim civilian men from Srebrenica.³⁸² The military experts for both the Prosecution and the Defence agreed that, under VRS regulations, the column qualified as a legitimate military target.³⁸³ Certainly the Indictment in this case does not allege that the combat activities against the column were deliberately or indiscriminately directed against civilians in the column. However, thousands of Bosnian Muslim men were also captured from the column, most of them civilians, transferred to detention sites, and subsequently executed. Consequently, the knowledge the Drina Corps had of the column, as well as Drina Corps involvement in action taken against it, particularly the capture of Bosnian Muslim prisoners, forms a critical backdrop to the Trial Chamber's findings on the criminal responsibility of General Krstic for the Srebrenica crimes.

(a) Combat against the Column

164. As the Bosnian Muslim column attempted to break out of the enclave, it first moved through the area of responsibility of the Bratunac Brigade. The 13 July 1995 Combat Report sent by the Bratunac Brigade to the Drina Corps Command discussed military activities related to encircling and crushing groups of Bosnian Muslims attempting to escape the area.³⁸⁴ The combat against the column in the Bratunac zone of responsibility, however, appears to have been of low intensity.³⁸⁵

165. Leaving the area of the Bratunac Brigade, the column moved up towards the Zvornik Brigade's zone of responsibility. On 12 July 1995 at 16.40 hours, the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade, Major Dragan Obrenovi}, was heard in an intercepted conversation discussing matters relating to the column and the activities of the MUP who were deployed to ambush the column along the Konjevi}-Polje road.³⁸⁶ In a conversation at 20.35 hours on 13 July 1995, Major Obrenovi} is again heard reporting on the movement of the column to an unidentified General.³⁸⁷ The General ordered Major Obrenovi} to take urgent steps to ensure he did not "let anything

Command and discussing the movement of the column); P 509 (intercept on 12 July 1995 at 13.45 hours involving an officer at the Drina Corps Command and discussing complications in the area where the 4th Battalion was deployed); and P 511 (intercepted conversation on 12 July 1995 at 16.40 hours involving Major Obrenovi}, the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade, discussing the movement of the column and the police ambushes that had been set along the Konjevi} Polje-Hrncici stretch.).

³⁸¹ P 500 (intercept between unidentified subscribers at 0603 hours on 12 July 1995); P 502 (intercept between unidentified subscribers at 06.56 hours on 12 July 1995); P 506 (intercept on 12 July 1995 discussing the location of the column); P 515 (intercepted conversation on 13 July 1995 at 09.10 hours involving Colonel Beara, Security Chief of the Main Staff, and discussing Bosnian Muslim prisoners in Konjevi} Polje)

³⁸² See *supra* para. 61.

³⁸³ Radinovic Report, para. 3.25; and Butler, T. 4921.

³⁸⁴ P 488.

³⁸⁵ Butler, T. 4993.

³⁸⁶ P 511; Butler, T. 4949-4951.

through". On 13 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade reported to the Command of the Drina Corps that troops not engaged for @epa were being deployed to deal with the enemy forces known to be moving out of Srebrenica and towards Tuzla. Clashes between the Zvornik Brigade and the 2nd Corps of the ABiH from Tuzla were also noted.³⁸⁸ The Daily Combat report sent to the Drina Corps Command by the Zvornik Brigade on 14 July 1995 reveals that clashes with the 2nd Corps continued and, in addition, the Zvornik Brigade encountered the Bosnian Muslim column at around 18.00 hours.³⁸⁹ Later that same day, the Zvornik Brigade reported to the Drina Corps Command, in an Interim Combat Report, that the Bosnian Muslim column had broken through the defences of the Zvornik Brigade.³⁹⁰ By 10.00 hours on 15 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade was aware of the presence of a column "of between four and five thousand".³⁹¹ The Daily Combat Report sent to the Drina Corps Command by the Zvornik Brigade on 15 July 1995 reported heavy combat with the Bosnian Muslim column, as well as the actions of Bosnian Muslim forces who were attacking the front line in an effort to assist the column in breaking through.³⁹² An Interim Combat Report of the same date states that the Zvornik Brigade was completely engaged by enemy forces.³⁹³ On 16 July 1995, Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurevi}, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, reported that, in view of the enormous pressure on his Brigade, he had taken a unilateral decision to open up a corridor to allow about 5,000 unarmed members of the Bosnian Muslim column to pass through.³⁹⁴ Following this, on 17 and 18 July 1995, Zvornik Brigade units engaged in pockets of combat with Bosnian Muslim stragglers who remained in the zone of responsibility.³⁹⁵

166. Undisputed evidence thus demonstrates that the Drina Corps subordinate Brigades, particularly the Bratunac and Zvornik Brigades, engaged in combat with the column as it attempted to break-through to Bosnian Muslim held territory. These Brigades were continuously reporting to the Drina Corps Command about matters relating to the column between 12 and 18 July 1995.

³⁸⁷ P 542.

³⁸⁸ P 540, (Zvornik Brigade Daily Combat Report 13 July 1995).

³⁸⁹ P 548 (Zvornik Brigade Daily Combat Report, 14 July 1995). See also P 555 (intercepted conversation at 09.10 hours on 14 July 1995 in which the duty officer of the Zvornik Brigade informs General @ivanovi} about the size of the column and the threat posed by it.); P 556 (intercepted conversation at 20.38 hours on 14 July 1995 between the duty officer of the Zvornik Brigade and General @ivanovi} about the column).

³⁹⁰ P 550 (Zvornik Brigade Interim Combat Report, 14 July 1995).

³⁹¹ P 607 (Intercept between Colonel Pandurevi} and a person named "Mijatovi}", 15 July 1995)

³⁹² P 597.

³⁹³ P 609; Butler, T. 5115.

³⁹⁴ P 614 (Zvornik Brigade Interim Combat Report, 16 July 1995).

³⁹⁵ P 641 (Zvornik Brigade Combat Report for 17 July 1995, sent to the Command of the Drina Corps); P 675 (Zvornik Brigade Interim Combat Report for 18 July 1995, sent to the Command of the Drina Corps); and P 676 (Zvornik Brigade Combat Report for 18 July 1995 sent to the Command of the Drina Corps); P 694 (intercepted conversation on 19 July 1995 at 08.12 hours in which Colonel Pandurevi} speaks of chasing 150 Muslims remaining within his zone of responsibility.) See also Butler Report, para. 7.74.

(b) Capture of Bosnian Muslim Men from the Column

167. Mr. Butler calculated that, from the afternoon of 12 July 1995, or the early evening at the latest, the Bosnian Serbs were capturing, within the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps, large numbers of the men from the column.³⁹⁶ How much the Drina Corps knew about the capture of the men and the involvement of Drina Corps units in these events, proved to be the subject of a critical debate between the parties in the case.

(i) General Knowledge that Bosnian Muslim Men were Being Captured from the Column

168. There is persuasive evidence that the Drina Corps Command knew that prisoners were being captured from the column from 12 July 1995 onwards. An intelligence report prepared by the Zvornik Brigade on 12 July 1995 and received by the Drina Corps Command in the early morning hours of 13 July 1995, expressly referred to the fact that Bosnian Muslims in the column were "fleeing in panic, without any control, in groups or individually and giving themselves up to the MUP/Ministry of the Interior/ or the VRS/Republika Srpska Army."³⁹⁷ On 13 July 1995, the contents of this report were subsequently conveyed by the Drina Corps Intelligence Department to, *inter alia*, the Main Staff and the MUP, in a document that stated "*our* soldiers were using megaphones asking them to surrender" (emphasis added).³⁹⁸

169. Certainly the Drina Corps Command was well aware of the general VRS plan to capture the Bosnian Muslim men trying to breakthrough to Tuzla. Indeed, the Drina Corps Command received direct orders from the Main Staff to take prisoners from the Bosnian Muslim column. On 13 July 1995,³⁹⁹ in an attempt to forewarn Drina Corps Brigades who were in the approaching column's line of attack, Lieutenant Colonel General Milan Gvero, the Main Staff Assistant Commander for Moral Legal and Religious Affairs, issued an order about the column to the Drina Corps Command.⁴⁰⁰ The order was also sent to the Drina Corps Forward Command Post (hereafter "FCP") and directly to the relevant subordinate Brigades, namely the Zvornik Brigade, the Bira} Brigade and the Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade. General Gvero described the column as comprised of "hardened criminals and cut-throats, who will stop at nothing in order to avoid capture and escape to Bosnian Muslim controlled territory." The Corps and Brigade commands were ordered to use all available manpower in "discovering, blocking, disarming and capturing" men from the column. To this end, the Drina Corps was ordered to set ambushes along the Zvornik-Crni Vrh-Sekovici-Vlasenica road. General Gvero specified the procedure to be followed when Bosnian

³⁹⁶ Butler T. 5453.

³⁹⁷ P 878.

³⁹⁸ P 739.

³⁹⁹ This date was identified by Butler, T.4 968.

Muslims from the column were captured, one aspect of which was reporting immediately to the "Superior Command." Later that same day, General @ivanovi} issued an order at 16.00 hours largely reproducing the order sent by General Gvero.⁴⁰¹

170. The Trial Chamber finds that, from 12 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command knew Bosnian Muslim prisoners were being taken from the column by Bosnian Serb forces within its zone of responsibility. The Drina Corps Command was informed of the Main Staff policy of blocking and capturing the Bosnian Muslim men in the Column and the Main Staff had directed that Drina Corps units be deployed in setting ambushes for the column.

(ii) 13 July 1995: Participation in the Capture of Prisoners along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje Road

171. The vast majority of prisoners were seized along the road between Bratunac and Konjevi} Polje on 13 July 1995. An intercepted conversation on that day indicates that about 6,000 men had been captured by 1730 hours.⁴⁰² Witnesses estimated that between 1,000 and 4,000 Bosnian Muslim men captured from the column were detained in the Sandi}i Meadow on 13 July 1995.⁴⁰³ The soldiers guarding the men forced them to drop their belongings into big piles and to hand over their valuables. Late in the afternoon of 13 July 1995, General Mladic visited the meadow and told the men that they would not be hurt but would be exchanged as prisoners of war and that their families had been transported safely to Tuzla.⁴⁰⁴ The Bosnian Serb forces on the scene began shepherding the men out of the meadow. Some were put on buses or marched towards the nearby Kravica Warehouse.⁴⁰⁵ Others were loaded on buses and trucks and taken to Bratunac and other nearby locations.⁴⁰⁶ In addition, an estimated 1,500 and 3,000 men captured from the column were held prisoner on the Nova Kasaba football field on 13 July 1995.⁴⁰⁷ As in the Sandi}i meadow, the men at Nova Kasaba were forced to turn over their valuables and abandon their belongings.⁴⁰⁸ General Mladic visited that field in the afternoon of 13 July 1995 as well, but this time he told the prisoners that the Bosnian Muslim authorities in Tuzla did not want them and so they would be sent

⁴⁰⁰ P 532.

⁴⁰¹ P 462.

⁴⁰² P 523.

⁴⁰³ Compare Witness K, T. 2503, 2508 (originally 1,000 people, increasing to 3,500 or 4,000 in a few hours); Witness L, T. 2659 (2,000 to 2,500 people); Husi}, T. 2619 (1,000 people); Witness J, T. 2451 (2,000 people); **Witness O, T. 2874 (1,000 to 2,000 people).**

⁴⁰⁴ Witness J, T. 2459; Witness K, T. 2509; Witness L, T. 2660-2661.

⁴⁰⁵ Witness K, T. 2510; Witness J, T. 2461.

⁴⁰⁶ Witness O, T. 2871.

⁴⁰⁷ Witness P, T. 2950-2951; **Witness Q, T. 3022.**

⁴⁰⁸ Witness P, T. 2950.

somewhere else.⁴⁰⁹ Most of the men at Nova Kasaba were subsequently loaded into buses and trucks and taken to Bratunac and other holding sites.⁴¹⁰

172. The evidence conclusively establishes that, on 13 July 1995, MUP forces were deployed along the stretch of road between Konjevi} Polje and Bratunac where the bulk of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners were captured from the column.⁴¹¹ The Prosecution argued that Drina Corps units were also present there, but the Defence adamantly denied this.

173. A video taken by Serb journalist, Zoran Petrovi}, in the company of Lieutenant Colonel Ljubisa Borov-anin, the Deputy Commander of a Special MUP Brigade, recorded the activity along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje road on 13 July 1995.⁴¹² Mr. Butler presented circumstantial evidence indicating that military equipment shown in the film belonged to units of the Drina Corps, specifically the 4th Battalion of the Bratunac Brigade (a Zvornik Brigade unit, that at the time was functioning as a Bratunac Brigade unit) and the 2nd Romanija Brigade.⁴¹³ However, this evidence is not sufficiently reliable to support a firm conclusion by the Trial Chamber that these Drina Corps units were engaged in the capture of Bosnian Muslim men along that stretch of road. For example, during his testimony, Mr. Butler suggested that a photograph of soldiers wearing flak jackets who were guarding a group of Bosnian Muslim prisoners in Sandi}i probably belonged to the 4th Battalion of the Bratunac Brigade. He drew this conclusion based upon information the OTP uncovered during the course of its investigations about the equipment inventories of the various units in the area.⁴¹⁴ However, when Mr. Butler was recalled during the Prosecution's rebuttal case, he informed the Chamber that ongoing investigations had revealed that the individuals in the photograph were members of a police unit and not in fact members of the army.⁴¹⁵ Similarly, during his initial testimony, Mr. Butler concluded that the army owned a tank shown in the Petrovi} video.⁴¹⁶ During rebuttal, the Prosecution filed a stipulation, with the agreement of the Defence, that a witness would testify that the tank in question belonged to a police unit.⁴¹⁷

174. The Prosecution also relied upon general evidence that army units, in addition to the MUP, were present along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road on 13 July 1995. First, Mr. Butler doubted

⁴⁰⁹ Witness P, T. 2953-2954. See also Witness Q, T. 3013-15.

⁴¹⁰ Witness P, T. 2955-2956

⁴¹¹ In addition to the video showing the presence of the MUP along this stretch of road on 13 July and discussed *Infra* para. 173, an intercepted conversation on 12 July 1995 at 16.40 hours reveals that the civilian police were involved in setting up an ambush in Konjevic Polje. See P 512. An order issued by the Main Staff in the late evening of 12 July 1995 also noted that organs of the MUP had been assigned to "secure the communication Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje." See D 165. General Krstic agreed that the MUP were present in this area. Krstic, T. 6416.

⁴¹² P 3.

⁴¹³ Butler, T. 4925-4931.

⁴¹⁴ P 493, and Butler T. 4926-4927.

⁴¹⁵ Butler, T. 9181.

⁴¹⁶ P 3 video still number 491.

whether the entire stretch of road between Bratunac and Konjevic Polje could have been secured by the MUP, given the breadth of the area involved and the limited number of MUP formations known to be present.⁴¹⁸ Second, Mr. Butler testified that, when interviewed by the OTP, the police who were filmed by Petrovi} guarding the Bosnian Muslim prisoners in Sandi}i on 13 July 1995, confirmed that there were army members with them in the Sandi}i meadow area that day.⁴¹⁹ The Bosnian Muslim men who made it through to Tuzla after being caught up in the second part of the column, stated that both the MUP and the VRS were engaged in capturing Bosnian Muslim men.⁴²⁰ The women, children and elderly who had been bussed from Poto-ari to Kladanj also told members of the ABiH, who met them upon their arrival, that they had seen dead men lying by the road and also claimed that the army had been involved.⁴²¹ Witnesses captured in several locations remembered only seeing "Bosnian Serb soldiers," in green camouflage uniforms, without knowing which unit they came from.⁴²² Some remembered blue camouflage uniforms⁴²³ and police cars.⁴²⁴ Other witnesses recounted rumours that members of the paramilitary group, called Arkan's Tigers, were in the area;⁴²⁵ some reported seeing Bosnian Serb soldiers dressed in stolen UN uniforms.⁴²⁶ There was, however, virtually no evidence demonstrating that units of the Drina Corps were amongst these army forces. The only exception is one eyewitness who recalled seeing a truck with a wolf's head on the door, the emblem of the Drina Corps, at the football field in Nova Kasaba, where captured men were collected.⁴²⁷

175. Although there is some persuasive force in the arguments and evidence presented by the Prosecution, the Trial Chamber is unable to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Drina Corps units participated in the capture of the thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from the column who were taken along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje Road on 13 July 1995.

176. Although the Prosecution was unable to identify specific Drina Corps units along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje road on 13 July 1995, there is strong evidence that the Corps Command knew that thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners had been captured along that stretch of road throughout the day. A series of intercepted conversations show close co-operation and co-

⁴¹⁷ Stipulation 890, T. 9186.

⁴¹⁸ Butler, T. 9201.

⁴¹⁹ Butler, T. 9182.

⁴²⁰ Had` ihasanovi}, T. 9604.

⁴²¹ Had` ihasanovi}, T. 9605.

⁴²² Witness K, T. 2506-2507; Witness L, T. 2657; Witness O, T. 2867.

⁴²³ Witness P, T. 2948-2949; Witness S, T. 3247.

⁴²⁴ Witness O, T. 2868.

⁴²⁵ Witness L, T. 2658.

⁴²⁶ Husi}, T. 2609-2613; Witness K, T.2517.

⁴²⁷ Egbers, T. 2237.

ordination between MUP units and Drina Corps units, particularly the Engineers Battalion,⁴²⁸ who were jointly engaged in action to block the Bosnian Muslim column.⁴²⁹ The Drina Corps Command was also in contact with the MUP unit along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje road, monitoring their progress. A conversation, intercepted on 13 July 1995 at 2040 hours, reveals that General Krstic spoke to Colonel Borov-anin, the Deputy Commander of the MUP unit, asked how things were going and stated that he would be in touch.⁴³⁰

177. Also on 13 July 1995 at 2100 hours, a conversation was recorded involving Colonel Krsmanovi}, the Drina Corps Chief of Transportation Services.⁴³¹ Colonel Krsmanovi}, who on 12 July 1995 had been involved in procuring the buses for the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Poto-ari, told the other participant in the conversation that there were "700 people in Sandi}i village" and that "(t)he buses need to stop there, load 10 pieces and bring them here to me." Between 1,000 and 4,000 Bosnian Muslim prisoners taken along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road were detained in the Sandi}i Meadow throughout 13 July 1995. It is difficult to attribute any precise meaning to the statement Colonel Krsmanovi} made about loading "10 pieces". At a minimum, however, the conversation shows that Colonel Krsmanovi} was still involved in directing the movement of buses in the area of the former enclave one hour after the transport of the Bosnian Muslim women, children, and elderly had been completed on the evening of 13 July 1995. More particularly, Colonel Krsmanovi} was directing the movement of buses in the very areas where thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners had been collected on 13 July 1995 and at the time when they were being transported to holding sites in Bratunac.

178. The Trial Chamber finds that the Drina Corps Command knew that thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners had been captured along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje Road on 13 July 1995. The Trial Chamber further finds that an officer in the Drina Corps Command was still involved in directing the movement of buses in the area of the former enclave where the prisoners were being held, despite the fact that the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of the enclave on the evening of 13 July 1995 had already been completed an hour earlier.

⁴²⁸ P 504 (intercepted conversation on 12 July 1995 at 0740 hours in which one participant stated "...the police in Konjevic Polje have been told to [sic] the same as the Engineering Battalion are doing, and that he can give orders to them through the commander of the Engineering Battalion."); P 505 (intercepted conversation on 12 July at 07.48 hours during which one participant refers to a person from the MUP and states "One of his companies is up there next to our man with the bulldozers, over there in/?Konjevic Polje/ and has the task of doing whatever he does. So you can give orders what to do through the commander.")

⁴²⁹ See the further discussion *Infra* para. 287.

⁴³⁰ P 529.

(iii) 12-15 July 1995: Involvement with the Detention of Bosnian Muslim Prisoners in Bratunac

179. Most of the Bosnian Muslim men separated at Potocari and captured from the woods were held in Bratunac for one to three days before being transferred to other detention and execution sites. Evidence that Drina Corps units knew about the detention of men in Bratunac, though circumstantial, is persuasive.

180. The town of Bratunac is in the zone of the Bratunac Brigade of the Drina Corps.⁴³² The arrival of many thousands of military aged Bosnian Muslim men could not have escaped the attention of the Brigade Command. In fact, a Bratunac Brigade military police log on 14 and 15 July 1995 reveals that military police from the Bratunac Brigade "were engaged in the escort of Bosnian Muslim refugees."⁴³³ Since the women, children and elderly had already been transported from Potocari by the night of 13 July 1995, it appears likely that this referred to an assignment to escort the busses of male prisoners as they commenced their journey up north towards the Zvornik Brigade.⁴³⁴ The Prosecution also relied on the presence of soldiers in green camouflage at the detention sites in Bratunac as evidence that Drina Corps troops were present there.⁴³⁵ However, as previously noted, this evidence, of itself, is insufficient to establish the involvement of the Drina Corps.

181. The Trial Chamber finds that the Drina Corps Bratunac Brigade could not but have known that thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were being detained in Bratunac between 12-15 July 1995. The Trial Chamber also accepts the evidence adduced by the Prosecution showing that Bratunac Brigade military police were engaged in escorting these prisoners to northern detention sites on 14 and 15 July 1995.

182. Mr. Butler further concluded that the Drina Corps Command must have been involved in making the arrangements to detain the men at Bratunac. He based this conclusion on the fact that the resources involved were over and above those owned by the Bratunac Brigade and that an intensive level of co-ordination with the Command level of the Corps would have been required.⁴³⁶ However, the Trial Chamber is unable to make any specific finding that the Drina Corps Command

⁴³¹ P 530.

⁴³² Butler, para. 6.11.

⁴³³ P 404 /2 (tab 61) (Military Police log for 14 and 15 July 1995).

⁴³⁴ Butler, Report para. 6.33 & fn. 206.

⁴³⁵ Witness G, T. 1653-1658.

⁴³⁶ Butler, T. 5408.

was involved in making the arrangement to detain the men in Bratunac based only on theories as to how such a task would normally be carried out.

183. Nonetheless, the Prosecutor made a compelling argument that the Drina Corps Command must have known the Bosnian Muslim prisoners were being detained in Bratunac on the nights between 12 and 15 July 1995. Certainly, the Bratunac Brigade Command would be expected to have informed the Drina Corps Command about the arrival of thousands of military-aged Bosnian Muslim men within its zone of responsibility. This is especially so given that the whereabouts of the 28th Division was an issue of great concern to the Drina Corps units involved in preparing for the operation in @epa.⁴³⁷

184. The Trial Chamber also notes that many men were transported to Bratunac from Potocari at the same time that Drina Corps troops were present and actively engaged in organising the buses for transporting the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of the compound. Throughout the trial, the Prosecution relied upon the fact that the Drina Corps Command had procured the buses for the transportation of the women, children and elderly out of Poto-ari, to support an inference that they must have also known about the transport of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners to detention and execution sites, including those in Bratunac, between 12 and 17 July 1995. The timing of the events suggests that the same buses used to transport the women, children and elderly were used to transport the Bosnian Muslim prisoners. Certainly, it is clear from eyewitness testimony that buses used to transport the men from Potocari to Bratunac on 12 and 13 July 1995 had to be diverted from the parallel task of transporting the women, children and elderly to Kladanj.⁴³⁸ Further, it was not until the bussing of the women, children and elderly from Potocari was finished in the evening of 13 July 1995, thus making the entire convoy of buses and trucks available, that the transportation of the men from Bratunac to the detention and northern execution sites in zone of the Zvornik Brigade commenced. Officers in the Drina Corps Command had co-ordinated the procurement of the buses in the first place and were monitoring the transport of the women, children and the elderly out of the enclave. They must have known that, first, the buses were being diverted to the parallel task of transporting the Bosnian Muslim men from Poto-ari to Bratunac on 12 and 13 July 1995 and, second, that they were subsequently used to transport the men up north to the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade after the transport of the women, children and elderly was completed. Buses were scarce in Eastern Bosnia during July 1995. The Drina Corps had scrambled to obtain the requisite number of buses on 12 July 1995 casting its net far and wide, including calling upon

⁴³⁷ The Defence argued that, even if subordinate Brigades of the Drina Corps had knowledge, of, or were involved in the executions, this information was not transmitted to the Corps Command, because there was a parallel chain of command involving the VRS Main Staff in operation. The issue of how the Drina Corps chain of command was operating during July 1995 is considered *Infra* paras. 262-276.

the resources of private companies. One witness who saw the long line of buses transporting the Bosnian Muslims out of Poto-ari remarked how strange it was to see them given that, in the three years prior, there had barely been a single vehicle in the enclave.⁴³⁹ It is difficult to imagine that different buses were then acquired to transport the thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners to detention and executions sites. An eyewitness testified that some of the buses that arrived to transport the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Poto-ari, bore the inscriptions of companies in the region such as "Sembrija Transport" from Bijeljina, and "Drina Trans" from Zvornik.⁴⁴⁰ Mr. Erdemovi} then testified that one of the buses used to transport Bosnian Muslim men to an execution site on 16 July 1995 bore the inscription of a Zvornik transportation company.⁴⁴¹ This is consistent with the notion that the buses originally procured by the Drina Corps were still in use. As previously noted, intercept evidence also suggests that the Drina Corps Transportation Chief was involved in directing the movement of buses subsequent to the conclusion of the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from the enclave. Overall, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the buses procured by the Drina Corps were used for the transportation of Bosnian Muslim prisoners to detention and execution sites. It follows from this that, on 12 and 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command must have been informed about the diversion of the buses from their original task of transporting the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly into transporting men from Poto-ari to Bratunac. The Trial Chamber also finds that, from the evening of 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps must have known that their buses had been put to further use in dealing with the Bosnian Muslim prisoner population remaining within its zone of responsibility.

185. Another factor supporting the proposition that the Drina Corps Command knew of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners detained at Bratunac is that, as Mr. Butler pointed out, it was very likely that the prisoner convoys leaving from Bratunac would have had to obtain route clearance from the Drina Corps for their journey up into the zone of the Zvornik Brigade since combat was ongoing in that area.⁴⁴²

186. The Trial Chamber finds that the Drina Corps Command had knowledge of both the fact that Bosnian Muslim men were being detained in Bratunac between 12 and 15 July 1995 and that, from the evening of 13 July 1995, they were transported to detention sites in the north, following completion of the removal of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly.

⁴³⁸ See the discussion *supra* para. 159.

⁴³⁹ Malagi}, T. 1992.

⁴⁴⁰ Mandzi}, T. 1000. Other witnesses said some of the buses came from companies in Serbia. See Malagi}, T. 1992.

⁴⁴¹ See *Infra* paras. 239.

⁴⁴² Butler Report, para. 6.34.

(iv) 13-16 July 1995: Zvornik Brigade Knowledge of Bosnian Muslim Prisoners detained in its Zone of Responsibility

187. There is evidence that, from 13 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade was aware of the plans to distribute, throughout the Zvornik area, the thousands of Bosnian Muslim men being detained temporarily in Bratunac. Vehicle records⁴⁴³ show that, on 13 July 1995, an Opel "Record", assigned to the Command of the Zvornik Brigade, travelled from the Zvornik Brigade headquarters to Orahovac (where a mass execution took place on 14 July 1995⁴⁴⁴) and Bratunac (where the Bosnian Muslim men were being detained at that time). On 14 July 1995, the vehicle visited Orahovac two more times and also went to Rocevic (where Prosecution investigators believe Bosnian Muslim men were subsequently detained in a school⁴⁴⁵). On 15 July 1995, it went to Kozluk (a known crime scene between 15 and 17 July 1995), Kula (where men were detained in the Pilica school on 14 and 15 July 1995), Pilica (where a mass execution took place on 16 July 1995⁴⁴⁶) and Rocevic. On 16 July 1995, it went to Kozluk, Pilica, Rocevic and Kravica. As is readily apparent, the timing and location of these visits correlate strongly to the timing and location of the detentions and mass executions.

188. The Defence argued that the Opel "Record" is known to have been the personal vehicle of Colonel Beara of the Main Staff and that he was responsible for these scouting visits.⁴⁴⁷ However, the documentation for the vehicle demonstrates that the vehicle was operated by three members of the Zvornik Brigade military police company.⁴⁴⁸ Even if Colonel Beara was involved in directing the trips, the Zvornik Brigade must have known it was being utilised for this purpose.

189. In a conversation intercepted on 14 July 1995 at 21.02 hours, the Zvornik Brigade duty officer was heard speaking to Colonel Beara, the Security Chief of the Main Staff, about "big problems...with the people, I mean, with the parcel."⁴⁴⁹ Mr. Butler confirmed that the word "parcel" was used throughout the intercepted conversations to describe the prisoners taken from the Bosnian Muslim column as opposed to the column itself.⁴⁵⁰ This intercept is further evidence that the Zvornik Brigade was fully aware of the existence of the Bosnian Muslim prisoner population within its zone.

⁴⁴³ P 543.

⁴⁴⁴ See the discussion *Infra* paras. 220-225.

⁴⁴⁵ Butler, T. 5029.

⁴⁴⁶ See the discussion *Infra* paras. 233-248.

⁴⁴⁷ Defence Final Brief, para. 312

⁴⁴⁸ P 543, Butler Report para. 6.34, Butler, T. 5027.

⁴⁴⁹ P 559. See also P 561 (intercepted conversation on 14 July 1995 at 2227 hours in which the Zvornik Brigade duty officer stated "This packet has done most to ruin us and since this morning we have been reporting on the numbers of people" at which point the other participant in the conversation cuts him off.)

⁴⁵⁰ Butler, T. 5056.

190. By 15 July 1995, Colonel Pandurevi}, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, was complaining loudly to the Drina Corps command about the "additional burden" on his Brigade caused by the thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners distributed throughout Zvornik.⁴⁵¹

191. The Trial Chamber finds that, from 13 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade became aware of plans to transport Bosnian Muslim prisoners to its zone of responsibility and began locating detention sites for them. From 14 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade knew that thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were distributed throughout Zvornik.

(v) Capture of Prisoners during Drina Corps Sweep Operation in the Former Enclave

192. Pursuant to an order issued by General Krstic on 13 July 1995, Drina Corps units were also involved in conducting sweep operations in the area of the former enclave. Three subordinate units of the Drina Corps, namely Bratunac Brigade, the Skelani Separate Battalion and the Mili}i Brigade, were directed to conduct search operations in and around the former enclave of Srebrenica for Bosnian Muslim stragglers and to report back to General Krstic by 17 July 1995 on their efforts.⁴⁵² In response, Colonel Ignjat Milanovi}, the Drina Corps Chief of Anti-Aircraft Defence, reported back to General Krstic on the situation within the zones of the Bratunac Brigade, the Mili}i Brigade and the Skelani Separate Battalion on 15 July 1995.⁴⁵³ Colonel Milanovi} wrote that he had acquainted himself with the situation to the east of the Mili}i-Konjevi} Polje-Bratunac road and that large groups of enemy soldiers were still present in this area. He indicated that the Bratunac Brigade was still searching this terrain. Colonel Milanovi} proposed, in the absence of available personnel from the Drina Corps Command, the appointment of the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade, Colonel Blagojevi}, as the commander of the forces engaged in sweeping the terrain. General Krstic subsequently accepted this proposal.⁴⁵⁴ Accordingly, the Bratunac Brigade Daily Combat Report for 16 July 1995 stated that the Brigade Commander had visited all the units blocking the enemy retreat and listed them (the 1st Mili}i Light Infantry Brigade, units of the 65th Protection Regiment, parts of the MUP and the Drina Corps 5th Engineer Battalion), defined their tasks and organised their joint action and communication.⁴⁵⁵

193. Nonetheless, the Prosecution conceded it did not have any evidence about the numbers of prisoners taken as a result of the sweep operations ordered by General Krstic, although Mr. Butler maintained that there is evidence showing that prisoners were being taken in the area after 15 July

⁴⁵¹ P 609 (Interim Combat Report of the Zvornik Brigade, 15 July 1995).

⁴⁵² P 463.

⁴⁵³ P 537.

⁴⁵⁴ Krstic, T. 6700-6701.

⁴⁵⁵ P 539.

1995.⁴⁵⁶ Although General Krstic agreed that, pursuant to his 13 July 1995 order, the area being searched by Drina Corps troops coincided with the route traversed by the column, he pointed out that the search took place on 14 July 1995 after the column had already passed through.⁴⁵⁷

194. The Trial Chamber is unable to make any specific finding about the capture of Bosnian Muslim prisoners during the sweep operations conducted pursuant to the 13 July 1995 search order issued by General Krstic. The manner in which the order was implemented, however, demonstrates that Drina Corps forces were operating hand in hand with non-Drina Corps forces, whether military (the 65th Protection Regiment) or non-military (the MUP).

5. Involvement of the Drina Corps in the Mass Executions

195. The vast amount of planning and high-level co-ordination that had to be invested in killing thousands of men in a few days is apparent from even the briefest description of the scale and the methodical nature in which the executions were carried out. The Trial Chamber now turns to the evidence presented by the Prosecution, including vehicle records, personnel records and radio intercepts, linking the Drina Corps with the various known execution sites for the Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica between 13 and 17 July 1995.

(a) The Morning of 13 July 1995: Jadar River Executions

196. A small-scale execution took place at Jadar River on 13 July 1995. Witness S, who survived this execution, testified before the Trial Chamber. Witness S recounted being captured near Konjevic Polje in the early morning hours of 13 July 1995 from where he was taken to a hut in front of a school building.⁴⁵⁸ From there he was taken across a meadow to the front of a house where four uniformed men proceeded to interrogate him.⁴⁵⁹ As this was happening, between about 7.00 and 9.00 hours in the morning of 13 July 1995,⁴⁶⁰ Witness S observed buses loaded with women and children going past.⁴⁶¹ Witness S was moved on to yet another house⁴⁶² and, subsequently, to a warehouse on the banks of the Jadar River, where his Serb captors beat him.⁴⁶³ Later, a bus arrived in front of the warehouse⁴⁶⁴ and Witness S, along with 16 other men, was

⁴⁵⁶ Butler, T. 5369.

⁴⁵⁷ Krstic, T. 7360.

⁴⁵⁸ Witness S, T. 3245-3250. P 177 (a photograph of the hut).

⁴⁵⁹ Witness S, T. 3255-3256.

⁴⁶⁰ Witness S, T. 3261.

⁴⁶¹ Witness S, T. 3258.

⁴⁶² Witness S, T. 3262.

⁴⁶³ Witness S, T. 3264, 3274.

⁴⁶⁴ Witness S, T. 3271.

transported a short distance to a spot on the banks of the Jadar River.⁴⁶⁵ The men were then lined up and shot.⁴⁶⁶ Witness S, after being hit in the hip by a bullet, sprang in to the River and managed to escape.⁴⁶⁷ The execution at Jadar River took place prior to midday, on 13 July 1995.⁴⁶⁸

197. Evidence directly implicating the Drina Corps in the Jadar River execution is slim. Witness S was unable to specifically identify any of the people involved in his detention or the executions as belonging to the Drina Corps. Certainly it appears that army personnel, in addition to police,⁴⁶⁹ may have been involved. At the hut in front of the school building, and later in the warehouse, Witness S saw soldiers in camouflage uniforms.⁴⁷⁰ He was also interrogated by a moustached man wearing a soldier's camouflage uniform.⁴⁷¹ This interrogator revealed that he had been in command of the Srebrenica operation in 1993.⁴⁷²

198. The Prosecution identified the area where Witness S had been interrogated as near the headquarters and COMS (communication) building of the Drina Corps 5th Engineering Battalion. Involvement of this Battalion in the Jadar River executions was, however, strongly contested by Defence Witness DE, an officer in the 5th Engineers Battalion in July 1995, who testified that the premises identified by Witness S were utilised by other units who had no command relationship with the Engineers Battalion.⁴⁷³ Indeed a series of intercepted conversations from 12 July 1995 reveal that a MUP company was in the area of the Drina Corps 5th Engineers Battalion on that day. However, the intercepts also indicate that this MUP unit could receive orders through the Drina Corps Engineers that day, thereby refuting Witness DE's claim that the Engineers had no connection with this MUP unit.⁴⁷⁴

199. Mr. Butler further pointed out that Colonel Milanovi}, the Drina Corps Chief of Anti-Aircraft Defence in July 1995 and previously the Chief of Staff of the Bratunac Brigade in 1992-1993, was heard in several intercepted conversations on 13 July 1995 trying to acquire bulldozers or backhoes. The Prosecution argued this equipment was probably related to executions in either the Jadar River, or subsequently in Cerska valley, but could not specify which.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁶⁵ Witness S, T. 3275.

⁴⁶⁶ Witness S, T. 3276-3277.

⁴⁶⁷ Witness S, T. 3277-3281.

⁴⁶⁸ Witness S, T. 3286.

⁴⁶⁹ Witness S testified that a man he knew previously was amongst the executioners at Jadar River. Witness S, T. 3267. The Prosecution has interviewed this person, who revealed that he was a part of the 2nd Police company, an intervention unit formed out of the Zvornik CSB (municipal police).

⁴⁷⁰ Witness S, T. 3251, 3254, 3272-3273

⁴⁷¹ Witness S, T. 3259-3260.

⁴⁷² Witness S, T. 3260.

⁴⁷³ Defence Witness DE, T. 7683-7684.

⁴⁷⁴ P 502, P 503, P 504, P 505.

⁴⁷⁵ P 517; P 521; Butler, T. 4775.

200. On balance, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence presented is insufficient to support a finding that the Drina Corps was involved in the Jadar River execution on the morning of 13 July 1995. It is possible that the army personnel Witness S recalled were non-Drina Corps units in light of the fact that many non-local units were in the area following the take-over of Srebrenica.⁴⁷⁶ Similarly, the Prosecution was unable to conclusively establish that the engineering equipment referred to by Colonel Milanovi} was used to bury the prisoners at this execution site. While the fact that prisoners were being interrogated near buildings utilised by the 5th Engineering Battalion may support an inference that this Drina Corps unit knew that several Bosnian Muslim prisoners had been taken by Bosnian Serb forces, it is insufficient to demonstrate that the Engineering Battalion thereby knew of, or was involved in, their subsequent execution.

(b) The Afternoon of 13 July 1995: Cerska Valley Executions

201. The first of the large-scale executions happened on the afternoon of 13 July 1995. Witness M, who was hiding in the woods, saw two or three buses followed by an armoured personnel carrier (hereafter "APC") and a backhoe driving towards Cerska at around 1400 hours. Afterwards, he heard small arms fire for about half an hour. The buses and the APC then returned along the same road, but the excavator remained there longer.⁴⁷⁷ Some of the men with whom Witness M hid in the woods later told him that they saw a pool of blood on the road to Cerska on 13 July 1995.⁴⁷⁸ Some weeks after, Witness M and his companions came across a mass grave near Cerska, which they believed contained the bodies of victims from the 13 July 1995 executions.⁴⁷⁹

202. Witness M's testimony as to the fact (if not the precise timing) of the execution at Cerska Valley is corroborated by physical evidence. Aerial photos show that the earth in this spot was disturbed between 5 July and 27 July 1995.⁴⁸⁰ Between 7 and 18 July 1996, investigators from the OTP, in conjunction with a team from Physicians for Human Rights, exhumed a mass grave to the southwest of the road through the Cerska Valley from the main road from Konjevic Polje to Nova Kasaba.⁴⁸¹ It appeared from the location of shell casings that the victims had been placed on the roadside while their executioners stood across the road. Soil from the northeast side of the road was used to cover the bodies where they fell. One hundred and fifty bodies were recovered from the mass grave and the cause of death for 149 was determined to be gunshot wounds. All were male, with a mean age from 14 to 50 and 147 were wearing civilian clothes. Forty-eight wire ligatures were recovered from the grave, about half of which were still in place binding the victims hands

⁴⁷⁶ See the discussion regarding the presence of such units in Poto-ari, *supra* para. 151.

⁴⁷⁷ Witness M, T. 2737-39.

⁴⁷⁸ Witness M, T. 2746.

⁴⁷⁹ Witness M, T. 2752.

⁴⁸⁰ Ruez, T. 689, P 16/2.

behind their backs.⁴⁸² Experts were able to positively identify nine of the exhumed bodies as persons listed as missing following the take-over of Srebrenica. All were Bosnian Muslim men.⁴⁸³

203. The Prosecution sought to prove Drina Corps involvement in the Cerska Valley executions from circumstantial proof. First, the Cerska Valley road is in the zone of operations of the Drina Corps, specifically either the Milici Brigade or the Vlasenica Brigade.⁴⁸⁴ Second, Witness M's eyewitness account of the buses followed by an earth loader driving up the Cerska Valley road into a wooded area, roughly corresponds in time to intercepted communications on 13 July 1995 in which Colonel Milanovi}, the Drina Corps Chief of Anti-Aircraft Defence, asked for engineering equipment to be sent to Konjevi} Polje.⁴⁸⁵ The Prosecution also relied upon the fact that the executions at Cerska Valley appeared to be planned in advance and were well-organised, to suggest co-ordination at the level of the Corps Command. The convoy to the Cerska Valley execution site included digging equipment and the Cerska Valley detention site had an adequate number of guards.

204. The Trial Chamber does not consider the intercept evidence, which loosely corresponds with the events in the Cerska Valley, together with arguments based upon the scale and planning required for this crime, sufficient to implicate the Drina Corps in its commission and is unable to conclude that Drina Corps units were involved in the Cerska Valley executions on 13 July 1995.⁴⁸⁶

(c) Late Afternoon of 13 July 1995: Kravica Warehouse

205. Between 1,000 and 1,500 Bosnian Muslim men from the column fleeing through the woods, who had been captured and detained in Sandi}i Meadow, were bussed or marched to the Kravica Warehouse on the afternoon of 13 July 1995.⁴⁸⁷ At around 18.00 hours, when the warehouse was full, the soldiers started throwing grenades and shooting directly into the midst of the men packed inside. Witness J, a survivor, recalled:

all of a sudden there was a lot of shooting in the warehouse, and we didn't know where it was coming from. There were rifles, grenades, bursts of gunfire and it was – it got so dark in the warehouse that we couldn't see anything. People started to scream, to shout, crying for help. And

⁴⁸¹ Manning Report, p. 00950937.

⁴⁸² P 206/1 (W. Haglund, Forensic Investigation of the Cerska Grave Site), pp. vii-viii.

⁴⁸³ Manning Report, p. 00950938.

⁴⁸⁴ Butler, T. 5003; Butler Report para. 6.14.

⁴⁸⁵ P 517; P 521; and Butler Report, para. 6.15 & fn. 186 & 187.

⁴⁸⁶ The paucity of evidence implicating the Drina Corps in the commission of the mass executions on 13 July stands in contrast to the substantial evidence implicating the Drina Corps in the commission of the mass executions from 14 July onwards as discussed *infra*.

⁴⁸⁷ Witness K, T. 2520.

then there would be a lull, and then all of a sudden it would start again. And they kept shooting like that until nightfall in the warehouse.⁴⁸⁸

Witness K, another survivor, could not find words to describe the massacre:

It is hard for me to describe it. I haven't seen anything like it in any of the horror movies that I saw. This was far worse than any film.⁴⁸⁹

206. Guards surrounding the building killed prisoners who tried to escape through the windows.⁴⁹⁰ By the time the shooting stopped, the warehouse was filled with corpses. Witness J recalled that "(n)owhere could you stand on the concrete floor without stepping on a dead body. The dead bodies had covered the entire concrete."⁴⁹¹ Witness K, who was only slightly wounded, described crossing the warehouse to make his escape through a window after the shooting stopped:

I was not even able to touch the floor, the concrete floor of the warehouse... After the shooting, I felt a strange kind of heat, warmth, which was actually coming from the blood that covered the concrete floor, and I was stepping on the dead people who were lying around. But there were even people who were still alive, who were only wounded, and as soon as I would step on him, I would hear him cry, moan, because I was trying to move as fast as I could. I could tell that people had been completely disembodied, and I could feel bones of the people that had been hit by those bursts of gunfire or shells, I could feel their ribs crushing. And then I would get up again and continue⁴⁹²

207. Soon after Witness K crawled out the window, he was shot by a Serb soldier still standing guard. He fell to the ground and lay quietly, pretending to be dead, until the morning. He then escaped while the soldiers were otherwise occupied. Witness J somehow escaped injury and spent the night inside the warehouse hiding under a dead body. The next morning, the soldiers called out to see if any of the wounded men were still alive. Upon identifying some wounded prisoners, the guards made some of them sing Serb songs and then they killed them.⁴⁹³ After the last one had been killed, an excavator began taking the bodies out of the warehouse. A water tank was used to wash the blood off the asphalt.⁴⁹⁴

208. Other evidence corroborates the survivors' testimony.⁴⁹⁵ An aerial reconnaissance photo, taken on 13 July 1995 at 14.00 hours, shows two buses outside the Warehouse, just as Witness K remembered.⁴⁹⁶ In addition, the OTP sent a team of experts to examine the warehouse on 30

⁴⁸⁸ Witness J, T. 2464.

⁴⁸⁹ Witness K, T. 2524.

⁴⁹⁰ Witness K, T. 2530, 2532.

⁴⁹¹ Witness J, T. 2469.

⁴⁹² Witness K, T. 2526.

⁴⁹³ Witness J, T. 2464-65; Witness K, T. 2535.

⁴⁹⁴ Witness K, T. 2536.

⁴⁹⁵ See also Witness Q, T. 3026 (testifying that he saw bodies outside the Kravica Warehouse as he was being transported by bus from Nova Kasaba to Bratunac).

⁴⁹⁶ P 8/1; Witness K, T. 2514-2515.

September 1996.⁴⁹⁷ Analyses of hair, blood and explosives residue, collected at the Kravica Warehouse, provide strong evidence of the killings. Experts determined the presence of bullet strikes, explosives residue, bullets and shell cases, as well as human blood, bones and tissue adhering to the walls and floors of the building.⁴⁹⁸

209. Forensic evidence presented by the Prosecutor suggests a link between the Kravica Warehouse, the primary mass grave known as Glogova 2, and the secondary grave known as Zeleni Jadar 5. These links were made by matching two shell cases found at the warehouse with shell cases found at the Zeleni Jadar 5 gravesite, which demonstrates that either the shell cases were fired by the same weapon (which must have been present at each site), or that the shell cases were transported from one site to another.⁴⁹⁹ In turn, forensic tests link Zeleni Jadar 5 with the primary grave of Glogova 2.⁵⁰⁰ The Glogova 2 gravesite was exhumed by the OTP between 11 September and 22 October 1999. A minimum number of 139 individuals were found. The sex of the victims could be determined in 109 cases and all were male. Predominately the victims died of gunshot wounds and in 22 cases there was evidence of charring to the bodies. No ligatures or blindfolds were uncovered.⁵⁰¹ The OTP exhumed the Zelenia Jadar 5 site between 1 and 21 October 1998.⁵⁰² Of at least 145 individuals in the grave, 120 were determined to be male with the remainder undetermined, and the predominant cause of death was gunshot wounds. Two ligatures were recovered, but no blindfolds were found.⁵⁰³

210. Exhumations conducted between 7 August and 20 October 2000 at the primary gravesite of Glogova 1 also revealed matches between broken masonry and door frames, and other artefacts found at both the gravesite and at the Kravica Warehouse execution site, suggesting that some of the victims from the Kravica Warehouse were buried there.⁵⁰⁴ The bodies of at least 191 individuals were located, but autopsies had not been finalised prior to the close of this trial.⁵⁰⁵ In one of the subgraves at this site, 12 individuals bound with ligatures were found, along with evidence of blindfolds on three bodies.⁵⁰⁶

⁴⁹⁷ Manning, T. 3616

⁴⁹⁸ P 181/1; P 181/2; P 181/3; P 181/4; P 150; and P 97. See also Manning, T. 3616-3625.

⁴⁹⁹ Manning, T. 3597; Manning Report, p. 00950916.

⁵⁰⁰ Manning Report, p. 00950983.

⁵⁰¹ Manning Report, p. 00950980.

⁵⁰² Manning Report, p. 00950984.

⁵⁰³ Manning Report, p. 00950984-5.

⁵⁰⁴ Additional Manning Report, p 7604.

⁵⁰⁵ Additional Manning Report, p 7604-7603.

⁵⁰⁶ Additional Manning Report, p 7602.

211. One of the few survivors said the soldiers outside the Warehouse were Bosnian Serbs wearing camouflage uniforms, but could not identify the specific unit they came from.⁵⁰⁷ The Trial Chamber also heard evidence that one individual, (hereafter "OA"), who was a member of the Drina Corps in July 1995, was informed sometime prior to 20 July 1995 that members of the army and the police had committed crimes in the Kravica Warehouse.⁵⁰⁸ Primarily, however, the Prosecution was left to rely upon three categories of circumstantial evidence that Drina Corps troops were involved in the Kravica Warehouse executions.

212. First there is evidence that Drina Corps units were in the vicinity where the executions was carried out. In particular, the bodies were taken from the Kravica Warehouse to the gravesite in Glogova, which is less than 400 meters from the command post of the 1st Infantry Battalion of the Bratunac Brigade.⁵⁰⁹ There is also an annotation in the Bratunac Military Police Platoon orders book discussing a military police detachment sent to provide security to public utility workers at Glogova on 19 July 1995.⁵¹⁰ The Prosecution argued that this may have been related to the burial of victims from the Kravica Warehouse. As already described, the bodies of victims from the Kravica Warehouse were subsequently buried in a gravesite at Glogova.

213. Second, the Prosecution argued that the Kravica Warehouse execution was well organised and involved a substantial amount of planning, requiring the participation of the Drina Corps Command. The Prosecution maintained that the Kravica Warehouse victims came from preliminary prisoner collection sites such as the Sandi}i meadow and Nova Kasaba football field which had to be set up well in advance as holding places for so many prisoners. Similarly, the Prosecution argued that the Kravica Warehouse must have been pre-designated as a holding site, since a concerted effort was made to bring prisoners there from several different intermediate sites on the afternoon of 13 July 1995. The Prosecution further suggested that the Drina Corps would have had to authorise the diversion of buses from the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potocari for this purpose.

214. Third, Mr. Butler relied upon the arrival of a bucket-loader after the killings to collect the bodies as evidence of knowledge at either the Brigade or the Corps level, since those are the levels

⁵⁰⁷ Witness K, T. 2517.

⁵⁰⁸ This individual was subpoenaed to appear as a witness for the Prosecution but was unable to appear for medical reasons. However, the Trial Chamber permitted the Prosecution to call one of its investigators, Mr. Jan Kruszewski (hereafter "Kruszewski"), who was present when "OA" was interviewed by the OTP. The Chamber also admitted into evidence the contemporaneous notes of Kruszewski (P 887), and the transcript of the interview given by "OA" (P 886).

⁵⁰⁹ Butler, T. 5001-03.

⁵¹⁰ P 404/2 tab 61; and Butler, para. 6.27 & fn.204.

at which the allocation of heavy equipment must be made.⁵¹¹ However, there was no direct evidence that the equipment belonged to, or had been procured by, a unit of the Drina Corps.

215. Overall, the evidence presented does not support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Drina Corps troops were involved in the executions at the Kravica Warehouse. The Trial Chamber does, however, find that the Drina Corps Command must have known that prisoners were transported to the Kravica Warehouse given that buses were diverted from the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Poto-ari for this purpose. Furthermore, given the proximity of the Drina Corps Bratunac Brigade to the execution and burial sites and the massive scale of the executions, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that, by the evening of 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps must have been well aware of the fact that the executions had taken place at the Kravica Warehouse. The Warehouse was situated on the main road between Bratunac and Konjevi}-Polje, which was heavily utilised by military vehicles that day. Some of the Bosnian Muslim refugees reported that, on 13 July 1995, as the busses they were travelling on passed through Kravica, they saw the bodies of men lying down in the meadow and others lined up with their hands tied behind their necks.⁵¹² The noise and high levels of activity associated with this massive scale crime could not have escaped the attention of the Drina Corps.

(d) 13-14 July 1995: Tišca

216. As the buses crowded with Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly made their way from Poto-ari to Kladanj, they were stopped at Tišca, searched, and the Bosnian Muslim men found on board were removed from the bus. The evidence of Witness D, who was separated from his family at the Tišca checkpoint on 13 July 1995, reveals a well-organised operation in Tišca. From the checkpoint, Witness D was taken to a nearby school, where a number of other prisoners were being held. An officer directed the soldier escorting Witness D towards a nearby school where many other prisoners were being held. At the school, a soldier on a field telephone appeared to be transmitting and receiving orders. Sometime around midnight, Witness D was loaded onto a truck with 22 other men with their hands tied behind their backs.⁵¹³ At one point the truck carrying Witness D stopped and a soldier on the scene said: "Not here. Take them up there, where they took people before."⁵¹⁴ The truck reached another stopping point and the soldiers came around to the back of the truck and started shooting the prisoners.⁵¹⁵ Witness D, who had managed to untie his

⁵¹¹ Butler, T. 5000-5001.

⁵¹² Witness D, T. 1259; Witness E, T. 1354-1355. See also Malagi}, T. 1976.

⁵¹³ Witness D, T. 1291.

⁵¹⁴ Witness D, T. 1293.

⁵¹⁵ Witness D, T. 1295.

hands, leaped from the truck and fled into the woods, narrowly escaping the gunfire. After an arduous journey through the woods, he eventually reached safety.⁵¹⁶

217. There is evidence that Drina Corps personnel were present in Ti{}a on 12 July 1995. Witness C, a Dutch Bat officer escorting one of the first convoys of buses and trucks, came across Major Sarkic, the Chief of Staff of the Mili}i Brigade, at the Ti{}a checkpoint. Major Sarki} told Witness C that he had been ordered by the Drina Corps Command to send people from his unit to Ti{}a. Major Sarki} expressed discontent about this assignment, in light of the other work he had to do in order to secure the enclave. Witness C also said it was clear to him that Major Sarki} was trying to avoid discussing what was being done with the men taken off the buses. At that time, Witness C was already contemplating the terrible possibility that the men may have been taken somewhere for execution and later informed his battalion about what he had seen in Ti{}a.⁵¹⁷

218. However, it is not clear from Witness C's testimony what Major Sarki}'s troops had been tasked to do at Ti{}a. He simply said that his men had been ordered to Ti{}a "to escort this group of people".⁵¹⁸ Witness C said that he did not make any inquiries into exactly what Sarki}'s men were doing with the Bosnian Muslim prisoners.⁵¹⁹ Whether troops from the Mili}i Brigade were actually involved in taking the men from Ti{}a to the execution sites remains unclear.

219. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has failed to prove that Drina Corps units either knew of, or were involved in, the subsequent executions of the Bosnian Muslim men screened at Ti{}a. Certainly though, the Mili}i Brigade knew that Bosnian Muslim men were being pulled off the buses at Ti{}a and taken to separate sites.

(e) 14 July 1995: Grbavci School Detention Site and Orahovac Execution site

220. A large group of the prisoners who had been held overnight in Bratunac were bussed in a convoy of 30 vehicles to the Grbavci school in Orahovac early in the morning of 14 July 1995.⁵²⁰ When they got there, the school gym was already half-filled with prisoners who had been arriving since the early morning hours⁵²¹ and, within a few hours, the building was completely full. Survivors estimated that there were 2,000 to 2,500 men there, some of them very young and some quite elderly, although the Prosecution suggested this may have been an over-estimation and that

⁵¹⁶ Witness D, T. 1297-1299

⁵¹⁷ Witness C, T. 1190-1196.

⁵¹⁸ Witness C, T. 1193.

⁵¹⁹ Witness C, T. 1229.

⁵²⁰ Witness L, T. 2665, T. 2674.

⁵²¹ Witness N, T. 2820 (arrived from Bratunac in the early morning of 14 July 1995).

the number of prisoners at this site was probably closer to 1,000.⁵²² The gym was packed and stifling; occasionally the guards would shoot at the ceiling to quiet the panicked prisoners.⁵²³ Some prisoners were taken outside and killed. At some point, a witness recalled, General Mladic arrived and told the men: "Well, your government does not want you, and I have to take care of you".⁵²⁴

221. After being held in the gym for several hours, the men were led out in small groups to the execution fields that afternoon. Each prisoner was blindfolded and given a drink of water as he left the gym.⁵²⁵ The prisoners were then taken in trucks to the execution fields less than one kilometre away. The men were lined up and shot in the back; those who survived the initial gunfire were killed with an extra shot.⁵²⁶ Two adjacent meadows were used; once one was full of bodies, the executioners moved to the other.⁵²⁷ While the executions were in progress, the survivors said, earth-moving equipment was digging the graves.⁵²⁸ Witness N, who survived the shootings by pretending to be dead, reported that General Mladic drove up in a red car and watched some of the executions.⁵²⁹

222. The forensic evidence supports crucial aspects of the survivors' testimony. Aerial photos show that the ground in Orahovac was disturbed between 5 and 27 July 1995⁵³⁰ and again between 7 and 27 September 1995.⁵³¹ Two primary mass graves were uncovered in the area, and were named "Lazete-1" and "Lazete-2" by investigators. The Lazete 1 gravesite was exhumed by the Prosecution between 13 July and 3 August 2000. All of the 130 individuals uncovered, for whom sex could be determined, were male. One hundred and thirty eight blindfolds were uncovered in the grave.⁵³² Identification material for twenty-three individuals, listed as missing following the fall of Srebrenica, was located during the exhumations at this site.⁵³³ The gravesite Lazete 2 was partly exhumed by a joint team from the OTP and Physicians for Human Rights between 19 August and 9 September 1996 and completed in 2000. All of the 243 victims associated with Lazete 2 were male and the experts determined that the vast majority died of gunshot injuries.⁵³⁴ In addition, 147 blindfolds were located. One victim also had his legs bound with a cloth sack.⁵³⁵ Twenty-one

⁵²² Witness N, T. 2822 (estimating there were about 2,500 men in the gym). Cf. Witness L, T. 2676-2677 (estimating there were at least 700 or 800 men) and Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 9851.

⁵²³ Witness L, T. 2683; Witness N, T. 2823.

⁵²⁴ Witness N, T. 2822.

⁵²⁵ Witness L, T. 2685-86; Witness N, T. 2824.

⁵²⁶ Witness N, T. 2824-25.

⁵²⁷ Witness L, T. 2698, 2703-2705.

⁵²⁸ Witness L, T. 2697-99; Witness N, T. 2825.

⁵²⁹ Witness N, T. 2825.

⁵³⁰ Ruez, T. 3476--50; P 162/2.

⁵³¹ Ruez, T. 3477; P 162/4 and 5.

⁵³² Additional Manning Report, p. 7601.

⁵³³ Additional Manning Report, p. 7600.

⁵³⁴ Additional Manning Report, p. 7608.

⁵³⁵ Manning Report, p. 00950952 and Additional Manning Report p. 7607.

individuals, listed as missing following the take-over of Srebrenica, were positively identified during the first exhumation of the Lazete 2 gravesite; all of them were Bosnian Muslim men.⁵³⁶ Identification documents for a further four men listed as missing following the fall of Srebrenica were uncovered during the exhumations at this site in 2000.⁵³⁷ On 11 April 1996, investigators from the OTP uncovered numerous strips of cloth in a "rubbish" site in the grounds of the Grbavci School next to the gymnasium. These cloth strips were indistinguishable from the blindfolds uncovered during the exhumation of the Lazete 2 gravesite.⁵³⁸

223. Forensic analysis of soil/pollen samples, blindfolds, ligatures, shell cases and aerial images of creation/disturbance dates, further revealed that bodies from the Lazete 1 and Lazete 2 graves were removed and reburied at secondary graves named Hodžici Road 3, 4 and 5.⁵³⁹ Aerial images show that these secondary gravesites were created between 7 September and 2 October 1995⁵⁴⁰ and all of them were exhumed by the OTP in 1998.⁵⁴¹ Following a similar pattern to the other Srebrenica related gravesites, the overwhelming majority of bodies at Hodžici Road 3, 4 and 5 were determined to be male and to have died of gunshot wounds.⁵⁴² Although only one ligature was located during exhumations at these three sites,⁵⁴³ a total of 90 blindfolds were found. The total minimum number of individuals exhumed at the three gravesites was 184.⁵⁴⁴

224. Substantial evidence links the executions at Orahovac to the Zvornik Brigade. First, Orahovac is located within the zone of responsibility of the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade. Second, as previously noted, an Opel "Record" belonging to the Zvornik Brigade visited this area on 13 and 14 July 1995. Third, at some point late in the evening of 13 July 1995, a detachment of military police from the Zvornik Brigade was dispatched to Orahovac.⁵⁴⁵ It appears that the personnel roster was later altered to conceal this fact. The originally pencilled text was erased, but the words "O-Orahovac" are still visible. The letter "O" was written next to 10 names, then erased and replaced with other letters, in what must have been an attempt to conceal their involvement in the crimes.⁵⁴⁶ Fourth, one of the Orahovac survivors recognised the voice of a former colleague, Gojko Simic, among the executioners.⁵⁴⁷ Personnel records show that a Gojko Simic matching the

⁵³⁶ Manning Report, p. 00950953.

⁵³⁷ Additional Manning Report, p. 7598.

⁵³⁸ Manning Report, p. 00950952.

⁵³⁹ Manning Report, p. 00950951, and Additional Manning Report, p. 7611.

⁵⁴⁰ P 167/1, P 167/4, P 167/5, P 167/6, and P167/7, Ruez, T. 3502-3503. Ruez also discussed the likely disturbance dates for additional, but as yet unexhumed, secondary burial sites along the Hod' iji Road. See T. 3499-3506.

⁵⁴¹ Manning Report, p. 00950950.

⁵⁴² Manning Report, p. 00950955-6, 00950959, 00950962-3.

⁵⁴³ Manning Report, p. 00950960. (This ligature was found at Hodžici Road 5)

⁵⁴⁴ Manning Report, p. 00950956, 00950960, 00950963.

⁵⁴⁵ P 567, Butler Report, para. 7.8; 7.16, Butler, T. 5067-5068.

⁵⁴⁶ P 568, Butler, T. 5069-5073, P 569.

⁵⁴⁷ Witness L, T.2694.

description given by the survivor was the Commander of the Heavy Weapons Platoon of the 4th Infantry Battalion of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade.⁵⁴⁸ The witness heard Simic tell the other executioners: "Collect your ammunition and let's go to the meadow to kill the men."⁵⁴⁹ Fifth, records of the Zvornik Brigade's Engineer Company reflect the presence of a number of vehicles in Orahovac on 14 July 1995: a TAM 75 (small size transportation vehicle⁵⁵⁰), which made two round-trips between the base and Orahovac; a Mercedes 2626 which towed an excavator to the village of Križevici (located one kilometre from Orahovac); one excavator, which went from the base to Orahovac, spent six hours digging and then returned to base; and an excavator-loader that went from the base to Orahovac and spent 5 hours working.⁵⁵¹ The Zvornik Brigade's fuel dispersal log shows that 200 litres of diesel fuel were distributed to the Engineer Company on 14 July 1995.⁵⁵² In addition, the Engineer Company Daily Orders Journal lists the following items on both 15 and 16 July 1995: work with BGH-700 (excavator) in Orahovac; work with ULT 220 (loader) in Orahovac.⁵⁵³ Zvornik Brigade vehicle utilisation records also show that, on 15 and 16 July 1995, one ULT 220 (loader) was operating for five hours at Orahovac and a TAM 75 truck made three or four trips between the base and Orahovac.⁵⁵⁴ Also on 15 July 1995, 40 litres of diesel fuel were disbursed to the Rear Services Battalion, operating out of Orahovac and, on 16 July 1995, a Mercedes truck towed an excavator with a trailer between the base and Orahovac, and a TAM 75 truck made two trips to Kozluk.⁵⁵⁵ This evidence is consistent with accounts given by survivors who stated there were large vehicles shining lights on the execution site.⁵⁵⁶

225. The Trial Chamber finds that the Drina Corps Zvornik Brigade participated in the execution of Bosnian Muslim men at Orahovac on 14 July 1995. Members of the military police company of the Zvornik Brigade were present immediately prior to the executions, presumably for such purposes as guarding the prisoners and then facilitating their transportation to the execution fields. Personnel from the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade were present at Orahovac during the executions, assisting in their commission. Further, machinery and equipment belonging to the Engineers Company of the Zvornik Brigade was engaged in tasks relating to the burial of the victims from Orahovac between 14 and 16 July 1995.

⁵⁴⁸Butler, T. 5066, 5074-5081.

⁵⁴⁹Witness L, T. 2698.

⁵⁵⁰Butler, T. 5085.

⁵⁵¹P 582, P 643, 580; Butler, T. 5082-5086; and Butler Report para. 7.20.

⁵⁵²P 645

⁵⁵³P 584; Butler, T. 5082-5083, 5087; and Butler Report, para. 7.22, 7.25, 7.27.

⁵⁵⁴P 589, P 582; Butler, T. 5085-5090; and Butler Report, para. 7.23.

⁵⁵⁵P 645; Butler Report, para. 7.27; P 643, P 582.

⁵⁵⁶Witness L, T. 2699-2700; Witness N, T. 2828.

(f) 14 - 15 July 1995: Petkovci School Detention Site and Petkovci Dam Execution Site

226. Another large group of about 1,500-2000 prisoners from Bratunac was driven north to the Petkovci School on the afternoon of 14 July 1995. As at the other detention sites, the conditions at Petkovci School were deplorable. It was extremely hot and crowded, the men had no food or water and some prisoners became so thirsty they resorted to drinking their own urine.⁵⁵⁷ Periodically, soldiers came in and beat the prisoners or called them out to be killed. A few prisoners discussed trying to escape but the others said it was better to remain; that surely the Red Cross was monitoring the situation and they would not all be killed.⁵⁵⁸ Eventually, however, the men were called out in small groups. They were told to strip to the waist, take off their shoes and their hands were tied behind their backs.⁵⁵⁹ Sometime during the night of 14 July 1995, the men were taken in trucks to a stony area near the Petkovci Dam. As soon as they saw their destination the prisoners recognised their fate. Witness P recalls seeing a large "field" already filled with dead men lying face down with their hands tied behind them.

227. Groups of five or ten prisoners were taken off the trucks. They were then lined up and shot. Some begged for water before being killed, but none was provided. Witness O recalled what he expected to be his final moments:

I was really sorry that I would die thirsty, and I was trying to hide amongst the people as long as I could, like everybody else. I just wanted to live for another second or two. And when it was my turn, I jumped out with what I believe were four other people. I could feel the gravel beneath my feet. It hurt. . . . I was walking with my head bent down and I wasn't feeling anything. . . . And then I thought that I would die very fast, that I would not suffer. And I just thought that my mother would never know where I had ended up. This is what I was thinking as I was getting out of the truck.⁵⁶⁰

In fact Witness O was only wounded and lay still expecting another round of gunfire to end his life.⁵⁶¹ When the soldiers were finished with a round of killing, they laughed and made jokes: "Look at this guy, he looks like a cabbage."⁵⁶² Then they walked around killing the wounded.⁵⁶³ Witness O almost called out for the soldiers to put him out of his misery:

I was still very thirsty. But I was sort of between life and death. I didn't know whether I wanted to live or to die anymore. I decided not to call out for them to shoot and kill me, but I was sort of praying to God that they'd come and kill me. But I decided not to call them and I was waiting to die.⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁵⁷ Witness P, T.2960-2961; [Witness O, T. 2902-2903](#)

⁵⁵⁸ [Witness O, T. 2905.](#)

⁵⁵⁹ [Witness O, T. 2904; Witness P, T. 2968-69.](#)

⁵⁶⁰ [Witness O, T. 2911-12.](#)

⁵⁶¹ [Witness O, T. 2912-14.](#)

⁵⁶² [Witness O, T. 2914; see also Witness P, T. 2977](#)

⁵⁶³ [Witness O, T. 2914-16; Witness P, T. 2976.](#)

⁵⁶⁴ [Witness O, T. 2916.](#)

228. After the soldiers had gone, however, Witness O was still alive. Another man, Witness P, was also alive a few rows ahead of him and they helped untie each other. Together they crawled across the field of bodies to hide in the woods nearby.⁵⁶⁵ They spent the night on a hill overlooking the "field" and, in the morning, they looked down at between 1,500-2,000 bodies in the "field".⁵⁶⁶ By then mechanical loaders had arrived and were collecting the bodies.⁵⁶⁷

229. The accounts given by the survivors are supported by forensic and other evidence. Aerial images show that earth around the Petkovci Dam site was first disturbed between 5 and 27 July 1995, and then again between 7 and 27 September 1995.⁵⁶⁸ A team of investigators from the OTP exhumed a gravesite at the Petkovci Dam between 15 and 25 April 1998.⁵⁶⁹ Experts determined that this gravesite had been "robbed", using a mechanical excavator that resulted in "grossly disarticulated body parts" throughout the grave.⁵⁷⁰ The minimum number of individuals located within this grave was 43, but only 15 could be identified as male with the remainder undetermined. Six body parts showed definite gunshot wounds, with a further 17 showing probable or possible gunshot wounds.⁵⁷¹ One ligature was located on the surface of the grave and one "possible" blindfold was found loose in the grave.⁵⁷²

230. Forensic tests show that a mass grave site known as Liplje 2 is a secondary gravesite associated with the primary gravesite at Petkovci Dam and this gravesite was exhumed by the OTP between 7 and 25 August 1998.⁵⁷³ Aerial images reveal that Liplje 2 was created between 7 September and 2 October 1995.⁵⁷⁴ Traces of mechanical teeth marks and wheel tracks show the grave was dug by a wheeled front loader with a toothed bucket.⁵⁷⁵ A minimum number of 191 individuals were located in this grave with 122 determined to be male, and the remainder undetermined. Where cause of death could be determined, gunshot wounds predominated.⁵⁷⁶ While 23 ligatures were uncovered, no definite blindfolds were found.⁵⁷⁷

231. The Zvornik Brigade was also much in view in the area of Petkovci and the Dam on 15 July 1995. The execution site at the Petkovci Dam is located less than two kilometres from the

⁵⁶⁵ Witness O, T. 2917-18.

⁵⁶⁶ Witness P, T. 2983

⁵⁶⁷ Witness O, T. 2925; Witness P, T. 2981.

⁵⁶⁸ P 163/2, and P 163/3. Manning Report, p. 00950965. Ruez, T.3480-3482.

⁵⁶⁹ Manning Report, p. 00950966.

⁵⁷⁰ Wright, T. 3653-3659.

⁵⁷¹ Manning Report, p. 00950966.

⁵⁷² Manning Report, p. 00950967.

⁵⁷³ Manning Report, p. 00950965.

⁵⁷⁴ P 168/2 and P 168/3, Ruez, T. 3508-3509. Ruez also discussed possible disturbance dates for other, as yet unexhumed, gravesites in this location. See T. 3506-3511.

⁵⁷⁵ Manning Report, p. 00950970.

⁵⁷⁶ Manning Report, p. 00950970-0090971.

⁵⁷⁷ Manning Report, p. 00950971.

command post of the Zvornik Brigade's 6th Infantry Battalion in Baljkovica.⁵⁷⁸ Further, the Zvornik Brigade Daily Orders record shows that, on 15 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade Engineer Company was assigned to work with an ULT and an excavator in Petkovci,⁵⁷⁹ although vehicle records do not show that any of the Engineer Company's earthmoving equipment was at the Petkovci execution site. However, vehicle records for the 6th Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade show that two trucks made a total of 10 roundtrips between Petkovci and the Dam on 15 July 1995, with two members of the 6th Infantry Battalion assigned as drivers of the vehicles.⁵⁸⁰

232. The Trial Chamber finds that drivers and trucks from the 6th Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade were used to transport the prisoners from the detention site to the execution site at Petkovci Dam on 15 July 1995 and that the Zvornik Brigade Engineer Company was assigned to work with earthmoving equipment to assist with the burial of the victims from Petkovci Dam.

(g) 14 - 16 July 1995: Pilica School Detention Site and Branjevo Military Farm Execution Site

233. On 14 July 1995, more prisoners from Bratunac were bussed northward to a school in the village of Pilica, north of Zvornik. As at other detention facilities, there was no food or water and several men died in the school gym from heat and dehydration.⁵⁸¹ The men were held at the Pilica School for two nights.⁵⁸² On 16 July 1995, following a now familiar pattern, the men were called out of the school and loaded onto buses with their hands tied behind their backs.⁵⁸³ They were then driven to the Branjevo Military Farm, where groups of 10 were lined up and shot.⁵⁸⁴

234. Mr. Drazen Erdemovi} was a member of the VRS 10th Sabotage Detachment (a Main Staff subordinate unit) and participated in the mass execution.⁵⁸⁵ Mr. Erdemovi} appeared as a Prosecution witness and testified:

The men in front of us were ordered to turn their backs. When those men turned their backs to us, we shot at them. We were given orders to shoot.⁵⁸⁶

Mr. Erdemovi} said that all but one of the victims wore civilian clothes and that, except for one person who tried to escape, they offered no resistance before being shot.⁵⁸⁷ Sometimes the

⁵⁷⁸ P 2, P 590, Butler, T. 5101.

⁵⁷⁹ P584, Butler T. 5086-5087, Butler Report, para. 7.33-7.34.

⁵⁸⁰ P 591, P 594, P 592, P 593, Butler, T. 5093-5103, Butler Report, para. 7.35.

⁵⁸¹ Witness Q, T. 3036.

⁵⁸² Witness Q, T. 3039.

⁵⁸³ Witness Q, T. 3040.

⁵⁸⁴ Witness I, T. 2390-92.

⁵⁸⁵ Mr. Erdemovi} was indicted for one count of crimes against humanity or alternatively a violation of the laws and customs of war. He entered a guilty plea to the count of crimes against humanity and was convicted for his role in the executions at Branjevo Military Farm. The Trial Chamber sentenced him to 10 years imprisonment. Following an appeal, this sentence was subsequently revised to five years for violations of the laws or customs of war. See *Prosecutor v Erdemovic*, Case No.: IT-96-22-Tbis, *Sentencing Judgement*, 5 March 1998.

executioners were particularly cruel. When some of the soldiers recognised acquaintances from Srebrenica, they beat and humiliated them before killing them.⁵⁸⁸ Mr. Erdemovi} had to persuade his fellow soldiers to stop using a machine gun for the killings; while it mortally wounded the prisoners it did not cause death immediately and prolonged their suffering.⁵⁸⁹

235. One of the survivors, Witness Q, recalled the moment when he was confronted by the firing squad:

When they opened fire, I threw myself on the ground. . . . And one man fell on my head. I think that he was killed on the spot. And I could feel the hot blood pouring over me. . . . I could hear one man crying for help. He was begging them to kill him. And they simply said "Let him suffer. We'll kill him later."⁵⁹⁰

236. Between 1,000 and 1,200 men were killed in the course of that day at this execution site.⁵⁹¹ The next day, Witness Q, who had crawled to safety and was hiding nearby, heard heavy machinery going back and forth from the killing field.⁵⁹²

237. The testimony of the survivors has other support in the Trial Record. Aerial photographs, taken on 17 July 1995, of an area around the Branjevo Military Farm, show a large number of bodies lying in the field near the farm, as well as traces of the excavator that collected the bodies from the field.⁵⁹³ The Branjevo Military Farm gravesite (also known as the Pilica gravesite) was exhumed between 10 and 24 September 1996 by the OTP and a team from Physicians for Human Rights.⁵⁹⁴ Where the sex of the bodies could be determined it was male and where cause of death could be determined it was gunshot wounds. Eighty-three ligatures and two cloth blindfolds were located⁵⁹⁵ and, in this grave, positive identification was made for 13 individuals who were missing following the take-over of Srebrenica: all of them Bosnian Muslim men.⁵⁹⁶

238. On the basis of forensic examinations, a gravesite known as Cancari Road 12 was determined to be a secondary grave associated with the primary site at Branjevo Military Farm.⁵⁹⁷ Aerial images show this secondary grave was created between 7 and 27 September 1995 and back

⁵⁸⁶ Erdemovi}, T. 3126.

⁵⁸⁷ Erdemovi}, T. 3138.

⁵⁸⁸ Erdemovi}, T. 3135.

⁵⁸⁹ Erdemovi}, T. 3128.

⁵⁹⁰ Witness Q, T. 3041-42.

⁵⁹¹ Erdemovi}, T. 3130, 3132; see also Witness I, T. 2392 (1,000 to 1,500 dead).

⁵⁹² Witness Q, T. 3045.

⁵⁹³ P 24/2, P 24/4; Ruez, T. 3486.

⁵⁹⁴ Manning Report, p. 00950943.

⁵⁹⁵ Manning Report, p. 00950944.

⁵⁹⁶ Manning Report, p. 00950944.

⁵⁹⁷ Manning Report, p. 00950942, T. 3605 (ligatures and blindfolds from the Branjevo Military Farm were matched to items found in Can-ari Road 3 and 12.).

filled prior to 2 October 1995.⁵⁹⁸ The bodies of 174 individuals were uncovered and, again, where the sex and cause of death of the victims could be determined, it was male and gunshot wounds respectively.⁵⁹⁹ Sixteen ligatures and eight blindfolds were also uncovered in this grave.⁶⁰⁰ One individual was positively identified as a Bosnian Muslim man listed as missing following the take-over of Srebrenica.⁶⁰¹

239. There is compelling evidence that Drina Corps units were connected with the atrocities at Branjevo Farm. Mr. Erdemovi} and the other members of his unit received orders relating to the executions on the morning of 16 July 1995. They first stopped at the Zvornik Brigade headquarters, where they met a Lieutenant Colonel who, although wearing a VRS uniform, did not have any insignia denoting the unit he belonged to.⁶⁰² Two military police officers wearing Drina Corps insignia accompanied the Lieutenant Colonel.⁶⁰³ The Defence suggested that the description of this person given by Mr. Erdemovi} accords with the physical appearance of Colonel Beara, the Main Staff Chief of Security.⁶⁰⁴ The Prosecution, on the other hand, pointed to the fact that he was accompanied by Drina Corps military police and was able to give orders to personnel at the Farm and so concluded that he must have been a Drina Corps officer.⁶⁰⁵ The Lieutenant Colonel and the police officers went with Erdemovi} and his fellow-soldiers from the 10th Sabotage Detachment to the Branjevo Military Farm. The Lieutenant Colonel then left.⁶⁰⁶ About half an hour after his departure, buses began to arrive carrying the Bosnian Muslim men, some of whom were blindfolded and had their hands tied. The buses that brought the prisoners to Branjevo Farm displayed the markings of "Centrotrans Sarajevo" and "Drinatrans Zvornik" transportation companies.⁶⁰⁷ These buses must have been the ones originally procured by the Drina Corps for the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Poto-ari. The fact that the Bosnian Muslim men were not transported to detention sites until after the transportation of the women, children and elderly was finished supports this conclusion, as does the fact that the Drina Corps are known to have procured buses from, *inter alia*, Zvornik.⁶⁰⁸ Mr. Erdemovi} also testified that policemen wearing the insignia of the Drina Corps military police escorted the buses of

⁵⁹⁸ P 169/25, P 169/26 and P169/27; Ruez, T. 3523-3524; Manning Report, p. 00950943. Ruez also discussed possible disturbance dates for other, as yet unexhumed gravesites along the Can-ari road. See T. 3511-3525.

⁵⁹⁹ Manning Report, p. 00950947-8.

⁶⁰⁰ Manning Report, p. 00950948.

⁶⁰¹ Manning Report, p. 00950949.

⁶⁰² Erdemovi}, T. 3116-3123.

⁶⁰³ Erdemovi}, T. 3121.

⁶⁰⁴ Krstic, T. 6330, 6333.; Defence Final Brief, para. 312.

⁶⁰⁵ Prosecutor's Final Trial Brief, 21 June 2001 (hereafter "Prosecution Final Brief"), para. 347.

⁶⁰⁶ Erdemovi}, T. 3122-3124.

⁶⁰⁷ Erdemovi} T. 3127.

⁶⁰⁸ P 435 (radio intercept at 07.35 hours on 12 July 1995 in which General Krstic ordered Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic, the Drina Corps Transport Officer, to procure 50 buses from Pale, Vi{egrad, Rogatica, Sokolac, Han Pijesak, Vlasenica, Mili}i, Bratunac and Zvornik.)

prisoners.⁶⁰⁹ Upon reaching the Farm, these Drina Corps military police began unloading the Bosnian Muslim men ten at a time to be then taken away and executed.⁶¹⁰

240. The shootings began at 10.00 hours and continued until 1500 hours.⁶¹¹ Mr. Erdemovi} explained that around ten soldiers, whom he was told were from Bratunac, joined his unit between 13.00 and 14.00 hours to assist with the shootings.⁶¹² These men were dressed in VRS uniforms and it was clear to Mr. Erdemovi} that they knew some of the Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica, suggesting that they were local people.⁶¹³ The Prosecution was, however, unable to identify any particular member of the Bratunac Brigade present at Branjevo Farm during the executions.⁶¹⁴ The Lieutenant Colonel, who had been there earlier, returned to the Branjevo Farm with the Drina Corps military police who accompanied the last bus of Bosnian Muslim prisoners.⁶¹⁵ The participation of personnel from the Bratunac Brigade in the executions in the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility on 16 July is further corroborated by a Zvornik Brigade Interim Combat Report dated 16 July 1995 stating that, in addition to the regular troops of the Zvornik Brigade, forces operating under the Brigade's command included two platoons from the Bratunac Infantry Brigade.⁶¹⁶

241. It is important to note that the Branjevo Farm itself was under the direct authority and control of the 1st Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade.⁶¹⁷ Further, Zvornik Brigade vehicle records show an ULT 220 in operation at Branjevo for eight-and-a-half hours on 17 July 1995 and that a truck towed a "BG-700" that day.⁶¹⁸ Although there are no utilisation records for a BGH-700 excavator, the Fuel Dispersal Log reveals that 100 litres of diesel fuel were disbursed to a BGH-700 on 17 July 1995.⁶¹⁹ The Daily Orders Journal of the Zvornik Brigade Engineering Company records work assignments of an ULT 220 in Branjevo and transportation of a BGH-700 to Branjevo on 17 July 1995.⁶²⁰ Aerial photographs show an excavator digging a hole at Branjevo on 17 July 1995.⁶²¹

242. There is also evidence implicating the Drina Corps Command itself in the Branjevo Farm executions. At around 1400 hours on 16 July 1995, a series of interconnected conversations were

⁶⁰⁹ Erdemovi}, T. 3129.

⁶¹⁰ Erdemovi}, T. 3129-3130.

⁶¹¹ Erdemovi}, T. 3130.

⁶¹² Erdemovi}, T. 3132, T. 3141.

⁶¹³ Erdemovi}, T. 31330-3134.

⁶¹⁴ Butler, T. 9194.

⁶¹⁵ Erdemovi}, T. 3138-3139.

⁶¹⁶ P 614; Butler, T. 5342-5345.

⁶¹⁷ P 616; Butler, T. 5133 and Butler Report, para. 7.46.

⁶¹⁸ P 646.

⁶¹⁹ P 645; Butler, T. 5169 and Butler Report, para. 7.43.

⁶²⁰ P 642; Butler, T. 5168 and Butler Report, para. 7.44.

intercepted relating to the executions. To begin, the duty officer at "Palma" (the Zvornik Brigade) called "Zlatar" (Drina Corps Headquarters) urgently requesting "500 litres of D 2" (diesel fuel) to be released to Colonel Popovi}.⁶²² The Zvornik Brigade duty officer stressed that unless he received the fuel, Colonel Popovi} would stop the work he was doing. Later in the conversation "Palma" stipulated to "Zlatar" that "(t)he bus loaded with oil is to go to Pilica village" and that Colonel Krsmanovi}, the Drina Corps Chief of Transportation, was to arrange the transportation. This fuel, the Prosecution argued, was necessary for the transport of Bosnian Muslim prisoners from Pilica to the execution site at the Branjevo Military Farm.⁶²³ Records for 16 July 1995 confirm that 500 litres of diesel fuel was dispatched for Colonel Popovi} and the Drina Corps Command⁶²⁴ is listed as the "recipient" on this document.⁶²⁵ Mr. Butler concluded from the timing of the executions and burials and the fact that the fuel was to be sent to Pilica Village where the Pilica school is located, that the fuel was most likely used for transporting the prisoners to the execution site at Branjevo Farm.⁶²⁶

243. The Trial Chamber finds that members of the Bratunac Brigade arrived at Branjevo Farm during the course of the afternoon on 16 July 1995 and participated in the killings.⁶²⁷ The Trial Chamber also finds that Drina Corps military police were engaged in guarding the Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the buses that took them to the Farm and that Zvornik Brigade equipment was used for activities relating to the burial of the victims. Finally, the Trial Chamber accepts the intercept evidence demonstrating that Colonel Popovi} was involved in organising fuel to transport the Bosnian Muslim prisoners to the execution site at Branjevo Farm and that the allocation of fuel was co-ordinated through the Drina Corps Command.

(h) 16 July 1995: Pilica Cultural Dom

244. Mr. Erdemovi} testified that, at around 1500 hours on 16 July 1995, after he and his fellow soldiers from the 10th Sabotage Detachment had finished executing the prisoners at the Branjevo Military Farm, they were told that there was a group of 500 Bosnian Muslim prisoners from

⁶²¹ Butler, T. 5169; Butler Report, para. 7.45 & fn.268; P 24/2 and 24/3.

⁶²² P 620.

⁶²³ Prosecution Final Brief para. 354; Butler, T. 5139 and Butler Report, para. 9.20.

⁶²⁴ P 619. Although the English translation on this document actually refers to "Drina Corps Commander", the B/C/S abbreviation "KDK" has consistently been translated as Drina Corps Command in other documents in the case, and so the Trial Chamber adopts that interpretation in relation to this document also. The Prosecution expressly accepted that the translation on the document was incorrect to this extent. See Prosecution Closing Statement, T. 9954.

⁶²⁵ P 619.

⁶²⁶ Butler, T. 5139.

⁶²⁷ See also the discussion *Infra* paras 380-387 regarding the deployment of members from the Bratunac Brigade to assist in the executions on 16 July 1995.

Srebrenica trying to break out of a nearby club.⁶²⁸ Mr. Erdemovi} and the other members of his unit refused to carry out any more killings. They were then told to attend a meeting with the Lieutenant Colonel at a café in Pilica. Mr. Erdemovi} and his fellow-soldiers travelled to the café as requested and, as they waited, they could hear shots and grenades being detonated.⁶²⁹ The sounds lasted for approximately 15-20 minutes after which a soldier from Bratunac entered the café to inform those present that "everything was over".⁶³⁰ No survivors from the Pilica Cultural Dom execution site appeared before the Trial Chamber.

245. The OTP sent a team of experts to conduct a forensic examination of the Pilica Dom between 27 and 29 September 1996, and again on 2 October 1998.⁶³¹ As with the forensic tests conducted at the Krivaca warehouse, analyses of hair, blood and explosives residue, collected at the Pilica Dom, provide strong evidence that mass executions had occurred in this location. Experts determined the presence of bullet strikes, explosives residue, bullets and shell cases, as well as human blood, bones and tissue adhering to the walls, ceilings and floors.⁶³²

246. The Pilica Cultural Centre is in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility.⁶³³ The Prosecution also relied upon the evidence of Mr. Erdemovi} to establish that the same soldiers from Bratunac, who had arrived to assist the 10th Sabotage Detachment with the Branjevo Farm killings, carried out killings at the Pilica Cultural Dom. According to Mr. Erdemovi} these soldiers from Bratunac left the Farm as soon as the executions there were finished and travelled to another location to continue with the killings.⁶³⁴ As already noted, the presence of the Bratunac Brigade, in the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility finds support in a Zvornik Brigade Combat Report from 16 July 1995, which indicates that personnel from the Bratunac Brigade were operating under the command of the Zvornik Brigade that day.⁶³⁵ In addition, the Bratunac Brigade Military Police Platoon log for 16 July 1995 indicates that "one police patrol remained in Pilica to secure and watch over the Bosnian Muslims."⁶³⁶ Mr. Butler argued that, since there was no combat in the Pilica area at that time, the Bratunac Brigade police must have been guarding the Bosnian Muslim men at Pilica who were subsequently executed in the late afternoon or early evening hours of 16 July 1995.⁶³⁷

⁶²⁸ Erdemovi}, T. 3140.

⁶²⁹ Erdemovi}, T. 3143-3144.

⁶³⁰ Erdemovi}, T. 3148-3149.

⁶³¹ Manning, T. 3619.

⁶³² P 181/1; P 181/2; P 182/3; P 182/4; P 150; and P 97. See also Manning, T. 3616-25

⁶³³ Butler, T. 5132-5136.

⁶³⁴ Erdemovi}, T. 3140-3141.

⁶³⁵ P 614; Butler, T. 5342-5345; Butler Report, para. 7.49 & fn. 272.

⁶³⁶ P 618 (extract from the daily orders book of the military police platoon of the Bratunac Brigade for 17 July 1995, recording events that took place on 16 July 1995).

⁶³⁷ Butler, T. 5136-5137.

247. The Prosecution also adduced some evidence that the Drina Corps Command knew about the prisoners in the Pilica Cultural Dom and was involved in co-ordinating action relating to them. A conversation was intercepted at 1111 hours on 16 July 1995 between Colonel Beara, the Security Chief of the VRS Main Staff and Colonel Cerovi}, the Drina Corps Assistant Commander for Moral, Legal and Religious Affairs. Colonel Beara stated that "triage" had to be done on the prisoners.⁶³⁸ The Prosecution argued that Colonel Beara and Colonel Cerovi} must have been referring to the prisoners in the Pilica Cultural Dom: at around this time the executions at the Branjevo Military Farm were already underway, but the prisoners in the Pilica Cultural Dom were still alive. Both parties agreed that the military term "triage" is used to describe the separation and further treatment of the sick and wounded.⁶³⁹ The reference to "triage" remains an unexplained aspect of the conversation and Mr. Butler conceded that attributing any particular meaning to it would be speculation.⁶⁴⁰ The Defence, by contrast, argued this reference to "triage" demonstrates an intent to spare some of the prisoners from the fate of the others.⁶⁴¹

248. The Trial Chamber accepts the forensic evidence showing that executions took place at the Pilica Cultural Dom, as well as the evidence linking the Bratunac Brigade to these crimes. The Trial Chamber cannot attribute any particular meaning to the conversation between Colonel Beara and Colonel Cerovi}. The most the Trial Chamber can conclude from this conversation is that, on 16 July 1995, a Drina Corps officer was discussing matters relating to Bosnian Muslim prisoners with Colonel Beara, who both parties identified as having been involved in the executions.

(i) Kozluk

249. In 1999, the OTP exhumed a grave near the town of Kozluk. Information obtained from a community of refugees in Germany about rumoured killings led to the identification of the Kozluk site and investigations carried out at the site confirm that mass executions had occurred there. According to the OTP investigator's conversations with the refugees, about 500 prisoners were forced to sing Serb songs while being driven on army trucks to the Kozluk site, where they were killed by an execution squad.⁶⁴² However, the Trial Chamber heard no direct testimony about these events and the Prosecution was unable to specify the timing of crimes committed in this location.

250. The minimum number of bodies uncovered from the Kozluk grave was 340 and all the individuals for whom sex could be determined were male. Gunshot wounds were the overwhelming cause of death for those bodies in which a cause could be ascertained. A number of

⁶³⁸ P 627.

⁶³⁹ Krstic, T. 6754.

⁶⁴⁰ Butler, T. 5357-5378.

⁶⁴¹ Defence Final Brief, para. 158.

bodies showed signs of pre-existing disability or chronic disease ranging from arthritis to amputations.⁶⁴³ Fifty-five blindfolds and 168 ligatures were uncovered.⁶⁴⁴ Aerial images show that the Kozluk mass gravesite was created between 5 and 17 July 1995⁶⁴⁵ and that it was disturbed again between 7 and 27 September 1995.⁶⁴⁶

251. The Prosecution's forensic experts have linked the Kozluk primary grave with the secondary grave at Cancari Road 3, which was exhumed by the OTP between 27 May and 10 June 1998.⁶⁴⁷ Aerial photographs show the Cancari Road 3 gravesite was first excavated after 27 September 1995, and back filled prior to 2 October 1995.⁶⁴⁸ In addition to the usual analyses of soil, material and shell cases, the link between the two graves was established by the presence at both sites of fragments of green glass bottles and bottle labels known to have come from the Vetinka bottling factory near the Kozluk mass grave.⁶⁴⁹ All of the bodies for which sex could be determined were male and gunshot wounds were the predominant cause of death for those individuals for which a cause could be ascertained.⁶⁵⁰ Eight blindfolds and 37 ligatures were located during the exhumation.⁶⁵¹

252. The Kozluk execution site is located within the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade⁶⁵² and there is evidence linking this Brigade with the Kozluk site on 16 July 1995 and in the days immediately following. On 16 July 1995, an excavator-loader belonging to the Zvornik Brigade operated for eight hours in Kozluk.⁶⁵³ A truck belonging to the Zvornik Brigade made two trips between Orahovac and Kozluk on that same day.⁶⁵⁴ A bulldozer operated in Kozluk for 1.5 hours on 18 July 1995 and another hour on 19 July 1995.⁶⁵⁵ The Zvornik Brigade Engineer Company Orders Journal shows assignments on 18 July 1995 to improve the trench in Kozluk and the transport of a bulldozer to Kozluk.⁶⁵⁶

253. The Trial Chamber is persuaded that the Zvornik Brigade excavators and bulldozers operating in the Kozluk area from 16 July 1995 were involved in work related to the burial of

⁶⁴² Ruez, T. 500, 783-788.

⁶⁴³ Manning Report, p. 00950973.

⁶⁴⁴ Manning Report, p. 00950974.

⁶⁴⁵ P 164/1; Ruez, T. 3482; Manning Report, p. 00950975.

⁶⁴⁶ P 164/3; Ruez, T. 3434-3484; and Manning, T. 3603-3608.

⁶⁴⁷ Manning Report, p. 00950976.

⁶⁴⁸ Manning Report, p. 00950975.

⁶⁴⁹ Manning T. 3609-3614.

⁶⁵⁰ Manning Report, p. 00950976-00950977

⁶⁵¹ Manning Report, p. 00950977.

⁶⁵² P 2; Butler Report, para. 7.53. Kozluk is the garrison area of the "Podrinje Detachment" (Drina Wolves).

⁶⁵³ P 580; Butler, T. 5082-5083.

⁶⁵⁴ P 582; Butler, T. 5085-5086.

⁶⁵⁵ P 404/tab 281.

victims from the Kozluk execution site. The executions in Kozluk must have occurred between 14 July and 17 July 1995, given that aerial images show the mass grave in the Kozluk area was created prior to 17 July 1995 and the prisoners were not transported to the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade until 14 July 1995. The location of Kozluk, between the Petkovci Dam and the Branjevo Military Farm, also suggests that the executions were likely to have taken place around 15-16 July 1995. Such a finding fits with the overall sequence of the northern executions: the crimes at Orahovac occurred on 14 July 1995; the crimes at Petkovci Dam, located to the north of Orahovac occurred on 15 July 1995; and the crimes at Branjevo Military Farm and the Pilica Dom, both of which are located to the north of Kozluk, occurred on 16 July 1995. The Trial Chamber finds that this extensive amount of Zvornik Brigade engineering work at Kozluk around this time was connected to the burial of bodies in the Kozluk grave.

(j) Smaller Scale Executions following the Mass Executions

254. In addition to the planned mass executions described, the Trial Chamber heard evidence about smaller scale executions in which small groups of Bosnian Muslim stragglers trying to escape the enclave were killed on location after capture by the VRS.⁶⁵⁷ Witness R was captured on 19 July 1995 with a group of about 11 stragglers and escaped being executed along with all the others at a location known as Nezuk within the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade.⁶⁵⁸

255. The Prosecution argued that these executions were carried out by the 16th Krajina Brigade which, at the time, was operating under the command of the Zvornik Brigade. An eyewitness identified Serb soldiers with yellow patches on the sleeve of their left arm reading "Krajisnik" or "Krajisnici".⁶⁵⁹ The Zvornik Brigade Daily Combat Report to the Drina Corps Command on 19 July reveals the presence of the 16th Krajina Brigade amongst the Zvornik Brigade's available units. This Report also stated that 13 Muslim soldiers had been eliminated that day, which approximates the number killed at Nezuk.⁶⁶⁰ Other records indicate that a unit from the 1st Krajina Corps had been deployed to the zone of the Zvornik Brigade to operate under the command of the Zvornik Brigade from about 16 July 1995 and that they remained there until about 22 July 1995.⁶⁶¹

⁶⁵⁶ P 404/4 (tab 214); Butler Report, para. 7.58 & fn.282.

⁶⁵⁷ See generally Witness R, T 3196-3206. The Prosecution also relied upon documents seized from the Zvornik Brigade which indicated that Muslim men were in their custody who are now on the ICRC missing persons list to demonstrate that the Zvornik Brigade killed captured Bosnian Muslim prisoners fleeing from Srebrenica following the mass executions. See P 707, P 706, Butler, T. 5227-5233. However, the Trial Chamber is unable to make any specific finding on the basis of the evidence presented.

⁶⁵⁸ Witness R, T. 3200-3202, Butler, T. 5227.

⁶⁵⁹ Witness R, T. 3205-3206, 3229-3230.

⁶⁶⁰ P 693.

⁶⁶¹ P 404 (tab 430 and tab 432); Butler Report para. 10.10.

256. In light of this evidence, the Trial Chamber accepts that units under the command of the Zvornik Brigade participated in the executions at Nezuk on 19 July 1995.

(k) The Reburials

257. The forensic evidence presented to the Trial Chamber suggests that, commencing in the early autumn of 1995, the Bosnian Serbs engaged in a concerted effort to conceal the mass killings by relocating the primary graves to remote secondary gravesites. All of the primary and secondary mass gravesites associated with the take-over of Srebrenica located by the OTP were within the Drina Corps area of responsibility.⁶⁶² However, the Prosecution presented very little evidence linking any Drina Corps Brigades to the reburials⁶⁶³ and no eyewitnesses to any of this activity were brought before the Trial Chamber.

258. One exception to this general paucity of evidence was a document sent by the VRS Main Staff to the Drina Corps Command on 14 September 1995 and copied to the Zvornik Brigade for their information.⁶⁶⁴ The document, which was signed by General Mladić, authorised the release of five tons of diesel fuel to carry out work in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility. The document specified that the fuel was to be delivered to Captain Milorad Trpić, which the Prosecution argued was probably a reference to a Zvornik Brigade security officer.⁶⁶⁵ Another order that same day from the Main Staff Technical Service Division authorised the release of the fuel to the Drina Corps.⁶⁶⁶ Mr. Butler pointed out that, normally, fuel for engineering works would be the responsibility of the Rear Services branch and the involvement of the security personnel on this occasion supported an inference that the fuel was linked with the criminal activity.⁶⁶⁷ Given that aerial images confirm the reburial activity was ongoing at this time and the fact that there is no information establishing that any legitimate engineer work was being carried out by the Zvornik Brigade, Mr. Butler concluded that the fuel must have been used for the reburial activity.⁶⁶⁸ More generally, the Prosecution argued it was logical that the Zvornik Brigade would be tasked with digging up the bodies, as they had been involved in the original burials and knew where the gravesites were.⁶⁶⁹

259. A journal, recording the issues raised during periodic meetings convened by the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade with his Corps Command Staff, indicates that, on 16 October 1995,

⁶⁶² Ruez, T. 3470.

⁶⁶³ Butler, T. 5235.

⁶⁶⁴ P 709.

⁶⁶⁵ Butler, T. 5236.

⁶⁶⁶ P 710.

⁶⁶⁷ Butler, T. 5236.

⁶⁶⁸ Butler, T. 5237.

⁶⁶⁹ Butler, T. 5242.

Captain Nikoli}, the Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security, stated that the Brigade was engaged in tasks issued by the VRS Main staff. Captain Nikoli} used the word “asanacija” to describe this work.⁶⁷⁰ “Asanacija” (which translates as “restoration of the terrain”) is used in military lexicon to refer to finding, identifying and burying the dead.⁶⁷¹

260. Investigators from the OTP estimate it would have taken at least two full nights and several trucks to move the bodies to the secondary gravesites. The longest distance between primary and secondary gravesites (Branjevo Farm to Can-ari Road) was 40 kilometres.⁶⁷²

261. Overall, however, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence adduced by the Prosecution about the reburial activity is too scant to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that units of the Drina Corps were engaged in the reburial of bodies from primary to secondary gravesites during the early Autumn of 1995. However, the Chamber is satisfied that, given the scale of the operation and the fact that it was carried out entirely within their zone of responsibility, the Drina Corps must have at least known this activity was occurring.

6. The Chain of Command in Operation for the Drina Corps: July 1995

262. Having concluded that Drina Corps units and equipment were involved in carrying out many of the acts charged in the Indictment against General Krstic, the Trial Chamber now considers the Drina Corps chain of command in operation during the relevant period. This discussion provides an important backdrop to Part II C, where the Trial Chamber considers the issue of what General Krstic knew, or should have known, about the activities of the Drina Corps as a result of his position in the Corps Command, first as Chief of Staff and then as Corps Commander.

(a) Parallel Chains of Command

263. The Defence argued that, even if Drina Corps personnel and resources were implicated at various crime sites, General Krstic had no knowledge of their involvement. One of the key arguments advanced in support of this position was that there was a parallel chain of command operating during the relevant time.⁶⁷³ Specifically, the Drina Corps had no control over the Srebrenica follow up operation, primarily due to the intervention of the Main Staff under the command of General Mladic. The Defence also argued that the activities of the VRS security organs, including those of Colonel Popovi}, the Drina Corps Assistant for Security, were conducted

⁶⁷⁰ P 374.

⁶⁷¹ Butler, T. 5121; P 611.

⁶⁷² Ruez, T. 3535-3536.

⁶⁷³ Another key aspect of this argument was the General Krstic was engaged as the Commander of the @epa operation and so knew nothing about events occurring back in Srebrenica.

independently of the Corps Command. As a result, argued the Defence, the Drina Corps Command was excluded from knowledge of the detention and execution of the Bosnian Muslim men, despite the fact that the illegal activities were carried out in its zone of responsibility. In addition, the Defence cited command competencies being exercised by the President of RS and the newly appointed civilian authority in Srebrenica, who reportedly also had certain duties and responsibilities regarding prisoners and refugees.⁶⁷⁴ However, as to the latter, the Trial Chamber emphasises it heard no evidence that the civilian Commissioner in any way exercised such authority or otherwise affected the involvement of the Drina Corps Command in the Srebrenica crimes.

(i) Did the VRS Main Staff exclude the Drina Corps Command from the Srebrenica Follow-up Operations?

264. The Defence pointed to four significant junctures at which the Main Staff directly intervened in Srebrenica-related operations in July 1995, thereby effectively rendering the Drina Corps Command powerless. The first point was on 9 July 1995 when General Mladic arrived at Pribicevac, where the Drina Corps had established its FCP for Krivaja 95, and took over command of the continued attack on Srebrenica and, in the process, expanded the original goals of Krivaja 95 to include its capture. The second was General Mladic's assumption of control over the movement of the civilian population out of Poto-ari. Third, General Mladic, rather than the then Corps Commander, General @ivanovi}, made the decision to appoint General Krstic commander of the VRS forces engaged in the @epa operation. Fourth, on 17 July 1995, despite the fact that the Drina Corps Command had earlier made its own arrangements for sweep operations in the Srebrenica area, the Main Staff appointed a Main Staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Keserovi}, to take over command of the search.⁶⁷⁵ Moreover, the Defence argued, General Mladic had expressly stated that the whereabouts of the 28th Division following the take-over of Srebrenica was his concern⁶⁷⁶ and, in the words of General Radinovi}, "the command of the Drina Corps was... completely excluded from any kind of command competence and, therefore, command responsibility."⁶⁷⁷

265. The Trial Record is indeed replete with evidence demonstrating that the Main Staff was heavily involved in the direction of events following the take-over of Srebrenica.⁶⁷⁸ Further, there are indications that Drina Corps units were not always informed or consulted about what the Main

⁶⁷⁴ On 11 July 1995 the President of Republika Srpska appointed a civilian commissioner for the Serbian municipality of Srebrenica. See P 404, fn 90. The President gave the civilian commissioner a very high level of responsibility, including responsibility for the treatment of prisoners of war, as well as ensuring that the civilian population chose freely whether to stay or to leave. See Radinovi}, T.8064.

⁶⁷⁵ P 649; Radinovi}, T. 8461-8463. See also Krstic; T. 7365, 7381.

⁶⁷⁶ Krstic, T. 6203.

⁶⁷⁷ Radinovi}, T. 8057

Staff was doing in their area of concern during the week that followed 11 July 1995. For example, in an intercepted conversation, on 13 July 1995 at 1829 hours, "Zile" (a nickname frequently associated with General @ivanovi}) discussed records on war criminals with an unknown participant, although only the words uttered by the latter were audible.⁶⁷⁹ During the course of the conversation, the unknown participant asked whether it was "possible to make a list of those from @epa, Srebrenica and Gora`de urgently?" and expressed concern that "they'll get away scott-free." At this time, captured Bosnian Muslim men had already been executed at Jadar River and Cerska and the executions at Kravica Warehouse were imminent. The unknown participant in the conversation appeared to be unaware of this and was still working on the assumption that a formal vetting process had been implemented, as foreshadowed by General Mladic at the Hotel Fontana meeting on 12 July 1995. It is also apparent that the 13 July 1995 search order issued by General Krstic⁶⁸⁰ was subsequently modified by some other authority.⁶⁸¹ Indeed the Trial Chamber heard evidence that one Brigade was searching land on the other side of the enclave altogether from that specified by General Krstic.⁶⁸² Further, in a report on 18 July 1995, Colonel Pandurevi}, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, complained of the fact that "someone" had brought thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners into his area of responsibility over the preceding ten days.⁶⁸³ The reference to "someone" admits of possible intervention by an authority outside of the Drina Corps in matters within the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility. It is also true that Colonel Beara from the Main Staff was heard issuing orders directly to Drina Corps officers.⁶⁸⁴ In addition, an intercept, dated 15 July at 0954 hours, between General Zivanovi} and Colonel Beara,⁶⁸⁵ suggests that, on about 13 July 1995, General Mladi} may have issued orders directly to members of the Drina Corps 5th Podrinje Brigade regarding the executions. It also suggests that General Zivanovi} was not fully apprised of the implementation of those orders prior to his conversation with Colonel Beara.⁶⁸⁶ Finally, in a conversation intercepted on 17 July 1995 at 2030 hours between General Krstic and an unidentified person, General Krsti} asked "(w)ith whose approval did you send

⁶⁷⁸ E.g. P 532 (Order from Main Staff to Drina Corps on 13 July 1995 directing that measures be taken to block and capture the men from the column); and Krstic, T. 6300.

⁶⁷⁹ P 525.

⁶⁸⁰ P 463.

⁶⁸¹ P 464 (order issued by the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade on 14 July 1995 which General Krstic testified demonstrated that areas being searched by that Brigade deviated from the order he issued). Krstic; T. 7351-735.

⁶⁸² P 536 and P 537, and Defence Witness DB, T. 7333-7335.

⁶⁸³ P 675.

⁶⁸⁴ P 627.

⁶⁸⁵ P 470.

⁶⁸⁶ The intercept refers to the failure of "Furtula" (who the Prosecution argued was Major Radomir Furtula, the Commander of the 5th Podrinje Brigade (also known as the Vi{egrad Brigade) to follow the "boss's" orders. The Prosecution argued that, in the context of this conversation, the "boss" must have been General Mladi}. See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 366. See the further discussion of this conversation and a related conversation involving General Krsti}, *Infra* paras. 380-387.

soldiers down there?" The other participant said "(o)n orders from the Main Staff,"⁶⁸⁷ suggesting the Main Staff was directing events at that time without informing the Drina Corps of all the details.⁶⁸⁸ The Trial Chamber has already noted the presence of non-Drina Corps units within the Drina Corps zone of responsibility from 11 July 1995 onwards. The evidence demonstrates that several of these non-Drina Corps units were heavily involved in the capture and execution of the Bosnian Muslim men, including the police battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment, the MUP, and the 10th Sabotage Detachment.⁶⁸⁹

266. Nonetheless, an evaluation of the complete Trial Record makes it abundantly clear that the Main Staff could not, and did not, handle the entire Srebrenica follow-up operation on its own and at almost every stage had to, and did, call upon Drina Corps resources for assistance. As acknowledged by the Defence's own military expert, General Radinovi}, the Main Staff did not have any resources of its own and could not carry out any operation without relying on those of its constituent Corps.⁶⁹⁰ It is clear from the details of the mass executions recounted previously that Drina Corps troops and resources were regularly called upon to assist with the executions.

267. General Radinovi}, however, argued that the senior command of the Main Staff had the power to requisition the resources of the subordinate brigades and to dispense with notification to the Corps in crisis situations.⁶⁹¹ This, said General Krstic, was exactly what happened following the take-over of Srebrenica: Colonel Beara, the Main Staff Security Chief, used the facilities of the Zvornik Brigade for the operation he had been tasked with by the Main Staff without notifying anyone at either the Brigade Command or Drina Corps Command level. General Krstic was adamant that Colonel Beara had not formally issued any assignment to the Zvornik Brigade involving the executions.⁶⁹² Further, General Krstic maintained, the Drina Corps Command did not receive any records about the utilisation of Drina Corps personnel or vehicles by Colonel Beara.⁶⁹³

268. The Trial Chamber accepts that, from 9 July 1995, when he arrived at the Pribicevac FCP in the midst of Krivaja 95, General Mladic, as Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, entered the zone of operation of the Drina Corps and may have directed key aspects of VRS activities, including the continued attack on Srebrenica, the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Poto-ari and, ultimately, the executions. Certainly, the evidence portrays General Mladic as a

⁶⁸⁷ P 364/2, tab 14/2.

⁶⁸⁸ Although it was not clear from the intercept that the unidentified participant was from the Drina Corps, the Defence argued this was implicit from the reference he made to the Poto-ari area, which is within the zone of the Drina Corps. T. 5445.

⁶⁸⁹ See the discussion of the relationship between these units and the Drina Corps *Infra* paras. 277-289.

⁶⁹⁰ Radinovi}, T. 8471-8472.

⁶⁹¹ Radinovi}, T. 8472.

⁶⁹² Krstic T. 6494-6495.

⁶⁹³ Krstic, T. 7399-7400.

dominating personality, who was actively involved in both the public and behind-the-scenes aspects of the unfolding events.⁶⁹⁴ Indisputably, General Mladic directed the meetings at the Hotel Fontana while the Drina Corps representatives sat in silence. He was also sighted in Poto-ari, and at several of the execution sites. However, the evidence does not support a finding that the Drina Corps Command was, thereby, completely excluded from all knowledge or authority as to the involvement of its troops or assets in the operation. Nor does the Trial Record support the Defence argument that orders to the subordinate Brigades of the Drina Corps thereafter came directly or exclusively from the Main Staff. As a military principle, it would be untenable if the Main Staff came into the Drina Corps zone of responsibility and took complete control of Drina Corps assets and personnel without the assent, or at least the knowledge, of the Drina Corps Command, especially in the midst of ongoing combat operations. No army could function under these circumstances and VRS principles did not admit of such a possibility. As reflected in the words of Defence Witness DE who was a Drina Corps officer in July 1995:

Our army functioned according to two basic principles: The principle of having one command and the principle of subordination. One command meant that every person in the chain of command above him has only one man who can issue orders to him, one superior; and the principle of subordination implied that the subordinated persons must act on the orders of their superior unless an order of that kind represented a criminal act, which was regulated in other rules and regulations positive.⁶⁹⁵

This accords with the testimony of Mr. Butler who stated that, in light of JNA regulations, it would be unheard of for a Commander of the Main Staff to interfere with the chain of command and assume direct command over subordinate units. Such a practice would be evidence of a poor and undisciplined army and, in Mr. Butler's view, the VRS was a very well organised army.⁶⁹⁶

269. The evidence does not, in any way, support a finding that the Drina Corps was completely excluded from matters relating to the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Poto-ari or the Bosnian Muslim prisoners. As described above, officers of the Drina Corps Command were engaged in the procurement and organisation of the buses on which the Bosnian Muslim civilians were transported out of Poto-ari. This is clearly inconsistent with the notion that the Main Staff had taken over direct command of the subordinate Drina Corps Brigades.⁶⁹⁷ The Drina Corps Intelligence Department also received a Main Staff document dated 13 July 1995 reporting on the completion of the transportation operation, showing that the Main Staff ensured the Corps Command remained informed about the activities being conducted within its zone.⁶⁹⁸ Further, when the Main Staff issued orders to the Drina Corps about blocking and detaining the Bosnian

⁶⁹⁴ Butler, T. 5447.

⁶⁹⁵ Defence Witness DE, T. 7620.

⁶⁹⁶ Butler, T. 4837, 5254.

⁶⁹⁷ See the discussion *supra* paras. 135-142.

⁶⁹⁸ P 459; and Butler, T. 4868.

Muslim column, the orders were sent through the Corps Command.⁶⁹⁹ It is true that these orders were also copied directly to the relevant Drina Corps subordinate Brigades, but the Trial Chamber accepts the explanation given by Mr. Butler that this was purely a time-saving device in an emergency situation.⁷⁰⁰ The most important factor is that the Drina Corps Command itself was included in the chain of command by the Main Staff and remained informed about the tasks being issued to its subordinate brigades.

270. There are many other examples of the Drina Corps chain of command operating in a normal manner in the period following the take-over of Srebrenica. On 15 July 1995, a conversation was intercepted between Colonel Beara and General Krstic in which Colonel Beara made a direct and urgent request to General Krstic for assistance in finding men who could assist him in the work he was carrying out.⁷⁰¹ In response, General Krstic directed Colonel Beara to contact Colonel Blagojevi}, the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade and to utilise his Red Berets (a reconnaissance unit subordinate to the 3rd Battalion of the Bratunac Brigade⁷⁰²). This episode is totally inconsistent with the notion that the Main Staff was directing the activities of Drina Corps subordinate Brigades without reference to the Drina Corps Command. Further, there is documentation showing that the subordinate Drina Corps Brigades were constantly reporting to the Drina Corps Command on matters relating to the Bosnian Muslim column and the prisoners. In his 15 July 1995 Interim Combat Report, Colonel Pandurevi}, Commander of the beleaguered Zvornik Brigade, which was caught up in combat with the Bosnian Muslim column, pleaded with the Corps Command for help with dealing with the prisoners being detained in his zone of responsibility. Colonel Pandurevi} warned the Drina Corps Command that if the situation were not alleviated, he would be forced to let the prisoners go.⁷⁰³ Similarly, on 16 July 1995, Colonel Pandurevi} made another urgent request to the Corps Command for assistance.⁷⁰⁴ This demonstrates that the Zvornik Brigade was still utilising the regular chain of command and that it was not reporting directly to the Main Staff about Srebrenica related events. Overall, the Prosecution produced 54 documents showing the involvement of the Drina Corps Command in the VRS chain of command in the wake of the take-over of Srebrenica.⁷⁰⁵

271. Further, records were kept by the Drina Corps subordinate units about the use of resources for matters connected to the executions. One would naturally expect the Drina Corps Command to have been closely monitoring the use of all its resources given the high level of military activity

⁶⁹⁹ P 532. See the discussion *supra* para. 169.

⁷⁰⁰ Butler, T. 4970.

⁷⁰¹ P 478.

⁷⁰² Butler, T. 4913-4914.

⁷⁰³ P 609.

⁷⁰⁴ P 614.

occurring in the week of 13 July 1995, including the commencement of the @epa Operation, the combat with the head of the Bosnian Muslim column composed of members of the 28th Division, the ABiH forces attacking from the direction of Tuzla, and the search operations around the Srebrenica area. It is inconceivable that Brigade commanders would fail to notice that the Main Staff had requisitioned Drina Corps personnel and resources for its own uses or fail to inform its own Command of such requisitions.

272. Aside from the documentary and intercept evidence adduced by the Prosecution, showing that the Drina Corps Command was not excluded from the Srebrenica follow-up activities, the proximity of Drina Corps Command to the crime sites strengthens the confidence of the Trial Chamber that the Corps Command could not be, and was not, oblivious to these events.

(ii) Were the Security Organs Operating in Secret?

273. The Defence also argued that prisoners of war were the exclusive responsibility of the security and intelligence organs, particularly the former.⁷⁰⁶ Moreover, according to the Defence, the security organ of the Drina Corps, in conjunction with the Main Staff security organ, formed an independent command line whereby operations were conducted secretly from the Drina Corps Command.⁷⁰⁷ In particular, General Radinovi} postulated that the VRS regulations governing the security organs permit security officers in the Corps Command to make their own assessment as to what is an official secret, which can only be divulged with the permission of the Assistant for Security of the Main Staff.⁷⁰⁸ The Defence hypothesised that Colonel Popovi}, the Assistant Commander of Security for the Drina Corps, received his assignments as to the prisoners directly from Colonel Beara, but that pursuant to VRS regulations he was not allowed to report about them to anyone in the Corps Command.⁷⁰⁹ Accordingly, the Drina Corps Command and the Commands of the subordinate Brigades were unaware of the crimes being committed by the security organs.⁷¹⁰ This, argued the Defence, is corroborated by the absence of documents from the security organs, during the relevant period, reporting to the Drina Corps Command about the fate of the prisoners.⁷¹¹

⁷⁰⁵ Butler, T. 5250-5251. These exhibits are listed in P 378.

⁷⁰⁶ Radinovi}, T. 8071.

⁷⁰⁷ Radinovi}, T. 8052, 8067, and 8068.

⁷⁰⁸ Radinovi}, T. 8069-8070, D 158/P 402 fn 34, (Rules of Service of Security Organs in the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, 1984. Para. 49 states that a security officer "may pass on information that constitutes an official secret to other authorised security organ officers or other persons only with the authorisation of his superior officer in the security organ.")

⁷⁰⁹ Krstic, T. 7367-7368.

⁷¹⁰ Krstic, T. 7366-7367.

⁷¹¹ Radinovi}, T. 8079.

274. The Prosecution's view of the relationship between the security organs in the Main Staff and the Drina Corps during the critical period is entirely different. It maintained that, according to VRS regulations, the Assistant Commander for Security was directly subordinate to the commanding officer of the unit of the armed forces under whose command he is placed: in this case, Colonel Popovi} was subordinated to the Drina Corps Commander.⁷¹² Mr. Butler argued that, while the Main Staff security organ provided "technical advice, technical assistance, in some cases, resources, guidance, and direction for the more technical aspects of security operations...", it did not form an alternative chain of command.⁷¹³

275. Mr. Butler conceded that there could be some circumstances in which the Corps Commander would not be informed of the work of the security officer, for example, if the Commander himself was the subject of the investigation. However, he maintained that for "daily activities" of the security branch, one would expect the Corps Commander to be fully informed.⁷¹⁴ The criminal activity involved in the execution of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men is hardly a "daily activity" and it is to be expected that some attempt would be made to shroud the commission of such crimes in secrecy, although their massive scale necessarily made that difficult. Nonetheless, the evidence, viewed in its entirety, does not support the view that the Main Staff and Drina Corps Security organs were carrying out activities relating to the executions without the knowledge of the Drina Corps command. Even if Colonel Beara and Colonel Popovi} were primarily directing this criminal activity under orders from General Mladic, they were continually communicating and co-ordinating with personnel from the Drina Corps Command. On 16 July 1995, around the time of the Branjevo Military Farm executions, Colonel Beara had a conversation with Colonel Cerovi} from the Drina Corps Command, during which Colonel Beara informed Colonel Cerovi} that "triage" had to be done on the prisoners.⁷¹⁵ On that same day, Colonel Popovi} co-ordinated his requests for fuel to be used in conjunction with the executions through the Zvornik Brigade, which in turn passed this request on to the Drina Corps Command.⁷¹⁶ The Drina Corps Command is also mentioned in the paper work for this fuel allocation.⁷¹⁷ In total, the Prosecution pointed to 11 exhibits⁷¹⁸ refuting the contention that the VRS security organs were operating secretly.

(iii) Conclusions

276. Overall, the Prosecution has made a compelling argument that, due to their massive nature and the level of co-operation and co-ordination required, the executions could not have been

⁷¹² P 402 fn 34, para. 16; Butler, T. 5351.

⁷¹³ Butler, T. 4767.

⁷¹⁴ Butler, T. 5301.

⁷¹⁵ P 627.

⁷¹⁶ P 620 (intercepted conversation at 1358 hours on 16 July 1995. See the discussion *supra* para. 242).

⁷¹⁷ P 619.

accomplished in isolation from the Drina Corps Command. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that, following the take-over of Srebrenica, the Drina Corps Command continued to exercise command competencies in relation to its subordinate Brigades and that this command role was not suspended as a result of the involvement of the VRS Main Staff, or the security organs, in the Srebrenica follow-up activity.

(b) Responsibility of the Drina Corps Command for the Actions of Non-Drina Corps Units Operating in the Drina Corps Area of Responsibility in July 1995

277. The evidence adduced indicates that two units of the VRS, that were normally subordinated to the Main Staff, were operating in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility during July 1995 and are implicated in the crimes committed: the 10th Sabotage Detachment was involved in the executions at Branjevo Military Farm⁷¹⁹ and the Trial Chamber heard evidence that the Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment was involved in the assembly and detention of Bosnian Muslim prisoners near Nova Kasaba.⁷²⁰ Further, MUP forces, including a special MUP unit as well as units of municipal police, were also operating in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility during July 1995. MUP units were present in Potocari, on 12 and 13 July 1995⁷²¹ and were involved in the capture of Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the Nova Kasaba region on 13 July 1995.⁷²² The Prosecution also maintained that MUP personnel are implicated in the executions that took place at Jadar River on the morning of 13 July 1995.⁷²³ The Prosecution has argued that all of these units were resubordinated to the Drina Corps "during various times in July 1995", so that the Drina Corps Command bears responsibility for their actions.⁷²⁴

(i) The 10th Sabotage Detachment

278. The video of the VRS victory walk through Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 shows the presence of soldiers of the 10th Sabotage Detachment at a checkpoint and, subsequently, the Commander of

⁷¹⁸ Butler, T. 5277; and P 378.

⁷¹⁹ See the discussion *supra* paras. 234, 239-240.

⁷²⁰ Butler T. 4918; Butler Report, para. 2.12-2.13. The Defence agreed that this unit was involved in the capture of massive numbers of Bosnian Muslim prisoners. Defence Final Brief, para. 303.

⁷²¹ Butler, T. 4856-4859; Van Duijn, T. 1742-1744; 1747; 1760-1771; 1778; 1780-1783 (identifying Captain Mendeljev "Mane" Duric, MUP Battalion Commander; supervising the separation process and identifying Duško Jevic a.k.a. "Stalin" from the MUP). See also P 459, (report dated 13 July 1995 from the Main Staff to the Drina Corps intelligence department stating that the MUP had been looting from UNPROFOR and that the MUP requested permission to participate in searching the UNPROFOR base in Poto-ari after the departure of the refugees); and Butler, T. 4869.

⁷²² Butler Report, para. 2.13.

⁷²³ Prosecution Final Brief, para. 202. See also the discussion of police involvement in the Jadar River executions, *supra* para. 197.

⁷²⁴ Butler Report, para. 2.12

that unit, Miso Pelemis, is shown in the centre of Srebrenica town.⁷²⁵ Mr. Erdemovi}, who was a member of the 10th Sabotage Detachment at that time, confirmed that members of his unit were present in Srebrenica on 11 July 1995.⁷²⁶ General Krstic, however, denied that the 10th Sabotage Detachment was engaged with the Drina Corps units for the purposes of Krivaja 95. He testified that he was unaware of the presence of the 10th Sabotage Detachment on 11 July 1995, despite the fact that the video shows General Krstic walking past soldiers wearing uniforms belonging to this unit.⁷²⁷ Defence Witness DB, who was a Drina Corps officer present at the Pribicevac FCP during Krivaja 95, contradicted this. Witness DB confirmed that the 10th Sabotage Detachment had arrived around 9 or 10 July 1995.⁷²⁸ Witness DB believed that General Krstic also knew the 10th Sabotage Detachment had arrived by this time.⁷²⁹ Further evidence as to the knowledge General Krstic had about the involvement of the 10th Sabotage Detachment in Krivaja 95 came from Witness II, who was a member of the Drina Corps in July 1995 and was with General Krstic during the walk through Srebrenica on 11 July 1995. Witness II said that he saw Miso Pelemis at that time and that, quite possibly, General Krstic spoke to Pelemis in Srebrenica town.⁷³⁰ However, as argued by the Defence, the 10th Sabotage Detachment comprised about 30 men and they arrived around 10 July 1995 by which time the VRS was already on the brink of capturing Srebrenica. It seems unlikely that the Command of the Drina Corps would have called upon this unit to assist in the military attack at this stage.⁷³¹

279. It is known that, on 16 July 1995, members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment participated in the execution of the Bosnian Muslim men at Branjevo Farm and that troops from the Bratunac Brigade were also involved in the commission of these atrocities.⁷³² Prior to proceeding to the execution fields, the 10th Sabotage Detachment called in at the headquarters of the Zvornik Brigade where they met a Lieutenant Colonel accompanied by two members of the Drina Corps military police. This officer was clearly in charge of directing the subsequent executions, including the participation of the 10th Sabotage Detachment, at the Branjevo Farm.⁷³³ This scenario, the Prosecution argued, demonstrated that the 10th Sabotage Detachment had come under the command of the Drina Corps at the time. However, the Defence argued that this Lieutenant Colonel was in

⁷²⁵ P 145 ; and P 146.

⁷²⁶ Erdemovic, T. 3087-3091; Butler, T. 4825-4826.

⁷²⁷ Krstic T. 6507-6508.

⁷²⁸ Defence Witness DB, T. 7233.

⁷²⁹ Defence Witness DB, T. 7233.

⁷³⁰ Witness II, T. 9120.

⁷³¹ Defence closing argument, T. 10105.

⁷³² See the discussion *supra* para. 240.

⁷³³ See the discussion *infra* para. 239.

fact a member of the Main Staff and not the Drina Corps and the Trial Chamber is unable to rule out that possibility.⁷³⁴

280. General Radinovi} testified that not a single piece of evidence existed showing the Main Staff authorised the Command of the Drina Corps to act with the 10th Sabotage Detachment.⁷³⁵ Mr. Butler conceded that there was no specific document indicating the 10th Sabotage Detachment was acting under the command of the Drina Corps⁷³⁶ and accepted that he knew of no “technical evidence” to support the theory of resubordination.⁷³⁷

281. The Trial Chamber is unable to conclude that the 10th Sabotage Detachment was formally resubordinated to the Drina Corps Command on 16 July 1995 when members of this unit were involved in the executions at Branjevo Farm. Nonetheless, it is clear that there must have been close co-operation and co-ordination between the Drina Corps and this unit from the time they arrived in Srebrenica and continuing throughout the follow-up action thereto. The Drina Corps Command must have been fully aware of the presence of this unit within its zone of responsibility and, as has already been determined, units of the Drina Corps acted together with the 10th Sabotage Detachment in the commission of the executions at Branjevo Farm on 16 July 1995.

(ii) The 65th Protection Regiment

282. The Prosecution pointed to documents indicating that a Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment, which was based in Nova Kasaba, fell under the control of the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade and, by extension the Drina Corps Command, on or about 15 July 1995.⁷³⁸ However, the Trial Chamber heard no persuasive evidence that the 65th Protection Regiment was involved in any illegal activity after this time.⁷³⁹ Certainly though, the Drina Corps Command was well aware of the presence of this unit within its zone of responsibility following the take-over of Srebrenica and was organising co-operative action with them to block the column.⁷⁴⁰

⁷³⁴ See the discussion *Infra* paras. 239.

⁷³⁵ Radinovi}, T. 8053, 8056.

⁷³⁶ Butler, T. 5381.

⁷³⁷ Butler, T. 5342.

⁷³⁸ Butler T. 4996; and Butler Report, para. 2.12.

⁷³⁹ Mr. Butler conceded the Prosecution could provide no details as to how many prisoners were taken as part of the sweep operations in which the 65th Protection Regiment were participating with the Drina Corps from 15 July 1995. Butler, T. 5369.

⁷⁴⁰ See the discussion of documents referring to the joint operations of the 65th Protection Regiment and units of the Drina Corps *supra* para. 162.

(iii) The MUP

283. The Prosecution argued that MUP forces were subordinated to the Drina Corps for the purposes of Krivaja 95 based on the order for active combat, which designated "two or three companies of MUP" amongst the reserve forces for the operation.⁷⁴¹ Defence Witness DB agreed that, by virtue of the orders, MUP forces were to be involved in the attack on Srebrenica as reserve forces.⁷⁴² The Prosecution pointed to regulations specifying that, when conducting operations with the army, MUP units are subordinated to the army for the duration of those operations,⁷⁴³ and argued that, therefore, the MUP had been resubordinated to the Drina Corps Command.

284. Although General Krstic agreed that a special detachment of the MUP, commanded by Colonel Borov-anin, had arrived in Bratunac by 11 July 1995,⁷⁴⁴ he denied that any MUP forces acted as reserves for Krivaja 95.⁷⁴⁵ Certainly, Mr. Butler could not refer to any documentation indicating that the reserve MUP forces referred to in the plan were actually deployed.⁷⁴⁶ In order to engage the special MUP unit commanded by Colonel Borov-anin, permission had to be obtained from the RS Minister of the Interior and no document to that effect was ever produced during the course of the trial.⁷⁴⁷

285. Another Defence witness testified that the special MUP unit, commanded by Colonel Borov-anin, did arrive on or about 10 July 1995. However he too disputed that this unit was the same one mentioned in the plan for Krivaja 95. If it had been, he said, the Krivaja 95 plan would have referred to "the special MUP units", whereas the MUP units referred to in the plan were the local public security stations in local communities.⁷⁴⁸ On the other hand, Mr Butler believed the MUP forces specified as reserves in the Krivaja 95 plan would have been Special MUP forces rather than municipal police, given that they were included as a military infantry company in the plan.⁷⁴⁹

286. Regardless of whether the MUP forces that arrived in the Srebrenica on about 10 July 1995 were engaged by the Drina Corps for Krivaja 95 or not, it is clear that, upon the withdrawal of the 28th Division from the enclave following the take-over of Srebrenica, MUP forces were

⁷⁴¹ P 428.

⁷⁴² Witness DB, T. 7134.

⁷⁴³ P 420 (The Law on the Implementation of the Law of Internal Affairs During an Imminent Threat of War or a State of War), Butler, T. 4768.

⁷⁴⁴ Krstic, T. 6140, 6416.

⁷⁴⁵ Krstic, T. 6413, 6416, 6418.

⁷⁴⁶ Butler, T. 5372-5373.

⁷⁴⁷ Radinovi}, T. 8061-8062.

⁷⁴⁸ Defence Witness DB, T. 7149.

⁷⁴⁹ Butler, T. 4806-4807.

incorporated into the “follow-up” operation. MUP units were present in Poto-ari⁷⁵⁰ and they were also placed along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje road, where they engaged in blocking and capturing large numbers of men from the Bosnian Muslim column on 13 July 1995.⁷⁵¹

287. The Prosecution pointed to intercepted conversations that, in its view, demonstrate that these units were acting under the command of the Drina Corps.⁷⁵² Certainly the evidence reveals that there was close co-operation and co-ordination between the MUP and Drina Corps units. On 11 July 1995, before the VRS found out about the formation and movement of the Bosnian Muslim column, the Main Staff ordered the Drina Corps to take pre-emptive steps, “by arrangement and co-operation with the MUP” to block the passage of Bosnian Muslims to and from the enclave.⁷⁵³ A Dutch Bat officer in Poto-ari spoke to a member of the police present there who said that his unit “had a sort of liaison with...the Drina Corps” and that, although his unit was not a part of the Drina Corps, they were “more or less working together.”⁷⁵⁴ During a conversation between two unidentified participants at 0656 hours on 12 July regarding the Bosnian Muslim column, one participant suggested “Maybe we should see or you could see if the MUP...can set up some ambushes and so on.”⁷⁵⁵ The language of this intercept suggests a co-operative relationship rather than one in which the MUP could be directly ordered to carry out tasks by the Drina Corps. Similarly, in a further intercepted conversation, on 12 July 1995 at 1305 hours, General Krstic is heard ordering the Vlasenica Brigade to “Get in touch with these guys from the MUP. That means you, your Brigade and them.”⁷⁵⁶ Another intercepted conversation, on 13 July 1995 at 1945 hours, took place between a person, “X”, who was calling from “General Krstic’s” and looking for Ljubisa, which was probably a reference to Colonel Ljubisa Borov-anin the Deputy Commander of the special MUP Brigade.⁷⁵⁷ Shortly thereafter at 2040 hours, General Krstic spoke to Colonel Borov-anin, asked how things were going and stated that “we’ll be in touch.”⁷⁵⁸ Furthermore, as noted above, MUP forces were engaged with Brigades of the Drina Corps in blocking the retreating Bosnian Muslim column and in searching the former enclave.⁷⁵⁹ On 15 July 1995, Colonel Ignjat

⁷⁵⁰ See the discussion *supra* para. 151.

⁷⁵¹ See the discussion *supra* para. 162.

⁷⁵² For example: P 504; P 506; and Butler, T. 4938-4939 (regarding intercepted conversations dated 12 July 1995 at 0740 hours and 0748 hours respectively, suggesting that orders for MUP units were being passed on through the Commander of the Drina Corps 5th Engineers Battalion), P 507 (intercepted conversation at 0843 hours on 12 July). The Trial Chamber notes, however, that Butler’s response to this conversation was “You can’t read too much into this one. Clearly it is an awareness piece that the forces are operating together.” Butler, T. 4945). Commenting on the series of intercepts relied upon by the Prosecution to show MUP resubordination, Mr Butler stated that they demonstrate that Drina Corps and MUP units were “co-ordinating their activities”. Butler, T. 9206.

⁷⁵³ P. 830.

⁷⁵⁴ van Duijn, T. 1742-1743.

⁷⁵⁵ P 502.

⁷⁵⁶ P 446.

⁷⁵⁷ P 527.

⁷⁵⁸ P 529.

⁷⁵⁹ See the discussion *supra* paras. 162 and 192.

Milanovic the Drina Corps Chief of Anti-Aircraft Defence, recommended the appointment of Colonel Blagojević, the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade, as the Commander of all of the units who were sweeping the terrain of the former enclave in accordance with the order issued by General Krstić on 13 July 1995.⁷⁶⁰ The following day, Colonel Blagojević reported that he had visited all units involved in blocking the enemy, including the MUP, and that he had “defined their tasks, and organised their joint actions and communications.”⁷⁶¹ The Defence maintained that this was evidence only that these units were working together and did not speak of a formal command relationship. This position is supported by the fact that, on 17 July 1995, the Main Staff issued an order appointing an officer of the Main Staff to take over the co-ordination of these forces, indicating that the Main Staff was directing the activities of all these units.⁷⁶² In an intercepted conversation on 15 July 1995, Colonel Beara spoke to General Krstić about acquiring some additional men for the work he was engaged in.⁷⁶³ When General Krstić suggested to Colonel Beara “...then take those MUP guys from up there”, Colonel Beara replied “No, they won’t do anything, I talked to them”. Thus Colonel Beara had obviously already spoken to the MUP without going through the Drina Corps Command first, yet he clearly considered that he had to get permission from General Krstić to use Drina Corps personnel.

288. Mr. Butler conceded that, during the period between 11 and 13 July 1995, when all the activity was occurring along the Bratunac/Konjević Polje Road, there is no document demonstrating that the MUP was subordinated to the Drina Corps.⁷⁶⁴ Moreover, he accepted that there was no evidence showing that MUP reported to the Drina Corps Command or subordinate Brigades about their activities along the Bratunac Konjević-Polje road.⁷⁶⁵ The only information the Prosecution obtained from their investigations into this matter is that MUP personnel were reporting up through Colonel Borovčanin. Mr. Butler accepted that there is no evidence to link the MUP with any of the local army commands other than their physical presence.⁷⁶⁶ Under cross-examination, Mr. Butler conceded that an order sent from the Main Staff on 12 July 1995 specified that the MUP was to act “in collaboration” with subordinate Brigades of the Drina Corps and that a command relationship was not specifically indicated.⁷⁶⁷

289. The Trial Chamber is unable to conclude that the MUP units present in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility were subordinate to the Drina Corps during July 1995. The evidence

⁷⁶⁰ P 537.

⁷⁶¹ P 539 (Bratunac Brigade Daily Combat Report, 16 July 1995).

⁷⁶² P 649.

⁷⁶³ P 478.

⁷⁶⁴ Butler, T. 9204.

⁷⁶⁵ Butler, T. 9204-9205.

⁷⁶⁶ Butler, T. 9205.

⁷⁶⁷ D 165, Butler, T. 9200-9203.

presented, although certainly demonstrating close co-ordination and co-operation, does not conclusively establish that the Drina Corps had assumed command of MUP units. There is no doubt, however, that the Drina Corps was well aware of the presence of MUP units within their zone of responsibility, as well as the action being taken by MUP units to block and capture Bosnian Muslim men in the column.

7. Conclusions about the Involvement of the Drina Corps in the Srebrenica Crimes

290. There is no evidence that the Drina Corps devised or instigated any of the atrocities that followed the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995. The evidence strongly suggests that the criminal activity was being directed by the VRS Main Staff under the direction of General Mladić. It was General Mladić who victoriously led the VRS officers through the streets of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 and it was he who threatened and intimidated the Bosnian Muslim and UNPROFOR representatives at Hotel Fontana meetings, on 11 and 12 July 1995, while demanding the surrender of the 28th Division. He was directing events in Poto-ari, both the transport of the women, children and elderly from Poto-ari⁷⁶⁸ and the separation of the men and their detention in the White House.⁷⁶⁹ Eyewitnesses reported the physical presence of General Mladić at the Sandići Meadow and Nova Kasaba football fields where thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were detained on 13 July 1995.⁷⁷⁰ He was also identified as being physically present at the Grbavci School Detention Site and at Orahovac, observing the executions on 14 July 1995.⁷⁷¹ Colonel Beara, the head of the Security Administration of the VRS Main Staff, was also much in view⁷⁷² and there is further evidence suggesting the involvement of other individuals from the Main Staff in the criminal activity.⁷⁷³

291. However, the Main Staff did not have the resources to carry out the activities that occurred in the area of the former enclave following the take-over of Srebrenica on its own. The Main Staff was an organisational shell and was largely dependent upon the personnel and equipment of its subordinate Brigades to implement its objectives. It stands to reason that the Drina Corps, the VRS

⁷⁶⁸ See for example, P 445 (intercepted conversation at 1250 hours on 12 July 1995, in which General Mladić is heard speaking of buses and trucks, and stating "We'll evacuate them all, those who want to and those who don't want to.")

⁷⁶⁹ See generally, Butler, T. 4853-4854.

⁷⁷⁰ See also P 472 (an intercept on 15 July 1995, in which Colonel Beara refers to the "Commanders" orders, which appears to be a reference to General Mladić in the context of the executions); and Butler T. 5512 (discussing the presence of General Mladić on the Bratunac-Konjević Polje Road on 13 July 1995 while bodies lined the road, and his presence at Sandići where one individual was killed).

⁷⁷¹ See also the testimony of Witness S, T. 3261, regarding the possible involvement of General Mladić in the Jadar River executions on 13 July 1995.

⁷⁷² P 472; P 478; P 627.

⁷⁷³ Butler, T. 4786-4789. See also P 627 (in which a Main Staff officer by the name of Trkulja is mentioned in the context of discussions relating to the prisoners).

subordinate Corps stationed in the area of Srebrenica would have been called upon and the evidence consistently bears this out.

292. The Drina Corps was not oblivious to the overall VRS strategy of eliminating the Srebrenica enclave. This had always been the long-term Drina Corps objective in the area. Although Krivaja 95 started out as a limited operation, it quickly accelerated to a plan for taking over Srebrenica town when the opportunity presented itself on the evening of 9 July 1995. From that point, the Drina Corps continued to shell the enclave intensively with the intent to cause the Bosnian Muslim civilians to flee the area. The Drina Corps was also fully cognisant of the catastrophic humanitarian situation of the Bosnian Muslim refugees in Poto-ari and the fact that Bosnian Serb forces were terrorising the population there.

293. When the plan to transport the Bosnian Muslim population out of Poto-ari was devised, the Drina Corps were called upon to procure the buses. Drina Corps personnel were also present in Poto-ari, overseeing the transportation operation, knowing full well that the Bosnian Muslims were not exercising a genuine choice to leave the area.

294. It has not been established that the Drina Corps was involved in devising the plan to execute the military aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica. However, although there may have been some initial desire on the part of the Main Staff to limit knowledge about the executions, this could not be sustained for three reasons. First, the executions formed an integral part of the VRS follow-up activities after the take-over of Srebrenica and could not be neatly or secretly compartmentalised. So, for example, the Bosnian Muslim men were being captured from the column at the same time and along the same road used for the transportation of the women, children and elderly out of the enclave. The Drina Corps was preoccupied with both the transportation operation and the passage of the Bosnian Muslim column at the time and thus inevitably had to know that the men were being taken prisoner. Second, the massive scale of the atrocities, all of which occurred within a section of the Drina Corps zone of responsibility (in an area that was no more than about 80 kilometres at its longest and widest points⁷⁷⁴) meant, inescapably, the Drina Corps must have known about their occurrence. Third, in the absence of sufficient personnel and equipment of its own, the Main Staff had to rely upon resources of the Drina Corps to assist with the executions.

295. Certainly the evidence does not conclusively demonstrate that the Drina Corps was informed of all aspects of the executions plan from the outset. Rather, it appears that the Corps'

⁷⁷⁴ These figures have been calculated on the basis of the map of the Drina Corps area of responsibility annexed to the Amended Indictment against General Krstic, dated 27 October 1999.

knowledge of, and involvement in, these atrocities gradually increased as the events unfolded. On 12 July and 13 July 1995, Drina Corps personnel knew that Bosnian Muslim men were being separated from the women, children and elderly in Poto-ari, taken from the buses passing through Ti{}a and detained, and that there was a real question as to what the fate of these men would be. From the evening of 12 July 1995, the Drina Corps knew that Bosnian Muslim men were being captured from the column attempting to break out of the enclave and that, on 13 July 1995, thousands of prisoners had been taken along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje road. The act of capturing the prisoners, of itself, was not unlawful. It could have been consistent with a plan to screen them for war crimes and/or ultimately exchange them for Bosnian Serb prisoners of war. However, it quickly became apparent that this was not the case. Bosnian Serb plans for the Bosnian Muslim men were radically revised in light of the knowledge that, on 12 and 13 July 1995, some 6,000 prisoners had been taken from the column fleeing through the woods. On 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command could not but have known that thousands of these captured Bosnian Muslim men had been taken to the Kravica Warehouse aboard busses originally procured by the Drina Corps for the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim refugees from Poto-ari and that these men were subsequently executed that same day. The Drina Corps Command must also have known that the remainder of the Bosnian Muslim men were not transferred to regular prisoner of war facilities but instead were detained in Bratunac without any provisions made for food, water or other necessities. For thousands of prisoners, arranging such provisions would have been no small task. Yet there was no evidence of any steps being taken in this regard, nor of inquiries made by the Drina Corps Command about what plans were being made for the Bosnian Muslim prisoners. It is also apparent that, by 13 July 1995 when a vehicle began scouting for detention sites, the Zvornik Brigade was aware of plans to transport the Bosnian Muslim prisoner's northward, to sites within its zone of responsibility. This decision to transport them to remote locations up north (again with no provision made for food or water), rather than to recognised prisoner of war facilities, amounted to an unequivocal signal that a mass executions plan was in operation. The Trial Chamber finds that, by the evening of 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command must have been aware of the VRS plan to execute all of the thousands of military aged Bosnian Muslim mens who were captured in the area of the former enclave.

296. In contrast to the scant evidence implicating the Drina Corps in the commission of the mass executions that took place on 13 July 1995, there is substantial and compelling evidence showing that between 14 July and 17 July 1995, the resources of subordinate Drina Corps Brigades were utilised to assist with the mass executions. Given that these subordinate Brigades continued to operate under the Command of the Drina Corps, the Command itself must have known of the involvement of its subordinate units in the executions as of 14 July 1995. This is particularly so in

view of the pressing military situation facing these units which must have prompted especially careful monitoring of Corps resources.

C. The Role of General Krstic in the Srebrenica Crimes

297. Having considered the role of the Drina Corps in the criminal activities that occurred following the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995, the Trial Chamber now proceeds to consider the specific role that the accused, General Krstic, played in these events.

1. Background Information

298. General Radislav Krstic was born in the village of Nedjeljište, in the municipality of Vlasenica, Bosnia, on 15 February 1948. Prior to the war in Bosnia, General Krstic was a Lieutenant Colonel in the JNA and he joined the VRS in July 1992. His first appointment was as Commander of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, which initially fell under the organisational structure of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the VRS, but was later resubordinated to the VRS Drina Corps. He was promoted to the rank of Colonel in October 1992.⁷⁷⁵ On 8 August 1994, the RS Minister of Defence appointed him as Chief of Staff/Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps, effective 15 August 1994.⁷⁷⁶ General Krstic assumed his new duty from the outgoing officer on 29 September 1994.⁷⁷⁷

299. In late December 1994, General Krstic was seriously injured when he stepped on a landmine. He was evacuated to a military hospital in Sokolac and subsequently transferred to the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade. As a result of the injuries he sustained from the landmine, part of his leg was amputated. He remained in rehabilitation and on leave until mid May 1995, when he resumed his work as the Drina Corps Chief of Staff/Deputy Commander.⁷⁷⁸ On 2 May 1995, the Drina Corps Commander, General @ivanovi}, recommended then-Colonel Krstic for early promotion to the rank of General-Major, which became effective on 28 June 1995.⁷⁷⁹

300. Throughout July 1995, General Krstic was frequently referred to by his shortened name of "Krlle". In the video of the VRS victory walk through Srebrenica on 11 July 1995, General Mladic is heard calling General Krstic by this name.⁷⁸⁰ Witness Z, a Bosnian Muslim intercept operator,

⁷⁷⁵ Krstic, T. 5972.

⁷⁷⁶ Butler Report, para. 8.3 & fn. 313.

⁷⁷⁷ Stipulations paras. 1-2; and Krstic, T. 5980.

⁷⁷⁸ Krstic, T. 6026-6028.

⁷⁷⁹ Agreed Facts, para. 12.

⁷⁸⁰ P 3.

said that even he and his colleagues referred to General Krstic as “Krlc” amongst themselves, because General Krstic was so often called by that name in the intercepted conversations.⁷⁸¹

2. Summary of the Defence Case

301. During his testimony before the Trial Chamber, General Krstic repeatedly stressed that, as a career military officer, he fully respected the laws of armed conflict. Several witnesses who testified on his behalf confirmed his strict approach to ensuring compliance with the Geneva Conventions among his troops and the humanitarian manner in which he treated members of the civilian population during the course of the war in Bosnia.⁷⁸² Defence Witness DC, who in July 1995 was a Drina Corps officer, expressed bewilderment as to why General Krstic should be the one on trial for the Srebrenica crimes:

All that we were able to see and hear about him [General Krstic] and our experience working with him has suddenly been totally undermined, and I simply cannot understand why he should have been accused. Because later when we learnt what had happened in the environs of Srebrenica, he could not have ordered that to happen, because throughout the war, everything he did and said was quite in the opposite sense.⁷⁸³

302. General Krstic accepted that the Drina Corps was responsible for planning and executing Krivaja 95, although he testified that he was not personally charged with drawing up the plans, nor did he provide any special advice in relation to the attack.⁷⁸⁴ He emphasised that it was a very limited operation designed to separate the Srebrenica and @epa enclaves and was a direct response to military activities being conducted by the ABiH in the area.⁷⁸⁵ The civilian population was not targeted in any way⁷⁸⁶ and General Krstic pointed out that the plan for Krivaja 95 specifically stated that, in dealing with prisoners of war and civilians, the Geneva Conventions were to be strictly complied with.⁷⁸⁷

303. From 5 July 1995, General Krstic was present at the FCP in Pribicevac in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps.⁷⁸⁸ On 9 July 1995, however, he said that General Mladic arrived at the FCP and subsequently assumed command of the operation, thereby sidelining both himself

⁷⁸¹ Witness Z, T. 4478.

⁷⁸² See: Defence Opening Statement, T. 5954; Krstic, T. 5973-5974, 7407, 7412-7413; Defence Witness Mr. Milenko Radulovi} (hereafter “Radulovi}”) T. 7595; Defence Witness DA, T. 6890-6893, 6895-6896; Defence Witness Borov-anin, T. 6997; Defence Witness DC T. 7451-7452, 7508-7509, 7512; Defence Witness Mr. Vlado Rudovi}, T. 7535-7356, 7545; Defence Witness DE, T. 7696. Witness II also confirmed that General Krstic always behaved in a professional manner, both towards his own colleagues and Bosnian Muslim soldiers. T. 9156-9157.

⁷⁸³ Defence Witness DC, T. 7451-7452.

⁷⁸⁴ Krstic, T. 7571.

⁷⁸⁵ Krstic, T. 6123-6125.

⁷⁸⁶ Krstic, T. 6410, Radinovi}, T.7953.

⁷⁸⁷ P 428.

⁷⁸⁸ Krstic, T. 6423.

and General @ivanovi} (who was also at the FCP by that time).⁷⁸⁹ It was General Mladic, acting pursuant to a decision issued by President Karad' i},⁷⁹⁰ who ordered the continuation of the attack to capture Srebrenica.⁷⁹¹ Although he was present as General Mladic victoriously strode through the streets of Srebrenica, General Krstic testified that he was not happy about the unfolding events. When General Mladic impatiently ordered the further continuation of the attack towards Poto-ari and Bratunac, Drina Corps Brigade Commanders prevailed upon him to reconsider, pointing out the dire consequences for the civilian population and the international condemnation of the VRS that would surely follow.⁷⁹² Furthermore, they argued, the whereabouts of the 28th Division was unknown and, from a military point of view, it would be foolish to accelerate the attack in the absence of such information. On this occasion they were successful and General Mladic, although angry, retracted his orders.⁷⁹³

304. Following completion of Krivaja 95, General Krsti} said that he attended a meeting called by General Mladic at the Bratunac Brigade Headquarters on the evening of 11 July 1995.⁷⁹⁴ At this meeting, General Mladic informed the assembled Drina Corps troops of VRS plans to launch an attack against the "safe area" of @epa.⁷⁹⁵ General Mladi} appointed General Krstic to be the commander of the forces engaged for @epa.⁷⁹⁶ Thereafter, General Krstic maintained, @epa became his over-riding concern and he had no further knowledge of events occurring back in the Srebrenica area: General Mladic assumed complete control of all the Srebrenica follow-up activities. General Krstic testified that he met with General Mladic at the Drina Corps headquarters in Vlasenica on 13 July 1995, whereupon General Mladic reiterated: "Krstic, you are the Commander of the forces engaged towards @epa. Until the completion of the @epa operation, you should not be coming back to the Vlasenica Command Post."⁷⁹⁷

305. Although General Krstic was present at two of the three Hotel Fontana meetings convened by General Mladic to discuss the fate of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Srebrenica, he maintained that he did not speak or have any discussions with General Mladic about these Bosnian Muslim refugees.⁷⁹⁸ He resolutely denied that he had any involvement in organising the transfer of

⁷⁸⁹ Krstic, T. 6185 (stating that General Mladic arrived at the FCP on 9 July 1995); and Krstic, T. 6188, 6428-6429. (stating that after General Mladi} assumed command, he and General @ivanovi} were effectively sidelined).

⁷⁹⁰ P 432.

⁷⁹¹ Krstic T.6427. This was confirmed by Defence Witness DB, T.7069-7070, T.7229.

⁷⁹² Krstic, T. 6195,

⁷⁹³ Krstic, T.6196; and P 770 (Photo of General Mladic sitting down and General Krstic standing over him communicating, which General Krstic said was taken after General Mladic gave order to continue operation towards Poto-ari. Krstic T. 6509).

⁷⁹⁴ Krstic, T. 6567. See also Defence Witness DB, T. 7092; and Defence Final Brief, para. 266.

⁷⁹⁵ Krstic, T. 6575.

⁷⁹⁶ Krstic, T. 6575-6576.

⁷⁹⁷ Krstic, T. 6233

⁷⁹⁸ Krstic, T. 6583.

the women, children, and the elderly from Poto-ari, or that he was even present in Poto-ari while that was happening. Upon the conclusion of the Hotel Fontana meeting, on 12 July 1995, he said he travelled back towards the Pribicevac FCP and, on the way, was stopped at a checkpoint in Poto-ari. He testified that soldiers acting upon orders from General Mladic refused to let him pass.⁷⁹⁹ By coincidence, he happened upon a television crew at the checkpoint and agreed to give a brief interview, after which he turned around and went back in the direction of Bratunac in order to continue his journey to the Pribicevac FCP.⁸⁰⁰ At the Poto-ari checkpoint he saw no signs of any refugees or the buses transporting them.

306. General Krstic testified that he first learned of the existence of the Bosnian Muslim column in the evening of 12 July 1995.⁸⁰¹ At this time he was informed that the column was comprised of members of the 28th Division and heard nothing about the presence of civilians in the column.⁸⁰² General Krstic also maintained that he heard nothing about the subsequent capture of men from the column during the week commencing 12 July 1995.⁸⁰³

307. General Krstic argued that, throughout the period during which the executions took place, he held the position of Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps. According to his version of events, he did not become Commander of the Drina Corps until 20 or 21 July 1995, when General Mladic appointed him to this position during a ceremony at a restaurant in the Han Kram hamlet.⁸⁰⁴ General @ivanovi} remained in his position as Commander of the Drina Corps until this time. Furthermore, as already noted, General Krstic said that, at a meeting at the Bratunac Brigade Headquarters on the evening of 11 July 1995, General Mladic appointed General Krstic commander of the VRS military operations in @epa. From that point, until the conclusion of the @epa operation on 2 August 1995, General Krstic was entirely focused upon @epa and had no involvement in any other Drina Corps matters.⁸⁰⁵ General Krstic testified that he had absolutely no knowledge of the executions until the end of August or beginning of September in 1995. Several other Defence witnesses confirmed that knowledge of the executions was not widespread within the VRS prior to August 1995. Witness DA, a Drina Corps officer during July 1995, said that he had no access to reliable information about the killings prior to the time that General Krstic was arrested.⁸⁰⁶ Defence Witness DC, another Drina Corps officer, did not hear any reports about the executions until two or

⁷⁹⁹ Krstic, T. 6644.

⁸⁰⁰ Krstic, T. 6642-6643.

⁸⁰¹ Krstic, T. 7390.

⁸⁰² Krstic, T. 7390.

⁸⁰³ Krstic, T. 7392-7393.

⁸⁰⁴ Krstic, T. 6263-6265.

⁸⁰⁵ Krstic, T. 6585.

⁸⁰⁶ Defence Witness DA, T. 6962.

three months after the take-over of Srebrenica.⁸⁰⁷ In particular, from 12 July to 2 August 1995, Witness DC did not hear any rumours about disappearances.⁸⁰⁸ A Drina Corps soldier engaged in the @epa operation, testified that during the period he was in @epa, he did not hear anything about the executions. He found out about the allegations for the first time at the beginning of October when he saw reports on television.⁸⁰⁹ Similarly, Defence Witness DF, another Drina Corps officer, did not receive any information that VRS killed thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners from Srebrenica from any Serb sources: he only became aware of these allegations through the mass media.⁸¹⁰

308. As already discussed, the existence of a parallel chain of command, whereby General Mladic and the Main Staff of the VRS assumed control of decision making relating to both the capture of Srebrenica, and the Srebrenica follow-up operations (including the bussing of the Bosnian Muslim population and the detention and execution of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men) was a central contention of the Defence case.

309. General Krstic did not contest the fact that the mass executions of Bosnian Muslim men in the Srebrenica enclave had taken place in July 1995,⁸¹¹ but he maintained that he first found out about these crimes at the end of August, or the beginning of September 1995. At this time, another Drina Corps officer informed him of certain aspects of the Bosnian Muslim executions perpetrated by senior officers in the VRS Main Staff and of the fact that one senior officer of the Drina Corps was involved in these crimes.⁸¹² Upon receipt of the information, he took steps to have this officer removed, but to no avail.⁸¹³ General Krstic felt there was nothing else he could do given that a superior officer from the Main Staff had instigated the crimes. He also held grave fears for the safety of his family and himself and saw no option but to remain silent.⁸¹⁴ Resignation was not something he considered appropriate as, in his view, the crimes were instigated by isolated individuals within the VRS and could not be attributed to the VRS as a whole.⁸¹⁵ Consequently, General Krstic stayed on in the VRS and contributed to the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords.⁸¹⁶ At the time of his arrest, he was the Commander of the 5th Corps. General Krstic said

⁸⁰⁷ Defence Witness DC, T. 7459.

⁸⁰⁸ Defence Witness DC, T. 7514.

⁸⁰⁹ Defence Witness Radulovi}, T.7 599.

⁸¹⁰ Defence Witness DF, T. 8542.

⁸¹¹ See the discussion *supra* para. 78.

⁸¹² Krstic, T. 6315, 6751-6753, 6851.

⁸¹³ Krstic, T. 6827

⁸¹⁴ Krstic, T. 6828, 7388.

⁸¹⁵ Krstic, T. 7389

⁸¹⁶ Krstic, T. 6309.

he made no effort to hide or to avoid contact with UN forces, as his conscience was clear about his conduct during the war.⁸¹⁷

310. The Trial Chamber now considers the claims made by the Defence in light of the evidence presented by the Prosecution.

3. The Command Position Held by General Krstic Throughout the Relevant Period

311. There was no dispute between the parties that, upon the commencement of Krivaja 95 on 6 July 1995, General Krstic was Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps. There was, however, a fundamental disagreement as to the precise time at which General Krstic assumed the role of Commander of the Drina Corps. The Prosecution argued that General Krstic assumed the role of Commander of the Drina Corps at around 2000 hours on 13 July 1995, at which time the mass executions of Bosnian Muslim men had commenced. The Defence denied this, and stated that General Krstic did not take over as Commander of the Drina Corps from General @ivanovi} until 20 or 21 July 1995, at a special hand-over ceremony at the Han Kram restaurant. General Mladic arrived in a helicopter with General Tolimir and read out a decree issued by President Karad' i}, thereby placing General @ivanovi} at the disposal of the Main Staff, appointing General Krstic as Commander of the Drina Corps and appointing Colonel Andri} as Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps.⁸¹⁸ By this time all of the executions had already occurred. However, even on the Defence version of events, General Krstic was Commander of the Drina Corps in September and early October 1995 when the bodies of executed Bosnian Muslim men were removed from primary graves to more remote secondary mass gravesites.⁸¹⁹

(a) The Evidence

312. The Prosecution relied both on documentary evidence and eyewitness evidence from two individuals, who were members of the Drina Corps in July 1995, to support its claim that General Krstic took over command of the Drina Corps on 13 July 1995. One of these individuals, Witness II, testified that, on the day prior to the commencement of the @epa operation⁸²⁰ (which began on 14 July 1995) he and General Krstic travelled to Viogora where General Krstic addressed the troops assembling for @epa.⁸²¹ Afterwards, they returned to the Drina Corps Command Post in Vlasenica where General Mladic had already begun assembling all the officers present. General Mladic then

⁸¹⁷ Krstic, T. 6309-6311.

⁸¹⁸ Krstic T. 6263-6266.

⁸¹⁹ See the discussion *supra* para. 78.

⁸²⁰ Witness II, T. 9128, 9131.

⁸²¹ Witness II, T. 9128.

appointed General Krstic as Corps Commander.⁸²² The time of the ceremony was between four and six in the afternoon.⁸²³ However, Witness II was unsure about exactly when the appointment of General Krstic as Corps Commander became effective.⁸²⁴ Witness II was quite clear, however, that "at @epa...everybody addressed General Krstic as Commander, meaning Corps Commander."⁸²⁵

313. The account given by Witness II was largely corroborated by the statement "OA" made to the OTP on 29 March 2000. "OA" said that in the afternoon of 13 or 14 July 1995, General Mladi} assembled all those present at the Drina Corps Headquarters in Vlasenica and announced that, from that very day, General Krstic had assumed the role of Corps Commander and that General @ivanovi} was retiring. At the same time, General Mladi} appointed Colonel Andri} as Corps Chief of Staff.⁸²⁶ "OA" thought that the transport of the Bosnian Muslim population from Poto-ari was still going on at the time the ceremony took place,⁸²⁷ which lends some support to the proposition that the ceremony must have taken place on 13 July 1995. The Trial Chamber notes, however, that "OA's" statement was not tested under cross-examination and, therefore, the weight attributed to it must be reduced accordingly. However, an intercepted conversation at 1822 hours on 13 July further supports the presence of General Krstic at the Drina Corps Headquarters in the company of General Mladic⁸²⁸ and is consistent with the evidence of both Witness II and "OA".

314. Although the parties agreed that official documentation regarding the hand over process must have been completed, neither party was able to produce this vital piece of paper during the main trial. It was only after the Defence surrebuttal case had been completed in April 2001 that the Prosecution finally managed to secure, from General @ivanovi}, documentation relating to the appointment of General Krstic as Commander of the Drina Corps. The document supported the Prosecution's claim that General Mladic had indeed appointed General Krstic as Corps Commander during a ceremony at Drina Corps headquarters on the afternoon of 13 July 1995 and that General Krstic assumed his new role of Corps Commander at that time.⁸²⁹

315. The Defence, while not disputing the authenticity of the stamp or signature on the document,⁸³⁰ argued that the document could not be viewed as evidence that General Krstic assumed the position of Corps Commander on 13 July 1995. General Radinovi} concluded it was

⁸²² Witness II, T. 9129.

⁸²³ Witness II, T. 9171.

⁸²⁴ Witness II, T. 9167.

⁸²⁵ Witness II, T. 9167.

⁸²⁶ P 886.

⁸²⁷ P 887; and P 886.

⁸²⁸ P 458.

⁸²⁹ P 905.

⁸³⁰ T. 9676.

possible that the document “was created by General @ivanovi} at the time for some unofficial purpose, or was created after the fact.”⁸³¹

316. Certainly, there are some inconsistencies in the 13 July 1995 handover document. Foremost amongst these is the fact that the document states that the handover was carried out pursuant to “the Decree of the President of Republika Srpska”. However, the decree naming General Krstic as commander of the Drina Corps was not issued by President Karadžić until 14 July 1995 and stated it was to take effect as of 15 July 1995. According to Mr. Butler, the Prosecution’s own military expert, under the law in Republika Srpska, President Karadžić was the only person authorised to appoint someone as Commander of the Drina Corps.⁸³² Mr. Butler was unable to explain why President Karadžić would have signed an order to take effect on 15 July 1995 if he actually meant it to take effect on 13 July 1995. General Dannatt speculated that General Mladic had appointed General Krstic as Corps Commander on 13 July pursuant to oral permission from President Karadžić with written ratification following the next day.⁸³³

317. The Trial Chamber is also mindful of Defence evidence that, pursuant to VRS rules and practice, certain formal procedures must be completed before the command of the Corps can be transferred.⁸³⁴ In particular, General Radinovi} argued that official minutes of handover (bearing the signatures of General Mladic, General Krstic, and General @ivanovi}) would have to be prepared before General Krstic could acquire the rights and duties attached to the position of Corps Commander.⁸³⁵ However, at least one Defence witness acknowledged that formal procedures for the hand over of duty could be, for good cause, dispensed with.⁸³⁶

318. Consistent with the notion that General @ivanovi} ceased to be Corps Commander some time on the evening of 13 July 1995, the last known order signed by General @ivanovi} in this capacity was sent out at 1730 hours on 13 July 1995.⁸³⁷ The same evening, at 2030 hours, General Krstic issued his 13 July 1995 search order directing units of the Bratunac and Mili}i Brigades and the Skelani Separate Battalion to begin sweep operations in the area of the former Srebrenica enclave.⁸³⁸ General Krstic signed this order with the word “Commander” under his signature. The

⁸³¹ D 181 (Statement of Prof. Gen. Radovan Radinovi}, dated 26 May 2001, submitted in response to the Prosecutor’s Motion to Reopen), p. 7; Radinovi}, T. 9733.

⁸³² P 406; and Butler, T. 4752.

⁸³³ Dannatt, T. 5703-5705.

⁸³⁴ Krstic, T. 7412; Defence Witness DE, T. 7612-7614; Defence Witness DB, T. 7337-7338.

⁸³⁵ Radinovi}, T. 9736-9739.

⁸³⁶ Defence Witness DB, T. 7297. This witness was an officer in the Drina Corps in July 1995 and accepted the possibility that someone may, *de facto*, assume command prior to the issuance of formal documentation signed by the President.

⁸³⁷ P 462.

⁸³⁸ P 463.

Prosecution argued that, by signing as "Commander", General Krstic was making a clear statement that he had taken over as Commander of the Drina Corps.⁸³⁹ The following day, the Bratunac Brigade issued an implementing order in response to the search order issued by General Krstic and raised no questions about his authority to direct their activities.⁸⁴⁰

319. The Defence did not dispute that the 13 July 1995 search order was signed by General Krstic as Commander, but maintained that it was done only in his role as Commander of the @epa operation and not the entire Drina Corps.⁸⁴¹ The Prosecutor in turn argued that the normal practice for someone in such a position would be to identify himself as a commander of the particular operative group, not just as Commander.

320. The Prosecution also relied upon the substance of the 13 July 1995 search order to support the claim that General Krstic had assumed the role of Corps Commander by the time it was issued. In the opinion of Mr. Butler, this order dealing with search operations in the former Srebrenica enclave had absolutely nothing to do with the @epa operation.⁸⁴² By contrast, General Krstic testified that the terrain of the former enclave had to be searched before starting towards @epa and that the order therefore formed part of the preparations for the @epa operation that was due to begin on 14 July 1995.⁸⁴³ Certainly, the Trial Chamber heard evidence that the whereabouts of the 28th Division of the ABiH was a matter of great concern to the VRS units preparing for @epa.⁸⁴⁴

321. The most puzzling aspect of the Prosecution case is that, although the last written order issued by General @ivanovic in his capacity as Drina Corps Commander was dated 13 July 1995, there is evidence that he continued to exercise some command authority up until 14 July 1995. General @ivanovic is heard in a number of radio intercepts on 14 July 1995. At 0910 hours on 14 July 1995 the duty officer of the Zvornik Brigade, Major Jokic, called and spoke to General @ivanovic.⁸⁴⁵ Major Jokic told General @ivanovic that he had information about a "huge group" of "Turks" moving towards Velja Glava. General @ivanovic instructed Major Jokic to inform "Mane" who had "policemen in Konjevic Polje and Zvornik." General Zivanovic stated that the Zvornik Public Security Centre would have to handle it as "the Army is busy." That evening, at 2038 hours, General @ivanovic told Major Jokic that reinforcements would be arriving in the morning and that Obrenovic (the Zvornik Brigade Chief of Staff) should maintain pressure and reconnaissance activities against the column. During this conversation, General @ivanovic said "take this as an

⁸³⁹ P 759 (showing both orders side by side for the purposes of comparison).

⁸⁴⁰ P 464. See also Butler T.4890; and Dannatt T.5644, and Radinovic, T. 8350-8351.

⁸⁴¹ Krstic, T. 6248-6249; Defence Witness DB T. 7335.

⁸⁴² Butler, T. 4888.

⁸⁴³ Krstic, T. 6686.

⁸⁴⁴ See the discussion *supra* para. 303.

⁸⁴⁵ P 555.

order.”⁸⁴⁶ The Prosecution hypothesised that, although General @ivanovi} had been relieved of Command by this time, he was still a superior VRS officer. Given that General Krstic appears to have been out of contact on 14 July 1995, the Prosecution argued that General @ivanovi} was stepping in on urgent matters relating to the column.⁸⁴⁷ Another conversation, recorded at 2056 hours on 14 July 1995, took place between General @ivanovi} and Colonel Vukovic, the commander of the Skelani Separate Battalion. General Zivanovic stated he had received the paper that Blagojevic (the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade) sent and that Colonel Vukovic should read his conclusions.⁸⁴⁸ In a further conversation, on 14 July 1995 at 2056 hours, an unidentified major was heard to ask “(h)ow can I find out where General @ivanovi} is as I’ve been waiting here for him on his orders since 1700 hours.” The unidentified major was subsequently put through to speak to General @ivanovi} later in the same conversation. He then proceeded to give General @ivanovi} a briefing on certain events, to which General @ivanovi} responded “excellent.”⁸⁴⁹ Mr. Butler was not able to explain why General @ivanovi} continued to play such a prominent role in co-ordinating the work of the Drina Corps if the command had truly passed to General Krstic, although Witness II testified that General @ivanovi} had close ties with people in the area and had remained there for two months or more after he had ceased being Corps Commander.⁸⁵⁰

322. However, one intercepted conversation at 0935 hours on 14 July 1995 provides a clue that General @ivanovi} was winding up his involvement with the Drina Corps. General @ivanovi} said to the other participant in the conversation “I’m here at the command post but I’m slowly packing my backpack, they’ve [presumably the Main Staff or the Supreme Command] already asked me to go somewhere else...”⁸⁵¹ There is also one radio intercept at 2236 hours on this same date that suggests General Krstic may have been physically present in the area around Srebrenica and that he had been briefed on certain matters. The conversation is between “Malinic” (probably Major Zoran Malinic, the Commander of the Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment) and an unidentified individual. The unidentified individual said “Krstic has just come up here. He went back there, he’ll call me later. He’ll look into it, and will assign someone to co-ordinate it...Yes, yes I know...Hey listen, I know. Just take it easy, this is an open line. I’m up to speed...@ivanovi} told me. Well, in short, now I have told Krle [the shortened name for General Krstic] about that, about what should/be/done. I suggested what he should do, so he’ll do something...”⁸⁵²

⁸⁴⁶ P 556.

⁸⁴⁷ Butler, T. 5049-5051, and 5438.

⁸⁴⁸ P 558; Butler, T. 5439-5442; and Butler Report, para. 8.25 & fns. 348-349; para. 8.27 & fn.351.

⁸⁴⁹ P 558.

⁸⁵⁰ Witness II, T. 9129.

⁸⁵¹ Butler Report, para. 8.21 & fn. 342, 343; P 466.

⁸⁵² P 364/1 (14 July 1995 tab 11).

323. At 0954 hours on 15 July 1995, Colonel Beara, the Security Chief of the Main Staff, was heard in an intercepted conversation asking General @ivanovi} to arrange for some men to be sent to him.⁸⁵³ General @ivanovi} replied that he could not “arrange for that anymore” and told Colonel Beara to call the “Zlatar” (the Drina Corps Command) switchboard at extension 385. A few minutes later, a conversation was intercepted between General Krstic and Colonel Beara during which Colonel Beara repeated the request he had made to General @ivanovi} and asked General Krstic to help him get the men he needed. General Krstic undertook to see what he could do to help Colonel Beara, clearly showing that he had taken over this authority from General @ivanovi}.⁸⁵⁴

324. Also on 15 July 1995, Colonel Ignat Milanovi}, the Drina Corps Chief of Anti-Aircraft Defence, sent a report to General Krstic at the FCP, proposing the appointment of Colonel Blagojevi}, the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade, to co-ordinate forces operating in the vicinity of the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje-Mili}i Road.⁸⁵⁵ Under cross-examination, General Krstic agreed that he had accepted this proposal.⁸⁵⁶ Subsequently, on 16 July 1995, Colonel Blagojevi} sent a report stating that he had visited the units involved and organised their joint action, again demonstrating that General Krstic was exercising command competencies in relation to Drina Corps units operating back in the Srebrenica area.⁸⁵⁷

325. In the days following 15 July 1995, General Krstic is noted issuing orders about matters clearly unrelated to the @epa operation, further confirming his role as Corps Commander. On 17 July 1995 General Krstic signed an order relating to mobilisation issues as Commander.⁸⁵⁸ At 0615 hours on that same day, General Krstic had a conversation with Captain Trbi}, who was acting as duty officer for the Zvornik Brigade, and then Colonel Pandurevi}, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade.⁸⁵⁹ During the course of the conversation, General Krstic acknowledged he had received reports sent by the Zvornik Brigade about the situation back in its zone of responsibility and that he had personally received an update from the Brigade Commander. In a further intercepted conversation, on 17 July 1995 at 0910 hours, General Krstic urgently ordered Lieutenant Colonel Vla-ic (who was temporarily acting as Chief of Staff of the newly formed 4th Drinski Light Infantry

⁸⁵³ P 472.

⁸⁵⁴ P 478.

⁸⁵⁵ P 537.

⁸⁵⁶ Krstic, T. 6695-6696.

⁸⁵⁷ P 539.

⁸⁵⁸ P 481. The Trial Chamber does not accept the explanation put forward by General Krstic that, although dated 17 July 1995, this document was signed, on about 22 or 23 July, after his return from the @epa operation. See Krstic, T. 6729-6730, 7361-7362.

⁸⁵⁹ P 650

Brigade deployed in the area of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps⁸⁶⁰) to return to his unit (the Bira} Brigade).⁸⁶¹ This demonstrates that General Krstic was taking responsibility for matters unconnected to the @epa operation. Finally, on 19 July 1995 at 0812 hours, Colonel Pandurevi}, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, was heard in conversation with Colonel Cerovi}, the Drina Corps Assistant Commander for Moral, Legal and Religious Affairs. Colonel Cerovi} informed Colonel Pandurevi} that in accordance with an order issued by General Krstic there could be no shift rotations for the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, again a matter that appears to be unconnected with the @epa operation, and the Defence did not seek to provide an explanation to the contrary.⁸⁶²

326. On 17 July 1995, a typed document was sent by the Bratunac Brigade, discussing a date for a farewell ceremony for General @ivanovi} on 23 June (probably meant to read 23 July). The document was originally written by hand and dispatched on 14 July 1995 to the communications centre to be typed and distributed.⁸⁶³ The document reads:

(w)e wish to inform you that we shall be able to secure the presence of the Command and representatives of the municipal authorities for the official farewell for General @ivanovi}, hitherto commander of the Drina Corps...

Also on 17 July 1995, General @ivanovi} himself issued an announcement relating to the "send-off" lunch-time gathering planned for him at the Jela restaurant in Han Kram on 20 July 1995.⁸⁶⁴ While the title of the document was "Send-off ceremony for the corps commander, announcement" the body of the document again referred to General @ivanovi} as the "hitherto corps commander". The parties strenuously debated whether the use of the word "hitherto" indicates that, at the time these documents were written (14 July and 17 July respectively), General @ivanovi} was no longer the Commander of the Drina Corps; a dispute that was complicated by translation ambiguities.⁸⁶⁵ Certainly though, General @ivanovi}'s signature on the document he issued on 17 July 1995 did not include any reference to him being Corps Commander. By contrast, documents issued by General @ivanovi} prior to 13 July show that his signature invariably included a reference to his position as Commander of the Drina Corps.

⁸⁶⁰ P 652.

⁸⁶¹ P 652.

⁸⁶² P 694. See also P 677 (intercepted conversation at 0712 hours on 18 July 1995 between General Krstic and Colonel Veleti} discussing matters outside the Corps zone); and P 680 (intercepted conversation on 18 July 1995 at 0716 hours between General Krstic and Colonel Cerovi}, in which General Krstic directs Colonel Cerovi} to go to a location that appears to be unconnected with @epa and orders him to assume command when he gets there.)

⁸⁶³ P 467; and Butler, T. 44896-4899.

⁸⁶⁴ D 181/5.

⁸⁶⁵ General Krstic (Krstic, T. 6720-6721) and General Radinovi} (Radinovi}, T. 8353, 8450-8451) both testified that the term used in the original Serbian version of the document does not mean that @ivanovi} was no longer the commander of the Drina Corps. The Prosecution obtained an official statement from the Tribunal translation service confirming that the correct English translation for the word was "hitherto". See T. 8356.

327. A number of Defence witnesses attested that General Krstic did not take over as Corps Commander until around 20 July 1995.⁸⁶⁶ Witness II, while confirming that he and General Krstic did go to the Han Kram restaurant sometime during the course of the @epa operation, was unsure as to the nature of the ceremony that General Krstic attended there.⁸⁶⁷ The Prosecution suggested that this event at the Han Kram restaurant was simply a farewell lunch for General @ivanovi}.⁸⁶⁸

(b) Conclusions

328. The conflicting evidence reveals that, from early July 1995, General Krstic began to assume more and more *de facto* responsibility within the Drina Corps. As discussed in further detail below, he was the person primarily directing Krivaja 95 from the Drina Corps Forward Command from 6 July 1995, at least until General Mladi} arrived on 9 July 1995.⁸⁶⁹ Further, while General @ivanovi} attended the first meeting at the Fontana Hotel with General Mladi} on 11 July 1995 at 2200 hours, it was General Krstic who attended the second meeting that same evening at 2300 hours and the third meeting the following morning: General @ivanovi} was not present. Some witnesses at these meetings came away with the impression that General Krstic was the Drina Corps Commander.⁸⁷⁰

329. The documentation of the hand over ceremony on 13 July 1995, which is corroborated by two eye-witness accounts, is very strong evidence that, on that date, General Mladic appointed General Krstic as Commander of the Drina Corps during a ceremony at the Vlasenica Headquarters. The reasons why this ceremony took place prior to the date of the Decree issued by President Karad`i} remain unknown. The Trial Chamber acknowledges that the handover may not have been carried out strictly in accordance with the procedures laid down in VRS regulations. However, the Trial Record is replete with examples of formal procedures being dispensed with due to the exigencies of war.⁸⁷¹

330. The Prosecution accepted that General @ivanovi} was, in accordance with the decree issued by President Karadzic, "officially on paper" Corps Commander until 15 July 1995.⁸⁷² Nonetheless, from the afternoon of 13 July 1995, General Krstic behaved as Commander of the Drina Corps,

⁸⁶⁶ Radinovi}, T. 7993; Defence Witness DC, T. 7450; Defence Witness Borov-anin, T. 6998; Defence Witness Radulovi}, T. 7593-7594.

⁸⁶⁷ Witness II, T. 9152-9153, T. 9168.

⁸⁶⁸ Witness JJ, T. 9707.

⁸⁶⁹ See the discussion *Infra* para. 334.

⁸⁷⁰ Witness C, T. 1240; Mandzi} T.1044.

⁸⁷¹ General Krstic himself acknowledged that, in some situations, formal procedures are not complied with and that oral orders may be sufficient. See Krstic, T. 7405, T. 7412. General Radinovi} similarly acknowledged that sometimes things have to be carried out in an ad hoc fashion in emergency situations. See Radinovi}, T. 8471-8472. The Trial Chamber also notes that General Mladic was accustomed to over-riding rules and procedures.

commencing with the 13 July search order, which he signed in his newly acquired capacity of Corps Commander. There was no confusion on the part of the Drina Corps: it was clearly understood that General Krstic was the Commander from 13 July 1995 and his orders were implemented accordingly.⁸⁷³ The evidence accords with the opinion of the Prosecution's military expert, Major Dannatt, that the "logical time" to appoint a new Corps Commander would be between the conclusion of the attack on Srebrenica and prior to the attack on @epa.⁸⁷⁴

331. The Trial Chamber finds that, on the evening of 13 July 1995, General Mladic appointed General Krstic as Commander of the Drina Corps and that, from that point in time, General Krstic operated as the Drina Corps Commander and the entire Corps recognised him as such.

4. The Role of General Krstic in Krivaja 95

332. The role that General Krstic played in Krivaja 95, the VRS assault on the Srebrenica enclave, is not directly relevant to the crimes charged in the Indictment, in the sense that the attack on Srebrenica is not alleged to be a violation of international law. However, Krivaja 95 forms an important backdrop to the Trial Chamber's consideration of the criminal responsibility of General Krstic for the crimes that followed the take-over of Srebrenica.

333. There was agreement between the parties that, as Chief of Staff, General Krstic played a role in planning and executing Krivaja 95. General Krstic said that his participation was limited to evaluating the overall situation together with General @ivanovi.⁸⁷⁵ Mr. Butler accepted the possibility that General Krstic may not have written the plan himself, but maintained that the plan was "a reflection of the work of the staff officers of the Drina Corps of which he [General Krstic] is the functional co-ordinator and controller..."⁸⁷⁶

334. While General @ivanovi appears to have been in formal control of the Krivaja 95 preparations, General Krstic assumed a pivotal role in the command of the attack itself,⁸⁷⁷ at least until the appearance of General Mladic on the scene on 9 July 1995.⁸⁷⁸ When President Karadzic

⁸⁷² Butler, T. 5361.

⁸⁷³ Butler, T. 4901.

⁸⁷⁴ Dannatt, T. 5656-5657.

⁸⁷⁵ Krstic, T. 6374.

⁸⁷⁶ Butler, T. 5432.

⁸⁷⁷ Two Defence witnesses, who were both at the Pribicevac FCP, testified that General Krstic was in command of the operation. Defence Witness DB, T. 7226 (testifying that General @ivanovi didn't interfere significantly and that his impression was that, up until 9 July 1995 the operation was under the command of General Krstic); and Defence Witness DC, T. 7438, (testifying that "Krivaja 95 was under the command of General Radislav Krstic...").

⁸⁷⁸ Defence Witness DC, an officer in a Drina Corps Brigade involved in Krivaja 95, testified that the Commander of the Brigade this witness belonged to in July 1995 received orders from General Krstic up until 10 July 1995 and thereafter from General Mladic directly. Defence Witness DC, T.7438-7440.

sent the order for the VRS to take the enclave on 9 July 1995, it came with instructions to deliver “personally” to General Krstic.⁸⁷⁹ The Defence asserted that General Krstic and General @ivanovi} were sidelined upon the arrival of General Mladic and therefore played no role in the continued attack on Srebrenica.⁸⁸⁰ This was confirmed by Defence Witness DC, a Drina Corps officer who was present at the Pribicevac FCP. Witness DC did not recall General Krstic issuing any orders after the arrival of General Mladic.⁸⁸¹ However, when General Mladic victoriously entered Srebrenica town with a camera crew in tow on the afternoon of 11 July 1995, General Krstic and General @ivanovi} were right beside him.⁸⁸² Later, both General Mladic and President Karadzic praised General Krstic for his leadership role in the conquest of the enclave. In December 1995, General Mladic gave a speech at a ceremony for the Drina Corps during which he told them:

You fought heroically under the leadership of your Chief of Staff or Corps Commander, who, although severely wounded, made a tremendous contribution to the victory of the Serbian arms and the Serbian army, not only against the Muslim gladiators in Srebrenica and @epa, but also against those who helped them, now by land, now by air, now from behind the conference table or through the media... They could not be saved because they did not deserve to be saved. All of those who obeyed the agreement and came to the UNPROFOR base were saved and transported.⁸⁸³

Although General Krstic suggested that General Mladic may have been referring to General @ivanovi} in this speech,⁸⁸⁴ the reference to the “Chief of Staff or Corps Commander” who had been “severely wounded” leaves little room for doubt that General Krstic was the subject of these comments. General Krstic was both Chief of Staff and Corps Commander during the period of the Srebrenica and @epa operations and the injuries he sustained as a result of his land mine accident are well known. General Krstic was present at the ceremony and indeed was sitting on the stage with General Mladic.⁸⁸⁵ On several occasions President Karadzic gave General Krstic credit for the victory in Srebrenica,⁸⁸⁶ although the Trial Chamber accepts that these statements may be explained, at least in part, as an attempt by President Karadzic to deflect attention from General Mladic as their relationship deteriorated.⁸⁸⁷

⁸⁷⁹ P 432; and Butler Report, para. 8.10 & fn. 325.

⁸⁸⁰ Krstic, T. 6427-6429, 6433, 6434, 6436-6437.

⁸⁸¹ Defence Witness DC, T. 7440.

⁸⁸² P 145 (showing General Krstic with General Mladic and others entering Srebrenica on 11 July 1995).

⁸⁸³ P 367 (video of ceremony); P 482 (a magazine article in *Srpska Vojska* on 28 December 1995 reporting the speech given by General Mladic); and see also Butler T. 5243-5247.

⁸⁸⁴ Krstic, T. 6446.

⁸⁸⁵ P 756 (photo of ceremony).

⁸⁸⁶ See P 112/1 (article dated July 20 1995 in the *Belgrade Crna* where President Karadzic refers to General Krstic and General @ivanovi} as the “chief architects” of the Bosnian Serb victories in Srebrenica and @epa); and P 430 and P 99, (a transcript and video respectively of a speech given by President Karadzic giving General Krstic credit for planning the attack on Srebrenica).

⁸⁸⁷ General Krstic explained the comments as an attempt by President Karadzic to discredit General Mladic. See Krstic T. 6308, 7570-7572. Mr. Butler also acknowledged this possibility. See Butler, T. 5468.

335. Despite efforts to distance himself from Krivaja 95, particularly the second phase involving the capture of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber is left without doubt that General Krstic was no ordinary participant in these events. Regardless of whether or not he was completely sidelined upon the arrival of General Mladic, it is clear that General Krstic was fully informed of the conduct of the operation. Given his position as Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps and his prominent role in the drafting and execution of Krivaja 95, the Trial Chamber finds that General Krstic must have known the VRS military activities against Srebrenica were calculated to trigger a humanitarian crisis, eventually leading to the elimination of the enclave. He thus played a leading role in the events that forced the terrorised civilian population of Srebrenica to flee the town in fear of their lives and move toward Potocari, setting the stage for the crimes that followed. From his vantage point at the FCP in the hills of Pribicevac, he had an unobstructed view of the impact of the shelling upon the terrorised Bosnian Muslim residents of Srebrenica town.⁸⁸⁸ It is inconceivable that a commander so actively involved in the campaign would not have been aware of such an obvious cause and effect relationship between the shelling and the exodus of residents from Srebrenica that was apparent to virtually all UN military personnel in the area.⁸⁸⁹

336. General Krstic entered Srebrenica with General Mladic and was present when General Mladic announced that "the moment has finally come to take revenge on the Turks here".⁸⁹⁰ Shortly after the conclusion of the VRS operations in Srebrenica and @epa, an article was published in Srpska Vojska, on 25 August 1995, reflecting an interview General Krstic had given to Borislav Djurjevi}.⁸⁹¹ General Krstic used ethnically inflammatory language, such as the term "Ustasha" and referred to the Muslims going back on their word about unconditionally laying down their arms following the take-over of Srebrenica. In a communication that General Krstic sent to the Zvornik Brigade on 30 October 1995, he congratulated them on their efforts to liberate centuries-old Serbian territories from the hated enemy and to prevent further genocide against the Serbian people.⁸⁹² In November 1995, an article about the Drina Corps in a magazine called Drinski called "The Youngest but an Elite Corps Already", again quotes General Krstic as using derogatory terms such as "Balija" in reference to Muslims from the Second World War.⁸⁹³ General Krstic spoke of the VRS struggles to remedy past injustices and, three times, he spoke of saving the Serbian people from the threat of "genocide" at the hands of the ABiH.⁸⁹⁴ General Krstic is also heard using derogatory language to refer to Bosnian Muslims in conversations intercepted by the ABiH during

⁸⁸⁸ Butler, T. 4187.

⁸⁸⁹ See the discussion *supra* paras. 122-125.

⁸⁹⁰ P 145 (video of Srebrenica 11 July 1995).

⁸⁹¹ P 743.

⁸⁹² P 745.

⁸⁹³ Krstic, T. 6540.-6541.

⁸⁹⁴ P 744.

July 1995.⁸⁹⁵ Although the Trial Chamber accepts that this type of charged language is commonplace amongst military personnel during war, it is of note that, during his testimony before the Trial Chamber, General Krstic denied that he ever used derogatory language such as “Turks” or “Baliyas” to refer to the Bosnian Muslims.⁸⁹⁶ The Trial Chamber cannot accept this in light of the evidence presented before it.

337. The Trial Chamber finds that General Krstic was well aware that the shelling of Srebrenica would drive tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians from the town into the small area of Poto-ari they thought “safe” because of the UN base there. He must have known that, inevitably, basic needs for shelter, food, water and medicine at that site would prove overwhelming. The Trial Chamber further finds that General Krstic was fully apprised of the VRS territorial goals in the Srebrenica enclave, which included cleansing the area of the Bosnian Muslim population.

5. 12-13 July 1995: The Role of General Krstic in the Removal of the Bosnian Muslim Women, Children and Elderly from Poto-ari

338. General Krstic claimed that, from the time he was appointed commander of the @epa campaign, on the evening of 11 July 1995,⁸⁹⁷ the preparations for that operation became his overriding concern. In particular, General Krstic testified that he was not present when the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly were removed from Potocari, on 12 and 13 July 1995, and that he played no role in making the arrangements for their transportation. At this time, the Defence argued, General Krstic was organising the deployment of his forces for @epa in the direction of Viogora-Derventa-Milici-Vlasenica-Han Pijesak-Plane and, from 12 July 1995 onwards, General Krstic was establishing his new FCP for the @epa operation in the village of Krivace.⁸⁹⁸ However, these claims are contradicted by overwhelming evidence that, in the opinion of the Trial Chamber, demonstrates that General Krstic played a significant role in the removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Poto-ari.

⁸⁹⁵ P 650, (in which General Krstic asks Trbi} “have you killed the Turks up there?”).

⁸⁹⁶ Krstic, T. 6514-6515.

⁸⁹⁷ The Prosecution argued that the meeting at the Bratunac Headquarters at which General Mladic first announced his plans for the attack on @epa actually occurred in the evening of 12 July. This conclusion was based upon the testimony of Witness II, as well as evidence that the road General Krstic reportedly travelled along the night of 11 July was not open to VRS traffic until 12 July 1995. See Prosecution Final Brief para. 241 and fn 764. The Trial Chamber finds it unnecessary to make a specific finding on this point. Whether General Krstic received his assignment for @epa on 11 or 12 July does not, in the view of the Trial Chamber, make a material difference to the outcome of the case.

⁸⁹⁸ Radinovic Report, para. 4.1.

(a) Attendance at the Hotel Fontana Meetings

339. General Krstic attended two of the three meetings convened by General Mladic at the Hotel Fontana dealing with issues relating to the fate of the civilian population from Srebrenica. The first meeting he attended was held on 11 July 1995 at 2300 hours and the second on 12 July 1995 at 1000 hours.⁸⁹⁹ At these meetings General Krstic represented the Drina Corps and he sat next to General Mladic, although he did not speak.⁹⁰⁰

340. As a result of his attendance at these meetings, there can be no doubt that General Krstic knew about the refugees in Poto-ari and their desperate plight: that was a primary reason for convening the meeting and the subject of detailed discussion by the Dutch Bat Commander, Colonel Karremans. Mr. Mandzi}, the unofficial Bosnian Muslim civilian representative, also spoke openly about the crisis conditions facing the refugees in Potocari, including the heat, overcrowding and lack of food and water.⁹⁰¹ General Krstic was present when the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Poto-ari was discussed and he heard the threatening language used by General Mladic. In particular, General Krstic was there when General Mladic bluntly stated to Mr. Mandzi} "...bring people who can secure the surrender of weapons and save your people from destruction."⁹⁰² It was apparently clear to General Krstic, as it was to the others present at the meetings, that staying in Srebrenica or Poto-ari would not be an option for the Bosnian Muslim civilians.⁹⁰³

341. General Krstic testified that he did not hear the cries of a pig being slaughtered outside the Hotel Fontana on the evening of 11 July 1995. He further claimed that he was unaware that Bosnian Muslims would be particularly offended by such an act.⁹⁰⁴ The Trial Chamber finds these claims untenable. The Chamber accepts that the death cries of the pig being slaughtered were clearly audible to all those present at the meeting and that this act was calculated to insult and threaten the Bosnian Muslim civilians. The import of this gesture, as well as other acts of intimidation, such as placing the broken signboard from the Srebrenica Town Hall in front of Mr. Mandzi}, could hardly be ignored by anyone present at the meeting.⁹⁰⁵ Most importantly, General Krstic was present when General Mladic announced that the survival of the Bosnian Muslim population was linked to the complete surrender of the ABiH.⁹⁰⁶ Under cross-examination, General

⁸⁹⁹ Krstic, T. 6208-6209, 6213-6214.

⁹⁰⁰ Mandzi}, T. 974, 987-989, 1042; Witness B, T. 886, 925-926; P 40.

⁹⁰¹ P 40 (transcript of meeting).

⁹⁰² P 40.

⁹⁰³ See the discussion *supra* para. 130.

⁹⁰⁴ Krstic, T. 6552-6554.

⁹⁰⁵ See the discussion *supra* para. 128.

⁹⁰⁶ See the discussion *supra* para. 130.

Krstic conceded that he was unaware of the ABiH ever agreeing to lay down their arms.⁹⁰⁷ Significantly, he said that he wondered how the Bosnian Muslim civilians would ever be able to comply with the demands made by General Mladi}, but that these thoughts “remained deep inside” him.⁹⁰⁸ He did nothing to raise these concerns with General Mladi}.

342. General Krsti} was also present at the Hotel Fontana when General Mladic told members of UNPROFOR and representatives of the Bosnian Muslim civilian population, that men of military age in Poto-ari would be screened for war crimes.⁹⁰⁹

343. The Trial Chamber finds that, as a result of his attendance at the Hotel Fontana meetings on 11 and 12 July 1995, General Krstic was fully appraised of the catastrophic humanitarian situation confronting the Bosnian Muslim refugees in Poto-ari and that he was put on notice that the survival of the Bosnian Muslim population was in question following the take-over of Srebrenica.

(b) Organisation of the buses

344. The Trial Record also indicates that General Krstic played a principal role in organising the buses for the evacuation throughout the day of 12 July 1995. A radio intercept, at 0735 hours on 12 July 1995, shows General Krstic ordering Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic, the Drina Corps Transport Officer, to procure 50 buses from Pale, Visegrad, Rogatica, Sokolac, Han Pijesak, Vlasenica, Mili}i, Bratunac and Zvornik.⁹¹⁰ Later intercepts show Colonel Krsmanovic working throughout the day on the organisation of the buses.⁹¹¹ At 12:10, a conversation was intercepted in which General Krstic ordered Colonel Krsmanovic to start moving the buses.⁹¹² Shortly thereafter, General Mladic was also recorded conversing with an unidentified person about the movement of the buses. That person told General Mladic that the buses had left ten minutes earlier.⁹¹³ At 1305 hours, General Krstic was heard talking to Lt. Colonel Šobot, the Personnel and Mobilisation Officer for the Drina Corps Rear Services. General Krstic asked how many buses were on the road, and Šobot answered, “Twenty.” General Krstic then asked to be connected to the Vlasenica Brigade and requested Colonel Kosori}, the Drina Corps Chief of Intelligence, who was not there. The evidence shows that Colonel Kosori} was also involved in organising buses for Poto-ari.⁹¹⁴ General Krstic then told “Savo” from the Vlasenica Brigade to secure the road “up to the

⁹⁰⁷ Krstic T. 6579-6580.

⁹⁰⁸ Krstic T. 6623.

⁹⁰⁹ Krstic, T. 6621-6622. Although witnesses testified that General Mladic had made this statement at the meeting on the morning of 12 July 1995, General Krstic indicated this may have happened on the evening of 11 July 1995. In any event, General Krstic accepted that he knew General Mladic had made this statement.

⁹¹⁰ P 435, Butler, T. 4827-4828

⁹¹¹ P 404 fn.130; and P 438.

⁹¹² P 440.

⁹¹³ P 404 fn 132; and P 445.

tunnel...that's where they'll be disembarking."⁹¹⁵ In the context of the events happening contemporaneously with this conversation, the Trial Chamber accepts that General Krstic was speaking of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Poto-ari. Survivors who were amongst those transported from Poto-ari speak of going through a tunnel along the road from Luke to Kladanj when they left the buses and continued their journey towards Bosnian Muslim held territory on foot.⁹¹⁶ Several other intercepts also appear to connect General Krstic with the organisation of transport for Poto-ari.⁹¹⁷ These intercepts, showing General Krstic's involvement in the organisation and planning of transferring the civilian population from Poto-ari, are consistent with the organisational role expected of the Chief of Staff of a Corps engaged in an operation such as the transport of tens of thousands of people out of Poto-ari.

345. The intercepts are further corroborated by the evidence of Witness II, who testified that, on 12 July 1995, General Krstic ordered the requisition of buses and trucks from local companies for use in transporting the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Poto-ari.⁹¹⁸ Further, Witness II recalled that, on 12 July 1995, General Mladic asked General Krstic "a couple of times how far they had gone in preparations, whether everything was finished, whether the buses were ready and things like that."⁹¹⁹ General Krstic told General Mladic that all the necessary measures had been taken and that the buses would be arriving as soon as possible.⁹²⁰ Although Witness II was not sure of exactly what orders were issued to whom, he was sure that General Krstic was involved in the organisation of the buses.⁹²¹

346. General Krstic, however, adamantly denied that he was involved in any conversations about the transfer of the civilian population from Poto-ari and said that he was completely without communications from the afternoon of 12 July 1995 until the early evening hours of that day.⁹²² At 13.05 hours, when he was recorded in intercepted conversations talking to the Drina Corps senior officers about buses, General Krstic said he was on the road coming back from the checkpoint at Poto-ari and heading to the Pribicevac FCP; he had no phone in his car. Witness II confirmed that

⁹¹⁴ See the discussion *supra* paras. 143.

⁹¹⁵ P 446; Butler, T. 4839-4840.

⁹¹⁶ See generally, Butler, T. 4842.

⁹¹⁷ See for example, P 359, and Butler T. 4831-4832 (showing General Krstic involved with the issue of fuel); P 440, and P 443 (referring to fuel and stating that "Krstic" (a shortened name for General Krstic, (see Butler T. 4834) ordered it). P 448 (intercept at 1848 hours on 12 July 1995 between two Main Staff personnel and referring to "Krlc" who the Prosecution's military expert, Butler, believes to be a reference to General Krstic given the context of the conversation. Butler, T. 4848).

⁹¹⁸ Witness II, T. 9122-9123.

⁹¹⁹ Witness II, T. 9123. See also Witness II, T. 9157-9161.

⁹²⁰ Witness II, T. 9123.

⁹²¹ Witness II, T. 9157-9161.

⁹²² Krstic, T. 6666.

the radio communications and built-in telephones fitted into the vehicles used by General Krstic did not work because relays were faulty.⁹²³ General Krstic also denied having any communications once he reached Pribicevac, arguing that the communications centre there had already been dismantled.⁹²⁴ There was a lengthy debate between the Prosecution and the Defence about whether the Pribicevac FCP had been dismantled at about 1900 hours on 11 July 1995 as claimed by the Defence.⁹²⁵ Regardless of the precise time at which the Pribicevac FCP was dismantled, overwhelming evidence demonstrates that General Krstic had access to communications during the relevant period (whether at Pribicevac or elsewhere) and that he organised buses to transport the Bosnian Muslim population from Poto-ari. The intercepts and eyewitness testimony to this effect are supported by a contemporaneous public statement made by General Krstic demonstrating an awareness and acceptance of responsibility for the transportation operation. In a television interview, given on 12 July 1995 at Poto-ari, General Krstic said:

The Drina Corps has been conducting this operation successfully. We have not suspended this operation. We are going all the way to liberate the municipality of Srebrenica. We guarantee safety to civilians. They will be taken safely to a destination of their choice.⁹²⁶

He made no mention of the possibility that the Bosnian Muslim refugees could remain in Srebrenica.

347. The Trial Chamber finds that General Krstic ordered the procurement of buses for the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim population from Potocari on 12 and 13 July 1995, that he issued orders to his subordinates about securing the road along which the busses would travel to Kladanj and that he generally supervised the transportation operation.

⁹²³ Witness II, T. 9113.

⁹²⁴ Krstic, T. 6611.

⁹²⁵ Defence Witness DB, a Drina Corps communications officer, insisted that the communications facilities at the Pribicevac FCP had been dismantled at about 1900 hours on 11 July 1995. See Defence Witness DB, T. 7078-7079, 7244-7245. The testimony of Defence Witness DB was corroborated by Defence Witness DG who was a Drina Corps signalman at Pribicevac in July 1995. Defence Witness DG said that he left the Pribicevac FCP on the day that the army entered Srebrenica (namely 11 July 1995), at about 1830-1930 hours, and that by the afternoon of 12 July 1995, the communications devices had already been transferred to the new FCP at Kriva-e. See Defence Witness DG, T. 9231-9232, 9320. The Prosecution argued that these witnesses must have been mistaken about the time at which the communications facilities at Pribicevac were dismantled. In particular, Defence Witness DB testified that, on the same evening he dismantled the Pribicevac FCP, he passed through Poto-ari and saw VRS soldiers present in the area amongst the Bosnian Muslim civilians and UNPROFOR members. See Defence Witness DB, T. 7081-7082. The Prosecution adduced evidence showing that there were no VRS soldiers present at Poto-ari until 12 July 1995, and therefore that Defence Witness DB must be mistaken about the date upon which the FCP had been dismantled. See Koster, T. 9040-9041.

⁹²⁶ P 66; and P 67.

(c) Presence in Poto-ari

(i) 12 July 1995

348. General Krstic testified that, upon the conclusion of the Hotel Fontana meeting at about 1200 hours on 12 July 1995, he went in the direction of Poto-ari, but was stopped at a checkpoint manned by troops of the 65th Protection Regiment: General Mladi} had ordered that no one was permitted to pass through.⁹²⁷ General Krstic recalled seeing both Colonel Kosori} and Colonel Popovi} at the checkpoint. According to General Krstic, he ordered Colonel Kosori} to report at the Kriva-e FCP the next morning: they did not discuss any matters relating to the situation in Poto-ari.⁹²⁸ General Krstic agreed that, at about 1230 hours, he gave a television interview at the Poto-ari checkpoint, but he said it took place at a location close to his car as his injured leg made it difficult for him to walk any distance.⁹²⁹ The video of this interview shows buses moving past, although General Krstic said that, during the time he was stopped at the Poto-ari checkpoint, he did not see the refugee population or any signs of the buses transporting them.⁹³⁰ The Prosecution presented evidence that General Krstic was only about four or five bus lengths away from the refugees in Poto-ari when he gave the interview.⁹³¹ General Krstic maintained that he was only in Poto-ari for a very brief period and neither saw nor heard anything alerting him to the ongoing removal of some 20,000 Bosnian Muslim refugees.⁹³²

349. General Krstic testified that, after he left the Poto-ari checkpoint, he went back to Bratunac, on his way to the Pribicevac FCP. According to his version of events, he arrived at the Pribicevac FCP around 1330 or 1400 hours and received a progress report from one of his subordinate officers about the preparations for the @epa operation.⁹³³ He subsequently went to Viogora where the units for @epa had commenced assembling⁹³⁴ and then travelled to the Drina Corps Headquarters in Vlasenica, arriving between 1700 and 1800 hours.⁹³⁵ He stayed at Headquarters only a short time to carry out preparations for his departure to @epa⁹³⁶ and then visited relatives in Han Pijesak, prior

⁹²⁷ Krstic, T. 6218.

⁹²⁸ Krstic, T. 6219, 7404.

⁹²⁹ Krstic, T. 6634.

⁹³⁰ Krstic, T. 6634, 6638.

⁹³¹ See P 769 (on which Ruez, an investigator from the OTP, marked with two red arrows the area that he believes General Krstic was standing at the time of the interview).

⁹³² Krstic, T. 6633-6634.

⁹³³ Krstic, T. 6220-6221.

⁹³⁴ Krstic, T. 6221-6227.

⁹³⁵ Krstic T. 6227.

⁹³⁶ Krstic T. 6229.

to arriving at the Kriva-e FCP between 2200 and 2300 hours.⁹³⁷ General Krstic said he spent that night at his wife's parent's home in Kusace, near the FCP at Kriva-e.⁹³⁸

350. By contrast, the evidence adduced by the Prosecution demonstrates that, on 12 July 1995, General Krstic was present in Poto-ari for a more substantial period of time than he admitted. The evidence also reveals that General Krstic was fully aware of, and involved in, the events taking place in Poto-ari relating to the transport of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of the compound. Witness F testified that he saw General Krstic in Poto-ari on two consecutive days following the take-over of Srebrenica.⁹³⁹ Colonel Kingori saw General Krstic in Poto-ari on 12 July 1995 and said that he arrived "somewhere in the middle of the day...".⁹⁴⁰ General Krstic was in the vicinity, said Colonel Kingori, "for quite some time. Let's say over an hour...",⁹⁴¹ although he recalled that General Krstic was inside the compound for only about 15 minutes.⁹⁴² Major Franken saw General Krstic in Poto-ari "(s)omewhere around the 12th, 13th, or 14th of July".⁹⁴³ Later, however, he thought it would most likely have been on 12 July in the afternoon, around 2-3pm.⁹⁴⁴ The most compelling evidence, however, comes from Witness II. This witness testified that, after the Hotel Fontana meeting on the morning of 12 July 1995, he accompanied General Krstic to Poto-ari. Witness II assumed the reason for this trip was to speak to UNPROFOR about the transport of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of the compound.⁹⁴⁵ While they were in fact stopped at a VRS military checkpoint as General Krstic maintained, they were subsequently permitted to proceed into Poto-ari.⁹⁴⁶ Witness II's recollection was that he and General Krstic stayed in Poto-ari "(f)or an hour or maybe two hours".⁹⁴⁷ During this time, Witness II recalled seeing the Bosnian Muslim refugees and the buses that had just arrived, although he was not sure whether the buses had already begun transporting people out at that stage.⁹⁴⁸ The eyewitness testimony about the presence of General Krstic in Poto-ari on 12 July 1995 is consistent with the intercept evidence showing that General Krstic was fully involved in organising the removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Poto-ari.

⁹³⁷ Krstic, T. 6229-6231.

⁹³⁸ Krstic, T. 6231.

⁹³⁹ Witness F, T. 1516-1519.

⁹⁴⁰ Kingori, T. 1837-8, 1846, T.1906.

⁹⁴¹ Kingori, T.1908.

⁹⁴² Kingori, T. 1839.

⁹⁴³ Franken, T. 2065.

⁹⁴⁴ Franken, T. 2084.

⁹⁴⁵ Witness II, T. 9123.

⁹⁴⁶ Witness II, T. 9124.

⁹⁴⁷ Witness II, T. 9124.

⁹⁴⁸ Witness II, T. 9165-9166.

351. The Defence pointed out that one of the Prosecution's witnesses, Colonel Kingori, did not report the presence of General Krstic in Poto-ari to his own command, whereas he did report the presence of General Mladi}, as well as Vukovic (an officer from the Skelani Battalion and liaison with Dutch Bat), Colonel Lazar A}amovi} (the Drina Corps Assistant Commander for Rear Services) and Major Nikoli} (the Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security Affairs of the Bratunac Brigade). Colonel Kingori explained that the list of officers in his report was not intended to be exhaustive and that VRS officers other than those mentioned were also present in Poto-ari.⁹⁴⁹ However, his omission of General Krstics' name from the report does tend to suggest that the officers named played a more visible role in the events taking place in Poto-ari compound than General Krstic did. This is confirmed by the fact that Colonel A}amovi} told Colonel Kingori that he was the special representative of General Mladi} in the area.⁹⁵⁰

352. As to the conduct of General Krstic while he was in Poto-ari, several witnesses testified to seeing General Krstic in and around the Poto-ari compound conferring with other high-ranking military officers,⁹⁵¹ including General Mladi}.⁹⁵² It appeared to several of these witnesses that General Krstic, as well as the other officers, were giving orders to the soldiers.⁹⁵³ This conclusion was based on the witnesses' observations of the body language and the comings and goings of the officers.⁹⁵⁴ Witness F said that the officers would speak to the soldiers and then the soldiers would go off and perform tasks.⁹⁵⁵ Due to language barriers, however, none of the Dutch Bat personnel could confirm the content of the conversations between General Krstic and the soldiers.

353. Nonetheless, it was clear to the UN and Dutch Bat observers that General Krstic and the other high ranking officers present in Poto-ari were:

...all working together, for the same cause, just to ensure that all the Muslims leave that place, all of them board those buses and go outside the enclave.⁹⁵⁶

Witness F further said that the officers he saw, including General Krstic:

...were present in order to see that everything was going according to plan, and sometimes they gave their commands, they gave orders, or they told people what to do, or it was reported to them how the situation was progressing.⁹⁵⁷

⁹⁴⁹ Kingori, T. 1909.

⁹⁵⁰ Kingori, T. 1874-1876.

⁹⁵¹ Witness F, T. 1517-1518; Kingori, T. 1837-8, 1846; Franken, T. 2065.

⁹⁵² Witness F, T. 1525; Kingori, T. 1848.

⁹⁵³ Kingori, T. 1848, Witness F, T. 1523-1524.

⁹⁵⁴ Witness F, T. 1556.

⁹⁵⁵ Witness F, T. 1906, 1910.

⁹⁵⁶ Kingori, T. 1887.

⁹⁵⁷ Witness F, T. 1523-1524. See also Witness F, T. 1517.

354. The Trial Chamber finds that General Krstic was in Poto-ari for between an hour and two hours in the afternoon of 12 July 1995 and that he was present with other VRS officers, including General Mladic, overseeing the bussing of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly. The Trial Chamber rejects the evidence given by General Krstic that he was only present for a few minutes at the Poto-ari checkpoint and that he had no knowledge of anything that was occurring in Poto-ari involving the Srebrenica refugees. As a result of his presence in Poto-ari on the afternoon of 12 July 1995, General Krstic must have known of the appalling conditions facing the Bosnian Muslim refugees and the general mistreatment inflicted by VRS soldiers on that day.

(ii) 13 July 1995

355. General Krstic vigorously denied being anywhere near Poto-ari on 13 July 1995. In the morning of that day, he testified, he first went to the Kriva-e FCP and then to the Drina Corps Command Post in Vlasenica to check on the progress of the plans for @epa.⁹⁵⁸ While there, he had a brief conversation with General Mladic about the @epa operation.⁹⁵⁹ The presence of General Krstic at the Drina Corps Headquarters on 13 July 1995 was corroborated by Defence Witness DA who saw him there that morning.⁹⁶⁰ Upon leaving Vlasenica, General Krstic said that he set off towards Han Pijesak with Witness DA.⁹⁶¹ He then spent the afternoon visiting hospitalised soldiers with Witness DA, as well as making social visits to his own relatives and relatives of Witness DA.⁹⁶² Defence Witness DA corroborated all of this.⁹⁶³ General Krstic testified that he then travelled to the Kriva-e FCP and arrived there between 1700 and 1800 hours in the evening of 13 July 1995.⁹⁶⁴ Witnesses DA⁹⁶⁵ and DB⁹⁶⁶ both provided corroboration of this sequence.

356. The Prosecution presented scant evidence in support of its claim that General Krstic was present in Poto-ari on 13 July 1995. Witness F, the Dutch Bat soldier who said that General Krstic was present on two consecutive days following the take-over of Srebrenica, was unable to identify precisely the dates and at one point in his evidence stated that the "second" day was actually 12 July 1995.⁹⁶⁷ Colonel Kingori testified that General Krstic "was still around" in Poto-ari on 13 July

⁹⁵⁸ Krstic, T. 6231.

⁹⁵⁹ Krstic, T. 6233, 6669-6670.

⁹⁶⁰ Defence Witness DA, T. 6918-6919.

⁹⁶¹ Krstic T. 6233.

⁹⁶² Krstic, T. 6234-.6236.

⁹⁶³ Defence Witness DA, T. 6886-6887, 6926-6927.

⁹⁶⁴ Krstic, T. 6236, 6669.

⁹⁶⁵ Defence Witness DA, T. 6927.

⁹⁶⁶ Defence Witness DB, T. 7097.

⁹⁶⁷ The witness initially referred to the "first" day as being the day on which soldiers first came into the enclave, (which the Prosecutor argues was 12 July 1995). However, Witness F subsequently testified that the 12th was the "second" day. See Witness F, T. 1533. On cross-examination the witness testified the "first" day was on the day the enclave fell, namely 11 July 1995. See Witness F, T. 1554. However, on redirect, the Witness said that the "first" day was the day

1995, but gave no further details about his observations on that day.⁹⁶⁸ The Trial Chamber is unable to rely on this evidence to establish that General Krstic was present in Poto-ari on 13 July 1995. Further, it was clear from the testimony of Witness II, who was with General Krstic throughout the day of 13 July 1995, that General Krstic did not return to Poto-ari that day. Undoubtedly, on this day, General Krstic must have been primarily focusing on all the preparations necessary for the operation that he would lead in @epa, which was due to commence the next day.

357. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has not proved that General Krstic was present in Poto-ari on 13 July 1995.

(d) Efforts Made by General Krstic to Ensure the Safety of the Bosnian Muslim Civilians Transported out of Poto-ari

358. On more than one occasion, General Krstic was heard to emphasise that no harm must befall the Bosnian Muslim civilians who were being transported out of Poto-ari. In an intercepted conversation, at 1305 hours on 12 July 1995, in which he was heard discussing the movement of the buses and the point at which the Bosnian Muslims on the buses would be disembarking, General Krstic said: "Take care, nothing must happen to any of them... is that clear".⁹⁶⁹ The Defence argued that, in fact, the literal translation of this is that "not a hair must be touched on their heads" and conveyed that the greatest possible care should be taken in relation to the Bosnian Muslim civilians.⁹⁷⁰ In the interview he gave in Poto-ari on 12 July 1995, General Krstic also emphasised that the civilians would be treated properly and transported wherever they wanted to go.⁹⁷¹

359. General Krstic displayed a similar concern during the removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilian population from @epa later that same month. In a conversation intercepted on 25 July 1995, the participants discussed an order, personally given by General Krstic, that the convoy bound for Kladanj was to be treated in a civilised fashion "so that nothing of the kind of problem we had before happens."⁹⁷² This indicates that General Krstic was anxious to ensure that the transport of the civilian population from @epa was conducted properly, but it also suggests that he was fully aware that there had been problems with similar operations in the past.

the VRS troops came into Poto-ari, which was the same day that the transportation of the refugees began (i.e. 12 July 1995). See T. 1559, and Witness F, T. 1516.

⁹⁶⁸ Kingori, T. 1859, 1908.

⁹⁶⁹ P 446.

⁹⁷⁰ T. 9336.

⁹⁷¹ See generally, Butler, T. 5472-5473.

⁹⁷² D 167.

6. The Role of General Krstic in the Executions

(a) Evolution of the Plan to Execute the Military Aged Bosnian Muslim Men of Srebrenica

360. The Trial Chamber heard no evidence that killing the Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica was part of the original plan for Krivaja 95. To the contrary, the Prosecution built its case on the theory that the plan to execute the Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica was devised in the evening hours of 11 July and the early morning hours of 12 July 1995, once the VRS became aware of the presence of men amongst the crowd at Poto-ari.⁹⁷³ At the Hotel Fontana meetings on the evening of 11 July 1995, General Mladic had asked UNPROFOR to organise the buses for the transport of the Bosnian Muslim refugees out of the enclave. However, at the meeting on 12 July, General Mladic informed the UNPROFOR representatives that the Bosnian Serbs would provide the buses, despite the fact that such resources were incredibly difficult to come by within the enclave at that time. He also announced, for the first time, that the Bosnian Muslim men of military age would be separated and screened for war crimes. The experts all agreed that this would have been a legitimate undertaking and the Prosecution did not dispute the existence of a list of suspected Bosnian Muslim war criminals in the enclave drawn up by the Bratunac Brigade on 12 July 1995.⁹⁷⁴ The Defence also pointed out that notes from interrogations of Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica were subsequently seized during a search of the Bratunac Brigade offices by the OTP.⁹⁷⁵ However, it quickly became apparent that the Bosnian Serbs had no intention of screening the men in accordance with accepted military practice. Instead, the men, as well as some boys who were not of military age, were seized and divested of their personal belongings, including their identification papers, which were later destroyed to ensure no trace of their identity remained. Even Bosnian Muslim men, on the brink of reaching Bosnian Muslim-held territory and clearly posing no military threat, were pulled off the buses at Ti{\}a on 12 and 13 July 1995 and dragged back into Bosnian Serb custody. The detention of the captured men, not in recognised prisoner of war facilities such as those at Bajkovici, but in brutal conditions and without adequate food or water all reflect the pre-conceived plan to execute them.⁹⁷⁶

361. The Prosecution also contended that the execution plan, given its scale and the level of detailed organisation involved, must have been conducted as a "military operation" in which the Drina Corps was fully involved. General Krstic, argued the Prosecution, was frequently in the presence of General Mladic between 9 and 13 July, including at the Hotel Fontana between 11 and 12 July 1995 and was involved in the development of the plan from the outset. The Trial Chamber

⁹⁷³ Prosecution Final Brief, para. 233.

⁹⁷⁴ See the discussion *supra* para. 156.

⁹⁷⁵ Butler, T. 5224; and Defence Final Brief para. 32.

does not accept this argument. Whereas there is ample direct evidence showing that General Krstic was involved in organising matters relating to the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of Poto-ari, there is no corresponding evidence showing him involved in making arrangements for the executions. He was not seen or heard giving any orders that could be construed as arranging the detention sites, guards, blindfolds, ligatures or other matters relating specifically to the executions. To the contrary, during this period, General Krstic was engaged as the Commander for the operation at @epa, which was due to start on 14 July 1995. He had plans of attack to devise, troops to marshal and a new forward command post to establish. The fact that General Krstic, along with several units of the Drina Corps, was concentrating on @epa just as the plan for the Srebrenica executions went into operation, suggests that the plan to kill the Bosnian Muslim men was not conceived as a military operation to be primarily implemented by the Drina Corps. Further, it is undisputed that non-Drina Corps units, such as the 10th Sabotage Detachment, were brought into the area to participate in the executions. Similarly, it appears that the security unit of the Main Staff was heavily involved in carrying out the crimes and there are indications on the Trial Record that the Drina Corps was not always consulted about what was going on within its zone of responsibility.⁹⁷⁷

362. The Trial Chamber cannot discount the possibility that the executions plan was initially devised by members of the VRS Main Staff without consultation with the Drina Corps Command generally and General Krstic in particular. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the executions were carried out on a massive scale, all within the Drina Corps zone of responsibility. General Krstic was present within the area of the former Srebrenica enclave at least up until the evening of 13 July by which time the first mass executions had already taken place. Between 14 and 19 July 1995 units of the Drina Corps became increasingly involved in the executions. The Trial Chamber has already found that the Drina Corps Command must have known about the plan to execute the Bosnian Muslim men as of the evening of 13 July 1995. The Trial Chamber will now consider the evidence directly relating to General Krstic's developing knowledge about the fate of the captured Bosnian Muslim men and their subsequent execution, and his participation therein.

(b) Separation and Mistreatment of the Bosnian Muslim Men in Poto-ari

363. The Trial Chamber has found that General Krstic was in Poto-ari during the afternoon of 12 July 1995. As a result of his presence there and his role in organising the buses, General Krstic

⁹⁷⁶ Prosecution Final Brief, para. 235-236.

⁹⁷⁷ See the discussion *supra* paras. 265.

must have been aware that the men were not being bussed out along with the women, children and elderly, but instead were separated and detained or transported elsewhere.

364. By the afternoon of 12 July 1995, some of the men were already being bussed out to detention facilities in Bratunac. Buses were diverted from the transportation of the women, children and elderly for this purpose. As the buses left the compound, the men shouted out, begging the UN to do something; it was clear from the manner in which the VRS soldiers were terrorising the Bosnian Muslim men in Poto-ari that their lives were imperilled.⁹⁷⁸ However, there is no clear evidence that General Krstic witnessed the men being bussed to Bratunac during the time he was in Poto-ari. Indeed the evidence reveals that General Krstic was present in Poto-ari in the early afternoon of 12 July 1995. Witness II said the buses had just arrived when he and General Krstic were there, giving rise to the possibility that Witness II and General Krstic had departed by the time the bussing of men to Bratunac commenced. However, given his principal role in organising the buses and overseeing the transportation of the women, children and elderly, he must at least have been informed that buses were being diverted for the purpose of transporting the men to Bratunac.

365. Eyewitnesses placed General Krstic in the vicinity of the White House where the Bosnian Muslim men were detained. In the afternoon of 12 July 1995, Colonel Kingori, alarmed at reports that Bosnian Muslim men were being taken behind the White House and shot, asked General Mladic to explain the situation. In an effort to allay his fears, General Mladic took Colonel Kingori to the White House. When they arrived, Colonel Kingori saw General Krstic and other VRS officers there.⁹⁷⁹

366. Given his physical presence close to the White House, on the afternoon of 12 July 1995, the Prosecution also asks the Chamber to infer that General Krstic must have been aware that Bosnian Muslim men were being taken out and shot in the vicinity. Colonel Kingori heard single shots not far from the White House on that day.⁹⁸⁰ Indeed, Colonel Kingori said that, when he went to the White House with General Mladic to investigate allegations about the shootings, General Krstic was at the White House. This might suggest that General Krstic had also been at the White House earlier when the shootings that prompted Colonel Kingori's investigations had occurred. Once again, however, the evidence as to the timing of the shootings and the presence of General Krstic near the White House was far from precise. It is clear from the Trial Record that the situation at the White House and indeed the compound generally, deteriorated as the day wore on. It is also clear

⁹⁷⁸ See the discussion *supra* para. 159.

⁹⁷⁹ Kingori, T. 1844-1846, 1848.

⁹⁸⁰ Kingori, T. 1853

that General Krstic was in Poto-ari early in the afternoon of 12 July 1995. None of the witnesses directly testified that they saw General Krstic at the White House at the time these acts occurred. Consequently, the Trial Chamber is unable to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that General Krstic necessarily knew about these shootings.

367. However, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that, from his presence at the White House, General Krstic must have known the segregated men were being detained in terrible conditions and were not being treated in accordance with accepted practice for war crimes screening. General Krstic must have realised, as did all the witnesses present in and around the compound that day, that there was a terrible uncertainty as to what was going to happen to the men who had been separated. Certainly, General Krstic took no steps to clarify with General Mladic or anyone else what the fate of the men would be.

(c) Separation of the Bosnian Muslim Men in Ti{}a

368. As the buses carrying the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly to Kladanj reached Ti{}a, they were stopped and further screening was carried out for men who had managed to escape the net in Poto-ari. A witness recounted how he was taken from the bus at Ti{}a on 13 July 1995 and spent the rest of the day detained in a school building. In the evening hours, he was taken out, with about 22 other men, for execution, but managed to survive.⁹⁸¹

369. An intercepted conversation, at 1305 hours on 12 July 1995, reveals that General Krstic was giving orders to Drina Corps units to secure the road from Vlasenica up toward Ti{}a where the civilians were disembarking.⁹⁸² The fact that General Krstic had been involved in issuing orders to Drina Corps units about securing this stretch of the road gives rise to an inference that he must have known the men were being taken off the buses at Ti{}a. The Trial Chamber agrees with Mr. Butler that the likelihood of General Krstic being unaware that men were being separated at this point was "rather low". Further, the Chief of Staff of the Mili}i Brigade and troops from his unit were present at the Ti{}a screening site upon orders from the Drina Corps Command.⁹⁸³ Mr. Butler went further and argued that, by implication, the Drina Corps Command, including General Krstic, must have known about the executions plan.⁹⁸⁴ The Trial Chamber does not agree. Certainly, it is clear that General Krstic must have known the men were being separated at Ti{}a and taken to detention sites, but whether he also had direct knowledge, at that point, that their ultimate fate would be execution has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

⁹⁸¹ Witness D T. 1260-1298

⁹⁸² P 446; and Butler T. 4838-4839.

⁹⁸³ See the discussion *supra* paras. 217.

(d) The Bosnian Muslim Column and the Capture of Prisoners

370. General Krstic said that he learned of the breakthrough of the Bosnian Muslim column in the direction of Tuzla on the evening of 12 July 1995, when he arrived at the Drina Corps Command Post in Vlasenica.⁹⁸⁵ However, according to General Krstic, he heard nothing of the capture of Bosnian Muslim civilians from the column during the entire week of 13-20 July 1995.⁹⁸⁶ This claim is not plausible in light of the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber.

371. There is substantial evidence showing that General Krstic was kept fully informed of the developments relating to the movement of the Bosnian Muslim column. A conversation was intercepted on 12 July 1995 at 1156 hours in which the Drina Corps Command informed that Bratunac Brigade that "they are moving towards Konjevic Polje."⁹⁸⁷ During the course of the conversation, the officer from Bratunac indicated that General Krstic was there with him and then told the Command that he was putting General Krstic on the line to speak to them. The presence of General Krstic at the Bratunac Brigade Headquarters, during this conversation, is consistent with the fact that the meeting General Krstic attended at the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac had concluded around this time. Similarly, in a conversation intercepted at 1345 hours on 12 July 1995, involving the duty officer at the Drina Corps Command, the participants spoke of matters related to the Bosnian Muslim column and then General Krstic came on the line.⁹⁸⁸ This is further evidence that General Krstic was at the scene when information regarding the column was coming in to the Drina Corps and that he must have been informed of all relevant developments thereto.

372. In the early morning hours of 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command received an intelligence report prepared by the Zvornik Brigade. The Zvornik Brigade expressly reported that Bosnian Muslims in the column were "fleeing in panic, without any control, in groups or individually and giving themselves up to the MUP/Ministry of the Interior/ or the VRS/Republika Srpska Army."⁹⁸⁹ On 13 July 1995, the contents of this report were subsequently forwarded to, among others, General Krstic personally.⁹⁹⁰

⁹⁸⁴ Butler, T. 5011.

⁹⁸⁵ Krstic, T. 7392.

⁹⁸⁶ Krstic, T.7392.

⁹⁸⁷ P 508.

⁹⁸⁸ P 509. See also P 510 (intercepted conversation dated 12 July 1995 at 1440 hours in which two unidentified participants discuss the movement of the column and at the end of the conversation General Krstic came on the line looking for Krsmanovic.).

⁹⁸⁹ P 878.

⁹⁹⁰ P 739.

373. General Krstic was included in the chain of command on a series of other communications about the column. First, on 13 July 1995, General Gvero from the Main Staff issued his order to the Drina Corps, regarding measures to block the column.⁹⁹¹ The order was sent to the Drina Corps Command, including the FCP. General Gvero directed the Drina Corps to use all available manpower in “discovering, blocking, disarming and capturing” Bosnian Muslims and to place them in “suitable premises”, where they could be guarded by small forces, and to report immediately to the Superior Command”. Although General Krstic testified that he did not receive this order signed by General Gvero,⁹⁹² he accepted that he did receive an order from General @ivanovi} that, in large part, reproduced the order General Gvero sent on 13 July 1995.⁹⁹³ General Krstic maintained that this was the first information he received that “people were being captured.”⁹⁹⁴ Another document, dated 13 July 1995, reveals that the Drina Corps Command Intelligence and Security section sent a document to, *inter alia*, General Krsti} personally at the Pribicevac FCP, analysing the movement of the column out of Srebrenica and towards Tuzla.⁹⁹⁵ Again, General Krstic said this could not have reached the FCP at Pribicevac, as the communications facilities there were already disbanded by the time this document was sent.⁹⁹⁶ Regardless of whether the Pribicevac FCP had already been disbanded by this time, these documents demonstrate that General Krstic was included in the chain of command for reporting matters relating to the Bosnian Muslim column. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that, even if the Pribicevac FCP had been disbanded by this time, General Krstic would have promptly received the communications addressed to him there. Defence Witness DB testified that, if a communication could not be delivered, steps would be taken, depending on the urgency of the communication, to deliver it to the recipient by other means, such as courier. In the case of urgent communications, the sender would be notified if the communication had not been delivered within two hours.⁹⁹⁷ The whereabouts of the Bosnian Muslim column was one of the most pressing issues facing the Drina Corps Command on 13 July 1995. In fact, General Krstic testified that he considered the 28th Division, whose whereabouts were unknown following the take-over of Srebrenica, as a potential threat to the ongoing military operations of the Drina Corps in the region, particularly those being conducted at @epa.⁹⁹⁸ At the meeting at the Bratunac Brigade Headquarters on 11 or 12 July 1995, Colonel Pandurevi}, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade,

⁹⁹¹ P 532.

⁹⁹² Krstic, T. 6672.

⁹⁹³ P 462. Krstic, T. 6672-6673.

⁹⁹⁴ Krstic, T. 6300.

⁹⁹⁵ P 739.

⁹⁹⁶ Krstic, T. 6654.

⁹⁹⁷ Defence Witness DB, T. 9293-9295.

⁹⁹⁸ Krstic, T. 6229, stating “If I were in General Mladi}’s shoes, I would not have issued such an order (for @epa) because we did not know where the 28th Division was and what it could do. It would have been much more useful and efficient for the forces that had taken part in the operation in Srebrenica, after their entry into Srebrenica, to go looking for the 28th Division, to pursue those units, and to get into contact with them in order to avoid the problems that occurred later and which had serious consequences for the 1st Zvornik Brigade and partly for the 1st Bira} Brigade.”

raised this issue with General Mladić as a potential problem for the @epa operation and General Krstić agreed with him.⁹⁹⁹ General Krstić therefore had a very compelling reason to remain informed about developments concerning the Bosnian Muslim column that was directly related to his campaign at @epa.

374. One Defence witness testified that, on 13 July 1995, he had a conversation about the Bosnian Muslim column with General Krstić, who expressed the view that the VRS should let the column pass so that the matter could be “ended as it should”.¹⁰⁰⁰ From his reference to letting the column pass, it might be surmised that General Krstić knew that steps were being taken to capture the men from the column or, at the very least, knew this was probable.

375. Witness II testified that, on the day of the ceremony at which General Mladić announced that General Krstić was the new Commander of the Drina Corps (which the Trial Chamber accepts was 13 July 1995), he and General Krstić drove back to the Vlasenica headquarters from Bratunac at about 1500-1600 hours. Their journey took them along the Bratunac, Konjević Polje, Milići, and Vlasenica road.¹⁰⁰¹ This is the same road where thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from the column were taken prisoner on 13 July 1995. However, Witness II testified that, although there were some soldiers around, he did not observe anything unusual. Nor did he see any buses with refugees coming from Bratunac.¹⁰⁰² Nonetheless, even if the evidence as to what General Krstić personally witnessed is unclear, there is compelling evidence that he would have received reports that Bosnian Muslim men from the column were captured along this road, given that units of the Drina Corps were working in close co-operation with other units involved in the capture, such as the MUP brigade commanded by Colonel Borovčanin.¹⁰⁰³ By the evening of 13 July 1995, General Krstić was the Commander of the Drina Corps and it is inconceivable to the Chamber that General Krstić would have been permitted to remain uninformed about the capture of thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners along the Bratunac-Konjević Polje Road, during the course of that day.

376. On the evening of 13 July 1995, General Krstić issued his order directing units of the Drina Corps to conduct search the area of the former Srebrenica enclave for Bosnian Muslims. By this time, thousands of Bosnian Muslims had already been taken prisoner. The presence of the column in the area would certainly have had an effect on the scope and intensity of the sweep operations contemplated in General Krstić’s order. On the basis of his 13 July 1995 search order,¹⁰⁰⁴ General Krstić was in charge of forces searching the former enclave for Bosnian Muslims from 14 to 17 July

⁹⁹⁹ Krstić, T. 6203, 6229

¹⁰⁰⁰ Defence Witness DA, T. 6928- 6929.

¹⁰⁰¹ Witness II, T. 9138.

¹⁰⁰² Witness II, T. 9169.

¹⁰⁰³ See the discussion *supra* paras. 286-287.

1995. Also on the evening of 13 July, General Krstic was heard speaking with Colonel Borov-anin from the MUP who was present along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje Road that day. In response to General Krstic's inquiry as to how things were going, Colonel Borov-anin informed him that things were "going well."¹⁰⁰⁵ In short, even if he was mainly focused on marshalling the resources for the attack on @epa, he must have known, by the evening of 13 July 1995, that there were several thousand Bosnian Muslim men being held prisoner in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps.

377. In summary, the Trial Chamber finds that General Krstic was fully informed of developments relating to the movement of the Bosnian Muslim column and that he knew, by the evening of 13 July 1995, that thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from the column had been captured by Bosnian Serb forces within his zone of responsibility.

(e) General Krstic's Involvement in the Executions

378. There is no evidence that General Krstic was personally present at any of the execution sites. Indisputably, at the time the executions commenced, he was engaged in preparations for the combat activities for @epa, and from 14 July 1995 onwards, in launching the attack itself.

379. Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber has already found that the executions began on 13 July 1995 and, as of that evening, the Drina Corps Command must have known about the plan to execute all of the military aged Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica. The Trial Chamber has further found that the Drina Corps Command must have known of the involvement of Drina Corps subordinate units in the mass executions as of 14 July 1995 and, by implication, that the fate of the thousands of Bosnian Muslim men being detained within its zone of responsibility was to be death by execution. Given his position in the Drina Corps Command, first as Chief of Staff and then as Commander from the evening of 13 July 1995, General Krstic must have also known about these matters. By 14 July 1995, General Krstic, in his role as Corps Commander, must have been informed about the participation of his subordinate units in the executions commencing on that date. Although General Krstic was also focusing on @epa during this period, the Chamber does not accept the Defence argument that General Krstic was completely excluded from matters related to the executions. The Trial Chamber now turns to the direct evidence demonstrating that General Krstic had knowledge of, and participated in, the executions.

¹⁰⁰⁴ P 463.

¹⁰⁰⁵ P 529 (intercepted conversation at 2040 hours on 13 July 1995).

(i) General Krstic and Colonel Beara Discuss the Deployment of Troops to Assist in the Executions: 15 July 1995

380. Just prior to 1000 hours on 15 July 1995, General @ivanovi} was heard in an intercepted conversation with Colonel Beara. Colonel Beara told him that Furtula (believed to be Major Radomir Furtula, the Commander of the 5th Podrinje Brigade (also known as the Vi{egrad-Goražde Brigade), a unit of the Drina Corps,¹⁰⁰⁶ "...didn't give a damn about the commander's order" and had not sent Lukic's intervention platoon.¹⁰⁰⁷ Colonel Beara then asked General @ivanovic to assist with organising replacement personnel but General @ivanovi} informed Colonel Beara that he could no longer arrange for that and advised him to call extension 385.¹⁰⁰⁸ A few minutes later at around 1000 hours, a conversation was intercepted, during which General Krstic was heard talking to Colonel Beara.¹⁰⁰⁹ A Bosnian Muslim interception officer of the ABiH recorded the following:

(Colonel Ljubo BEARA-General Krstic)

B: General, FURTULA didn't carry out the boss's order.

K: Listen, he ordered him to lead out a tank, not a train.

B: But I need 30 men just like it was ordered.

K: Take them from NASTIC OR BLAGOJEVIC, I can't pull anybody out of here for you.

B: But I don't have any here. I need them today and I'll give them back tonight. Krle, you have to understand. I can't explain it like this to you.

K: I'll disturb everything on this axis if I pull them out, and a lot depends on him.

B: I can't do anything without 15 to 30 men with Boban INDI] .

K: Ljubo, this/line/is not secure.

B: I know, I know.

K: I'll see what I can do, but I'll disturb a lot. Check down with NASTIC and BLAGOJEVIC.

B: But I don't have any. If I did, I wouldn't still be asking for the 3rd day.

K: Check with BLAGOJEVIC, take his Red Berets.

B: They're not there, only 4 of them are still there. They took off, fuck 'em, they're not there any more.

K: I'll see what I can do.

B: Check it out and have them go to Drago's.

K: I can't guarantee anything.

B: Krle, I don't know what to do any more.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Butler, T. 4903, Butler Report, para. 9.13.

¹⁰⁰⁷ P 472.

¹⁰⁰⁸ See the discussion *supra* para. 323.

¹⁰⁰⁹ P 478.

K: Ljubo, then take those MUP/Ministry of Interior/guys from up there.

B: No, they won't do anything, I talked to them. There's no other solution but for those 15 to 30 men with INDI]. That were supposed to arrive on the 13th but didn't.

K: Ljubo, you have to understand me, you guys fucked me up so much.

B: I understand, but you have to understand me too, had this been done then, we wouldn't be arguing over it now.

K: Fuck it, now I'll be the one to blame.

B: I don't know what to do. I mean it, Krle. There are still 3,500 parcels that I have to distribute and I have no solution.

K: Fuck it, I'll see what I can do.

Two other Bosnian Muslim interceptors recorded this same conversation. One of the records is a partial transcript reflecting the very beginning of the conversation, in which both General Krstic and Colonel Beara fully reveal their identities as they attempted to establish contact with each other.¹⁰¹⁰ The other version is a complete transcript that does not differ materially from the one outlined above.¹⁰¹¹

381. As can be seen from this transcript, Colonel Beara repeated the comment he had previously made to General @ivanovi} that "Furtula didn't carry out the boss's order" and that he needed thirty men. Although the language used is somewhat cryptic, General Krstic knew what Colonel Beara was talking about, as had General @ivanovi} in the conversation that took place just before. Thus both the new and the old Drina Corps Commanders knew about the prior "boss's order" to send thirty men with Boban Indi} three days earlier on 13 July 1995.¹⁰¹² The executions commenced on 13 July 1995, which supports an inference that these thirty men, who did not arrive, were to have been utilised in connection with this criminal activity. In their absence, Colonel Beara was urgently seeking assistance from General Krstic to assemble the men he needed.

382. General Krstic's initial reluctance to provide any men for Colonel Beara is consistent with the fact that, by this time, units from the Zvornik Brigade had been withdrawn from @epa and sent back to address the urgent situation in their zone of responsibility.¹⁰¹³ General Krstic directed Colonel Beara to check with "Nastic" (probably Major Nastic, the commander of the Mili}i Brigade) and "Blagojevic" (probably Colonel Blagojevic, the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade). General Krstic advised Colonel Beara to take some of "Blagojevic's Red Berets". The Bratunac

¹⁰¹⁰ P 474.

¹⁰¹¹ P 475.

¹⁰¹² Defence Witness DB testified that Boban Indi} was a member of the Višegrad Brigade (a subordinate unit of the Drina Corps) and that Indi} was present during the @epa operation. Defence Witness DB, T. 7274.

Brigade did indeed have a reconnaissance platoon called the "Red Berets".¹⁰¹⁴ Most critically, Colonel Beara said that he still had "3500 parcels" to "distribute" and had "no solution". He asserted that he would only need the additional troops for a few hours and could return them by the evening. General Krstic then made a commitment to help Colonel Beara, saying "I'll see what I can do".

383. The Prosecution has persuasively argued that "parcels" was a code name for Bosnian Muslims and that "distribute" was a code for killing them.¹⁰¹⁵ Several intercepts, recorded throughout the period of July 1995, reveal that VRS officers expressed concern about discussing matters related to the Bosnian Muslim prisoners over the telephone, and so the use of code words on this occasion is not surprising.¹⁰¹⁶ (In this very conversation, General Krstic warned Colonel Beara that the line was not secure.) During an intercepted conversation on 14 July 1995 at 2102 hours, Major Jokic, duty officer of the Zvornik Brigade, spoke to Colonel Beara and told him that the "Superior Command" urgently needed him. He then said there were "big problems with the people, I mean, with the parcel."¹⁰¹⁷ In another intercepted conversation, later that same evening at 2227 hours, Major Joki} said to a person who was identified as General Vilotic:

...Obrenovic is really engaged to the maximum. We all are, believe me. This packet has done most to ruin us...and since this morning we have been reporting on the number of people, well...well, so..¹⁰¹⁸

General Vilotic cut Major Joki} off at that point, saying he did not want to discuss it. A conversation intercepted on 2 August 1995 at 1240 hours, between General Krstic and Colonel Popovi}, provides a further example of the use of the term "parcel". Colonel Popovi} asked General Krstic whether a person called "Cica" was on his way towards Colonel Popovi}, and General Krstic confirmed that he was. Colonel Popovic then said "(h)e went up there because we had some parcels, to check what they know".¹⁰¹⁹ General Krstic replied "Good". The Chamber heard evidence that Bosnian Muslim prisoners were still being taken within the Drina Corps zone of responsibility throughout this period.¹⁰²⁰ This supports an inference that by "parcels" the VRS were referring to people, specifically Bosnian Muslim prisoners from whom information could be

¹⁰¹³ See the discussion *Infra* paras. 388-399.

¹⁰¹⁴ Krstic, T. 6727.

¹⁰¹⁵ Prosecutor's opening statement T. 483.

¹⁰¹⁶ P 364/1 (14 July 1995, tab 9) (conversation dated 14 July 1995 at 2102 hours); P 364/1 (14 July 1995 tab 10) (conversation dated 14 July 1995 at 2227 hours); P 364/1 (14 July 1995 tab 12) (conversation dated 14 July 1995 at 2241 hours); P 364/2 (15 July 1995 tab 1) (conversation dated 15 July 1995 at 0818 hours); and P 364/2 (17 July 1995 tab 14) (conversation dated 17 July 1995 at 2030 hours).

¹⁰¹⁷ P 559.

¹⁰¹⁸ P 561. The Prosecution was unable to explain who General Vilotic is or his role in the events. See Butler Report, para. 7.66.

¹⁰¹⁹ P 851. See also P 850, being a copy of the original record of the conversation from the notebook of interceptions).

obtained and that General Krstic was well aware of this. These intercepted conversations strongly support an inference that VRS personnel were using the word "parcel" as a code name for the Bosnian Muslim prisoners.

384. The conversation between General Krstic and Colonel Beara on 15 July 1995 is critical. Although the language itself is indirect, viewed in the context of what was happening on all fronts in the Drina Corps area of responsibility, the Trial Chamber concludes that the subject matter of this conversation was the executions. Both the Prosecution and the Defence agreed that Colonel Beara was fully involved in the killings.¹⁰²¹ Further, this conversation occurred in the middle of the period in which the executions were carried out. Mr. Butler pointed out that it took place after the mass executions at Orahovac and Petkovci Dam, but before the executions at the Branjevo Farm, Kozluk and the Pilica Dom.¹⁰²² In addition, Colonel Beara mentioned that he would only need the men for a few hours and would return them at the end of the day. This indicates a short and discreet assignment rather than the deployment of men for combat.

385. Revealingly, General Krstic did not attempt to provide an alternative meaning for this conversation, but rather denied that it had ever taken place, or indeed that he ever had a conversation with Colonel Beara between 13 and 17 July 1995. The Bosnian Muslim interceptors recorded that, during the course of the conversation, General Krstic referred to Colonel Beara by his first name of "Ljubo". General Krstic said that he never addressed officers from a superior command by just a name without mentioning the rank.¹⁰²³ The Trial Chamber rejects this explanation and finds that, at the time this conversation took place on 15 July 1995, General Krstic knew the executions were occurring and that he undertook to assist Colonel Beara in obtaining the necessary personnel to carry them out. This intercepted conversation does, however, support the notion that the Main Staff was primarily directing the executions, albeit calling upon the resources of the Drina Corps Command. This is apparent both from Colonel Beara's involvement and also the reference General Krstic made to the fact that "you guys fucked me up so much", which would appear to be a reference to the Main Staff, to which Colonel Beara belonged.

386. During the intercepted conversation, General Krstic had suggested that Colonel Beara approached the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade about getting the men needed for the

¹⁰²⁰ In fact, the Trial Chamber heard that, as late as October 1995, the Bratunac Brigade was continuing to capture Muslim men who were trying to remain in the area near their houses. See P 712; and Butler, T. 5239, 5369.

¹⁰²¹ Krstic, T. 6737

¹⁰²² Butler T. 4910.

¹⁰²³ Krstic, T. 6726-6727.

executions and had personally undertaken to try to assist Colonel Beara in this regard.¹⁰²⁴ Subsequently, on 16 July 1995, men from the Bratunac Brigade arrived to assist members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment with the executions at Branjevo Farm.¹⁰²⁵ The Chamber has also found that these men from Bratunac left the Branjevo Farm execution site at the conclusion of the killings and proceeded immediately to the Pilica Dom execution site.¹⁰²⁶

387. The Trial Chamber finds that, on the morning of 15 July 1995, Colonel Beara asked General Krstic for additional men to help with the execution of Bosnian Muslim prisoners being carried out in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility. General Krstic undertook to assist Colonel Beara with obtaining the men required to carry out the execution of Bosnian Muslim men. General Krstic raised the possibility that men from the Bratunac Brigade could be used, undertook to arrange that and then men from that Brigade subsequently arrived to assist with the Branjevo Farm executions on 16 July 1995.

(ii) The Recall of Colonel Pandurevi} and the Zvornik Brigade from @epa: 15 July 1995

388. The @epa operation commenced on the morning of 14 July 1995.¹⁰²⁷ General Krstic testified that, on that same day, he received a call from General @ivanovi} who requested the urgent return of Colonel Pandurevi}, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, and parts of his unit. General Krstic testified that General @ivanovi} simply said the situation in the area of the Zvornik Brigade was very complex and uncertain and that General @ivanovi} gave no further details.¹⁰²⁸ General Krstic further testified that, in the afternoon hours of 14 July 1995, sometime around 1800 hours, he received a call from the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade, Major Obrenovi}, who submitted the same request.¹⁰²⁹ On the night between 14 and 15 July 1995, Colonel Pandurevi} pulled his units out of @epa and organised a march towards Zvornik, his primary area of responsibility.¹⁰³⁰ According to his testimony, General Krstic learned nothing further about the events in Zvornik that had provoked this transfer of troops, namely the intensive battle being waged against the Bosnian Muslim column and the simultaneous arrival of thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners into the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility. When questioned about this, General Krstic said that the withdrawal of Colonel Pandurevi} and the Zvornik Brigade did not impact upon the operation at @epa and he therefore had no reason to inquire into the matter further.¹⁰³¹ This

¹⁰²⁴ Further confirmation that men from Bratunac were sent to assist in the executions is found in P 622, discussed *Infra* paras. 401-402.

¹⁰²⁵ See the discussion *supra* paras. 240.

¹⁰²⁶ See the discussion *supra* paras. 246-248.

¹⁰²⁷ See Defence Witness DC, T. 7449.

¹⁰²⁸ Krstic, T. 6253,-6254.

¹⁰²⁹ Krstic, T. 6745-6747.

¹⁰³⁰ Krstic, T. 6744.

¹⁰³¹ Krstic, T. 6777-6778.

contrasts with the statement General Krstic made to the OTP in an interview on 18 February 2000, where he stated that, on the evening of 14 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade Chief of Staff reported to him that the front lines of the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility had been broken through.¹⁰³²

389. At 1925 hours on 15 July 1995, Colonel Pandurevi}, who had then been back in his zone of responsibility for about one day, sent an Interim Combat Report to the Command of the Drina Corps, discussing the threat posed to the Zvornik Brigade by the Bosnian Muslim column. Colonel Pandurevi} stated that:

An additional burden for us is the large numbers of prisoners distributed throughout schools in the brigade area, as well as obligations of security and restoration of the terrain... This command cannot take care of these problems any longer, as it has neither the material nor other resources. If no one takes on this responsibility, I will be forced to let them go.¹⁰³³

At this time on 15 July 1995, the prisoners held at Orahovac and the Dam had already been executed and, for the most part, buried. The prisoners in Pilica and those who were later killed at Kozluk, were still alive.

390. It is clear from this Interim Combat Report that Colonel Pandurevi} knew about the prisoner situation in his area of responsibility by 15 July 1995. He was concerned about the diversion of Zvornik Brigade resources from combat with the 28th Division in order to meet the demands posed by the presence of the prisoners in his zone. Up until that point the Zvornik Brigade had been assigned tasks relating to the prisoners and Colonel Pandurevi} warned his Command that he would not tolerate the situation any longer.

391. Whether Colonel Pandurevi} also knew that prisoners were being liquidated in his zone at the time he sent his 15 July 1995 Interim Combat Report was the subject of dispute between the parties. General Radinovi} argued that if Colonel Pandurevi} had known about the executions he would not have referred to the prisoners at all in his report to ensure that he did not implicate himself in the crimes.¹⁰³⁴ General Krstic testified that when Colonel Pandurevi} referred to being unable to "take care of these problems any longer", he was referring only to the problem of guarding them.¹⁰³⁵ The defence further maintained that the "burden" referred to by Colonel Pandurevi} was the care and feeding of the prisoners.¹⁰³⁶ However, as the Prosecution pointed out, there is no evidence of the Zvornik Brigade Rear Services Staff taking action to co-ordinate food and water or other essential supplies for a large group of prisoners at this time.¹⁰³⁷ According to the

¹⁰³² P 228, p. 24.

¹⁰³³ P 609.

¹⁰³⁴ Radinovi}, T. 7988, 8390-8396.

¹⁰³⁵ Krstic, T. 6738-6739.

¹⁰³⁶ Krstic, T. 6740-6741. See also, Radinovi}, T. 8407-8408.

¹⁰³⁷ Butler Report, para. 7.77.

Prosecution, when Colonel Pandurevi} wrote of "restoration of the terrain" (or "asanacija terena" as it appears in the original B/C/S version of the document) in his 15 July Interim Combat Report he was referring to burying the bodies of executed Bosnian Muslim prisoners. The Defence disputed this, arguing that it referred only to cleaning up the battlefield when fighting was over.¹⁰³⁸ Mr. Butler accepted that clearing the battlefield to dispose of combat casualties was standard operating practice pursuant to JNA regulations.¹⁰³⁹ However, as Mr. Butler pointed out, it seems unlikely that Colonel Pandurevi} was referring to legitimate battle cleanup activities, as combat with the Bosnian Muslim column was ongoing at this time. It would be a surprising military practice for "asanacija terena" to be carried out in the middle of the hostilities.

392. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that, at the time he wrote his 15 July 1995 Interim Combat Report, Colonel Pandurevi} knew about the ongoing execution of Bosnian Muslim prisoners in his zone of responsibility. On 13 and 14 July 1995, Zvornik Brigade resources were engaged in scouting sites that were subsequently used to detain the prisoners throughout Zvornik. Further, the Chamber has already determined that, on 14 and 15 July 1995, Zvornik Brigade resources were being utilised to assist with the executions at Orahovac and Petkovci Dam.¹⁰⁴⁰

393. That Colonel Pandurevi} knew of the executions is consistent with his complaint that vital Zvornik Brigade resources were being diverted into dealing with the prisoners. As Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, Colonel Pandurevi} must have been informed about the deployment of these individuals and resources, given the impact it was having on the ability of the Zvornik Brigade to respond to the threat posed by the Bosnian Muslim column. Moreover, Colonel Pandurevi} obviously considered that he had some control over what was being done with prisoners because he said that, unless he received some assistance, *he* would be forced to let them go. The Chamber also accepts that the Interim Combat Report was written on the assumption that the Drina Corps Command, including General Krstic as Commander, knew about both the prisoner situation and the executions being carried out in the Zvornik Brigade's zone: otherwise such cryptic references would be unintelligible by the Command.

394. General Krstic denied that he ever received the 15 July 1995 Interim Combat Report sent by Pandurevi} at the Kriva-e FCP.¹⁰⁴¹ However, as Commander of the Drina Corps, General Krstic would surely have demanded follow-up information, knowing the situation faced by the Zvornik Brigade was so critical. An intercepted conversation on 17 July 1995 at 0615 hours also suggests

¹⁰³⁸ Radinovi}, T. 8409-8410, 8410-8411.

¹⁰³⁹ Butler, T. 5339-5340.

¹⁰⁴⁰ See the discussion *supra* paras. 225 and 232.

¹⁰⁴¹ Krstic, T. 6736, 6793.

that General Krstic received the Daily Combat Reports and Interim Combat Reports sent by Colonel Pandurevi} during this period.¹⁰⁴²

395. The crisis facing the Zvornik Brigade was also referred to in a 15 July 1995 report from Colonel Milanovi}, the Drina Corps Chief of Anti-Aircraft Defence and previously Chief of Staff of the Bratunac Brigade,¹⁰⁴³ describing the situation in the zone of the Bratunac Brigade, the Mili}i Brigade and the Skelani Separate Battalion. General Krstic accepted he had received this report at the Kriva-e FCP.¹⁰⁴⁴ Colonel Milanovi} proposed taking "200 or more soldiers from the 1st Mili}i Brigade in the direction of Stubli}, besides the SB Skelani, if Pandurevi} settles his situation." Obviously, Colonel Milanovi} believed that General Krstic knew about Colonel Pandurevi}'s "situation", and that General Krstic would understand the reference in his report without further explanation.

396. An intercepted conversation on 16 July 1995 provides a further glimpse that General Krstic was taking steps to remain fully informed of the developing situation of the Zvornik Brigade. At 1602 hours, "Zlatar 01" (a code associated with Drina Corps Commander who by that time was General Krstic) called to speak with "Palma 01" (a code associated with the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade) and, when the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade could not be located, Zlatar 01 left a message for him to call Zlatar 385, an extension associated with General Krstic.¹⁰⁴⁵

397. On 18 July 1995, Colonel Pandurevi} sent a further Interim Combat Report about events in the Zvornik Brigade area of responsibility.¹⁰⁴⁶ This time, the Prosecution and the Defence were in agreement: in this Report Colonel Pandurevi} voiced strong discontent about the crimes that had occurred within his area of responsibility.¹⁰⁴⁷ Colonel Pandurevi} wrote:

It is inconceivable to me that someone brought in 3,000 Turks of military age and placed them in schools in the municipality, in addition to the 7,000 or so who have fled into the forests. This has created an extremely complex situation and the possibility of the total occupation of Zvornik in conjunction with the forces at the front. These actions have stirred up great discontent among the people and the general opinion is that Zvornik is to pay the price for the taking of Srebrenica.

The Prosecution argued that Colonel Pandurevi} was speaking of the discontent in Zvornik that had resulted from the killings of thousands of Bosnian Muslims in that area. Colonel Pandurevi} was

¹⁰⁴² P 650 (intercepted conversation from 17 July 1995 at 0615 hours between General Krstic and Captain Trbi} of the Zvornik Brigade during which General Krstic acknowledged having received a report (which must have been one of the combat reports sent on 16 July 1995) from the Zvornik Brigade. Later in the conversation, General Krstic spoke to Colonel Pandurevi} and discussed whether there were any changes to the report).

¹⁰⁴³ P 537, Butler, T. 4986-498.

¹⁰⁴⁴ P 537, and Krstic, T. 6771.

¹⁰⁴⁵ P 635. See also P 630 (intercepted conversation at 1355 hours on 16 July 1995 in which "Zlatar 1" (the Drina Corps Command) called "Palma 01" (the Zvornik Brigade Command) for a briefing on "what's new for Zlatar 1").

¹⁰⁴⁶ P 675.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Radinovi}, T. 7989.

angry because his whole area was, as the Prosecution argued, "soaked in Muslim blood".¹⁰⁴⁸ General Radinovi} agreed with this interpretation.¹⁰⁴⁹

398. General Krstic said that the 18 July 1995 Report did not reach him at the FCP.¹⁰⁵⁰ However, there is strong evidence to the contrary. In an intercepted conversation on 19 July 1995 at 0812 hours,¹⁰⁵¹ Colonel Pandurevi} spoke to Colonel Cerovi}, the Drina Corps Assistant Commander for Legal Religious and Moral Affairs, about the losses sustained by the Zvornik Brigade in combat with the Bosnian Muslim column and referred to a report that Colonel Pandurevi} had sent the previous day. This must have been a reference to the Interim Combat Report sent by Colonel Pandurevi} on 18 July 1995, which included information about the casualties suffered by the Zvornik Brigade. Colonel Cerovi} acknowledged receipt of the report and said "(y)es and I presented that to Krstic and wrote him special/report/ based on your interim and daily reports." While General Krstic denied that this intercepted conversation was a reliable piece of evidence, he was at a loss to explain how or why a Bosnian Muslim interceptor could or would have made up these words.¹⁰⁵² The conversation not only demonstrates that General Krstic received the Interim Combat Report sent by Colonel Pandurevi} on 18 July 1995, but also supports an inference that Colonel Cerovi} was ensuring that all the "interim and daily reports" sent by Colonel Pandurevi} were being forwarded to General Krstic. This would be expected given the pressing situation of the Zvornik Brigade at that time.

399. The Trial Chamber finds that General Krstic knew that the Zvornik Brigade was recalled in order to deal with the dual problems of combat with the column and the presence of thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners within his zone of responsibility. In the days following 14 July 1995, General Krstic was kept fully informed about events taking place in the Zvornik Brigade's zone of responsibility. It is beyond belief that, as Commander of the @epa Operation and, more particularly, of the Drina Corps, he did not receive, or demand an explanation as to why troops assigned to the combat operation that he was leading were being withdrawn and deployed elsewhere. Nor does the evidence described above admit of such a remote possibility. The recall of Colonel Pandurevi} and the Combat and Interim Combat Reports Colonel Pandurevi} subsequently sent to the Drina Corps Command, confirm that, by 15 July 1995, General Krstic was well aware of the large number of prisoners distributed throughout the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility, as well as the use of Zvornik Brigade resources in connection with the executions.

¹⁰⁴⁸ T.8417.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Radinovi}, T. 8417.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Krstic, T. 6792-6793.

¹⁰⁵¹ P 695.

(iii) Knowledge of Colonel Popovi}’s Activities on 16 July 1995

400. A series of intercepts and documents from 16 July 1995 reveal that Colonel Popovi} was up in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade and that he asked the Drina Corps Command to send diesel fuel to him in Pilica to enable him to continue his “work”.¹⁰⁵³ These intercepts are corroborated by Drina Corps records showing the distribution of this fuel to Colonel Popovi}.¹⁰⁵⁴ This paperwork makes reference to the Drina Corps Command¹⁰⁵⁵ as the “recipient” of the fuel, which was addressed to Colonel Popovi}, confirming that the Corps Command was fully comprised of the work being carried out by Colonel Popovi}. Given that General Krstic was, by that time, the Corps Commander, he must have known that the fuel had been allocated to Colonel Popovi} to assist with the work he was doing in the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility. The involvement of the Corps Command on this issue is consistent with the fact that fuel was immensely scarce in Eastern Bosnia at this time. In the words of Mr. Butler, fuel was “liquid gold”.¹⁰⁵⁶

401. Also on 16 July 1995, the day after the Colonel Beara/General Krstic intercept, a conversation was intercepted between Colonel Popovi} and a person called Rasi} (an officer within the operations centre of the Drina Corps¹⁰⁵⁷) at 2116 hours.¹⁰⁵⁸ The Bosnian Muslim intercept operator recorded the following:

(*Palma*/code-name) Lt. Col. Vujadin Popovi}-Rasic (OC/Operations Centre/) Lt. Colonel Popovi} asked to be connected with General Krsti} at *Zlatar*/code-name/ and he was not there, he asked to be connected with the OC

P: Hello, Lt. Col. Popovi} speaking.

R: Rasi} here, can I help you?

P: Rale!

R: Yes?

P: I was just up there.

R: Yes.

¹⁰⁵² Krstic, T. 6792-6793.

¹⁰⁵³ See the discussion *supra* para. 242.

¹⁰⁵⁴ P 619.

¹⁰⁵⁵ The English version of this document actually translates the BCS reference to “KDK” as “Drina Corps Commander”. Elsewhere however, this acronym has been translated as “Drina Corps Command” and the Prosecution did not seek to argue the document referred to the Drina Corps Commander specifically. See *supra* para. 242 and accompanying footnote.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Butler T. 4832. See also P 638 (intercepted conversation from 16 July 1995 showing General Krstic was closely monitoring the Corps fuel resources.)

¹⁰⁵⁷ Butler, T. 5143.

¹⁰⁵⁸ P 622.

P: I was with the boss personally.

R: Yes.

P: Here where I am...you know where I am?

R: I know.

P: Well, you got his interim report.

R: All of it.

P: It's all just like he wrote it...I was there on the spot and was convinced he had received some numbers...well, that's not even important...I'll come there tomorrow so tell the General...I've finished the job.

R: You finished?

P: I finished everything.

R: Good.

P: I'll come there tomorrow when I'm sure that's all been taken care of, you know.

R: Good.

P: After I bring a transport from there.

R: Right.

P: Well, in general, there weren't any major problems. But up there, there were horrible problems and that thing the commander sent, it was just the right thing.

R: Good.

P: Just the thing...horrible...it was horrible.

R: Listen Vujadin.

P: What?

R: Tell me, did anything arrive there now from Vidoje Blagojevi}?

P: From Vidoje?

R: Today.

P: Yes...You mean manpower?

R: Yes, yes...did anything arrive? Something was supposed to arrive?

P: Yes, it arrived...it's up there...it's up there but it didn't arrive on time and it wasn't brought in on time. And the others who arrived, did arrive, but they were late and so they weren't brought in on time, and that's why the commander who was here had problems.

R: When exactly did Blagojevi}'s men arrive?

P: Fuck it, I don't know exactly, now I can't...

R: I know... the duty officer/as printed/

P: Maybe the duty officer...here's the duty officer.

R: Let me talk to him.

P: OK.

D: Hello!
R: Hello!
D: Yes go ahead.
R: When did Blagojevi}’s men arrive?
D: From *Badem/code-name/*?
R: Yes...when did they arrive and how many of them arrived?
D: I’ll call you right back.
R: OK, find out exactly and call me back.
D: I will.

Thus Colonel Popovi} was calling from “Palma”, the code name for the Zvornik Brigade. Mr. Butler surmised that the reference to Colonel Popovi} being “up there” meant that Colonel Popovi} had just returned from an area north of Zvornik, i.e. the Pilica area,¹⁰⁵⁹ and that Rasic (and therefore the Drina Corps Command where Rasic was the duty officer) knew this.¹⁰⁶⁰ In this context, when Colonel Popovi} referred to “the boss”, he was likely referring to Colonel Pandurevi} the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade,¹⁰⁶¹ and the Interim Combat Report mentioned by Colonel Popovi} was the one sent by Colonel Pandurevi} on 16 July 1995.¹⁰⁶² Colonel Popovi} referred to the fact that the men from Colonel Blagojevi} (the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade) had arrived. The Trial Chamber has already found that members of the Bratunac Brigade arrived to assist in the Branjevo Farm executions and that they had subsequently participated in the executions at Pilica.¹⁰⁶³ The third participant in the conversation, “D”, subsequently linked the men with *Badem* (the code name of the Bratunac Brigade) further supporting the position that the men being discussed were from the Bratunac Brigade. Consequently, this intercept is further evidence that men were sent from the Bratunac Brigade to assist in the executions on 16 July 1995 following Colonel Beara’s request for additional men from General Krstic on the morning of 15 July 1995.

402. In light of the fact that Colonel Popovi} initially asked for General Krstic, the Trial Chamber finds the “General” subsequently referred to is also General Krstic. The Trial Chamber is also persuaded, having regard to the timing of the conversation that “the job” Colonel Popovi} referred to was the criminal activity in the Pilica area that had taken place on 16 July 1995.¹⁰⁶⁴ It is clear from the statements Colonel Popovi} made during the course of the conversation, that Colonel Blagojevi}’s men had arrived late. This is consistent with the testimony of Mr. Erdemovi} that

¹⁰⁵⁹ Butler, T. 5144.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Butler, T. 5144.

¹⁰⁶¹ Butler, T. 5144.

¹⁰⁶² Butler, T. 5145.

¹⁰⁶³ See the discussion *supra* para. 240, 243, 246 and 248.

soldiers from the Bratunac Brigade arrived mid-way through the executions at Branjevo Farm to assist the 10th Sabotage Detachment.

403. Further intercepts taken on 17 July 1995 support a finding that Colonel Popovi} was reporting to the Drina Corps Command and, specifically to General Krstic, about the executions. At 1242 hours on that day, "Zlatar 01" (the code associated with General Krstic as Drina Corps Commander) called Major Golic from the Drina Corps intelligence section looking for Colonel Popovi}.¹⁰⁶⁵ Major Golic, referring to "Zlatar 01" as "General", informed him that "Popovi} is still in Zvornik, but will be back in the afternoon." "Zlatar 01" then instructed Major Goli} to "...find Popovi}, and have him call the Forward Command Post immediately."¹⁰⁶⁶ Several hours later Colonel Popovi} was overheard in a conversation during which he stated:

Hello, it's Popovi}...boss...everything's OK, that job is done...everything's OK...everything has been brought to an end, no problems...I'm here at the place...I'm here at the place where I was before, you know...I'm at the base...at the base, the base...Can I just take a little break, take a shower and then I'll think again later...basically, that all gets an "A"...an "A"...the grade is "A", everything's OK...that's it, bye, take care¹⁰⁶⁷

Although General Krstic was not expressly identified in the conversation, given the executions that had been completed at this time, the preceding conversation in which General Krstic was seeking a report from Colonel Popovi} and Popovi}'s reference to "boss", the inference is very strong that this conversation recorded Colonel Popovi} reporting to General Krstic about the completion of the executions.

404. The Trial Chamber finds that, as of 16 July 1995, Colonel Popovi} was in contact with General Krstic to report on matters relating to the executions. General Krstic was being informed about what had happened as part of the chain of command for reporting purposes and was supervising and monitoring the activities of his subordinate officers who were participating in the executions.

(iv) Conversation Between General Krstic and "OA" about the Executions on 20 July 1995

405. During his interview with the OTP, on 29 March 2000, "OA" stated that, some time between the point when the Bosnian Muslim population was transported from Poto-ari and 20 July 1995, he heard, informally, stories that killings had occurred following the take-over of Srebrenica.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Butler, T. 5148.

¹⁰⁶⁵ P 661.

¹⁰⁶⁶ See also P 662 (intercept on 17 July 1995 at 1244 hours in which an unidentified subscriber speaks to Captain Trbi} at the Zvornik Brigade and asks that Colonel Popovi} be contacted and told to leave right away for "Zlatar 01", the code name associated with General Krstic in the intercepts);

Specifically, "OA" was told that liquidations had occurred in a co-operative hall in Kravica¹⁰⁶⁸ and were carried out by members of the army and the police.¹⁰⁶⁹ Sometime prior to 20 July 1995, "OA" repeated these stories separately to General Krstic and Colonel Kosori} and neither of them responded.¹⁰⁷⁰ "OA" emphasised, however, that at the time he spoke with General Krstic and Colonel Kosori}, he did not have any confirmed or official information.¹⁰⁷¹ Although "OA" did not appear before the Chamber and could not be cross-examined, the statement he made is consistent with other evidence presented to the Trial Chamber that General Krstic had direct knowledge of the executions by the time their conversation took place some time prior to 20 July 1995.

(v) Contact Between General Krstic and Other Individuals Involved in the Executions

406. Throughout the critical period, General Krstic was regularly in contact with individuals who appear to have been involved in the Srebrenica crimes. This contact is relevant because it refutes the assertion made by General Krstic that he was completely isolated from events in Srebrenica due to his position as Commander of the @epa operation and played no role in the crimes committed in the aftermath of the take-over of Srebrenica. Although the Trial Chamber could not, on the basis of these contacts alone, conclude that General Krstic was involved in the crimes, in combination, the frequency of these contacts during the critical days of July 1995 supports the other evidence adduced that General Krstic was also involved in these events.

407. First and foremost, is the interaction between General Krstic and General Mladic. The parties agreed that General Mladic was the primary figure behind the executions in Srebrenica.¹⁰⁷² If General Mladic} knew about the killings, it would be natural for General Krstic to know as well. They were in constant contact throughout the relevant period: at the Pribicevac FCP; during the victory march through Srebrenica; at the Bratunac Brigade Headquarters meeting on 11 or 12 July 1995; at the Hotel Fontana meetings on 11 and 12 July 1995; at Poto-ari on 12 July 1995; at Vlasenica on the morning of 13 July 1995; at Viogora on 13 July 1995 addressing the troops assembling for @epa;¹⁰⁷³ at Vlasenica on the evening of 13 July 1995 when General Mladic}

¹⁰⁶⁷ P 666; P 667; Butler, T. 5186-5187.

¹⁰⁶⁸ P 886, P 01908768.

¹⁰⁶⁹ P 886, P 01908769.

¹⁰⁷⁰ P 886, P 01908764, 01908768, 01908770-1.

¹⁰⁷¹ P 01908771.

¹⁰⁷² See also the testimony of Witness J, T. 2459; Witness K, T. 2509; and Witness L, T. 2658-2661 (that, late in the afternoon of 13 July 1995, General Mladic} visited the Sandi}i Meadow); and the testimony of Witness P, T. 2953-2954; and Witness Q, T. 3024, (that he also visited the Nova Kasaba football field in the afternoon of 13 July 1995).

¹⁰⁷³ Witness II, T. 9218; Krstic, T. 6669.

appointed General Krstic as Corps Commander;¹⁰⁷⁴ and subsequently at the FCP at Kriva-e, and later Godjenje, during the course of the @epa negotiations between the Bosnian Serb side and the Bosnian Muslim side.¹⁰⁷⁵ The Defence, of course, argued that General Mladic concealed the executions from General Krstic, but a question eventually arises as to why General Krstic himself would not inquire about what was being done with the prisoners.

408. Second, as already noted, on 15 July 1995, General Krstic was heard speaking to Colonel Beara, the Chief of Security for the Security Administration of the Main Staff.¹⁰⁷⁶ There was also agreement between the parties that Colonel Beara was heavily involved in the killings. Further, Defence Witness DC testified that Colonel Beara was present amongst the command staff at @epa, along with General Mladic and that he was engaged in negotiations at @epa from mid July 1995 onwards.¹⁰⁷⁷ Witness II testified that Colonel Beara was at an UNPROFOR checkpoint in @epa during the course of the @epa operation and that General Krstic met with him.¹⁰⁷⁸

409. Third, General Krstic had frequent contact with Colonel Popovic during the relevant period. The evidence presented to the Trial Chamber suggests that Colonel Popovic played a significant role in the crimes committed following the take-over of Srebrenica. He was with the VRS officers who walked through the streets of Srebrenica, on the afternoon of 11 July 1995¹⁰⁷⁹ and he was present at the Hotel Fontana meeting convened by General Mladic, on the morning of 12 July 1995.¹⁰⁸⁰ Eyewitnesses place him in Poto-ari on 12 July 1995¹⁰⁸¹ and, in addition, he is known to have been in the Zvornik area around 16 July 1995 and to have organised fuel used in conjunction with the executions in the Pilica area.¹⁰⁸² The Defence accepted that Colonel Popovic was implicated in the Srebrenica crimes.

¹⁰⁷⁴ See also P 458 (conversation intercepted at 1822 hours on 13 July 1995 placing General Krstic and General Mladic together), and the explanation given by Butler, T. 4868.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Krstic T.6262. Defence Witness DB, T. 7101, (testifying that General Mladic occasionally came to the FCPs at Kriva-e and later in Godjenje, and came two or three times during the @epa operation); and Krstic, T. 6255-6259, 6262 (testifying that he had contact with General Mladic during the @epa operations when General Mladic came to the FCP or if a Brigade commander informed General Krstic he was in the region of deployment of that Brigade); and Defence Witness DB, T. 7290 (testifying that General Mladic was frequently at @epa during the negotiations). See also P 671 (intercept dated 17 July 1995 of a conversation between General Mladic and General Krstic discussing matters pertaining to the negotiations at @epa).

¹⁰⁷⁶ See the discussion *supra* paras. 380-387.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Defence Witness DC, T. 7503, 7513.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Witness II, T. 9134.

¹⁰⁷⁹ PP 145 A (video of the walk through Srebrenica).

¹⁰⁸⁰ See the discussion *supra* para. 131.

¹⁰⁸¹ See the discussion *supra* para. 143.

¹⁰⁸² P 620 (intercept in the afternoon of 16 July 1995 in which the duty officer at the Zvornik Brigade is passing on Colonel Popovic's request for diesel fuel to the Drina Corps Command); and P 619 (confirming that 500 litres of diesel fuel was released to Colonel Popovic). See also P 624 (intercept on 16 July 1995 at 2233 hours in which the Duty Officer of the Zvornik Brigade confirms that Colonel Popovic had been at the Zvornik Brigade.); and P 661 (an intercepted conversation from 1242 hours on 17 July 1995 in which an officer at Drina Corps headquarters notes that Colonel Popovic was still in Zvornik.) See generally Butler, T. 5345.

410. Colonel Popovi} is seen standing behind General Krstic, during the televised interview given in Poto-ari on 12 July 1995.¹⁰⁸³ On 16 July 1995, Colonel Popovi} left a message for General Krstic reporting on activities relating to the executions.¹⁰⁸⁴ Further conversations were intercepted, on 17 July 1995 at 1242 hours demonstrating contact between General Krstic and Colonel Popovi}.¹⁰⁸⁵ Witness II testified that Colonel Popovi} was present in @epa "a few times" during the course of the @epa operation.¹⁰⁸⁶

411. Fourth, the intensive involvement of Colonel Pandurevi}, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, in events relating to the Bosnian Muslim column and prisoners has already been noted,¹⁰⁸⁷ along with the involvement of the Zvornik Brigade personnel and resources at the execution sites at Orahovac, Petkovci Dam, Branjevo Farm and Kozluk. On 16 July 1995 at 1602 hours, a conversation was intercepted in which Zlatar 01 (the code name for the Drina Corps Commander¹⁰⁸⁸ i.e. General Krstic) called to speak to Palma 01 (code name for the Zvornik Brigade Commander, i.e. Colonel Pandurevic). Zlatar 01 said "Tell him it's Zlatar 01 calling to ask what's new... "and Palma asks"...who should he call when he gets a chance?" The answer came back: "Zlatar 385", a number frequently associated with General Krstic throughout the intercepts.¹⁰⁸⁹ The Trial Chamber accepts this intercept as evidence that General Krsti} was trying to reach Colonel Pandurevi}. Given that Colonel Pandurevi} had, the previous night, been urgently recalled from @epa upon the orders of General Krsti}, it would be expected that General Krstic would have checked in with Colonel Pandurevi} around this time.¹⁰⁹⁰ On 17 July 1995 at 0615 hours, a conversation was intercepted between General Krstic and Trbi} (duty officer of the Zvornik Brigade). Trbi} reported to General Krstic that "everything's under control so far. There are no further problems to yesterday's report" (which appears to be a reference to the Interim Combat Report sent by Colonel Pandurevi} on 16 July 1995 describing combat between the column and the 2nd Corps, which resulted in many Bosnian Serb casualties). General Krstic then said: "OK have you killed the Turks up there?". Trbi} replied: "Well I guess you got the report. What more can I tell you". General Krstic said "I got it" and Trbi} responded "Basically we did". General Krstic asked to speak to Trbi}'s Commander and Trbi} told General Krstic he would have to go through

¹⁰⁸³ P 58.

¹⁰⁸⁴ See the discussion *supra* paras. 401-402.

¹⁰⁸⁵ P 661; P 666; P 667; and Butler T. 5180.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Witness II, T. 9134.

¹⁰⁸⁷ See the discussion *supra* paras 388-399.

¹⁰⁸⁸ The Trial Chamber heard evidence that the designation "01" was used to refer to indicated "commander". (insert details) The Prosecution conceded that, insofar as written orders were concerned, the use of this code was not uniform, so that it could not necessarily be concluded that a document which included the reference "01" was issued by the Corps Commander. However, in the context of this spoken conversation, the Chamber is satisfied that "Zlatar 01" was a reference to General Krstic given the subsequent reference to extension 385, which the Trial Chamber has already found was associated with General Krstic during this period.

¹⁰⁸⁹ P 635.

switchboard. General Krstic then said "Hello Vinko, Vinko!" (Vinko is the first name of Colonel Pandurevi}). General Krstic asked Vinko "Are there any changes in reference to that report?" And Vinko said: "Nothing significant. Basically, we'll probably finish this today." General Krstic then said "I am going up there now, you know."¹⁰⁹¹

412. Fifth, on 18 July 1995 at 0716 hours, a conversation was intercepted between General Krstic and Colonel Cerovi}.¹⁰⁹² In July 1995, Colonel Cerovi} was the Drina Corps Assistant Commander for Legal, Religious and Moral Affairs. He was heard in several intercepts conducting conversations from the Drina Corps Command Post relating to the handling of prisoners.¹⁰⁹³ In the intercepted conversation on 18 July 1995, General Krstic said to Colonel Cerovi}: "I hope that everything is OK down there with Vinko", and Colonel Cerovi} replied: "It is. I talked to Vinko last night. He'll send an additional report today. He stabilised everything he was supposed to do." The Trial Chamber accepts that the reference to Vinko was a reference to Colonel Vinko Pandurevi}, the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade, who on 18 July 1995 sent an Interim Combat Report to the Drina Corps Command.

7. Other Evidence that General Krstic Remained Informed of Events Occurring in Srebrenica Before and After the VRS Military Take-Over on 11 July 1995

413. There is other evidence that General Krstic was not as isolated from the events occurring around Srebrenica, during the critical period from 11 July 1995 onwards, as he maintained. In particular, General Krstic dropped in frequently to the Drina Corps Headquarters in Vlasenica, during the period between 11 July and 17 July 1995. He acknowledged being there on 12 July 1995 around 1700 and 1800 hours¹⁰⁹⁴ and again the next morning.¹⁰⁹⁵ An eye-witness also gave evidence that General Krstic returned to the Drina Corps headquarters in Vlasenica "a few times" during the course of the @epa operation, further confirming that he was in a position to learn about events happening outside his immediate area of concern in @epa.¹⁰⁹⁶ This was corroborated in the statement made to the OTP by the protected individual "OA" who said that General Krstic would

¹⁰⁹⁰ Butler, T. 5161.

¹⁰⁹¹ P 650, see also Butler T. 5175 ff.

¹⁰⁹² P 688.

¹⁰⁹³ P 627 (intercepted conversation on 16 July 1995 in which Colonel Cerovi} states that "Triage has to be done on the prisoners. Later in the same conversation, Colonel Cerovi} spoke to Colonel Beara and again mentioned triage and the prisoners, and Colonel Beara cut him off saying "I don't want to talk about it on the phone." At this time, the two groups of prisoners left alive were those coming from the Pilica School to the Branjevo Military Farm and those at the Pilica Dom. See Butler T. 5156.)

¹⁰⁹⁴ Krstic, T. 6667.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Krstic, T. 6669

¹⁰⁹⁶ Witness II, T. 9133.

occasionally travel to Vlasenica in the evenings during the course of the @epa operation.¹⁰⁹⁷ The distance between Vlasenica and Kriva-e is minimal: about 34 kilometres.¹⁰⁹⁸

8. The Role of General Krstic in the Reburial and Cover-up Operations

414. Documentation linking the Drina Corps to the reburial activity is scant and the available evidence discloses no direct involvement by General Krstic in this aspect of the crimes. The Prosecution relied primarily on the fact that, even on the Defence version of events, General Krstic was the Corps Commander throughout this period. An operation of the scale required to dig up thousands of corpses and transfer them to remote locations, all within the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps, could hardly have escaped his notice. As Mr. Butler testified, at that time a declared state of war was in existence in the zone:

...and the fact that most of the areas in question fall into the designated war zones where the military has exclusive primacy based on the scope of activity that had to have occurred and one would assume primarily at night for the burial operations and the movement of the remains, the different locations and all the assets that needed to happen with that, I would be very hard pressed to come up with any form of an explanation on how the Drina Corps staff, in general, and how the Drina Corps Commander, specifically, could not have been aware of what was going on over, essentially, a two-month period.¹⁰⁹⁹

415. The Prosecution sought to rely on two documents from the Main Staff allegedly dealing with the allocation of fuel for the reburial works, which were addressed directly to the Drina Corps Command. On the basis of these documents, the Prosecution argued that General Krstic, as Commander, must have been informed of what was going on.¹¹⁰⁰ As previously determined, the Trial Chamber is unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the fuel allocated was used for the reburial works, or that Drina Corps resources were implicated in this activity. However, the Trial Chamber does accept that, at a minimum, General Krstic, the Commander of the Drina Corps, must have known that the massive reburial operation was occurring within his zone of responsibility.

9. The Response of General Krstic to the Executions

416. The Defence argued that, given the involvement of superior Main Staff officers in the executions, notably General Mladic, General Krstic was in no position to take any action to prevent the executions, or punish those who were involved. General Krstic specifically stated that "nobody could or dared comment on anything that General Mladi} said."¹¹⁰¹ However, there is evidence on

¹⁰⁹⁷ P 886, p. 01908770.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Prosecution stipulation number 892, T. 9187.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Butler, T. 5241.

¹¹⁰⁰ P 709; and P 710.

¹¹⁰¹ Krstic, T. 6623.

the Trial Record to contradict this. Notably, on 11 July 1995, Drina Corps officers prevailed upon General Mladic to reconsider his ill-conceived plan to continue the VRS attack towards Poto-ari and Bratunac.¹¹⁰² General Mladic, although angry, retracted his orders,¹¹⁰³ suggesting that it was neither out of the question to challenge General Mladic, nor impossible to change his mind. Further, on 17 July 1995 at 2030 hours, a conversation was intercepted between General Krstic and an unidentified participant, discussing the deployment of troops. General Krstic asked the other participant in the conversation: "With whose approval did you send soldiers down there?" The other conversant replied: "on orders from the Main Staff". General Krstic responded: "God damn you, bring me back the soldiers as soon as possible."¹¹⁰⁴ This strong reaction on the part of General Krstic is another indication that he was not afraid to question, or indeed override, the authority of the Main Staff, and by implication, General Mladic.

417. As already noted, General Krstic testified that, when he first found out about the executions, at the end of August or the beginning of September 1995, he took steps to have a senior officer of the Drina Corps who was implicated in the executions, removed, but to no avail.¹¹⁰⁵ However, no evidence, other than the testimony of General Krstic himself, was proffered in support of this claim. To the contrary, the totality of the evidence suggests that General Krstic continued to be a loyal supporter of General Mladic. An article dated 25 August 1995, reflecting an interview given by General Krstic to a journalist with the Srpska Vojska, General Krstic specifically praised General Mladic for the role he had played in the "liberation" of Srebrenica.¹¹⁰⁶ In December 1995, General Krstic sat next to General Mladic on a podium at a ceremony for the Drina Corps.¹¹⁰⁷ Further, as the relationship between President Karadzic and General Mladic deteriorated, General Krstic was amongst the VRS Generals who signed a document protesting attempts by President Karadzic to remove General Mladic.¹¹⁰⁸ General Krstic accepted that he knew about the executions at the time he endorsed the document, but testified that he had to sign because he did not dare to defy General Mladic. As a career soldier who loved his profession, General Krstic felt unable to retire and move away from the area, despite everything that had happened. He thus exercised a choice to remain in his birth-place surrounded by his family.¹¹⁰⁹

¹¹⁰² See the discussion *supra* para. 303.

¹¹⁰³ Krstic, T. 6196, 6510-6511; and P 770 (Photo of General Mladic sitting down and General Krstic standing over him communicating, which General Krstic said was taken after gave order to continue operation towards Poto-ari). Krstic T. 6509..

¹¹⁰⁴ P 364/2 (17 July tab 14).

¹¹⁰⁵ Krstic, T. 6335.

¹¹⁰⁶ P 743.

¹¹⁰⁷ P 367; Butler, T. 5243-5246.

¹¹⁰⁸ P 91.

¹¹⁰⁹ Krstic, T. 6831-6834.

418. The Trial Chamber finds that General Krstic was aware that men under his command had participated in the execution of Bosnian Muslim men between 14 and 19 July 1995 and failed to take steps to punish any of them.

D. Conclusions

419. Taking control of the Middle Podrinje area was a critical element of the Bosnian Serb strategy for military victory. At the time the removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from the enclave took place, General Krstic was Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, which was formed specifically for the purpose of pursuing Bosnian Serb territorial goals in Middle Podrinje. Despite his efforts to present himself as a soldier with no interest in politics and no ethnic hatreds, the Trial Chamber does not accept that General Krstic was disinterested in measures being taken to cleanse the area of Bosnian Muslims. Certainly, General Krstic was not a reluctant participant in the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim population out of the enclave, on 12 and 13 July 1995, although he appeared concerned to ensure that the operation was conducted in an orderly fashion. He simply wanted the civilian population out of the area and he had no interest in mistreating them along the way.

420. Additionally, the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber does not support the notion that General Krstic himself ever envisaged that the chosen method of removing the Bosnian Muslims from the enclave would be to systematically execute part of the civilian population. Rather, General Krstic appears as a reserved and serious career officer who is unlikely to have ever instigated a plan such as the one devised for the mass execution of Bosnian Muslim men, following the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995. Left to his own devices, it seems doubtful that General Krstic would have been associated with such a plan at all. One Defence witness testified that, as news of the breakthrough by the Bosnian Muslim column filtered in, General Krstic said to him "Let them pass, just so that this can be ended as it should."¹¹¹⁰

421. Nonetheless, in July 1995, General Krstic found himself squarely in the middle of one of the most heinous wartime acts committed in Europe since the Second World War. The plan to execute the Bosnian Muslim men may not have been of his own making, but it was carried out within the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps. Furthermore Drina Corps resources were utilised to assist with the executions from 14 July 1995 onwards. By virtue of his position as Drina Corps Commander, from 13 July 1995, General Krstic must have known about this.

¹¹¹⁰ Defence Witness DA, T.6928- 6929.

422. The Prosecution's case against General Krstic was based on layer upon layer of circumstantial evidence as well as critical pieces of direct evidence, which reveals his developing knowledge of, and participation in, the executions. Although, on 11 or 12 July 1995, he had been appointed as Commander of the new VRS operation against @epa, General Krstic remained informed of events occurring back in Srebrenica. General Krstic attended two meetings at the Hotel Fontana with General Mladic, relating to the fate of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Srebrenica. Furthermore, he was involved in organising the transport of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Poto-ari and, on 12 July 1995, was present in Poto-ari while the transportation operation was being carried out. General Krstic remained fully informed of matters relating to the Bosnian Muslim column, including the capture and detention of the prisoners.

423. Although there is little evidence linking General Krstic directly with the activity occurring in the Srebrenica area on 13 and 14 July 1995, the evidence shows that he was fully aware of these events. On 14 July 1995, General Krstic was contacted about the crisis facing the Zvornik Brigade, which was simultaneously engaged in heavy combat with the armed head of the Bosnian Muslim column and trying to cope with the thousands of prisoners detained in schools throughout Zvornik. He immediately sent Colonel Pandurevi} and his men back from @epa to their zone of responsibility. General Krstic knew full well the reasons for this urgent recall. In the following days, Colonel Pandurevi} reported back to the Drina Corps Command about the situation facing his Brigade, including matters relating to the prisoners and the executions. Furthermore, on 15 July 1995, when Colonel Beara contacted him to inform him that the Main Staff was unable to secure enough troops to continue with the executions, General Krstic chose to further assist in the commission of the crimes. On 15 July 1995, thousands of prisoners were still alive; had General Krstic intervened at even that late date they might have been saved.

E. Summary of the Trial Chamber's Key Factual Findings

424. The Trial Chamber concludes that the following key facts have been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

(i) General Findings

425. In July 1995, following the take-over of Srebrenica, Bosnian Serb forces devised and implemented a plan to transport all of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from the area (para. 52).

426. In July 1995, following the take-over of Srebrenica, Bosnian Serb forces executed several thousand Bosnian Muslim men. The total number of victims is likely to be within the range of 7,000 -8,000 men (para. 84).

427. Following the take-over of Srebrenica, in July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces devised and implemented a plan to execute as many as possible of the military aged Bosnian Muslim men present in the enclave (para. 87).

428. During a period of several weeks, in September and early October 1995, Bosnian Serb forces dug up a number of the primary mass graves containing the bodies of executed Bosnian Muslim men and reburied them in secondary graves in still more remote locations (para. 78).

(ii) Findings Relating to the Drina Corps

429. The Drina Corps plan for Krivaja 95 was aimed at reducing the "safe area" of Srebrenica to its urban core and was a step towards the larger VRS goal of plunging the Bosnian Muslim population into humanitarian crisis and, ultimately, eliminating the enclave (para. 121).

430. On 10 and 11 July 1995, the shelling of Srebrenica, carried out by the Drina Corps, was calculated to terrify the Bosnian Muslim population and to drive them out of Srebrenica town and, thereby, the area (para. 125).

431. The Drina Corps was instrumental in procuring the buses and other vehicles that, on 12 and 13 July 1995, were used to transport the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of the Poto-ari compound, as well as the fuel needed to accomplish that task (para. 142).

432. Drina Corps Command officers and units were present in Poto-ari monitoring the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of the area on 12 and 13 July 1995 (para. 144).

433. On 12 and 13 July 1995, the Bosnian Muslim civilians of Srebrenica who were bussed out of Poto-ari were not exercising a free choice to leave the area of the former enclave. The Drina Corps personnel involved in the transportation operation knew that the Bosnian Muslim population was being forced out of the area by the VRS (para. 149).

434. The Prosecution has failed to prove that Drina Corps units committed any of the opportunistic crimes that occurred in Poto-ari on 12 and 13 July 1995. However, Drina Corps personnel present in the Poto-ari compound, on 12 and 13 July 1995, must have been aware of the catastrophic humanitarian situation confronting the Bosnian Muslim refugees, as well as the mistreatment being inflicted by Bosnian Serb forces, but took no action in response (para. 155).

435. Drina Corps personnel present in the Poto-ari compound, on 12 and 13 July 1995, knew that the Bosnian Muslim men who were separated from the women, children and elderly, were not treated in accordance with accepted practice for war crimes screening and that there was a terrible uncertainty about the fate of these men. The Drina Corps Command also knew that the separated men from Poto-ari were bussed out to detention sites in Bratunac using busses that had been diverted from the transportation of the women, children and elderly, which the Drina Corps was overseeing (para. 161).

436. Between 12 and 18 July 1995, Drina Corps Brigades, particularly the Bratunac and Zvornik Brigades, were engaged in combat with the Bosnian Muslim column as it attempted to break-through to Bosnian Muslim held territory. These Brigades were continuously reporting to the Drina Corps Command about matters relating to the column (para. 166).

437. From 12 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command knew Bosnian Muslim prisoners were being taken from the column by Bosnian Serb forces within its zone of responsibility. The Drina Corps Command was further informed of the Main Staff policy of blocking and capturing the Bosnian Muslim men in the column, and the Main Staff directed the deployment of Drina Corps units in setting ambushes for the column (para. 170).

438. The Prosecution has failed to prove that, on 13 July 1995, Drina Corps units participated in the capture of the thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from the column who were taken along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje Road (para. 175).

439. The Drina Corps Command knew that, on 13 July 1995, thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners had been captured along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje Road (para. 178).

440. The Drina Corps Bratunac Brigade could not but have known that, between 12-15 July 1995, thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were being detained in Bratunac. On 14 and 15 July 1995, the Bratunac Brigade military police were engaged in escorting these prisoners to northern detention sites (para. 181).

441. The Drina Corps Command could not but have known that, between 12 and 15 July 1995, thousands of Bosnian Muslim men were being detained in Bratunac and that they were transported to detention sites in the north following completion of the removal of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly (para. 186).

442. Buses procured by the Drina Corps were used for the transportation of Bosnian Muslim prisoners to detention and execution sites. On 12 and 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command must have been informed about the diversion of the buses from their original task of transporting

the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly into transporting men from Poto-ari to Bratunac and, from the evening of 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps must have known that the buses had been put to further use in transporting Bosnian Muslim prisoners north to Zvornik (para. 184).

443. From 13 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade became aware of plans to transport Bosnian Muslim prisoners to its zone of responsibility and began locating detention sites for them. From 14 July 1995, the Zvornik Brigade was aware of the existence of the thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners distributed throughout Zvornik (para. 191).

444. The Prosecution has not proved the involvement of the Drina Corps in the Jadar River execution on the morning of 13 July 1995 (para. 200).

445. The Prosecution has not proved that Drina Corps units were involved in the Cerska Valley executions on 13 July 1995 (para. 204).

446. The Prosecution has not proved that Drina Corps units were involved in the executions at the Kravica Warehouse on 13 July 1995. However, the Corps Command must have known that prisoners were transported to the Kravice Warehouse and, by the evening of 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps must have been well aware of the fact that the executions had taken place at the Kravica Warehouse (para. 215).

447. The Prosecution has not proved that Drina Corps units either knew of, or were involved in, the executions of the Bosnian Muslim men screened at Ti{}a. The Mili}i Brigade did, however, know that Bosnian Muslim men were being pulled off the buses at Ti{}a and taken to separate sites (para. 219).

448. By the evening of 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps must have been aware of the VRS plan to execute all of the thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys captured in the area of the former enclave following the take-over of Srebrenica (para. 295).

449. The Zvornik Brigade participated in the execution of Bosnian Muslim men at Orahovac on 14 July 1995. Members of the military police company of the Zvornik Brigade were present immediately prior to the executions, presumably for such purposes as guarding the prisoners and then facilitating their transportation to the execution fields. Personnel from the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade were present at Orahovac during the executions, assisting in their commission. Further, machinery and equipment belonging to the Engineers Company of the Zvornik Brigade was engaged in tasks relating to the burial of the victims from Orahovac between 14 and 16 July 1995 (para. 225).

450. On 15 July 1995, drivers and trucks from the 6th Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade were used to transport the prisoners from the detention site to the execution site at Petkovci Dam and the Zvornik Brigade Engineer Company was assigned to work with earthmoving equipment to assist with the burial of the victims from Petkovci Dam (para. 232).

451. On 16 July 1995, members of the Bratunac Brigade participated in the killings at Branjevo Farm. Drina Corps military police were also engaged in guarding the Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the buses that took them to the Farm and Zvornik Brigade equipment was engaged in activities relating to the burial of the victims. The Drina Corps Assistant Commander for Security, Colonel Popovi}, was involved in organising fuel to transport the Bosnian Muslim prisoners to the execution site at Branjevo Farm and the allocation of fuel for his work was co-ordinated through the Drina Corps Command (para. 243).

452. On 16 July 1995, the Bratunac Brigade assisted with the executions that took place at the Pilica Cultural Dom (para. 248).

453. Zvornik Brigade excavators and bulldozers operating in the Kozluk area, from 16 July 1995, were involved in work related to the burial of victims from the Kozluk executions, which occurred between 14 July and 17 July 1995 (para. 253).

454. On 19 July 1995, units under the command of the Zvornik Brigade participated in the executions at Nezuk (para. 256).

455. The Prosecution has not proved that units of the Drina Corps were engaged in the reburial of bodies from the primary gravesites to secondary gravesites in the early Autumn of 1995. However, given the scale of the operation, the Drina Corps Command must at least have known this activity was being carried out within its zone of responsibility. (para. 261)

456. Following the take-over of Srebrenica, the Drina Corps Command continued to exercise command competencies in relation to its subordinate Brigades and its command role was not suspended as a result of the involvement of the VRS Main Staff, or the security organs, in the Srebrenica follow-up activity. (para. 276)

457. The Prosecution has not proved that, on 16 July 1995, the 10th Sabotage Detachment was resubordinated to the Drina Corps Command, when members of this unit were involved in the executions at Branjevo Farm. However, there must have been close co-operation and co-ordination between the Drina Corps and this unit, from the time they arrived in Srebrenica and continuing throughout the follow-up action thereto (para. 281).

458. The Prosecution has not proved that MUP units were resubordinated to the Drina Corps following the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995. The Drina Corps Command was, however, well aware of the presence of MUP units within their zone of responsibility, as well as the action being taken by MUP units to block and capture Bosnian Muslim men in the column (para. 289).

459. The Prosecution has not proved that the Drina Corps devised or instigated any of the atrocities that followed the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995 (para. 290).

460. The Drina Corps Command knew of the involvement of its subordinate units in the executions of Bosnian Muslim men as of 14 July 1995 (para. 296).

(iii) Findings Relating Specifically to General Krstic

461. On the evening of 13 July 1995, General Mladic appointed General Krstic as Commander of the Drina Corps. From that point in time, General Krstic operated as the Drina Corps Commander and the entire Corps recognised him as such (para. 331).

462. General Krstic was well aware that the shelling of Srebrenica would drive thousands of civilians from Srebrenica town into the small area of Poto-ari they thought "safe" because of the UN base there. He must have known that, inevitably, basic needs for shelter, food, water and medicine at that site would prove overwhelming. General Krstic was fully apprised of the VRS territorial goals in the Srebrenica enclave (para. 337).

463. As a result of his attendance at the Hotel Fontana meetings on 11 and 12 July 1995, General Krstic was fully apprised of the catastrophic humanitarian situation confronting the Bosnian Muslim refugees in Poto-ari and he was put on notice that the survival of the Bosnian Muslim population was in question following the take-over of Srebrenica (para. 343).

464. General Krstic ordered the procurement of buses for the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim population out of Potocari on 12 and 13 July 1995, issued orders to his subordinates about securing the road along which the busses would travel to Kladanj and he generally supervised the transportation operation (para. 347).

465. General Krstic was in Poto-ari for between an hour and two hours in the early afternoon of 12 July 1995, and he was present with other VRS officers, including General Mladic, overseeing the bussing of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly. As a result of his presence in Poto-ari, General Krstic must have known of the appalling conditions facing the Bosnian Muslim refugees and the general mistreatment inflicted by VRS soldiers on that day (para. 354).

466. The Prosecution has not proved that General Krstic was present in Poto-ari on 13 July 1995 (para. 357).

467. General Krstic was heard ordering his subordinates that no harm must befall the Bosnian Muslim civilians who were being transported out of Poto-ari (para. 358).

468. The Prosecution has not proved that General Krstic was involved in designing the execution plan (para. 362).

469. As a result of his presence at the White House during the afternoon of 12 July 1995, General Krstic must have known the segregated men were being detained in terrible conditions and not being treated in accordance with accepted practice for war crimes screening. General Krstic must have realised, as did all the witnesses present in and around the compound that day, that there was a terrible uncertainty as to what was going to happen to the men who had been separated. However, General Krstic took no steps to clarify with General Mladic, or anyone else, what the fate of the men would be (para. 367).

470. On 12 July 1995, General Krstic must have known the men were being pulled off the passing buses at Ti{}a and taken to detention sites, but the Prosecution has not proved that he also had known that their ultimate fate would be execution (para. 369).

471. General Krstic was fully informed of developments relating to the movement of the Bosnian Muslim column and he knew, by the evening of 13 July 1995, that thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from the column had been captured by Bosnian Serb forces within his zone of responsibility (para. 377).

472. As of 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command must have known about the plan to execute all of the military aged Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica and, as of 14 July 1995, the Corps Command must have known of the involvement of Drina Corps subordinate units in the mass executions. Given his position in the Drina Corps Command, first as Chief of Staff and then, from the evening of 13 July 1995, as Commander, General Krstic must also have known about these matters (para. 379).

473. On the morning of 15 July 1995, Colonel Beara asked General Krstic for additional men to help with the execution of Bosnian Muslim prisoners. General Krstic undertook to assist Colonel Beara with obtaining the men required to carry out the execution of these men. General Krstic raised the possibility that men from the Bratunac Brigade could be used, undertook to arrange that men from that Brigade subsequently arrived to assist with the Branjevo Farm executions on 16 July 1995 (para. 387).

474. General Krstic ordered the Zvornik Brigade to return to its zone of responsibility in order to deal with the dual problems of combat with the column and the presence of thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners within his zone of responsibility. In the days following 14 July 1995, General Krstic was kept fully informed about events taking place in the Zvornik Brigade's zone of responsibility. On 15 July 1995, General Krstic was well aware of the large number of prisoners distributed throughout the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility, as well as of the use of Zvornik Brigade resources in connection with the executions (para. 399).

475. As of 16 July 1995, Colonel Popovi} was in contact with General Krstic to report on matters relating to the executions. General Krstic was informed about what had happened as part of the chain of command for reporting purposes and was supervising and monitoring the activities of his subordinate officers who were participating in the executions (para. 404).

476. The Prosecution has failed to establish that General Krstic was directly involved in the reburial activity. However, General Krstic must have at least known that this massive operation was occurring within his zone of responsibility (para. 415).

477. General Krstic was aware that men under his command had participated in the execution of Bosnian Muslim men between 14 and 19 July 1995 and failed to punish any of them (para. 418).

III. LEGAL FINDINGS

A. Introduction

478. In this third Part, the Trial Chamber will explore whether the particular facts, as found by the Trial Chamber, support beyond reasonable doubt findings that the crimes alleged in the indictment have been committed. Since, by their nature, these crimes tend to involve many people with differing degrees of participation and to include series of events over a period of time, it is reasonable to ascertain, first, whether a factual case has been made out that the legal pre-requisites for the commission of these crimes have been proved and, then, to determine the degree of culpability, if any, attributable to the defendant, General Krsti}. The legal pre-requisites will be determined in light of the state of customary international law at the time of the events Srebrenica took place.

479. The Indictment charges the accused with murders, as independent crimes under both Article 3 and Article 5 of the Statute and as an element of the counts of persecutions and extermination under Article 5. The murders are further referred to in the alternative counts of genocide and

complicity of genocide, which counts also encompass causing serious bodily or mental harm. Finally, the indictment alleges that crimes against humanity, in the form of deportation or forcible transfer of women, children and elderly persons, were committed in violation of Article 5. Each of these crimes has its own specific elements which the Trial Chamber will now discuss.

480. The jurisprudence of the Tribunal establishes that, for a crime under Article 3, it must be determined that a state of armed conflict existed, at the time the criminal acts were committed, and that there is a close nexus between the armed conflict and those acts. By comparison, Article 5 of the Statute requires only that there be an armed conflict and that the acts have occurred within the frame of that armed conflict. The critical element of a crime under Article 5 is that the criminal acts form part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. Further, such acts may constitute persecution where it is demonstrated that they were perpetrated with a discriminatory intent on political, racial or religious grounds. By contrast, genocide, as envisaged in Article 4 of the Statute, does not require that there be an armed conflict, only that the prohibited acts be committed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such (...)."

481. According to the Appeals Chamber, "an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed forces between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State."¹¹¹¹ In the present instance, it is not disputed that a state of armed conflict existed between BiH and its armed forces, on the one hand, and the Republika Srpska and its armed forces, on the other. There is no doubt that the criminal acts set out in the indictment occurred not only within the frame of, but in close relation to, that conflict.

482. According to the Judgement rendered by Trial Chamber II in the Kunarac case,¹¹¹² five elements are required for "an attack directed against a civilian population" within the meaning of Article 5 of the Statute:

- (i) There must be an attack.¹¹¹³
- (ii) The acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack.¹¹¹⁴
- (iii) The attack must be "directed against any civilian population".¹¹¹⁵

¹¹¹¹ Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995 (*Tadi* Appeal I).

¹¹¹² Judgement, *The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković*, IT-96-23T and IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001, para. 410.

¹¹¹³ Appeals Judgement, *The Prosecutor v. Tadi*, IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, para. 251.

¹¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 248.

- (iv) The attack must be “widespread or systematic”.¹¹¹⁶
- (v) The perpetrator must know of the wider context in which his acts occur and know his acts are part of the attack.¹¹¹⁷

All of these elements are met in this case. Thus, there is no doubt, from a reading of the factual Part of this Judgement,¹¹¹⁸ that all the criminal acts described in the indictment form part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and were committed with discriminatory intent within the meaning of Article 5 (h) of the Statute.

In sum, all the statutory pre-requisites for crimes under Articles 3 and 5, including persecution, are met.

483. The next question is whether the factual elements of each of the specific crimes encompassed by Articles 3, 4 and 5 listed in the indictment have been met and especially whether the particularly strict requirements of Article 4 have been established. The Trial Chamber will discuss those factual elements for, in turn: murder, extermination, serious bodily or mental harm, deportation or forcible transfer, persecution and, finally, genocide and complicity of genocide.

B. Murders¹¹¹⁹

484. The Prosecution argues that the notion of murder encompasses “all forms of voluntary killings, whether premeditated or not”.¹¹²⁰ The Defence made no specific submissions in this regard.

485. Murder has consistently been defined by the ICTY and the ICTR as the death of the victim resulting from an act or omission of the accused committed with the intention to kill or to cause serious bodily harm which he/she should reasonably have known might lead to death.¹¹²¹

¹¹¹⁵ Article 5 of the Statute.

¹¹¹⁶ See note 1114 above, para. 248.

¹¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹⁸ Part II.

¹¹¹⁹ Different terminology is used in the English and French versions of the Statute. The French version specifies “meurtre” whereas the English version uses the term “killing”. The term “killing” refers to any act causing death without specifying the perpetrator’s degree of intention. The *Akayesu* Judgement observed that the notion of “meurtre” or “murder” should be preferred to that of “killings” in accordance with the general principles of criminal law which provide that where there are two possible interpretations the one which is more favourable to the accused must be used (*Akayesu* Judgement, par. 501). It also noted (at para. 588) that the term “murder” is translated in French into “assassinat” (which supposes premeditation and may involve, if proven, a higher sentence) and stated that the term “meurtre” in French should be preferred, in keeping with customary international law. The Chamber subscribes to the position previously adopted by the ICTR in the *Akayesu* Judgement.

¹¹²⁰ Prosecutor’s pre-trial brief pursuant to Rule 65 *ter* (E) (i), 25 February 2000, para. 104, p. 38.

486. In this case, it is undisputed that thousands of Bosnian Muslims, residing or taking refuge in Srebrenica, were murdered during the period of 12-19 July and, in particular, that varying size groups of men were summarily executed on several sites within the jurisdiction of the Drina Corps.¹¹²² These mass executions were not challenged by the accused.¹¹²³

487. The Trial Chamber concluded that almost all of those murdered at the execution sites were adult Bosnian Muslim men and that up to 7000-8000 men were executed.¹¹²⁴

488. In addition, many murders were committed in Poto-ari on 12, 13 and 14 July.¹¹²⁵ The people murdered there were Bosnian Muslim adults, although witnesses T and Ademovi} recounted the murder of a young boy¹¹²⁶ and a baby.¹¹²⁷ It is impossible to determine exactly how many murders were committed in Poto-ari, but it was a sizeable number. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that men, detained in Bratunac between 12 and 14 July 1995, were executed at night opportunistically,¹¹²⁸ although again, it is not possible to establish exactly how many victims there were.

489. Therefore, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that murders falling within the meaning of Article 3 and Article 5 (murder and persecution) of the Statute were committed.

C. Extermination

490. The indictment also charges extermination under Article 5(b) based on these murders. The Trial Chamber will first set out a legal definition of extermination, before moving to consider whether the elements required to establish the crime of extermination are met in this case.

1. Definition

491. Article 5 of the Statute which covers crimes against humanity states:

¹¹²¹ See in particular the *Akayesu* Judgement, para. 589; the *^elebi}i* Judgement, para. 439; the *Bla{ki}* Judgement, paras. 153, 181, and 217; and the *Jelisi}* Judgement, paras. 35 and 63 (in the latter case, the Trial Chamber ruled that a perpetrator of murder must have had the intention to cause death; the foreseeable consequence theory was not upheld).

¹¹²² The indictment covers a period from 12 July to 1st November 1995. The Prosecution, however, offered no evidence of killings occurring after approximately 19 July 1995.

¹¹²³ See in particular the cross-examination of the accused, T. 6489.

¹¹²⁴ *Supra*, paras. 80-84.

¹¹²⁵ *Supra*, para. 44-45.

¹¹²⁶ *Supra*, para. 44.

¹¹²⁷ *Supra*, para. 45.

¹¹²⁸ *Supra*, para. 66.

The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in an armed conflict, whether international or national in character, and directed against any civilian population:

...

(b) extermination.

492. Extermination is also widely recognised as a crime against humanity in many international¹¹²⁹ and national¹¹³⁰ instruments. Nevertheless, it has rarely been invoked by national courts¹¹³¹ and it has not yet been defined by this Tribunal. The term "extermination" appeared in a number of post-war decisions by the Nuremberg Military Tribunal and the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland. However, although the crime of extermination was alleged, the judgements generally relied on the broader notion of crimes against humanity and did not provide any specific definition of the term "extermination".¹¹³² Only the ICTR has defined, on several occasions, the requisite elements of the offence:¹¹³³

1. the accused or his subordinate participated in the killing of certain named or described persons;
2. the act or omission was unlawful and intentional.

¹¹²⁹ Article 6(c) of the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal; Article II(c) of Control Council Law No. 10, Principle VI of the Nuremberg Principles; Article 5(b) of the Statute of the ICTY; Article 3(b) of the Statute of the ICTR; Article 18(b) of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind adopted by the ILC at its 48th session in 1996; and Articles 7(1)(b) and 7(2)(b) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

¹¹³⁰ See especially section 7 (3.76) of the Canadian Criminal Code and Article 212-1, paragraph 1 of the French Penal Code (adopted by Act no. 92-1336 of 16 December 1992, amended by Act no. 93-913 of 19 July 1993, entered into force on 1 March 1994) which uses the term "widespread and systematic practice of summary executions". Yet, the definition used in French law differs from that used in the international texts because a discriminatory element is required for all crimes against humanity.

¹¹³¹ See the District Court of Jerusalem which found Adolf Eichmann guilty of the crime against humanity of extermination although no definition was expressly provided. *Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann*, Israel, District Court of Jerusalem, 12 December 1961, 36 ILR, (1968), Part IV, p. 239, see *Barbie case*, Cour de Cassation, 3 June 1988, 78 ILR, pp. 332 and 336.

¹¹³² See the following judgements. *Josef Altstötter and others*, US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg (1947), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals by the UN War Crimes Commission, Vol. VI. The accused were found guilty of crimes against humanity. The expression "racial extermination of the Poles" is used in the judgement to define the programme implemented nation-wide, p. 75; *Amon Leopold Goeth (Hauptsturmführer)*, Supreme National Tribunal of Poland (1946), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. VII. The judgement uses the term "extermination" broadly to justify genocide. The Tribunal notes that a policy of extermination was applied in order to destroy the Jewish and Polish nations (unofficial translation), p. 9. *I.G. Farben Trial: Carl Krauch and 22 others*, US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg (1947-1948), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. X. *The Krupp Case: Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp Von Bohlen und Halbach & 11 others*, US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, (1947-1948), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. X. *The High Command Case: Wilhelm Von Leeb and 13 others*, US Military Tribunal (1947-1948), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XII. *The Rusha Case: Ulrich Greifelt & others*, US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, (1947-1948), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XIII. The Tribunal notes that the programme implemented by the Nazis corresponded to a systematic programme of genocide which involved *inter alia* the extermination of national and racial groups. *Gauleiter Artur Greiser*, Supreme National Tribunal of Poland (1946), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XIII.

¹¹³³ Judgement, *The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu*, case no. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, paras. 591-592; Judgement, *The Prosecutor v. Kambanda*, case no. ICTR-97-23, 4 September 1998; Judgement, *The Prosecutor v. Kayishema/Ruzindana*, case no. ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999, paras. 141-147; Judgement, *The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda*, case no. ICTR-96-3-T, 6 December 1999, paras. 82-84; Judgement, *The Prosecutor v. Musema*, case no. ICTR-96-13-T, 27 January 2000.

3. the unlawful act or omission must be part of a widespread or systematic attack;
4. the attack must be against the civilian population[.]¹¹³⁴

493. The Prosecutor submits¹¹³⁵ that the crime of extermination must, by its very nature, be directed against a group of individuals, that it requires an element of mass destruction and that it embraces situations where a large number of people who do not share any common characteristic are killed.¹¹³⁶ No discriminatory element is required.¹¹³⁷

494. The pre-trial Brief of the Defence¹¹³⁸ argues that the act of extermination is distinguishable from genocide by the fact that it is not committed on account of a person's national, ethnical, racial or religious affiliation and that, moreover, the commission of the act does not require any special intention, that is, the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.¹¹³⁹

495. The offences of murder and extermination have a similar element in that they both intend the death of the victims. They have the same *mens rea*, which consists of the intention to kill or the intention to cause serious bodily injury to the victim which the perpetrator must have reasonably foreseen was likely to result in death.¹¹⁴⁰ The Trial Chamber will now identify what extermination further involves and whether the requirements of that crime are met in this case.

496. To this end, the Trial Chamber notes the common definition of "extermination". According to the French Dictionary *Nouveau Petit Robert*, "*exterminer*" (to exterminate) derives from the Latin *exterminare*, meaning "to drive out", which comes from "*ex*" meaning "out" and "*terminus*" meaning "border". Likewise, the *Oxford English Dictionary* gives the primary meaning of the word "exterminate"¹¹⁴¹ as the act of driving out or banishing a person or group of persons beyond the boundaries of a state, territory or community. The ordinary use of the term "extermination",¹¹⁴²

¹¹³⁴ *Akayesu* Judgement, para. 592. This Judgement further refers to the conditions required for a crime against humanity pursuant to the ICTR Statute, which also involve that the attack "be on discriminatory grounds, namely: national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds." There is no such requirement in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute regarding crimes against humanity other than persecution.

¹¹³⁵ Prosecutor's pre-trial Brief pursuant to Rule 65 *ter* (E)(i), 25 February 2001.

¹¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 129.

¹¹³⁷ In accordance with the *Tadić* I Appeals Judgement, paras. 273-305. Conversely, see *Akayesu* Judgement, para. 592, *Kayishema/Ruzindana* Judgement, para. 144, *Rutaganda* Judgement, paras. 83-84, and *Musema* Judgement, paras. 218-219.

¹¹³⁸ *The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić*, case no. IT-98-33-PT, Pre-trial Brief of the Defence pursuant to Rule 65 *ter* (E)(i), 29 February 2000.

¹¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 35-36.

¹¹⁴⁰ *Akayesu* Judgement, para. 589; *Blagojević* Judgement, para. 217; *Jelisić* Judgement, para. 35; *Kupreškić* Judgement, paras. 560-561.

¹¹⁴¹ The term appeared in the Christian Latin language in the twelfth century but was hardly used before the sixteenth. See *The Oxford English Dictionary* (2nd Edition) Vol. V, p. 601. *Le Nouveau Petit Robert*, French language dictionary (Dictionnaires Le Robert - Paris, 1994), p. 871.

¹¹⁴² *Ibid.* Meaning which appeared first in Vulgate and then in French.

however, has come to acquire a more destructive connotation meaning the annihilation of a mass of people.

497. Thus, the International Law Commission insists on the element of mass destruction in defining extermination:

[Extermination is a] crime which by its very nature is directed against a group of individuals. In addition, the act used to carry out the offence of extermination involves an element of mass destruction which is not required for murder. In this regard, extermination is closely related to the crime of genocide ?...g¹¹⁴³

498. Given the limited precedents in the matter, it is useful to refer further to Article 7(2)(b) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, which goes into more detail on the definition of the term "extermination" and specifies that:

Extermination includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, *inter alia* the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the population.

From the insertion of this provision, we surmise that the crime of extermination may be applied to acts committed with the intention of bringing about the death of a large number of victims either directly, such as by killing the victim with a firearm, or less directly, by creating conditions provoking the victim's death.¹¹⁴⁴ The Report of the ICC Preparatory Commission on the Elements of the crimes provides further guidance. It indicates that "the perpetrator [should have] killed one or more persons" and that the conduct should have taken place "as part of a mass killing of members of a civilian population."¹¹⁴⁵

499. It is necessary, then, to identify the victims. Article 5 of the ICTY Statute covering crimes against humanity refers to acts "directed against any civilian population". The victims need not share national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics. In accordance with the Tadi} Appeals Judgement,¹¹⁴⁶ the Trial Chamber is of the view that it is unnecessary that the victims were discriminated against for political, social or religious grounds, to establish the crime of extermination.

500. According to the commentary on the ILC Draft Code, extermination distinguishes itself from the crime of genocide by the fact that the targeted population does not necessarily have any

¹¹⁴³ See in particular the commentary on the ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (hereinafter, "ILC Draft Code"), *Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th session, 6 May - 26 July 1996*, Official Documents of the United Nations General Assembly's 51st session, Supplement no. 10 (A/51/10), Article 18, p. 118.

¹¹⁴⁴ Cherif Bassiouni, *Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law* (2nd edition, 1999), p. 295.

¹¹⁴⁵ Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, 2 November 2000 (footnotes omitted).

¹¹⁴⁶ Tadi} / Appeals Judgement, paras. 281-305.

common national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristic, and that it also covers situations where “some members of a group are killed while others are spared”.¹¹⁴⁷ For this reason, extermination may be retained when the crime is directed against an entire group of individuals even though no discriminatory intent nor intention to destroy the group as such on national, ethnical, racial or religious grounds has been demonstrated; or where the targeted population does not share any common national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.

501. The very term “extermination” strongly suggests the commission of a massive crime, which in turn assumes a substantial degree of preparation and organisation.¹¹⁴⁸ It should be noted, though, that “extermination” could also, theoretically, be applied to the commission of a crime which is not “widespread” but nonetheless consists in eradicating an entire population, distinguishable by some characteristic(s) not covered by the Genocide Convention, but made up of only a relatively small number of people. In other words, while extermination generally involves a large number of victims, it may be constituted even where the number of victims is limited.

502. In this respect, the ICC definition of extermination indicates that it would be sufficient that the criminal acts be “calculated to bring about the destruction of *part* of the population.” The Trial Chamber notes that this definition was adopted after the time the offences in this case were committed. In accordance with the principle that where there is a plausible difference of interpretation or application, the position which most favours the accused should be adopted, the Chamber determines that, for the purpose of this case, the definition should be read as meaning the destruction of a numerically significant part of the population concerned.

503. In sum, the Trial Chamber finds that for the crime of extermination to be established, in addition to the general requirements for a crime against humanity, there must be evidence that a particular population was targeted and that its members were killed or otherwise subjected to conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of a numerically significant part of the population.

¹¹⁴⁷ See note 1143 above.

¹¹⁴⁸ In para. 207, the Bla{ki} Judgement provides: “in practice, these two criteria ?widespread and systematic attack? will often be difficult to separate since a widespread attack targeting a large number of victims generally relies on some form of planning or organisation. The quantitative criterion is not objectively definable as witnessed by the fact that neither international texts nor international and national case-law set any threshold starting with which a crime against humanity is constituted.”.

2. Findings

504. Although there is evidence that a small number of killings in Poto-ari and afterwards involved women, children and elderly,¹¹⁴⁹ virtually all of the persons killed in the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica were Bosnian Muslim males of military age. The screening process at Poto-ari, the gathering of those men at detention sites, their transportation to execution sites, the opportunistic killings of members of the column along the Bratunac-Mili}i road as they were apprehended, demonstrate beyond any doubt that all of the military aged Bosnian Muslim males that were captured or fell otherwise in the hands of the Serb forces were systematically executed. The result was that the majority of the military aged Bosnian Muslim males who fled Srebrenica in July 1995 were killed.

505. A crime of extermination was committed at Srebrenica.

D. Mistreatments

506. While the indictment cites mainly the killing of large numbers of Bosnian Muslim men, it also alleges two kinds of mistreatments: serious bodily or mental harm, as a genocidal crime;¹¹⁵⁰ and cruel and inhumane treatment, including severe beatings, as an element of the persecutions inflicted on the Bosnian Muslims.¹¹⁵¹

1. Serious bodily or mental harm

507. The serious bodily or mental harm, cited by the Prosecution in support of the genocide charge, relates to the suffering endured by those who survived the executions.

508. The Prosecution relies upon the definition of serious bodily or mental harm found in the *Akayesu* Judgement, which includes "acts of torture, be they bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution".¹¹⁵² The Prosecution also quotes the *Eichmann* Judgement rendered by the Jerusalem District Court on 12 December 1961, according to which "the enslavement, starvation, deportation and persecution and the detention of individuals in ghettos, transit camps and concentration camps in conditions which were designed to cause their degradation, deprivation of their rights as human beings and to suppress them and cause them

¹¹⁴⁹ One witness testified about the slaughtering of a baby. Expert reports on the exhumations show that a small number of the victims were under the age of fifteen or over sixty-five year old. Although those victims may not legally qualify as "military aged men", there were obviously treated by the Bosnian Serb forces as if of military age.

¹¹⁵⁰ Indictment, para. 21 (b).

¹¹⁵¹ Indictment, para. 31 (b).

¹¹⁵² *Akayesu* Judgement, para. 504, cited in Prosecutor's pre-trial brief pursuant to Rule 65 *ter* (E) (i), 25 February 2000, para. 105, p. 39.

inhumane suffering and torture”¹¹⁵³ may constitute serious bodily or mental harm. The Defence made no specific submissions on this issue.

509. The Chamber observes that, in the decision on the review of the indictment against *Karadžić and Mladić* pursuant to Rule 61, the ICTY stated that cruel treatment, torture, rape and deportation could constitute serious bodily or mental harm done to members of a group under a count of genocide.¹¹⁵⁴ The Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court indicated that serious bodily and mental harm “may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment”.¹¹⁵⁵

510. The *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Judgement defined serious bodily harm as “harm that seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the external, internal organs or senses”.¹¹⁵⁶ The same Judgement held that serious mental harm must “be interpreted on a case-by-case basis in light of the relevant jurisprudence”.¹¹⁵⁷ Reference to serious mental harm, in the context of the Genocide Convention, appears to have been restricted originally to the injection of pharmacological substances occasioning the serious impairment of mental faculties.¹¹⁵⁸ The United States supported this restrictive interpretation, indicating in a statement of interpretation annexed to their instrument of accession that, in their view, “mental harm” meant permanent impairment of the mental faculties brought on through drugs, torture or techniques similar thereto.¹¹⁵⁹ In addition, the Preparatory Committee of the International Criminal Court points out that “‘mental harm’ is understood to mean more than the minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties”.¹¹⁶⁰ A distinction must thus be drawn between serious mental harm and emotional or psychological damage or attacks on the dignity of the human person not causing

¹¹⁵³ *The Israeli Government Prosecutor General v. Adolph Eichmann*, Jerusalem District Court, 12 December 1961 (hereinafter “the *Eichmann* District Court Judgement”), in *International Law Reports* (ILR), vol. 36, 1968, p. 340, cited in the Prosecutor’s pre-trial Brief pursuant to Rule 65 *ter* (E) (i), 25 February 2000, para. 105, p. 39.

¹¹⁵⁴ *The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić*, Review of the Indictments pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, 11 July 1996 (hereinafter “the *Karadžić and Mladić* case”), para. 93.

¹¹⁵⁵ Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court. Finalised draft text of the elements of crimes, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2, 6 July 2000, p. 6.

¹¹⁵⁶ *The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana*, ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999, para. 109 (hereinafter “the *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Judgement”).

¹¹⁵⁷ *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Judgement, para. 113.

¹¹⁵⁸ Reference to serious mental harm for this purpose was first proposed by China (UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, p. 9; UN Doc. A/C.6/211; UN Doc. A/C.6/232/Rev. 1; UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.81). Though at first rejected, the proposition was ultimately adopted at the initiative of India (UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.81). See also Nehemia Robinson’s *The Genocide Convention; A commentary*, New York, 1960, p. ix.

¹¹⁵⁹ 132:15 CONG. REC. S1378. See also the Genocide Convention Implementing Act of 1987, s. 1091(a)(3).

¹¹⁶⁰ Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. Part 2. Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/2/Add.1, 14 April 1998, p. 11.

lasting impairment. The *Akayesu* Judgement stressed, however, that “causing serious bodily or mental harm ?...g does not necessarily mean that the harm is permanent and irremediable”.¹¹⁶¹

511. The serious bodily or mental harm, included within Article 4 of the Statute, can be informed by the Tribunal’s interpretation of the offence of wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health under Article 2 of the Statute. The latter offence was defined in the *^elebi}i* Judgement as “an act or omission that is intentional, being an act which, judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental, which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury”.¹¹⁶²

512. The *Bla{ki}* Judgement defined the serious bodily or mental harm required to prove a charge of persecution under Article 5 as follows:

the victim must have suffered serious bodily or mental harm; the degree of severity must be assessed on a case by case basis with due regard for the individual circumstances;

the suffering must be the result of an act of the accused or his subordinate;

when the offence was committed, the accused or his subordinate must have been motivated by the intent to inflict serious bodily or mental harm upon the victim, through his own will or deliberate recklessness.¹¹⁶³

513. The Trial Chamber finds that serious bodily or mental harm for purposes of Article 4 *actus reus* is an intentional act or omission causing serious bodily or mental suffering. The gravity of the suffering must be assessed on a case by case basis and with due regard for the particular circumstances. In line with the *Akayesu* Judgement,¹¹⁶⁴ the Trial Chamber states that serious harm need not cause permanent and irremediable harm, but it must involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation. It must be harm that results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life. In subscribing to the above case-law, the Chamber holds that inhuman treatment, torture, rape, sexual abuse and deportation are among the acts which may cause serious bodily or mental injury.

514. The Chamber is fully satisfied that the wounds and trauma suffered by those few individuals who managed to survive the mass executions do constitute serious bodily and mental harm within the meaning of Article 4 of the Statute.¹¹⁶⁵

¹¹⁶¹ *Akayesu* Judgement, para. 502.

¹¹⁶² *The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delali}, Zdravko Muci} a/k/a “Pavo”, Hazim Deli} and Esad Land`o a/k/a “Zenga”, IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998 (hereinafter “the *^elebi}i* Judgement”), para. 511.*

¹¹⁶³ *Bla{ki}* Judgement, para. 243.

¹¹⁶⁴ *Akayesu* Judgement, para. 502.

¹¹⁶⁵ *Eichmann* District Court Judgement, para. 199: “there is no doubt that causing serious bodily harm to Jews was a direct and unavoidable result of the activities which were carried out with the intention of exterminating those Jews who remained alive”.

2. Cruel and Inhumane Treatment

515. The Prosecution relies on paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 11 and 22 to 26 of the indictment to allege that persecutions were committed against the Bosnian Muslims by, among other crimes, "the cruel and inhumane treatment of Bosnian Muslim civilians, including severe beatings."¹¹⁶⁶ The paragraphs mentioned above, however, do not contain any specifics with respect to cruel and inhumane treatment.

516. Cruel and inhumane treatment has been defined in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal as "an intentional act or omission, that is an act which, judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental, which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity" and includes such offences as torture.¹¹⁶⁷ The Chamber has just explained how the term "serious" should be interpreted.

517. The Trial Chamber has described in detail the ordeal suffered both by the Bosnian Muslims who fled to Poto-ari and the Bosnian Muslims captured from the column. More specifically, the Trial Chamber heard reliable evidence concerning the severe beatings and other cruel treatments suffered by the Bosnian Muslim men after they had been separated from their relatives in Poto-ari. Numerous witnesses further testified about the terrible conditions prevailing both in and outside the UN Poto-ari compound: lack of food and water which the VRS provided in very limited quantity, thousands of people crammed into a small space. More significantly, rapes and killings were reported by credible witnesses and some committed suicide out of terror. The entire situation in Poto-ari has been depicted as a campaign of terror. As an ultimate suffering, some women about to board the buses had their young sons dragged away from them, never to be seen again.¹¹⁶⁸

518. The Trial Chamber thus concludes that the VRS and other Serb forces imposed cruel and inhumane treatment on a large number of Bosnian Muslims who were subjected to intolerable conditions in Poto-ari, cruelly separated from their family members, and, in the case of the men, subjected to the unspeakable horror of watching their fellow captives die on the execution fields, escaping that fate only by chance. The main fact for which the Prosecution alleges inhumane treatment, though, is the forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly outside the enclave of Srebrenica.

¹¹⁶⁶ Indictment, para. 31 (b).

¹¹⁶⁷ *^elebi}* Judgment, para. 552; *Bla{ki}* Judgment, para. 186.

¹¹⁶⁸ Witness DD.

E. Deportation or Forcible Transfer

519. The Chamber has found that, on 12 and 13 July 1995, about 25,000 Bosnian Muslim civilians were forcibly bussed outside the enclave of Srebrenica to the territory under BiH control. The transportation of these Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Poto-ari to Kladanj forms the basis of three counts in the indictment. It is included under the count of crime against humanity for persecutions (count 6). In addition, the Prosecution characterises the act as a deportation constituting a crime against humanity (count 7) or, alternatively, as an inhumane act constituting a crime against humanity (forcible transfer) (count 8).

1. General Considerations

520. The Prosecution defines deportation as the “forced displacement of civilians from the area in which they are lawfully present without grounds permitted by international law”. The Prosecution submits that it is “not necessary ...g for civilians to be forcibly removed across a national border in order for the offence to be established”.¹¹⁶⁹ The Defence defines deportation as the forced removal of a person to another country,¹¹⁷⁰ and emphasises that not all forcible transfers of civilians are criminal offences.¹¹⁷¹

521. Both deportation and forcible transfer relate to the involuntary and unlawful evacuation of individuals from the territory in which they reside. Yet, the two are not synonymous in customary international law. Deportation presumes transfer beyond State borders, whereas forcible transfer relates to displacements within a State.¹¹⁷²

522. However, this distinction has no bearing on the condemnation of such practices in international humanitarian law. Article 2(g) of the Statute, Articles 49 and 147 of the Geneva Convention concerning the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), Article 85(4)(a) of Additional Protocol I, Article 18 of the ILC Draft Code and Article 7(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court all condemn deportation or forcible

¹¹⁶⁹ Prosecutor’s pre-trial Brief pursuant to Rule 65 *ter* (E) (i), para. 131.

¹¹⁷⁰ Final Submissions of the Accused, para. 375-377.

¹¹⁷¹ Final Submissions of the Accused, para. 386.

¹¹⁷² See in particular the commentary on the ILC Draft Code, p. 122 “Whereas deportation implies expulsion from the national territory, the forcible transfer of population could occur wholly within the frontiers of one and the same State”.

transfer of protected persons.¹¹⁷³ Article 17 of Protocol II likewise condemns the “displacement” of civilians.

523. In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes that any forced displacement is by definition a traumatic experience which involves abandoning one’s home, losing property and being displaced under duress to another location. As previously stated by the Trial Chamber in the *Kupre{ki}* case,¹¹⁷⁴ forcible displacement within or between national borders is included as an inhumane act under Article 5(i) defining crimes against humanity. Whether, in this instance, the facts constitute forcible transfer or deportation is discussed below.

2. Evaluation of the facts

(a) Lawfulness of the transfer

524. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 17 of Protocol II allow total or partial evacuation of the population “if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand”.¹¹⁷⁵ Article 49 however specifies that “persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased”.

525. As a preliminary matter, this condition is not satisfied in the present case. The Srebrenica citizens who had gathered in Poto-ari were not returned to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question had ceased. In fact, active hostilities in Srebrenica town itself and to the south of the enclave had already ceased by the time people were bussed out of Poto-ari. Security of the civilian population can thus not be presented as the reason justifying the transfer.

526. In addition to the security of the population, the Geneva Convention also allows for evacuations based on “imperative military reasons”. In terms of military necessity, two World War II cases are relevant. General Lothar Rendulic was accused of violating Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which prohibits the destruction or seizure of the enemy’s property, “unless such

¹¹⁷³ According to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited...g”. Article 85(4) of Protocol I characterises “...g the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory?...g” as a grave breach of the Protocol. Article 18 of the ILC Draft Code and Article 7(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court specify under the same heading “deportation or forcible transfer of population” as acts liable to constitute crimes against humanity.

¹¹⁷⁴ *Kupre{ki}* Judgement, para. 566.

¹¹⁷⁵ Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention reads as follows: “the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. [...] Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased”. Security of the population and imperative military reasons are also listed in Article 17 of Protocol II as the only reasons that could justify the evacuation of the civilian population.

destruction or seizure "isg imperatively demanded by the necessities of war". Retreating forces under his command engaged in scorched earth tactics, destroying all facilities that they thought might aid the opposing army. In addition, Rendulic ordered the evacuation of civilians in the area. Rendulic raised the defence of "military necessity", since his troops were being pursued by what appeared to be overwhelming Soviet forces. The U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg concluded that, even though Rendulic may have erred in his judgement as to the military necessity for evacuating the civilians, his decisions were still justified by "urgent military necessity" based on the information in his hands at the time.¹¹⁷⁶ By contrast, Field Marshall Erich von Manstein was convicted by a British military tribunal of "the mass deportation and evacuation of civilian inhabitants" of the Ukraine. Von Manstein argued that the evacuation was warranted by the military necessity of preventing espionage and depriving the enemy of manpower.¹¹⁷⁷ This was not found to be a legitimate reason for the evacuation of the population or the destruction of their property.¹¹⁷⁸ In addition, the judge advocate¹¹⁷⁹ noted that the Prosecution's evidence showed that "far from this destruction being the result of imperative necessities of the moment, it was really the carrying out of a policy planned a considerable time before, a policy which the accused had in fact been prepared to carry out on two previous occasions and now was carrying out in its entirety and carrying out irrespective of any question of military necessity".¹¹⁸⁰

527. In this case no military threat was present following the taking of Srebrenica. The atmosphere of terror in which the evacuation was conducted proves, conversely, that the transfer was carried out in furtherance of a well organised policy whose purpose was to expel the Bosnian Muslim population from the enclave. The evacuation was itself the goal and neither the protection of the civilians nor imperative military necessity justified the action.

¹¹⁷⁶ *Wilhelm List and others*, US military Tribunal, Nuremberg (" the Hostages Trial"), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. VIII, case No. 47, p. 69 (1948): "It is our considered opinion that the conditions as they appeared to the defendant at the time were sufficient, upon which he could honestly conclude that urgent military necessity warranted the decision made. This being true, the defendant may have erred in the exercise of his judgement but he was guilty of no criminal act".

¹¹⁷⁷ *Von Lewinski (called von Manstein)*, British Military Court at Hamburg (Germany), Dec. 19, 1949, in 16 Annual Dig. and Reports of Public International Law Cases 509, 521 (1949): "In a country so thickly populated as the Ukraine it was necessary for the security of the troops to remove the population from the battle or the combat zone. To do otherwise would have been to invite espionage. The evacuation of this zone was therefore mere military security. Further, it was necessary to deprive the enemy of labour potential as the enemy put every able-bodied man into the army and utilised women and even small children. They could not allow them to fall into the hands of the enemy".

¹¹⁷⁸ *Id.* at 522-23. Indeed, the judge advocate went so far as to suggest that deportation of civilians could never be justified by military necessity, but only by concern for the safety of the population. *Id.* at 523. This position, however, is contradicted by the text of the later Geneva Convention IV, which does include "imperative military reasons", and the Geneva Convention is more authoritative than the views of one judge advocate.

¹¹⁷⁹ The British military tribunals did not issue reasoned opinions, so the law reports contain the submissions of the judge advocates, who advised the court on the law after the presentation of the prosecution and defence.

¹¹⁸⁰ *Von Lewinski (von Manstein)*, *op. cit.* p. 522-23.

(b) The compulsory nature of the transfer

528. The Chamber next must determine whether the civilians were in fact forcefully transferred. The commentary to Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV suggests that departures motivated by the fear of discrimination are not necessarily in violation of the law:

[T]he Diplomatic Conference preferred not to place an absolute prohibition on transfers of all kinds, as some might up to a certain point have the consent of those being transferred. The Conference had particularly in mind the case of protected persons belonging to ethnic or political minorities who might have suffered discrimination or persecution on that account and might therefore wish to leave the country. In order to make due allowances for that legitimate desire the Conference decided to authorise voluntary transfers by implication, and only to prohibit 'forcible' transfers.¹¹⁸¹

529. However, the finalised draft text of the elements of the crimes adopted by the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court provides that:

The term 'forcibly' is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment.¹¹⁸²

530. The threats to Srebrenica residents far transcended mere fear of discrimination. The evacuation took place at the final stage of a campaign conducted to force the population to flee the enclave during a time when VRS troops were actively threatening and injuring the Bosnian Muslim civilians of Srebrenica. The negotiations between the Bosnian Muslim "representative", Nesib Mandić, and General Mladić at the second meeting in the Hotel Fontana on 11 July attest to the intimidating conditions in which the Bosnian Muslim civilians were evacuated.¹¹⁸³ The Trial Chamber has already found that, despite the attempts by the VRS to make it look like a voluntary movement, the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica were not exercising a genuine choice to go, but reacted reflexively to a certainty that their survival depended on their flight.¹¹⁸⁴

(c) The fact of the transfer within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina

531. The Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly assembled at Poto-ari were forcibly transferred to Kladanj, an area in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled by the ABiH, in order to eradicate all trace of Bosnian Muslims in the territory in which the Bosnian Serbs were looking to establish their own State. However, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the only State formally recognised by the international community at the time of the events. Since the Srebrenica civilians

¹¹⁸¹ Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, at 279.

¹¹⁸² Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Finalised Draft Text of the Elements of the Crimes, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2, 6 July 2000, p. 11.

¹¹⁸³ *Supra*, paras. 128-130.

¹¹⁸⁴ *Supra*, paras. 145 to 149.

were displaced within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the forcible displacement may not be characterised as deportation in customary international law.

532. The Chamber therefore concludes that the civilians assembled at Poto-ari and transported to Kladanj were not subjected to deportation but rather to forcible transfer. This forcible transfer, in the circumstances of this case, still constitutes a form of inhumane treatment covered under Article 5.

F. Persecutions

533. General Krsti} is accused of persecutions, a crime against humanity, on the basis of his alleged participation in:

- a. the murder of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians, including men, women, children, and elderly persons;
- b. the cruel and inhumane treatment of Bosnian Muslim civilians, including severe beatings;
- c. the terrorising of Bosnian Muslim civilians;
- d. the destruction of personal property of Bosnian Muslims; and
- e. the deportation or forcible transfer of Bosnian Muslims from the Srebrenica enclave.¹¹⁸⁵

534. The Trial Chamber has already discussed generally some of these offences referred to by the Prosecutor. It will now turn more specifically to the offences not previously covered, bearing in mind that the crime of persecutions has been defined, in the *Kupre{ki}* Judgement, as "the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5".¹¹⁸⁶

535. The Tribunal's case-law has specified that persecutory acts are not limited to those acts enumerated in other sub-clauses of Article 5¹¹⁸⁷ or elsewhere in the Statute,¹¹⁸⁸ but also include the denial of other fundamental human rights, provided they are of equal gravity or severity.¹¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, the Tribunal's case-law emphasises that "discriminatory acts charged as persecution must not be considered in isolation, but in context, by looking at their cumulative effect. Although

¹¹⁸⁵ Indictment, para. 31.

¹¹⁸⁶ *Kupre{ki}* Judgement, para. 621.

¹¹⁸⁷ *Kupre{ki}* Judgement, para. 605.

¹¹⁸⁸ *Kordi}* and *Cerkez* Judgement, para. 193.

¹¹⁸⁹ *Kupre{ki}* Judgement, para. 619; *Kordi}* and *^erkez* Judgement, para. 195.

individual acts may not be inhumane, their overall consequences must offend humanity in such a way that they may be termed ‘inhumane’.¹¹⁹⁰

536. The Trial Chamber has previously determined that a widespread and systematic attack was launched against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica from 11 July onwards, by reason of their belonging to the Bosnian Muslim group.

537. The humanitarian crisis in Poto-ari, the burning of homes in Srebrenica and Poto-ari, the terrorisation of Bosnian Muslim civilians, the murder of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians, in Poto-ari or in carefully orchestrated mass scale executions, and the forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly out of the territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, constitute persecutory acts.

538. The Trial Chamber is thus satisfied that a crime of persecution, as defined in the indictment, was committed from 11 July 1995 onward in the enclave of Srebrenica.

G. Genocide

539. General Krsti} is principally charged with genocide and, in the alternative, with complicity in genocide¹¹⁹¹ in relation to the mass executions of the Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica between 11 July and 1 November 1995.¹¹⁹²

540. Article 4(2) of the Statute defines genocide as:

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) killing members of the group;
- (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

541. The Trial Chamber must interpret Article 4 of the Statute taking into account the state of customary international law at the time the events in Srebrenica took place. Several sources have been considered in this respect. The Trial Chamber first referred to the codification work

¹¹⁹⁰ *Kupre{ki}* Judgement, para. 622.

¹¹⁹¹ Counts 1 and 2.

undertaken by international bodies. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide¹¹⁹³ (hereinafter "the Convention"), adopted on 9 December 1948,¹¹⁹⁴ whose provisions Article 4 adopts *verbatim*, constitutes the main reference source in this respect. Although the Convention was adopted during the same period that the term "genocide" itself was coined, the Convention has been viewed as codifying a norm of international law long recognised and which case-law would soon elevate to the level of a peremptory norm of general international law (*jus cogens*).¹¹⁹⁵ The Trial Chamber has interpreted the Convention pursuant to the general rules of interpretation of treaties laid down in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As a result, the Chamber took into account the object and purpose of the Convention in addition to the ordinary meaning of the terms in its provisions. As a supplementary means of interpretation, the Trial Chamber also consulted the preparatory work and the circumstances which gave rise to the Convention. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber considered the international case-law on the crime of genocide, in particular, that developed by the ICTR. The Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind¹¹⁹⁶ received particular attention. Although the report was completed in 1996, it is the product of several years of reflection by the Commission whose purpose was to codify international law, notably on genocide : it therefore constitutes a particularly relevant source for interpretation of Article 4. The work of other international committees, especially the reports of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the UN Commission on Human Rights,¹¹⁹⁷ was also reviewed. Furthermore, the Chamber gave consideration to the work done in producing the Rome Statute on the establishment of an international criminal court, specifically, the finalised draft text of the elements of crimes completed by the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court in July 2000.¹¹⁹⁸ Although that document post-dates the acts involved here, it has proved helpful in assessing the state of customary international law which the Chamber itself derived from other sources. In this regard, it should be noted that all the States attending the conference, whether signatories of the Rome Statute or not, were eligible to be represented on the Preparatory Commission. From this perspective, the

¹¹⁹² Indictment, para. 21.

¹¹⁹³ Articles II and III.

¹¹⁹⁴ Entered into force on 12 January 1951.

¹¹⁹⁵ *Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1951), p. 23.

¹¹⁹⁶ ILC Draft Code, in particular, pp. 106-114.

¹¹⁹⁷ Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, *Study on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/416, 4 July 1978; Benjamin Whitaker, *Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, 2 July 1985.

document is a useful key to the *opinio juris* of the States. Finally, the Trial Chamber also looked for guidance in the legislation and practice of States, especially their judicial interpretations and decisions.

542. Article 4 of the Statute characterises genocide by two constitutive elements:

- the *actus reus* of the offence, which consists of one or several of the acts enumerated under Article 4(2);
- the *mens rea* of the offence, which is described as the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.

1. Actus reus

543. The Trial Chamber has discussed above the murders and serious bodily and mental harm alleged by the Prosecution and has concluded they have been proved. It has been established beyond all reasonable doubt that Bosnian Muslim men residing in the enclave were murdered, in mass executions or individually. It has also been established that serious bodily or mental harm was done to the few individuals who survived the mass executions.

2. Mens rea

544. The critical determination still to be made is whether the offences were committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.

545. The Prosecution contends that the Bosnian Serb forces planned and intended to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military age at Srebrenica and that these large scale murders constitute genocide.¹¹⁹⁹ The Defence does not challenge that the Bosnian Serb forces killed a significant number of Bosnian Muslim men of military age but disagrees a genocidal intent within the meaning of Article 4 has been proved.

546. The Trial Chamber is ultimately satisfied that murders and infliction of serious bodily or mental harm were committed with the intent to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military age at Srebrenica. The evidence shows that the mass executions mainly took place between 13 and 16 July, while executions of smaller scale continued until 19 July. All of the executions systematically targeted Bosnian Muslim men of military age, regardless of whether they were civilians or soldiers.

¹¹⁹⁸ PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add. 2, 6 July 2000.

¹¹⁹⁹ Prosecution Opening Statement, T. 461.

The military aged men who fled to Poto-ari were systematically separated from the other refugees. They were gathered in the "White House" and were forced to leave their identification papers and personal belongings outside the house. While opportunistic killings occurred in Poto-ari on 12 and 13 July,¹²⁰⁰ most of the men detained in the White house were bussed to Bratunac, from the afternoon of 12 July throughout 13 July,¹²⁰¹ and were subsequently led to execution sites. Additionally, the VRS launched an artillery attack against the column of Bosnian Muslim men marching toward Tuzla soon after it became aware of its existence.¹²⁰² A relentless search for the men forming the column started on 12 July and continued throughout 13 July. The few survivors qualified the search as a "man hunt" that left hardly any chance of escape.¹²⁰³ Attack resumed on 14 and 15 July against the third of the column that had managed to cross the asphalt road between Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba on 11-12 July.¹²⁰⁴ As the pressures on the VRS mounted during the fatal week of 11-16 July, negotiations were undertaken between the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb sides and a portion of the Bosnian Muslim column was eventually let through to government-held territory.¹²⁰⁵ The most logical reason for this was that most of the VRS troops had been relocated to @epa by this time and, due to lack of manpower to stop the column, the Zvornik brigade was forced to let them go.¹²⁰⁶ Overall, however, as many as 8,000 to 10,000 men from the Muslim column of 10,000 to 15,000 men were eventually reported as missing.¹²⁰⁷

547. The VRS may have initially considered only targeting the military men for execution.¹²⁰⁸ Some men from the column were in fact killed in combat and it is not certain that the VRS intended at first to kill all the captured Muslim men, including the civilians in the column.¹²⁰⁹ Evidence shows, however, that a decision was taken, at some point, to capture and kill all the Bosnian Muslim men indiscriminately. No effort thereafter was made to distinguish the soldiers from the civilians. Identification papers and personal belongings were taken away from both Bosnian Muslim men at Poto-ari and from men captured from the column; their papers and belongings were piled up and eventually burnt.¹²¹⁰ The strength of the desire to capture all the Bosnian Muslim men was so great that Bosnian Serb forces systematically stopped the buses transporting the women,

¹²⁰⁰ *Supra*, paras. 43-47, 58.

¹²⁰¹ *Supra*, para. 59, 66.

¹²⁰² An intercept submitted into evidence indicates that the Bosnian Serbs were aware of the column as of 12 July at 0300 hours. *Supra*, para. 162.

¹²⁰³ *Supra*, para. 62.

¹²⁰⁴ *Supra*, para. 65.

¹²⁰⁵ *Supra*, para. 65.

¹²⁰⁶ *Supra*, para. 85.

¹²⁰⁷ *Supra*, para. 83.

¹²⁰⁸ A list of criminals of war was drawn upon @ivanovi}'s order dated 13 July; an intercepted conversation between Cerovi} and Beara on 16 July (P335) also indicates that the prisoners should be screened.

¹²⁰⁹ *Supra*, paras. 77, 80.

¹²¹⁰ *Supra*, para. 171.

children and the elderly at Ti{\}a and checked that no men were hiding on board.¹²¹¹ Those men found in the buses were removed and subsequently executed.¹²¹² Admittedly, as the Defence has argued, some wounded men were authorised to leave the Srebrenica enclave under the escort of UNPROFOR. A report of 13 July, however, indicates that the VRS agreed to their evacuation only because of the presence of UNPROFOR and in order to show to the media that non-combatants were properly treated.¹²¹³ Except for the wounded, all the men, whether separated in Poto-ari or captured from the column, were executed, either in small groups or in carefully orchestrated mass executions. They were led to sites located in remote places for execution. The men, sometimes blindfolded, barefoot or with their wrists bound behind their backs, were lined up and shot in rounds. Others were jammed into buildings and killed by rounds of automatic rifles or machine gunfire, or with hand grenades hurled into the buildings.¹²¹⁴ Bulldozers usually arrived immediately after the execution was completed, to bury the corpses.¹²¹⁵ Soldiers would sometimes start digging the graves while the executions were still in progress.¹²¹⁶ Bosnian Serb soldiers would come back to the execution sites a few hours later and check that no one had been left alive.¹²¹⁷ The evidence shows that the VRS sought to kill all the Bosnian Muslim military aged men in Srebrenica, regardless of their civilian or military status.

548. The Prosecution contends that evidence demonstrates an intent to destroy part of a group as such,¹²¹⁸ which is consonant with the definition of genocide. Conversely, the Defence maintains that the intent to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military age living in Srebrenica cannot be interpreted as an intent to destroy in whole or in part a group as such within the meaning of Article 4 of the Statute.

549. As a preliminary, the Chamber emphasises the need to distinguish between the individual intent of the accused and the intent involved in the conception and commission of the crime. The gravity and the scale of the crime of genocide ordinarily presume that several protagonists were involved in its perpetration. Although the motive of each participant may differ, the objective of the criminal enterprise remains the same. In such cases of joint participation, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a group as such must be discernible in the criminal act itself, apart from the intent of particular perpetrators. It is then necessary to establish whether the accused being prosecuted for genocide shared the intention that a genocide be carried out.

¹²¹¹ *Supra*, para. 216. The screening of the men probably took place on 12 July and in the earlier hours of 13 July.

¹²¹² para. 106.

¹²¹³ P459, *supra* para. 86.

¹²¹⁴ Execution in Kravica on 13 July, Pilica cultural Dom on 16 July.

¹²¹⁵ *Supra*, para. 68.

¹²¹⁶ Orahovac, 14 July.

550. Genocide refers to any criminal enterprise seeking to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular kind of human group, as such, by certain means. Those are two elements of the special intent requirement of genocide:

- the act or acts must target a national, ethnical, racial or religious group;
- the act or acts must seek to destroy all or part of that group.¹²¹⁹

(a) A group, as such

551. The parties agreed that genocide must target not only one or several individuals but a group as such.¹²²⁰

552. United Nations General Assembly resolution 96 (I) defined genocide as “a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups”.¹²²¹ On the same issue, the Secretariat explained:

The victim of the crime of genocide is a human group. It is not a greater or smaller number of individuals who are affected for a particular reason but a group as such.¹²²²

In 1951, following the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the International Court of Justice observed that the Convention looked “to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and [...] to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality”.¹²²³ The ILC also insisted on this point in 1996:

The group itself is the ultimate target or intended victim of this type of massive criminal conduct. [...] the intention must be to destroy the group ‘as such’, meaning as a separate and distinct entity.¹²²⁴

The *Akayesu* Judgement¹²²⁵ and the *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Judgement¹²²⁶ upheld this interpretation.

¹²¹⁷ See esp. Witnesses J and K’s testimony who are survivors of the execution carried out at the Kravica warehouse. *supra* para. 207.

¹²¹⁸ Indictment, para. 21.

¹²¹⁹ *Jelisić* Judgement, para. 66.

¹²²⁰ Prosecutor’s Submissions of agreed matters of law presented during the pre-trial conference of 7 March 2000, 8 March 2000, paras. 92 and 93.

¹²²¹ UN Doc. A/ 96(I) (1946), 11 December 1946.

¹²²² “Relations Between the Convention on Genocide on the One Hand and the Formulation of the Nurnberg Principles and the Preparation of a Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security on the Other”, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/3/Rev.1, 12 April 1948, p. 6. Nehemia Robinson set forth this essential characteristic of genocide very explicitly in his commentary on the Convention: “The main characteristic of Genocide is its object: the act must be directed toward the destruction of a *group*. Groups consist of individuals, and therefore, destructive action must, in the last analysis, be taken against individuals. However, these individuals are important not *per se* but only as members of the group to which they belong” (*op.cit.* p. 63).

¹²²³ *Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1951), p. 23.

¹²²⁴ ILC Draft Code, p. 88.

553. The Convention thus seeks to protect the right to life of human groups, as such. This characteristic makes genocide an exceptionally grave crime and distinguishes it from other serious crimes, in particular persecution, where the perpetrator selects his victims because of their membership in a specific community but does not necessarily seek to destroy the community as such.¹²²⁷

554. However, the Genocide Convention does not protect all types of human groups. Its application is confined to national, ethnical, racial or religious groups.

555. National, ethnical, racial or religious group are not clearly defined in the Convention or elsewhere. In contrast, the preparatory work on the Convention and the work conducted by international bodies in relation to the protection of minorities show that the concepts of protected groups and national minorities partially overlap and are on occasion synonymous. European instruments on human rights use the term "national minorities",¹²²⁸ while universal instruments more commonly make reference to "ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities";¹²²⁹ the two expressions appear to embrace the same goals.¹²³⁰ In a study conducted for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1979, F. Capotorti commented that "the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities decided, in 1950, to replace the word 'racial' by the word 'ethnic' in all references to minority groups described by their ethnic origin".¹²³¹ The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination¹²³² defines racial discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or

¹²²⁵ *Akayesu* Judgement, para. 522: "The perpetration of the act charged therefore extends beyond its actual commission, for example, the murder of a particular individual, for the realisation of an ulterior motive, which is to destroy, in whole or in part, the group of which the individual is just one element".

¹²²⁶ *Kayishema, Ruzindana* Judgement, para. 99: "'Destroying' has to be directed at the group *as such*, that is, *qua group*".

¹²²⁷ See in particular the *Kupre{ki}* Judgement, para. 636 and the *Jelisi* Judgement, para. 79.

¹²²⁸ See in particular Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as ...g association with a national minority ...g". See also the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ETS 157, or principle VII of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975), point 105, para. 2.

¹²²⁹ See in particular Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: "In those States in which *ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities* exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language".

¹²³⁰ See in particular the definition suggested by the European Commission for Democracy through Law, *The Protection of Minorities*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press, 1994, p. 12: a national minority is "a group which is smaller in number than the rest of a population of a State, whose members, who are nationals of that State, have ethnical, religious or linguistic features different from those of the rest of the population, and are guided by the will to safeguard their culture, traditions, religion or language".

¹²³¹ F. Capotorti, *Study on the Rights of the Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities*, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1979), paras. 197, referring to the debates held on a draft resolution on the definition of minorities (E/CN.4/Sub.2/103).

¹²³² UNTS, vol. 660, no. 9646.

preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin".¹²³³ The preparatory work on the Genocide Convention also reflects that the term "ethnic" was added at a later stage in order to better define the type of groups protected by the Convention and ensure that the term "national" would not be understood as encompassing purely political groups.¹²³⁴

556. The preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting out such a list was designed more to describe a single phenomenon, roughly corresponding to what was recognised, before the second world war, as "national minorities", rather than to refer to several distinct prototypes of human groups. To attempt to differentiate each of the named groups on the basis of scientifically objective criteria would thus be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention.

557. A group's cultural, religious, ethnical or national characteristics must be identified within the socio-historic context which it inhabits. As in the *Nikoli*¹²³⁵ and *Jelisi*¹²³⁶ cases, the Chamber identifies the relevant group by using as a criterion the stigmatisation of the group, notably by the perpetrators of the crime, on the basis of its perceived national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.

558. Whereas the indictment in this case defined the targeted group as the Bosnian Muslims, the Prosecution appeared to use an alternative definition in its pre-trial brief by pleading the intention to eliminate the "Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica" through mass killing and deportation.¹²³⁷ In its final trial brief, the Prosecution chose to define the group as the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica,¹²³⁸ while it referred to the Bosnian Muslims of Eastern Bosnia in its final arguments.¹²³⁹ The Defence argued in its final brief that the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica did not form a specific national, ethnical, racial or religious group. In particular, it contended that "one cannot create an artificial 'group' by limiting its scope to a geographical area".¹²⁴⁰ According to the Defence, the Bosnian Muslims constitute the only group that fits the definition of a group protected by the Convention.¹²⁴¹

559. Originally viewed as a religious group, the Bosnian Muslims were recognised as a "nation" by the Yugoslav Constitution of 1963. The evidence tendered at trial also shows very clearly that the highest Bosnian Serb political authorities and the Bosnian Serb forces operating in Srebrenica in

¹²³³ Article 1.

¹²³⁴ UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 (Petren, Sweden); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Petren, Sweden).

¹²³⁵ *The Prosecutor v. Nikoli*, Review of the indictment pursuant to Rule 61, Decision of Trial Chamber I, 20 October 1995, case no. IT-94-2-R61 (hereinafter "the *Nikoli* Decision"), para. 27.

¹²³⁶ *Jelisi* Judgement, para. 70.

¹²³⁷ Prosecutor's pre-trial brief pursuant to Rule 65 ter (E) (i), 25 February 2000, para. 12.

¹²³⁸ Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 412.

¹²³⁹ Closing argument, T. 9983.

¹²⁴⁰ Final Submissions of the Accused, para. 104.

July 1995 viewed the Bosnian Muslims as a specific national group. Conversely, no national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristic makes it possible to differentiate the Bosnian Muslims residing in Srebrenica, at the time of the 1995 offensive, from the other Bosnian Muslims. The only distinctive criterion would be their geographical location, not a criterion contemplated by the Convention. In addition, it is doubtful that the Bosnian Muslims residing in the enclave at the time of the offensive considered themselves a distinct national, ethnical, racial or religious group among the Bosnian Muslims. Indeed, most of the Bosnian Muslims residing in Srebrenica at the time of the attack were not originally from Srebrenica but from all around the central Podrinje region. Evidence shows that they rather viewed themselves as members of the Bosnian Muslim group.

560. The Chamber concludes that the protected group, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Statute, must be defined, in the present case, as the Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica or the Bosnian Muslims of Eastern Bosnia constitute a part of the protected group under Article 4. The question of whether an intent to destroy a part of the protected group falls under the definition of genocide is a separate issue that will be discussed below.

561. The Prosecution and the Defence, in this case, concur in their belief that the victims of genocide must be targeted *by reason of* their membership in a group.¹²⁴² This is the only interpretation coinciding with the intent which characterises the crime of genocide. The intent to destroy a group as such, in whole or in part, presupposes that the victims were chosen by reason of their membership in the group whose destruction was sought. Mere knowledge of the victims' membership in a distinct group on the part of the perpetrators is not sufficient to establish an intention to destroy the group as such. As the ILC noted:

?...g the intention must be to destroy a group and not merely one or more individuals who are coincidentally members of a particular group. The ...g act must be committed against an individual because of his membership in a particular group and as an incremental step in the overall objective of destroying the group.¹²⁴³

562. As a result, there are obvious similarities between a genocidal policy and the policy commonly known as "ethnic cleansing". In this case, acts of discrimination are not confined to the events in Srebrenica alone, but characterise the whole of the 1992-95 conflict between the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats. The Report of the Secretary-General comments that "a central objective of the conflict was the use of military means to terrorise civilian populations, often with

¹²⁴¹ Final Submissions of the Accused, paras. 102-107.

¹²⁴² Prosecutor's pre-trial brief pursuant to Rule 65 *ter* (E) (i), 25 February 2000, para. 92, p. 33.

¹²⁴³ ILC Draft Code, p. 109. See also Pieter Drost, *The Crime of State, Genocide*, p. 124, for a commentary on the Convention: "It is an externally perceptible quality or characteristic which the victim has in common with the other members of the group, which makes him distinct from the rest of society in the criminal mind of his attacker and which for that very reason causes the attacker to commit the crime against such marked and indicated individual".

the goal of forcing their flight in a process that came to be known as 'ethnic cleansing'".¹²⁴⁴ The Bosnian Serbs' war objective was clearly spelt out, notably in a decision issued on 12 May 1992 by Mom-ilo Kraji{nik, then President of the National Assembly of the Bosnian Serb People. The decision indicates that one of the strategic objectives of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina was to reunite all Serbian people in a single State, in particular by erasing the border along the Drina which separated Serbia from Eastern Bosnia, whose population was mostly Serbian.¹²⁴⁵

563. The accused himself defined the objective of the campaign in Bosnia during an interview in November 1995, when he explained that the Podrinje region should remain "Serbian for ever, while the Eastern part of Republika Srpska and the Drina river w?ouldg be an important meeting point for the entire Serbian people from both sides of the Drina".¹²⁴⁶

564. In this goal, the cleansing of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica had special advantages. Lying in the central Podrinje region, whose strategic importance for the creation of a Bosnian Serb Republic has frequently been cited in testimony,¹²⁴⁷ Srebrenica and the surrounding area was a predominantly Muslim pocket within a mainly Serbian region adjoining Serbia.¹²⁴⁸ Given the war objectives, it is hardly surprising that the Serbs and Bosnian Muslims fought each other bitterly in this region from the outbreak of the conflict.¹²⁴⁹

565. Many attacks were launched by both parties against villages controlled by the other side in the region. The Bosnian Muslim forces committed apparent violations of humanitarian law directed against the Bosnian Serb inhabitants of the region, especially from May 1992 to January 1993.¹²⁵⁰ In response, operations were conducted by the Bosnian Serb forces, notably, a large-scale attack launched in January 1993. The attack forced the Bosnian Muslim population from the surrounding villages to flee to the areas of Srebrenica and @epa. As a result, the population of Srebrenica climbed from 37,000 in 1991 to 50,000 or 60,000 in 1993 while, at the same time, the territory shrank from 900 to 150 square km.¹²⁵¹ A significant majority of the Muslim population, residing in the territory of the Drina Corps' zone of responsibility, had already been displaced by April 1993. By that date, the Bosnian Serb forces had ethnically cleansed the towns and villages of Zvornik,

¹²⁴⁴ para. 19.

¹²⁴⁵ P746/a.

¹²⁴⁶ P743, p. 2.

¹²⁴⁷ Radinovi}, T. 7812. *supra*, para. 12.

¹²⁴⁸ See para. 11, referring to the Report of the Secretary-General, para. 33.

¹²⁴⁹ The Report of the Secretary-General, para. 33, lists the crimes committed by the Bosnian Serb forces against the Bosnian Muslim population from the very outset of the conflict.

¹²⁵⁰ Report of the Secretary-General, paras. 34 to 37.

¹²⁵¹ *Supra*, para. 13-14.

[ekovi}i, Kalesija, Bratunac, Vlasenica, Kladanj, Olovo, Han Pijesak, Rogatica and Sokolac.¹²⁵² The over-populated municipality of Srebrenica was then subjected to constant shelling before the Security Council decided, on 16 April 1993, to declare the enclave a safe area.¹²⁵³ Despite a period of relative stability, the living conditions remained dreadful. The Security Council Mission, set up pursuant to resolution 819, described Srebrenica on 30 April 1993 as an "open jail"¹²⁵⁴ and stated that 50% of the dwellings had been demolished. The Mission further lamented the Bosnian Serb forces' harassment of the humanitarian convoys heading for Srebrenica and the obstacles confronted in transporting the sick and wounded out of the enclave.¹²⁵⁵ Until 1995, the water and electricity networks were unusable, having been either destroyed or cut. There was an extreme shortage of food and medicines.¹²⁵⁶

566. Even before the offensive of July 1995 and as early as January 1995, the Bosnian Serb forces tried to prevent the humanitarian convoys from getting through to the enclave.¹²⁵⁷ The Trial Chamber has previously described the catastrophic humanitarian situation which was born out of the policy of systematically hampering humanitarian convoys.¹²⁵⁸ In particular, several persons died from starvation on 7 and 8 July 1995 and a report from the command of the 28th Division, dated 8 July 1995, warned that the civilian population would very soon be forced to flee the enclave if it wished to survive.¹²⁵⁹

567. However, the Trial Chamber has found that, on its face, the operation Krivaja 95 did not include a plan to overrun the enclave and expel the Bosnian Muslim population.¹²⁶⁰ The Trial Chamber heard credible testimony on the chronic refusal of Bosnian Muslim forces to respect the demilitarisation agreement of 1993.¹²⁶¹ Defence witnesses accused the Bosnian Muslim forces of using the safe area as a fortified base from which to launch offensives against the Bosnian Serb forces. In particular, on 26 June 1995, several weeks prior to the offensive of the VRS on Srebrenica, the Bosnian Muslim forces launched an assault from the enclave on the Serbian village

¹²⁵² Statement of General Had' ihasanovi} made on 24 January 2001, para. 4, corroborated by General Krsti}'s statement in a press article published in November 1995 (P744/c, p. 1).

¹²⁵³ Resolution 819 (1993), 16 April 1993.

¹²⁵⁴ P 126: Report of the Security Council Mission set up pursuant to resolution 819 (1993), UN Doc. S/25700 (30 April 1993), para. 18.

¹²⁵⁵ *Ibid*, para. 10 and 11.

¹²⁵⁶ *Supra*, para. 15.

¹²⁵⁷ *Supra*, para. 26.

¹²⁵⁸ *Supra*, para. 28.

¹²⁵⁹ P 901, p. 2.

¹²⁶⁰ *Supra*, para. 120.

¹²⁶¹ *Supra*, p ara. 24. First agreement signed on 18 April 1993, followed by the agreement of 8 May 1993.

of Višnica 5km away.¹²⁶² Such acts could well have motivated an attack designed to cut communications between the enclaves of Žepa and Srebrenica.

568. The operation, however, was not confined to mere retaliation. Its objective, although perhaps restricted initially to blocking communications between the two enclaves and reducing the Srebrenica enclave to its urban core, was quickly extended. Realising that no resistance was being offered by the Bosnian Muslim forces or the international community, President Karadžić broadened the operation's objective by issuing, on 9 July, the order to seize the town.¹²⁶³ By 11 July, the town of Srebrenica was captured, driving 20,000 to 25,000 Muslim refugees to flee towards Potočari. Operation Krivaja 1995 then became an instrument of the policy designed to drive out the Bosnian Muslim population. The humanitarian crisis caused by the flow of refugees arriving at Potočari, the intensity and the scale of the violence, the illegal confinement of the men in one area, while the women and children were forcibly transferred out of the Bosnian Serb held territory, and the subsequent death of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilian and military men, most of whom clearly did not die in combat, demonstrate that a purposeful decision was taken by the Bosnian Serb forces to target the Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica, by reason of their membership in the Bosnian Muslim group. It remains to determine whether this discriminatory attack sought to destroy the group, in whole or in part, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Statute.

(b) Intent to destroy the group in whole or in part

(i) Intent to destroy

569. The Prosecution urges a broad interpretation of Article 4's requirement of an intent to destroy all or part of the group. It contends that the acts have been committed with the requisite intent if "the accused consciously desired his acts to result in the destruction, in whole or in part, of the group, as such; or he knew his acts were destroying, in whole or in part, the group, as such; or he knew that the likely consequence of his acts would be to destroy, in whole or in part, the group, as such".¹²⁶⁴ The Prosecution is of the opinion that, in this case, General Krstić and others "consciously desired their acts to lead to the destruction of part of the Bosnian Muslim people as a ...g group".¹²⁶⁵

¹²⁶² Report of the Secretary-General, para. 225.

¹²⁶³ *Supra*, para. 33.

¹²⁶⁴ Prosecutor's pre-trial brief pursuant to Rule 65 *ter*(E)(i), 25 February 2000, para. 90.

¹²⁶⁵ *Ibid*, para. 91, p. 33.

570. Conversely, the Defence claims that the perpetrator of genocide must “have the specific intent to destroy the [...] group” and concludes that “the *dolus specialis* constitutes a higher form of premeditation”.¹²⁶⁶

571. The preparatory work of the Genocide Convention clearly shows that the drafters envisaged genocide as an enterprise whose goal, or objective, was to destroy a human group, in whole or in part. United Nations General Assembly resolution 96 (I) defined genocide as “the *denial* of the right of existence of entire human groups”.¹²⁶⁷ The draft Convention prepared by the Secretary-General presented genocide as a criminal act which aims to destroy a group, in whole or in part,¹²⁶⁸ and specified that this definition excluded certain acts, which may result in the total or partial destruction of a group, but are committed in the absence of an intent to destroy the group.¹²⁶⁹ The International Law Commission upheld this interpretation and indicated that “a general intent to commit one of the enumerated acts combined with a general awareness of the probable consequences of such an act with respect to the immediate victim or victims is not sufficient for the crime of genocide. The definition of this crime requires a *particular state of mind* or a *specific intent* with respect to the overall consequence of the prohibited act”.¹²⁷⁰ The International Court of Justice insisted, in its Opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*,¹²⁷¹ that specific intent to destroy was required and indicated that “the prohibition of genocide would be pertinent in this case if the recourse to nuclear weapons did indeed entail the element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision quoted above”.¹²⁷² The ICTR adopted the same interpretation. In *The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda*, the Trial Chamber stated: “the crime of genocide is unique because of its element of *dolus specialis* (special intent) which requires that the crime be committed with the intent ‘to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or

¹²⁶⁶ Final Submissions of the Accused, 21 June 2001, para. 94.

¹²⁶⁷ UN Doc. A/96 (I), 11 December 1946 (Emphasis added).

¹²⁶⁸ UN Doc. E/447 (1947), p. 20 “the word genocide means a criminal act directed against any one of the aforesaid groups of human beings, with the purpose of destroying it in whole or in part, or of preventing its preservation or development”.

¹²⁶⁹ UN Doc. E/447 (1947), p. 23. See also “Relations Between the Convention on Genocide on the One Hand and the Formulation of the Nurnberg Principles and the Preparation of a Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security on the Other”, UN Doc. E/AC.25/3/Rev.1, 12 April 1948, p. 6: “The destruction of the human group is the actual aim in view. In the case of foreign or civil war, one side may inflict extremely heavy losses on the other but its purpose is to impose its will on the other side and not to destroy it.”

¹²⁷⁰ ILC Draft Code, p. 88 (emphasis added).

¹²⁷¹ ICJ Repors (1996), p. 240.

¹²⁷² Para. 26. The Chamber notes however that several dissenting opinions criticised the Opinion on the issue by holding that an act whose foreseeable result was the destruction of a group as such and which did indeed cause the destruction of the group did constitute genocide. In particular, Judge Weeramantry observes that the use of nuclear weapons inevitably brings about the destruction of entire populations and constitutes, as such, genocide. He thus challenges the interpretation that “there must be an intention to target a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group qua such group, and not incidentally to some other act” (Reports p. 502). In the same vein, Judge Koroma comments on “the abhorrent shocking consequences that a whole population could be wiped out by the use of nuclear weapons during an armed conflict”. He claims that such a situation constitutes genocide “if the consequences of the act could have been foreseen” (Reports, p. 577).

religious group as such".¹²⁷³ In *Kayishema, Ruzindana*, the Trial Chamber also emphasised that "genocide requires the aforementioned specific intent to exterminate a protected group (in whole or in part)".¹²⁷⁴ Moreover, the Chamber notes that the domestic law of some States distinguishes genocide by the existence of a plan to destroy a group.¹²⁷⁵ Some legal commentators further contend that genocide embraces those acts whose foreseeable or probable consequence is the total or partial destruction of the group without any necessity of showing that destruction was the goal of the act.¹²⁷⁶ Whether this interpretation can be viewed as reflecting the status of customary international law at the time of the acts involved here is not clear. For the purpose of this case, the Chamber will therefore adhere to the characterisation of genocide which encompass only acts committed with the *goal* of destroying all or part of a group.

572. Article 4 of the Statute does not require that the genocidal acts be premeditated over a long period.¹²⁷⁷ It is conceivable that, although the intention at the outset of an operation was not the destruction of a group, it may become the goal at some later point during the implementation of the operation. For instance, an armed force could decide to destroy a protected group during a military operation whose primary objective was totally unrelated to the fate of the group. The Appeals Chamber, in a recent decision, indicated that the existence of a plan was not a legal ingredient of the crime of genocide but could be of evidential assistance to prove the intent of the authors of the criminal act(s).¹²⁷⁸ Evidence presented in this case has shown that the killings were planned: the number and nature of the forces involved, the standardised coded language used by the units in communicating information about the killings, the scale of the executions, the invariability of the killing methods applied, indicate that a decision was made to kill all the Bosnian Muslim military aged men.¹²⁷⁹

573. The Trial Chamber is unable to determine the precise date on which the decision to kill all the military aged men was taken. Hence, it cannot find that the killings committed in Poto-ari on 12 and 13 July 1995 formed part of the plan to kill all the military aged men. Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber is confident that the mass executions and other killings committed from 13 July onwards were part of this plan.

¹²⁷³ ICTR 97-23-S, 4 September 1998 (hereinafter The "*Kambanda* Judgement"), para. 16.

¹²⁷⁴ 21 May 1999, para. 89.

¹²⁷⁵ Article 211-1 of the French Criminal Code states that the crime must be committed "in the execution of a concerted plan to destroy wholly or partially a group".

¹²⁷⁶ See in particular Eric David, *Droit des conflits armés*, p. 615; Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, "Rethinking genocidal intent: the case for a knowledge-based interpretation", *Columbia Law Review*, December 1999, pp. 2259-2294; Gil Gil *Derecho penal internacional, especial consideracion del delito de genicidio*, 1999.

¹²⁷⁷ The element of premeditation was dismissed at the proposal of Belgium (UN Doc. A/C.6/217) on the ground that such a provision was superfluous in light of the special intent already incorporated into the definition of the crime (UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.72, p. 8).

¹²⁷⁸ *Jelisić* Appeal Judgement, para. 48.

¹²⁷⁹ *Supra*, para. 85-87.

574. The manner in which the destruction of a group may be implemented so as to qualify as a genocide under Article 4 must also be discussed. The physical destruction of a group is the most obvious method, but one may also conceive of destroying a group through purposeful eradication of its culture and identity resulting in the eventual extinction of the group as an entity distinct from the remainder of the community.

575. The notion of genocide, as fashioned by Raphael Lemkin in 1944, originally covered all forms of destruction of a group as a distinct social entity.¹²⁸⁰ As such, genocide closely resembled the crime of persecution. In this regard, the ILC stated, in its 1996 report, that genocide as currently defined corresponds to the second category of crime against humanity established under Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Tribunal's Statute, namely the crime of persecution.¹²⁸¹ There is consensus that the crime of persecution provided for by the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal was not limited to the physical destruction of the group but covered all acts designed to destroy the social and/or cultural bases of a group. Such a broad interpretation of persecution was upheld *inter alia* in the indictment against *Ulrich Greifelt et al.*, before the United States Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. The accused were charged with implementing a systematic programme of genocide which sought to destroy foreign nations and ethnic groups. The indictment interpreted destruction to mean not only the extermination of the members of those groups but also the eradication of their national characteristics.¹²⁸² It should be noted that this interpretation was supported by the working group established to report on the human rights violations in South Africa in 1985. While recognising that the Convention literally covered only the physical or material destruction of the group, the report explained that it was adopting a broader interpretation that viewed as genocidal any act which prevented an individual "from participating fully in national life", the latter being understood "in its more general sense".¹²⁸³

576. Although the Convention does not specifically speak to the point, the preparatory work points out that the "cultural" destruction of a group was expressly rejected after having been seriously contemplated.¹²⁸⁴ The notion of cultural genocide was considered too vague and too

¹²⁸⁰ *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, p. 79, pp. 87-89.

¹²⁸¹ ILC Draft Code, *op. cit.*, commentary of article 17, p. 106.

¹²⁸² *USA v. Ulrich Greifelt et al*, Trials of War Criminals, vol. XIV (1948), p. 2: "The acts, conduct, plans and enterprises charged in Paragraph 1 of this Count were carried out as part of a systematic program of genocide, aimed at the destruction of foreign nations and ethnic groups, in part by murderous extermination, and in part by elimination and suppression of national characteristics". See also the judgements rendered by the Polish Supreme Court against Amon Leopold Goeth (Trials of War Criminals, vol. VII, no. 37, p. 8) and Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess (Trials of War Criminals, vol. VII, no. 38, p. 24).

¹²⁸³ *Violations of Human Rights in Southern Africa: Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts*, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/14, 28 January 1985, paras. 56 and 57.

¹²⁸⁴ The notion of a cultural genocide was rejected by the General Assembly Sixth Committee by 25 votes to 6, with 4 abstentions and 13 delegations absent.

removed from the physical or biological destruction that motivated the Convention. The ILC noted in 1996:

As clearly shown by the preparatory work for the Convention, the destruction in question is the material destruction of a group either by physical or by biological means, not the destruction of the national, linguistic, religious, cultural or other identity of a particular group. The national or religious element and the racial or ethnic element are not taken into consideration in the definition of the word "destruction", which must be taken only in its material sense, its physical or biological sense.¹²⁸⁵

577. Several recent declarations and decisions, however, have interpreted the intent to destroy clause in Article 4 so as to encompass evidence relating to acts that involved cultural and other non physical forms of group destruction.

578. In 1992, the United Nations General Assembly labelled ethnic cleansing as a form of genocide.¹²⁸⁶

579. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany said in December 2000 that:

the statutory definition of genocide defends a supra-individual object of legal protection, i.e. the *social* existence of the group [...] the intent to destroy the group [...] extends beyond physical and biological extermination [...] The text of the law does not therefore compel the interpretation that the culprit's intent must be to exterminate physically at least a substantial number of the members of the group.¹²⁸⁷

580. The Trial Chamber is aware that it must interpret the Convention with due regard for the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege*. It therefore recognises that, despite recent developments, customary international law limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biological destruction of all or part of the group. Hence, an enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these elements which give to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the community would not fall under the definition of genocide. The Trial Chamber however points out that where there is physical or biological destruction there are often simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group. In this case, the Trial Chamber will thus take into account as evidence of intent to destroy the group the deliberate destruction of mosques and houses belonging to members of the group.

¹²⁸⁵ ILC Draft Code, pp. 90-91.

¹²⁸⁶ UN Doc. AG/Res./47/121 of 18 December 1992.

¹²⁸⁷ Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1290/99, 12 December 2000, para. (III)(4)(a)(aa). Emphasis added.

(ii) "In part"

581. Since in this case primarily the Bosnian Muslim men of military age were killed, a second issue is whether this group of victims represented a sufficient part of the Bosnian Muslim group so that the intent to destroy them qualifies as an "intent to destroy the group in whole or in part" under Article 4 of the Statute.

582. Invoking the work of the ILC and the *Jelisić* Judgement, the Prosecution interprets the expression "in whole or in part" to mean a "substantial" part in quantitative or qualitative terms.¹²⁸⁸ However, the Prosecution states that "it is not necessary to consider the global population of the group. The intent to destroy a multitude of persons because of their membership in a particular group constitutes genocide even if these persons constitute only part of a group either within a country or within a region or within a single community".¹²⁸⁹ The Prosecution relies on, *inter alia*, the *Akayesu* Judgement which found the accused guilty of genocide for acts he committed within a single commune and the *Nikolić* Decision taken pursuant to Rule 61, which upheld the characterisation of genocide for acts committed within a single region of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in that case, the region of Vlasenica.¹²⁹⁰ The Prosecution further cites the *Jelisić* Judgement which declared that "international custom admit?tedg the characterisation of genocide even when the exterminatory intent only extend?edg to a limited geographic zone".¹²⁹¹

583. The Defence contends that the term "in part" refers to the scale of the crimes actually committed, as opposed to the intent, which would have to extend to destroying the group as such, *i.e.* in its entirety.¹²⁹² The Defence relies for this interpretation on the intention of the drafters of the Convention, which it contends was confirmed by the subsequent commentary of Raphael Lemkin in 1950 before the American Congress during the debates on the Convention's ratification¹²⁹³ and by the implementing legislation proposed by the United States during the Nixon and Carter administrations.¹²⁹⁴ That is, any destruction, even if only partial, must have been carried out with the intent to destroy the entire group, as such.

¹²⁸⁸ Prosecutor's pre-trial brief pursuant to Rule 65 *ter* (E)(i), 25 February 2000, para. 100.

¹²⁸⁹ Prosecutor's pre-trial brief pursuant to Rule 65 *ter* (E)(i), 25 February 2000, para. 101.

¹²⁹⁰ Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Decision of Trial Chamber I, 20 October 1995, IT-94-2-R61, para. 34.

¹²⁹¹ *Jelisić* Judgement, para. 83.

¹²⁹² Final Submissions of the Accused, paras. 96-101.

¹²⁹³ Letter of Raphael Lemkin published in "Executive Sessions of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee", Historical Series 781-805 (1976), p. 370, quoted in the Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 97. Raphael Lemkin explained that partial destruction must target a substantial part in such a way that it affects the group as a whole.

¹²⁹⁴ Senate Executive Report No. 23, 94th Cong., 2nd Session (1976), pp. 34-35.

584. The Trial Chamber does not agree. Admittedly, by adding the term "in part", some of the Convention's drafters may have intended that actual destruction of a mere part of a human group could be characterised as genocide, only as long as it was carried out with the intent to destroy the group as such.¹²⁹⁵ The debates on this point during the preparatory work are unclear, however, and a plain reading of the Convention contradicts this interpretation. Under the Convention, the term "in whole or in part" refers to the intent, as opposed to the actual destruction, and it would run contrary to the rules of interpretation to alter the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the Convention by recourse to the preparatory work which lacks clarity on the issue. The Trial Chamber concludes that any act committed with the intent to destroy a part of a group, as such, constitutes an act of genocide within the meaning of the Convention.

585. The Genocide Convention itself provides no indication of what constitutes intent to destroy "in part". The preparatory work offers few indications either. The draft Convention submitted by the Secretary-General observes that "the systematic destruction even of a fraction of a group of human beings constitutes an exceptionally heinous crime".¹²⁹⁶ Early commentaries on the Genocide Convention opined that the matter of what was substantial fell within the ambit of the Judges' discretionary evaluation. Nehemia Robinson was of the view that the intent to destroy could pertain to only a region or even a local community if the number of persons targeted was substantial.¹²⁹⁷ Pieter Drost remarked that any systematic destruction of a fraction of a protected group constituted genocide.¹²⁹⁸

586. A somewhat stricter interpretation has prevailed in more recent times. According to the ILC, the perpetrators of the crime must seek to destroy a quantitatively substantial part of the protected group:

¹²⁹⁵ In this regard, see especially the commentary of the representative of the United Kingdom, Fitzmaurice, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR. 73. The preparatory work is unclear on the issue. It does indeed seem that there was confusion between the *actus reus* and the *mens rea* in this respect.

¹²⁹⁶ Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide presented by the Secretary-General, 26 June 1947, UN Doc. E/447, p. 24.

¹²⁹⁷ Nehemia Robinson, *The Genocide Convention*, p. 63: "the intent to destroy a multitude of persons of the same group must be classified as genocide even if these persons constitute only part of a group either within a country or within a region *or within a single community*, provided the number is substantial". The writer also noted before the Foreign Relations Commission of the American Senate: "the intent to destroy a multitude of persons of the same group must be classified as genocide even if these persons constitute only part of a group either within a country or within a single community, provided the number is substantial because the aim of the convention is to deal with action against large numbers, not individual events if they happen to possess the same characteristics. It will be up to the court to decide in every case whether such intent existed" (*The Genocide Convention - Its Origins and Interpretation, reprinted in Hearings on the Genocide Convention Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 487, 498 (1950)*).

¹²⁹⁸ Pieter Drost, *The Crime of State, Book II, Genocide*, Sythoff, Leyden, p. 85: "Acts perpetrated with the intended purpose to destroy various people as members of the same group are to be classified as genocidal crimes although the victims amount to only a small part of the entire group present within the national, regional or local community".

It is not necessary to intend to achieve the complete annihilation of a group from every corner of the globe. None the less the crime of genocide by its very nature requires the intention to destroy at least a substantial part of a particular group.¹²⁹⁹

The *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Judgement stated that the intent to destroy a part of a group must affect a "considerable" number of individuals.¹³⁰⁰ The Judgement handed down on Ignace Bagilishema, on 7 June 2001, also recognised that the destruction sought must target at least a substantial part of the group.¹³⁰¹

587. Benjamin Whitaker's 1985 study on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide holds that the partial destruction of a group merits the characterisation of genocide when it concerns a large portion of the entire group or a significant section of that group.

'In part' would seem to imply a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group, such as its leadership.¹³⁰²

The "Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992)" (hereinafter "Report of the Commission of Experts") confirmed this interpretation, and considered that an intent to destroy a specific part of a group, such as its political, administrative, intellectual or business leaders, "may be a strong indication of genocide regardless of the actual numbers killed". The report states that extermination specifically directed against law enforcement and military personnel may affect "a significant section of a group in that it renders the group at large defenceless against other abuses of a similar or other nature". However, the Report goes on to say that "the attack on the leadership must be viewed *in the context of the fate of what happened to the rest of the group*. If a group suffers extermination of its leadership and in the wake of that loss, a large number of its members are killed or subjected to other heinous acts, for example deportation, the cluster of violations ought to be considered in its entirety in order to interpret the provisions of the Convention in a spirit consistent with its purpose".¹³⁰³

588. Judge Elihu Lauterpacht, the *ad hoc* Judge nominated by Bosnia-Herzegovina in the case before the International Court of Justice regarding the application of the Convention on the

¹²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹³⁰⁰ *Kayishema and Ruzindana* case, para. 97: "'in part' requires the intention to destroy a considerable number of individuals who are part of the group".

¹³⁰¹ *The Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema*, case no. ICTR-95-1A-T, 7 June 2001 (hereinafter "*Bagilishema* Judgement") para. 64: "Although the destruction sought need not be directed at every member of the targeted group, the Chamber considers that the intention to destroy must target at least a substantial part of the group".

¹³⁰² Para. 29.

¹³⁰³ *Report of the Commission of Experts*, UN Doc. S/1994/674, para. 94 (emphasis added).

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, spoke similarly in his separate opinion.¹³⁰⁴ Judge Lauterpacht observed that the Bosnian Serb forces had murdered and caused serious mental and bodily injury to the Bosnian Muslims and had subjected the group to living conditions meant to bring about its total or partial physical destruction. He went on to take into account “the forced migration of civilians, more commonly known as ‘ethnic cleansing’” in order to establish the intent to destroy all or part of the group. In his view, this demonstrated the Serbs’ intent “to eliminate Muslim control of, and presence in, substantial parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina”. Judge Lauterpacht concluded that the acts which led to the group’s physical destruction had to be characterised as “acts of genocide” since they were “directed against an ethnical or religious group as such, and they [were] intended to destroy that group, if not in whole certainly in part, to the extent necessary to ensure that that group [would] no longer occup[y] the parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina coveted by the Serbs”.¹³⁰⁵

589. Several other sources confirm that the intent to eradicate a group within a limited geographical area such as the region of a country or even a municipality may be characterised as genocide. The United Nations General Assembly characterised as an act of genocide the murder of approximately 800 Palestinians¹³⁰⁶ detained at Sabra and Shatila, most of whom were women, children and elderly.¹³⁰⁷ The *Jelisić* Judgement held that genocide could target a limited geographic zone.¹³⁰⁸ Two Judgements recently rendered by German courts took the view that genocide could be perpetrated within a limited geographical area. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, in the *Nikola Jorgić* case, upheld the Judgement of the Düsseldorf Supreme Court,¹³⁰⁹ interpreting the intent to destroy the group “in part” as including the intention to destroy a group within a limited geographical area.¹³¹⁰ In a Judgement against Novislav Djajić on 23 May 1997, the Bavarian

¹³⁰⁴ *Application of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Order on further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports (1993), pp. 325- 795.

¹³⁰⁵ Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, ICJ Reports (1993), p. 431.

¹³⁰⁶ There are varying estimates as to the number of victims. The Israeli commission of inquiry put the number of victims at 800. However, according to the ICRC, no less than 2,400 people were massacred. The massacre was perpetrated over two days, on 16 and 17 September 1982.

¹³⁰⁷ UN Doc. AG/Res.37/123D (16 December 1982), para. 2. It should however be noted that the resolution was not adopted unanimously, notably, the paragraph characterising the massacre as an act of genocide was approved by 98 votes to 19, with 23 abstentions. See UN Doc. A/37/PV.108, para. 151.

¹³⁰⁸ *Jelisić* Judgement, para. 83.

¹³⁰⁹ Düsseldorf Supreme Court, *Nikola Jorgić* case, 30 April 1999, 3StR 215/98.

¹³¹⁰ Federal Constitutional Court, 2BvR 1290/99, 12 December 2000, par. 23: “The courts also do not go beyond the possible meaning of the text by accepting that the intent to destroy may relate to a geographically limited part of the group. There is support for that interpretation in the fact that STGB para. 220a [the national law integrating the Convention] penalises the intent to destroy partially as well as entirely”.

Appeals Chamber similarly found that acts of genocide were committed in June 1992 though confined within the administrative district of Foča.¹³¹¹

590. The Trial Chamber is thus left with a margin of discretion in assessing what is destruction “in part” of the group. But it must exercise its discretionary power in a spirit consonant with the object and purpose of the Convention which is to criminalise specified conduct directed against the existence of protected *groups*, as such. The Trial Chamber is therefore of the opinion that the intent to destroy a group, even if only in part, means seeking to destroy a distinct part of the group as opposed to an accumulation of isolated individuals within it. Although the perpetrators of genocide need not seek to destroy the entire group protected by the Convention, they must view the part of the group they wish to destroy as a distinct entity which must be eliminated as such. A campaign resulting in the killings, in different places spread over a broad geographical area, of a finite number of members of a protected group might not thus qualify as genocide, despite the high total number of casualties, because it would not show an intent by the perpetrators to target the very existence of the group as such. Conversely, the killing of all members of the part of a group located within a small geographical area, although resulting in a lesser number of victims, would qualify as genocide if carried out with the intent to destroy the part of the group as such located in this small geographical area. Indeed, the physical destruction may target only a part of the geographically limited part of the larger group because the perpetrators of the genocide regard the intended destruction as sufficient to annihilate the group as a distinct entity in the geographic area at issue. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind the total context in which the physical destruction is carried out.

591. The parties have presented opposing views as to whether the killings of Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica were carried out with intent to destroy a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group. It should be recalled that the Prosecution at different times has proposed different definitions of the group in the context of the charge of genocide. In the Indictment, as in the submission of the Defence, the Prosecution referred to the group of the Bosnian Muslims, while in the final brief and arguments it defined the group as the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica or the Bosnian Muslims of Eastern Bosnia. The Trial Chamber has previously indicated that the protected group, under Article 4 of the Statute, should be defined as the Bosnian Muslims.

592. The Prosecution first argues that “causing at least 7,475 deaths of mainly Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica, the destruction of this part of the group, which numbered in total approximately

¹³¹¹ Bavarian Appeals Court, *Novislav Djaji* case, 23 May 1997, 3 St 20/96, section VI, p. 24 of the English translation.

38,000 to 42,000 prior to the fall”,¹³¹² constitutes a substantial part of the group not only because it targeted a numerically high number of victims, but also because the victims represented a significant part of the group. It was common knowledge that the Bosnian Muslims of Eastern Bosnia constituted a patriarchal society in which men had more education, training and provided material support to their family. The Prosecution claims that the VRS troops were fully cognisant that by killing all the military aged men, they would profoundly disrupt the bedrock social and cultural foundations of the group. The Prosecution adds that the mass executions of the military aged men must be viewed in the context of what occurred to the remainder of the Srebrenica group. The offensive against the safe area aimed to ethnically cleanse the Bosnian Muslims¹³¹³ and progressively culminated in the murder of the Bosnian Muslim men as well as the evacuation of the women, children and elderly.¹³¹⁴ In the Prosecution’s view, the end result was purposeful, as shown by the longstanding plan of Republika Sprska to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims from the area. Specifically, Radovan Karadzic, in Directive 7 of 7 March 1995,¹³¹⁵ ordered the Drina Corps to “?...g create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and @epa”.¹³¹⁶ General Krstic and his superiors also manifested genocidal intent by using inflammatory rhetoric and racist statements that presented the VRS as defending the Serbian people from a threat of genocide posed by “Ustasha-Muslim hords”.¹³¹⁷ According to the Prosecution, “by killing the leaders and defenders of the group and deporting the remainder of it, the VRS and General Krstic had assured that the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica and its surrounds would not return to Srebrenica nor would it reconstitute itself in that region or indeed, anywhere else”.¹³¹⁸ The Prosecution points us to the terrible impact the events of 11-16 July had upon the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica : “what remains of the Srebrenica community survives in many cases only in the biological sense, nothing more. It’s a community in despair; it’s a community clinging to memories; it’s a community that is lacking leadership; it’s a community that’s a shadow of what it once was”.¹³¹⁹ The Prosecution concludes that “the defendant’s crimes have not only resulted in the death of thousands men and boys, but have destroyed the Srebrenica Muslim community”.¹³²⁰

593. The Defence argues in rejoinder that, “although the desire to condemn the acts of the Bosnian Serb Army at Srebrenica in the most pejorative terms is understandably strong”, these acts

¹³¹² Prosecutor’s final Trial Brief, para. 412.

¹³¹³ Prosecutor’s final Trial Brief, para. 420.

¹³¹⁴ Prosecutor’s final Trial Brief, para. 423.

¹³¹⁵ P425.

¹³¹⁶ cited in the Prosecutor’s final Trial Brief, para. 425.

¹³¹⁷ P750, cited in the Prosecutor’s final Trial Brief, para. 416.

¹³¹⁸ Prosecutor’s final Trial Brief, para. 438.

¹³¹⁹ T. 10004-10005.

¹³²⁰ Closing arguments, T. 10009.

do not fall under the legal definition of genocide because it was not proven that they were committed with the intent to destroy the group as an entity.¹³²¹ First, the killing of up to 7,500 members of a group, the Bosnian Muslims, that numbers about 1,4 million people, does not evidence an intent to destroy a “substantial” part of the group. To the Defence, the 7,500 dead are not even substantial when compared to the 40,000 Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica.¹³²² The Defence also points to the fact that the VRS forces did not kill the women, children and elderly gathered at Poto-ari but transported them safely to Kladanj, as opposed to all other genocides in modern history, which have indiscriminately targeted men, women and children.¹³²³ The Defence counters the Prosecution’s submission that the murder of all the military aged men would constitute a selective genocide, as the VRS knew that their death would inevitably result in the destruction of the Muslim community of Srebrenica as such.¹³²⁴ According to the Defence, had the VRS actually intended to destroy the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica, it would have killed all the women and children, who were powerless and already under its control, rather than undertaking the time and manpower consuming task of searching out and eliminating the men of the column.¹³²⁵ The Defence rejects the notion that the transfer of the women, children and elderly can be viewed cynically as a public relations cover-up for the planned execution of the men. First, it says the decision to transfer the women, children and elderly was taken on 11 July, *i.e.* before the VRS decided to kill all the military aged men. Further, the Defence points out, by the time the evacuation started, the world community was already aware of, and outraged by, the humanitarian crisis caused by the VRS in Srebrenica, and the VRS was not concerned with covering up its true intentions.¹³²⁶ The Defence also argues that the VRS would have killed the Bosnian Muslims in @epa, a neighbouring enclave, as well, if its intent was to kill the Bosnian Muslims as a group.¹³²⁷ Furthermore, the Defence claims that none of the military expert witnesses “could attribute the killings to any overall plan to destroy the Bosnian Muslims as a group”.¹³²⁸ To the Defence, a true genocide is almost invariably preceded by propaganda that calls for killings of the targeted group and nothing similar occurred in the present case. Inflammatory public statements made by one group against another – short of calling for killings - are common practice in any war and cannot be taken as evidence of genocidal intent.¹³²⁹ The Defence argues that, despite the unprecedented access to confidential material obtained by the Prosecution, none of the documents submitted, not even the intercepted conversations of VRS Army officers involved in the Srebrenica campaign,

¹³²¹ Final Submissions of the Accused, para. 131.

¹³²² Closing arguments, T. 10113.

¹³²³ Final Submissions of the Accused, para. 133.

¹³²⁴ Closing arguments, T. 10118.

¹³²⁵ Closing arguments, T. 10118.

¹³²⁶ Closing arguments, T. 10118-10119.

¹³²⁷ Final Submissions of the Accused, paras. 141-145.

¹³²⁸ Final Submissions of the Accused, para. 156.

show an intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims as a group.¹³³⁰ The Defence contends that the facts instead prove that the VRS forces intended to kill solely all potential fighters in order to eliminate any future military threat. The wounded men were spared.¹³³¹ More significantly, 3,000 members of the column were let through after a general truce was concluded between the warring parties.¹³³² The Defence concludes that the killings were committed by a small group of individuals within a short period of time as a retaliation for failure to meet General Mladić's demand of surrender to the VRS of the BiH Army units in the Srebrenica area. The Defence recognises that "the consequences of the killings of 7,500 people on those who survived are undoubtedly terrible". However, it argues that these consequences would remain the same, regardless of the intent underlying the killings and thus "do not contribute to deciding and determining what the true intent of the killing was".¹³³³ The Defence concludes that "there is no proof and evidence upon which this Trial Chamber could conclude beyond all reasonable doubt that the killings were carried out with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Bosnian Muslims as an ethnic group".¹³³⁴

594. The Trial Chamber concludes from the evidence that the VRS forces sought to eliminate all of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica as a community. Within a period of no more than seven days, as many as 7,000- 8,000 men of military age were systematically massacred while the remainder of the Bosnian Muslim population present at Srebrenica, some 25,000 people, were forcibly transferred to Kladanj. The Trial Chamber previously described how the VRS attempted to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military age, regardless of their civilian or military status; wounded men were spared only because of the presence of UNPROFOR and the portion of the column that managed to get through to government-held territory owed its survival to the fact that the VRS lacked the military resources to capture them.

595. Granted, only the men of military age were systematically massacred, but it is significant that these massacres occurred at a time when the forcible transfer of the rest of the Bosnian Muslim population was well under way. The Bosnian Serb forces could not have failed to know, by the time they decided to kill all the men, that this selective destruction of the group would have a lasting impact upon the entire group. Their death precluded any effective attempt by the Bosnian Muslims to recapture the territory. Furthermore, the Bosnian Serb forces had to be aware of the catastrophic impact that the disappearance of two or three generations of men would have on the

¹³²⁹ Final Submissions of the Accused, para. 161, Closing arguments, T. 10129.

¹³³⁰ Final Submissions of the Accused, para. 157, 166.

¹³³¹ Closing arguments, T. 10120.

¹³³² Final Submissions of the Accused, paras. 146-147.

¹³³³ Closing arguments, T. 10139.

¹³³⁴ Closing arguments, T. 10140.

survival of a traditionally patriarchal society, an impact the Chamber has previously described in detail.¹³³⁵ The Bosnian Serb forces knew, by the time they decided to kill all of the military aged men, that the combination of those killings with the forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly would inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica. Intent by the Bosnian Serb forces to target the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica as a group is further evidenced by their destroying homes of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and Poto-ari¹³³⁶ and the principal mosque in Srebrenica soon after the attack.¹³³⁷

596. Finally, there is a strong indication of the intent to destroy the group as such in the concealment of the bodies in mass graves, which were later dug up, the bodies mutilated and reburied in other mass graves located in even more remote areas, thereby preventing any decent burial in accord with religious and ethnic customs and causing terrible distress to the mourning survivors, many of whom have been unable to come to a closure until the death of their men is finally verified.

597. The strategic location of the enclave, situated between two Serb territories, may explain why the Bosnian Serb forces did not limit themselves to expelling the Bosnian Muslim population. By killing all the military aged men, the Bosnian Serb forces effectively destroyed the community of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica as such and eliminated all likelihood that it could ever re-establish itself on that territory.¹³³⁸

598. The Chamber concludes that the intent to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military age in Srebrenica constitutes an intent to destroy in part the Bosnian Muslim group within the meaning of Article 4 and therefore must be qualified as a genocide.

599. The Trial Chamber has thus concluded that the Prosecution has proven beyond all reasonable doubt that genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war were perpetrated against the Bosnian Muslims, at Srebrenica, in July 1995. The Chamber now proceeds to consider the criminal responsibility of General Krsti} for these crimes in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Statute.

¹³³⁵ *Supra*, paras. 90-94.

¹³³⁶ *Supra*, paras. 41, 123, 153.

¹³³⁷ It was eventually turned into a parking lot. P4/4 to P4/6; Ruez, T. 542-543.

¹³³⁸ See Witness Halilovi}, *Supra* para. 94.

H. Criminal Responsibility of General Krsti}

1. Introduction

600. The Prosecution alleges that General Krsti} is criminally responsible for his participation in the crimes charged in the indictment, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute,¹³³⁹ which states that:

A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.

601. The Trial Chambers of the ICTY and the ICTR and the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY have identified the elements of the various heads of individual criminal responsibility in Article 7(1) of the Statute.¹³⁴⁰ The essential findings in the jurisprudence may be briefly summarised as follows:

- "Planning" means that one or more persons design the commission of a crime at both the preparatory and execution phases;¹³⁴¹
- "Instigating" means prompting another to commit an offence;¹³⁴²
- "Ordering" entails a person in a position of authority using that position to convince another to commit an offence;¹³⁴³
- "Committing" covers physically perpetrating a crime or engendering a culpable omission in violation of criminal law;¹³⁴⁴
- "Aiding and abetting" means rendering a substantial contribution to the commission of a crime;¹³⁴⁵ and
- "Joint criminal enterprise" liability is a form of criminal responsibility which the Appeals Chamber found to be implicitly included in Article 7(1) of the Statute. It entails individual responsibility for participation in a joint criminal enterprise to commit a crime;¹³⁴⁶

¹³³⁹ Para. 18 of the Indictment. In its Final Trial Brief (para. 27), the Prosecution makes reference to each head - except "committing" - mentioned in Article 7(1) as well as the "common purpose doctrine" (discussed below) as a basis for General Krsti}'s guilt.

¹³⁴⁰ Cf. Article 6(1) of the Statute of the ICTR. In its Final Trial Brief (para. 3), the Prosecution incorporates by reference its submissions on Article 7 in its Pre-Trial Brief (paras 13-86). Likewise, the Defence's submissions on Article 7 in its Pre-Trial Brief (paras 13-29) are incorporated in its Final Trial Brief (para. 2).

¹³⁴¹ *Akayesu* Judgement, para. 480; *Blaškic* Judgement, para. 279; *Kordic and Cerkez* Judgement, para. 386.

¹³⁴² *Akayesu* Judgement, para. 482; *Blaškic* Judgement, para. 280; *Kordic and Cerkez* Judgement, para. 387.

¹³⁴³ *Akayesu* Judgement, para. 483; *Blaškic* Judgement, para. 281; *Kordic and Cerkez* Judgement, para. 388.

¹³⁴⁴ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 188; *Kunarac et al.* Judgement, para. 390.

¹³⁴⁵ *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, paras. 162-164.

602. Since the Prosecution has not charged any specific head of criminal responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute,¹³⁴⁷ it is within the discretion of the Trial Chamber to convict the Accused under the appropriate head within the limits of the Indictment and fair notice of the charges and insofar as the evidence permits.¹³⁴⁸ As to joint criminal enterprise liability, in its Final Trial Brief the Defence contends that it is not open to the Trial Chamber to apply this doctrine because it has not been pleaded in the Indictment. The Trial Chamber rejects this submission. The Prosecutor's Pre-trial Brief discussed this form of liability, specifically in the context of ethnic cleansing;¹³⁴⁹ the Defence acknowledged this pleading in its Pre-trial Brief and did not object to the concept itself but only to some details of the legal submissions on the matter.¹³⁵⁰ Moreover, the Trial Chamber finds that the "nature and cause of the charge against the accused" pleaded in the indictment contains sufficient references to his responsibility for the alleged crimes committed in concert with others.¹³⁵¹

603. The Prosecution "also, or alternatively" alleges that General Krsti} incurs "command responsibility" for the crimes charged in the Indictment pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute.¹³⁵² Pursuant to this provision:

The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

604. According to the case law,¹³⁵³ the following three conditions must be met before a person can be held responsible for the acts of another person under Article 7(3) of the Statute:

¹³⁴⁶ *Tadic* Appeal Judgement, paras. 185-229. The Appeals Chamber in the *Tadic* Appeal Judgement interchangeably used several other terms, such as "common purpose" liability (*Tadic* Appeal Judgement, para. 220), to denote the same form of participation. For reasons discussed below, the Trial Chamber proposes to apply the label "joint criminal enterprise" throughout this Judgement. Trial Chamber II recently discussed joint criminal enterprise liability in detail in *Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin and Momir Talic*, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, 26 June 2001 (the "*Talic* Decision").

¹³⁴⁷ The Trial Chamber notes in this regard that the Appeals Chamber held that: "Although greater specificity in drafting indictments is desirable, failure to identify expressly the exact mode of participation is not necessarily fatal to an indictment if it nevertheless makes clear to the accused the 'nature and cause of the charge against him'". *Celebici* Appeal Judgement, para. 351.

¹³⁴⁸ *Furundžija* Judgement, para. 189; *Kupreškic* Judgement, para. 746; *Kunarac et al.* Judgement, para. 388.

¹³⁴⁹ Prosecutor's Pre-trial Brief, paras. 21-27. The Prosecution refers to joint criminal enterprise liability as "co-perpetration"; the Appeals Chamber has in fact employed this term in this sense (*Tadic* Appeal Judgement, paras. 196, 228; *Furundžija* Appeal Judgement, para. 118). The Prosecution further considers "co-perpetration" to be a form of "committing".

¹³⁵⁰ Defence's Pre-trial Brief, paras. 18-19. See also para. 21 of the Prosecutor's Pre-trial Brief annexed to the Prosecutor's Submission of Agreed Matters of Law Presented During the Pre-trial Conference of 7 March 2000, dated 8 March 2000. On the Defence's objection to the joint criminal enterprise doctrine, see para. ?? *supra*.

¹³⁵¹ See Indictment, e.g., paras. 6-11.

¹³⁵² Para. 19 of the Indictment.

¹³⁵³ See, e.g., *Blaškic* Judgement, para. 294; *Kunarac et al.* Judgement, para. 395.

- The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
- The superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and
- The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.

605. The facts pertaining to the commission of a crime may establish that the requirements for criminal responsibility under both Article 7(1) and Article 7(3) are met. However, the Trial Chamber adheres to the belief that where a commander participates in the commission of a crime *through his subordinates*, by "planning", "instigating" or "ordering" the commission of the crime, any responsibility under Article 7(3) is subsumed under Article 7(1).¹³⁵⁴ The same applies to the commander who incurs criminal responsibility under the joint criminal enterprise doctrine through the physical acts of his subordinates.

2. The criminal responsibility of General Krsti} for the crimes proved at trial

606. The Trial Chamber will now turn to the criminal responsibility of General Krsti} for the crimes proved at trial. The following discussion distinguishes between two sets of crimes:

- The humanitarian crisis and crimes of terror committed at Potocari and the subsequent forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly; and
- The mass executions of the military-aged Muslim men from Srebrenica.

(a) General Krsti}'s responsibility for the crimes committed at Potocari

607. The Trial Chamber characterises the humanitarian crisis, the crimes of terror and the forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly¹³⁵⁵ at Poto-ari as constituting crimes against humanity, that is, persecution¹³⁵⁶ and inhumane acts.¹³⁵⁷

608. The evidence establishes that General Krsti}, along with others, played a significant role in the organisation of the transportation of the civilians from Potocari. Specifically, the Trial Chamber has concluded that, on 12 July, General Krsti} ordered the procurement of buses and their subsequent departure carrying the civilians from Potocari. At some later stage, he personally

¹³⁵⁴ Likewise, *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Judgement, para. 223; *Blaškic* Judgement, para. 337.

¹³⁵⁵ Paras. 38-51, 337.

¹³⁵⁶ Murder, cruel and inhumane treatment (including terrorisation, destruction of personal property and forcible transfer) - count 6.

¹³⁵⁷ Forcible transfer - count 8.

inquired about the number of buses already en route. The Trial Chamber has also found that General Krsti} ordered the securing of the road from Luke to Kladanj up to the tunnel where the people on the buses were to disembark. It has further been established that General Krsti} knew that this was a forcible, not a voluntary, transfer.¹³⁵⁸

609. The Trial Chamber has similarly concluded that General Krsti} was fully aware of the ongoing humanitarian crisis at Potocari as a result of his presence at the hotel Fontana meeting, on 11 July at 2300 hours, where General Mladi} and Colonel Karremans of Dutchbat discussed the urgency of the situation, and, at the meeting on 12 July, when General Mladi} decided that the VRS would organise the evacuation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly. Following this meeting, General Krsti} was present himself at Potocari, for one to two hours, thus he could not help but be aware of the piteous conditions of the civilians and their mistreatment by VRS soldiers on that day.¹³⁵⁹

610. In light of these facts, the Trial Chamber is of the view that the issue of General Krsti}'s criminal responsibility for the crimes against the civilian population of Srebrenica occurring at Potocari is most appropriately determined under Article 7(1) by considering whether he participated, along with General Mladi} and key members of the VRS Main Staff and the Drina Corps, in a joint criminal enterprise to forcibly "cleanse" the Srebrenica enclave of its Muslim population and to ensure that they left the territory otherwise occupied by Serbian forces.

611. According to the Appeals Chamber in the *Tadi}* Appeal Judgement, for joint criminal enterprise liability to arise, three *actus reus* elements require proof:¹³⁶⁰

- (i) A plurality of persons;
- (ii) The existence of a common plan, which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute; the Appeals Chamber specified that¹³⁶¹

There is no necessity for this plan, design or purpose to have been previously arranged or formulated. The common plan or purpose may materialise extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons acts in unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise.

- (iii) Participation of the accused in the execution of the common plan,¹³⁶² otherwise formulated as the accused's "membership" in a particular joint criminal enterprise.¹³⁶³

¹³⁵⁸ *Supra* paras. 340, 344.

¹³⁵⁹ *Supra* paras. 340, 354.

¹³⁶⁰ *Tadi}* Appeal Judgement, para. 227.

¹³⁶¹ *Tadi}* Appeal Judgement, para. 227(ii). The Appeals Chamber reaffirmed this statement in the *Furundžija* Appeal Judgement, para. 119.

612. The facts described in the preceding paragraphs compel the inference that the political and/or military leadership of the VRS formulated a plan to permanently remove the Bosnian Muslim population from Srebrenica, following the take-over of the enclave. From 11 through 13 July, this plan of what is colloquially referred to as "ethnic cleansing" was realised mainly through the forcible transfer of the bulk of the civilian population out of Potocari, once the military aged men had been separated from the rest of the population. General Krsti} was a key participant in the forcible transfer, working in close co-operation with other military officials of the VRS Main Staff and the Drina Corps.¹³⁶⁴ The *actus reus* requirements for joint criminal enterprise liability therefore have been met.

613. In defining the intent requirement, or *mens rea*, of joint criminal enterprise liability, the Appeals Chamber has distinguished between crimes committed in the execution of the agreed upon objectives of the criminal enterprise and crimes upon which the participants had not agreed but which were a natural and foreseeable consequence of the plan.¹³⁶⁵ In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes that Trial Chamber II interpreted the relevant portion of the *Tadi}* Appeal Judgement as follows:¹³⁶⁶

The state of mind of the accused to be established by the prosecution accordingly differs according to whether the crime charged:

- (a) was within the object of the joint criminal enterprise, or
- (b) went beyond the object of that enterprise, but was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of that enterprise.

If the crime charged fell *within* the object of the joint criminal enterprise, the prosecution must establish that the accused shared with the person who personally perpetrated the crime the state of mind required for that crime. If the crime charged went *beyond* the object of the joint criminal enterprise, the prosecution needs to establish only that the accused was aware that the further crime was a possible consequence in the execution of that enterprise and that, with that awareness, he participated in that enterprise.

¹³⁶² The Prosecution submits that it is not required that each participant fulfils different elements of the *actus reus* of the crime; it suffices that each participant makes an essential contribution to the execution of the crime (Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief, para. 23). In this respect, the Defence formulates its reservation to the joint criminal enterprise doctrine as follows: "it is necessary [...] to specify among the *actus rei* each individual act committed by each perpetrator." (Defence's Pre-Trial Brief, para. 18).

¹³⁶³ *Talic* Decision, para. 43.

¹³⁶⁴ *Supra* para. 344.

¹³⁶⁵ *Tadic* Appeal Judgement, para. 228.

¹³⁶⁶ *Talic* Decision, para. 31 (emphasis in original). Since members of the joint criminal enterprise may incur liability for crimes committed by other members which fall *outside the object of the common plan*, the Trial Chamber agrees that the doctrine is best referred to as "joint criminal enterprise", rather than "common purpose" liability (*Talic* Decision, para. 37). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in regard to responsibility for a crime falling outside the object of the joint enterprise, the *Talic* Decision explains that the requirement that such a crime be a "natural and foreseeable" consequence of the execution of the enterprise, "is an *objective* element of the crime, and does not depend upon the state of mind on the part of the accused". The requirement that the accused was aware that the commission of such a crime was a possible consequence of the execution of the enterprise, "is the *subjective* state of mind on the part of the accused which the prosecution must establish." *Talic* decision, para. 30 (emphasis in original).

614. In order to determine whether General Krsti} had the requisite *mens rea* for responsibility to arise under the joint criminal enterprise doctrine, the Trial Chamber must determine which crimes fell within and which fell outside the agreed object of the joint criminal enterprise to ethnically cleanse the Srebrenica enclave.

615. The object of the joint criminal enterprise implemented at Potocari on 12 and 13 July was firstly the forcible transfer of the Muslim civilians out of Srebrenica. That General Krsti} had the intent for this crime is indisputably evidenced by his extensive participation in it. Furthermore, the humanitarian crisis that prevailed at Potocari was so closely connected to, and so instrumental in, the forcible evacuation of the civilians that it cannot but also have fallen within the object of the criminal enterprise. When General Krsti} marched triumphantly into Srebrenica alongside General Mladi} on 11 July, he saw the town completely empty and soon found out, at least by the evening, that a huge number of the inhabitants had fled to Potocari and were crowded together in the UN compound and surrounding buildings. Although, by his own claim, he was the organiser of the military operation on Srebrenica, he had taken no action to provide food or water, nor to guarantee the security of the civilians inhabitants of the town. The Trial Chamber finds that General Krsti} subscribed to the creation of a humanitarian crisis as a prelude to the forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslim civilians. This is the only plausible inference that can be drawn from his active participation in the holding and transfer operation at Potocari and from his total declination to attempt any effort to alleviate that crisis despite his on the scene presence.

616. The Trial Chamber is not, however, convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the murders, rapes, beatings and abuses committed against the refugees at Potocari were also an agreed upon objective among the members of the joint criminal enterprise. However, there is no doubt that these crimes were natural and foreseeable consequences of the ethnic cleansing campaign. Furthermore, given the circumstances at the time the plan was formed, General Krsti} must have been aware that an outbreak of these crimes would be inevitable given the lack of shelter, the density of the crowds, the vulnerable condition of the refugees, the presence of many regular and irregular military and paramilitary units in the area and the sheer lack of sufficient numbers of UN soldiers to provide protection. In fact, on 12 July, the VRS organised and implemented the transportation of the women, children and elderly outside the enclave; General Krsti} was himself on the scene and exposed to firsthand knowledge that the refugees were being mistreated by VRS or other armed forces.

617. In sum, the Trial Chamber finds General Krsti} guilty as a member of a joint criminal enterprise whose objective was to forcibly transfer the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Potocari on 12 and 13 July and to create a humanitarian crisis in support of this

endeavour by causing the Srebrenica residents to flee to Potocari where a total lack of food, shelter and necessary services would accelerate their fear and panic and ultimately their willingness to leave the territory. General Krsti} thus incurs liability also for the incidental murders, rapes, beatings and abuses committed in the execution of this criminal enterprise at Potocari.

618. Finally, General Krsti} knew that these crimes were related to a widespread or systematic attack directed against the Bosnian Muslim civilian population of Srebrenica; his participation in them is undeniable evidence of his intent to discriminate against the Bosnian Muslims. General Krsti} is therefore liable of inhumane acts¹³⁶⁷ and persecution¹³⁶⁸ as crimes against humanity.

(b) General Krsti}'s criminal responsibility for the killing of the military-aged Muslim men from Srebrenica

619. The Trial Chamber has made findings that, as of 13 July, the plan to ethnically cleanse the area of Srebrenica escalated to a far more insidious level that included killing all of the military-aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica. A transfer of the men after screening for war criminals - the purported reason for their separation from the women, children and elderly at Potocari - to Bosnian Muslim held territory or to prisons to await a prisoner exchange was at some point considered an inadequate mode for assuring the ethnic cleansing of Srebrenica. Killing the men, in addition to forcibly transferring the women, children and elderly, became the object of the newly elevated joint criminal enterprise of General Mladi} and VRS Main Staff personnel. The Trial Chamber concluded that this campaign to kill all the military aged men was conducted to guarantee that the Bosnian Muslim population would be permanently eradicated from Srebrenica and therefore constituted genocide.

620. The issue that remains to determine is whether General Krsti} was a member of the escalated joint criminal enterprise to kill the military-aged men and whether he thus incurred responsibility for genocide, including the causing of serious bodily and mental harm to the few men surviving the massacres. In this respect, the Trial Chamber will discuss the relationship between Article 7(1) and Article 4(3), and between "genocide" in Article 4(3)(a)¹³⁶⁹ and the alternative allegation of "complicity in genocide" in Article 4(3)(e).¹³⁷⁰ The Trial Chamber further will determine whether General Krsti} also incurs responsibility for the other crimes constituted by the killings, that is, persecutions,¹³⁷¹ extermination¹³⁷² and murder¹³⁷³ as crimes against humanity, and

¹³⁶⁷ Forcible transfer - count 8.

¹³⁶⁸ Murder, and cruel and inhumane treatment (including terrorisation, destruction of personal property and forcible transfer) - count 6.

¹³⁶⁹ Count 1 of the Indictment.

¹³⁷⁰ Count 2 of the Indictment.

¹³⁷¹ Count 6 of the Indictment.

murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war.¹³⁷⁴ Lastly, the Trial Chamber will consider whether the evidence suggests that General Krsti} incurs command responsibility for the crimes alleged under Article 7(3).

(i) Participation in the genocidal joint criminal enterprise to kill the military-aged men

621. The Trial Chamber has concluded that General Krsti} was involved in organising the buses for the transportation of the women, children and elderly from Potocari throughout 12 July. He personally saw that the military-aged men were being segregated at Potocari and that they were being detained at the White House in sordid conditions. He must have observed, further, that contrary to General Mladi}'s statement at the Hotel Fontana meeting, no genuine efforts were taking place to screen the men for war criminals. General Krsti} knew, also on 12 July, that the buses exiting from Potocari were being stopped at Tiš}a where any men who had managed to get aboard were pulled off and taken to detention sites.¹³⁷⁵ On 13 July, when he was preparing the military operation at Žepa which commenced the next day, General Krsti} found out that thousands of Srebrenica men fleeing in the column through the woods toward Tuzla had been captured on the territory of the Drina Corps. As the then Corps' Chief of Staff, "the primary co-ordinator of the Corps' activities",¹³⁷⁶ General Krsti} must have been aware that no adequate measures were being taken to provide for shelter, food, water and medical care for several thousand captured men and that no arrangements or negotiations were ongoing for their prisoner-of-war exchange.¹³⁷⁷

622. On that basis alone, the Trial Chamber must conclude that, by the evening of 13 July at the latest, General Krsti} knew that the Muslim men were being executed at a number of separate sites and that none had been allowed to enter government held territory along with the women, children and elderly. General Krsti} could only surmise that the original objective of ethnic cleansing by forcible transfer had turned into a lethal plan to destroy the male population of Srebrenica once and for all.

¹³⁷² Count 3 of the Indictment.

¹³⁷³ Count 4 of the Indictment.

¹³⁷⁴ Count 5 of the Indictment.

¹³⁷⁵ *Supra*, para. 470.

¹³⁷⁶ Richard Butler, VRS Corps Command Responsibility Report, Section Two, para. 2.6 (P401). In his Report, Prosecution military expert Mr Butler refers to, amongst others, para. 66 of the JNA Rules for Land Forces Corps (Provisional) (P402/4) and Article 11 of the JNA Regulations on the Responsibilities of the Land Army Corps Command in Peacetime (P402/10). On the applicability of these instruments of the former Yugoslav National Army to the Army of Republika Srpska, see *Infra*. On the responsibilities of the VRS Corps Chief of Staff, see also the testimony of Prosecution military expert General Dannatt, T. 5578.

¹³⁷⁷ *Supra* paras. 363-379, 465-472.

623. In terms of General Krsti}’s participation in the killing plan, the evidence has established that, from 14 July onwards, Drina Corps troops took part in killing episodes. The facts in relation to the Drina Corps’ participation at each site may be summarised as follows:

- Zvornik Brigade units scouted for sites at Orahovac presumably to be used for detention and execution on 13 and 14 July;¹³⁷⁸ furthermore, Zvornik Brigade personnel were present at Orahovac immediately prior to, and during the killings; Zvornik Brigade military equipment was engaged in tasks relating to the burial of the victims from Orahovac between 14 and 16 July;¹³⁷⁹
- Drivers and trucks from the 6th Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade were used to transport the prisoners from the detention site at Petkovci Dam to the execution sites on 15 July; the Zvornik Brigade Engineer Company was assigned to work with earthmoving equipment to assist with the burial of the victims from Petkovci Dam;¹³⁸⁰
- Members of the Bratunac Brigade assisted in the killings on the site of the Branjevo Farm on 16 July; Drina Corps military police were engaged in guarding the Muslim prisoners in the buses that took them from several detention places to the Farm and Zvornik Brigade equipment was engaged in activities relating to the burial of the victims; Colonel Popovi}, the Drina Corps’ Assistant Commander for Security, was involved in organising fuel to transport the Muslim prisoners to the execution sites at Branjevo Farm and the allocation of fuel was co-ordinated through the Drina Corps Command;¹³⁸¹
- The Bratunac Brigade assisted with the executions that took place at the Pilica Cultural Dom on 16 July;¹³⁸² and
- Zvornik Brigade engineering work on 16 July was traced to the burial of bodies in the Kozluk grave.¹³⁸³

624. Thus, the Drina Corps rendered tangible and substantial assistance and technical support to the detention, killing and burial at these several sites between 14 and 16 July. The need for their involvement was unavoidable because the Main Staff had limited assets and resources of its own and had to utilise the Drina Corps resources and expertise for complicated operations like these detentions, executions and burials on Drina Corps territory.¹³⁸⁴ It is inconceivable that the

¹³⁷⁸ *Supra* paras. 220-225.

¹³⁷⁹ *Supra* para. 449.

¹³⁸⁰ *Supra* para. 450.

¹³⁸¹ *Supra* para. 451.

¹³⁸² *Supra* para. 452.

¹³⁸³ *Supra* para. 453.

¹³⁸⁴ *Supra* para. 266.

involvement of Drina Corps troops and equipment could take place without some - even if hasty - degree of planning which, moreover, required the involvement of the top levels of command.

625. The evidence shows that, following the capture of Srebrenica, the Drina Corps Command continued to exercise regular command competencies over its subordinate troops. The Corps' ordinary chain of command was not suspended as a result of the direct involvement of the Main Staff or the security organs in certain aspects of the Srebrenica follow up operation. The Trial Chamber has further held that General Krstić became the *de facto* Corps Commander from the evening of 13 July onwards and *de jure* Corps Commander from 15 July onwards.¹³⁸⁵

626. Three military experts submitted reports and testified before the Trial Chamber on the responsibilities and authorities of the Commander of the Drina Corps in July 1995. The Prosecution called its in-house expert Richard Butler, as well as Major General F.R. Dannatt of the British Army.¹³⁸⁶ Professor Dr R. Radinovic, a retired General in the JNA, provided expert evidence for the Defence.¹³⁸⁷

627. The experts based their opinions on certain military regulations which the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) adopted from the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA),¹³⁸⁸ as well as Republika Srpska legislation. These instruments define the responsibilities and corresponding authorities of VRS Corps Commanders.

628. According to Article 65 of the JNA Rules for Land Forces Corps (Provisional), the VRS Corps Commander:

bears the responsibility for the accomplishment of a mission. He takes decisions, gives assignments to his subordinates, organises co-ordination and co-operation, and controls the implementation of decisions.

The Commander accomplishes this through the exercise of "command and control", which Article 63 of the JNA Rules for Land Forces Corps (Provisional) defines as:

conscious and organised activities of the Commander of the Corps and the bodies of command, aimed at engaging and unifying the actions and activities of all units, commands, headquarters and other entities of All People's Defence and social self-protection in the zone of operation, as well as equipment used in combat, for the purpose of achieving the set goals in the optimal way.

Article 6 of the JNA Regulations on the Responsibilities of the Land Army Corps Command in Peacetime further provides that:

¹³⁸⁵ *Supra* para. 330.

¹³⁸⁶ Butler Report; Statement of Major General F.R. Dannatt, Military Expert (P385A).

¹³⁸⁷ Prof. Dr. Radovan Radinovic, Retired General, Military Expert Testimony of Srebrenica (D160).

¹³⁸⁸ The Trial Chamber accepts that these JNA documents were the regulatory foundation of the VRS; it understands this to be the position of General Radinovic. See Butler Report, para. 1.4; Radinovic, T. 7997-7998.

The right to command units and institutions of [the Corps] is under the exclusive responsibility of the Commander. Units and institutions outside the Corps' organic compound, those temporarily subordinated, are commanded and controlled by the Commander only within the limits of stipulated authorities.

According to General Krsti} himself, the principle of "command and control" is "fundamental not only to military operations but also to the work of the commands and staffs in control and command of units".¹³⁸⁹ General Krsti} testified that he was well-versed in this principle and experienced in its execution.¹³⁹⁰ Furthermore, although General Radinovic contested that the Instructions on How the 4th Corps Command is to Operate When Carrying out Priority Assignments in Peacetime and Wartime apply to the VRS Drina Corps,¹³⁹¹ he agreed with the following portion of the Butler Report which quotes from these Instructions:¹³⁹²

[The Corps Commander] is personally, directly and legally empowered to 'lead the operations of the Corps Command, assign tasks to his subordinate officers, ensure that they are carried out, and bear full responsibility for their completion.'

629. The military regulations confer the widest powers on the Corps Commander in order to enable him to carry out his command responsibilities. According to Article 173 of the RS Law on the Army,¹³⁹³ command in the army is based on:

the principles of a unified command regarding the use of forces and means, single authority, obligations to enforce decisions, command and orders issued by superior officers.

Article 4 of the RS Law on the Army defines a "Superior Officer" as:

a person in command of a military unit or a person managing a military institution [...], and in command of personnel serving in the military unit or institution, in compliance with the law and other regulations issued by the competent body.

The concept of "Superior Officer" is further defined in the Interim Provisions on the Service in the Army of the Serb Republic.¹³⁹⁴ Paragraph 17 of these Provisions provides that:

Members of the Army shall carry out the orders of their superiors without demur, in full, accurately and punctually.

630. These sources show indisputably that as Commander of the Drina Corps, General Krsti} had extensive formal powers over the assets and troops of the Drina Corps.¹³⁹⁵ The trial record

¹³⁸⁹ Krsti}, T. 6341.

¹³⁹⁰ Krsti}, T. 6342.

¹³⁹¹ Radinovic, T. 7809, 7999. P402/7 contains The Instructions on How the 4th Corps Command is to Operate When Carrying out Priority Assignments in Peacetime and Wartime.

¹³⁹² Butler Report, para. 2.0, referring to page 14 of the Instructions on How the 4th Corps Command is to Operate When Carrying out Priority Assignments in Peacetime and Wartime; Radinovic, T. 8011.

¹³⁹³ P142/40.

¹³⁹⁴ Signed into effect by the President of Republika Srpska on 18 August 1992. P142/24.

¹³⁹⁵ See Radinovic Report, Chapter III, para. 3.7. General Radinovic testified that "the [...] Corps Commander [...] does not share his command responsibility with anybody at all." (T. 8019). Mr Butler testified that "[the Commander] is

confirms that General Krsti} exercised many of these powers from the evening of 13 July on - in matters affecting the entire Drina Corps, not just the Žepa operation - once General Mladi} had appointed him as Commander:¹³⁹⁶

- On the evening of 13 July, General Krsti} signed a search order as “Commander”, which the Trial Chamber accepts to mean “Commander of the Drina Corps”, as opposed to “Commander of the Žepa operation”;¹³⁹⁷
- Witness II stated that “at Žepa [i.e. from 14 July]...everybody addressed General Krsti} as Commander, meaning Corps Commander”;¹³⁹⁸
- A Radio intercept, at 2236 hours on 14 July, between “Malinic” (the commander of the Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment) and an unidentified individual contains a statement by the latter that:¹³⁹⁹

he [Krsti}] [will] look into it, and will assign someone to co-ordinate it [...] I’m up to speed...Živanovi} told me. Well, in short, now I have told Krle about that, about what should/be/done. I suggested what he should do, so he’ll do something...

- The authority of General Živanovi} - the outgoing Corps Commander - is seen to be fast fading away. Although he exercised a few command functions on 14 July, in an intercept at 0935 hours on that day, General Živanovi} disclosed that he was slowly “packing his backpack” and that “they” (presumably the Main Staff) had already asked him to go somewhere else.¹⁴⁰⁰

631. The Trial Chamber concludes that from the evening of 13 July, General Krsti} exercised “effective control” over Drina Corps troops and assets throughout the territory on which the detentions, executions and burials were taking place. The Trial Chamber finds furthermore that from that time onwards, General Krsti} participated in the full scope of the criminal plan to kill the Bosnian Muslim men originated earlier by General Mladi} and other VRS officers. In fact, by 13 July - when the mass killings started - General Krsti} had already organised the military attack on

legally empowered with the authorities and the responsibilities to command and direct the activities of his, in this case, corps.” (T. 4754-4755). See also Dannatt Report, para. 26. The evidence does not establish that the 10th Sabotage Detachment and the MUP were re-subordinated to the Drina Corps, however, and General Krsti}'s formal powers therefore did not extend to these troops (*supra* paras. 278-290).

¹³⁹⁶ *Supra*, para. 312.

¹³⁹⁷ *Supra*, para. 318.

¹³⁹⁸ *Supra*, para. 312.

¹³⁹⁹ *Supra*, para. 322.

¹⁴⁰⁰ *Supra*, para. 322.

Žepa and as Drina Corps Chief of Staff and Commander-to-be¹⁴⁰¹ he had to make provision for Drina Corps resources to be applied in the clean-up activities following the fall of Srebrenica. On 14 July, while some of his Drina Corps troops were participating in the @epa operation, other troops under his effective control were engaged in capturing and assisting in the execution of Muslim men from Srebrenica.

632. On 15 July, General Krsti}’s participation in the killing plan reached an aggressive apex. According to an interchange intercepted early that day, Colonel Beara - a Main Staff officer whom General Krsti} himself identifies as personally engaged in supervising the killings - requests General Živanovi} to arrange for more men to be sent to him. General Živanovi} states he can not “arrange for that anymore” and refers Colonel Beara to General Krsti}.¹⁴⁰² Colonel Beara subsequently urgently requests General Krsti}’s assistance in the “distribution of 3,500 parcels”, a code term repeatedly used in military communications to signify captured Bosnian Muslim men that are slated to be killed. General Krsti} suggests that Colonel Beara solicit help from several units, including the Bratunac and Milici Brigades in the Drina Corps, and the MUP. Colonel Beara replies that these units were not available, saying: “I don’t know what to do. I mean it, Krle”. The intercept strongly implies that when the MUP troops declined to carry out the killings, General Krsti} agreed to fill the breach, stating: “I’ll see what I can do”.¹⁴⁰³ General Krsti} arranged for Bratunac Brigade members to assist in the killings at the Branjevo Farm and the Pilica Dom the next day.¹⁴⁰⁴

633. The Trial Chamber concludes beyond reasonable doubt that General Krsti} participated in a joint criminal enterprise to kill the Bosnian Muslim military-aged men from Srebrenica from the evening of 13 July onward. General Krsti} may not have devised the killing plan, or participated in the initial decision to escalate the objective of the criminal enterprise from forcible transfer to destruction of Srebrenica’s Bosnian Muslim military-aged male community, but there can be no doubt that, from the point he learned of the widespread and systematic killings and became clearly involved in their perpetration, he shared the genocidal intent to kill the men. This cannot be gainsaid given his informed participation in the executions through the use of Drina Corps assets.

634. Finally, the Trial Chamber has concluded that, in terms of the requirement of Article 4(2) of the Statute that an intent to destroy only part of the group must nevertheless concern a substantial part thereof, either numerically or qualitatively, the military aged Bosnian Muslim men of

¹⁴⁰¹ Witness JJ was told by General @ivanovi} that General Mladi} had informed him between 15 and 20 June 1995 that General Krsti} was going to replace him as Corps Commander. General @ivanovi} also told the witness that General Krsti} was anxious to be in command. T. 9683, 9708.

¹⁴⁰² *Supra*, para. 323.

¹⁴⁰³ *Supra*, para. 380.

Srebrenica do in fact constitute a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group, because the killing of these men inevitably and fundamentally would result in the annihilation of the entire Bosnian Muslim community at Srebrenica. In this respect, the intent to kill the men amounted to an intent to destroy a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group. Having already played a key role in the forcible transfer of the Muslim women, children and elderly out of Serb-held territory, General Krsti} undeniably was aware of the fatal impact that the killing of the men would have on the ability of the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica to survive, as such. General Krsti} thus participated in the genocidal acts of "killing members of the group" under Article 4(2)(a) with the intent to destroy a part of the group.

635. The Trial Chamber has further determined that the ordeal inflicted on the men who survived the massacres may appropriately be characterised as a genocidal act causing serious bodily and mental harm to members of the group pursuant to Article 4(2)(b). While the agreed objective of the joint criminal enterprise in which General Krsti} participated was the actual killing of the military aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica, the terrible bodily and mental suffering of the few survivors clearly was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the enterprise. General Krsti} must have been aware of this possibility and he therefore incurs responsibility for these crimes as well.

636. General Krsti} thus incurs responsibility for the killings and causing of serious bodily and mental harm as a co-participant in a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide. However, the Prosecution has alleged alternatively that General Krsti} incurs responsibility for "genocide" under Article 4(2) and 4(3)(a), or for "complicity in genocide" under Article 4(3)(e). This requires a brief discussion as to the relationship between these provisions.

637. The Prosecution's submissions on this matter are limited to the distinction between "genocide" and "complicity in genocide" under Article 4(3). The Prosecution submits that the *mens rea* requirement for both forms of participation entails genocidal intent. The Prosecution further contends that this is not incompatible with the *Akayesu* Judgement of ICTR Trial Chamber I, according to which complicity in genocide is defined to include aiding and abetting the commission of genocidal acts with the knowledge of the principal's genocidal intent even if that intent is not shared. The Prosecution submits that "knowledge" of the genocidal intent accompanied by substantial contribution to the genocidal plan or enterprise amounts to a shared intent.¹⁴⁰⁵

¹⁴⁰⁴ *Supra*, paras. 386 and 401.

¹⁴⁰⁵ Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief, .06-107. During closing argument, the Prosecution submitted that General Krsti} "had the genocidal intent from the beginning, he maintained it throughout, and that complicity for genocide would require

638. The Defence, on the other hand, submits that “Complicity is a form of accomplice liability and exists upon proof that a person planned, instigated or ordered an act or otherwise aided and abetted its performance.”¹⁴⁰⁶ To be liable as an accomplice in genocide, it must be established that the accused rendered a substantial contribution to the commission of the act in the awareness of the principle’s genocidal intent. Thus, according to the Defence, to establish that General Krsti} was an accomplice in genocide, the Prosecution need not prove that he had genocidal intent.¹⁴⁰⁷

639. The Trial Chamber’s view on the relationship between the heads of criminal responsibility in Article 7(1) and Articles 4(3)(a) and (e) is as follows.

640. Article 7(1) entails a general provision on individual criminal responsibility applicable to all crimes in the Statute. Article 4(3) provides for heads of responsibility in relation to genocide only; it is taken *verbatim* from Article III of the Genocide Convention. Article 4(3) provides for a broad range of heads of criminal responsibility, including heads which are not included in Article 7(1), such as “conspiracy to commit genocide” and “attempt to commit genocide”.¹⁴⁰⁸ By incorporating Article 4(3) in the Statute, the drafters of the Statute ensured that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over all forms of participation in genocide prohibited under customary international law.¹⁴⁰⁹ The consequence of this approach, however, is that certain heads of individual criminal responsibility in Article 4(3) overlap with those in Article 7(1).

641. The question whether participation in a joint criminal enterprise under Article 7(1) corresponds to “genocide” or “complicity in genocide”, pursuant to Article 4(3), has not yet been answered in the case law.¹⁴¹⁰

642. In the *Tadi}* Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber referred to “the notion of common design as a form of accomplice liability”,¹⁴¹¹ a phrase upon which Trial Chamber II subsequently

some leaps of faith based principally on General Krsti}’s testimony. We don’t think that the interpretation should be given to the facts in this case that he is culpable of only complicity.” T 10020.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Defence’s Final Trial Brief, para. 123.

¹⁴⁰⁷ Defence’s Final Trial Brief, paras. 124-128.

¹⁴⁰⁸ In this respect, it is noteworthy that the ICC Statute includes a *single* provision on individual criminal responsibility - Article 25 - which is applicable to all crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, including genocide.

¹⁴⁰⁹ The Report of the Secretary-General states that “the [Genocide] Convention is today considered part of international customary law as evidenced by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951.” Report of the Secretary-General, para. 45 (footnote omitted).

¹⁴¹⁰ The Trial Chamber notes that in *Akayesu* and *Musema* ICTR Trial Chamber I pronounced on the elements of “complicity in genocide”. However, the Trial Chamber interpreted “complicity” in accordance with the Rwandan Penal Code, which is why this jurisprudence is only of limited value to the present case. See *Akayesu* Judgement, paras. 537, 540; *Musema* Judgement, paras. 179, 183.

¹⁴¹¹ *Tadic* Appeal Judgement, paras. 220, 223 (emphasis provided).

relied to distinguish “committing” from “common purpose liability” under Article 7(1).¹⁴¹² However, this Trial Chamber views the comment in the *Tadić* Appeal Judgement as not part of the *ratio decidendi* of that Judgement and does not believe that *Tadić* characterisation means that any involvement in a joint criminal enterprise automatically relegates the liability of an accused to that of “complicity in genocide” in Article 4(3)(e).¹⁴¹³ In the *Celebici* Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber reaffirmed the meaning of the plain language of Article 7 (1) that “liability under Article 7(1) applies to direct perpetrators of crimes and to accomplices”,¹⁴¹⁴ and the *Kordic and Cerkez* Trial Chamber stated that “[t]he various forms of participation listed in Article 7(1) may be divided between principal perpetrators and accomplices.”¹⁴¹⁵ In short, the Trial Chamber sees no basis for refusing to accord the status of a co-perpetrator to a member of a joint genocidal enterprise whose participation is of an extremely significant nature and at the leadership level.

643. It seems clear that “accomplice liability” denotes a secondary form of participation which stands in contrast to the responsibility of the direct or principal perpetrators. The Trial Chamber is of the view that this distinction coincides with that between “genocide” and “complicity in genocide” in Article 4(3). The question comes down to whether, on the face of the case, a participant in the criminal enterprise may be most accurately characterised as a direct or principal perpetrator or as a secondary figure in the traditional role of an accomplice.

644. In the present case, General Krstić participated in a joint criminal enterprise to kill the military-aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica with the awareness that such killings would lead to the annihilation of the entire Bosnian Muslim community at Srebrenica. His intent to kill the men thus amounts to a genocidal intent to destroy the group in part. General Krstić did not conceive the plan to kill the men, nor did he kill them personally. However, he fulfilled a key co-ordinating role in the implementation of the killing campaign. In particular, at a stage when his participation was clearly indispensable, General Krstić exerted his authority as Drina Corps Commander and arranged for men under his command to commit killings. He thus was an essential participant in the genocidal killings in the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica. In sum, in view of both his *mens rea* and *actus reus*, General Krstić must be considered a principal perpetrator of these crimes.¹⁴¹⁶

¹⁴¹² *Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin and Momir Talic*, Decision on Motion by Momir Talic for Provisional Release, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, 28 March 2001, paras. 40-45.

¹⁴¹³ According to the Appeals Chamber: “a proper construction of the Statute requires that the *ratio decidendi* of its decisions is binding on Trial Chambers”. *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, para. 113.

¹⁴¹⁴ *^elebici* Appeal Judgement, para. 338.

¹⁴¹⁵ *Kordic and Cerkez* Judgement, para. 373.

¹⁴¹⁶ The Trial Chamber notes in this respect that Article 141 of the Criminal Code of Republika Srpska (P402/98) provides with regard to genocide that he who *orders* the commission of genocidal acts or *commits* such acts shall be punished by imprisonment of at least five years or by the death penalty. This supports the finding that the category of

645. General Krsti} is guilty of genocide pursuant to Article 4(2)(a).

(ii) Participation in the other crimes constituted by the killings

646. The Trial Chamber finds that, by his participation in the joint criminal enterprise to kill the military-aged Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica, General Krsti} is also guilty of murders as violations of the laws or customs of war. Furthermore, as he cannot but have been aware that these murders were related to a widespread or systematic attack against the Bosnian Muslim civilian population of Srebrenica, General Krsti} is also guilty of murders as crimes against humanity and - in view of the object of the joint criminal enterprise to kill all the military-aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica - extermination. Finally, General Krsti} is guilty of murders as acts of persecution: his intent to discriminate against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica is his participation in the killings of all the Bosnian Muslim men and the transfer of all the women, children and elderly from the territory of the Drina Corps.

(iii) Responsibility for the killings under Article 7(3)

647. The evidence also satisfies the three-pronged test established by the jurisprudence for General Krsti} to incur command responsibility under Article 7(3) for the participation of Drina Corps personnel in the killing campaign.¹⁴¹⁷

648. First, General Krsti} exercised effective control over Drina Corps troops involved in the killings.¹⁴¹⁸ Second, in terms of *mens rea*, not only was General Krsti} fully aware of the ongoing killing campaign and of its impact on the survival of the Bosnian Muslim group at Srebrenica, as well as the fact that it was related to a widespread or systematic attack against Srebrenica's Bosnian Muslim civilian population, but the Drina Corps (and Main Staff) officers and troops involved in conducting the executions had to have been aware of the genocidal objectives. Third, General

principle perpetrators of genocide is not limited to those *physically committing* acts of genocide. On 21 July 1993, the National Assembly of Republika Srpska adopted - with minor amendments unrelated to the above provision - the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and renamed it the "Criminal Code of Republika Srpska". See Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (P402/58).¹⁴¹⁷ Since it can not be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that Drina Corps troops - or other troops under the effective control of General Krsti} - were responsible for the terror crimes at Poto-ari (FM, para. 155), the Trial Chamber can not conclude that General Krsti} incurs liability for these crimes under Article 7(3).

¹⁴¹⁸ This is the first test under Article 7(3) (*Celebici* Appeal Judgement, paras 186-198, 266). In the case in point, there is no evidence to rebut the presumption that as Commander of the Drina Corps, General Krsti}'s *de jure* powers amounted to his effective control over subordinate troops (*Celebici* Appeal Judgement, para. 197). To the contrary, the evidence on the record confirms that as Corps Commander General Krsti} was firmly in charge of his troops. Conversely, it has not been established that General Krsti} exercised formal powers over the 10th Sabotage Detachment and the MUP. In the absence of other conclusive evidence that he in reality did exercise effective control over these troops, General Krsti} can not be said to incur command responsibility for their participation in the crimes.

Krsti} failed to prevent his Drina Corps subordinates from participating in the crimes or to punish them thereafter.

649. In respect to this last issue, the Trial Chamber finds that General Krsti}'s effective control enabled him to prevent Drina Corps officers and troops from participating in the commission of crimes. Further, as to General Krsti}'s ability to punish subordinates, the Trial Chamber considers that, on 13 May 1992, President Karad' ic issued his Order on the Application of the Rules of the International Law of War in the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁴¹⁹ General Krsti} testified that he was aware of the obligation enshrined in paragraph 2 of this Order,¹⁴²⁰ namely that:

It is the duty of the competent superior officer to initiate proceedings for legal sanctions against individuals who violate the rules of the international law of war.

The Guidelines for Determining Criteria for Criminal Prosecution, issued by the Military Prosecutor's Office of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Republika Srpska,¹⁴²¹ state in relation to "criminal offences against humanity and international law" that:

officers in all units must accept the obligation to draft reports on all incidents which might be regarded as criminal offences [...] In these cases, the commands have a duty to inform, among others, the military prosecutor's office, which will, after making an assessment, take appropriate action in keeping with the law and prosecution policy.

In a similar fashion, General Radinovi} testified, with regard to units not subordinated to the Drina Corps, that:¹⁴²²

[i]f, in the command system and the system of informing, the command of the Drina Corps found out that these units committed something that was proscribed under regulations, then they would be obliged, the Drina Corps, and the command system would be obliged to act in accordance or exactly the same way that any officer or any member of an army would behave when they found out that somebody was acting against rules and regulations, *meaning that procedures would have to be initiated and investigations* which would be required in such a particular case.

General Radinovi} also stated that, if an officer becomes aware that persons in the highest level in command are responsible for a violation of the law, this officer is duty bound to report the violation to the civil authorities above the army.¹⁴²³

650. The Trial Chamber has found that General Krsti} did not punish a single Drina Corps officer or soldier who participated in the killings in the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica.¹⁴²⁴ General Krsti} testified that, after the commission of these crimes, he only found out about the involvement

¹⁴¹⁹ P402/76

¹⁴²⁰ Krsti}, T. 6346-6347.

¹⁴²¹ Exhibit 402/68; Guidelines, p. 8.

¹⁴²² Radinovic, T. 8057.

¹⁴²³ Radinovic, T. 8466.

of one Drina Corps officer. He unsuccessfully tried to have this person replaced and, as a result, was himself subsequently targeted by the Security Services for special surveillance. General Krsti} testified that, at the time, he feared for his safety and that of his family.¹⁴²⁵ He stated under cross-examination that:¹⁴²⁶

I must acknowledge here before you and this Trial Chamber that not in my wildest dreams was I able to undertake any measures. We weren't allowed to talk about anything like that let alone take steps against a commanding officer, regardless of my knowledge that he or somebody else had perhaps committed a war crime. [...] It was my intention to report war crimes but that was not a possibility. I was not able to do so. [...] First of all, for security reasons, the security and safety of my family.

651. However, Mr. Butler, the Prosecutor's military expert, testified that VRS Corps Commanders did switch jobs throughout the war and that he had found no evidence that officers in general were operating in a climate of fear.¹⁴²⁷ Moreover, in the case of General Krsti}, the fact is that he was publicly extolled by both General Mladi} and President Karad' ic for his leadership role in the conquest of the Srebrenica enclave, months after the massacres occurred. General Krsti} also appeared on public platforms as an enthusiastic supporter of General Mladi} in the following year and indeed signed a plea to President Karad' i} to keep General Mladi} on as Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS.¹⁴²⁸ These facts tend to demonstrate General Krsti}'s solidarity with, rather than his fear of, the highest military and civilian echelons of the Republika Serpska.

652. Although the elements of Article 7(3) have thus been fulfilled, the Trial Chamber will not enter a conviction to that effect because in its view General Krsti}'s responsibility for the participation of his troops in the killings is sufficiently expressed in a finding of guilt under Article 7(1).

(c) Conclusions on General Krsti}'s criminal responsibility

653. The Trial Chamber's findings on the issue of cumulative convictions are discussed below. At this point, the Trial Chamber concludes that General Krsti} incurs criminal responsibility for his participation in two different sets of crimes that occurred following the attack of the VRS on Srebrenica in July 1995.

¹⁴²⁴ *supra*, para. 477.

¹⁴²⁵ Krsti}, T. 6350-6351, 6358, 7422.

¹⁴²⁶ Krsti}, T. 6347.

¹⁴²⁷ Butler, T. 5474-5. General Dannatt testified likewise, stating that: "I don't believe I have come across an incident in the Balkans whereby a general who refused to follow orders has been shot. [...] I think there are cases of people being removed or dismissed from their position, which is quite common in military matters." Dannatt, T. 5685.

¹⁴²⁸ *Supra*, paras. 334, 417.

Firstly, on the basis of the humanitarian crisis and crimes of terror at Potocari and the forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly from Potocari to Bosnian Muslim held territory, from 11 to 13 July, General Krsti} incurs responsibility under Article 7(1) for inhumane acts (forcible transfer, count 8 of the Indictment) and persecution (murder, cruel and inhumane treatment, terrorisation, destruction of personal property and forcible transfer, count 6 of the Indictment).

Secondly, on the basis of the killing of the military aged Muslim men from Srebrenica and the causing of serious bodily and mental harm to the men surviving the massacres: General Krsti} incurs responsibility under Article 7(1) and Article 4(3)(a) for genocide (count 1), General Krsti} also incurs responsibility under Article 7(1) for the killings as extermination (count 3), murder (count 4) and persecution (count 6) as crimes against humanity, and murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war (count 5).

654. Having pronounced on the crimes for which General Krsti} may be held criminally responsible, the Trial Chamber now turns to address the issue of cumulative charging and convictions in order to decide upon which of these crimes, based on the same underlying conduct, it will enter convictions.

I. Cumulative charging and convictions

655. The Prosecutor and the Defence made submissions on the issue. They disagree on the standards regarding when an accused can be convicted of more than one offence under a single or several Article(s) of the Statute for the same underlying conduct.

1. Applicable Law

656. The Statute provides no guidance on cumulative convictions. The Rules indicate that the "Trial Chamber shall vote on each charge contained in the indictment."¹⁴²⁹ As recently amended,¹⁴³⁰ they further state that the Trial Chamber "shall impose a sentence in respect of each finding of guilt and indicate whether such sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently, unless it decides to exercise its power to impose a single sentence reflecting the totality of the criminal conduct of the accused".¹⁴³¹

657. The jurisprudence of the Tribunal is however of assistance in the matter. In the *^elebi}* case, the Appeals Chamber pronounced on the issue of cumulative charging and convictions in

¹⁴²⁹ Rule 87 (B).

¹⁴³⁰ The Rule was last amended at the Twenty Third Plenary Session in December 2000 and, since it may be construed as more favourable to the accused than the previous one, is applicable in this case.

¹⁴³¹ Rule 87 (D).

respect of Article 2 (Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions) and Article 3 (Violations of the Law and Customs of the War) violations.¹⁴³² In the *Jelisi}* case, the Appeals Chamber adopted the same approach as in the *^elebi}* Appeals Judgement, in relation to charges under Articles 3 and 5.¹⁴³³ Both the Prosecutor and the Defence made submissions in this case based on the rulings of the Appeals Chamber in the *^elebi}* case.¹⁴³⁴

(a) Cumulative Charging

658. The Prosecution submits that “cumulative charging is allowed and customary under ICTY jurisprudence”.¹⁴³⁵ The present Trial Chamber has already decided that “cumulative charging under different sub-sections of Article 5 is permissible”.¹⁴³⁶

659. With regard to other cumulative charging under Articles 3, 4 and 5, the Trial Chamber adopts the approach taken by the Appeals Chamber in the *^elebi}* case, which decided that:

Cumulative charging is to be allowed in light of the fact that, prior to the presentation of all of the evidence, it is not possible to determine to a certainty which of the charges brought against an accused will be proven. The Trial Chamber is better poised, after the parties’ presentation of the evidence, to evaluate which of the charges may be retained, based upon the sufficiency of the evidence. In addition, cumulative charging constitutes the usual practice of both this Tribunal and the ICTR.¹⁴³⁷

660. As a result, it is possible for the accused to be found guilty of more than one crime on the basis of the same criminal conduct. It thus becomes important to determine when more than one conviction is punishable under the Tribunal’s jurisprudence and tenets of fundamental fairness.

(b) Cumulative Convictions

661. On the basis of the facts contained in paragraphs 21 to 26 of the Indictment, General Krsti} has been charged by the Prosecution with genocide under Article 4,¹⁴³⁸ also with murder under Article 5 (a), extermination under Article 5 (b), murder under Article 3 and persecutions under Article 5 (h).¹⁴³⁹ The Indictment also alleges facts in paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 11, 24.1, 24.3-24.6, 24.8,

¹⁴³² *^elebi}* Appeal Judgement, paras. 400 *et seq.*

¹⁴³³ *Jelisi}* Appeal Judgement, para. 82.

¹⁴³⁴ The submissions were filed before the *Jelisi}* Appeals Judgement was rendered.

¹⁴³⁵ Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 472.

¹⁴³⁶ *The Prosecutor v Krsti}*, Decision on Defence Preliminary Motion on the form of the Amended Indictment, Case No IT-98-33-PT, 28 January 2000, pp. 4-7.

¹⁴³⁷ *^elebi}* Appeal Judgement, para. 400.

¹⁴³⁸ The genocide is perpetrated through the killings of the group and through serious bodily or mental harm caused to members of the group.

¹⁴³⁹ The offence of persecutions is perpetrated through the murder of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians, including men, women, children and elderly persons, the cruel and inhumane treatment (including severe beatings) of Bosnian Muslim civilians, the terrorising, the destruction of personal property of Bosnian Muslim civilians and the deportation or forcible transfer of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica.

24.9 and 24.11 on the basis of which it charges persecutions under Article 5 (h) and deportation under Article 5 (d) (or, in the alternative, other inhumane acts in the form of forcible transfer under Article 5 (i)). After stating the submissions made by the Prosecution and the Defence on this issue, the Trial Chamber will set out the test it will utilise.

(i) Submissions of the Parties

662. The Prosecutor argues that “[u]nder the *elebi* framework, the Trial Chamber may choose to focus its attention on a “Count 4, Murder as a Crime Against Humanity” (under Article 5 of the Statute) conviction over a “Count 5, Murder as a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War (under Article 3 of the Statute) conviction because murder under Article 5 requires a materially distinct element not contained in murder under Article 3”.¹⁴⁴⁰ The Prosecutor makes no other arguments as to the relation between other crimes cumulatively charged in the Indictment.

663. The Defence contends that under the *elebi* framework, Article 3 and Article 5 both have materially distinct elements, but in contrast, acknowledges that General Krsti} can be convicted of both offences.¹⁴⁴¹ However, the Defence is of the view that “the dissenting opinion of Judges Hunt and Bennouna more correctly define(s) the test for multiple convictions”, because “only elements relating to the conduct and mental state of the accused should be taken into account when applying the “different elements” test”.¹⁴⁴² The Defence further states that “if the formulation of the dissent is applied to Counts 4 and 5 of the Amended Indictment, both charging murder, only one conviction could be imposed”.¹⁴⁴³ Finally, the Defence submits that charges specified to be in the alternative cannot be cumulative, such as charges contained in Counts 1 and 2, (genocide or complicity in genocide) and in Counts 7 and 8 (deportation or forcible transfer).¹⁴⁴⁴ The Defence does not make any submission as to the relation between other crimes cumulatively charged in the indictment (e.g. genocide, extermination and persecutions).

(ii) The Test Laid down by the Appeals Chamber in the *elebi* Case (« the Test »)

664. The Appeals Chamber in the *elebi* case held that cumulative convictions are permissible to punish the same criminal conduct if the following two prong test is met:

[... M]ultiple criminal convictions entered under different statutory provisions but based on the same conduct are permissible only if each statutory provision involved has a materially distinct element not

¹⁴⁴⁰ Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 473. It should be noted that the Prosecution seems to have misread the *elebi* Test, which is detailed *Infra* in (ii) “the Test laid down by the Appeals Chamber in the *elebi* case”.

¹⁴⁴¹ Final Submission of the Accused, para. 399.

¹⁴⁴² Final Submission of the Accused, para. 400, p. 124.

¹⁴⁴³ Final Submission of the Accused, para. 400, p. 124.

contained in the other. An element is materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact not required by the other.¹⁴⁴⁵

The Appeals Chamber further stated that:

[...] the Chamber must decide in relation to which offence it will enter a conviction. This should be done on the basis of the principle that the conviction under the more specific provision should be upheld. Thus, if a set of facts is regulated by two provisions, one of which contains an additional materially distinct element, then a conviction should be entered only under that provision.¹⁴⁴⁶

665. Thus, the first inquiry to be made is whether, under the definitions of the separate offences, the accused may be found liable for more than one offence based upon the same conduct. If this is so, the Trial Chamber will then determine whether the definition of each offence provision has a materially distinct element not contained in the other. For instance, the Appeals Chamber in the *^elebi}i* case held that “the offence of wilfully causing great suffering under Article 2 contains an element not present in the offence of cruel treatment under Article 3 : the protected person status of the victim. Because protected persons necessarily constitute individuals who are not taking an active part in the hostilities, the definition of cruel treatment does not contain a materially distinct element [...]”.¹⁴⁴⁷ In so ruling, the Appeals Chamber in the *^elebi}i* case reasoned that the requirement of Article 3 that victims not be taking an active part in the hostilities is not materially distinct from the requirement of Article 2 that victims are protected persons. Thus, cumulative convictions could not be entered under both Article 2 for wilfully causing great suffering and Article 3 for cruel treatment.

666. A subsidiary question is which requirements of the offences definitions must be compared. As mentioned above, the Statute requires that both war crimes and crimes against humanity be committed during an armed conflict but, according to the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, whereas Article 3 requires that the acts of the accused be committed in close connection with an armed conflict, this is not a substantive requirement for the applicability of Article 5.¹⁴⁴⁸ The Appeals Chamber, in the *Jelisi}i* case, did rule that Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute each contain a unique,

¹⁴⁴⁴ Final Submission of the Accused, paras. 397, 398.

¹⁴⁴⁵ *^elebi}i* Appeal Judgement, para. 412.

¹⁴⁴⁶ *^elebi}i* Appeal Judgement, para. 413.

¹⁴⁴⁷ *^elebi}i* Appeal Judgement, para. 424. Also, on the question of whether entering cumulative convictions under Articles 2 and 3 is permissible, the Appeals Chamber in the *^elebi}i* case stated that “It should also be borne in mind that Article 2 applies to international conflicts, while Article 3 applies to both internal and international conflicts. However, this potentially distinguishing element does not come into play here, because the conflict at issue has been characterised as international as well”. Footnote 652.

¹⁴⁴⁸ The armed conflict requirement in Article 5’s chapeau has been characterised by the jurisprudence of the Tribunal as not a substantive requirement for cumulative convictions purposes. It is however a jurisdictional requirement for the

materially distinct element not contained in the other, that is Article 3 requires a close nexus to an armed conflict and Article 5 requires that the act or omission be committed as part of a widespread or systematic campaign against a civilian population. In this sense, the Trial Chamber will consider only substantive requirements when comparing offences.

667. Finally, if the application of this first prong of the Test requires that the Trial Chamber render only one conviction, the Trial Chamber will, in accordance with the second prong of the Test, select the most specific applicable criminal provision. For instance, applying the second prong of the Test, the Appeals Chamber in the *^elebi}i* case held that because the offence of wilfully causing great suffering sanctioned by Article 2 is more specific than the offence of cruel treatment sanctioned by Article 3, the Article 2 offence must be preferred, and the Article 3 offence must be dismissed.

2. Application of the Test to the Concurrent Offences Specified in the Indictment

668. The Trial Chamber has found that General Krsti} participated, first, in the campaign of terror that followed the attack on Srebrenica from 10 to 13 July 1995 and which led to the forcible transfer of Bosnian Muslim civilians and, secondly, in the murders of Bosnian Muslim military aged men, which took place from 13 July to 19 July 1995.

669. The Test will be applied to the cumulatively charged offences characterising each criminal conduct proved, first to offences charged under different Articles of the Statute, and then to different offences charged under Article 5.

(a) The Concurrent Offences Characterising “the campaign of terror” in Poto-ari and the Subsequent Forcible Transfer of the Bosnian Muslim Civilians from 10 to 13 July 1995

670. Paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 11 and 22 to 26 of the Indictment describe, *inter alia*, how thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians, fled to Poto-ari, were terrorised and/or murdered there and were thereafter transported by buses and trucks, under the control of the VRS, to areas outside the enclave of Srebrenica. Counts 1, 3 to 6, and 8 characterise the acts described in these paragraphs as genocide, extermination, murder under Articles 3 and 5, persecutions and deportations (or, in the alternative, inhumane acts in the form of forcible transfer). With regard to the offence of persecutions, Count 6 of the Indictment states that persecutions were committed not only through murder but also through “the cruel and inhumane treatment of Bosnian Muslim civilians, including

application of Article 3 of the Statute. *Jelisi}* Appeal Judgement, para. 82. See also *Tadi}* Jurisdiction Decision and *Tadi}* Appeal Judgement, para. 249.

severe beatings”, “the terrorising of Bosnian Muslim civilians”, “the destruction of personal property of Bosnian Muslims” and “the deportation or forcible transfer of Bosnian Muslims”. Murder is thus but one of the sub-crimes of the offence of persecutions.

671. The Trial Chamber has found that the events between 10 to 13 July 1995 in Poto-ari are appropriately characterised as murders and as persecutions committed through murder, cruel and inhumane treatment (including severe beatings), terrorising, destruction of personal property of Bosnian Muslim civilians and forcible transfer. While the cruel and inhumane treatments (including severe beatings), terrorising and destruction of personal property of the Bosnian Muslim civilians are solely covered by the persecutions count (Count 6), the murders committed at this time can also be legally characterised as murders under Article 3 and 5 (Counts 4-5) and persecutions (Count 6). The forcible transfer at this time can be characterised as a persecution committed by means of inhumane acts (Count 6) and as a separate Article 5 offence of other inhumane acts (Count 8).¹⁴⁴⁹

672. The Chamber has not found the accused guilty of genocide, complicity of genocide and extermination under Counts 1, 2 and 3 for the acts committed in Poto-ari from 10 to 13 July 1995 and has decided that the forcible transfers are most appropriately considered under other inhumane acts rather than deportation.

673. Thus, the Trial Chamber will apply the Test with a view to determining whether convictions for the offence of murder, under both Articles 3 and 5, and persecutions (Article 5 (h)), committed through murder, are permissible and whether convictions under both persecutions (Article 5 (h)), committed through other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), and other inhumane acts (Article 5 (i)), committed through forcible transfer, may be used to punish the same criminal conduct.

(i) Relationship between Offences under Article 3 and Offences under Article 5

674. The Test is first applied to determine whether murder sanctioned by Article 3 requires a materially distinct constituent element not required by murder sanctioned by Article 5 and *vice versa*, with a view to determining whether convictions under both the offence of murder under Article 3 and offences under Article 5, punishing the same conduct, is permissible. The application of the Test involves a comparison between the elements of the crimes as defined by the Trial Chamber. Murder as a war crime is any illegal and intentional act or omission, which caused the death of a non-combatant person, and was committed in close connection with an armed conflict. Article 5 punishes any prohibited intentional acts or omissions committed within an armed conflict

as part of a general and systematic attack upon a civilian population. Murder under Article 3 requires a unique and materially distinct element in the form of a close nexus between the acts of the accused and an armed conflict. Offences under Article 5 require a unique and materially distinct element in the form of a requirement that they be perpetrated as part of a widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian population. Because each category of offences contains an element not required by the other, the Test is satisfied and the Trial Chamber finds it permissible to enter a conviction under both Articles 3 and 5 to punish the same murders.

(ii) Relationship between Murder under Article 5 and Persecutions

675. The Test must also be applied to determine whether murder sanctioned by Article 5 (a) requires a materially distinct element not required by persecutions sanctioned by Article 5 (h) and *vice versa*. Thus, the Chamber has to determine whether entering both convictions under the offence of murder under Article 5 and persecutions perpetrated through murder under Article 5, to punish the same conduct, is permissible. Murder under Article 5 (a) punishes any illegal and intentional act or omission, which caused the death of one or more persons and was committed in an armed conflict, as part of a widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian population. Article 5(h) persecutions punishes any illegal and intentional act or omission, which has wronged one or more persons and was committed in an armed conflict, as part of a widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian population for political, racial or religious reasons. Persecutions require a discriminatory intent as an additional element not required by murder under Article 5. Because the offence of persecution requires a unique materially distinct element vis-à-vis murder under Article 5 (a), the Test is not met. The second prong of the Test must be applied. Since the offence of persecutions is more specific than the offence of murder, persecutions must be preferred. The Trial Chamber, accordingly, enters a conviction under the charge of persecutions and dismisses the charge of murder under Article 5 (a).

(iii) Relationship between Persecutions (forcible transfer) and Other Inhumane Acts (forcible transfer)

676. The offence of persecutions has been defined above. The offence of other inhumane acts is defined as any intentional act or omission, which caused injury to a human being in terms of physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity.¹⁴⁵⁰ The offence of persecutions requires a unique additional material element not required by the offence of other inhumane acts in the form

¹⁴⁴⁹ The Trial Chamber has found that the transfer of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Poto-ari to areas controlled by Muslim forces is to be characterised as forcible transfer and not as deportation. See *supra*, para. XX (genocide part).

¹⁴⁵⁰ *Tadić* Judgement, para. 729 (citing the ILC *Draft Code*, p. 103).

of a requirement that the offence of persecutions must have been perpetrated on the basis of a discriminatory intent, the offence of other inhumane acts has no counterpart of a distinct material element. The Test is not satisfied and the second prong of the Test must be applied. Because persecutions require a unique additional materially distinct element vis-à-vis other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), the offence of persecutions applies with more specificity to the situation at hand. The Trial Chamber finds that it is not permissible to enter convictions both under persecutions by way of forcible transfer and under other inhumane acts (forcible transfer) to punish the same conduct. The Trial Chamber therefore dismisses the separate charge of other inhumane acts (forcible transfer) under Article 5 (i). General Krsti} can only be convicted for persecutions (count 6) for the acts of forcible transfer that took place on 10 and 13 July 1995.

(iv) Conclusions

677. In sum, the Trial Chamber enters convictions for charges of murder under Article 3 and for charges of persecution, murders, terrorising the civilian population, destruction of personal property, and cruel and inhumane treatment committed from 10 to 13 July 1995 in Poto-ari.

678. The Trial Chamber will now apply the Test on cumulative offences with regard to the second category of murders charged against General Krsti}, namely the killings that occurred between 13 and 19 July 1995.

(b) The Concurrent Offences Characterising the Murders Committed Against the Bosnian Muslim Civilians from 13 to 19 July 1995

679. Paragraphs 21 to 25 of the indictment describe, *inter alia*, how thousands of Bosnian Muslim men were arrested by the Bosnian Serb forces, led to execution sites and executed. It has been decided that these acts fulfil the requirements of genocide sanctioned by Article 4, as well as murder under Article 3, murder under Article 5, extermination and persecutions under Article 5. For the reasons stated above,¹⁴⁵¹ the Test is applicable only insofar as the offence of persecutions is perpetrated through murders.

(i) Relationship Between Offences under Article 3 (war crimes) and Article 4 (genocide) and between Article 3 (war crimes) and Article 5 (crimes against humanity)

680. The Trial Chamber has already found that it is permissible to enter convictions on charges of murder under both Article 3 and Article 5 to punish the same criminal conduct.¹⁴⁵²

¹⁴⁵¹ *Supra*, para. 670.

¹⁴⁵² *Jelisi}* Appeal Judgement, para. 82.

681. The same reasoning applies to the relationship between murder under Article 3 and genocide under Article 4. The relationship between genocide and murder as a war crime can be characterised as follows. The offence of genocide requires a special intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group (or part thereof). Murder as a war crime requires a close nexus between the acts of the accused and an armed conflict, which is not required by genocide. The Test for separate convictions is satisfied. Accordingly, convictions must be entered on both charges in respect of the same criminal conduct because genocide and murder under Article 3 each contain an additional element not required by the other.

(ii) Relationship Between Offences under Article 4 (genocide) and Article 5 (crimes against humanity)

682. The Trial Chamber notes that Article 4 (genocide) demands proof of elements not required by Article 5 (crimes against humanity). Article 5 offences demand proof that they have been perpetrated in an armed conflict, as part of a widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian population. With regard to the first requirement that Article 5 offences be committed in an armed conflict, it has been held that the requirement of an armed conflict is not a substantive requirement for this purpose.¹⁴⁵³ The other Article 5 requirement that the acts be perpetrated against a civilian population prevents isolated or random acts being characterised as crimes against humanity.¹⁴⁵⁴ Similarly, the notion of an intent to destroy a “group” in genocide would rule out isolated or random acts being characterised as genocide. However, the limitation to certain types of “group” as defined in the crime of genocide is far more specific than the “civilian population” defined in the crimes against humanity. The requirement in Article 5 that the crimes be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population is comprised within the genocide requirement that there be an intent to destroy a specified type of group. As discussed above, acts of genocide must be committed in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct, or themselves constitute a conduct that could in itself effect the destruction of the group, in whole or part, as such. Thus, Article 5’s exclusion of random or isolated acts also characterises genocide.¹⁴⁵⁵

¹⁴⁵³ *Tadić* Jurisdiction Decision, para. 141: “It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict. Indeed, as the Prosecutor points out, customary international law may not require a connection between crimes against humanity and armed conflict at all...”.

¹⁴⁵⁴ *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Decision on Defence Motion on the Form of the Indictment, Case No IT-94-1-PT, 14 November 1995, para. 11.

¹⁴⁵⁵ The question of whether genocide is an autonomous crime or an aspect of a crime against humanity was discussed during the drafting of the genocide Convention. Many delegates were firm in their views that the two concepts of genocide and crimes against humanity should be kept separate and the Ad Hoc Committee rejected the proposition to have the preamble describe genocide as “a crime against humanity”. The Polish delegate expressed the view held by representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee that while it is true that genocide is a crime against humanity, to state that in the Genocide Convention would overreach the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 180 (II). See, W. Schabas, *Genocide in International Law*, p 64. Similarly, the ICTY in the *Karadžić* and *Mladić* case held that the genocidal

683. While murder under Article 5 (a) does not require any additional materially distinct element than what is contained in the definition of extermination and persecutions, extermination under Article 5 (b) and persecutions under Article 5 (h) both contain an additional element, which must be considered with regard to Article 4 of the Statute. The Preparatory Commission for the ICC defined extermination as the killing of one or more persons as part of a mass killing of civilians.¹⁴⁵⁶ Persecutions is defined as any illegal and intentional act or omission which, as part of a massive or systematic attack on a civilian population, has wronged one or more individuals for political, racial or religious reasons.

684. The offences of genocide and persecutions both require proof of a special intent, respectively an intent to destroy a particular type of group (or part of that group) as such and an intent to discriminate against persons on political, racial or religious grounds. Clearly, genocide has a distinct, mutual element in the form of its requirement of an intent to destroy a group, altogether, in whole or in part, over and above any lesser persecutory objective. The offence of persecutions, on the other hand, contains no element of intent or implementation that would not be subsumed in the destruction requirement of genocide. The Test is not satisfied. Since the crimes of persecutions and genocide do not have a mutually distinct element, it is not possible to cumulate convictions for both. When the application of the first prong demonstrates that it is impermissible to convict an accused of two offences based on the same conduct, the second prong of the Test must be applied to determine for which offence the accused should be convicted. Genocide requires a highly specialised intent in the destruction of a characterised group or part of a group, the discriminatory intent in persecutions is less specific. Genocide, the most specifically defined crime, is to be retained.

685. Extermination requires an intentional killing of one or more persons as part of the mass killing of a civilian population. Genocide, though it might also be committed by a single or a few murders, needs proof that the perpetrator intended to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, or part of the group, as such.¹⁴⁵⁷ Thus, while neither crime has a substantiality threshold as such in term of the actual killings perpetrated, both require that the killings be part of an extensive

"intent may also be inferred from the perpetration of acts which violate, or which the perpetrators themselves consider to violate the very foundation of the group- acts which are not in themselves covered by the list in Article 4 (2) but which are committed as part of the same pattern of conduct". Consideration of the Indictment within the framework of Rule 61, para. 94. The ICC Statute indicates clearly that genocide requires that "the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct", repeating the requirement that crimes against humanity are not perpetrated as isolated or random acts but are part of a pattern of similar acts. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the ICC.

¹⁴⁵⁶ *Supra*, para. 498.

¹⁴⁵⁷ In the *Kara/zi} and Mladi}* case, the Trial Chamber considered that the definition of genocide requires "a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group such as its leadership.", transcript on hearing on 27 June 1996, p. 15.

plan to kill a substantial part of a civilian population. But genocide has a distinct additional requirement, in terms of the nature of the group targeted. In extermination, the killings may be indiscriminate. Thus, in this case, at least, where genocide is committed by killings, it cannot be supplemented by extermination for the same underlying acts. Because the Test is not satisfied, it is impermissible to convict the accused of the two offences of extermination and genocide based on the same conduct and the second prong of the Test must be applied to determine for which offence the accused should be convicted. Genocide requires a highly specialised intent in the destruction of a characterised group or part of a group, extermination does not. Genocide, the most specific crime, is to be retained.

686. The Trial Chamber thus finds that, based on the same conduct, it is permissible to enter cumulative convictions under both Articles 3 and 4 and under both Articles 3 and 5. But it is not permissible to enter cumulative convictions based on the executions under both Articles 4 and 5. The Article 4 offence, as the most specific offence, is to be preferred.

3. Conclusions

687. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that, in respect of the conduct attributed to General Krsti} which took place from 10 to 13 July 1995, it is permissible to enter a conviction under persecutions (Article 5) and murder (Article 3), i.e., to retain Counts 5 and 6. In respect of the murder-type conduct, which took place from 13 to 19 July 1995, it is permissible to enter a conviction on both murder (Article 3) and genocide, i.e., Counts 5 and 1.

688. As a result of the foregoing discussions, General Krsti} is to be found guilty of:

- genocide;
- persecutions; and
- murder

689. Finally, the Trial Chamber turns to the question of the appropriate sentence to be imposed on General Krsti} in respect of the convictions entered.

IV. SENTENCING

690. The Prosecutor submits that General Krsti} should receive consecutive life sentences for each crime for which he is found guilty, pursuant to Article 24 of the Statute and Rule 101 of the

Rules.¹⁴⁵⁸ The Defence submits that General Krstić must be acquitted on all counts of the indictment and thus made no submission on sentencing.¹⁴⁵⁹

691. The sentence is to be determined by reference to the relevant provisions of Articles 23 and 24 of the Statute and Rules 87 (C) and 101 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Trial Chamber should also consider the general sentencing principles and practices of the Tribunal, as well as those of the ICTR.¹⁴⁶⁰

A. The Applicable Provisions

692. Articles 23 and 24 of the Statute and Rules 87(C) and 101 contain sentencing provisions. These provisions determine the objectives of sentencing, the factors to be taken into consideration for the determination of a sentence and the manner in which a sentence should be imposed.

693. Article 23 (1) of the Statute states that “the Trial Chamber shall pronounce judgements and impose sentences and penalties on persons convicted of serious violations of international humanitarian law”. The practice of the Tribunal, based on these provisions, reflects two objectives of a sentence: the need to punish an individual for the crimes committed and the need to deter other individuals from committing similar crimes.¹⁴⁶¹

694. Article 24 (1) of the Statute provides that “the penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment” and further states that the appropriate term of imprisonment is to be determined by “recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia”. Article 24 (2) provides for the Trial Chambers to “take into account such factors as the gravity of the offences and the individual circumstances of the convicted person”. These statutory provisions are to be read in conjunction with Rule 101, which provides that the Chamber *shall* take into account the factors mentioned in Article 24 (2) as well as *such* factors as any aggravating or mitigating circumstances and the general practice of the courts in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁶²

¹⁴⁵⁸ Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 467.

¹⁴⁵⁹ Defence Closing Argument, T. 10148.

¹⁴⁶⁰ *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, para. 107.

¹⁴⁶¹ See in particular, *Kunara* judgement, paras 836 *et seq.*; *Kordić* Judgement, para. 847.

¹⁴⁶² Rule 101 defines the weight to be placed upon the provisions of Article 24 when determining the appropriate sentence. Rule 101 provides in full that:

- (A) A convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up to and including the remainder of the convicted person's life.
- (B) In determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall take into account the factors mentioned in Article 24, paragraph 2, of the Statute, as well as such factors as:
 - (i) any aggravating circumstances;
 - (ii) any mitigating circumstances including the substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before or after conviction;

695. Rule 101 states also that the Trial Chamber must take into consideration "any penalty imposed by a Court of any State on the convicted person for the same act" and which has already been served, as well as the period, if any, during which the convicted person was detained in custody pending surrender to the Tribunal or pending trial or appeal. On the other side, Rule 87(C) grants the Trial Chamber discretion to either impose a penalty "in respect of each finding of guilt" or a single sentence reflecting the totality of the criminal conduct of the accused.¹⁴⁶³ In the case of multiple sentences, the Trial Chamber shall indicate whether they are to be served consecutively or concurrently (Rule 101 (c)).¹⁴⁶⁴

696. In accordance with the relevant sentencing provisions, the ICTY and the ICTR have developed a number of factors that should be examined when determining a proper sentence: the general practice on prison sentences in the former Yugoslavia, the gravity of the crimes and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.

B. General Sentencing Principles

1. General Practice on Prison Sentences in the former Yugoslavia

697. It is well established that the general sentencing practice of the former Yugoslavia is not binding on the Tribunal, although the Tribunal should have regard to it.¹⁴⁶⁵ Sentencing by the courts of the former Yugoslavia was based on the provisions of Chapter XVI, "Criminal Acts Against Humanity and International Law"¹⁴⁶⁶ and Article 41(1)¹⁴⁶⁷ of the SFRY criminal code. The

- (iii) the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia;
- (iv) the extent to which any penalty imposed by a court of any State on the convicted person for the same act has already been served, as referred to in Article 10, paragraph 3, of the Statute.
- (C) The Trial Chamber shall indicate whether multiple sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently.
- (D) Credit shall be given to the convicted person for the period, if any, during which the convicted person was detained in custody pending surrender to the Tribunal or pending trial or appeal.

¹⁴⁶³ In particular, as to the sentence to be imposed for cumulative convictions, the Appeals Chamber in the *elebi}i* case held that "...the overarching goal in sentencing must be to ensure that the final or aggregate sentence reflects the totality of the criminal conduct and overall culpability of the offender. [...] The decision as to how this should be achieved lies within the discretion of the Trial Chamber", *elebi}i* Appeal Judgement, para. 430.

¹⁴⁶⁴ Most of the Trial Chambers of the ICTY have rendered judgements imposing multiple sentences, but the *Jelis}i*, *Bla}ki*, *Kordi}*, *Kunara}*, *Kambanda* and *Serushago* Judgements imposed single sentences as in the cases before the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals.

¹⁴⁶⁵ *Tadi}* Sentencing Judgement II, para. 12; *Furud`ija* Judgement, para. 285; *Aleksovski* Judgement, para. 242; *Kordi}* Judgement, para. 849; *Kunara}* Judgement, para. 859. The ICTR adopts, *mutatis mutandis*, a similar position: *Kambanda* Judgement, para. 23; *Akayesu* Sentence, para. 12-14; *Kayishema* Sentence, paras. 5-7.

¹⁴⁶⁶ See Chapter XVI of the criminal code of the former Yugoslavia "Crimes Against Humanity and International Law: Articles 141 and 142(1) dealt with the crimes of genocide and other war crimes committed against civilians. See also Articles 142-156 and Articles 38 "Imprisonment", 41 "Sentences", and 48 "Coincidence of several offences." Crimes against peace and international law, including the crime of genocide and war crimes against a civilian population, were punishable by a sentence of 5-15 years in prison, by the death penalty or by 20 years in prison if a prison sentence was substituted for the death penalty, or in cases of aggravated homicide.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Article 41(1) of the criminal code of the SFRY states: " The court shall determine the sentence for the perpetrator of a given crime within the limits prescribed by the law for this crime, bearing in mind the purpose of the punishment and

death penalty could be imposed for war crimes and genocide, while a minimum prison sentence of ten years and a maximum of fifteen years were stipulated as the penalty to be imposed for aggravated murders. Article 38(2) of the SFRY criminal code permitted courts to hand down a sentence of twenty years in prison in lieu of the death penalty.¹⁴⁶⁸ In 1998, Bosnia and Herzegovina abolished the death penalty and introduced in its place a long-term imprisonment of 20-40 years "for the gravest forms of criminal offences [...] committed with intention".¹⁴⁶⁹ In accordance with the recommendation of the Secretary General's Report, the Tribunal cannot impose the death penalty.¹⁴⁷⁰ "The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment" (Article 24-1 of the Statute). The sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber in this case thus falls near the range of sentence afforded by the FRY for the most severe war crimes.

2. Gravity of the Crime

698. The gravity of the offence is a primary factor to be taken into account in imposing a sentence. The Trial Chamber in the *^elebi}i* case stated that it was "by far the most important consideration, which may be regarded as the litmus test for the appropriate sentence".¹⁴⁷¹ The seriousness of the crime must weigh heavily in the sentence imposed irrespective of the form of the criminal participation of the individual.¹⁴⁷² Taking into consideration the seriousness of the crime avoids excessive disparities in sentences imposed for the same type of conduct.¹⁴⁷³

699. The Prosecutor argues that the gravity of crimes with which General Krsti} may be convicted is self-evident and that genocide "constitutes the crime of crimes, which must be taken into account when deciding the sentence".¹⁴⁷⁴ The Prosecutor also argues that the number of victims and their suffering are factors to be taken into account in assessing the gravity of the crimes committed.

700. Assessing the seriousness of the crimes is not a mere matter of comparing and ranking the crimes in the abstract. It has been argued that crimes against humanity and war crimes are equally

taking into account all the circumstances that could lead to this sentence being more or less severe, in particular: the degree of criminal responsibility, the motives of the crime, the degree of the threat or damage to protected property, the circumstances under which the crime was committed, the background of the perpetrator, his personal circumstances and behaviour after the commission of the crime as well as other circumstances which relate to the character of the perpetrator".

¹⁴⁶⁸ *Kordi}* Judgement, para. 849.

¹⁴⁶⁹ *Tadi}* Sentencing Judgement II, para. 12.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Report of the Secretary General, paras 111-112.

¹⁴⁷¹ *^elebi}i* Judgement, para. 1225.

¹⁴⁷² *^elebi}i* Appeal Judgement, para. 741.

¹⁴⁷³ *^elebi}i* Appeal Judgement, paras. 756-758.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 468 (citing *Blaski}* Judgement, para. 800, itself citing *Kambanda* judgement, para. 9, 16).

serious and that "there is in law no distinction between the seriousness of a crime against humanity and that of a war crime [...]".¹⁴⁷⁵ No Chamber has yet ruled on the ranking of crimes in a case where an individual has been found guilty of genocide. It can also be argued, however, that genocide is the most serious crime because of its requirement of the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such. In this sense, even though the criminal acts themselves involved in a genocide may not vary from those in a crime against humanity or a crime against the laws and customs of war, the convicted person is, because of his specific intent, deemed to be more blameworthy. However, this does not rule out the Trial Chamber's duty to decide on the appropriate punishment according to the facts of each case. Genocide embodies a horrendous concept, indeed, but a close look at the myriad of situations that can come within its boundaries cautions against prescribing a monolithic punishment for one and all genocides or similarly for one and all crimes against humanity or war crimes.¹⁴⁷⁶ A murder, whether qualified as a crime against humanity, a war crime or an act of genocide, may be a graver offence than imposing serious bodily or mental harm upon an individual. In this regard, the Trial Chamber ascribes to the approach taken by the Appeals Chamber that "[t]he level [of penalty] in any particular case [be] fixed by reference to the circumstances of the case."¹⁴⁷⁷

701. Thus, the Trial Chamber must assess the seriousness of the crimes in the light of their individual circumstances and consequences. This presupposes taking into account quantitatively the number of victims and qualitatively the suffering inflicted on the victims.¹⁴⁷⁸

702. In this sense, the Trial Chamber agrees with the Prosecutor that the number of victims and their suffering are relevant factors in determining the sentence¹⁴⁷⁹ and that the mistreatment of women¹⁴⁸⁰ or children is especially significant in the present case. However, the Prosecutor also contends that the "overwhelming scope of the crimes", the manner in which the crimes were committed, the fact that some of the victims were elderly men and young boys, the fact that many

¹⁴⁷⁵ *Tadić* Sentencing Judgement III, para. 69 and the Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen. The Appeals Chamber, and subsequently Trial Chambers confirmed this assertion. *Furund'ija* Judgement, paras 240 to 243; *Kunara* Judgement, para. 851. In the opposite sense, see Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese appended to the *Tadić* Sentencing Judgement III, para. 14, where it is stated that crimes against humanity are more serious than war crimes because of "a whole pattern of criminality" within which they are committed and the intent of the perpetrator of the crime who must be aware of the said pattern. Also see the Joint Separate Opinions of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah appended to *Erdemović* Appeal Judgement, paras 20 *et seq.* and Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li appended to the *Erdemović* Appeal Judgement, paras 19 *et seq.* See also the Declaration of Judge Vohrah appended to the *Furund'ija* Appeal Judgement, in particular paras 5 *et seq.*

¹⁴⁷⁶ In this regard, the Trial Chamber in the *Tadić* case held that "... What is to be punished by penalty is the proven criminal conduct...". *Prosecutor v. Tadić*, Decision on Defence Motion on the Form of the Indictment, IT-94-1-PT, 14 November 1995.

¹⁴⁷⁷ *Tadić* Sentencing Judgement III, para. 69.

¹⁴⁷⁸ *Ālebići* Judgement, para. 1226.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Prosecutor's Final Brief, para. 469; See also *Erdemović* Appeal Judgement, para. 15, the *Kambanda* Judgement, para.42, *Kayishema* Sentence, para. 26; *Kordi* Judgement, para. 852.

¹⁴⁸⁰ *Furund'ija* Judgement, para. 283.

of the executed were blindfolded and had their hands tied behind their back when they were murdered, and the “long-term damage to their surviving family members and the Bosnian Muslim community” are aggravating circumstances.¹⁴⁸¹ As such, the Prosecutor does not draw any clear line between factors relevant to assess the gravity of the crimes committed and factors relevant as aggravating circumstances.

703. The Trial Chamber considers that the circumstance that the victim detainees were completely at the mercy of their captors,¹⁴⁸² the physical and psychological suffering inflicted upon witnesses to the crime,¹⁴⁸³ the “indiscriminate, disproportionate, terrifying” or “heinous” means and methods used to commit the crimes¹⁴⁸⁴ are all relevant in assessing the gravity of the crimes in this case.¹⁴⁸⁵ Appropriate consideration of those circumstances gives “a voice” to the suffering of the victims.¹⁴⁸⁶

3. Personal Situation of the Accused

704. The Trial Chamber must also take into account factors pertaining to the “individual circumstances of the convicted person” (Article 24-2 of the Statute), to “bring to light the reasons for the accused's criminal conduct” and to assess “the possibility of rehabilitating the accused.”¹⁴⁸⁷ The prospect of rehabilitating the accused and the extent to which the accused is a great danger to the community as a whole should be taken into account.¹⁴⁸⁸ Thus, in general, factors peculiar to the person who committed the crimes, and not those pertaining to the crimes committed, are considered as aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

(a) Aggravating Circumstances

705. The Statute and the Rules do not stipulate which factors are to be considered as aggravating circumstances. In finding whether there are any aggravating circumstances, the Trial Chamber proceeds with caution.¹⁴⁸⁹ Factors identified as potentially aggravating by the Trial Chamber are the level of criminal participation, the premeditation and the motive of the convicted person.

¹⁴⁸¹ Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 471.

¹⁴⁸² *^elebi}i* Judgement, para. 1268.

¹⁴⁸³ *Jelisi}* Judgement, para. 132.

¹⁴⁸⁴ *Kayishema* Sentence, para. 18; *Bla{ki}* Judgement, para. 787; *Kordi}* Judgement, para. 852.

¹⁴⁸⁵ In the opposite sense, *Kunara}* judgement, which refers to the fact that some crimes stretch over a long period or are committed repeatedly as an aggravating circumstance, para. 865. This fact seems to enter in the quantitative assessment of the crimes.

¹⁴⁸⁶ *Tadi}* Judgement; the *^elebi}i* (paras.1226, 1260, 1273), *Furund`ija* (paras 281 *et seq.*) and *Bla{ki}* (para. 787) Judgements.

¹⁴⁸⁷ *Bla{ki}* Judgement, paras. 779 and 780.

¹⁴⁸⁸ *Erdemovi}* Sentencing Judgement, para. 110, and *Erdemovi}* Sentencing Judgement II, para. 16(1).

¹⁴⁸⁹ In many national jurisdictions, the law specifically identifies those aggravating circumstances, e.g. Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act of South Australia, (1988), Section 10; United States of America Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In

(i) Criminal Participation

706. The Prosecutor argues that General Krsti's "direct, conscious and deliberate participation in creating and furthering the criminal plan as the Chief of Staff and Commander of the Troops which committed the offences, which evidences his intent and willingness to participate in the commission of the crimes, serves as an aggravating factor". The Prosecutor argues that General Krsti's "penultimate command after General Mladi, and/or the fact that he was in a position to order the prevention, cessation or punishment" of the crimes serve as aggravating factors.¹⁴⁹⁰

707. The Trial Chamber has already examined the criminal responsibility of the accused in order to decide on his guilt. The same elements should not be reviewed a first time as a constitutive element of the crime and a second time as an aggravating circumstance.

708. Direct criminal participation under Article 7 (1), if linked to a high-rank position of command, may be invoked as an aggravating factor. In determining a sentence, both Tribunals have mentioned the three most direct forms of participation, "planning, ordering, instigating", as possible aggravating circumstances in the case of a highly placed accused.¹⁴⁹¹ So it is in the case of genocide. Because an accused can commit genocide without the aid and co-operation of others, provided he has the requisite intent, a one-man genocidal agent could be viewed differently from the commander of an army or the president of a State, who has enlisted the resources of an army or a nation to carry out his genocidal effort. The Trial Chamber finds that the direct participation of a high level superior in a crime is an aggravating circumstance, although to what degree depends on the actual level of authority and the form of direct participation.

709. A high rank in the military or political field does not, in itself, lead to a harsher sentence. But a person who abuses or wrongly exercises power deserves a harsher sentence than an individual acting on his or her own. The consequences of a person's acts are necessarily more serious if he is at the apex of a military or political hierarchy and uses his position to commit crimes.¹⁴⁹² It must be noted though that current case law of the Tribunal does not evidence a discernible pattern of the

some jurisdictions, the judge cannot consider any other aggravating circumstances than those provided by the law, e.g. French Criminal Code, articles 132.71 *et seq.* (in general) for instance; Dutch Criminal Code, Articles 10, 57, 421-423 for instance.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 471.

¹⁴⁹¹ *Kambanda* Judgement, para. 44, *Kupre{ki}* Judgement, para. 862; *Rutaganda* Judgement, para. 470 and *Akayesu* Judgement, para. 36.

¹⁴⁹² *Rutaganda* Judgement, para. 469: "the fact that a person in a high position abused his authority and committed crimes is to be viewed as an aggravating factor." *Kambanda* Judgement, para. 44. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber reduced the sentence imposed on Du{ko Tadi} from 25 to 20 years stating that "there is a need for sentences to reflect the relative significance of the role of the [accused] and [...to take into account] his level in the command structure, [which] was law.", *Tadi*} Sentencing Judgement III, paras 55-57.

Tribunal imposing sentences on subordinates that differ greatly from those imposed on their superiors.¹⁴⁹³

(ii) Premeditation and Motives of Crimes

710. The Prosecutor also argues that the "premeditation involved in the genocide and deportation is clearly an aggravating circumstance in the case, given General Krsti}'s critical role in planning this massive crime".¹⁴⁹⁴

711. Premeditation¹⁴⁹⁵ may "constitute an aggravating circumstance when it is particularly flagrant" and motive "to some extent [is] a necessary factor in the determination of sentence after guilt has been established."¹⁴⁹⁶ When a genocide or a war crime, neither of which requires the element of premeditation, are in fact planned in advance, premeditation may constitute an aggravating circumstance.¹⁴⁹⁷ Premeditated or enthusiastic participation in a criminal act necessarily reveals a higher level of criminality on the part of the participant.¹⁴⁹⁸ In determining the appropriate sentence, a distinction is to be made between the individuals who allowed themselves to be drawn into a maelstrom of violence, even reluctantly, and those who initiated or aggravated it and thereby more substantially contributed to the overall harm. Indeed, reluctant participation in the crimes may in some instances be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

712. The Trial Chamber agrees with the Prosecutor on the relevance of premeditation as an aggravating factor in the abstract but, based on the sequence of General Krsti}'s delayed participation in the genocidal scheme initiated by General Mladi} and others, finds it not applicable to the situation.

(b) Mitigating Circumstances

713. Neither the Statute, the Rules nor the jurisprudence of the Tribunals define "mitigating" circumstances.¹⁴⁹⁹ A definition of what is a mitigating circumstance is provided in fact by the SFRY Criminal Code. Article 42(2) of the SFRY Criminal Code stated that the judge may determine whether "there are mitigating circumstances *which are such that they indicate that the*

¹⁴⁹³ Sentences imposed by the ICTY on subordinates are of an average of 15 years imprisonment as opposed to sentences imposed on superiors, which are of an average of 17 years imprisonment.

¹⁴⁹⁴ Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 471.

¹⁴⁹⁵ The Defense submits that the true motive for the murders of the Bosnian Muslim men, were vengeance and punishment, for failing to surrender following General Mladi}'s invitation to do so. Defence Closing Arguments, T. 10157.

¹⁴⁹⁶ *Bla{ki}* Judgement, para. 785.

¹⁴⁹⁷ *Serushago* Sentence, para. 30.

¹⁴⁹⁸ *Jelisi}* Judgement, paras 130-131; see also the *Tadi}* Sentencing Judgement, para. 57 and the *Tadi}* Sentencing Judgement II, para. 20: the enthusiastic support for the attack launched against the non-Serbian civilian population.

¹⁴⁹⁹ *Kordi}* Judgement, para. 848.

objective of the sentence may be achieved equally well by a reduced sentence." Mitigating circumstances, concomitant or posterior to the crimes, vary from case to case. The Prosecution submits that there are no mitigating circumstances in the present case.¹⁵⁰⁰ However, the Trial Chamber has the discretion to consider any factors it considers to be of a mitigating nature.

(i) Mitigating Circumstances Concomitant with the Commission of the Crimes

714. Indirect participation is one circumstance that may go to mitigating a sentence. An act of assistance to a crime is a form of participation in a crime often considered less serious than personal participation or commission as a principal and may, depending on the circumstances, warrant a lighter sentence than that imposed for direct commission.¹⁵⁰¹ Similarly, in some cases, forced participation in a crime can be a mitigating circumstance. The jurisprudence of the Tribunal established that, while duress¹⁵⁰² cannot afford a "complete defence to a soldier charged with crimes against humanity or war crimes in international law involving the taking of innocent lives",¹⁵⁰³ it may be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance. The Trial Chamber may also take into account the particular personal circumstances of the accused at the time the crimes are committed, if they illustrate the character and the capacity of the convicted person to be reintegrated in society. For instance, the fact that an accused has no prior convictions for violent crimes may be considered relevant.¹⁵⁰⁴ In contrast, personality disorders ("borderline, narcissistic and anti-social characteristics") are not relevant factors,¹⁵⁰⁵ although significant mental handicap¹⁵⁰⁶ can constitute a mitigating circumstance. Good character¹⁵⁰⁷, "keen sense for the soldiering profession", or "poor family background" in combination with youth and an "immature and fragile" personality are also elements that may constitute mitigating circumstances.¹⁵⁰⁸

(ii) Mitigating Circumstances Posterior to the Commission of the Crimes

715. The behaviour of the accused after commission of the criminal acts is also relevant to the Trial Chamber's assessment of the appropriate sentence. The behaviour of the accused in the proceedings instigated against him is of particular importance. The fact that an accused is co-operating with the court, or that he or she voluntarily surrendered, admits guilt and expresses

¹⁵⁰⁰ Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 10011.

¹⁵⁰¹ *Furund`ija* Judgement, para. 282. For instance, participation as an aider or abettor, e.g. in the crime of genocide, may range from providing information, resources, or covering-up the crimes, to leading the execution squads.

¹⁵⁰² Defined as: "imminent threats to the life of an accused if he refuses to commit a crime", Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah appended to the *Erdemovi*} Appeal Judgement, para. 66.

¹⁵⁰³ Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah appended to the *Erdemovi*} Appeal Judgement, para. 88.

¹⁵⁰⁴ *Jelisi*} Judgement, para. 124, *Furund`ija*, para. 284.

¹⁵⁰⁵ *Jelisi*} Judgement, para. 125.

¹⁵⁰⁶ Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 67 (A)(ii)(b): "diminished or lack of mental responsibility".

¹⁵⁰⁷ *Erdemovi*} Judgement, para. 16(i); *Akayesu* Sentencing Judgement, para. 35 (iii), but not in the *^elebi*}i Judgement, para. 1256.

remorse before convictions are all relevant factors and can constitute mitigating circumstances provided the accused is acting knowingly and sincerely.¹⁵⁰⁹

716. The only mitigating circumstance explicitly provided for in Rule 101(B)(ii) is co-operation with the Prosecutor. "The earnestness and degree of co-operation with the Prosecutor decides whether there is reason to reduce the sentence on these grounds".¹⁵¹⁰ This co-operation often becomes a question of the quantity and quality of the information provided by the accused.¹⁵¹¹ The providing of statements by the accused, which elucidate the details of the crimes or implicate other persons, may be considered a mitigating circumstance.¹⁵¹² Such statements may increase the speed of a trial.¹⁵¹³ Co-operation that continues during the hearings may also be relevant.¹⁵¹⁴ In this regard, the Prosecution emphasises the fact that General Krsti} gave a voluntary statement but that the information he provided was not wholly true.¹⁵¹⁵ In contrast, the "health" of the convicted person may also be a mitigating circumstance and the Defence stressed the bad health of General Krsti} throughout the trial.¹⁵¹⁶

717. The Trial Chamber turns now to determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon General Krsti} in view of the factors examined above: the general sentencing practice of the former Yugoslavia for persons convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the gravity of the crimes committed by General Krsti} and the existence and the weight of any aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances. The Trial Chamber has already alluded to the fact that genocide, being the gravest offence under Yugoslav law, would have permitted its highest sentence, up to forty years, and that the sentence will fall near that range.

C. Determination of General Krsti}'s Sentence

718. General Krsti} was 47 years old at the time of Srebrenica. At the beginning of the ten fateful days, which are 10 to 19 July 1995, he held the position of Chief of the VRS Drina Corps Staff and, during the ten days, he was promoted to the rank of commander of the VRS Drina Corps. As a

¹⁵⁰⁸ *^elebi}* Judgement, para. 1283.

¹⁵⁰⁹ *Kupre{ki}* Judgement, para. 853; *Serushago* Sentence, para. 35; see also the *Musema* Judgement, para. 1007; see also on contrary *Kambanda* Judgement, para. 51; *Akayesu* Sentencing Judgement, para. 35(i), *Serushago* Sentence, paras 40 and 41, *Ruggiu* Judgement, paras 69-72, *Kunara}* Judgement, para. 869; *Bla{ki}* Judgement, para. 780.

¹⁵¹⁰ *Bla{ki}* Judgement, para. 774.

¹⁵¹¹ *Bla{ki}* Judgement, para. 774, the *Erdemovi}* Sentencing Judgement, paras 99-101 and the *Erdemovi}* Sentencing Judgement II, para. 16 iv, and the *Kambanda* Judgement, para. 47.

¹⁵¹² *Kunara}* Judgement, para. 868.

¹⁵¹³ *Musema* Judgement, para. 1007. *Idem* in the *Ruggiu* Judgement, para. 53: a guilty plea accelerates the proceedings and makes it possible to save resources.

¹⁵¹⁴ *Idem* and in the contrary sense, *^elebi}* Judgement, para. 1244: Muci}'s lack of respect for the judicial process, attempts to fabricate evidence and influence witnesses are taken to be aggravating circumstances.

¹⁵¹⁵ Prosecution Closing Arguments, T. 10011.

military professional, General Krstić} was well aware of the extent of his obligations laid out in the military codes of the former JNA and then of the VRS. He was congratulated for the manner in which he launched the military attack on Srebrenica. On 2 December 1998, when he was arrested by SFOR, he was in command of the VRS 5th Corps in Sokolac. Since that date, he has been detained in the UN Detention Unit in Scheveningen at The Hague in the Netherlands.

719. The Trial Chamber found that General Krstić} participated in two criminal plans, initially to ethnically cleanse the Srebrenica enclave of all Muslim civilians and later to kill the military aged men of Srebrenica. For his participation in these crimes, General Krstić} has been found guilty of murder (under Article 3), persecutions (under Article 5) and genocide (under Article 4). The commission of those crimes would have justified the harshest of sentences in the former Yugoslavia.

720. The extreme gravity of the crimes committed by General Krstić} is established by their scale and organisation and the speed with which they were perpetrated in a ten day period. The Trial Chamber has already described in detail how all Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica were uprooted, how up to 25,000 Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly persons were expelled toward Bosnian Muslim controlled territory and how 7,000 to 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were executed in the most cruel manner. The Trial Chamber notes the physical and psychological suffering inflicted on the victims and the obvious psychological suffering of the survivors. The survivors lost their male family members; three generations of Muslim men from the Srebrenica area disappeared in a single week. To date, most of the women and children survivors have not been able to return to their homes and many suffer what is now known as the "Srebrenica Syndrome": an inability to get on with their lives because of the lack of definite news on the fate of their lost sons, husbands and fathers.¹⁵¹⁷

¹⁵¹⁶ *^elebi}i* Judgement, para. 1270.

¹⁵¹⁷ *Supra*, paras. 90-94. See also Witness I, T. 2420-22: "And 8.000 Srebrenica inhabitants are missing, and we must all know that. We must all know that there must have been children, poor people, between 16.000 and 20.000, and one needs to feed them all, to bring them up. There are so many fathers without sons and sons without fathers. I had two sons, and I don't have them any more. Why is that? And I lived and I worked in my own home, nobody else's, and that was -- that same held true for my father and my grandfather, but what they seized, what they took away, what they grabbed. I had two houses. One they burnt down. It could burn. They burnt it down, but the other one they couldn't burn, so they came and put a mine to it because the house was new and I hadn't finished it yet. The roof was still missing, but it was all made of concrete and bricks, so it wouldn't burn. And I thought. Well, it will survive at least. But no, they came and planted mines, and it just went down; nothing but bust. But, right. Never mind that. I had it, so it's gone. They took it. They seized it. But why did they have to kill my sons? "And I stand today as dried as that tree in the forest. I could have lived with my sons and with my own land, and now I don't have either. And how am I supposed to live today? I don't have a pension or anything. Before that, I relied on my sons. They wouldn't have left me. They wouldn't have let me go hungry. And today, without my sons, without land, I'm slowly starving."

721. As to the role of the accused, the Trial Chamber has affirmed General Krsti}’s conscious and voluntary participation in the crimes of which he has been found guilty. General Krsti} held a high rank in the VRS military hierarchy and was even promoted after the perpetration of the aforementioned crimes. At the time of the crimes, he was third, then second in command after General Mladi}. In this regard, the Trial Chamber finds that the fact that General Krsti} occupied the highest level of VRS Corps commander is an aggravating factor because he utilised that position to participate directly in a genocide.

722. The Trial Chamber also notes that the conduct of General Krsti} during the course of the trial has not been altogether forthcoming. General Krsti} testified under oath before the Trial Chamber. While this could be viewed as a sign of co-operation with the Tribunal, the evidence clearly established that he put up a false defence on several critical issues, most notably, his denial that he or anyone from the Drina Corps was involved in the forcible transfer of Muslim women, children and elderly from Poto-ari; the date upon which he became commander of the Drina Corps, or became aware of the mass executions. General Krsti}’s manner was one of obstinacy under cross-examination. He continually refused to answer directly or forthrightly legitimate questions put to him by the Prosecution or even Judges. Overall, his conduct during the proceedings evidences a lack of remorse for the role he played in the Srebrenica area in July 1995.

723. The Trial Chamber finds no other relevant circumstances. Although sympathetic to General Krsti}’s discomfort throughout the trial because of medical complications he suffered,¹⁵¹⁸ the Trial Chamber considers that this circumstance is not related to the objectives of sentence.

724. The Trial Chamber’s overall assessment is that General Krsti} is a professional soldier who willingly participated in the forcible transfer of all women, children and elderly from Srebrenica, but would not likely, on his own, have embarked on a genocidal venture; however, he allowed himself, as he assumed command responsibility for the Drina Corps, to be drawn into the heinous scheme and to sanction the use of Corps assets to assist with the genocide. After he had assumed command of the Drina Corps, on 13 July 1995, he could have tried to halt the use of Drina Corps resources in the implementation of the genocide. His own commander, General Mladi}, was calling the shots and personally supervising the killings. General Krsti}’s participation in the genocide consisted primarily of allowing Drina Corps assets to be used in connection with the executions from 14 July onwards and assisting with the provision of men to be deployed to participate in executions that occurred on 16 July 1995. General Krsti} remained largely passive in the face of

¹⁵¹⁸ In late December 1994, General Krsti} was seriously injured when he stepped on a landmine. He was evacuated to a military hospital in Sokolac, and subsequently transferred to the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade. As a result of

his knowledge of what was going on; he is guilty, but his guilt is palpably less than others who devised and supervised the executions all through that week and who remain at large. When pressured, he assisted the effort in deploying some men for the task, but on his own he would not likely have initiated such a plan. Afterwards, as word of the executions filtered in, he kept silent and even expressed sentiments lionising the Bosnian Serb campaign in Srebrenica. After the signing of the Dayton Accords, he co-operated with the implementers of the accord and continued with his professional career although he insisted that his fruitless effort to unseat one of his officers, whom he believed to have directly participated in the killings, meant he would not be trusted or treated as a devoted loyalist by the Bosnian Serb authorities thereafter. His story is one of a respected professional soldier who could not balk his superiors' insane desire to forever rid the Srebrenica area of Muslim civilians, and who, finally, participated in the unlawful realisation of this hideous design.

725. The Prosecutor submits that General Krsti} should be sentenced to consecutive life sentences for each count of the Indictment under which General Krsti} is found guilty. However, in view of the fact that General Krsti} is guilty of crimes characterised in several different ways but which form part of a single campaign or strategies of crimes committed in a geographically limited territory over a limited period of time, the Trial Chamber holds it preferable to impose a single sentence, bearing in mind that the nearly three years spent in the custody of the Tribunal is to be deducted from the time to be served.¹⁵¹⁹

726. In light of the above considerations, the Trial Chamber sentences General Krsti} to Forty six years of imprisonment.

the injuries he sustained from the landmine, part of his leg was amputated and he remained in rehabilitation and on leave until mid May 1995.

¹⁵¹⁹ Rule 101 (D).

V. DISPOSITION

727. Based upon the facts and the legal findings as determined by the Trial Chamber and for the foregoing reasons, the Trial Chamber:

FINDS Radislav Krsti} **GUILTY** of:

- Genocide;
- Persecution for murders, cruel and inhumane treatment, terrorising the civilian population, forcible transfer and destruction of personal property of Bosnian Muslim civilians;
- Murder as a violation of the Laws and Customs of War;

SENTENCES Radislav KRSTI] to Fourty six years of imprisonment and **STATES** that the full amount of time spent in the custody of the Tribunal will be deducted from the time to be served.

Done on second of August 2001 in English and French, the English text being authoritative.

At The Hague, The Netherlands

Judge Fouad Riad

Judge Almiro Rodrigues

Judge Patricia Wald

Presiding