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Issues: Did the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Somali: Dowladda Federaalka Kumeelgaarka) have a Ministry of National Security between 2007-2011?

If so, any information in regards to its structure and how it was connected to the National Security Agency, with a particular focus on;

1) who was responsible for gathering intelligence on counter terrorism within this period, as well as

2) the use of torture and/or summary executions by the TFG National Security Agency (or Ministry of National Security) (including frequency) within this period.

Keywords: Transitional Federal Government – Ministry of National Security – national Security Agency – intelligence – counter terrorism – torture – summary execution

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Did the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Somali: Dowladda Federaalka Kumeelgaarka) have a Ministry of National Security between 2007-2011?

In August 2011 the *US Congressional Research Service* reported that in June 2006 Mohamed Qanyare was sacked from his position as Minister of National Security,

“On February 18, 2006, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) was created, allegedly to fight terrorism. Very little is known about ARPCT, although the founders of the Alliance are known warlords who contributed to numerous armed clashes and instability in Somalia over the past decade. Members of the Alliance reportedly include Bashir Rage, Mohammed Qanyare Afrah, Muse Sudi Yalahow, Omar Finnish, and Abdirashid Shire Ilqyete. These actors were seen by many Somali groups as major obstacles to the creation of central authority in Mogadishu, as agreed to by all major Somali groups under the IGAD peace agreement in 2004. In early June 2006, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi dismissed four ministers from the Transitional Federal Government belonging to ARPCT.

These ministers include Mohamed Qanyare (National Security Minister), Musa Sudi Yalahow (Commerce Minister), Issa Botan Alin (Rehabilitation Minister), and Omar Finnish (Minister for Religious Affairs). The warlords were dismissed because they reportedly ignored calls by Prime Minister Ghedi's government to stop the fighting in Mogadishu. The Islamic Courts leaders argued then that the TFG did nothing to challenge these warlords and kept them in senior positions in the TFG until the Islamic Courts defeated the warlords in Mogadishu. In late July 2006, members of the TFG parliament complained that the U.S. government bypassed the TFG and provided support to the warlords, the same warlords who obstructed peace in Somalia.”¹

In December 2007 news agency *Reuters* reported that Hassan Mohamed Nur Shatigadud resigned from his position as National Security Minister on 3 December 2007, the day after Prime Minister Hussein had appointed him in his cabinet,

“Hussein's government is the 14th attempt at establishing effective central rule since clan warlords toppled military dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991.

The clan issue -- paramount in Somali life and politics -- has beset the interim government since it was formed at peace talks in Kenya three years ago.

Four ministers from the Rahanwein clan -- one of the big four clans -- quit late on Monday, including National Security Minister Hassan Mohamed Nur Shatigadud.

“We decided to resign because we, as Rahanwein, have been scorned and we have not been given our fair share in Nur Adde's new government,” Shatigadud told a news conference, referring to the premier by his nickname Nur Adde.”

The squabbling highlights the difficulty of Hussein's task to unite the lawless Horn of Africa country whose 10 million citizens are more likely to pledge allegiance to their clan than a national government.

Hussein's inauguration last month was seen as an opportunity for reconciliation in Somalia where fighting between government troops and Islamist insurgents has killed almost 6,000 civilians, and uprooted hundreds of thousands this year.

¹ US Congressional Research Service, Somalia: Current conditions and prospects for a lasting peace, August 31 2011, available from <http://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/row/RL33911.pdf>, accessed 6 October 2012

On Sunday, Hussein named what he said was an "all-inclusive" cabinet."²

In June 2009 UK daily newspaper, *The Guardian* reported that Somali National Security Minister Omar Hashi Aden was killed by a bomb attack on a hotel,

"Somalia's national security minister was killed today in an explosion blamed on a suicide bomber that also killed at least 20 others.

Omar Hashi Aden died in the blast outside the Medina hotel in Beledweyne, a frequent haunt of Khartoum officials.³

In July 2010 US daily newspaper, *The Seattle Times* reported that Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke had appointed a member of a moderate Islamic militia to the Ministry of National Security,

"Somalia's prime minister has named members of a powerful moderate Islamic militia to the Cabinet, more than three months after the government signed a power-sharing deal with them.

Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke appointed late Saturday members of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama to the ministries of National Security, Finance, Health and Education.

To accommodate the new members, Sharmarke demoted and fired other ministers. Changes in the Cabinet signal an easing in relations between Sharmarke and President Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed.

The two leaders had a falling out in May after Ahmed fired Sharmarke, saying he wanted to end divisions in the government. Sharmarke challenged the decision and Ahmed later reversed it. The prime minister consulted with the president on these Cabinet appointments."⁴

In November 2010 *USDOS* reported in its Background Note that Ahmed Abdisalaam Aden was the Minister of National Security.⁵

In November 2010 *Hiiraan Online* reported that Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed appointed Abdishakur Sheikh Hassan Farah as Minister for Interior and National Security in his new cabinet,

1. Deputy PM & Foreign Minister, Abdullahi Mohamed Omaar
2. Deputy PM & Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Dr. Abdiweli Ali
3. Deputy PM & Minister of Defence, Abdihakim Mohamoud Haji-Faqi
4. Minister of Finance and Treasury, Hussein Abdi Halane Minister
5. Minister of Interior and National Security, Abdishakur Sheikh Hassan Farah.

² Reuters, Somali president flown to hospital in Kenya, 4 December 2007, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/12/04/us-somalia-conflict-president-idUSL041219920071204>, accessed 5 October 2012

³ The Guardian, Blast kills Somali security minister, 18 June 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/18/somalia-blast-kills-minister>, accessed 10 October 2012

⁴ The Seattle Times, Somali prime minister names Islamists to Cabinet, 4 July 2010, http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2012275839_apafsomalia.html, accessed 4 October 2012

⁵ United States Department of State, Background Note, Somalia, 8 November 2010, <http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/somalia/154048.htm>, accessed 10 October 2012

6. Ministry of Information, Post and Telecommunication, Prof. Abdulkareem Hassan Jama
7. Minister of Education, Higher Education and Culture, Dr. Abdinur Sheikh Mohamed
8. Ministry of Ports, Marine, Air and Land Transport, Ahmed Abdirahman Abade.
9. Ministry of Commerce, Dr. Mohamud Abdi Ibrahim
10. Ministry of Public Works and Reconstruction, Abdirashid Hashi
11. Ministry of Justice, Religious Affairs and Endowment ,Abdullahi Abyan Nur.
12. Ministry of Women's Development and Family Welfare, Dr. Maryan Qasim
13. Ministry of Mineral Resources, Abdirisak Sheikh Muhyadin
14. Ministry of Health and Human Services, Dr. Aden Haji Ibrahim Daud
15. Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, Yusuf Moallim Amin
16. ministry of Youth and Sports, Abdinur Moallim Mohamud
17. Minister of Fisheries, Marine Resources, Dr. Mohamed Moallim Hassan Mohamed
18. Ministry of Constitution and Federalism, Mohamud Mohamed Boonow.”⁶

In May 2011 media NGO the *Somalia Report*, reported that Interior and National Security Minister Abdishakur Hassan Farah stated that the Ministry of National Security had issued a circular prohibiting the illegal possession of arms,

“Interior and National Security Minister Abdishakur Hassan Farah [] said that the ministry has issued a circular that prohibits the possessions of arms illegally.

“I call on all the Somali people to work jointly with the security forces in reducing the crime level in the city and report all suspicious looking characters more and those who have weapons in their possession, “ Abdishakur said.”⁷

In June 2011 the *Long War Journal*, established by former US officials, reported that Interior Minister Abdishakur Sheik Hassan was killed in an attack, stating that he also served as Minister for National Security,

“Shabaab has claimed credit for a suicide attack today that killed Somalia's interior minister in his home in a secured area of Mogadishu.

Interior Minister Abdishakur Sheik Hassan was killed after suffering fatal wounds during a bombing at his home in the war-torn Somali capital. A woman believed to be Hassan's niece is thought to have carried out the suicide attack. If it is confirmed that Hassan's niece carried out the attack, this would be the first suicide bombing carried out by a woman in Somalia.

⁶ Hiiraan Online, Somali Prime Minister unveiled his cabinet, 12 November 2010, http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2010/nov/somali_prime_minister_unveiled_his_cabinet.aspx, accessed 5 October 2012

⁷ Somalia Report, TFG Security heads meet after suicide attack, 31 May 2011, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/subcategory/1/Home_LAND/Government/052011///1, accessed 5 October 2012

Hassan, who also served as Somalia's minister for national security, helped coordinate the weak Transitional Federal Government's fight with the African Union against Shabaab.”⁸

In August 2011 the *US Congressional Research Service* reported that Abdishakur Hassan Farah, the Minister of Interior and National Security was killed in June 2011,

“On June 10, 2011, the Minister of Interior and National Security,

Abdishakur Hassan Farah, was killed in a suicide attack. The attacker was reportedly his own niece.”⁹

In July 2011 NGO media agency *Somalia Report* stated that Prime Minister Abdiweli had appointed Abdisama Maalim Mohamud Sheekh Hassan as Minister of Interior and National Security.¹⁰

**If so, any information in regards to its structure and how it was connected to the National Security Agency, with a particular focus on
1) who was responsible for gathering intelligence on counter terrorism within this period**

In its 2008 annual report, covering the events of 2007, *Amnesty International* reported that the National Security Agency was created in 2007,

“The Transitional Federal Parliament approved a three-month state of emergency in January, which was not renewed. It established a new National Security Agency.”¹¹

No direct links between the Ministry of National Security and the National Security Agency were identified within the sources consulted during the timeframe of this research.

In August 2011 US daily newspaper, *The New York Times*, stated that the Somali National Security Agency (NSA) is largely funded by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), reporting some concerns that the NSA was becoming independent of the government,

“Unlike regular Somali government troops, the C.I.A.-trained Somali commandos are outfitted with new weapons and flak jackets, and are given sunglasses and ski masks to conceal their identities. They are part of the Somali National Security Agency — an intelligence organization financed largely by the C.I.A. — which answers to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government. Many in Mogadishu, though, believe that the Somali intelligence service is building a power base independent of the weak government.

One Somali official, speaking only on the condition of anonymity, said that the spy service was becoming a “government within a government.”

“No one, not even the president, knows what the N.S.A. is doing,” he said. “The Americans are creating a monster.”¹²

⁸ The Long War Journal, Shabaab suicide bomber kills Somali interior minister, 10 June 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/06/shabaab_suicide_bomb_1.php, accessed 6 October 2012

⁹ US Congressional Research Service, Somalia: Current conditions and prospects for a lasting peace, August 31 2011, available from <http://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/row/RL33911.pdf>, accessed 6 October 2012

¹⁰ SomaliaReport, PM Abdiweli names new cabinet, 20 July 2011, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1184/PM_Abdiweli_Names_New_Cabinet, accessed 10 October 2012

¹¹ Amnesty International, Annual Report 2008, Somalia, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/somalia/report-2008>, accessed 11 October 2012

¹² The New York Times, US relies on contractors in Somalia conflict, 10 August 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/world/africa/11somalia.html?pagewanted=all, accessed 10 October 2012

In August 2011 US newspaper *The Nation* reported that the CIA in Somali preferred not to deal directly with political leaders and instead had Somali intelligence agents on its payroll,

“According to well-connected Somali sources, the CIA is reluctant to deal directly with Somali political leaders, who are regarded by US officials as corrupt and untrustworthy. Instead, the United States has Somali intelligence agents on its payroll. Somali sources with knowledge of the program described the agents as lining up to receive \$200 monthly cash payments from Americans. “They support us in a big way financially,” says the senior Somali intelligence official. “They are the largest [funder] by far.””¹³

In August 2011 US newspaper *The Nation* reported that it was not clear if the Somali president was fully briefed on National Security Agency operations and that the CIA did not engage with Somalia’s political leadership. *The Nation* further reported that Somali intelligence agents were not firmly under Somali government control,

“It is unclear how much control, if any, Somalia’s internationally recognized president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, has over this counterterrorism force or if he is even fully briefed on its operations. The CIA personnel and other US intelligence agents “do not bother to be in touch with the political leadership of the country. And that says a lot about the intentions,” says Aynte. “Essentially, the CIA seems to be operating, doing the foreign policy of the United States. You should have had State Department people doing foreign policy, but the CIA seems to be doing it across the country.” []

the CIA is training, paying and at times directing Somali intelligence agents who are not firmly under the control of the Somali government”¹⁴

In August 2011 US newspaper *The Nation* reported that the CIA provides counterterrorism training to the Somali intelligence agents and that there was an underground prison beneath the National Security Agency headquarters where suspected Al Shabab members were held and interrogated ,

“Nestled in a back corner of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport is a sprawling walled compound run by the Central Intelligence Agency. Set on the coast of the Indian Ocean, the facility looks like a small gated community, with more than a dozen buildings behind large protective walls and secured by guard towers at each of its four corners. Adjacent to the compound are eight large metal hangars, and the CIA has its own aircraft at the airport. The site, which airport officials and Somali intelligence sources say was completed four months ago, is guarded by Somali soldiers, but the Americans control access. At the facility, the CIA runs a counterterrorism training program for Somali intelligence agents and operatives aimed at building an indigenous strike force capable of snatch operations and targeted “combat” operations against members of Al Shabab, an Islamic militant group with close ties to Al Qaeda.

As part of its expanding counterterrorism program in Somalia, the CIA also uses a secret prison buried in the basement of Somalia’s National Security Agency (NSA) headquarters, where prisoners suspected of being Shabab members or of having links to the group are held. Some of the prisoners have been snatched off the streets of Kenya and rendered by plane to Mogadishu. While the underground prison is officially run by the Somali NSA, US intelligence personnel pay the salaries of intelligence agents and also directly interrogate prisoners. The existence of both facilities and the CIA role was uncovered by *The Nation* during an extensive on-the-ground investigation in Mogadishu. Among the sources who provided information for this story are senior Somali intelligence officials; senior members of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG); former prisoners held at the

¹³ The Nation, The CIA’s secret sites in Somalia, 1-8 August 2011, <http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia?page=0.0>, accessed 11 October 2012

¹⁴ The Nation, The CIA’s secret sites in Somalia, 1-8 August 2011, <http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia?page=0.0>, accessed 11 October 2012

underground prison; and several well-connected Somali analysts and militia leaders, some of whom have worked with US agents, including those from the CIA. A US official, who confirmed the existence of both sites, told *The Nation*, "It makes complete sense to have a strong counterterrorism partnership" with the Somali government."¹⁵

In August 2011 US newspaper *The Nation* reported that cells in the prison underneath the National Security Agency's headquarters were windowless, dirty and infested with bedbugs and mosquitoes. According to *The Nation* some detainees had been held for over a year and were not allowed outside, further, detainees were interrogated by French and US agents,

"According to former detainees, the underground prison, which is staffed by Somali guards, consists of a long corridor lined with filthy small cells infested with bedbugs and mosquitoes. One said that when he arrived in February, he saw two white men wearing military boots, combat trousers, gray tucked-in shirts and black sunglasses. The former prisoners described the cells as windowless and the air thick, moist and disgusting. Prisoners, they said, are not allowed outside. Many have developed rashes and scratch themselves incessantly. Some have been detained for a year or more. According to one former prisoner, inmates who had been there for long periods would pace around constantly, while others leaned against walls rocking.

A Somali who was arrested in Mogadishu and taken to the prison told *The Nation* that he was held in a windowless underground cell. Among the prisoners he met during his time there was a man who held a Western passport (he declined to identify the man's nationality). Some of the prisoners told him they were picked up in Nairobi and rendered on small aircraft to Mogadishu, where they were handed over to Somali intelligence agents. Once in custody, according to the senior Somali intelligence official and former prisoners, some detainees are freely interrogated by US and French agents. "Our goal is to please our partners, so we get more [out] of them, like any relationship," said the Somali intelligence official in describing the policy of allowing foreign agents, including from the CIA, to interrogate prisoners. The Americans, according to the Somali official, operate unilaterally in the country, while the French agents are embedded within the African Union force known as AMISOM."¹⁶

In August 2011 US daily newspaper, *The New York Times*, stated that the CIA has worked with the Somali Intelligence agency to interrogate prisoners,

"The C.I.A. has also occasionally joined Somali operatives in interrogating prisoners, including Ahmed Abdullahi Hassan, a Kenyan arrested in Nairobi in 2009 on an American intelligence tip and handed over to Somalia by the Kenyans. The C.I.A. operations in Somalia were first reported last month by the magazine *The Nation*.

An American official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of restrictions against discussing relationships with foreign intelligence services, said that agency officers had questioned Mr. Hassan in a Somali prison under strict interrogation rules.

"The host country must give credible assurances that suspects will be treated humanely," the official said, and intelligence officials "must be convinced that the individual in custody has time-sensitive information about terrorist operations targeting U.S. interests."

A C.I.A. spokeswoman said that the spy agency was not holding suspects in secret American prisons, as it did in the years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

¹⁵ The Nation, The CIA's secret sites in Somalia, 1-8 August 2011, <http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia?page=0.0>, accessed 11 October 2012

¹⁶ The Nation, The CIA's secret sites in Somalia, 1-8 August 2011, <http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia?page=0.0>, accessed 11 October 2012

“The C.I.A. does not run prisons in Somalia or anywhere else, period,” said the spokeswoman, Marie Harf. “The C.I.A.’s detention and interrogation program ended over two and a half years ago.”¹⁷

In August 2011 US newspaper *The Nation* reported that 87 people were rendered to Somalia in 2007 and that detainees in the National Security Agency prison in Mogadishu have been held without access to a lawyer, or being charged or brought to court. According to *The Nation*, lawyers representing a detainee likened the NSA/CIA relationship at the prison to being a decentralized, outsourced Guantanamo Bay,

“Among the men believed to be held in the secret underground prison is Ahmed Abdullahi Hassan, a 25- or 26-year-old Kenyan citizen who disappeared from the congested Somali slum of Eastleigh in Nairobi around July 2009. After he went missing, Hassan’s family retained Mbugua Mureithi, a well-known Kenyan human rights lawyer, who filed a habeas petition on his behalf. The Kenyan government responded that Hassan was not being held in Kenya and said it had no knowledge of his whereabouts. His fate remained a mystery until this spring, when another man who had been held in the Mogadishu prison contacted Clara Gutteridge, a veteran human rights investigator with the British legal organization Reprieve, and told her he had met Hassan in the prison. Hassan, he said, had told him how Kenyan police had knocked down his door, snatched him and taken him to a secret location in Nairobi. The next night, Hassan had said, he was rendered to Mogadishu.

According to the former fellow prisoner, Hassan told him that his captors took him to Wilson Airport: “They put a bag on my head, Guantánamo style. They tied my hands behind my back and put me on a plane. In the early hours we landed in Mogadishu. The way I realized I was in Mogadishu was because of the smell of the sea—the runway is just next to the seashore. The plane lands and touches the sea. They took me to this prison, where I have been up to now. I have been here for one year, seven months. I have been interrogated so many times. Interrogated by Somali men and white men. Every day. New faces show up. They have nothing on me. I have never seen a lawyer, never seen an outsider. Only other prisoners, interrogators, guards. Here there is no court or tribunal.”

After meeting the man who had spoken with Hassan in the underground prison, Gutteridge began working with Hassan’s Kenyan lawyers to determine his whereabouts. She says he has never been charged or brought before a court. “Hassan’s abduction from Nairobi and rendition to a secret prison in Somalia bears all the hallmarks of a classic US rendition operation,” she says. The US official interviewed for this article denied the CIA had rendered Hassan but said, “The United States provided information which helped get Hassan—a dangerous terrorist—off the street.” Human Rights Watch and Reprieve have documented that Kenyan security and intelligence forces have facilitated scores of renditions for the US and other governments, including eighty-five people rendered to Somalia in 2007 alone. []

“Hassan’s lawyers are preparing to file a habeas petition on his behalf in US courts. “Hassan’s case suggests that the US may be involved in a decentralized, out-sourced Guantánamo Bay in central Mogadishu,” his legal team asserted in a statement to *The Nation*. “Mr. Hassan must be given the opportunity to challenge both his rendition and continued detention as a matter of urgency. The US must urgently confirm exactly what has been done to Mr. Hassan, why he is being held, and when he will be given a fair hearing.”¹⁸

In August 2011 US newspaper *The Nation* reported that Somali officials started the interrogations and then US and French agents followed with their own interrogations, with the Somali agents

¹⁷ The New York Times, US relies on contractors in Somalia conflict, 10 August 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/world/africa/11somalia.html?pagewanted=all, accessed 10 October 2012

¹⁸ The Nation, The CIA’s secret sites in Somalia, 1-8 August 2011, <http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia?page=0,0>, accessed 11 October 2012

present. According to *The Nation*, in addition to alleged renderings, the CIA also notified the National Security Agency of suspects arriving by commercial flights to Mogadishu airport,

[]“The bunker is there, and that’s where the intelligence agency does interrogate people,” says Abdirahman “Aynte” Ali, a Somali analyst who has researched the Shabab and Somali security forces. “When CIA and other intelligence agencies—who actually are in Mogadishu—want to interrogate those people, they usually just do that.” Somali officials “start the interrogation, but then foreign intelligence agencies eventually do their own interrogation as well, the Americans and the French.” The US official said that US agents’ “debriefing” prisoners in the facility has “been done on only rare occasions” and always jointly with Somali agents.

Some prisoners, like Hassan, were allegedly rendered from Nairobi, while in other cases, according to Aynte, “the US and other intelligence agencies have notified the Somali intelligence agency that some people, some suspects, people who have been in contact with the leadership of Al Shabab, are on their way to Mogadishu on a [commercial] plane, and to essentially be at the airport for those people. Catch them, interrogate them.”¹⁹

2) The use of torture and/or summary executions by the TFG National Security Agency (or Ministry of National Security) (including frequency) within this period.

Several reports document torture and killings by Transitional Federal Government Forces, but no specific references to torture or summary executions by the Ministry of National Security were identified within the sources consulted during the timeframe of this research.²⁰

In 2007 *Human Rights Watch* reported that concerns that detainees were subject to beatings and torture at Baarista Hisbiga, a facility Human Rights Watch believed to be under the control of the National Security Agency,

“Mass arrests became increasingly prevalent in June and July 2007 with TFG militias and Ethiopian troops cordoning off large neighborhoods of the city, and then arresting and detaining hundreds of individuals, including children in some cases.

According to Human Rights Watch’s research, the detainees are being held in several locations: Baarista Hisbiga; [HRW footnote 252; “Baarista Hisbiga is a three-story building originally built for the former Somali Revolutionary and Socialism Party (SRSP) of Siad Barre. It contains an underground detention bunker which the Barre government used to detain political dissidents. It reportedly has seven to ten large rooms which can accommodate up to 200 people. The center is currently believed to be controlled by the National Security Agency.”] Saldhigga Bari police station; Hawlwadag police station; the CID prison at K-4 junction; and a detention center inside Villa Somalia. Some of the prisoners initially held in these locations were later transferred to the main central prison known as Galshire, near the sea port.

A significant number of the detainees, including individuals who were arrested as long ago as March, were held without charge. The emergency law passed on January 13, 2007 (see Chapter IV, “Mogadishu Under Siege”), does not address periods that detainees can be held without charge, although apparently police told some detainees that they could hold people indefinitely without charge during the duration of the emergency law. Although the emergency law was of only three months duration (and therefore due to end in April), it was July by the time the speaker of the Parliament announced its expiry.

¹⁹ The Nation, The CIA’s secret sites in Somalia, 1-8 August 2011, http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia?page=0_0, accessed 11 October 2012

²⁰ Human Rights Watch, So much to fear, War crimes and the devastation of Somalia, December 2008, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia1208web.pdf>, accessed 11 October 2012

Human Rights Watch is concerned that detainees are being subjected to beatings, mistreatment, and possibly torture in detention. Released individuals have described serious abuses by TFG and Ethiopian security forces against detainees. []

Another man who was arrested in a June 7 operation that detained more than 100 people was transferred to Baarista Hisbiga. He saw at least five other detainees there who were badly beaten, with blood covering their faces, and some had broken noses, split lips, and other injuries to the head. He saw boys as young as 16 and 17 years old among the detainees.

A released detainee described Baarista Hisbiga as the "worst place to be detained." He added, "Some guards let a few detainees go outside to have some fresh air. Those who have influential people campaigning for their release often get this opportunity. The majority of the detainees do not get any chance to come out of these underground bunkers."²¹

In December 2008 *Human Rights Watch* stated that the National Security Agency has a detention facility at the Baarista Hisbiga in Mogadishu and that persons suspected of being insurgents faced abusive interrogation,

"The National Security Agency (NSA) is the TFG's intelligence service, under the command of Mohammed Warsame Darwish. The NSA maintains its own detention facility at the Baarista Hisbiga in Mogadishu; the appalling conditions in this facility and the treatment meted out to NSA detainees there are described below. The NSA has arrested several journalists and aid workers. In October 2007 the NSA detained and interrogated a World Food Program official for nearly a week after storming the WFP's offices. Darwish publicly defended the action.[]

TFG police and NSA personnel have frequently arrested residents of Mogadishu on suspicion of links to the insurgency. Persons who are arrested as suspected insurgents often face abusive interrogation at the hands of SPF or NSA officers.²²

In recommendations to the Transitional Federal Government in December 2008, *Human Rights Watch* stated that abusive conditions at Baarista Hisbiga were systematic,

"Immediately close the NSA detention facility at the Baarista Hisbiga, where abusive conditions of detention are systematic. Charge with cognizable criminal offenses or release all current NSA detainees. Those charged should be transferred to other detention facilities."²³

In December 2008 *Human Rights Watch* stated that the Baarista Hisbiga is "dungeon-like," with harsh unsanitary conditions in which approximately 200 detainees are held in cramped cells without natural light or fresh air,

"The TFG's National Security Agency maintains a dungeon-like detention facility in the Baarista Hisbiga building near Villa Somalia in southern Mogadishu. Human Rights Watch gathered detailed accounts of the appalling conditions of detention there from four former NSA detainees. The detention facility consists of a long basement corridor with seven rooms branching off of it. Five of those rooms are holding cells and two of them serve as communal toilets and washrooms. There is no source of natural light or fresh air and as many as 200 detainees are held there at one time. The cramped holding cells cannot hold such large numbers so the doors are usually left open and detainees compete for space

²¹ Human Rights Watch, Shell-shocked, Civilians under siege in Mogadishu,

<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0807webwcover.pdf>, accessed 12 October 2012

²² Human Rights Watch, So much to fear, War crimes and the devastation of Somalia, December 2008, p46 and p52,

<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia1208web.pdf>, accessed 11 October 2012

²³ Human Rights Watch, So much to fear, War crimes and the devastation of Somalia, December 2008, p10,

<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia1208web.pdf>, accessed 11 October 2012

inside of the cells and along the corridor. One former detainee recalled that on his first day there, "The most difficult issue was that you could not get a place to sleep. I sat down somewhere and someone yelled at me, 'Don't sit there, that is my place!'"

The toilets are filthy and often back up and overflow with raw sewage and cold water. The taps inside of those rooms are the detainees' only source of drinking water. The two holding cells opposite the toilets would flood whenever the toilets overflowed; the guards sometimes use these as punishment cells for detainees who caused trouble or made too much noise. The only time detainees normally leave the basement detention facility is if they are brought up the stairs for questioning and many detainees remain underground for weeks or months at a stretch. These conditions caused some detainees serious psychological distress. One former inmate recalled that, "At night it was very hot, people are shouting, sometimes they are jumping to try and break the door at the top of the stairs" that served as the only exit from the place."²⁴

In December 2008 *Human Rights Watch* stated former detainees reported seeing people bloodied and beaten following interrogation and that there was no access to medical care,

"The detainees who spoke to Human Rights Watch had been interrogated both by NSA and ENDF personnel. None said they had been tortured, but all had seen other detainees shoved down the stairs back into the basement after questioning bearing the signs of severe beatings and other forms of torture. "When people came back from upstairs they were bloody and beaten," one former prisoner recalled. "People were crying. And there is no doctor in there."

The Baarista Hisbiga's detainees were a diverse group. Those interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that during their time there they met suspected insurgent fighters; businessmen suspected of supporting the insurgency; journalists; and relatives of wealthy people who had never been interrogated and believed they were being held only for ransom. Others said they had been arrested at random off of the street following roadside bomb attacks or ambushes of TFG or ENDF personnel.²⁵

In recommendations to the Transitional Federal Government in December 2008, *Human Rights Watch* stated that the National Security Agency was responsible for extrajudicial killings, rape and the mistreatment of civilians,

"Immediately issue clear, public orders and take all necessary steps to ensure that all TFG security forces and militias comply with international human rights and humanitarian law, including by ending extrajudicial killings, rapes, mistreatment of civilians, and pillaging and looting of civilian property. Forces currently responsible for such abuses include the National Security Agency, the Somali Police Force, the Presidential Guard, and militias beholden to TFG officials including the former mayor of Mogadishu."²⁶

In March 2008 *Amnesty International* stated that journalists reporting on conflict had received death threats from persons identifying themselves as officers in the National Security Agency,

"Journalists who fled Mogadishu to neighbouring countries have told Amnesty International that they regularly receive death threats when they report on casualties suffered by any parties to the conflict. Threats are typically delivered by calls to mobile phones, with the number of the caller withheld, although in many cases the caller has identified himself as an

²⁴ Human Rights Watch, So much to fear, War crimes and the devastation of Somalia, December 2008, p54 <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia1208web.pdf>, accessed 11 October 2012

²⁵ Human Rights Watch, So much to fear, War crimes and the devastation of Somalia, December 2008, p53 and p54, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia1208web.pdf>, accessed 11 October 2012

²⁶ Human Rights Watch, So much to fear, War crimes and the devastation of Somalia, December 2008, p10, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia1208web.pdf>, accessed 11 October 2012

officer of the National Security Agency (NSA) of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).²⁷

In March 2008 *Amnesty International* reported that journalists were detained by the National Security Agency and subjected to psychological torture,

“Other journalists have been arrested multiple times by TFG forces or the Ethiopian military. Many identified their captors as members of the NSA, headed by General Mohamed Aden, known as General “Darwish”. They were usually detained after having conducted interviews or filed stories about the conflict -- particularly interviews with government opponents.

Some told Amnesty International that while they were being questioned, NSA officers openly discussed amongst themselves whether or not they should kill the journalist.

“Somali journalists are struggling to do their jobs in one of the most dangerous and difficult climates imaginable,” said Kagari. “The attacks and threats they are being subjected to on a daily basis are a deliberate attempt to silence the most important voices revealing human rights violations by all parties to the conflict in Somalia. These voices must be protected.”²⁸

In January 2009 *Amnesty International* expressed concern that a UN Resolution that authorised training of Somali security forces, stating that National Security Agency personnel had participated in human rights violations,

“The provision of the resolution authorizing AMISOM and a proposed UN force to assist the re-establishment and training of Somali security forces is particularly worrying, given the fact that Transitional Federal Government forces, including National Security Agency personnel and pro-TFG armed groups have been implicated in violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.”²⁹

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²⁷ Amnesty International, Somalia: Journalists face deliberate and systematic attack, 3 March 2008, <http://www.amnesty.org/fr/node/4009>, accessed 11 October 2012

²⁸ Amnesty International, Somalia: Journalists face deliberate and systematic attack, 3 March 2008, <http://www.amnesty.org/fr/node/4009>, accessed 11 October 2012

²⁹ Amnesty International, Media Briefing - Somalia: Protection of civilians should be a paramount concern for the UN Security Council, 16 January 2009, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4975963f1e.html>, 11 October 2012