

The Border Consortium

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POVERTY, DISPLACEMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH EAST BURMA / MYANMAR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the pace of reform has slowed in Burma/Myanmar¹ during 2013, the potential for an inclusive political dialogue process to address the causes of conflict has increased. The sustainability of national reconciliation will require sensitivity to the concerns and aspirations of ethnic nationality communities in relation to identity, security and justice. This village-level survey describes the challenge of addressing chronic poverty, protracted displacement and weak governance at the community level in South East Myanmar as part of the conflict transformation process.

The Border Consortium (TBC) collaborated with eleven civil society organisations to design and conduct this assessment in 209 villages spread across 22 townships, 4 states and 2 regions. As the government's village lists provide an incomplete sampling frame in contested areas, field staffs were advised to select one significant village per village tract. Almost half of the villages surveyed are administered to some degree by non-state armed groups and only 6% have been included in similar processes recently facilitated by UN agencies or other non-government organisations.

Decades of military rule, conflict and abuse have left rural communities impoverished, lacking basic infrastructure, struggling to cope with shocks to livelihoods and with limited access to social services. The vast majority of villagers are subsistence farmers with insufficient access to agricultural land to meet the threshold for self-reliance. While the ceasefire agreements have enabled greater access for farmers to fields and markets, the accompanying influx of mining, logging and commercial agriculture companies has exacerbated land grabbing and inequalities. Similarly, while accesses to health and education services are priority needs, there are concerns that the expansion of government services into ethnic areas could be a new form of assimilation and control.

As this year's survey focused on village profiles across less townships than previously covered, it has not been possible to update last year's estimate of 400,000 internally displaced persons in rural areas of South East Myanmar. However, new displacement is increasingly caused by natural disasters, such as the floods in central Karen State which displaced over 33,000 people in July, and abuses associated with resource extraction rather than armed conflict.

The scale of return to former villages or resettlement nearby remains limited, with displaced persons consistently reporting that they are waiting for at least some withdrawal or disentanglement of troops first. There is general agreement that conditions are not yet conducive for sustainable and organised return, but that it is time for displaced persons, communities in areas of potential return and indeed all stakeholders to start preparing. However, the construction of sub-township development sites and proposals for pilot return processes have raised concerns that international principles may be neglected.

Local governance mechanisms are primarily dependent on village leaders, who this survey indicates are largely accountable to local households and are the main mechanism for resolving disputes and managing community affairs. Non-state armed groups provide some support in terms of information about security and protection issues, but the findings suggest a widespread lack of trust and confidence in Myanmar's township authorities and police force. This will be a significant obstacle to strengthening community-based natural resource management and access to justice in rural areas. Integrating institutional systems between the government and non-state armed groups will be vital to harnessing capacity and reducing the burden for village leaders.

For international aid agencies, the challenge in this process of conflict transformation is to shift away from responding to basic needs and focus more on being sensitive to protection concerns. This is particularly true given that the legitimacy of the state remains in dispute and so traditional development objectives such as expanding humanitarian access and strengthening government capacities may be counterproductive to building confidence amongst local communities in the peace process. There is chronic vulnerability spread across all sectors and townships in the South East, but there are also incredibly resilient communities. It is vital that aid agencies seek to support social capital during the peace process, or at least ensure that ill-conceived plans do not undermine local coping strategies.

¹ 'Burma' and 'Myanmar' are used interchangeably in this report, as are the corresponding place names and boundaries for states, regions and townships. No endorsement is intended either way.



There has been armed fighting in Myanmar since just months after independence from the United Kingdom in 1948. It is the longest running set of armed conflicts anywhere in the world...

The remaining conflicts all have an ethnic character and are rooted in long-standing ethnic grievances and aspirations. And in Myanmar there is not just one non-state armed group but more than a dozen. Please imagine the complexities of any peace process then multiply it by twelve. There are issues of autonomy and self-determination, of power-sharing and resource-sharing, of cultural rights and language policy, of protection against discrimination and security sector reform...

I believe (we) will turn a corner soon. Very possibly, over the coming weeks, we will have a nation-wide ceasefire and the guns will go silent everywhere in Myanmar for the very first time in over sixty years. This will be a watershed worth celebrating. But it will also be only the first step towards the just and lasting peace we will need to achieve. Difficult tasks will follow and hard compromises will need to be made. But it must be done.

And (for) our peace process to be successful, it must be connected to the emergence of a more inclusive national identity. Myanmar people of all ethnic backgrounds and all faiths — Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, Hindu and others — must feel part of this new national identity. We are a multi-cultural, multi-faith nation.



President Thein Sein, Chatham House, London, 15 July 2013

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

CIDKP, Sukali Sub-township Development, Myawaddy, 2013

KORD, Protesting Land Confiscation and Dam Construction, Taungoo, 2012





1.1 CONTEXT

"We are happy and welcome the ceasefire agreement and want them to continue developing genuine peace. If there is peace, we can live quietly and will not need to worry for our security".

Kayah Man, Demawso Township, June 2013, KSWDC Interview

The characteristics of ethnic conflict in Burma/Myanmar reflect subnational conflicts throughout Asia since World War Two. Under the guise of decolonisation and state-building, political authority over a variety of culturally distinct nationalities has been consolidated in the hands of the urban elite within the dominant ethnic group. Centralised and discriminatory governance, cultural assimilation, and the occupation of ancestral lands have all contributed to perceptions of injustice and a prolonged assault on ethnic minority identities. Armed resistance to the state's authority has been suppressed by counterinsurgency warfare targeting civilians which exacerbated fears and suspicions. The legitimacy of the state remains a central issue of dispute.²

Notable opportunities for reconciliation and nation-building have been missed at independence in 1948, after the restoration of civilian rule in 1960, during the nation-wide 'peace parley' in 1963-64 and during the democracy uprising of 1988. Indeed, the marginalisation of different political and ethnic interests is arguably the nation's most fundamental failure given that ethnic minorities constitute at least a third of the population. So while the international community's optimism in creating momentum for change is commendable, the caution of civil society in regards to the current reform process is also understandable.³

The current transition period in Burma/Myanmar provides an opportunity to learn from the lessons of missed opportunities and strive for a transparent and inclusive process of national reconciliation to address the legacy of conflict and injustice. Rather than avoiding discussion of sensitive issues, the fears and hopes of conflict-affected communities need to be acknowledged and embraced. Building confidence and transforming institutions to address concerns relating to identity, security and justice will be keys to the sustainability of the peace process.

Despite a constitution drafted by military appointees and an election widely considered as neither free nor fair, the first half of President Thein Sein's term has been characterised by liberal reforms. The broadening of political space, release of a significant number of political prisoners and a courageous civil society have encouraged public debate, even though new legislation on issues such as land rights and media freedom has included many restrictive measures. Concerns remain about the *Tatmadaw*'s continuing political role but there has been legislative reform to devolve authority to state and regional governments and a parliamentary committee formed to review the constitution while public forums discussing federalism are more common.

The government and the non-state armed groups have negotiated 13 ceasefire agreements which have significantly decreased hostilities. Armed conflict escalated in Kachin State at the end of 2012, but there has been a significant decrease since dialogue between the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and the government's Union-level Peacemaking Work Committee (UWPC) resumed in February even if a formal ceasefire agreement has not been signed. Sporadic skirmishes continue in other areas too, most notably northern and central Shan State, while the ceasefires have generally coincided with an increase in the deployment of Tatmadaw troops and supplies into contested areas. However, roving counterinsurgency patrols and restrictions on movement have decreased which has enhanced civilian access to fields and markets.

The rule of law is compromised throughout Myanmar, but access to justice is particularly problematic in conflict-affected areas. The absence of independent ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanisms means the lack of protection for civilians from human rights abuse in contested areas of South East Myanmar continues. While humanitarian access is largely dependent on organisational relations with state-level authorities, there have generally been slight improvements in obtaining authorisation to travel. International staff still require accompaniment in conflict-affected areas. However, given protracted

Transnational Institute & Burma Centre Netherlands, Oct. 2013, "Burma's Ethnic Challenge: From Aspirations to Solutions", page 3-4, www.tni.org/work-area/burma-project



² Parks, Colletta & Oppenheim, 2013, "The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Conflict and International Development Assistance", The Asia Foundation, Bangkok, pages 1-2, www.asiafoundation.org/conflictstudy

resistance to "Burmanisation" and the expansion of state control, social services responding to humanitarian needs appear likely to remain limited until protection concerns relating to security and justice are substantively addressed.

Negotiations are ongoing between the government and non-state armed groups about the framework for political dialogue to address these root causes of conflict. The government and some of the ethnic leaders are hoping a nation-wide ceasefire to signal the start of political dialogue could be announced before the end of 2013. This framework envisions consultations and negotiations about thematic and constitutional issues feeding into a Panglong-like conference so a set of guiding principles for a national accord could be announced prior to the end of this parliament's term in 2015. No one is suggesting that decades of conflict could be resolved in a matter of months, but there is an urgency to seize the opportunity and establish some transitional arrangements so that the peace process can continue and deepen beyond the 2015 elections.

Other ethnic leaders have expressed concerns that the bilateral ceasefire agreements have not yet been implemented so it is premature to move on to a national ceasefire. Similarly, there are fears that the proposed framework legitimises the current constitution and military involvement in parliament which are perceived as two key impediments to conflict transformation. The views of Tatmadaw leaders about the proposed political dialogue process remain unclear, which fuels speculation that a nation-wide ceasefire announcement could be interpreted as a signal to international investors that Myanmar's resource-rich borderlands are open for business. In a transitional and unregulated environment, investments could induce another round of grievances and derail the peace process.

This climate of political uncertainty raises hopes and anxieties for displaced and conflict-affected communities in South East Myanmar and presents a conundrum for humanitarian agencies. 128,000 refugees are currently in camps in Thailand while an estimated 400,000 internally displaced persons are spread across the rural areas of South East Myanmar. Spontaneous return to former villages or resettlement nearby has been limited to date amongst both refugee and internally displaced communities. So the challenge for humanitarian agencies is to support displaced persons and local communities to prepare for the potential return and reintegration processes, without promoting premature and unsustainable movements.⁴

Previous experience along the Thailand border in regards to ceasefires and refugee return processes has been riddled with obstacles which have hindered sustainable reintegration. The coerced return of Mon refugees during 1995 into resettlement sites in ceasefire areas left people stranded and isolated without access to protection, livelihoods or social services. Karenni refugees returned prematurely in the same year before fleeing again within months when the ceasefire broke down due to Tatmadaw troop deployments and militarisation. The Wa ceasefire and relocation programme from 1999-2001 contributed to the displacement of Shan civilians who were subsequently denied access to asylum in Thailand. Even a comprehensive contingency planning process for the voluntary return of Karen refugees in 2004 ended up being shelved after Khin Nyunt was arrested and the 'gentleman's agreement' collapsed.

One of the fundamental lessons learnt from these experiences is that supporting the recovery of conflict-affected communities is interdependent with creating the conditions which will support sustainable, voluntary and dignified return and reintegration of displaced communities. A holistic approach is required to promote protection and solutions ensuring physical safety, including protection from armed conflict and landmines; legal security, including access to justice and citizenship; and material security, including access to land and humanitarian assistance. This is a huge challenge given that previous surveys suggest that 59% of households in rural areas of South East Myanmar are impoverished and that human rights abuses have been widespread.⁵

⁴ The Border Consortium, "Programme Report: January - June 2013", www.theborderconsortium.org

⁵ The Border Consortium, Oct 2012, "Changing Realities, Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar"

1.2 METHODOLOGY

"The population in our village area is already dense and there's no land available for livelihoods. Of course refugees want to come back to their original villages. But there will be water shortages and insufficient land for them to cultivate after they return".

Kayah Man, Demawso Township, June 2013, KSWDC Interview

TBC collaborates with civil society organisations to document conditions in rural areas of South East Myanmar. Annual reports since 2002 have estimated the scale, distribution and characteristics of displacement through interviews with key informants across more than 35 townships and situation updates reflecting observations from the field. The 2012 report also documented results from poverty assessments conducted with over 4,000 households across 21 townships. This provided standard baseline indicators for vulnerability in rural areas of South East Myanmar which had not previously been disaggregated beyond the state and regional level to the township level and released publicly.⁶

This year's survey seeks to supplement TBC's previous household survey by disaggregating data to the sub-township level and supporting the broader humanitarian community's efforts to document village profiles in conflict affected areas. This village-level assessment of poverty, displacement and governance was designed in collaboration with 11 civil society organisations during March and April. Consultation with OCHA, UNICEF and an NGO consortium led by Mercy Corps helped to standardise some of the indicators to facilitate comparison with other village-level assessments recently conducted in the South East across a range of sectors.

The survey design complemented quantitative questionnaires with video documentation of personal testimonies about basic living conditions, the impacts of ceasefire agreements, protection concerns and perceptions about the potential return of displaced persons. Video documentation of perspectives from local villagers was compiled primarily for distribution to refugees as an information sharing mechanism in local languages, but has also been utilised to interpret results from the questionnaires. TBC staff facilitated orientation and training sessions with field staff from the participating civil society organisations during April and May to introduce the survey tools, GPS units, facilitation skills for focus group discussions, interview skills and video techniques.

There was an incomplete sampling frame for selecting villages as the government's village lists have limited reach in contested areas and the non-state armed groups are reluctant to identify and potentially incriminate villages under the administration of so-called 'rebels'. Survey teams were asked to travel to as many village tracts as possible across at least 20 townships, and to survey one significant village per village tract. Villages were supposed to have at least 50 households in lowland areas and at least 20 households in upland areas to be surveyed. A list of villages recently surveyed by UNICEF and the NGO consortium led by Mercy Corps was distributed to avoid duplication, unless the villages were particularly significant.

Civil society organisations conducted focus group discussions in 209 villages during June and July. These villages are spread across 155 village tracts as demarcated by the government, which represents 24% of all village tracts in the 22 townships surveyed. 42% of the villages surveyed are in upland areas and 38% include internally displaced persons, while Figure 1 overlays villages onto an indicative map of political influence and suggests a comparable proportion of villages surveyed are administered to some degree by non-state armed groups. 40% of villages surveyed are from Karen State, 21% from Karenni/Kayah State and 19% from Tanintharyi Region while only 20% are from Shan State, Bago Region and Mon State combined. Only 13 villages (6%) had also been surveyed by either UNICEF or Mercy Corps during 2013, with 12 of these villages located in Karenni/Kayah State.


Focus groups consisted of a combined total of 2,959 informants, of whom 34% were female. 53% of focus group participants were ordinary villagers while 25% were either village or village tract leaders, 17% were social service providers or religious leaders, 4% were affiliated with non-state armed groups and 1% were affiliated with local government. The combined population of villages surveyed amounted to over 121,000 people, with an average village size of 583 people and the average household size at 5.5 people.

⁷ See Appendix 1 for a complete list of villages surveyed.



⁶ TBC, 2012, "Changing Realities, Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar"

Figure 1: Village Survey Reach, 2013



The survey was translated into local languages and responses were recorded onto hard copies of the questionnaire in the field. A customised on-line database was developed using Survey Monkey for the participating civil society organisations to enter data upon the return of their respective field staff to administrative offices. The merged data was then processed and analysed by TBC staff and the draft findings reviewed by civil society organisations in a joint meeting before the narrative assessment was finalised.

The longitude and latitude of every surveyed village was recorded using GPS receivers to enable the issuance of Place-Codes (P-Codes) by the Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) to villages that were not previously recognised by government and international agencies. The geographic references will potentially also facilitate cross-referencing between village profiles compiled by other agencies during 2013. TBC has approached MIMU about providing a common interactive mapping platform to compare results from these complementary initiatives. It is hoped that this will provide an enhanced mechanism for ensuring assessments from individual villages are not lost in aggregated overviews.

Analysis has not yet been validated against findings documented by other agencies in the South East. UNICEF's survey was conducted in 131 villages in Tanintharyi Region and Kayin State during March 2013.8 Mercy Corps led a consortium of NGOs including ACF, AVSI, CARE and the Metta Development Foundation to facilitate a Socio-economic analysis in Karenni/Kayah State which incorporated 111 quantitative and 53 qualitative village-level assessments during April and May 2013.9 UNHCR have summarised 702 village profiles conducted between 2008 and 2012 in Tanintharyi Region, Mon and Karen States. While efforts were made to standardise the surveys conducted in 2013, methodological differences may limit the significance of comparative analysis.

The main limitation for this survey is the lack of a comprehensive village list across contested areas to frame the sampling method. This was compounded by the lack of a common understanding about the demarcation of village tracts and sub-townships. Villagers and civil society organisations are often more familiar with territory as demarcated by non-state armed groups than by the central government. As a result, the determination of which village is most significant in a village tract is problematic and in some cases more than one village was surveyed per village tract.

The decision to focus efforts on collecting more information at the village level has also resulted in a reduction of the number of townships surveyed. As a result, TBC and partners are no longer able to present overall estimates for the scale and distribution of internal displacement in South East Myanmar. For over 10 years, TBC and partners have updated these estimates on an annual basis by interviewing key informants in over 35 townships. As this year's survey only covers significant villages in 24% of the village tracts across 22 townships, this is no longer possible.

It should also be noted that village-level assessments are generally used for rapid assessments and are less conducive to gender analysis than household surveys. This shortcoming was exacerbated in approximately 10% of the village surveys conducted where field staff lacked experienced facilitating focus group discussions. The findings documented in this report thus need to be considered as supplementary to the household poverty survey published in 2012.

⁸ UNICEF, June 2013, Initial Rapid Assessment of Selected IDP Settlements in Kayin and Tanintharyi, Myanmar, DRAFT

⁹ Mercy Corps, forthcoming, Kayah State Socio-Economic Analysis

¹⁰ UNHCR, September 2013, South East Myanmar: A Report on Village Profiles 2008-2012

CHAPTER 2

POVERTY

CIDKP, Karen Education System students, Thandaunggyi, 2012

MRDC, Water Supply Systems, Ye, 2012





2.1 PHYSICAL ACCESS

"After the ceasefire agreement, authorities came to our village and issued ID cards so it is more convenient for us to go to town. Even without ID cards, the checks have stopped". Mon Man, Ye Township, June 2013, MRDC Interview

Decades of armed conflict and government neglect have resulted in a network of dirt tracks and single lane roads which has inhibited both rural development and the deployment of Tatmadaw troops into ethnic territory. However the preliminary ceasefires, government reforms and proposed regional economic integration have increased interests in upgrading roads and infrastructure to facilitate trans-border trade corridors and investment in resource extraction and other industries. This could potentially foster connectivity and strengthen local livelihoods, but improved physical access in an unregulated environment could also exacerbate land grabbing and aggravate inequalities to the detriment of subsistence farmers.¹¹

The majority of villages surveyed primarily access the nearest towns and markets by motorbike and/or on foot. Figure 2 illustrates how the lack of infrastructure is particularly prominent in the upland areas of northern Karen and Karenni/Kayah States where access is generally limited to travel by foot. The reach and affordability of Chinese-manufactured motorbikes in rural communities is noticeable in low land areas. Only 5% of villages reported car or truck as the main mode of transport, which is indicative of the poor state of rural roads even in the dry season. Boats were also identified as key for transportation by 5% of villages, which highlights the importance of rivers for access to markets and livelihoods.

28% of villages reported being more than 3 hours away from the nearest town by the main mode of transportation, as illustrated in figure 3. The imposition of curfews and restrictions on overnight travel has been a key constraint on accessing markets throughout the protracted conflict. However, one of the primary benefits of the ceasefire agreements has been greater freedom of movement for civilians.

Figure 3: Travel Time to Nearest Town




Figure 2: Main Method of Travel



Transnational Institute & Burma Centre Netherlands, February 2013, "Developing Disparity: Regional Investment in Burma's Borderlands", www.tni.org/work-area/burma-project



2.2 SHELTER

"If refugees want to return and live here, I will be happy to offer shelter. But on the other hand, the peace process is not stable yet, so I want them to stay there in the camps. I don't want to say 'come back' and I also don't want to say 'stay there'".

Karen Monk, Hpapun Township, May 2013, KESAN/KHRG Interview

Government statistics suggest that 32% of poor households nation-wide have adequate shelter, ¹² while TBC's household survey in rural areas of South East Myanmar documented only 20%. ¹³ This likely reflects the habits of insecure and displaced households in conflict affected areas to construct two or three temporary shelters rather than one durable house as a coping strategy for dealing with military offensives.

Given protracted conflict and displacement, targeting construction assistance without reinforcing political allegiances is particularly challenging in the shelter and settlement sector. The risk of building materials inducing land confiscation and coerced population movements is especially relevant to the construction of private dwellings as distinct from schools, health clinics and community centres.

Figure 4 represents the primary type of shelter documented by TBC partners in 2013. Households were mainly living in bamboo structures in 57% of villages surveyed, and the prominence of these temporary shelters was widespread across the borderlands. Shelters appear more durable in 33% of the villages profiled where the majority of households were living in wooden frame structures.

There is generally a positive correlation between the durability of housing and the likelihood of having access to electricity. 74% of villages surveyed reported no access to power while the majority of residents in 21% of the villages had access to electricity for less than 4 hours a day.

However, this survey suggests that private generators are the main source of electricity and that just 4% of rural villages in South East Myanmar have access to the national electricity grid. This is a particularly sensitive issue in Karenni/Kayah State, where the Lawpita hydro-electricity station has been providing electricity for the national grid for half a century and yet local villages remain dependent on candlelight. It has also been a contentious issue in Mon communities since the 1995 ceasefire and refugee return was triggered by investment interests to export gas from the Andaman Sea to Thailand.

Figure 4: Primary Shelter Type



¹² IHLCA, 2011, Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar (2009-10): Poverty Profile, Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, UNDP and UNICEF, Yangon, page 62

¹³ TBC, 2012, "Changing Realities, Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar", page 42

2.3 WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION

"We access a water source up the mountain, but our pipes are plastic and are easily destroyed by forest fires or animals. Water shortages are also more regular now that trees are almost gone".

Kayan Woman, MeSe Township, June 2013, KSWDC Interview

A high prevalence of water-borne disease such as cholera and typhoid as well as other ailments such as diarrhoea is generally related to limitations in accessing clean water, sanitary latrines and waste disposal systems. Household surveys in rural areas of South East Myanmar have previously indicated that just 27% of families' access protected water sources, while only 51% utilise a wet surface or fly proof latrine.¹⁴

This village-level survey found similar results with the majority of households in 65% of villages reportedly accessing unprotected water sources such as hand-dug wells, rivers and unfenced springs. However, natural springs and streams in upland areas may be relatively unpolluted at the moment. The majority of households in 28% of villages were found to be accessing protected water sources such as tube wells, rain water tanks or piped water.

Household water treatment practices will become increasingly important as pollution from mining and logging concessions expand into contested areas. 43% of villages reported that boiling water is currently the primary method for treating water and that 26% depend on a cloth filter to remove sediment. Spatial analysis suggests that upland villages are generally more likely to boil water whereas lowland villages may tend to use cloth filters or not treat water prior to drinking at all.

In terms of sanitation, Figure 5 illustrates 27% of villages surveyed do not have any fly-proof latrines while a further 29% of villages have on average more than 20 people competing to use one sanitary latrine. Defectaion in fields and forests is common practice, and this reflects poor waste disposal practices more generally. Only 2% of villages surveyed reported using a common dump for discarding material rubbish.

The findings highlight the importance of public health awareness campaigns to promote hygiene standards. Champions of behavioural change need to come from within the ethnic communities. The relatively high prevalence of boiling water as a practice in contested upland areas suggests that health workers affiliated with the ethnic armed groups are key agencies to lead this type of public education.

Figure 5: Fly-proof Latrines per Capita



¹⁴ TBC, 2012, "Changing Realities, Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar", pages 41-42

2.4 LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY


"We are concerned about agricultural and mining companies coming into our area. If they come, it is sure that our lands will be grabbed and our livelihoods will become very difficult".

Karen Woman, Tanintharyi Township, June 2013, CIDKP Interview

Rural livelihoods in South East Myanmar are characterised by subsistence agriculture, low levels of market integration and exploitative relations between local authorities and farmers or labourers. Preliminary ceasefire agreements have led to a decrease in conflict and roving patrols which has enhanced access to fields. However trust-building has not extended to the withdrawal of troops or demarcation of landmines in contested areas. TBC's surveys have previously indicated that 59% of households are impoverished while a comparable proportion has recorded inadequate food security.¹⁵

This village-level assessment identified farming crops and livestock as the main sources of livelihoods in the South East, as documented in Figure 7. Low levels of agricultural productivity are related to a lack of capital assets and irrigation which induces dependence on manual labour, simple hoes and machetes to prepare fields for shifting cultivation. However, this is only sustainable if there is enough land to allow the rotation of fields over a 4-7 year period so that secondary vegetation can regenerate soil nutrition during the fallow years.

Figure 7: Main Livelihood Sources



At least 2 acres of agricultural land is considered necessary for low land farmers to cultivate enough rice for subsistence needs each year. However, this survey found that less than 30% of households meet this threshold for self-reliance, and that is without taking into the account the needs of shifting cultivators for fallow land. Access to land is particularly constrained in Hpapun Township due to the influx of displaced persons from surrounding townships.

Figure 8: Access to Agricultural Land





Figure 6: Access to Agricultural Land




¹⁵ TBC, 2012, "Changing Realities, Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar", pages 19, 54-55

WFP, 2011, Food Security Assessment in Northern Rakhine State, Myanmar, page 7; WFP, 2011, Food Security Assessment in Dry Zone, Myanmar, page 6

Over 70% of villages surveyed identified natural hazards such as floods or unseasonal rains and rats or pests as a significant constraint on livelihoods during the previous 12 months. Figure 9 illustrates the geographic distribution of the main shock for each village, with the impact of landmines in Hpapun of particular concern. It should also be noted that there is a positive correlation between infestations of rats and pests with farmers hiding from military patrols as well as more intensive agriculture induced by population density and increased competition for land.

Local capacities to deal with these shocks determine the sustainability of livelihoods. As this survey was conducted during June and July and the wet season rice crop is harvested around November, subsistence farmers needed about 4 months of rice stocks in order to be self-reliant. Figure 10 suggests that less than 20% of households have sufficient staple food stocks to survive until the harvest without buying, borrowing or bartering for additional rice. This is not necessarily an impediment for the minority whose livelihoods are based around trade, daily labour, mining or logging. However, seasonal shocks remain a significant threat for subsistence farmers who have very little disposable income to buy additional food supplies.

Figure 10: Staple Food Stocks



Buying cheaper, poorer quality food and borrowing have previously been identified as the main coping strategies for dealing with shocks to livelihoods. However, the importance of social capital for the sustainability of livelihoods is highlighted by 88% of villages in this survey identifying family or friends as the primary source of credit. This reflects the resilience of conflict-affected communities and reluctance to access commercial money lenders, micro-credit associations and financial institutions.

Figure 9: Shocks to Livelihoods



¹⁷ TBC, 2012, "Changing Realities, Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar, page 58

2.5 EDUCATION

"We have a school built and run by our villagers. We sent an official letter to the township authorities requesting materials and to send teachers. They said that they are arranging this but we don't see anything. And no teachers have come".

Karen Man, Tanintharyi Township, June 2013, CIDKP Interview

The links between education, poverty reduction, empowering girls and human development are widely recognised. However, household surveys have suggested that a third of children between 5 and 12 years of age in rural areas of South East Myanmar are regularly missing school. Decades of neglect have left Myanmar's education system in peril and students without basic literacy and numeracy skills. Meanwhile, the respective ethnic education systems are caught between promoting distinct cultural and linguistic identities and integrating curricula with the Union structure.

In the villages surveyed, 61% had schools which were mainly utilising the government curriculum. However, in many cases local villages are left to cover most of costs for these schools, including the teachers' housing and board. 13% had schools primarily administered by ethnic education systems, 15% had schools integrating both curricula and 5% had non-formal or monastic schools. Figure 11 illustrates the prominence of Karen Education Department affiliated schools in northern Karen State and a high proportion of schools offering both the government and Mon National curricula in southern Mon State. These two ethnic education systems support over 1,300 schools between them.¹⁹

Figure 12: Schools, Students and Teachers

# villages	Type of school	# students	# teachers	Teacher/ student ratio
72	72 Pre-School/Nursery 161 Primary (KG-Gr. 4) 44 Middle School (Gr. 5-8)		156	1:15
161			553	1:26
44			372	1:27
5	High School (Gr. 9-10)	946	45	1:21
13	No school	0	0	n/a
282	Total	27,581	1,126	1:24

6% of surveyed villages did not offer any type of schooling. Accessibility is more of a problem for students continuing beyond primary school, with almost a third of students reportedly moving into boarding houses to attend middle school. That figure increases to over 60% of students if they continue on to high school. Apart from distance, other significant reasons for children not attending school include requirements to conduct domestic chores, a lack of interest and inability to pay school fees.

63% of villages reported that the majority of teachers can speak local languages. This is likely to become an increasingly sensitive issue as more teachers are deployed from central Myanmar to facilitate the expansion of the government's school system.

Figure 11: Access to Schools



 $^{^{18}\,}$ TBC, 2012, "Changing Realities, Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar", page 44

¹⁹ See http://ktwg.org/schoolinfo.htm and http://monedu.org/schools.html

2.6 HEALTH CARE

"Our village tract has a midwife and a nurse. They are responsible for all the villages in this tract. When we need them, we go and call them. They provide treatment if they can, and if not then we go to the nearest town".

Karen Man, Tanintharyi Township, June 2013, CIDKP Interview

While public expenditure on health care has increased during the current government's tenure, the health sector continues to lack adequate equipment, supplies and expertise while costs remain a barrier to access for the rural communities in South East Myanmar. ²⁰ Building on the capacities of ethnic health organisations and integrating these services with government and private networks is a key challenge for public health promotion.

Malaria was rated as the main health concern in 65% of villages surveyed with dengue, diarrhoea and respiratory infections ranked highest in 7-11% of villages each. Indeed, malaria is still the main cause of morbidity and mortality in Myanmar and is especially endemic in forested areas of the South East.²¹ Considering that malaria rates in the refugee camps are relatively low, returnees who have not developed any immunity will be particularly vulnerable.


Figure 13 indicates that 42% of villages surveyed do not have any health facilities located on premises. 34% are primarily serviced by government clinics, although this does not necessarily mean that medicine and trained personnel are available. 53% of villages reported the majority of households purchase medicines from private traders, while only 12% report clinics in the village as the primary source of medicine and 2% reported daily access to a doctor.

However, access to public health care providers is broader than the lack of clinical facilities suggests. There is daily access to community health workers in 24% of villages surveyed as well as traditional birth attendants (21%), midwives (19%) and nurses (9%). This, in part, reflects the reach and capacity of ethnic health organisations that support over 2,000 health workers living in rural areas of South East Myanmar.²² Preventative health services, particularly immunization and deworming campaigns, reached a significant number of surveyed villages during the previous year as documented in Figure 14.

Figure 14: Health Services Provided During Past 12 Months

Services	% villages		
Immunization	72%		
Deworming	46%		
Health Education	38%		
Distribution of Insecticide Nets	36%		
Malaria Diagnosis & Treatment	34%		
Antenatal Care	34%		
Basic Medical Care	22%		
Referral Services	12%		

Figure 13: Access to Health facilities



²⁰ Ministry of National Planning & Economic Development & UNICEF, July 2012, "Situation Analysis of Children in Myanmar"

²¹ ibid, www.unicef.org/eapro/myanmar_Situation_Analysis.pdf

²² For a case study, see Backpack Health Worker Team, 2012, Mid-Year Report, http://www.backpackteam.org/

CHAPTER 3

DISPLACEMENT

SSDF, Flood Damaged Paddy Fields, Keng Tung, 2013 CIDKP, Resting on an Upland Trading Route, Thandaunggyi, 2012





3.1 DISPLACEMENT

"There was a lot of fighting in this area. We were forced to move here and there, and our livelihoods were damaged. That was why a lot of people went to Thailand to look for work".

Shan Woman, Mong Pan Township, July 2013, SSDF Interview

Given restrictions on access, TBC has been the primary source of information about the scale and distribution of internal displacement in South East Myanmar for over a decade. These estimates have been guided by international standards which include people who have been forced to leave homes due to armed conflict, natural disaster or human rights abuses. Rather than setting arbitrary time limits for an end to displacement, international standards refer to voluntary return or resettlement, reintegration into society without discrimination and the recovery or restitution of land and property.²³

TBC has documented the destruction, forced relocation or abandonment of more than 3,700 villages between 1996 and 2011 and an average annual rate of 75,000 people displaced during the past decade. This rate of displacement decreased significantly to approximately 10,000 people between August 2011 and July 2012. However, at least 400,000 internally displaced persons were estimated to remain in the rural areas of 36 townships of South East Myanmar at the end of 2012. ²⁵

It is not possible to update these overall estimates in 2013, as the survey focused on 24% of village tracts in just 22 townships. However, field reports suggest low rates of new displacement have primarily been caused by natural disasters and abuses associated with development projects rather than armed conflict. Flooding in central Karen State at the end of July caused over 33,000 people to flee from their homes and was the biggest single cause of displacement during the year in South East Myanmar.

38% of the 209 villages surveyed reported a combined total of 16,000 internally displaced persons, as mapped in Figure 15. This represents 13% of the combined population of all villages surveyed and 35% of the population in villages where displaced persons reside. The proportion of displaced persons is closer to 100% in KNU and NMSP administered areas of Hpapun and Ye Townships.

However, displacement has increased in the west and north just as rates have slowed in South Eastern Myanmar. It is estimated that 140,000 people have been displaced in Rakhine State and over 100,000 in Kachin and northern Shan State since the current government took office.²⁶

Figure 15: Internally Displaced Persons



²³ UN Commission on Human Rights, 1998, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

²⁴ TBBC, 2011, "Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar", pages 16-18

²⁵ TBC, 2012, "Changing Realities, Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar", pages 16-18

UNHCR, 30 Sept 2013, "Rakhine State Info-graphic", UNOCHA, July 2013, "Myanmar: Internal Displacement Snapshot - Kachin and northern Shan States"

3.2 RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

"If refugees come back, the government should provide land for shelters. Healthcare assistance should be ready. They should also provide food at the beginning and education can come later. They should provide land for cultivation, or create jobs so there is income for survival".

Karen Man, Dawei Township, June 2013, CIDKP Interview

TBC and partners have previously estimated the tentative return or resettlement of 37,000 displaced persons in rural areas of South East Myanmar between August 2011 and July 2012.²⁷ In addition, TBC's population database for monitoring the refugee camps indicates that around 18,000 people left the camps during 2012 but the majority either resettled to third countries or migrated in search of income into Thailand. The analysis suggests that just 2,300 refugees returned to Myanmar during 2012, with the returnee profile characterised as 1-2 members of a household on a temporary visit to assess the situation while the others waited in camp.²⁸

Preliminary findings from UNHCR's recently established returnee monitoring system in South East Myanmar concur that the scale of return remains limited at this stage. Field reports from TBC's partners also suggest that internally displaced communities in low land areas are more likely to be exploring the possibility of return to former villages or resettlement nearby compared to those in upland areas. Demilitarisation, either through the withdrawal or separation of troops, is consistently identified as the primary indicator that displaced communities in contested areas are waiting for before adapting their survival strategies.

Amongst the villages in this survey, just over 1,300 individuals are reported to have migrated into 82 villages between August 2012 and July 2013. This represents just 1% of the total population dispersed thinly amongst 39% of the village surveyed. The average number of incoming migrants was 16 per village, with the highest number recorded at 120 people in a village near Dawei.

Almost two thirds of recent migrants are from nearby villages, while less than a quarter are from towns or elsewhere in Myanmar, and a small proportion had returned from refugee camps or elsewhere in Thailand. It is possible that some people coming from towns or elsewhere in Myanmar had originally been displaced from these villages. However, it is likely that some, if not many, of them are economic migrants in search of new horizons. This echoes the concerns of local and displaced communities in regards to the 'Burmanisation' of, and economic migration into, ethnic territories during the peace process.

Figure 16: Returnees



²⁷ TBC, 2012, "Changing Realities, Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar", page 16

²⁸ TBC, 2013, Programme Report: January - June 2013, page 17

3.3 PRINCIPLES FOR RETURN AND REINTEGRATION

"It will be difficult for the refugees to come back at the moment. Landmines have not yet been removed. We, ourselves, have to be very careful when we go out from our village. The ceasefire is not stable yet so unless there are assurances of their safety, then better not to come back yet".

Karen Woman, Thandaunggyi Township, June 2013, KORD Interview

There is general agreement amongst the Governments of Myanmar and Thailand, the non-state armed groups, displaced persons, local communities and the international donor community that conditions are not yet conducive for an organised and sustainable return process on a large scale. Displaced communities are cautious because protection concerns remain, including landmine pollution and militarisation. Non-state armed groups want to formalise independent ceasefire monitoring mechanisms and address the political causes of conflict and abuse. The Government of Myanmar needs more time to create an economic climate conducive to job creation in areas of potential return, while it is not in the Royal Thai Government's interests to dismantle the camps unless the return is going to be sustainable.

Nonetheless, preparing for a sustainable return and reintegration process in South East Myanmar will take time and involve engagement with a range of stakeholders. Displaced persons want to be at the forefront of planning related to their futures while local communities in areas of potential return and resettlement have concerns related to issues such as land, livelihoods and assistance which also need to be addressed. A number of workshops and public forums have been facilitated and statements issued in which civil society organisations from both sides of the border have reaffirmed their commitment to pursue return according to the principles of voluntariness, safety and dignity.²⁹

International principles and standards have been applied to the local context in two discussion papers. UNHCR Bangkok has articulated a framework to promote the voluntary return of refugees from Thailand. This includes informed consent and free choice without any form of coercion and conditions which ensure physical safety from landmines, violence and armed conflict; legal security and access to justice; and material security including access to land, livelihoods and assistance.³⁰ UNHCR Yangon has offered a framework for supporting the reintegration of displaced persons in South East Myanmar. This emphasises a protection focus on promoting sustainable solutions rather than the logistical issues of return and outlines a phased approach which starts with engaging internally displaced and local communities.³¹

The distribution of these discussion papers has been limited, but information flows within and between local and displaced communities will be key to building accountability and strengthening civil society's participation in preparing for return and reintegration. Given that government troops have been the primary perpetrators of violence and abuse, there is a high level of scepticism amongst displaced and local communities that reforms in the cities will lead to changes in ethnic areas.

Civil society organisations have learnt from previous unsustainable and coerced return processes to remain vigilant in the face of promises from government and international agencies. Perhaps the most worrying trends in this preparedness process so far have been proposals for sub-township development sites and pilot return processes. The sub-township construction sites have been associated with land confiscation, the 'model village' development paradigm and undermining the principles of consultation and informed consent. Proposals for pilot return processes have been repeatedly rejected by the Karen Refugee Committee as a piecemeal approach which is unrelated from the principles of voluntary return.³²

Additional efforts will need to address the aspirations and concerns of ethnic Indian and Rohingya refugees, who represent 8% of the population in Thailand's camps. The wave of violence targeted against the Muslim community in Myanmar during the past year has been widespread, and has emerged as a key obstacle to a competing vision of multiculturalism and pluralism. Local communities in rural areas of South East Myanmar may well be reluctant to accept ethnic Indian and Rohingya returnees, and statelessness will be prolonged unless access to citizenship can be clarified.

²⁹ Karen Refugee Committee (KRC), March 2013, "Position on Repatriation"; Burma Partnership, December 2012, "Nothing About Us, Without Us" http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gOWo7BsBdrM

³⁰ UNHCR, October 2012, "Framework for Voluntary Repatriation: Refugees from Myanmar in Thailand", Annex II, Bangkok

 $^{^{31}}$ UNHCR, June 2013, Supporting Durable Solutions in South East Myanmar: A Framework for UNHCR Engagement, Yangon

³² KRC, May 2013, "KRC's Chairperson met with Chief Minister of Karen State"

CHAPTER 4

LOCAL GOVERNANCE

HURFOM, Villager on his Confiscated Rubber Plantation, Ye, 2013

KSWDC, Community Meeting, Shadaw, 2012



4.1 CIVILIAN PROTECTION

"We dare not trust the Tatmadaw because instead of withdrawing their troops, they build stronger outposts. We dare not cultivate our hillside paddy fields near their outposts". Karen Man, Hpapun Township, May 2013, KESAN interview

Addressing protection concerns relating to physical security and access to justice will be the key test for the peace process. While all parties to the conflict have neglected their obligations to protect civilians, the Tatmadaw's counter-insurgency strategy has specifically targeted communities in contested areas and been responsible for a large proportion of human rights violations. Stopping widespread and systematic abuses and preventing their reoccurrence will require transforming the climate of impunity and holding perpetrators to account.³³

Previous surveys have indicated that approximately half of households in rural areas of South East Myanmar have citizenship cards. ³⁴ This survey corroborates these findings with 59% of villages reporting that the majority of members have identity cards, 21% estimating citizenship amongst half of members and 20% reporting a minority or absence of identity card holders.

Only 3% of villages reported the police as the main mechanism for dealing with serious disputes and crimes, which highlights the lack of access to, or confidence in, Myanmar's legal system. Village leaders are the primary arbitrators of justice in 73% of sites surveyed, while 22% reported utilising a mix of government and ethnic opposition judicial mechanisms.

Indicators for access to information about national laws reflect a general lack of awareness about rights and responsibilities. The majority of households in 41% of villages surveyed have no reliable access to information while most households in 34% of villages are informed by listening to the radio. Non-state armed groups and village leaders are the most significant formal mechanism for disseminating information in 5% of villages each, but people are otherwise largely dependent on family and friends.

No landmines are reported around 39% of the villages surveyed, but the lack of landmine demarcation is illustrated by majority of households not being aware of the location of landmines in 32% of villages. Warning signs posted on location by any of the armed groups are the means of informing the majority of households in only 3% of villages surveyed. Most households depend on verbal warnings from non-state armed groups in 16% of villages, while it isn't until a human or animal casualty that landmines become common knowledge in 6% of villages.

Figure 17: Dispute Mechanisms



³³ See US Institute of Peace, June 2013, "Burma/Myanmar Rule of Law Trip Report: Working Document for Discussion"

³⁴ TBC, 2012, "Changing Realities, Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar", page 40



4.2 VILLAGE LEADERSHIP

"Confiscated lands have not yet been returned. The land owners are asking but nothing happens. The governing authorities are still the same as before. Policies change but their characters stay the same. I am still suspicious about this ceasefire agreement".

Mon Man, Ye Township, June 2013, MRDC Interview

Despite the establishment of state and regional governments, Myanmar's system of governance remains centralised because of restrictions on political autonomy at the subnational level, confusion over administrative lines of accountability for public servants and Union oversight of revenue and expenditures. Decentralisation within the existing constitutional constraints will not provide the devolution of authority that the non-state armed groups seek. However, strengthening local governance will contribute to building confidence, accountability and transparency.³⁵

Legislative reform in 2012 enabled the replacement of centrally-appointed village tract administrators with indirectly elected representatives which provide an opportunity to strengthen local governance. The dynamics between government township authorities and village leaders have generally been characterised by a top-down command structure.³⁶ When asked how village leaders access government authorities, half of the villages surveyed indicated that the primary mechanism was waiting until township authorities call a meeting of village tract leaders while 10% have no contact at all. Only 27% of village leaders initiate contact by visiting township authorities or through written correspondence.

Indicators for the accountability of village leaders are more positive and suggest that social capital has generally withstood decades of military rule. Regardless of official procedures, 57% of villages in this survey choose leaders through regular elections for a fixed term limit while only 15% are appointed by village tract leaders or benefitted from a hereditary system. Similarly, 68% of villages surveyed indicated that communities are at least consulted by village leaders before important decisions are made about public affairs.

While village leaders are the main mechanism for resolving disputes and managing community affairs, their capacities are increasingly stretched. Non-state armed groups have provided differing degrees of institutional support for local governance, but this affiliation can also induce negative repercussions from government officials. The challenge of integrating political, administrative and financial systems between government and non-state armed groups at the local level will be keys to harnessing capacity and reducing the burden for village leaders.

Figure 18: Leadership Elections



³⁵ Centre for Social and Economic Development and The Asia Foundation, 2013, "State and Region Governments in Myanmar", http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/1249

³⁶ Kempel & MDR, 2012, "Village Institutions and Leadership in Myanmar: A View from Below", Unpublished report to UNDP

4.3 NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

"I heard that if the ceasefire agreement becomes stronger, trading will increase in our area. They will take all our valuable resources away from our area. I don't want to see this. They will benefit but our farmlands will be destroyed. We will get nothing".

Karen Woman, Thandaunggyi Township, June 2013, KORD Interview

With investors flocking to Asia's last frontier, there are significant risks that local communities will bear the burden of resource extraction, which includes environmental degradation, land confiscation and displacement. Unless the potential social and environmental impacts are addressed and customary management of natural resources acknowledged, investments are likely to exacerbate local grievances and potentially derail the national peace process.


The Extractive Industries' Transparency Initiative (EITI) in Myanmar could potentially evolve into a regulatory body to ensure that payments are not misappropriated from government revenue. Community participation in planning and monitoring projects will also be vital at the local level to promote sustainable livelihoods. There are currently village development committees in 37% of villages surveyed and a comparable proportion of forums to promote community-based natural resource management.

No protection from agriculture or other encroachment is currently organised for forests surrounding 59% of the villages surveyed. Only 20% of villages had demarcated significant forests as protected areas with an authority which is widely respected and rarely infringed.

Securing land tenure for customary and displaced subsistence farmers is key to ensuring livelihood opportunities are sustainable and enhancing a sense of justice.³⁷ This survey suggests that at least half of the households in 41% of villages currently depend on village leaders to protect land tenure for housing or agriculture. The majority of households in 30% of villages surveyed have land demarcated and recognised by the government, while non-state armed groups have issued land use certificates for most households in 26% of villages.

Given the cessation of hostilities but the absence of any political settlements, investors are expanding into contested areas by exploiting the lack of a regulatory environment. Short term concessions with limited acreage offered by non-state armed groups have been leveraged by private companies into long term deals over vast areas of land with Government authorities. Logging and mining operations are reported nearby 40% and 27% of the surveyed villages respectively, while commercial agricultural plantations and road construction are each in the vicinity of 11% of villages.

Figure 19: Mechanisms for Land Tenure



³⁷ Displacement Solutions, June 2013, "Bridging the HLP Gap", Geneva, page 5

4.4 CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

"I want the ceasefire groups and private businessmen to be more transparent. Maybe they are doing goods for our state but they never tell the public what and why they are doing business, so we can have misunderstandings. We can get a genuine peace if they work alongside people".

Kayah Man, Pruso Township, June 2013, KSWDC Interview

The legacy of military rule and armed conflict in the borderlands of South East Myanmar includes chronic poverty, widespread abuse and enduring insecurity. Traditional development objectives such as increasing economic growth, building government capacities and improving service delivery, may be counterproductive given that the legitimacy of the state is at issue. Strategies which build confidence in the transition to peace and transform institutions to address security, justice and economic concerns may be more relevant. This will require aid agencies shifting focus away from responding to humanitarian needs to becoming more sensitive to local concerns.³⁸

This survey did not make a distinction between needs and concerns. When focus groups were asked to prioritise the most important needs, the responses ranged from education (21% of villages), to health care (20%), food security and livelihoods (18%), water and sanitation (15%), roads and bridges (10%), electricity (8%) and a small proportion of other sectors. These are all legitimate needs given the lack of public infrastructure in rural areas, and a funding proposal could be justified on this basis alone.

However, the virtual silence regarding concerns about security, justice and the peace process contradicts observations by field staff that these are priority issues for local communities. An enabling and protective environment is a pre-requisite for any of these activities to contribute to the recovery of conflict-affected communities. One explanation for this apparent anomaly is that the survey led villagers to focus on needs rather than concerns or problems.

Gaps in knowledge and analysis are a key barrier to developing networks between aid agencies, parties to the conflict and community leaders about linking relief and development programmes to conflict transformation strategies. Decades of censorship and restrictions on access have cultivated a culture of discreet information sharing which needs to be overcome in order to strengthen conflict analysis. At the same time, the ongoing legal and security constraints that civil society organisations affiliated with non-state armed groups face cannot be ignored. Rather than just focusing on the pace of reforms and the window of opportunity, the sustainability of the peace process will also require listening to the fears and concerns of ethnic communities.

Figure 20: Priority Needs



³⁸ Parks, Colletta & Oppenheim, 2013, "The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Conflict and International Development Assistance", The Asia Foundation, Bangkok

³⁹ Peace Donor Support Group, 22 April 2013, "Desktop Review of Needs and Gaps in Conflict-Affected Parts of Myanmar", pages 15-16



Over the past year, the 18 ethnic armed groups have worked together to develop a framework for political dialogue with the Government. Armed groups have committed to this framework in order to ensure that the peace process does not stop with individual ceasefires. ... Each armed group retains the legal authority and mandate to negotiate with the government on behalf of their people.

The process of attaining a nation-wide ceasefire has involved direct negotiations between the armed groups and the Government, as these conflict partners must agree to end the armed conflict. In the political dialogue, additional stakeholders such as political parties, civil society, Parliament, the Burma Army, and key leaders such as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi need to participate actively.



Saw Mutu Sae Poe, Chairman, Karen National Union, and Sao Yawd Serk, Chairman, Restoration Council of the Shan State Joint Statement, 17 July 2013



The current 2008 Constitution practiced by U Thein Sein Government is not accepted, as it is devoid democratic essence and not in accordance with the principles of federalism. A new Constitution based on genuine federal principles will be drafted and promoted for practice...

In political dialogue and negotiation, the 6 point political programme laid down by the Ethnic Nationality Conference held in September 2012, will be followed. In political dialogue and negotiation, all the resistance organisations are to be represented as a bloc, and not individually.



Statement of the Ethnic Nationalities Conference, United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), 2 August 2013

APPENDICES

KSWDC, Returning from the market, Hpasawng, 2013

CIDKP, Flood, Kawkareik, 2013



Appendix 1: Surveyed Village List

Township	Village Name	Latitude	Longitude	Number of Households	Village Population	Other Surveys
Shan State	1	-		-		•
	Gung Grad	20.30587	98.30491	44	150	
	Kung Kae	20.30965	98.31477	53	203	
	Loi Noi	20.31684	98.33149	40	100	
	Mai Kom	20.30807	98.30785	40	160	
3.0	Mai Neuw	20.31711	98.32372	55	204	
Mongpan	Mong Hong	20.31262	98.26792	62	210	
Mongpan	Mong Pai	20.31717	98.32861	18	90	
	Nam Tein	20.306962	98.310139	53	188	
	Nar Lar	20.30814	98.22567	18	70	
	Wan Mai Kong Moo	20.31729	98.32592	40	160	
	Hong Lin	20.25844	98.91135	42	210	
	Na Pa Kao	20.21797	98.99815	110	484	
	Nam Hoo Sin	20.126342	98.90211	33	157	
Mongton	Pang Kaeng	20.25844	98.91135	23	76	
	Phai Kae	20.27539	98.89902	113	587	
	Wan Mai Naw Gawng Moo	20	98.9	51	153	
	Wan Mork Sai Li	20.17662	98.95096	14	273	
Karenni / Kaya	nh State					
	Chee Kwet	19.0201	97.35318	96	584	Mercy Corps
Bawlakhe	Wan Loik	19.17362	97.5018	24	131	
Dawiakiie	Yae Ne Pauk	19.11992	97.32688	78	230	Mercy Corps
	Ywa Thit	19.16162	97.4925	72	300	
	Boe Lyar	19.4577	97.32222	53	272	
	Daw Ku Le	19.50585	97.18448	48	271	
	Daw Ta Ma Gyi	19.323	97.359	335	1,983	
Demoso	Nan Hu Tway	17.532	97.214	50	235	
	Pan Pae	19.59548	96.9884	62	150	
	Saw Pa Tan	19.515	97.085	61	329	
	Thee So Pya	19.57547	97.2004	54	267	
	Ba Han Law	18.923	97.214	28	120	
	Bu Kho	18.966	97.038	92	450	
	Ka Yeh Khee	18.711	97.168	24	156	
Hpasawng	Kaw Thu Doe	18.853028	97.148617	71	360	Mercy Corps
Hpasawiig	Kayar Wan Aung	18.871	97.347	80	450	Mercy Corps
	Khoe Baw Doe	18.763	97.203	29	145	
	Lo Khar Lo	18.823653	97.147397	250	2,000	Mercy Corps
	Doe Hta Relocation Site	18.846	97.312	43	196	
	B`Yar	19.35871	96.966 77 8	101	460	
	Daw Kue Khu	19.47367	97.110183	70	428	
	Daw Lar Saw	19.2721	97.064772	32	165	
	Htee Byar Nye	19.38573	97.22183	82	219	
	Htee Wah Khaw	19.143447	96.950242	31	179	
	Kay Kee	19.132264	97.003108	15	167	
Hpruso	Ka Yoe Kho	19.259844	97.038772	82	394	
	Khar Bae	19.262556	96.946528	73	338	
	Lyar Du	19.36455	97.16838	20	114	Mercy Corps
	Mar Karw Shay	19.34962	97.19802	87	455	
	Mo Hso	19.41438	97.096	82	400	
	Pa Leit Lel	19.208833	97.202789	44	290	
	Raw Daw Khaw	19.2642	96.87118	63	400	
	Daw Paw Ka Leh	19.702	97.164	30	162	Mercy Corps
Loikaw	Tee Sae Khar	19.882	97.279	36	173	
	Wan Kun	19.641	97.301	83	380	
	Ho Gyit	18.58607	97.4766	54	252	Mercy Corps
Maga	Mae Sae Nan	18.70033	97.48355	38	455	Mercy Corps
Mese	Nan Man	18.712	97.676	110	400	Mercy Corps
	Pan Tain	18.65123	97.56547	89	420	Mercy Corps

Township	Village Name	Latitude	Longitude	Number of Households	Village Population	Other Surveys
	Daw Kee Sar	19.6365	97.485467	31	184	
	Daw Naw Klu	19.89	97.519	62	339	Mercy Corps
Shadaw	Nun Aung Lay	19.827	97.589	56	218	
	Sa Loung	19.61758	97.59863	52	228	
	Shadaw Relocation Site	19.63721	97.51931	160	890	
Bago Region						
	Hpo Thaw Su	18.39073	96.70126	85	586	
	Hto War Saik	18.15271	96.74051	69	401	
	Kyaw Soo	18.55007	96.69556	180	901	
	Myeit Yen	18.36511	96.7077	53	302	
Kyaukkyi	Naung Kone	18.283049	96.723209	140	865	
	Nga Laug Teik T`Hkaw Pyaw	18.42415	96.71372	52	588	
	Taw Kyaug Pauk	18.47142	96.65914	402	2,228	
	Waya Daw Hko	18.21124 18.17644	96.69545 96.70813	136	720 538	
	Yae Le	18.31234	96.69163	170	918	
	Chaung Kyo	18.06638	96.80334	60	210	
	Hin Tha	18.12783	96.76153	330	1,752	
	Hwheh Deh	17.80172	96.88744	110	556	
	Kaw Tha Say	18.1474	96.84125	94	504	
	Leh Kaung Wa	18.09269	96.81654	55	296	
Shwegyin	Leh Pin Wel	18.07553	96.75747	81	408	
	Me Ka Dee	17.68088	97.11507	132	660	
	Sa Lu Chaung	17.84441	96.88101	156	1,568	
	Tha Yet Chaung	17.98672	96.87095	210	1,200	
	War Pyu Taung	17.59264	97.03008	55	240	
Karen / Kayin S	State					
	Bi Sa Kat	16.87484	98.07768	156	624	
	Hti Poe Kein	16.89827	98.03393	123	620	
	Hty Bu	16.82528	98.08554	100	500	
	Ka Tay Ko	16.80668	98.07786	90	460	
	Kawrt lay Poe	16.82932	97.98299	130	650	
	Kwee Kyn	17.00011	98.06689	35	170	
	Kyet Tu Yway	16.87488	98.07773	72	360	
Hlaingbwe	Ler Dah	16.80282	98.0054	50	260	
	Mae Pa Ra kee Naung Mya lwe	17.03324 16.85592	98.06109 97.99888	120	600	
	Nor Boe	16.83598	98.07793	75 80	380	
	Paung	16.89517	98.04663	226	1,189	
	Pway Htaw Ru	17.07678	98.04003	70	320	
	Si Ko	16.89977	98.04909	80	550	
	Ta Nay Kaw	16.89439	98.00453	60	290	
	Tha Mo	17.13542	98.01983	92	435	
	Baw Tho Hta	17.73886	97.41725	104	520	
	Hkeh Pa Hta	18.14694	97.2757	48	283	
	Hso Per Hko	18.52553	97.08609	54	372	
	Htee Baw Hkee	18.44398	97.09993	59	386	
	Htee Ber Kah Hta	17.95648	97.44298	39	228	
	Htee Gaw Hta	17.94947	97.34355	56	329	
	Htee Hsaw Aye Hkee	18.33718	97.2046	15	267	
	Htee Hswel Ni	18.267	97.37072	56	206	
	Htee Theh Lay	17.6824	97.45671	220	1,110	
Hpapun	Hton Mu	17.80839	97.48824	42	237	
	Kho Kyaw Der	18.53866	97.13787	42	312	
	Klaw Hta	17.92322	97.44963	67	521	
	Lah Eh Der	18.45699	97.23068	15	101	
	Law Pwo Der	18.08798	97.36051	38	220	
	Ler Htu Poe	17.96959	97.31047	23	109	
	Mae Wah Der	18.16497	97.40728	54	383	
	Pah Heh Der	18.31598	97.19473	24	143	
		.0	0			
	Paw Khaw Plaw Ta Hko Tor Baw	18.51234 18.41797	97.13821 97.26184	20	204 155	

Township	Village Name	Latitude	Longitude	Number of Households	Village Population	Other Surveys
	An Hpa Gyi	16.49824	98.25622	170	970	
	An Kaung	16.46107	98.21815	360	1,850	
	Kyn Tha Lyn	16.45424	98.23647	130	750	
	Laung Kaing	16.46826	98.1438	214	1,035	
Kawkareik	Myo How	16.52384	98.28458	48	240	
	Set Ka Wet	16.45662	98.2978	313	1,778	
Kawkareik	Ta Bro	16.34849	98.20101	238	1,322	
Kawkareik	Ta Ri Ta Khaung	16.41729	98.2119	332	1,660	
	Ta Tan Ku	16.56406	98.27229	130	160	
	Taung Kyar Inn	16.49691	98.16	519	2,383	
	Tha Mein Dut	16.40406	98.1015	315	1,785	
	Win Ka	16.34724	98.11588	107	1,530	
	Yae Kyaw Linn	16.5266	98.21728	140	900	
	Tar Shin	16.4202	98.23534	182	1,041	
	Auk Too Hta	16.175778	98.164101	59	336	
	Hti War Ka Lu	15.582517	98.264018	87	471	
	Lan Hpar	16.183827	98.193317	30	172	
	Mae Pleh	16.2332	98.180154	270	1,106	
	Maw Khe Khee	16.062666	98.240182	115	598	
Kyainseikgyi	Mea K' Thu Chaw Pyah	16.13309	98.211639	77	547	
	Mea Nah Thaw	16.214584	98.185147	29	162	
	Mea Ta Ler	15.505071	98.324253	52	284	
	Pein Neh Gon	16.150494	98.20165	69	487	
	Pu Yea	16.022358	98.245715	167	827	
	Ther Der Hko	16.050213	98.231494	78	475	
	Hpa Lu	16.5702	98.56849	245	1,191	
	Kwin Ka Lay	16.64816	98.37698	311	2,188	
	Me Htaw Tha Lay	16.63068	98.53703	500	2,500	
Myawaddy	Me Ka Lar	16.1885	98.60522	25	100	
Myawaddy	Me Ka Nei	16.59988	98.4578	40	200	
	Me Ka Nei	16.67144	98.41895	229	1,241	
	Me Lah Pei	16.58009	98.57949	400	2,600	
	Ta O'Hta	16.36253	98.87144	108	600	
	Chee Thu Saw (Lower)	19.25373	96.66165	65	420	
	Ha Moh	19.10385	96.54975	29	130	
	Hker Weh	19.04128	96.73094	115	665	
	Hplay Hsa Law	18.75209	96.74495	74	400	
	KThwee De Hkee	19.11814	96.69253	28	175	
	L'Mehgyi	19.01659	96.77612	45	300	
	Leik Pyar Ay auk	19.21653	96.56859	36	180	
Thandaunggyi	Leik Pyar Ka Lay	19.09322	96.69253	28	200	
	Ma Sa Auk	19.24536	96.62914	53	235	
	Ma Sa Hkaw	19.26322	96.74949	38	230	
	Nga Pyaw Daw	19.27516	96.64426	58	350	
	Saw Law Hko	19.12466	96.83157	20	130	
	Shaw Wa Der	18.83383	96.84632	53	279	
	Shwe La Bo	19.14096	96.58313	38	200	
	Thay Mu Der	18.97555	96.87626	45	200	
Mon State						
	Ah Yu Taung	15.22545	97.514	52	270	
	Chei Daik	15.16044	98.08876	95	450	
	Halockhani	15.16444	98.17867	220	1,260	
	Joo Hapraoc	15.079402	98.161115	147	760	
Ye	Kabyar	15.04362	97.49008	150	1,000	
	Kani	15.12197	98.0405	67	430	
	Khaw Za Chaung Wa	15.02086	97.4946	615	3,800	
	Toe Thet Ywa Thit	15.16571	97.5204	197	850	
	War Zin	15.21698	97.97947	48	222	

Township	Village Name	Latitude	Longitude	Number of Households	Village Population	Other Surveys
Tanintharyi Re	egion					
	Dar Thway Kyauk	14.07747	98.33056	62	312	
	Hnit Se Thone Maing	14.17355	98.40119	74	450	
	Hpaung Taw Gyi	14.00685	98.54912	190	975	
	Ka Lit Gyi	14.16633	98.46536	52	192	
D:	Kataungni	13.84928	98.65547	195	1,074	
Dawei	Myitta	14.16142	98.5208	333	1,682	
	Pyin Thar Taw	14.21077	98.43001	65	350	
	Shwe Chaung	14.16481	98.46475	63	380	
	Yam Ma Zu	14.14688	98.32254	76	400	
	Yinbuwa	14.106	98.46733	62	294	
	Du Yin Pin Shaung	12.97989	98.69351	95	680	
	Hta Min Ma Sar	13.11989	98.62929	40	700	
	Ka De	12.93157	98.70147	230	1,100	
D 1	Mi Kyaung Thaik	13.04077	98.75638	130	700	
Palaw	Pyi Char	13.1839	98.6328	250	1,025	
	Shan Dut	13.04131	98.68407	97	536	
	Sin Htoe Nge	13.28398	98.58975	150	750	
	Zat Di Win	12.96844	98.76156	85	465	
	Ka Nan Kwin	12.10788	99.1437	120	700	
	Ka Wert Hta	12.554	99.01826	30	131	
	Kyein Chaung	11.93732	99.24656	84	350	
m ' .1 '	Mei Ngaw	12.27979	99.03394	32	140	
Tanintharyi	Pa Ta Myar	12.28854	99.05993	60	320	
	Pa Wa Htauk Ma	12.066	98.90313	78	434	
	Theh Pyu	11.85448	99.28643	130	650	
	Thin Baw U	12.92577	98.94884	65	365	
	Alae Sakhan	15.00131	97.5938	330	1,589	
	Jao Dong	14.87036	98.19236	35	227	
	Kya Khat Taw	14.4627	97.5742	57	327	
	Lei Gyi	14.46508	97.5717	105	370	
Yebyu	May Gyi	14.44083	97.5742	124	985	
	Platarao	14.58879	98.03916	62	370	
	Rar Hpu	14.51003	98.0259	280	1,420	UNICEF
	Sin Swei	14.50244	97.5833	100	507	
	Yin Ye	15.0646	97.4906	418	4,500	

APPENDIX 2: 2013 SURVEY FRAMEWORK

"Hello, my name is	I work	for I we	ould like to learn	n more about living conditions, s	ocial services,
increase awareness ab	out the situation i	n this village. You wi	ll not be paid for	your name, but we will use this a participating in this survey, an ith your answers. Are you willing	d there are no
time and respond to the	ese questions?"				
State / Region (on g	overnment map	s):			
Township:					
Village Tract / Sub-	Township:				
Village:					
Latitude (dd.ddddd)) or (dd mm ss):				
Longitude (dd.dddd	ld) or (dd mm ss) :			
Organisation of field	d staff intervieu	ver:			
No. of key informan	its:				
1. Male			2. Femal	le	
🔲 3. Village Tra	ict Leaders		4. Villag	e leaders	
5. Teachers, l	health care workers	or religious leaders	6. Other	Villagers	
7. Local gove	rnment authorities		8. Non-s	state armed group representatives	
RESPONSE CODE (I		-		Y ()	
1. All (or almost all)	2. Most	3. Around Half	4. Few	5. None (or almost none)	
DEMOGRAPHICS					
1. What is the tota	l number of hou	seholds in this vill	age?		
2. What is the tota	l population in t	his village?			
3. How many peop	ole displaced by	conflict, abuse or n	atural disaster	es stay in this village?	
4. How many peop	ole have moved o	out of this village d	uring the past 1	2 months?	
5. Where did peop	ole who moved o	ut of this village du	ring the nast 19	2 months go to?	
J. Where the peop	ne who moved o	at of this vinage da	ing the past i	USE THE RESPO	NSE CODE)
1 Refugee ca	mps in Thailand	2 Elsewhe	ere in Thailand	3. Nearby Villages in I	
		nar 5. Other (viyammar
6. How many peor	ole have moved i	nto this village dur	ing the past 12	months?	
Free			8 F		
7. Where did peop	ple who moved i	nto village in the pa	ast 12 months o	come from? (USE THE RESPO	ONSE CODE)
1. Refugee ca	mps in Thailand	2. Elsewhe	ere in Thailand	3. Nearby Villages in I	Myanmar
4. Towns or e	elsewhere in Myanı	mar 🔲 5. Other (1	olease specify):		
A CONTRACT OF THE PARTY OF THE	gious compositio	on of this village?		(USE THE RESPO)NSE CODE)
1. Animist		2. Buddhis	st	3. Christian	
4. Moslem		5. None		6. Other	
O What is the other	nic composition	of this village?		(USE THE RESPO	NSE CODE)
9. What is the ethr		2. Pwo Ka	ren	3. Kayah	MOL CODE)
	ш	5. Paku	CII		
4. Kayaw 7. Shan		5. Paku 8. Palaung		 6. Kayan 9. Pa-○	
7. Snan 10. Lahu		11. Mon	•		
10. Lanu		11. Wion		12. Burman	

GEOGRAPHY

10.	What type of geography surrounds this	village?	(IDENTIFY NO MC	RE THAN TWO RESPONSES)
	1. Upland hills		2. Lowland plains	
	3. Peri-urban		4. Remote / rural	
11.	What is the nearest or most accessible t	town?		
12.	How do people travel to the nearest or	most accessible to	wn?	(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. By foot	2. Cart	The second secon	Motorbike
	4. Mini-tractor / trology	☐ 5. Car/Truck	☐ 6.	Boat
	7. Other (please specify):			
13.	What is the average travel time to the n	earest or most acc	essible town?	(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Less than 1 hour	2. One to Three ho		Four to eight hours
	4. Nine hours to one day	5. One to Two days	6.	Three days or more
но	USING			
	W	.1	. 9	(LIGE THE DECDONGE CODE)
14.	How many households regularly have e		ះ 2. Less than 4 hours រុ	(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	3. 4-8 hours per day	一	4. More than 8 hours	
	5. Varied or uncertain		4. More than 6 hours	per day
	5. varied of uncertain			
15.	What is the main source for electricity?			(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
-0-	1. Government	2. Community	1 3.	Commercial / private business
				, Ferrina a manage
16.	What type of shelter do people have?			(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Bamboo hut		2. Wooden house	
	3. Brick house		4. Community building	ngs
	5. Temporary shelter (e.g. tarpaulins)			
WA	TER SUPPLY AND SANITATION			
17.	What are the main sources of drinking	water used in this	village?	(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Tube-well		2. Rain water tanks	
	3. Natural spring / gravity flow pipes		4. Piped water / Tap s	stand system
	5. Hand-dug, unlined well		6. River / Stream / La	ke
				/
18.	How do people treat water before drink	ang in this village?		(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Boil it	-	2. Use ceramic filter	
	3. Use cloth filter		4. Add purification ta	blets
	5. Nothing			
19.	How many wet latrines or fly proof pit t	toilets are in this vi	illage?	
20.	What are the main types of latrines use	ed in this village?		(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Wet latrine		2. Fly proof / covered	
	3. Uncovered / direct pit		4. No latrine	· •
21.	Is there a common waste dump for the	village?		
	1. Yes		2. No	

LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY

22.	How many households are mainly dependent on t	he following livelihoods? (Us	SE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Cultivating crops / plantations	2. Farming livestock	
	3. Mining	4. Logging	
	5. trade	6. fishing / hunting / coll	ecting forest products
	7. construction	8. manufacturing	
	9. public servant / government officer	10. Social work / teacher	/ health care
	11. Other (please specify):	,	,
23.	How many households access agricultural land fo	r farming in this village? (Us	SE THE RESPONSE CODE)
Ü	1. No land for farming	2. Less than 2 acres of lar	
	3. 2-5 acres of land	4. More than 5 acres of la	
24.	How many households own the following livestood	k? (Us	SE THE RESPONSE CODE)
-4.	1. buffalo / ox	2. cow	
	3. horse / mule	4. pig	
	5. chicken / duck / other poultry	6. goat	
	7. Other (please specify):	0. goat	
	/. Other (please specify).		
0.5	What have been the main constraints on shocks to	livelihoods during the past 10	months?
25.	What have been the main constraints or shocks to		NK 3 MOST IMPORTANT)
	I loss of ampleyment / income	2. floods / heavy rains / d	_
	1. loss of employment / income		-
	3. rats / pests damaged crops	4. commodity price increase	
	5. sickness / injury	6. interest rates for debt r	
	7. limited availability of land	8. military patrols / restri	ictions on movement
	9. landmines	10. Armed conflict	
	11. forced labour	12. Extortion or arbitrary	
	13. forced displacement	14. No shocks to livelihoo	ds
26.	How many households are currently capable of co	vering basic food needs for th	e following periods?
26.	How many households are currently capable of co	overing basic food needs for th	e following periods? (USE RESPONSE CODE)
26.	How many households are currently capable of co	overing basic food needs for th	
26.			
26.	1. Currently not at all	2. Less than 1 week	
26.	1. Currently not at all 3. 1-4 weeks	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months	
	1. Currently not at all 3. 1-4 weeks	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months	
	1. Currently not at all 3. 1-4 weeks 5. 2-4 months	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT)
	 1. Currently not at all 3. 1-4 weeks 5. 2-4 months What are the main sources of credit?	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender
	1. Currently not at all 3. 1-4 weeks 5. 2-4 months What are the main sources of credit? 1. Family or friends	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund
	1. Currently not at all 3. 1-4 weeks 5. 2-4 months What are the main sources of credit? 1. Family or friends 3. Bank	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA 2. Commercial / private r. 4. Micro credit Association	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund
27.	1. Currently not at all 3. 1-4 weeks 5. 2-4 months What are the main sources of credit? 1. Family or friends 3. Bank	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA 2. Commercial / private r. 4. Micro credit Association	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund
27.	 1. Currently not at all 3. 1-4 weeks 5. 2-4 months What are the main sources of credit? 1. Family or friends 3. Bank 5. Employer 	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA 2. Commercial / private r. 4. Micro credit Association	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund
27. ACC	 1. Currently not at all 3. 1-4 weeks 5. 2-4 months What are the main sources of credit? 1. Family or friends 3. Bank 5. Employer 	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA 2. Commercial / private r 4. Micro credit Association 6. Religious leader / insti	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund
27. ACC	1. Currently not at all 3. 1-4 weeks 5. 2-4 months What are the main sources of credit? 1. Family or friends 3. Bank 5. Employer CESS TO HEALTH CARE	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA 2. Commercial / private r 4. Micro credit Association 6. Religious leader / insti	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund tution SELECT ALL THAT APPLY)
27. ACC	 □ 1. Currently not at all □ 3. 1-4 weeks □ 5. 2-4 months What are the main sources of credit? □ 1. Family or friends □ 3. Bank □ 5. Employer CESS TO HEALTH CARE What kind of health facilities are located in this vi □ 1. Hospital (Government) 	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA 2. Commercial / private r. 4. Micro credit Association 6. Religious leader / insti	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund tution SELECT ALL THAT APPLY)
27. ACC	☐ 1. Currently not at all ☐ 3. 1-4 weeks ☐ 5. 2-4 months What are the main sources of credit? ☐ 1. Family or friends ☐ 3. Bank ☐ 5. Employer CESS TO HEALTH CARE What kind of health facilities are located in this vi	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA 2. Commercial / private r. 4. Micro credit Association 6. Religious leader / institution (Section 2) (Section 3) (Section 3) (Section 3) (Section 4) (Section 4) (Section 5) (Section 5) (Section 6) (Section 6	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund tution SELECT ALL THAT APPLY) overnment)
27. ACC	 □ 1. Currently not at all □ 3. 1-4 weeks □ 5. 2-4 months What are the main sources of credit? □ 1. Family or friends □ 3. Bank □ 5. Employer CESS TO HEALTH CARE What kind of health facilities are located in this vi □ 1. Hospital (Government) □ 3. Rural Health Clinic (Ethnic Health Organisation) 	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA 2. Commercial / private r 4. Micro credit Associatio 6. Religious leader / insti llage? 2. Rural Health Clinic (Go	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund tution SELECT ALL THAT APPLY) overnment)
27. ACC 28.		2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA 2. Commercial / private r 4. Micro credit Association 6. Religious leader / institution 1. Religious leader / institution 2. Rural Health Clinic (Good 4. Private Clinic 6. Other (please specify):	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund tution SELECT ALL THAT APPLY) overnment)
27. ACC 28.		2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA 2. Commercial / private r 4. Micro credit Association 6. Religious leader / institution 1. Religious leader / institution 2. Rural Health Clinic (Good 4. Private Clinic 6. Other (please specify):	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund tution SELECT ALL THAT APPLY) overnment)
27. ACC 28.		2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA 2. Commercial / private r 4. Micro credit Association 6. Religious leader / instite 1. Less than 1 week (RA 2. Commercial / private r 4. Micro credit Association 6. Religious leader / instite 2. Rural Health Clinic (Good A. Private Clinic 6. Other (please specify): 1. Private Clinic 6. Other (please specify): 1. Pregularly?	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund tution SELECT ALL THAT APPLY) overnment)
27. ACC 28.	☐ 1. Currently not at all ☐ 3. 1-4 weeks ☐ 5. 2-4 months What are the main sources of credit? ☐ 1. Family or friends ☐ 3. Bank ☐ 5. Employer CESS TO HEALTH CARE What kind of health facilities are located in this vi ☐ 1. Hospital (Government) ☐ 3. Rural Health Clinic (Ethnic Health Organisation) ☐ 5. NGO Clinic Who provides health care in this village and how to (SEI)	2. Less than 1 week 4. 1-2 months 6. More than 4 months (RA 2. Commercial / private r 4. Micro credit Association 6. Religious leader / instite 1. Less than 1 week (RA 2. Commercial / private r 4. Micro credit Association 6. Religious leader / instite 2. Rural Health Clinic (Good A. Private Clinic 6. Other (please specify): 1. Private Clinic 6. Other (please specify): 1. Pregularly?	(USE RESPONSE CODE) ANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT) noney lender on / Village Fund tution SELECT ALL THAT APPLY) overnment) E CODE FOR HOW OFTEN)
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30.	what were the main health concern	s mat occurred o	_		OG TO DANK TUDEE)
					RS TO RANK THREE)
	1. Malaria		2. Tuberculosis		
	3. Diarrhea		4. Skin infection		
	5. Dysentery		·	nsmitted Disease	es
	7. Respiratory Infection		8. Trauma (phy		
	9. Dengue		10. Other (pleas	se specify):	
31.	Which services have been provided	during the past	12 months in this vi	llage? (SELEC	CT ALL THAT APPLY)
	1. Immunization		_	nosis and treatm	
	3. Basic Medical Care		4. Distribution	of insecticide ne	ts
	5. Antenatal Care		6. Referral serv	ices	
	7. Health education		8. Deworming		
	9. Other (please specify):				
32.	Where do families access medicines	i?		(USE TH	IE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Trader / Shop in the village		2. Trader / Sho	p in another tow	n
	3. Clinic in the village		4. Clinic in anot	ther town	
	5. Health worker / mobile clinic		6. NGO		
	7. Other (please specify):				
ACC	CESS TO EDUCATION				
33.	What type of school and curriculum	is available in tl		-	CT ALL THAT APPLY)
	1. Government Basic Education		2. Monastic / N	on-formal	
	3. Ethnic Nationality / Non-State Sy	stem	4. Mixed		
	5. None (skip to Question 35)				
34.	What education facilities are availal	ble in this village	?	(SELEC	CT ALL THAT APPLY)
•		No. Students	No. Teachers	5	
	1. Pre-school / Nursery	***************************************	***************************************		
	2. Primary (KG – Grade 4)	***************************************	***************************************		
	3. Middle School (Grade 5-8)		***************************************		
	4. High School (Grade 9-10)				
35.	Can teachers in the village school sp	eak the local lan		(USE TH	IE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Yes		2. No		
36.	Where are the nearest schools outsi	de the village?			
		(SELECT ALL TI	HAT APPLY & USE	CODES FOR L	OCATION & ACCESS)
	a. Location Codes			a. Location	b. Means of Access
	1. nearby (less than 2 hours away)			(Use code)	(Use code)
	2. far away (more than 2 hours away)	1. Pre-schoo	l / Nursery		
	b. Means of access Codes	2. Primary (KG-Grade 4)		
	1. Motor Vehicle; 2. Bicycle;	3. Middle Sc	hool (Grade 5-8)		
	3. By foot; 4. Boarding	4. High Scho	ool (Grade 9-10)		
	xx 191 4 4 91	. 1 1	1 10	(MOE DI)	TE DEGRONGE GODE)
3 7•	How many children in the village ar	e not regularly a		(USE TH	IE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Aged 5-12		2. Aged 12-16		
38.	What is the main reason why childr	en do not attend	school regularly?	(USE TH	IE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Illness or hanidcap		2. Cannot pay t	ransport cost / s	
	3. Cannot pay school fees		4. Security situs	ation is not safe	
	3. Cannot pay school fees5. Child needed for domestic chores		4. Security situs		ehold for cash or food

PROTECTION

39.	What type of identity documents do people in this vi	llage	have?	(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Citizenship (Pink Cards)		2. Associate Citizensh	ip (Blue Cards)
	3. Naturalised Citizenship (Green Cards)		4. Temporary Registra	ation (White Cards)
	5. Family List / Household Registration		6. Birth Registration (
	7. Other (please specify):		J	
40.	What are the main mechanisms for dealing with ser	ious		in this village? (USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Adjudication by village leaders		2. Adjudication by rel	igious leaders or elders
	3. Referral to Myanmar Police & Judiciary		4. Referral to local Ta	
	5. Referral to non-state armed groups' judiciary	\Box		GO complaint mechanisms
	7. Other (please specify):			•
41.	How do people access information about rights and	respo	onsibilities under M	yanmar law?
				(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Radio		Newspaper	
	3. Booklets / pamphlets		4. Video / DVD	
	5. Verbally from village leaders		6. Verbally from frien	ds or family
	7. Verbally from Myanmar government authorities		8. Verbally from non-	
	9. Verbally from local civil society groups	\Box		or international NGOs
			v	
42.	How do villagers know about the location of landmin	ne fie	lds?	(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Verbal warnings from Tatmadaw			m non-state armed groups
	3. Signs on location from Tatmadaw		-	om non-state armed groups
	5. Reports of human or animal casualties		6. Warnings from other	
	7. No landmines in this area			fy):
			o. other (prease speed	
NA'	TURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT			
43.	How is land tenure for housing and agricultural use	prote	ected in this village?	(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Recognition from village leaders		_	nure certificate from non-state
		-	armed group	
	3. Community land tenure certificate from Government			enure certificate from non-state
	J. Community and tenure certificate from Government	-	armed group	mare certificate from non state
	5. Private land tenure certificate from Government		0 1	fy):
	J. Titvate land tendre certificate from Government		o. other (prease speed	.,,,
44.	Is any surrounding forest land given special protect	ion fr	om agriculture or o	ther activities?
•			O	(ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
	1. No		2. Yes, but small area, i	not widely agreed and often violated
	3. Yes, large areas, widely agreed and rarely violated			demarcated and well protected
			4,, -0,	
45.	Is there a village committee to promote community-	base	d natural resource n	nanagement?
				(ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
	1. No		2. Yes. but weak and lac	king legitimacy, authority or capacity
	3. Yes, there is an effective committee			
	or ros, there is an enestine committee			
46.	What types of business exploit natural resources in	the s	urrounding area?	(USE THE RESPONSE CODE)
	1. Logging		2. Mining	·
	3. Commercial agricultural plantations	\equiv	4. Road construction	
	5. Industrial estates / special economic zones	\equiv		d with migrants from Myanmar
	7. Competition for land with returning refugees		8. None	a maninigiana nom myanina
		ш	o. None	
	9. Other (please specify):			

LOCAL GOVERNANCE

47.	How are village leaders chosen?	(ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
	1. Hereditary / Birth right	2. Appointment by township or village tract leaders
	3. Occasional election as required	4. Regular election for fixed term limit
	5. Other (please specify):	
48.	How are important decisions about community af	fairs most often managed? (ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
	1. Village leaders make decisions	
	2. Village leaders make decisions and inform the community afterwards	
	3. The community is consulted before village leaders make decisions, and then informed afterwards	
	4. The community is informed and participates in making decisions together with village leaders	
49.	How do village leaders access Government authorities at the township level?	
	, and the second	(RANK THREE MOST IMPORTANT)
	1. None	2. If authorities call village tract meetings
	3. If township authorities come to the village	4. Village leaders go to township authorities
	5. Written correspondence	6. Via Tatmadaw officers
	7.Via non-state armed group representatives	8. Other (please specify):
50.	Is there a village development committee and plan to improve the community's well being?	
		(ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
	1. No	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	2. No, but consultation and preparation have started	
	3. Yes, but the plan is not widely agreed or funded	
	4. Yes, there is community support and funding for the	ne plan
		•
SU	MMARY	
51.	List the three most important needs of this village	?
	1.	
	2.	

APPENDIX 3: ACRONYMS AND PLACE NAMES

CIDKP Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People

HURFOM Human Rights Foundation of Monland

IDP internally displaced person

IHLCA Integrated Household Living Conditions Assessment

KEG Karenni Evergreen

KESAN Karen Environmental and Social Action Network

KHRG Karen Human Rights Group
KIO Kachin Indepdence Organisation
KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party

KNU Karen National Union

KNWO Karenni National Womens Organisation KORD Karen Office of Relief and Development

KRC Karen Refugee Committee

KSWDC Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre

KWO Karen Womens Organisation

MIMU Myanmar Information Management Unit MRDC Mon Relief and Development Committee

NGO non government organisation

NMSP New Mon State Party

OCHA (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

RCSS Restoration Council of Shan State
SHRF Shan Human Rights Foundation
SSDF Shan State Development Foundation

TBC The Border Consortium

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UPWC Union-level Peacemaking Work Committee

WFP World Food Program

BURMA PLACE NAMES

Sittaung River

MYANMAR PLACE NAMES

Sittoung River

Irrawaddy Region Ayeyarwady Region

Karenni State Kayah State Karen State Kavin State Kyaukgyi Kyaukkyi Moulmein Mawlamvine Mergui Myeik Paan Hpa-an Papun Hpapun **Pasaung** Hpasawng Pegu Region Bago Region Salween River Thanlwin River

Tavoy Dawei

Tenasserim Region Tanintharyi Region

Taungoo Toungoo Rangoon Yangon



The Border Consortium Working with displaced people 29 Years

The Border Consortium (TBC), a non-profit, non-governmental organisation, is an alliance of partners working together with displaced and conflict-affected people of Burma/Myanmar to address humanitarian needs and to support community driven solutions in pursuit of peace and development.

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