Mali: Situation of the Tuareg in southern Mali, including Bamako; treatment of Tuareg members of the gendarmerie in the army; the Tuareg Imghad and Allies Self-defence Group (Groupe autodéfense touareg Imghad et alliés, GATIA) and its connection with the gendarmerie; the obligation for Tuareg members of the gendarmerie to assist GATIA and their treatment if they refuse to do so (2015-April 2017)

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa

1. Overview

According to an article published in 2016 by the International Centre for Peace and Human Rights (Centre international pour la paix et les droits de l'homme, CIPADH), a non-profit organization that offers analysis of human rights issues (CIPADH n.d.), there is still [translation] "prejudice with respect to disloyalty" against the Tuareg in Mali and it results in "violence and discrimination" (CIPADH 8 Feb. 2016). The same source refers to a [translation] "lingering societal mistrust of Tuareg nationals" and explains that the Tuareg, who fled the country in 2012 in the midst of the rebellion led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad, MNLA), "remain stigmatized" following their return to Mali (CIPADH 8 Feb. 2016). This article states that there is a [translation] "persistent feeling of suspicion" between Malians in the south and Tuareg in the north (CIPADH 8 Feb. 2016). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

In its World Report 2016, Human Rights Watch indicates the following about Mali:

[Human Rights Watch English version]

The most frequent and serious abuse was meted out by army soldiers and members of the pro-government militia Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), largely targeting men from the Peuhl and Tuareg ethnic groups. (Human Rights Watch 27 Jan. 2016, 3)

According to the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 published by the US Department of State, the majority of the "military abuses" that targeted Peuhl, Tuareg, and Arab individuals were "in reprisal" for attacks attributed to armed groups associated with those ethnicities (US 3 Mar. 2017, 11).

The same report indicates that there is still "societal discrimination" against black Tuaregs in Mali (U.S. 3 Mar. 2017, 25). The same source reports that because of traditional slavery-like practices and hereditary servitude relationships, certain Tuareg groups deprived black Tuaregs of their civil freedoms in Mali (US 3 Mar. 2017, 25). In addition, according to a report from the United Nations Human Rights Council published in 2012, slavery [UN English version] "is still a widespread practice" within certain Tuareg communities (UN 7 Jan. 2012, para. 17).

1.1 Situation of the Tuareg in Southern Mali, including Bamako

Information about the situation of the Tuareg in southern Mali, including Bamako, was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

During a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, a research director [1] at the National Centre for Scientific Research (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, CNRS), a multidisciplinary research agency run by the French government (CNRS n.d.), whose research subjects include the Sahara and Sahel regions of Africa, notably Mali and nomadic Tuareg societies, and who was located in Bamako in March 2017, explained that he was not aware of abuses being carried out recently against Tuareg in Bamako (Research Director 28 Apr. 2017). The same source also reported that three Tuareg Malians-whom he has known for a long time, who were on an assignment in Niamey, and with whom he had spoken a few days prior-also stated that they had no knowledge of abuses being carried out against Tuareg in Bamako recently (Research Director 28 Apr. 2017). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2. Treatment of Tuareg Members of the Gendarmerie in the Army

Information about the treatment of Tuareg members of the gendarmerie in the army was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an independent journalist who specializes in civilian-military relations in western Africa and who has published several articles about Mali, wrote the following:

[translation]

[T]here are tensions between the gendarmerie and the army. The gendarmerie has a "military police mission," which means that they act as the police force during military missions. Many military personnel are frustrated with the gendarmerie because they do not understand that it is not enough to simply arrest terrorists and put them in prison, that there needs to be evidence and a trial. The gendarmerie upholds citizens' rights, and the army has difficulty respecting the basic rights of suspects. That creates tension with the army on the ground. However, [it is limited] to the central part of the country and some regions in the north where the gendarmerie has been deployed.

… I presume that a Tuareg in the gendarmerie would have to constantly prove he is not a traitor and does not support the rebellion…. But, other than suspicion, I have never heard tell of any "particular" treatment.

…

I have a very hard time seeing how a Tuareg in the gendarmerie would be subject to particular treatment in the army because of his "Tuareg" identity. It is plausible, but it depends on the group he is part of, the region where he is deployed and whether he defected (or not) in 2012…. I have met several Tuareg members of the gendarmerie [and military] recently and they do not appear to be talking about being marginalized (Independent journalist 2 May 2017).

Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3. Tuareg Imghad and Allies Self-defence Group (Groupe autodéfense touareg Imghad et alliés, GATIA)

Several sources state that GATIA was created on 14 August 2014 (McGregor 3 Apr. 2015; Huffington Post 14 Aug. 2014; EU 17 June 2016, 6). According to an article published in 2016 on Mali Actu, a website containing information and news about Mali, GATIA's leaders [Moulay and Haba Laye] stated that their group was created to protect the people of the Imghad [Imrad] community [the largest Tuareg tribe in northern Mali (Jeune Afrique 16 Feb. 2015)] and their allies from armed groups (Mali Actu 29 Sept. 2016). In addition, an article published in February 2015 by Jeune Afrique states that GATIA was created to protect the Imghad community from other armed groups (Jeune Afrique 16 Feb. 2015). Several sources state that GATIA has a presence in northern Mali (Huffington Post 14 Aug. 2014; Jeune Afrique 17 June 2016; Clingendael March 2015, 20).

According to several sources, GATIA supports the Malian government, or is progovernment (Iran Daily 20 Mar. 2017; McGregor 3 Apr. 2015; Libération 3 Aug. 2016). Sources indicate that GATIA recognizes Mali's territorial integrity (Huffington Post 14 Aug. 2014; Libération 3 Aug. 2016). Furthermore, during an interview on 18 January 2014 that was published on the Malian information website titled Maliweb, GATIA's secretary general, Fahad Ag Almahmoud, stated that GATIA [translation] "is not a movement that is at odds with the government" and it has "no separatist, secessionist or autonomist demands" (Maliweb 22 Jan. 2015).

In an article published in 2015 by Terrorism Monitor, a biweekly journal that provides an analysis of terrorism and security related issues by focusing on topics that are "un-reported or under-reported" (Jamestown Foundation n.d.a), Andrew McGregor, who holds a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto's Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations (Jamestown Foundation n.d.b), indicates that there are an estimated 1,000 GATIA fighters drawn from Tuareg and Arab communities (McGregor 3 Apr. 2015). Moreover, other sources write that GATIA claims to have nearly 1,000 fighters (Huffington Post 14 Aug. 2014; RFI 15 Aug. 2014). However, an article published in April 2016 by Jeune Afrique states that according to a confidential report from MINUSMA [United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali], GATIA allegedly has [translation] "fewer than 500 men" (Jeune Afrique 29 Apr. 2016). During an interview in 2014, GATIA's secretary general stated that the group has the [translation] "capability of mobilizing numerous human resources" (Maliweb 22 Jan. 2015). According to the same source, GATIA's secretary general stated that allies, [translation] "particularly the Imouchar and Kelsouk communities and their allies," joined the Imghad community, with whom an alliance had been established (Maliweb 22 Jan. 2015).

An article published in 2015 by Agence France-Presse (AFP) indicates that according to one testimony [2], GATIA had tried, in April 2015, to recruit members in Tin-Hama [a municipality in the Gao region of northern Mali], but it [translation] "met with refusal from the Kel Essouk [a Tuareg tribe]" (AFP 2 June 2015). According to the same source, GATIA fighters allegedly [translation] "forcibly apprehended, early on 21 May [2015], six young people from that community [Kel Essouk]" who were then executed (AFP 2 June 2015). In addition, a joint report published in 2015 by MINUSMA and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) indicates that on 21 May 2015, GATIA members executed six civilians in TinHama because they belonged to the Kel Essouk community (UN Dec. 2015, para. 4). However, the same source indicates that the GATIA members responsible for the executions were [translation] "looking for individuals they believed were working with CMA [Coordination of Azawad Movements (Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad), who had fought GATIA in TinHama the day before]" (UN Dec. 2015, para. 28). The Country Reports 2016 indicates that GATIA committed "serious human rights abuses, including summary executions" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 2).

4. Relations Between the National Gendarmerie and GATIA

According to the website of the Department of Security and Public Safety [ministère de la Sécurité et de la Protection civile], Mali's national gendarmerie is a [translation] "military formation" that undertakes the following missions, among others:

Ensuring public safety

…

Exercising the role of military police within the army;

Playing a part in mobilization;

Participating in the operational defence of the country;

Participating in civil protection;

… (Mali n.d.).

An article published in 2016 by Maliweb states that the National Gendarmerie [Gendarmerie nationale] [translation] "is both a defence and public safety force," is spread throughout Mali and "actively participates in the response to various types of attacks, including terrorist attacks" (Maliweb 25 Mar. 2016).

Sources state that the US Ambassador to Mali, Paul Folmsbee, asked the Malian government to cut all ties with GATIA (RFI 29 Sept. 2016; Iran Daily 20 Mar. 2017). An article published in 2016 by Radio France internationale (RFI) indicates that the Ambassador was referring to [translation] "all public and private ties" to GATIA (RFI 29 Sept. 2016).

According to the Country Reports 2016, GATIA received equipment and logistical support from the Malian government between July and September 2016 (US 3 Mar. 2017, 3). Furthermore, a report published in 2015 by the Conflict Research Unit (CRU), a specialized team within the Netherlands Institute of International Relations - Clingendael [3] that conducts research specifically on the analysis of crises and conflicts, indicates that GATIA was funded and equipped by the Malian government and received support from the Malian army (Clingendael March 2015, 20 and 41). An article published in March 2015 by Jeune Afrique reports that [translation] "[a]ccording to several security sources," GATIA includes soldiers provided by the Malian armed forces (Forces armées du Mali, FAMa), as well as vehicles, weapons and uniforms that have also been provided by FAMa (Jeune Afrique 4 March 2015). The same source indicates that MINUSMA officers were surprised that among the GATIA members injured in combat against rebel groups, there were fighters who had received training from the European Union Training Mission in Koulikoro to help rebuild FAMa, which then created [translation] "a connection between the authorities and the militia" despite "denials from officials" (Jeune Afrique 4 March 2015). An article published in February 2015 by Jeune Afrique indicates that according to a western military source in Bamako, those living in Tessite [in the Gao region] who had seen GATIA members confirmed that fighters from that group were part of the [translation] "former Delta militia of [El Hadj] Ag Gamou and some were from the Joint Technical Group (Groupe technique inter armes, GTIA) in the Malian army" (Jeune Afrique 16 Feb. 2015). According to several sources, [El Hadj] Ag Gamou leads GATIA (Independent journalist 2 May 2017; McGregor 3 Apr. 2015; Clingendael March 2015, 41). Furthermore, according to an article published by RFI, GATIA's secretary general, Fahad Ag Almahmoud, does not hide the fact that [translation] "his movement has close ties to Alaji Gamou, a Tuareg general in the Malian army" (RFI 15 Aug. 2014). According to a report on armed groups in Mali, published in 2016 by the European Union (EU) Institute for Security Studies, General El Hadj Ag Gamou is a high-ranking officer in the Malian army (EU 17 June 2016, 6). Moreover, an article published in February 2015 by Jeune Afrique indicates that, officially, General [El Hadj] Ag Gamou [translation] "is the advisor to the Chief Major General of the Malian army" and that he founded GATIA (Jeune Afrique 16 Feb. 2015).

However, an article published in 2016 by RFI states that the Malian authorities [translation] "have repeatedly dismissed allegations of collusion [with GATIA]" (RFI 29 Sept. 2016). Moreover, according to the article published in February 2015 by Jeune Afrique, the Department of Defence is of the opinion that the allegations of a rapprochement between GATIA and the Malian army [translation] "stem from a desire to discredit the Malian army" (Jeune Afrique 16 Feb. 2015). An article published in 2016 by Mali Actu indicates that during a meeting that took place on 28 September 2016, GATIA leaders stated that GATIA was [translation] "not on the government's payroll [and] far from being a government militia" and that "GATIA was on the ground with resources that had been mobilized from the communities it comprises and those taken from the enemy, not the Malian government" (Mali Actu 29 Sept. 2016).

The independent journalist explained the following:

[translation]

There are no "formal" ties between GATIA and the gendarmerie. But, since GATIA receives indirect support from the government and is primarily composed of former Malian military personnel and pro-government militia who, prior to the 2012 crisis, received training from security forces (including the gendarmerie), suffice it to say that GATIA could be a proxy group of the government. At the very least, the gendarmerie provides moral support to GATIA. However, the evidence suggests that GATIA has a strong connection with the gendarmerie. I have even seen members of the gendarmerie in training camps with Ganda Iso, a militia that is part of GATIA. (Independent journalist 2 May 2017)

Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4.1 Obligation for Tuareg Members of the Gendarmerie to Assist GATIA

Information about the obligation for Tuareg members of the gendarmerie to assist GATIA was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The independent journalist wrote the following about Tuareg members of the national gendarmerie and GATIA:

[translation]

[N]umerous Tuaregs [former separatists who became members of the gendarmerie as part of the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration in the 1990s and 2000s] left the gendarmerie in 2012 at the end of the crisis and joined separatist groups such as the MNLA. Certain Tuaregs, notably those who are members of Imghad, stayed in the gendarmerie and are fighting against the MNLA. The head of GATIA, [General El Hadj] Ag Gamou is Imghad. It is legitimate to think that Tuaregs who stayed in the gendarmerie have a good relationship with GATIA.

The head of GATIA is Tuareg, as are the most active members, who are all Malian military personnel who joined GATIA. (Independent journalist 2 May 2017)

With respect to GATIA's expectations of Tuareg members of the national gendarmerie, the independent journalist referred to the possibility of a [translation] "tacit support," while adding that it remains "unclear" because GATIA has a presence in several zones where the gendarmerie, like all other governmental organizations, has not been deployed" (Independent journalist 2 May 2017). The same source indicates that [translation] "[c]ertain groups affiliated with GATIA, such as Ganda Izo, espouse a strong anti-Tuareg rhetoric," but that "those groups are part of GATIA, which is still controlled by General [El Hadj Ag] Gamou and his closest Tuareg military personnel" (Independent journalist 2 May 2017). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4.1.1 Treatment of Tuareg Members of the Gendarmerie who Refuse to Assist GATIA

Information about the treatment of Tuareg members of the gendarmerie who refuse to assist GATIA was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The independent journalist stated that it is doubtful that there would be consequences for Tuareg members of the gendarmerie who refuse to assist GATIA (Independent journalist 2 May 2017). The same source indicated the following:

[translation]

There are several Tuaregs in the gendarmerie. If there is pressure for them to prove that they support the Malian government, I have never heard about GATIA putting that pressure on them. GATIA is independent of the security forces.

However, the fact remains that GATIA has a particular presence in areas where the gendarmerie has not been deployed. It is difficult to know how, in that situation, they could provide assistance, apart from volunteering to go into GATIA regions to train [Malian] troops. (Independent journalist 2 May 2017)

Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] The CNRS research director explained that the information he provided during the telephone interview with the Research Directorate represents his personal opinion.

[2] In the article, AFP writes that the testimony comes from family of the victims, that it was shared through an information site known as Siwel, a Kabyle agency (Algerian Tuareg), and that tj,yfrhe [translation] "extremely detailed account was unable to be independently verified" (AFP 2 June 2015).

[3] Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations is a think tank that provides an analysis of global developments in economic diplomacy, international security and conflict management (Clingendael n.d.)

References

Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2 June 2015. "Mali : des ONG des droits de l'homme dénoncent de possibles 'crimes de guerre'." (Factiva)

Centre international pour la paix et les droits de l'homme (CIPADH). 8 February 2016. "La stigmatisation des touaregs du Mali, obstacle aux accords de paix." [Accessed 21 Apr. 2017]

Centre international pour la paix et les droits de l'homme (CIPADH). N.d. "Notre mission." [Accessed 25 Apr. 2017]

Centre national de recherche scientifique (CNRS). N.d. "Présentation." [Accessed 8 May 2017]

Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations. March 2015. Grégory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme. The Roots of Mali's Conflict - Moving Beyond the 2012 Crisis. [Accessed 19 Apr. 2017]

Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations. N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 26 Apr. 2017]

European Union (EU). 17 June 2016. Institute for Security Studies. Ibrahim Maïga. "Groupes armés au Mali : au-delà des étiquettes." Rapport sur l'Afrique de l'Ouest. [Accessed 19 Apr. 2017]

Huffington Post. 14 August 2014. "Un nouveau groupe armé créé par des Touaregs dans le nord du Mali." [Accessed 10 Apr. 2017]

Human Rights Watch. 27 January 2016. "Mali." Rapport mondial 2016. [Accessed 1 May 2017]

Independent journalist. 2 May 2017. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Iran Daily. 20 March 2017. "UN Official Says Mali Security Situation Worrying." (Factiva)

Jamestown Foundation. N.d.a. "About Jamestown's Terrorism Program." [Accessed 24 Apr. 2017]

Jamestown Foundation. N.d.b. "Andrew McGregor." [Accessed 24 Apr. 2017]

Jeune Afrique. 17 June 2016. Rémi Carayol. "Carte : au centre du Mali, une constellation de groupes armés." [Accessed 10 Apr. 2017]

Jeune Afrique. 29 April 2016. Baba Ahmed. "Mali : le business du cantonnement?" [Accessed 10 Apr. 2017]

Jeune Afrique. 4 March 2015. "Mali : le Gatia, drôle de milice." [Accessed 10 Apr. 2017]

Jeune Afrique. 16 February 2015. Baba Ahmed. "Nord du Mali : de l'irrédentisme touareg à la guerre tribale?" [Accessed 25 Apr. 2017]

Libération. 3 August 2016. Célian Macé. "À Kidal, la lutte fratricide des Touaregs du Mali." [Accessed 20 Apr. 2017]

Mali. N.d. Ministère de la Sécurité et de la Protection civile. "La Gendarmerie nationale." [Accessed 13 Apr. 2017]

Mali Actu. 29 September 2016. "Mali : les leaders du GATIA face à la presse : 'Nous ne sommes pas à la solde de l'État, encore moins une milice gouvernementale'." [Accessed 13 Apr. 2017]

Maliweb. 25 March 2016. "Gendarmerie nationale du Mali : une force humaine au service du peuple." [Accessed 13 Apr. 2017]

Maliweb. 22 January 2015. L'Aube. "GATIA à l'Aube : 'L'Azawad n'est pas une entité politique'." [Accessed 10 Apr. 2017]

McGregor, Andrew. 3 April 2015. "GATIA: A Profile of Northern Mali's ProGovernment Tuareg and Arab Militia." Terrorism Monitor. Vol. 13, No. 7.

Radio France internationale (RFI). 29 September 2016. "Mali : silence des autorités face aux accusations des États-Unis sur le GATIA." [Accessed 10 Apr. 2017]

Radio France internationale (RFI). 15 August 2014. "Nord du Mali : naissance d'un groupe armé opposé à l'autodétermination." [Accessed 10 Apr. 2017]

Research Director, Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), France. 28 April 2017. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.

United Nations (UN). December 2015. United Nations - Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Rapport conjoint sur les événements de Tin Hama les 20 et 21 mai 2015. [Accessed 26 Apr. 2017]

United Nations (UN). 7 January 2012. Human Rights Council. Rapport de la Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme sur la situation des droits de l'homme au Mali. [Accessed 27 Apr. 2017]

United States (US). 3 March 2017. Department of State. "Mali." Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016. [Accessed 19 Apr. 2017]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Aberfoyle International Security; Anthropologist, expert on the Sahara-Sahel region; Associate Professor, Lehigh University; Associate Researcher, Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies; Associate Researcher, Institut Thomas More and Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité; Association malienne des droits de l'homme; The Broker; International Crisis Group; Mali - Commission nationale des droits de l'homme; Ph.D. candidate, Columbia University; Professor, Humboldt University in Berlin; Professor, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne; Research Officer, Institut de recherche pour le développement; Réseau des défenseurs des droits humains au Mali; Senior Researcher, Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations); Sustainable Security Programme, Oxford Research Group; United Nations - Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

Internet sites, including: aBamako; Amnesty International; ecoi.net; Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme; Le Figaro; IHS Jane's 360; International Crisis Group; Jactiv; Mali - government portal; Minority Rights Group; Political Handbook of the World 2015; United Kingdom - Visas and Immigration; United Nations - Refworld; Tamoudre.