

# U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT



LESSONS  
FROM THE  
OPERATIONAL  
LEVEL IN  
AFRICA

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of the many people interviewed in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo during Refugees International's visits to both countries. Staff members of the United Nations and many local and international non-governmental organizations were particularly helpful, and their willingness to share information and insights is sincerely appreciated. Superintendent Dag Roger Dahlen of the Norwegian Police and Lieutenant Colonel William M. Wyatt of the U.S. Army deserve a special thank you for their time, interest, and candid exchange of information on police and military reform in Liberia. The author would also like to thank Refugees International colleagues Megan Fowler and Kimberly Compton, whose input and help with the preparation of this report were invaluable. And finally, the author thanks the Connect U.S. Fund for their generous financial support that made this report possible.

*New recruits for the Armed  
Forced of Liberia undergo  
training exercises in  
Monrovia as part of  
a U.S.-funded security  
sector reform plan. The  
U.S. is only helping four  
African countries  
transform their armies  
and security agencies.*

© Refugees International

## ABOUT REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL

Refugees International advocates for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises. Based on our on-the-ground knowledge of key humanitarian emergencies, Refugees International successfully pressures governments, international agencies and nongovernmental organizations to improve conditions for displaced people.

Refugees International is an independent, non-profit humanitarian advocacy organization based in Washington, DC. We do not accept government or United Nations funding, relying instead on contributions from individuals, foundations and corporations. Learn more at [www.refugeesinternational.org](http://www.refugeesinternational.org).

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . .	i
Introduction . . . . .	I
The Nature of the Imbalance . . . . .	3
<i>The Cold War Peace Dividend: Forever Lost To GWOT?</i> . . . . .	3
<i>The Perversion of Aid</i> . . . . .	4
<i>Militarization and “Securitization” of U.S. Foreign Assistance</i> . . . . .	7
<i>Overhauling Foreign Assistance</i> . . . . .	10
The Marginalization of Africa in U.S. Foreign Policy . . . . .	12
U.S. Security Sector Reform Efforts In Liberia . . . . .	16
<i>Background</i> . . . . .	16
<i>The Legal Framework</i> . . . . .	17
<i>The Conceptual Framework</i> . . . . .	18
<i>Role of the New AFL and the Security Sector Reform Program</i> . . . . .	19
<i>Recruitment and Training</i> . . . . .	21
<i>The New AFL</i> . . . . .	22
<i>Funding and Resources</i> . . . . .	23
<i>Transparency and Accountability</i> . . . . .	24
<i>Contractors Are Not the Answer</i> . . . . .	24
Security Sector Reform Efforts in the DR Congo . . . . .	26
<i>Background</i> . . . . .	26
<i>Military “Integration” in the DRC</i> . . . . .	26
<i>The European Contribution</i> . . . . .	28
<i>Real Commitment Needed</i> . . . . .	29
The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) . . . . .	31
<i>Background</i> . . . . .	31
<i>Posture and Promises</i> . . . . .	32
<i>Extant U.S. Security Programs in Africa</i> . . . . .	33
<i>Resource Issues</i> . . . . .	36
<i>Potential for a Cohesive Approach to Africa</i> . . . . .	37
Conclusion . . . . .	39
Recommendations . . . . .	40
List of Acronyms . . . . .	42
Endnotes . . . . .	44

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In his introduction to the 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush said: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” Failing states with weak state institutions struggle to deliver services to their population or to control corruption and are at risk of ongoing conflict. When these countries descend into civil war, massive flows of refugees and large-scale human displacement lead to further regional and global instability. Nowhere is this more of a challenge than in Africa.

There is broad agreement that combating today’s global threats requires a balanced, integrated approach with coordinated defense, diplomacy and development efforts. In practice, the Pentagon is largely dictating America’s approach to foreign policy. The nation’s foreign aid budget is too low; its civilian capacity to construct and carry out effective, long-term policies to rebuild states is too weak; interventions abroad are often unilateral when multilateral solutions could be more effective; and the military, which is well trained to invade countries, not to build them up, is playing an increasingly active and well-funded role in promoting development and democracy. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted that U.S. soldiers conducting development and assistance activities in countries where they frequently don’t speak the language is “no replacement for the real thing – civilian involvement and expertise.”

The rising military role in shaping U.S. global engagement is a challenge to the next president. Foreign assistance represents less than one percent of the federal budget, while defense spending is 20%. The U.S. military has over 1.5 million uniformed active duty employees and over 10,100 civilian employees, while the Department of State has some 6,500 permanent employees. Although several high-level task forces and commissions have emphasized the urgent need to modernize our aid infrastructure and increase sustainable development activities, such assistance is increasingly being overseen by military institutions whose policies are driven by the Global War on Terror, not by the war against poverty. Between 1998 and 2005, the percentage of Official Development Assistance the Pentagon controlled exploded from 3.5% to nearly 22%, while the percentage controlled by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) shrunk from 65% to 40%.

This civil-military imbalance has particular ramifications for Africa, where Global War on Terror imperatives do not address the continent’s biggest needs for security assistance. The U.S. is only helping four African countries transform their armies and security agencies into professional organizations that protect citizens rather than abuse them. Resources are allocated in a manner that does not reflect the continent’s most pressing priorities. For example, the U.S. has allocated \$49.65 million for reforming a 2,000-strong Liberian army to defend the four million people of that country. In contrast, it only plans to spend \$5.5 million in 2009 to help reform a 164,000-strong army in the DR Congo, a country with 65 million people where Africa’s “first world war” claimed the lives of over five million people.

Two case studies emphasize the problems inherent in the U.S. approach. Military dominance over reform programs in Liberia has resulted in a policy focused solely on restructuring Liberia’s army by expensive private contractors, DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers. Meanwhile, intelligence, judiciary, and prison agencies are sadly neglected. In the DR Congo, the State Department has played a very active role in facilitating dialogue among belligerents and is concerned about the humanitarian situation in the east, but the Defense Department is virtually ignoring the nation’s desperate need of military reform. As a result, an inadequately resourced security sector reform program has contributed to the Congolese army becoming a major source of insecurity for civilian communities.

The U.S. military's new Africa Command (AFRICOM) is poised to become the dominant influence over U.S. policy on the continent. Originally, AFRICOM was promoted as integrating military and civilian agencies for "humanitarian assistance, civic action... and response to natural disasters." After much criticism from African nations and the international humanitarian community, the new AFRICOM Commander is now emphasizing the value the Command can add to the many U.S. military programs already operating in Africa.

AFRICOM should focus on two unashamedly military/political roles that will strengthen peace and security in Africa: a) assisting African countries with defense sector reform; and b) supporting Africa's regional organizations in building conflict management and standby force capacity. The Command's legitimacy will ultimately be determined by its ability to work with the African Union and UN operations to address Africa's principal security challenge – mobilizing sufficient resources to provide a secure, stable and well-governed environment in which human rights are protected and promoted and where business can thrive. Assisting with the coordination of security sector and peacekeeping assistance should be strongly emphasized in its mandate to help national governments absorb the plethora of uncoordinated initiatives from various coalitions of donor countries.

Another priority for AFRICOM should be to enhance peacekeeping capacity-building programs. As a matter of urgency, AFRICOM should establish a core of civil-military expertise specifically related to UN peace operations in Africa. With the demand for African peacekeepers far outstripping the supply of adequately trained and equipped forces, AFRICOM has the potential to increase the number of trained soldiers for UN or AU peace operations.

AFRICOM could also enhance international cooperation for delivering more sustainable support to African efforts to establish peace and security. Instead of having three commanders that deal with Africa as a third or fourth priority, an informed, consistent and coherent engagement with Africa could be established. However, AFRICOM's current meager budget for bilateral security cooperation falls far short of what is needed to have true credibility and impact. Currently, no funds are allocated for security sector and governance capacity-building for African nations. Instead, funding is being requested for Global War on Terror priorities.

While AFRICOM can improve engagement with African nations, more effective non-military support is needed to provide the basic foundations of stability that would encourage refugees to return home and would meet Africa's enormous development challenges. Although the current administration is promoting a range of initiatives to redress the imbalance in U.S. instruments for global engagement, these are aimed at a "quick fix" for long-broken machinery.

The next president must strengthen civilian professional capacity to carry out diplomatic and development operations. More funding is needed to address the current 17 to 1 spending imbalance in staffing and resources between defense and diplomatic/development operations, and to reduce the use of contractors in foreign assistance programs. A thorough assessment of both civilian and military capacities to achieve developmental goals must also be conducted.

Doing a few things well in Africa, and doing the right thing in Africa, can have a positive impact on 53 UN member states, help uplift 80% of the world's poorest people, and win friends and influence in the most under-governed continent in the world. If the establishment of AFRICOM, the strengthening of the State Department's Africa Bureau and USAID programs in Africa can be seen to produce positive results, the effort could serve as a model for U.S. global engagement.

# U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT:

## LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA

### INTRODUCTION

The impetus for recent efforts by the U.S. and other donor governments to integrate their defense, diplomatic, development, and other policies in engaging weak, failing, and war-torn countries in the developing world is clear: fragile states are not only a major development challenge; they are also seen as a leading source of transnational threats to global security.<sup>1</sup> From a humanitarian perspective, one of the major concerns about fragile states is the massive flows of refugees and the large-scale human displacement that results when these countries descend into civil war.

Policy makers have come to recognize that the security, governance, and development challenges of fragile and failing states are interconnected. Experience suggests that efforts to bolster, reform, or reconstruct weak or failed states must simultaneously address security and stability, good governance, and development needs. To do so effectively requires a wide range of capabilities and

instruments spanning traditionally independent spheres of diplomacy, development, and defense (the 3Ds) – as well as trade, finance, intelligence, and others. Moreover, these elements of engagement should be consciously aligned so as to be mutually reinforcing.<sup>2</sup>

In the U.S., the quest for policy coherence is much more difficult than in countries such as Canada, the UK and Sweden because in these and other donor countries, the amount of government resources allocated for development and diplomacy is fairly well balanced with money for defense. In the U.S., however, defense spending dwarfs that of the civilian agencies for global engagement by a factor of approximately seventeen to one. Foreign assistance represents less than one percent of the federal budget, while defense spending is 20%.<sup>3</sup> The U.S. military (including the Coast Guard) has over 1.5 million uniformed active duty employees, nearly a million more in the reserve forces, and over 10,100 civilian employees.<sup>4</sup> By contrast, the Department of State has some 6,500 permanent employees

*Nearly one million people are displaced inside Somalia, including 250,000 in this camp. Fragile states like Somalia are not only a major development challenge; they are a major threat to regional and global stability.*

© Refugees International



– about the same as the number of personnel serving in one U.S. carrier battle group, and less than the number employed in military bands. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has only 2,021 permanent employees – a number said to be less than the number of lawyers working in DOD headquarters at the Pentagon.

Giant arms manufacturers such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman have been the main beneficiaries of the Pentagon’s rising expenditures.<sup>5</sup> The Pentagon’s fast-growing service contractors have equally been making fortunes. Contracted services extend from basic food and sanitation provision to highly sophisticated services, such as the provision of security to U.S. personnel serving abroad. By the end of 2006, there were about 100,000 government contractors operating in Iraq, not counting subcontractors – a total that was fast approaching the size of the U.S. military force there.<sup>6</sup>

The inflated defense budget deprives civilian agencies of the resources they need to build up their own technical expertise and response capabilities, respond to unforeseen contingencies and provide foreign aid to fragile and post-conflict states. While exaggerating the position of the Pentagon in the nation’s national security structure, the greatly skewed resource allocations have led to an over-reliance on soldiers to conduct post-conflict activities – such as policing, governance reform and infrastructure development – that should logically be done by civilian agencies and actors.<sup>7</sup>

Although there is broad rhetorical agreement that the problems of poor governance, instability, and war-torn states require integrated, “3D” approaches (through merging or at least better coordinating defense, diplomacy, and development efforts), the Pentagon is largely dictating the doctrinal debate on how to stabilize and reconstruct failed states. There is not yet a strong political or interagency consensus on the rationale for U.S. engagement; the criteria that should guide U.S. involvement; the scale of U.S. aspirations; the end state toward which prevention, stabilization and reconstruction efforts should be directed; and the means required to achieve success.<sup>8</sup> Achieving consensus will require strong leadership from the relevant civilian agencies of government, as well as strong guidance and support from the presidency and the legislature.

While Africa has historically been of marginal strategic interest to America, the majority of the world’s most fragile states are on that continent. However, the new U.S. concern for failed states is shaped by recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, and resources allocated accordingly. Even where the State Department has a clear mandate and budget to engage in stabilization and reconstruction tasks in Africa (such as security sector reform in Liberia, and support to the African Union and the AU Mission in Sudan), core tasks are contracted out to private U.S. companies. The issues of State Department weakness and of military dominance of U.S. Africa policy come to the fore in the debate on the establishment of AFRICOM.

**While Africa has historically been of marginal strategic interest to America, the majority of the world’s most fragile states are on that continent.**

CIVILIAN VS. MILITARY PERSONNEL	
Department	Number of Personnel
US Military Active Duty Employees	1,500,000
US Military Reserve Forces	1,000,000
US Military Civilian Employees	10,100
US Dept of State Permanent Employees	6,500
USAID Permanent Employees	2,021

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>The FY 2008 military budget is more than 30 times higher than all spending on State Department operations and non-military foreign aid combined.</b></p>	<p>On March 13, 2008 General ‘Kip’ Ward, Commander of AFRICOM, presented before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees the first free-standing posture statement on the U.S. security strategy for Africa. According to Ward:</p> <p>“AFRICOM is pioneering a new way for a Unified Command to fulfill its role in supporting the security interests of our nation. From inception, AFRICOM was intended to be a different kind of command designed to address the changing security challenges confronting the U.S. in the 21st century. We are integrating interagency personnel into our structure to improve both the planning and execution of our duties. By incorporating interagency representatives into our structure, we will provide better informed and more effective support to initiatives led by civilian Departments and Agencies, such as the Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).”<sup>9</sup></p> <p>Many humanitarian NGOs are highly critical of the new Command and are deeply concerned by the role of AFRICOM in harnessing – or hijacking – relief and development assistance to combat terrorism. This role is described by Robert Kaplan as one in which:</p> <p>“...through a combination of small-scale military strikes that do not generate bad publicity and constant involvement on the soft, humanitarian side of military operations, AFRICOM could rebuild the post-Iraq image of the American soldier in the global commons... AFRICOM will be about picking low-hanging terrorist fruit. The so-called long war – and particularly the work of AFRICOM – will be relentless and low-key.”<sup>10</sup></p> <p><b>THE NATURE OF THE IMBALANCE</b></p> <p><b><i>The Cold War Peace Dividend: Forever Lost to GWOT?</i></b></p> <p>The Cold War years saw high spending on aid as well as defense, as each super power and their allies aided regimes friendly to their strategic interests. The end of the Cold War did not, however, see reduced military budgets resulting in some resources being put towards increased aid, as hoped.</p> <p>While there was a peace dividend in the U.S., it was erased after September 11, 2001. U.S. military spending returned to Cold War levels by 2004 and in 2006, spending was 9 per cent higher in real terms than in 1988.<sup>11</sup> Between 2001 and 2007, U.S. military expenditure increased by 53% in real terms. Since 2001, Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with hundreds of billions of dollars in supplemental and annual appropriations for military operations in support of the war on terrorism. DOD’s reported annual obligations for GWOT have shown a steady increase from about \$0.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about \$139.8 billion in fiscal year 2007. To continue GWOT operations, the President requested \$189.3 billion in appropriations for DOD in fiscal year 2008. The United States’ commitments to GWOT will likely involve the continued investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal challenge.</p> <p>The supplemental appropriation to pay for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would bring proposed military spending for FY 2008 to \$647.2 billion, the highest level of military spending since the end of World War II.<sup>12</sup> Using official budget figures, William D. Hartung, provides the following useful comparisons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proposed U.S. military spending for FY 2008 is larger than military spending by all of the other nations in the world combined.</li> <li>• The FY 2008 military budget is more than 30 times higher than all spending on State Department operations and non-military foreign aid combined.</li> </ul>
<p>3</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>




- The FY 2008 military spending represents 58 cents out of every dollar spent by the U.S. government on discretionary programs: education, health, housing assistance, international affairs, natural resources and environment, justice, veterans' benefits, science and space, transportation, training/employment and social services, economic development, and several more items.<sup>13</sup>

By any conceivable measure, the United States is currently the most powerful country in the history of the world. Potential challenges cannot even begin to rival its military power. The United States outspends China by about seven to one. China spends 3.9 percent of its GDP on defense; it would have to spend about 25 percent of GDP on defense if it were to begin to rival the United States.

**The Perversion of Aid**

A smart security strategy must be comprehensive and long-term to combat today's global threats. However, despite its extraordinary and historically unprecedented military preeminence, the United States has failed to reduce, to any significant degree, the endemic insecurity that prevails among the people of the world's poorest nations – including those living in the kind of 'failing states' that are seen as likely 'breeding grounds' for terrorists. Approximately two-fifths of the world population live in 'high-mortality developing countries' – mainly located in sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia. In these countries, one-third of premature death and disability results from four risk factors: being underweight; unsafe sex; unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene; and indoor smoke from fossil fuel.

**The United States has failed to reduce... the endemic insecurity that prevails among the people of the world's poorest nations.**



<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Many forms of aid are not directed towards poverty alleviation.</b></p>	<p>Thus, interventions to reduce hunger, improve the physical environment and reduce poverty are important means of improving the security of human lives. Furthermore, in comparisons with military expenditure, the prevention strategies developed for the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations to achieve this appear highly cost-effective. For example, it has been estimated that 8 million lives could be saved annually for an investment of \$57 billion in basic health interventions in poor countries.</p> <p>U.S. aid, in terms of percentage of GDP, has almost always been lower than any other industrialized nation in the world, though since 2000, its dollar amount has been the highest. Moreover, if aid numbers are adjusted to include qualitative indicators of the efficacy of aid, as David Roodman has done, then the U.S. ranks no higher than Greece and Spain.<sup>14</sup></p> <p>In 1970, official development assistance was understood as bilateral grants and loans on concessional terms, and official contributions to multilateral agencies. However, a number of factors have led to a large decline in aid that meets such criteria – including tighter budgetary constraints in richer countries during the 1980s; neo-liberalism and structural adjustment programs; and donors putting a broader interpretation on what constitutes development assistance. Regarding the latter, expanded categories for official development assistance include, for example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Debt relief;</li> <li>• Subsidies on exports to developing countries;</li> <li>• Food aid which disposes of agricultural surpluses resulting from government subsidies;</li> <li>• Provision of surplus commodities of little economic value;</li> <li>• Administrative costs;</li> <li>• Payments for care and education of refugees in donor countries;</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Grants to NGOs and to domestic agencies to support emergency relief operations; and</li> <li>• Technical co-operation grants which pay for the services of nationals of the donor countries.</li> </ul> <p>In short, many forms of aid are not directed towards poverty alleviation. For example, in 2006 Action Aid estimated “... that \$37 billion – roughly half of global aid – is ‘phantom aid,’ that is, it is not genuinely available to poor countries to fight poverty.”<sup>15</sup> Technical assistance was singled out as a particular problem, with at least one quarter of donor budgets being spent on consultants, research and training:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">“This is despite a growing body of evidence... that technical assistance is often overpriced and ineffective, and in the worst cases destroys rather than builds the capacity of the poorest countries...Donor funded advisers have even been brought in to draft supposedly ‘country owned’ poverty reduction strategies.”<sup>16</sup></p> <p>The U.S. spends more on international technical assistance than any other donor – almost half its official development assistance. The bulk of that funding goes to U.S. consultants whose real expertise is often knowing how to adhere to complex U.S. procurement and administrative procedures rather than having knowledge of context, experience in the field, language skills, or a long-term poverty reduction orientation.<sup>17</sup> Between 1998 and 2006, reductions in USAID direct-hire staff were accompanied by a sharp increase in foreign assistance spending, with the result that aid disbursement per staff member grew by 46 percent to \$2 million. USAID has consequently had to reduce development expertise in favor of general management skills.</p> <p>In fact, the U.S. has no coherent long-term foreign assistance strategy. As stated by the Secretary of Defense,</p>
<p>5</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>

<p>“The U.S. government has tried to meet post-Cold War challenges and pursue 21st century objectives with processes and organizations designed in the wake of the Second World War... The last major legislation structuring how America dispenses foreign assistance was signed by President Kennedy. Operating within this outdated bureaucratic superstructure, the U.S. government has sought to improve interagency planning and cooperation through a variety of means: new legislation, directives, offices, coordinators, ‘tsars’, authorities, and initiatives with varying degrees of success.”<sup>18</sup></p> <p>Instead of modernizing the Cold War era aid infrastructure, the U.S. administration has responded to each new global challenge by creating new <i>ad hoc</i> institutional arrangements alongside the old ones – like the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the State/F Bureau.<sup>19</sup> America’s foreign aid is now (mis)managed by an alphabet soup of no less than fifty separate units within the executive branch, pursuing fifty disparate and sometimes overlapping objectives ranging from narcotics eradication to biodiversity preservation. Poor coordination and lack of integration means that U.S. agencies often work at cross purposes – something which is not lost on recipient countries that are already wary of the fact that the U.S. ties more aid to the purchase of American goods and services than any other donor. Of the more than \$2.6 billion in aid that the U.S. reported to the OECD Development Assistance Committee for 2005, less than \$200 million was untied aid. If development aid is an important element of the U.S. national security strategy, including “winning hearts and minds,” then this sends precisely the wrong message.</p> <p>Effective aid requires the promotion of ownership by recipient governments, alignment of aid under national plans, harmonization with other donors, and empowerment of the citizenry. Since 2001, the United States has</p>	<p>pursued a distinctively unilateral posture in the pursuit of national security and foreign and development policy. American policy places little emphasis on the need to harmonize U.S. approaches with those of other donors, or indeed to align these policies with the priorities of aid recipients.</p> <p>The principle of local ownership is undermined by the U.S. appropriations process, which rewards agencies for delivering narrowly defined outcomes on a year-to-year basis and provides little space for handing over controls to foreign states or their citizens. With the notable exception of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, U.S. development agencies are prohibited from committing funding over the long term, making it difficult for operational agencies and recipient governments to plan.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, no major donor country makes less use than the U.S. does of recipient governments’ procurement or public finance management systems for its funding.<sup>21</sup> And the U.S. ties more aid than any other donor.</p> <p>Several high level task forces and commissions have reported on different aspects of U.S. aid effectiveness in recent years.<sup>22</sup> All emphasized the urgent need to modernize an aid infrastructure and for greater U.S. engagement on development. All called for elevating development on a par with diplomacy and defense – and not for subordinating it to either. The United Kingdom provides an example of how this can be done. Besides being a full cabinet department, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is governed by the International Development Act, which mandates that its funds be spent “to support sustainable development.” This gives the Secretary of State for development near total discretion over the use of those funds. DFID’s Public Service Agreement with the Treasury provides an additional constraint on the diversion of DFID resources, by mandating that 90 percent of the department’s budget be spent on low-income countries – effectively restricting the lion’s share of DFID’s aid to the poorest regions of Africa and Asia.<sup>23</sup></p>	<p><b>“The U.S. government has tried to meet post-Cold War challenges and pursue 21st century objectives with processes and organizations designed in the wake of the Second World War...”</b></p> <p><b>– Secretary of Defense Robert Gates</b></p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>6</p>	

There is thus a clear danger that the U.S. Department of Defense will effectively bypass the United Nations and other multilateral institutions at a time when global partnerships are most needed.


### **Militarization and “Securitization” of U.S. Foreign Assistance**

The Pentagon has greatly increased and expanded its involvement into the realm of aid activities that have traditionally been implemented by civilian agencies and overseen by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The numbers speak for themselves: the percentage of the Official Development Assistance the Pentagon controls has exploded from 1998 to 2005, growing from 3.5% to nearly 22%, while USAID’s percentage of ODA shrunk from 65% to 40%.

In 2005, President Bush established a new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44)<sup>24</sup> and assigned to the Secretary of State responsibility to prepare for, plan, coordinate, and implement reconstruction and stabilization operations in a wide range of contingencies, ranging from complex emergencies to failing and failed states, and war-torn societies. The office is, theoretically, supposed to serve as the focal point for creating, managing, and deploying standing civilian response capabilities for a range of purposes, including to advance “internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.”<sup>25</sup> Where the U.S. military may be involved, the office is to coordinate with the Department of Defense to harmonize military and civilian involvement.

The directive seems logical enough in concept, but application has proved extremely problematic – mainly because the civilian capacity of the Federal government to implement international policies and programs has eroded over the past twenty-five years. The Department of State is unable to provide even advisory support to essential governmental functions in post-conflict states, while USAID relies largely upon contractors to promote its various development objectives. Innate civilian agency capacity, there and elsewhere, to operate overseas is very, very thin.

In a November 26, 2007 speech, Secretary Gates explained that DOD has, by force of circumstance, stepped into the breach:



“The Department of Defense has taken on many of (the) burdens that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past.... [F]orced by circumstances, our brave men and women in uniform have stepped up to the task, with field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils – usually in a language they don’t speak. ... But it is no replacement for the real thing – civilian involvement and expertise.”

Secretary Gates lamented the gutting of “key instruments of America’s national power” and the withering of America’s ability to engage, assist, and communicate with other parts of the world which had been so important throughout the Cold War.<sup>26</sup> Budgetary allocations are important, but money alone will not fix the problem without a substantive overhaul of strategy and policy – while funding can be relatively quickly allocated, it will take years to address the civilian deficit in human resources.

The U.S. response to these problems for the foreseeable future, it seems, is to formalize the U.S. military’s present and future roles in post-conflict reconstruction and state-building processes abroad. DOD Directive 3000.05 *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, dated November 28, 2005, recognizes that civilian Federal agencies lack capability to operate in high-risk environments, and establishes the policy that DOD shall give stability operations “priority comparable to combat operations,” and



*U.S. soldiers carry school equipment in eastern Mali in November 2006. Skewed resource allocations have led to an over-reliance on soldiers to conduct post-conflict activities – such as policing, governance reform and development assistance – that should logically be done by civilian agencies..*

© REUTERS/Luc Gnago

that U.S. military forces shall be prepared to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. The major mission elements comprising SSTR are to:

“Establish and maintain a safe, secure environment; deliver humanitarian assistance; **reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services; support economic development; establish representative, effective governance and the rule of law;** and conduct strategic communications.”<sup>27</sup>

According to the Secretary of Defense:

“The objective is to synchronize DOD activities with those of other U.S. Government agencies and international partners in coherent campaigns that improve civil security, promote effective governance, and foster economic stability. To achieve our national objectives, stability operations require unity of purpose and synchronized, timely efforts in all diplomatic, defense, and development activities to build partner capacity and address the causes of conflict.”<sup>28</sup>

There is thus a clear danger that the DOD will effectively bypass the United Nations and other multilateral institutions at a time when global partnerships are most needed. The desire of the Department of Defense for a “unity of purpose” that uses all U.S. government agencies as “force multipliers” in the war on terror is further changing how civilian agencies operate. This trend is seen in the current USAID strategic plan, which focuses on “counterterrorism; weapons of mass destruction and destabilizing conventional weapons; security cooperation and security sector reform; conflict prevention, mitigation, and response; and transnational crime.”

The results of this strategy have been dubious. For example, the ‘development’ programs funded under the rubric of the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) have thus far been little more than a collection of initiatives cobbled together from various accounts, with little consideration of their strategic integration, sustainability, and long-term developmental impacts.<sup>29</sup> There are also increasing concerns that USAID intends to seek DOD funding

<p><b>The U.S. now provides over half of its global aid to 10 countries alone, in contrast to the 5 percent it allocates among the 10 poorest countries.</b></p>	<p>for USAID development activities – and this may indeed already have occurred.<sup>30</sup></p> <p>Further, the Pentagon is seeking yet more discretionary money for military assistance. Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides funding for DOD to fight and win America’s wars, and cannot be used to provide equipment, supplies, and/or training to build the capacity of foreign national military forces. However, Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) created a unique three-year authority permitting DOD and State jointly to plan, execute, and oversee up to \$300 million annually in bilateral and regional military-to-military programs to develop foreign military forces’ capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations or to support stability operations. Embassy country teams and regional combatant commands jointly formulate projects. As a ‘dual-key’ program, the Secretaries of State and Defense must both approve the proposed projects.<sup>31</sup></p> <p>The DOD (with strong support from the Secretary of State) is now requesting Congress to authorize the “Building Global Partnerships Act of 2007,” which would make permanent in Title 10 the three-year pilot program established under Section 1206 – and would allow the DOD to spend up to \$750 million a year on training and weapons for militaries of its choosing. The proposed legislation would allow the Defense Department to bypass historic provisions within the Foreign Assistance Act<sup>32</sup> that prevent assistance from going to countries that commit gross human rights violations, experience a military coup, engage in nuclear proliferation, or condone human trafficking, child soldiers, or religious intolerance. Secretary Gates also wants to use Section 1206 money to support non-military forces, such as constabulary, coast guard, border guards, and similar units.<sup>33</sup></p> <p>In advocating for authority and money for the DOD to support non-military security agencies, while also arguing against the funding and execution of Section 1206 activities by the State Department, Secretary</p> <p>Gates lent credence to fears of increased militarization of U.S. foreign assistance. While he emphasized that there has been excellent cooperation between DOD and DOS on Section 1206 issues, and that all projects are decided jointly, Gates also stated that:</p> <p>“In my view, building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement – irrespective of the capacity of other departments – and its authorities and funding mechanisms should reflect that reality. The Department of Defense would no more outsource this substantial and costly security requirement to a civilian agency than it would any other key military mission.”<sup>34</sup></p> <p>Moreover, the DOD appears to think that countering terrorism (or criminal acts of terror) is the exclusive preserve of the military, but it is happy for the Department of State to retain responsibility for training and equipping thousands of military peacekeepers under the Global Peace Operations Initiative – with most of these activities actually conducted by private contractors.</p> <p>Extant U.S. aid – whether delivered by DOD or DOS/USAID – is not geared towards poverty reduction. The U.S. does not allocate its development aid on the basis of neutrality; it is concentrated around countries that are political allies in the “war on terror.” According to the 2006 National Strategy for Countering Terrorism:</p> <p>“We will continue to prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned or under-governed areas as safe havens – secure spaces that allow our enemies to plan, organize, train, and prepare for operations. ... To further counter terrorist exploitation of under-governed lands, we will promote effective economic development to help ensure long-term stability and prosperity.”<sup>35</sup></p> <p>The U.S. now provides over half of its global aid to 10 countries alone, in contrast to the 5 percent it allocates among the world’s 10 poorest countries. The current</p>
<p>9</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>



*A rusty sign marks the headquarters for Liberia's disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) program, which helps former soldiers establish new lives in their communities. The U.S. Department of State has minimal funding or civilian capacity to support programs like this that are essential to rebuilding war-torn societies.*

© Refugees International

administration's engagement with weak and failing states is motivated almost entirely by traditional national security concerns, ignoring the fact that a comprehensive strategy for security and stability also requires addressing good governance and development. Development is severely compromised when short-term security objectives are prioritized over longer-term poverty reduction goals. It becomes very difficult to hold U.S. aid agencies accountable for poverty reduction results -- and recipients of U.S. development funding know that they can rely on a continuing flow of assistance regardless of development outcomes -- as long as they remain solely aligned with U.S. military objectives.

**Overhauling Foreign Assistance**

In her testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on 15 April 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice highlighted the dangers of weak and failing states. She reminded the Committee that President Bush has designated the State Department as a national security agency, and that failed states "create holes in the fabric of the international system where terrorists can arm and train to kill the innocent, where criminal

networks can traffic in drugs and people and weapons of mass destruction..." The Bush administration's response to this challenge is 'transformational diplomacy' – a civilian-led, whole-of-government effort to "build and sustain a world of democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, that reduce widespread poverty, and that conduct themselves responsibly in the international system."<sup>36</sup>

To address these challenges, the State Department's FY 2009 budget request seeks to increase the size of the diplomatic corps with 1,100 new positions for the Department of State and 300 new positions for the U.S. Agency for International Development.<sup>37</sup> The Department of State has also launched a Civilian Stabilization Initiative with the aim of creating a rapid civilian response capability for use in stabilization and reconstruction environments. The idea is that elements of this new team could be deployed alongside of the U.S. military, with international partners, or on their own. This is a good first step towards increasing civilian capacity, but such an initiative is still ad hoc and not a comprehensive response to structural deficiencies in the U.S. government.

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>The current U.S. interagency “partnership” is far from equitable, with permanent DOD employees outnumbering those of AID by a ratio of 750:1.</b></p>	<p>The Civilian Stabilization Initiative is based on the establishment of three tiers of civilian response capabilities: an Active Response Corps of selected and specially trained diplomats and interagency federal employees; a Standby Response Corps of federal employees; and a Civilian Reserve Corps that will be comprised of private sector, local government and civil society personnel with relevant specialized skill sets. Following a decision to take action, the objective is to be able to deploy trained and equipped Active Response Corps members to a conflict zone within 48-72 hours of notification. The larger force of Standby and Civilian Reserve Corps members could then be mobilized within two months. The President’s FY09 budget includes \$248.6 million to launch this capability.</p> <p>Secretary Rice has been an unashamed champion of the Building Global Partnerships Act and the extension and expansion of the Section 1206 authority. She is also pushing hard for an extension and expansion of Section 1207 authority, which would give the State Department money to deploy diplomats in support of U.S. military forces. Whereas 1206 is a DOD-State Department program with DOD lead, Section 1207 is a State Department-DOD program with a DOS lead. Congress authorized both programs through the Defense Department because they meet important <i>military</i> requirements. Section 1207 allows DOD to transfer up to \$100 million to the Department of State to bring civilian expertise to bear alongside the military. DOD and State are now jointly pushing Congress for a five-year extension of Section 1207 and an increase in the authority to \$200 million.</p> <p>Still, the Section 1206 and 1207 authorities are <i>ad hoc</i> responses that will not provide a coherent structure to meeting the world’s development challenges. While Gates calls the programs “terrific interagency partnerships,”<sup>38</sup> the notion of partnership, implies an equitable relationship based on a balance of power and interests. The current U.S. interagency “partnership” is far from equitable, with permanent DOD employees outnumbering those of AID by a ratio of 750:1.</p> <p>A recent RAND Corporation study confirms that despite the common notion that civil capabilities and military power are equally important to counterinsurgency operations, the meager and infrequent bump-ups in the State Department’s budget have been dwarfed by massive increases in Pentagon spending. The report notes that, “... if countering [Islamic] insurgency requires a broad and balanced array of capabilities, the grim implication is that the United States is ill equipped to counter the gravest threat it faces.”<sup>39</sup> The authors estimate that the United States would need to add thousands of deployable civilian professionals and billions more in targeted foreign aid to meet counterinsurgency needs.</p> <p>However, generating and sustaining popular and legislative support for such substantial increases in resources devoted to development activities will require a broad consensus among the American people regarding the importance of international development to America’s interests as well as its values. Establishing a dedicated cabinet-level department for foreign assistance and development efforts -- a debate re-emerging within policy circles in Washington -- will not change the trend towards harnessing aid in pursuit of a militarized national security in the absence of consensus on a global development policy. Structure should follow strategy, as form follows function. The debate over a cabinet level department for international development should continue, but it must be informed by robust discussions on a concrete and enduring strategy for sustained and meaningful foreign assistance.</p> <p>The next U.S. administration will certainly have to deal with urgent issues of strategy, including the need to re-craft the National Security Act of 1947 for the 21st century and perhaps, in tandem, to initiate an overhaul of the Foreign Assistance Act.<sup>40</sup></p>
<p>11</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>



## THE MARGINALIZATION OF AFRICA IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

While U.S. aid to Africa has doubled since President Bush entered the White House in 2001, and is set to double again by 2010, it is still relatively insignificant. For example, U.S. aid to sub-Saharan Africa in the 45 years from 1961 to 2005 was about half of what the U.S. government spent in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007 alone.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, since the end of the Cold War era proxy wars in Africa and the U.S. military debacle in Somalia, the U.S. has failed to make any significant investment in the enhancement of African security – beyond its support for UN peace operations on the continent.

The marginalization of Africa – especially sub-Saharan Africa – is reflected in the Foreign Military Financing budget request for Fiscal Year 2009. According to the government blurb:

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) furthers U.S. interests around the world by ensuring that coalition partners and friendly foreign governments are equipped and trained to work toward common security goals and share burdens in joint missions. FMF promotes U.S. national security by contributing to regional and global stability, strengthening military support for democratically-elected governments, and containing transnational threats including terrorism and trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and persons. FMF is allocated strategically within regions with the vast majority of funds directed to our sustaining partners and a significant proportion to developing countries to support their advancement to transforming status.<sup>42</sup>

The total FY09 request for Africa is for \$12.55 million – 0.26% of the total FMF amount of \$4.812 billion – with more than half of that going to GWOT partners Djibouti and Ethiopia. For the Near East, the



*UN peacekeepers patrol in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. While the U.S. continues to rely on UN peacekeepers to maintain peace and security in Africa, Congress frequently falls behind on its share of funding for UN peacekeeping.*

© Refugees International

<p><b>In its desire to find and combat terrorism in Africa, the DOD has oriented its major regional initiatives in North and East Africa along counterterrorism lines.</b></p>	<p>figure is nearly \$4.2 billion, with Israel and Egypt by far the primary beneficiaries (\$2.55 billion and \$1.3 billion respectively). Despite the rhetoric, it is clear that the countries of sub-Saharan Africa – with a combined total of \$3.5 million, or 0.08% of the FMF budget – count for virtually nothing.</p> <p>Africa’s proportional share of funded military training opportunities in the USA is much larger. According to the U.S. government, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is a key component of U.S. security assistance, promoting regional stability and defense capabilities through professional military training and education to students from “allied and friendly nations.” The global sum allocated to IMET in the FY09 budget is \$90,500,000 – with 15% of this designated for 45 African countries. However, there is no way to assess the positive effects of IMET on African peace and security (or for that matter, in combating terrorism), and the program has been criticized in the past for training officers who have served despots like Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.</p> <p>The most – and most meaningful – financial support to African peace and security currently provided by the U.S. is undoubtedly the money it contributes to UN peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping in Africa is at a historic high today, accounting for 70 percent or more of the over 120,000 blue helmets authorized by the UN Security Council worldwide. The UN has increasingly proved willing to intervene to help terminate civil wars and establish rule of law in Africa and other places where the U.S. cannot or does not want to go. <sup>43</sup> To enable it to do so, the UN depends heavily on the U.S. picking up a little over a quarter of the cost of each mission. This turnaround in UN engagement in Africa remains absolutely critical to restoring security on the continent. Whatever their operational shortcomings, the UN and its specialized agencies command respect and support from almost every African government and from all levels of African society. <sup>44</sup></p> <p>However, the U.S., as a permanent and influential member of the Security Council, continues to approve mission after mission in Africa while falling behind on its payments. Two weeks prior to his African visit, on 4 February 2008, President Bush imperiled a number of African countries emerging from war to peace by releasing a FY 09 budget request that significantly shortchanged UN peacekeeping – asking for an amount that was some \$610m short of what it will owe to peacekeeping for FY 09, and that would bring America’s total arrears to the UN to nearly \$2bn.</p> <p>In its desire to find and combat terrorism in Africa, the DOD has oriented its major regional initiatives in North and East Africa along counterterrorism lines, despite the fact that the GWOT simply does not rank high on the list of African security priorities. Although these programs have involved efforts to improve governance and security sector capacity, their potential benefits have been overshadowed by short-term, kinetic operations conducted by U.S. military forces against suspected terrorists.</p> <p>On January 7, 2008, for example, two U.S. AC-130 gunships<sup>45</sup> attacked a convoy of trucks moving through the Somali fishing village of Ras Kamboni, near the Kenyan border. The targets were Abu Taha al-Sudani, al-Qaeda’s leader in East Africa, and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, one of two suspected operatives involved in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. According to local Somalis, and confirmed by western diplomats and aid officials in Nairobi, a group of pastoralists were killed in the U.S. attack, and none of the dead was connected to al-Qaeda or the Islamic Courts.</p> <p>The hunt for Nabhan and other suspects continued and, on March 3, 2008, a U.S. submarine launched two Tomahawk cruise missiles that struck near Dhoobley, a remote Somali town some 140 miles from the Kenyan border. <sup>46</sup> The strike was aimed at a “facility where there were known terrorists”</p>
<p>13</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>

affiliated with East African al-Qaeda operations. According to the local district commissioner, the missiles hit two houses, killing three women and three children and wounding another 20 people. The Pentagon has not said whether it believes Nabhan or any other terrorist suspects were killed or wounded in the attack.

Using cruise missiles to target individual suspects at great risk of collateral damage raises a host of moral, ethical and legal issues that are worthy of lengthy debate. Beyond such issues, however, the concrete numbers in the President's FY 09 budget point to a total lack of concern for security in Somalia – where the world's worst humanitarian crisis continues to fester, eclipsing even the scale of human suffering in the Darfur region of the Sudan. In this hunting ground for the U.S. military and its Ethiopian allies in pursuit of Islamic jihadis, a meager \$11.6 million is allocated to “transforming the Somali military into a profes-

sional armed force capable of maintaining national peace and security as part of a multi-sectoral approach to post-conflict security sector reform.”<sup>47</sup>

Somalia is not the only country being neglected; the U.S. is in fact doing remarkably little to help transform African armies and security agencies into professional organizations dedicated to protecting the citizenry rather than abusing them. Civilian and democratic control over security structures – including armed forces, police, security management and oversight bodies, and justice and law enforcement institutions – may not guarantee economic development, but they are certainly a necessary precondition.

In an ideal world, security sector reform (SSR) is an essential part of a comprehensive post conflict peace-building process, where the reform program derives from a comprehensive national defense and security review. It involves, at its core, the transformation of



*The Temple of Justice in Liberia is home to Liberia's court system. Liberia's judiciary and public defenders receive some training and supervision from a U.S.-funded project run by a private contractor, PAE, but many parts of the justice system still suffer from a chronic lack of qualified human resources and funding.*

© Refugees International

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Security sector reform often is aimed simply at the training and equipping of armed forces and police agencies, with little attention or resources being devoted to the other components of the security system.</b></p>	<p>a country’s military and police forces, but it also involves a comprehensive review and restructuring of intelligence services, the penitentiary, the judiciary, and other agencies charged in some way with preserving and promoting the safety and security of the state and its citizenry.</p> <p>However, in real-life war to peace transitions in Africa, the process of security sector reform – as supported by the international community and bilateral donors – is often far more rudimentary. It often is aimed simply at the training and equipping of armed forces and police agencies, with little attention or resources being devoted to the other components of the security system.</p> <p>The U.S. contribution to SSR in Africa is funded through the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account. As stated in the administration’s budget request: “PKO funding provides security assistance to help diminish and resolve conflict, ... address counter-terrorism threats, and, in the aftermath of conflict, reforms military establishments into professional military forces with respect for the rule of law...” The FY 09 request is for a modest \$247 million (down from a FY08 estimate of \$261 million).<sup>48</sup> Of this amount, \$96.75 million is dedicated to SSR activities in only four countries in Africa, in a manner that does not reflect at all the most pressing reform priorities on the continent.</p> <p>For example, \$49.65 million is allocated to “[complete] efforts to transform the Liberian military into a professional two thousand member strong armed force that respects the rule of law and has the capacity to protect Liberia’s borders and maintain adequate security in the country.”<sup>49</sup> While this support is much needed and in the interests of stability in the West African region, Liberia has a total population of only three million people. Its significance in terms of continental peace and security pales in comparison to that of the DR Congo – a country the size of Western Europe with 65 million people in over 200 ethnic groups – where Africa’s “first world war” has claimed the lives of over five million people and where over a million people have been displaced over the past year alone as a result of continued violence in the east. The DRC has a dysfunctional and mal-integrated army of 164,000 – 82 times the size of that of Liberia. Yet the FY 09 request is for a paltry \$5.5 million, to “continue efforts to reform the military in the DR Congo into a force capable of maintaining peace and security.”<sup>50</sup></p>
<p>15</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>

**U.S. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM EFFORTS IN LIBERIA**

**Background**

Fourteen years of civil war displaced nearly one-third of Liberia’s population and took the lives of approximately 250,000 people. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1989, Liberia’s rulers had developed systems of parallel and informal governance that sidelined and hollowed-out state institutions. They virtually subcontracted the management of state security and revenue resources to an informal group of presidential associates – which led inevitably to the collapse of the state bureaucracy and security services.

A key feature of security institutions in Liberia was the gross abuse of human rights (often with impunity) by security personnel through torture, arbitrary arrests and killings, and the use of official powers for private gains. Not surprisingly, by the time of the August 2003 Comprehensive Peace

Agreement (CPA), the population and the transitional government were deeply mistrustful of law enforcement and military officials. Police and military officers were not regarded as a source of protection, but rather as entities to be feared.

The international community is now supporting a multidimensional transition from war to peace; from militant misrule to rule of law. This support has coalesced around the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Established in September 2003, UNMIL has helped to restore relative calm to the country by supporting and overseeing the disarmament of over 100,000 combatants; the disbandment of former armed factions; the partial restoration of State authority in the counties; and the launching of a security sector reform program. The Liberian government’s Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS) prioritized key development issues and challenges into four pillars, namely:



*On August 21, 2007, Liberia’s Ministry of Defense announced a recruitment drive for the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). However, weak and erratic funding from the U.S. has led to delays in AFL development.*

© Refugees International

<p><b>The UN has not been effective in the broad realm of security sector reform, and has not had the conceptual framework or the means to engage meaningfully in military transformation processes.</b></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Enhancing national security;</li> <li>2. Revitalizing economic growth;</li> <li>3. Strengthening governance and the rule of law; and</li> <li>4. Rehabilitating infrastructure and delivering basic services.</li> </ol> <p>Significantly, national security is the first pillar. Responsibility (including financial support) for the reconstitution of Liberia’s security sector is shared between the U.S. government, which is leading the reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); the Liberian government (Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Justice); and UNMIL, which is implementing police reform. However, the UN has not been effective in the broad realm of security sector reform, and has not had the conceptual framework or the means to engage meaningfully in military transformation processes. As explained in the UN’s Capstone Doctrine for peace operations:</p> <p>“Given their relatively short lifespan and limited access to program funds and specialist expertise, UN peacekeeping operations are neither mandated nor resourced to engage in the long-term peace-building activities required to achieve the objectives identified above. Other actors, both within and outside the UN system, normally undertake the bulk of this work.”<sup>51</sup></p> <p>SSR continues to slip into a systemic funding vacuum, while the Security Council continues to mandate missions to do SSR work – hoping that a “lead nation” will step up to the plate and provide both the leadership and resources to reform the security sector in host nations. For Liberia, the lead nation has been the U.S.</p> <p><b><i>The Legal Framework</i></b></p> <p>Liberia’s post-war security architecture is characterized by redundancy, inadequate control, and incoherence. The present government inherited no fewer than 15 separate agencies and structures tasked with a variety</p> <p>of security functions, some discrete and some overlapping. Overarching responsibility for developing national security strategy and policies is supposed to be vested in the National Security Council (NSC), created on March 12, 1999 by an Act of Legislature.<sup>52</sup> However, the Liberian government has not yet produced this long-awaited National Security Strategy and supplementary legislation and policy documents.</p> <p>In the absence thereof, SSR has been hastily implemented within the convoluted legal framework provided by the 1986 Constitution of Liberia, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2003, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003). The CPA provides specific criteria for the restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); in particular specifying that recruits would be screened with respect to educational, professional, medical and fitness qualifications and prior history of human rights abuses. Further, it stressed that the restructured army should reflect regional balance within the country and that the AFL’s mission shall be to defend Liberian “national sovereignty and in extremis, respond to natural disasters.” It also identifies the UN, AU and other organizations for the provision of staff, equipment and logistics, and the U.S. as playing “a lead role” in organizing the restructuring program.<sup>53</sup></p> <p>UN Security Council Resolution 1509 specifically stipulates that UNMIL shall work with Liberia’s government to develop a civilian police training program and restructure the Liberian military.<sup>54</sup> Although the CPA is specific about the role of the U.S. in the restructuring of the army, Resolution 1509 refers simply to “Interested States.”</p> <p>From August 2003 to January 2006, the CPA was the major source of legal authority for SSR in Liberia, and even suspended parts of the Liberian Constitution. However, the inauguration of Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in January 2006 has again made the Constitution of Liberia relevant to the process.<sup>55</sup> As</p>
<p>17</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>

<p>Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Liberia, the President “appoints members of the military from the rank of lieutenant or its equivalence and above; and field marshals, deputy field marshals and sheriffs.”<sup>56</sup></p> <p>There is obviously potential for debate and argument as to which of these three documents is legally supreme, but there is broad agreement that the security sector should be reformed and transformed.<sup>57</sup> However, there are strong differences of opinion within Liberian civil society, and some of the security agencies themselves, as to the nature and scope of reform – and the rationale behind it.</p> <p><b>The Conceptual Framework</b></p> <p>In view of the role played by ill-governed and predatory security institutions in the Liberian civil wars, the success and sustainability of rebuilding Liberia depends on a security sector that can operate effectively, and within a framework of effective democratic control. Thus, the challenge before the national, regional, and international communities lay not just in rebuilding the Liberian military and police force – but also in defining their new roles in the post-conflict society and ensuring effective oversight and management.</p> <p>According to the IPRS, the government’s medium-term approach is to “... develop a national security strategy to guide security sector reform, extend national security actions to ensure national safety, security and peace as well as build national security capabilities.” The Governance Reform Commission (GRC), the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) are supposed to lead this process. The IPRS also commits the government to developing a:</p> <p>“comprehensive longer-term operational and institutional security reform agenda... in order to rationalize various security forces, facilitate a change in culture of the security forces, define clear missions and tasks and ensure there are no duplications, overlap or conflicts of interest between security agencies.”<sup>58</sup></p> <p>While the GRC is supposed to lead the development of a national security strategy, it has not succeeded in moving the process forward at a satisfactory pace. The GRC has deep concerns about the legal framework for SSR and the roles of the various actors involved, and how this is being interpreted and applied. For example, while the CPA provided for the U.S. to play a lead role in defense transformation, the GRC contends that the U.S. SSR Team is “muscling out everybody else” in the area of defense sector transformation and that the U.S.-driven process does not sufficiently take into account the regional realities and security situation. In particular, defense (re)structuring is proceeding in isolation from the ECOWAS security architecture, and does not seem to be based on a thorough analysis of the security dynamics of the Mano River Basin. The Chairman of the GRC, Dr. Amos Sawyer<sup>59</sup> contends that the AFL is being organized according to an apparently threat-independent approach to defense planning and structuring.<sup>60</sup></p> <p>The Defense Act of 1956, which framed Liberia’s defense policy, was extremely controversial and has been withdrawn by President Johnson-Sirleaf. SSR Program staff from the U.S. subsequently assisted MoD staff with the drafting of a new Liberian National Defense Act, in coordination with and incorporating guidance from Minister of National Defense Brownie Samukai and Minister of Justice Counselor Frances Johnson-Morris. The draft Act, which is similar to the U.S. Title X, was completed by December 2006, but it is still being debated and vetted by the Liberian legislature. According to Tom Dempsey, who was on the faculty of the SSR Program at the time, the draft Act “...delineated the responsibilities and missions of the Liberian Defense sector and established a solid foundation for civilian control and oversight of the Armed Forces of Liberia.”<sup>61</sup> However, the GRC contends that the new draft does not differ significantly from the old Defense Act, and that there is a clear need to first develop a comprehensive secu-</p>	<p><b>The success and sustainability of rebuilding Liberia depends on a security sector that can operate effectively, and within a framework of effective democratic control.</b></p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>18</p>

<p><b>The new Liberian government determined that the country needed a force with the ability to patrol borders, control immigration, and manage criminality.</b></p>	<p>rity sector policy as well as an authoritative defense policy which can then be enacted in specific legislation.<sup>62</sup></p> <p>The GRC attributes delays in the formulation and promulgation of a national security strategy and policy to a turf struggle between the “security community,” UNMIL, and the GRC. Amos Sawyer explains this as follows:</p> <p>“The security community – including the Ministry of Defense, the IGP, the SSR Team and the National Security Advisor – favors secrecy and ‘opaqueness.’ UNMIL (which takes the lead on police reform) feels that the UN Security Council is the legitimate authority to provide direction to the SSR process and that UNMIL should therefore be the lead agency. The GRC sees security sector reform as part and parcel of human security policy and of the overall governance reform agenda which it leads.”<sup>63</sup></p> <p>In the absence of an authoritative and comprehensive National Security Strategy, and attendant legislation and policies, the only clear guidance for pursuing SSR in Liberia remains the RAND Report, which is based on international “best practices” and clear, logical analysis rather than an in-depth understanding of Liberia and the West African region. The RAND Report’s general recommendation is that Liberia’s capabilities architecture should respond to a security concept whereby (a) public safety and law enforcement are immediate concerns, (b) the appearance of organized armed internal opposition can be anticipated and prevented, and (c) future external threats that may arise without long warning can be countered.</p> <p>The RAND Report rightly states that, even with foreign assistance, Liberia’s economy does not permit large forces,<sup>64</sup> and that the key to cost-effectiveness for Liberia’s security forces is to have complementary capabilities that cover the forces’ core security functions, possess the right qualities, and can be used flexibly. In addition to a reconstituted</p> <p>police service and armed forces, the RAND Corporation’s analysis of possible operational contingencies also suggested a need for an additional capability that would complete and tie together currently planned capabilities: a mobile unit of the LNP that can perform either in a law-enforcement mode or in combat. RAND therefore recommended the establishment of a police quick-response unit (QRU) that would complement the regular police. Unlike the police support unit, which is meant to deal with civil unrest (e.g. riot control), the QRU would be capable of defeating organized armed threats, specifically where countering the formation of armed opposition forces would extend beyond the capabilities of regular police, yet not warrant the domestic use of the army.<sup>65</sup></p> <p><b><i>Role of the new AFL and the Security Sector Reform Program</i></b></p> <p>In the absence of a valid National Defense Act, the RAND Report again provides the most credible direction for the establishment of a new army, beginning with a definition of the role and functions, as well as the posture of the AFL. In particular, it notes that, “At present, non-state external and internal threats are more likely than threats from neighboring states. The size of the AFL is less important than that it be superior in quality and capability to foreseeable threats.”<sup>66</sup></p> <p>Underpinning this RAND assessment is the logic that the size, structure, and function of the new AFL should be framed by financial, regional, and historical concerns. According to a former member of the SSR Program staff, the government of Liberia therefore envisioned an infantry force that was able to move quickly while at the same time posing no threats to its neighboring countries. Rather than building a force with the capacity to fight external threats, the new Liberian government determined that the country needed a force with the ability to patrol borders, control immigration, and manage criminality. Sean McFate elaborates:</p>
<p>19</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>





*Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) is one of two companies contracted by the U.S. State Department to support security sector reform programs in Liberia. The increasing reliance on military contractors reflects the lack of civilian capacity to oversee and implement such overseas development programs.*

© Refugees International

“The force must be postured so that it is strong enough to defend the integrity of the nation’s borders but not so strong that it threatens neighbors with its force-projection capability. Its structure, equipment, and training must be appropriate to the force’s mission (for example, Liberia does not require F-16 fighter jets). Perhaps most critically, the new security force must not be so large that the government cannot pay its salaries. Such a condition is a precipitant to civil war.”<sup>67</sup>

The United States pledged \$210 million and signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Interim Transitional Government of Liberia, formalizing the U.S. role and commitment, through the Security Sector Reform Program, to assist in demobilizing the existing Liberian military, recruiting and vetting recruits for an entirely new force, and then training, equipping and sustaining that force until it was operational.

The most controversial facet of the SSR Program is the framing of the national security architecture by the RAND Corporation and the use by the U.S. Department of State of two private contractors to build it. DynCorp International has been contracted to provide basic facilities and basic training for the AFL, and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) won the contract for building some of the bases, for forming and structuring the AFL and its component units, and for providing specialized and advanced training, including mentoring of the AFL’s fledgling officer and non-commissioned officer corps. DynCorp’s job is essentially to “recruit and make soldiers,” while PAE is employed to “mentor and develop” them into a fully operational force. In addition to the contracted trainers, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) is seconding eight active duty officers and non-commissioned officers to work alongside PAE in mentoring the AFL commanders. While EUCOM will pay

<p><b>The Government of Liberia decided that the new AFL will be trained according to U.S. Army doctrine.</b></p>	<p>for these officers’ general service benefits, PAE will provide them with accommodation and vehicles.</p> <p>The SSR Program has provided for the demobilization of 13,770 soldiers who served in the old AFL, allocating one-time payments of between US\$285 and \$4,300, depending on the seniority and length of service of demobilized personnel. The SSR Program also supported the demobilization of the Ministry of National Defense, which had 400-450 personnel in its books, and the retraining of select candidates. On March 20, 2007, 119 civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense graduated after completing 17 weeks of training offered by the U.S. Defense Department.</p> <p><b>Recruitment and Training</b></p> <p>The SSR program subsequently supported the MoD with the recruiting and vetting of an initial 12,100 applicants for service in the new AFL. DynCorp designed, and continues to manage, the ongoing recruiting and vetting program. Given the long civil war, acute suffering of civilians, and the widespread atrocities committed by all of the armed groups, the government of Liberia and the SSR Program established a number of stages by which to screen recruits for the new Liberian army. As explained by McFate:</p> <p>“The goal of the recruiting, vetting, and training components of security sector reform is to achieve a force that maintains a professional ethos, respects the rule of law, cultivates public service leadership, is apolitical, and accepts civilian control with transparent oversight mechanisms.”<sup>68</sup></p> <p>The vetting process has proved thorough. There is concern for ensuring that the new AFL reflects a healthy regional and ethnic balance,<sup>69</sup> and there has been a very strong emphasis on ensuring that those with a history of committing human rights abuses are not admitted to the AFL. A vetting council, comprised of a representative of the Ministry of Defense, Liberian civil society, and the United States Embassy, assesses each candidate’s physical fitness, literacy level, health, and human rights record. This body, the Joint Personnel Board (JPB), is the final arbiter of who gets accepted and who gets rejected for training and service in the AFL.</p> <p>The Government of Liberia decided that the new AFL will be trained according to U.S. Army doctrine, because this had been the basis of the training of the old AFL. Every soldier, irrespective of final mustering, is first trained as an infantry rifleman during a basic training – Initial Entry Training (IET) course – which was 11 weeks long for the initial intake. The period has subsequently been reduced to 8 weeks by cutting three weeks of training time initially devoted to human rights training and education in civics and civil-military relations in a democracy.</p> <p>These subjects have been dropped from the curriculum because of the high cost of basic training. DynCorp instructors are all former drill instructors from the U.S. Army or the U.S. Marine Corps, or who have served in their respective Corps Instruction Schools. Their average age is 39 years; they are the type of people who can command an excellent rate of remuneration in the private security industry in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. This drives up the DynCorp salary bill. Training in civic consciousness, human rights, and International Humanitarian Law is therefore planned for a later stage of training, after soldiers are assigned to permanent units.</p> <p>The training program is much like the basic training presented in most armies; it includes subjects such as personal hygiene, drill, weapons instruction, field craft, and land navigation. The facilities are designed to accommodate a maximum of 550 recruits and are functional, but by no means luxurious or extravagant. The basic weaponry provided to the AFL is compatible with that of other countries in the region – AK-47 assault rifles and RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers.<sup>70</sup></p>
<p>21</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>



*More than two years after the launch of a UN-led police training program in Liberia, students were still accommodated in these rudimentary refugee camp style tents.*

© Refugees International

**The New AFL**

The end state for the AFL is a professional army “... modeled on U.S. Army doctrine, that will support the national objectives of the Government of Liberia.”<sup>71</sup> The SSR Program plans to deliver, by September 2010, an AFL that will essentially be comprised of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade. The total planned strength of this brigade is 2,000 men and women –146 officers and 1,854 enlisted ranks. The 23<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade will be commanded by a colonel, and have a higher headquarter element staffed by a total of 113 personnel.

The constituent units, sub units, and sub-sub units of the brigade are planned as follows:

- 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalions — light infantry battalions each comprised of 680 soldiers, and organized into a battalion headquarters, three rifle companies and a combat

support company. The rifle companies will each comprise a company headquarters and three rifle platoons.

- An engineering company with a strength of 220.
- A military police company with a strength of 105.
- A Brigade Training Unit (BTU) with a strength of 162.
- The band platoon with 40 members.

While the basic and specialized training of enlisted ranks and junior officers is well underway, there is clearly a gap when it comes to senior command positions in the AFL. Ideally, the appointment of the brigade commander, battalion commander and senior staff officers should have preceded the formation, activation, and operationalization of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Brigade. The Brigade

<p><b>It generally takes 20-30 years of military training and experience to create a good brigade commander, and the AFL is being created from scratch.</b></p>	<p>certainly cannot be declared operational until such posts are filled by competent officers. However, it generally takes 20-30 years of military training and experience to create a good brigade commander, and the AFL is being created from scratch.</p> <p><b>Funding and Resources</b></p> <p>The SSR Program is funding every aspect of the AFL (from bases and base maintenance to uniforms and food during the initial training phase), except salaries.<sup>72</sup> However, according to the ODC, the SSR Program is not entirely a U.S. “closed shop,” as suggested by the GRC and some civil society interlocutors. There is a Defense Support Group for Liberia, comprised of representatives of all interested donor governments, which meets quarterly in Monrovia. Assistance to the AFL is being provided by other partners, sometimes making up for shortfalls in essential areas where needs cannot be met by the U.S. team due to funding limitations.<sup>73</sup></p> <p>The funding for the SSR Program, including the DynCorp and PAE contracts, is provided through the PKO budget, as well as through IMET (eight of the nine AFL officers who graduated in May 2007, and two AFL non-commissioned officers are currently on courses in the USA, at Fort Bragg and Fort Benning). Much has been said of the high costs involved in standing up the AFL, with the figure of \$210 million having been contested by many as extremely high. The truth is that the SSR Program was never fully funded. Funding to date has fallen far short of this figure, and money has been disbursed in dribs and drabs.</p> <p>In the FY 07/08 budget, for example, only \$13 million was appropriated. This was followed by a further \$11 million transfer from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) in June 2007 and by \$45 million in the July 2007 supplemental budget voted for Liberia, although \$5 million of this was allocated for the establishment of a Police Quick Reaction Unit and \$5 million for support to the LNP and Corrections Service. The remaining \$35 million in the July 2007 supplemental was not enough to see the SSR Program through to conclusion, but it came just in time to prevent the collapse of the recruitment and basic training program. The Department of State would not allow the commencement of training for a further intake until the money to pay them was secured.<sup>74</sup> According to a former senior DynCorp employee in Liberia, the U.S. Department of State has been lax in overseeing the process and promoting an effective and sustained SSR program in Liberia; in particular, it has been unwilling to press Congress for increased funding.<sup>75</sup></p> <p>Weak and erratic funding is thus said to be the main cause of the slow pace of AFL development, with the timelines specified in original contracts and agreed to with the Liberian MoD slipping badly.<sup>76</sup> Only 5% of the force had completed the basic IET course by August 2007.<sup>77</sup> With the graduation of the second intake on September 7, 2007, this figure increased to 32% (604 plus 40 band members). By the first week of February 2008, 57% of the force had completed basic training; and by the first week of May 2008, the figure was up to around 80% of the 2,000 troops.</p> <p>Past delays in funding have significantly increased the cost of basic training for recruits. As previously mentioned, DynCorp’s services are particularly expensive. In 2007, the company employed 82 international staff in Liberia, as well as 239 Liberian staff. The thorough recruiting and vetting process, including the services of expert investigators, was both time consuming and very expensive. Like other State Department contracts, the DynCorp contract has been signed on a “cost plus [overhead]” basis. Cost escalation for goods and services, including idle personnel time due to late disbursement of funding, is therefore passed on directly to the U.S. Government, and DynCorp has a fixed “burn rate” for every month that it is retained in Liberia. (The combined expenses of DynCorp and PAE totaled \$18 million in the first six months of 2007.)<sup>78</sup></p>
<p>23</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>

UNMIL has also expressed concern about delays in establishing an operational AFL, because time frames for the drawdown and ultimate withdrawal of UNMIL forces are closely linked to AFL (and LNP) capacity to assume responsibility for the territorial integrity of Liberia.<sup>79</sup> As the drawdown plans for the UNMIL force include benchmarks that are directly linked to AFL capacity, delays in meeting SSR Program targets may well lead to additional expenses for the U.S., given the \$722 million annual budget of UNMIL, of which the U.S. is assessed to pay nearly \$190 million.<sup>80</sup>

**Transparency and Accountability**

Liberian civil society groups and some government officials have complained of lack of transparency regarding the contract between the U.S. Department of State and DynCorp. (Little is said of PAE, probably because DynCorp is far more visible and in the media limelight.) The concerns are mainly about several controversies involving DynCorp in other countries,<sup>81</sup> perceived lack of performance by DynCorp in Liberia, and lack of consultation with Liberian stakeholders on the military transformation process. According to Pajibo and Woods, for example: “After more than two years in Liberia... DynCorp has not only failed to train the 2,000 men it was contracted to train, it has also not engaged Liberia’s legislature or its civil society in defining the nature, content, or character of the new army.”<sup>82</sup>

The U.S. response to such criticism, from the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) Chief in Liberia, is broadly as follows: a) The details of the contracts with DynCorp and PAE may not be revealed, not even to the Government of Liberia, as it is against U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations; b) The U.S. is providing gratis assistance to Liberia for the restructuring of its armed forces through an assistance package that the Liberian government has approved and accepted; c) The Government of Liberia is entitled to query and get information on the

design of the new AFL (which it has agreed to) and on progress made in implementing agreed plans and on the quality of equipment and training provided to the AFL; and d) The U.S. Government, in turn, accepts its responsibility to deliver promised and agreed assistance through the SSR program, and to effectively oversee the services of the contractors that it hires to do the job.

The U.S. view is not shared by the GRC, which complains that the build-up of the AFL is being done in a very insular way, one which pays lip-service to the concept of Security Sector Reform and which is not linked to a broader security sector policy. While international SSR guidelines call for a consultative process of security sector reform, there is strong resistance to a public discourse on security from the Liberian authorities – the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice, the Presidency, and the IGP – as well as the SSR Program team. Liberians in general assume, because of the past, that security issues are secret in nature, and that they should not be discussed openly.<sup>83</sup>

According to Sawyer, “the image of DynCorp creating an armed elite is disconcerting to many Liberians.” He recalls that in 1980, the U.S. Government spent \$500 million to train and equip the army of then president Samuel Doe, and adds that “every armed group that plundered Liberia over the past 25 years had its core in these U.S.-trained AFL soldiers.”<sup>84</sup> There is thus a fear that when the U.S. withdraws support for its SSR program and funding for the AFL, Liberia will be sitting on a time bomb – a well trained and armed force of elite soldiers who are used to good pay and conditions of service, which may be impossible for the government of Liberia to sustain on its own.

**Contractors Are Not the Answer**

Outside of Europe, a multi-sectoral, whole-of-government approach to SSR may be conceptually valid, but unworkable in practice. In Africa, donor countries have generally not had the fortitude to see comprehensive pro-

**There is thus a fear that when the U.S. withdraws support for its SSR program and funding for the AFL, Liberia will be sitting on a time bomb.**

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>In a country... where recent history has been shaped by warlords and mercenaries, the U.S. Department of State has shown remarkable insensitivity by sending in contractors to shape the new army.</b></p>	<p>cesses through, and recipient countries have not had the financial and human resource capacity to implement or sustain ambitious, overarching SSR programs. Nevertheless, much more can be done to actually arrest insecurity within a conceptually and practically more modest program that focuses primarily on military and criminal justice reform. It is clear that both the UN and the U.S. have made a start with police and military reform, but they have not done nearly enough towards accomplishing the SSR goals laid out in Resolution 1509 and the CPA respectively.</p> <p>Sierra Leone faced similar, if not much larger and more urgent, SSR challenges than Liberia. The United Kingdom supported the enhancement of short- and longer-term security in Sierra Leone through a program aimed at training, equipping and advising government security forces. This program involved the integration of UK military advisors, serving British officers, into Sierra Leone forces; close co-ordination with UN-AMSIL and the Sierra Leone Police; and the enhancement of the combat effectiveness of the forces through ongoing advice and training. The UK advisors made sure that the armed forces were operationally proficient and capable of conducting effective joint patrols with UN forces, before UNAMSIL withdrew. The UK also seconded a senior British police officer to take charge as IGP; it set up an effective Office of National Security, and helped produce a comprehensive national security strategy and defense policy.</p> <p>The UK's efforts in Sierra Leone stand in stark contrast to the U.S.'s SSR Program, which after two years amounted to little more than processing groups of admittedly well screened recruits through boot camp. The job is being done by private contractors, by trainers who are all former U.S. soldiers, but who have opted out of their national military and chosen a "paramilitary" occupation with a stronger cash-work nexus. While contractors may be good at providing basic and even advanced infantry training, they are certainly not the ideal role models to instill</p> <p>in the AFL the notion of duty to country and military service ethics – including the democratic principle of civil supremacy over the military. Indeed, in a country and region where recent history has been shaped by warlords and mercenaries, the U.S. Department of State has shown remarkable insensitivity by sending in contractors to shape the new army.</p> <p>Assistance with military reform is clearly best provided by active duty military personnel who are directly accountable to the U.S. government. However, the narrow focus of the Liberia SSR Program – almost exclusively on the AFL -- is indicative of the lack of U.S. government civilian capacity to engage robustly and effectively in the other dimensions of SSR. There is clearly a need for a cadre of federal government employees who can oversee police reform and help build local capacity in prison services, judicial services, intelligence services, border control, and customs and immigrations – as well as within the appropriate legislative and departmental oversight mechanisms for these elements of the security and justice sector.</p>
<p>25</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>

## SECURITY SECTOR REFORM EFFORTS IN THE DR CONGO

### **Background**

With a population of 65 million and over 200 ethnic groups in a country that is one quarter the size of the United States, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a country with a very violent history, from the period of Belgian colonization to the 32 years of ruthless dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko. A massive inflow of refugees in 1994 from fighting in Rwanda and Burundi caused ethnic strife and civil war, sparking the overthrow of the Mobutu regime in May 1997 by a rebellion backed by Rwanda and Uganda and fronted by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. On 10 July 1999, the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement was signed by the major parties involved in the war.

A small UN observer mission was deployed to monitor the cease-fire in August 1999. This became the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in November 1999 – a mission that, after many mandate adjustments over the ensuing years, eventually grew into the largest and most expensive UN peace operation ever deployed. Yet the Eastern part of the country has remained in turmoil to date, with rebel groups, financed in part by illegal extraction of resources, continuing to operate with seeming impunity. Eight years after Lusaka and a year after democratic elections, the people of the Kivus are still at the mercy of thousands of armed belligerents fighting for and against the Congolese government, and often among themselves. The armed groups all have one thing in common. Without exception, they have preyed off the local population and committed gross human rights abuses.

By 2005 MONUC's most important task was ensuring that national elections went ahead as planned for 2006.<sup>85</sup> To accomplish this task MONUC supported the newly-constituted *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*<sup>86</sup> (FARDC) in prosecuting a counter-

insurgency campaign against recalcitrant armed groups operating in the east. The campaign was at best partially successful, but after the 2006 elections, primary responsibility for the intractable security problems, incomplete disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes, and protection challenges in the eastern DRC was shifted from MONUC to the government of the DRC. President Kabila has set 2009 as the target for the DRC to take over full responsibility for the security of the country. MONUC continues to 'support the transition' and to provide training and operational assistance to the government forces.

Security sector reform (SSR), especially military reform, is key to meeting the remaining disarmament and civilian protection challenges in the DRC. However, it has not been pursued with sufficient vigor to actually enhance security in the eastern Congo. Rather, an inadequately resourced and supported SSR program has contributed to the FARDC becoming a major source of insecurity for civilian communities in the east. While the U.S. Department of State is concerned about the humanitarian situation in the east, and has played a very active role in facilitating dialogue among belligerents, the DRC seems to be a very low priority for a Department of Defense that is preoccupied with GWOT priorities.

### **Military "Integration" in the DRC**

While the U.S. government may be criticized for what it is doing in the realm of military reform in Liberia, it should be criticized mainly for what it is *not* doing in support of military reform in the DRC. Given the level of suffering endured by the Congolese people and strategic importance of the DRC – not only in terms of minerals for the West and China, but also for the future stability of the Great Lakes region and sub-Saharan Africa – the U.S. administration's level of support is shockingly small. Indeed, the FY 09 request – for \$5.5 million to "continue efforts to reform the military in the Democratic

**Given the level of suffering endured by the Congolese people and strategic importance of the DRC... the U.S. administration's level of support is shockingly small.**

An estimated 1.1 million people are displaced in North and South Kivu provinces in eastern Congo and forced to live with neighbors or in camps like this one outside of Goma. With minimal support going toward reform of the Congolese military, the Congolese army is better known for preying on civilian communities than protecting them.

© Refugees International



Republic of the Congo into a force capable of maintaining peace and security” – smacks of tokenism.<sup>87</sup>

In the absence of a strong lead nation, MONUC was unable to rally donor support for military reform, and it has become increasingly apparent that the Congolese government prefers bilateral agreements to meaningful international coordination, so as to extract as much as possible from individual donor countries.

With the disarmament of all armed groups in the DRC far from complete, donor governments supported the build-up of a new Congolese army through a process of integration of the disparate armed forces that were signatory to the April 2003 “Global and All-inclusive Peace Agreement” for the DRC. This process, called *brassage*, was conceived as an emergency measure rather than strategically-planned process of defense sector reform. African mediators proposed the

plan, which was supposed to begin with all armed forces regrouping under the authority of the Chief of General Staff. The creation of a number of infantry brigades was planned to occur sequentially, beginning with a census of all combatants eligible for integration into the FARDC, followed by disarmament at assembly points and transportation to orientation centers, where individuals could elect for demobilization or a career in the integrated army. Those electing for military service were then to be organized into standard brigades of 4,200 troops and training of the new brigades at six *Centres de Brassage* (CBRs), after which nine brigades would be deployed to the eastern provinces. A further nine brigades were also to be integrated and deployed to the rest of the country before the elections in March 2006.

Due to capacity constraints, centers were not established for the identification of combatants for the DDR process. Consequently, the FARDC, supported by various donor



<p>countries, took responsibility for regrouping the combatants and transporting them directly to the CBRs, resulting in combatants bypassing the orientation centre phase. Individuals were grouped together and groups were topped up with new arrivals until brigade strength was reached at which time the whole group entered a 45-day basic training program, upon completion of which the group became a numbered “Integrated Brigade.” Substantive training was supposed to take place <i>after</i> the newly formed brigades were deployed from the CBRs to the operational areas. The training of the first integrated brigade with assistance from the Belgian government began in February 2004 at the CBR in Kisangani.<sup>88</sup> While the Belgian-run training was regarded as successful, the living conditions at the CBRs in Mishaki and Luberizi were so appalling that between March and August 2005 an estimated 2,500 out of 6,000 troops assembled there deserted.</p> <p><i>Brassage</i> in the DRC was at most a process of amalgamation, rather than integration or even assimilation. The result of <i>brassage</i> is a national army that is out of control, at least by democratic and professional military standards. Command and control are weak and unstructured. The army lacks cohesion and basic operational capability. FARDC exactions and harassment of the local population continue in virtually all areas of deployment. Soldiers take their families with them on operations, where they often live in far worse conditions than the thousands of displaced civilians. Government troops have been responsible for serious human rights violations, including sexual violence, which remains rife in eastern DRC. Illicit taxing by government forces is ubiquitous. FARDC elements cooperate with the FDLR, the remnants of the Hutu forces that committed the genocide in Rwanda, who they are supposed to disarm, sharing looted items and taxes and the proceeds from gold and coltan mining operations. Serious criminal acts, such as murder and rape, go unpunished.</p> <p>Moreover, President Kabila does not trust his military staff in Kinshasa, and issues orders directly to his regional commanders and brigade commanders in the field. Not one written operational order has been issued, and there are no written administrative and logistic reports within the FARDC. According to the MONUC Force Commander:</p> <p>“The national authorities, FARDC and PNC [Congolese National Police], remain the leading perpetrators of human rights abuses in the country ...Until such time as the Security Sector Reform (SSR) is effectively implemented, the civilian population will remain at high risk of human rights violations at the hands of rebel groups and Congolese Law Enforcement and Security Agencies.”<sup>89</sup></p> <p>It is difficult to see how the Congolese government and those countries that assisted with the process convinced themselves that cohesive, operationally proficient and combat effective brigades could be formed in such a short space of time. In most armies of the world, the formation of an effective platoon takes at least six months. The building of the small, single-brigade Liberian army is scheduled to take at least three years and the brigade will be thoroughly evaluated by the U.S.-sponsored SSR Program before it is operationally deployed.</p> <p><b><i>The European Contribution</i></b></p> <p>It is evident that real military reform in the DRC requires work on the base of the FARDC. Human resource management systems must be developed and implemented, administrative and logistic systems created, new training schools and barracks built, etc. For the past few years, the European Union (EU) has attempted to partner with the Congolese government in supporting such a process. Following an official request by the DRC government, the EU decided to establish an EU advisory and assistance mission – the EU Security Sector Reform Mission (EUSEC) in the DR Congo. The mission is intended to provide advice and assistance to</p>	<p><b>Government troops have been responsible for serious human rights violations, including sexual violence, which remains rife in eastern DRC.</b></p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>28</p>

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>While the Government of the DRC needs considerable help with defense restructuring and the build-up of a professional army, there is a chronic lack of international funding for such a process.</b></p>	<p>the Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law. The mission was launched on June 8, 2005, with French General Pierre Joana as head.</p> <p>The first priority of EUSEC was to provide technical expertise to the GoDRC on issues of military command and control, budgetary and financial management, training, accountancy and dealing with contracts and tenders. A project known as ‘EUSEC FIN’ – aimed at setting up a chain of payment system for the FARDC – was launched on December 1, 2005 to target one of the key weaknesses of the FARDC: the embezzlement of a considerable part of the soldiers’ salaries at various points in the chain of command, and the issue of ‘ghost soldiers’ on the military payroll.<sup>90</sup></p> <p>The basis of the EUSEC FIN project is to separate the payment chain from the command chain, so that corrupt commanders cannot help themselves at each level of command. The idea is to simplify the payment procedure of salaries and reduce the risk of embezzlement of funds. EUSEC FIN involves the deployment of a number of international advisors in the chain of payment system, down to brigade level units. EUSEC is also working on the compilation of an accurate biometric personnel database, which is a <i>sine qua non</i> for improving human resources management.</p> <p>The current estimate is that there are 164,000 members on the FARDC payroll (30,000 of them “ghosts”), and a further 80-90,000 individuals awaiting registration and <i>brassage</i>.<sup>91</sup> There is an urgent need to demobilize approximately 40,000 redundant FARDC soldiers. More than 30,000 FARDC personnel are over 60 years of age, and there is no military pension system in place. The resultant army is bloated, and the military hierarchy is badly skewed – about 33% of</p> <p>the FARDC are officers; 44% are warrant officers and non-commissioned officers; and only 30% are privates. According to EUSEC, the FARDC should be reduced in number to around 70,000 personnel.</p> <p>While the Government of the DRC needs considerable help with defense restructuring and the build-up of a professional army, there is a chronic lack of international funding for such a process. The EUSEC team consists of 49 personnel from 13 different EU member states, but EUSEC cannot access any money at all from the European Commission’s development assistance budget. Although it is widely accepted that security is a prerequisite for development, no funding mechanism has yet been found to convert this common wisdom into tangible funding for the establishment of capable and sustainable defense forces.</p> <p>MONUC and bilateral partners have therefore engaged in low-level capacity building rather than defense sector reform. MONUC has merely been holding the line, keeping a lid on the FARDC in attempt to prevent force disintegration and the widespread commission of human rights abuses, while using the FARDC to stabilize the eastern DRC.</p> <p><b><i>Real Commitment Needed</i></b></p> <p>The current situation of military mal-integration and ongoing insecurity in the eastern DRC stems from a transition process that was fundamentally flawed. Elections were held with sub-national armed groups still operative, and long before the creation of a unified and integrated national military. Although security sector reform – or more pertinently defense sector transformation – was acknowledged as the key to meeting the remaining disarmament and civilian protection challenges, it was not pursued with sufficient vigor to actually enhance security in the eastern Congo. Rather, an inadequately resourced and supported SSR program has resulted in the FARDC becoming a major part of the security problem for civilians, rather than the solution.</p>
<p>29</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>

<p>Building new armed forces from the base up will require 10-15 years of sustained effort by the Government of the DRC as well as long-term and coordinated international support for the effort. The DRC does not so much need more technical military assistance, in the form of training and equipment. The real need is for assistance with military organization, professional military socialization, and the institution of effective command and control. However, there is a lack of international coordination and cooperation, as well as a lack of coordination and cooperation among Congolese institutions on these issues. The heart of the matter is that there is a total lack of willingness to actually <i>deal</i> with SSR beyond the level of rhetoric.</p> <p>The Congolese government and its international partners – including the U.S. – need to accept and deal with the <i>real</i> need for assistance – for military organization, professional military education and socialization, and the institution of effective command and control. If a relapse into civil war is to be averted over the medium to long term, and the ongoing human rights abuses halted, the UN Security Council, MONUC, the “P3+2,”<sup>92</sup> the European Union, the Contact Group, and others who are dabbling in military assistance to the DRC, must get a grip on the real challenges of defense sector transformation in the DRC and be prepared to commit resources for the long term.</p>	<p><b>Building new armed forces from the base up will require 10-15 years of sustained effort...</b></p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>30</p>

## THE UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND (AFRICOM)

### **Background**

Unified and specified combatant commands were first described by statute in the U.S. National Security Act of 1947, and three such commands have been operating in Africa for decades: European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM).<sup>93</sup> On October 1, 2008, AFRICOM will assume mission responsibility as a Unified Command, and serve as the Department of Defense lead for support to U.S. Government agencies and departments responsible for implementing U.S. foreign policy in Africa.

U.S. foreign and security policies that played out in Africa during the Cold War, however, have made African leaders suspicious of U.S. intentions with the new combatant command. For many African leaders and analysts, AFRICOM is, along with the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, another sign that the U.S. is seeking to re-assert Ameri-


can power and hegemony globally. The view remains widespread that AFRICOM is a tool to secure better access to Africa's natural resources, erode China's growing influence on the continent, and establish forward bases to hunt and destroy networks linked to al-Qaeda. As one Nigerian journalist puts it:

"Energy supplies are concentrated in those countries where a mix of internal social tensions, radical Islamism and anti-Americanism has produced a fertile breeding ground for militancy and terrorism. Oil platforms, tankers, pipelines, expatriate workers and the whole integrated infrastructure of the petroleum industry are extremely vulnerable to attacks."<sup>94</sup>

While the Pentagon has gone to great lengths to deny anything but a desire to "help Africans help themselves" in its public diplomacy efforts, it is common knowledge that key members of the Bush administration, as well as some legislators and influential U.S. think tanks, have become more and more alarmed by the growing efforts of China to expand its access to energy supplies

*A Senegalese soldier holds two U.S. soldiers prisoner during a "Visit, Board, Search and Seizure" military exercise using dummy weapons on the USS Fort McHenry in Dakar's harbor in April 2008. Such military training will be continued as one of the security assistance programs of the new Africa Command (AFRICOM).*

© Refugees International



<p>and other resources from Africa and to enhance its political and economic influence throughout the continent. It is easy to assume, therefore, that AFRICOM is a response to these developments.</p> <p><b>Posture and Promises</b></p> <p>The initial reaction of the Office of the Secretary for Defense to African concerns about AFRICOM was to disparage them. Senior officials such as Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, denied what he described as myths, stating categorically that AFRICOM is not being established in support of the war on terrorism, and that it will not be concerned with securing U.S. oil interests and/or countering Chinese influence in Africa. For example, in June 2007, Mr. Henry explained to the foreign press that:</p> <p>“The missions that AFRICOM will emphasize are those of humanitarian assistance, civic action ...and response to natural disasters.... [T]he deputy for the command... will be a senior civilian from the State Department so that we can integrate with the diplomatic aspects.... [We] will also have a large percentage of civilians from different parts of the U.S. government integrated into the command, because our engagement on the continent is one of diplomacy, of development and where we can be of assistance to Africans. And having an <b>integrated staff</b> will help us to do a better job in <b>integrating</b> with those other parts of the U.S. government’s engagement.”<sup>95</sup></p> <p>The specter of integration was as unpalatable for humanitarians as it was for Africans, as there was clear ignorance of core humanitarian principles of Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality and Independence. The observance of these principles is essential in order to maintain the trust of all sides of a given conflict, and to maintain access to victims, while the DOD was co-opting the language and aims of humanitarianism for political and military purposes. The DOD eventually took note of such criticism, and has amended</p>	<p>the thrust of its public diplomacy accordingly. Since his confirmation as AFRICOM Commander last September, General Ward has also done much to set the record straight, emphasizing not new and complex possibilities on the humanitarian and developmental front, but rather the value his Command can add to extant U.S. security assistance programs in Africa.</p> <p>In his April 2008 statement to Congress on AFRICOM’s posture, General Ward outlined the following aims and objectives for the command, “in support of vital national interests”:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• to prevent attacks emanating from Africa against Americans,</li> <li>• to secure U.S. strategic access, and</li> <li>• to preserve unhindered movement along lines of communication in AFRICOM’s Area of Responsibility.</li> </ul> <p>To achieve these ends, AFRICOM will adopt a strategy of Active Security that will focus on establishing and sustaining reliable partnerships while developing security partner capacity at the theater, regional, and state levels.<sup>96</sup> Ward defined Active Security as “a persistent and sustained level of effort oriented on security assistance programs that prevent conflict and foster continued dialogue and development.” The goal of Active Security is “to enable the work of Africans to marginalize the enemies of peace and prevent conflict, thereby enabling the growth of strong and just governments and legitimate institutions to support the development of civil societies.” General Ward added that “AFRICOM will contribute to this goal by employing a wide range of tools at its disposal – from conducting security cooperation activities to <b>prosecuting combat operations.</b>”<sup>97</sup> Although it promises sustained African capacity building assistance, General Ward’s concept of Active Security is thus clearly driven by U.S. national security interests and the imperatives of GWOT.</p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>General Ward has also done much to set the record straight, emphasizing... the value his Command can add to extant U.S. security assistance programs in Africa.</p> <p>32</p>

<p style="text-align: center;"> <b>When the command becomes fully operational... it will take over responsibility for the implementation of a range of ongoing military, security cooperation, and security assistance programs.</b> </p>	<p>Two of the U.S. military’s most significant African security cooperation programs – Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa – carry a mandate directly linked to the Global War on Terrorism.<sup>98</sup> Since their inception, these initiatives have placed U.S. counterterrorism efforts within a larger framework of development, long-term counterinsurgency, and a campaign to win “hearts and minds.” However, U.S. operations in North and East Africa have nonetheless relied on “kinetic” military operations focused on short-term objectives, such as those in Somalia discussed above.</p> <p><b><i>Extant U.S. Security Programs in Africa</i></b></p> <p>AFRICOM is not being created entirely from scratch. When the command becomes fully operational on October 1, 2008, it will take over responsibility for the implementation of a range of ongoing military, security cooperation, and security assistance programs, which are funded through either the State Department or the Defense Department. The U.S. provides military training to African military personnel through a wide variety of training and education programs. In addition, it conducts military exercises in Africa jointly with African and European troops to provide training to others as well as to train its own forces for possible deployment to Africa in the future. Extant programs in Africa include the following:<sup>99</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)</b> exercises, conducted primarily by units of the U.S. Army Special Forces and the U.S. Army Rangers, to provide training experience both for American troops and for the troops of African countries. JCETs were conducted in 2005 and 2007 as part of Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) which now links the U.S. with Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. The TSCTP received some \$31 million in FY 2006,</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;">nearly \$82 million in FY 2007, and is expected to receive approximately \$100 million annually from FY 2008 through FY 2013.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA).</b> This program, which began operating in 2002, is now part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). ACOTA is officially designed to provide training to African military forces to improve their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations. By FY 2007, nineteen African countries were participating in the ACOTA program. It is impossible to ascertain exact levels of funding for ACOTA, since its funding is subsumed within the budget for GPOI.</li> <li>• <b>International Military Education and Training Program (IMET).</b> The IMET program brings African military officers to military academies and other military educational institutions in the United States for professional training. Nearly all African countries participate in the program. In FY 2006 14,731 students from the African continent (excluding Egypt) participated in IMET at a cost of \$14.7 million.</li> <li>• <b>Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS).</b> The FMS program sells U.S. military equipment to African countries; such sales are conducted by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency of the Defense Department. The U.S. government provides loans to finance the purchase of virtually all of this equipment through the Foreign Military Financing Program, but repayment of these loans by African governments is almost always waived, so that they amount to free grants. In FY 2006, sub-Saharan African countries received a total of nearly \$14 million in FMF funding, and the Maghreb countries of Morocco and Tunisia received almost another \$21 million; for FY 2007, the Bush administration requested nearly \$15 million for sub-Saharan Africa and \$21 million for Morocco and Tunisia; and for FY 2008, the administration</li> </ul>
<p>33</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>

<p>requested nearly \$8 million for sub-Saharan Africa and nearly \$6 million for the Maghreb.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> <p><b>African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBS Program).</b> This program provides specialized equipment (such as patrol vessels and vehicles, communications equipment, night vision devices, and electronic monitors and sensors) to African countries to improve their ability to patrol and defend their own coastal waters and borders from terrorist operations, smuggling, and other illicit activities. In some cases, airborne surveillance and intelligence training also may be provided. In FY 2006, the ACBS Program received nearly \$4 million in FMF funding, and the Bush administration requested \$4 million in FMF funding for the program in FY 2007. No dedicated funding was requested for FY 2008, but the program may be revived in the future.</p> </li> <li> <p><b>Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)</b> In October 2002, the U.S. Central Command played the leading role in the creation of this joint task force that was designed to conduct naval and aerial patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean as part of the effort to detect and counter the activities of terrorist groups in the region. Based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, long the site of a major French military base, the CJTF- HOA is made up of approximately 1,400 U.S. military personnel (sailors, Marines, and Special Forces troops) that work with a multi-national naval force composed of American naval vessels along with ships from the navies of France, Italy, and Germany, and other NATO allies.<sup>100</sup></p> </li> <li> <p><b>Joint Task Force Aztec Silence(JTFAS).</b> In December 2003, the U.S. European Command created this joint task force under the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet (Europe) to carry out counter-terrorism operations in North and West Africa and to coordinate U.S. operations</p> </li> </ul> <p>with those of countries in those regions. Specifically, JTFAS was charged with conducting surveillance operations using the assets of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and to share information, along with intelligence collected by U.S. intelligence agencies, with local military forces.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> <p><b>Naval Operations in the Gulf of Guinea.</b> Although American naval forces operating in the Gulf of Guinea and other areas along Africa’s shores are formally under the command of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, and other U.S. Navy commands, AFRICOM will help coordinate naval operations along the African coastline. For example, on October 16, 2007 the U.S.S. Fort McHenry began a seven-month deployment to the Gulf of Guinea. The amphibious dock landing ship serves as a platform for the Africa Partnership Station (APS) initiative, which aims to work cooperatively with U.S. and international partners in promoting maritime security in Western Africa. The Fort McHenry will serve as a “floating schoolhouse” to train local forces in port and oil-platform security, search-and-rescue missions, and medical and humanitarian assistance.</p> </li> </ul> <p>The APS initiative is the first U.S. operation in the sub-region since the launch of AFRICOM in February 2007. According to General Ward, the initiative,</p> <p>“provides a good example of what the newly established U.S. Africa Command is all about as it relates to helping our partner nations on the continent of Africa build their capacity to better govern their spaces (and) to have more effect in providing for the security of their people.”<sup>101</sup></p> <p>There can be little doubt that the extant programs, including the APS, will constitute the core of AFRICOM’s activities for the foreseeable future. This was indeed confirmed during a press briefing at the African Union headquarters on November 8, 2007, where General Ward concluded his statement</p>	<p><b>The Africa Partnership Station initiative... aims to work cooperatively with U.S. and international partners in promoting maritime security in Western Africa.</b></p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEEINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>34</p>

<p><b>A top priority for AFRICOM should be to enhance U.S. peacekeeping capacity-building programs.</b></p>	<p>by reaffirming that “U.S. AFRICOM will sustain the activities that the three commands and our African friends are already conducting together.”<sup>102</sup></p> <p>However, a top priority for AFRICOM should be to enhance U.S. peacekeeping capacity-building programs. The demand for African peacekeepers far outstrips the supply of adequately trained and equipped forces, capable of sustaining themselves for lengthy periods while deployed on UN and AU operations, and AFRICOM is well-suited to address this. According to U.S. Ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad:</p> <p>“The United States is committed to helping African states increase their capacity. Since 2005, the United States has trained over 34,000 African peacekeepers from 19 countries and has provided \$375 million to increase global capacity for peacekeeping operations in Africa and elsewhere. Additionally, we see an opportunity for several African countries to increase their capacity for combined and joint operations by stressing interoperability in equipment, training, and communications and building professional relationships among officers of all African nations. Steps such as these will enhance overall AU peacekeeping capacity and will be a focus for the new U.S.-African command (AFRICOM).”<sup>103</sup></p> <p>The numbers look impressive at first blush – but years of U.S. assistance to Africa through ACRI, ACOTA and GPOI have not produced a viable and credible independent African peace operations capability. Rather, these programs bring home the fact that real capacity building is not a simple “train and equip” quick fix. Africa needs a demonstrable commitment by AFRICOM to provide long-term, sustainable support to developing African peacekeeping capabilities for participating in UN peacekeeping, as well as African Union and regional operations. AFRICOM holds the promise of joining up current U.S. military capacity-building programs such as GPOI, ACOTA, and IMET</p> <p>and of evaluating and updating such programs to ensure their relevance, coherence and effectiveness in enhancing the quality and quantity of African troops who are readily available for peace operations.</p> <p>There are, however, a number of very real and practical challenges regarding AFRICOM’s ability to deliver on the non-counter-terrorism part of its mission, and to add the necessary value to existing U.S. capacity-building programs that General Ward has been promising. Capacity-building is a long-term, relationship-based activity, rather than simply a menu of trainings or skill-sets to be delivered. Human resources development is central to any capacity building process. Expert-led practices have to be replaced by local training, education and technical transfer of know-how, for the aim of capacity building is to nurture local ownership and to develop local competences in order to break out of a vicious circle of dependency. In practice, however, interveners inevitably attempt to transplant their own national systems, procedures and values to host-nation institutions. Failure occurs when the specificities of the recipient country are either not correctly addressed, or ignored, resulting in a bad copy of the initial model and, in the long run, to its abandonment because of its lack of effectiveness.</p> <p>The problem for AFRICOM is that U.S. forces have no recent experience as UN peacekeepers. Moreover, while U.S. forces have deployed to Africa and worked with African militaries in different contexts over the years, the U.S. military has less exposure to and knowledge of Africa than many other foreign militaries. Ex-colonial powers such as France and the United Kingdom have more military experience in Africa, both combat and peacetime, than does the United States. AFRICOM therefore lacks the depth of historical knowledge, cultural references and local connections regional commands enjoy in other theaters of operation.</p> <p>Part of the delivery challenge will lie in the time it takes to build AFRICOM’s staff</p>
<p>35</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>



<p>capacity, to build true African knowledge within the Command, and to forge lasting and meaningful relationships with African counterparts. This will take a good deal of time, and require sufficient dedicated financial and human resources to prove to Africans that the U.S. is serious about AFRICOM's capacity-building mandate. However, it is unclear at this point where these resources will come from.</p> <p><b>Resource Issues</b></p> <p>While the President's budget provided funds to establish AFRICOM's interim headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany,<sup>104</sup> funds are not currently allocated to allow AFRICOM to play a more effective role as a security sector and governance capacity-building vehicle for African nations. General Ward has told the House Armed Services Committee that "...building regional stability and security will take many years of sustained and dedicated effort. There is no conspicuous finish line. Therefore, enduring Congressional support is indispensable."<sup>105</sup> However, the focus of General Ward's pitch, like that of Secretaries Gates and Rice to the same committee a month later, was on entrenching and expanding Section 1206 authority, and was motivated with reference to the GWOT. Ward asked Congress specifically to:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">"Provide budgetary flexibility to Combatant Commanders and Ambassadors, including making Section 1206 Global Train and Equip authority permanent and expanding it to meet the demand State and DOD have seen over the past three years ... This authority is a vital element of the GWOT."<sup>106</sup></p> <p>General Ward made no mention of Title 22 of the U.S. Code, which gives the Department of State authority for important tools for supporting military professionalism and security sector reform – like the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). AFRICOM's potential share of an expanded</p>	<p>Section 1206 allocation would be insufficient for the Command to successfully accomplish its full range of missions, especially SSR and the building of real and sustainable African peacekeeping capacity. Security-related programs in Africa currently receive only about \$250 million a year. This level of funding is woefully inadequate. While security is a prerequisite for development, U.S. security assistance to Africa remains ineffective. It is both under funded and skewed towards perceived partners in the war on terrorism.</p> <p>Africa's principal security challenge is to mobilize sufficient resources to provide a secure, stable, and well-governed environment characterized by the Rule of Law, in which human rights and civil liberties are protected and promoted, and where business can thrive. All African countries face a capacity deficit in their institutions of state, and the state is too often a predator rather than a facilitator. Since the 1960s, African armies have exhibited a tendency towards rapacious behavior, and the rebellions spawned in response have caused unimaginable suffering for civilians. To support defense sector transformation in a manner that can be sustained over a long period, AFRICOM will need additional resources, as well as expertise. For example, only two officials in USAID have any knowledge of SSR or Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programming.</p> <p>In the realm of defense sector reform, the importance of sustained external mentoring and commitment is well recognized and cannot be over-emphasized. The usefulness of a lead-nation rather than multinational approach has been demonstrated by the UK in Sierra Leone, as has the allocation of sufficient financial resources to do the job properly. On the other hand, there are many examples of perverse consequences of short-term U.S. assistance to select African armies. AFRICOM should therefore demonstrate that it understands the role of military support within the broader sphere of Security Sector Reform (which includes the police</p>	<p><b>Funds are not currently allocated to allow AFRICOM to play a more effective role as a security sector and governance capacity-building vehicle for African nations.</b></p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>36</p>	

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Informed, consistent and coherent engagement is far better than ad hoc U.S. military engagement or retrenchment in Africa.</b></p>	<p>and intelligence agencies as well as the judicial sector), that it is willing to provide sustained support to defense transformation in partner countries, and that it will have a secure funding mechanism to do so.</p> <p>AFRICOM’s current meager DOS budget for bilateral security cooperation falls far short of what is required if AFRICOM is to have true credibility and impact. Without sufficient authority and resources for AFRICOM, it may well be “business as usual” in Africa. Because of the length of budget cycles, competing priorities, emerging crises, and its perceived lack of importance compared to other regions, Africa usually gets short changed. Absent the creation of a mechanism such as the UK Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, increases in foreign military financing (FMF), international military education and training (IMET), and a substantial increase in peacekeeping operations (PKO) funding should be used to support AFRICOM engagement initiatives. At the same time, the State Department’s Africa Bureau will need an increase in personnel to facilitate coordination with AFRICOM and to ensure faster processing of program and spending proposals.</p> <p>Such resource increases should help to address the conspicuous imbalance that now exists between the modest amounts currently allocated to actual programmatic activities in Africa and the much larger cost projections for the establishment and operation of AFRICOM. Unless substantial programs exist to justify AFRICOM’s overhead costs, hard questions are likely to arise about the gap between AFRICOM’s posture of “Active Security” and the actual enhancement of African security through the delivery of assistance programs that are appropriate, meaningful and sustainable.</p> <p><b>Potential for a Cohesive Approach to Africa</b></p> <p>The establishment of AFRICOM and the transfer of geographical responsibility for Africa from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM hold great promise for a more</p> <p>cohesive approach to U.S. military engagement with the continent. Instead of having three commanders that deal with Africa as a third or fourth priority, there is now a single four-star general who deals with the continent as his first and only priority. The new command should therefore be welcomed by Africans. Informed, consistent and coherent engagement is far better than <i>ad hoc</i> U.S. military engagement or retrenchment in Africa. However, this simple benefit has been overshadowed by U.S. public diplomacy that emphasizes the “soft” side of AFRICOM’s mandate, at the same time as the U.S. military continues with short-term kinetic operations, such as air strikes, in support of the GWOT.</p> <p>Elements of the global jihadi insurgency are no doubt present in several African regions, and AFRICOM rightly considers the neutralization of these elements one of its primary goals. However, this objective would be more consonant with broader U.S. goals in Africa and the proclaimed concept of ‘active security’ if it were accomplished through partnering with African nations in areas such as intelligence sharing, law enforcement, and military cooperation, as well as through longer-term civilian-led efforts to reduce poverty, promote development under the rule of law, and improve governance. If AFRICOM continues to be justified to Congress primarily in terms of the GWOT, and if the U.S. military continues to conduct sporadic but dramatic military strikes on individuals suspected of terrorism – while attempting to embed AFRICOM in a larger construct of humanitarianism and capacity building – African and domestic humanitarian opposition to the command is bound to grow stronger.</p> <p>AFRICOM’s legitimacy on the continent will be largely determined by its ability to work in collaboration with and close support of the African Union, as well as with United Nations operations in Africa. Although African security needs are well defined and articulated in the various conflict manage-</p>
<p>37</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>

<p>ment protocols of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities, these have hitherto not been well known by U.S. military staff. Indeed there has been a general and serious dearth of knowledge about the African continent among DOD officers, and AFRICOM presents the opportunity to develop a stable cadre of African area specialists, officers who know Africa and how to interact constructively with Africans. Part of the delivery challenge will therefore lie in the time it takes to build true African knowledge within the Command, and to forge lasting and meaningful relationships with African counterparts.</p> <p>The African Union is increasingly working in close cooperation and often in tandem with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. With the United Nations present in virtually every corner of Africa, often in a peacebuilding or peacekeeping capacity, AFRICOM will not be able to operate for long without intersecting in some way with UN activities. To the extent that AFRICOM is perceived as supportive of UN security and peacekeeping missions, international acceptance of AFRICOM will grow. Conversely, few things are as likely to undermine AFRICOM’s effectiveness or its welcome in Africa as a perception that AFRICOM is working at cross-purposes with the United Nations.<sup>107</sup></p> <p>If AFRICOM is to overcome the legacy of nearly a year of negative hype and African opposition, and attract U.S. budgetary support, then much detail needs to be added to a new strategy, one backed by substance rather than rhetoric. Talk of “value added” is necessary but insufficient. General Ward and his AFRICOM staff need to communicate a <i>plan</i> that provides evidence of a deep understanding of the African peace and security architecture and illustrates in some detail exactly how the U.S. intends to support this through a variety of capacity-building programs that are coordinated and integrated, both within the U.S. Government and among Africa’s other international partners. And the State</p>	<p>Department and USAID need the capacity and the will to engage robustly with their DOD counterparts in AFRICOM in the development and execution of this plan.</p> <p>In order to be effective in a capacity-building role, AFRICOM will need access to a predictable and substantial enough source of funding to allow for engagement in the kind of long-term interagency programming that may actually deliver meaningful results.<sup>108</sup> However, any increased funding that may accrue to the Command through DOD should be over-matched by the funding of State Department funding for Africa programs. As Senator Feingold warned last year,</p> <p>“...We need to ensure that [AFRICOM] will contribute to, not define, the U.S. Government’s overall strategy and objectives for the continent. We also need to make sure that the U.S. military’s activities and involvement on the continent do not overshadow, skew, or otherwise hinder our Government’s other key objectives.... We need to look at an equally aggressive plan to strengthen our diplomatic, development, humanitarian, and human rights work throughout the continent. This may include addressing how the Congress allocates funds—both to this new command and to the other departments and agencies that will make the spirit and intent of this command work.”<sup>109</sup></p> <p><b>If AFRICOM is to overcome the legacy of nearly a year of negative hype and African opposition... then much detail needs to be added to a new strategy.</b></p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>38</p>

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>There is clearly an urgent need to modernize the U.S. aid infrastructure and for elevating development on a par with diplomacy and defense.</b></p>	<p><b>CONCLUSION</b></p> <p>The erosion of civilian capacity and the accompanying reliance on military power have significant consequences for the U.S. and the world. Military and other security concerns have effectively reshaped U.S. international priorities such that global engagement is often determined by the military’s capabilities and requirements. Issues that lack a security dimension for the U.S. have been relegated to a much lower priority, if they are addressed at all. Moreover, since 2001, the United States has pursued an increasingly unilateral posture in the pursuit of national security and foreign and development policy. American policy places little emphasis on the need to harmonize U.S. approaches with those of the UN and other donors, or indeed to align these policies with the priorities of local actors. The U.S. ties more aid than any other donor to the purchase of its own goods, it relies far more heavily on contractors for delivery, and it spends more on international technical assistance than any other donor, with the bulk of that money going to U.S. consultants.</p> <p>The U.S. military is moving rapidly to fill the vacuum created by shrinking civilian capacity, in pursuit of short-term solutions to stabilization problems that do not address the vexing and enduring challenges facing the world’s billion most impoverished people. The desire of the Department of Defense for a “unity of effort” that uses all U.S. government agencies as “force multipliers” in the war on terror is changing the ethos and manner in which weakened civilian agencies operate. The resultant militarization of aid in an effort to prevail in the war against terrorism and in pursuit of national security objectives is unlikely to enhance either national security or the ability of the U.S. to achieve its foreign policy goals. The history of counter-insurgency, as well as development theory and practice, points rather towards long-term failure.</p> <p>Despite all the talk of “Smart Power,” it is clear that the U.S. has not been very smart in its “3D” approach to bolstering weak, fragile, failing or failed states. While the gains of targeted aid harnessed in pursuit of the fight against terrorism remain dubious at best, the U.S. has no coherent long-term foreign assistance strategy in the fight against global poverty. There is clearly an urgent need to modernize the U.S. aid infrastructure and for elevating development on a par with diplomacy and defense. Beyond better targeted and delivered development assistance, the United States could clearly wield far greater influence per aid dollar spent by deploying its influence in trade, investment, debt, and financial policies in a deliberate manner towards achieving coherent rather than conflicting objectives abroad. For example, in the realm of agriculture, U.S. development and trade policies frequently work at cross purposes.</p> <p>While the current administration is promoting a range of initiatives to redress the imbalance in U.S. instruments for global engagement, these efforts do not go far enough. They are aimed at a “quick fix” for long-broken machinery, with the objective of getting the machinery running quickly and smoothly enough for all parts to engage in the overarching U.S. foreign policy objective – victory in the GWOT. Reform efforts point in the direction of further militarization of foreign policy, with the DOD championing the cause for increased funding for State and AID, and the State Department reciprocating all too willingly in the name of interagency cooperation and unity of effort in pursuit of ‘transformational diplomacy.’</p> <p>In both aid and diplomacy, a new U.S. commitment to multilateral global engagement – especially through the UN and its various departments and agencies – would lend credence to the notion that both development and the war against terrorism are global challenges, and that America can work with a variety of allies to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Where the UN intervenes in a peacekeeping role, it is time to think of the success or failure of such operations</p>
<p>39</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>

<p>also as U.S. successes or failures. With the U.S. playing a dominant role in the Security Council and paying more than a quarter of the peacekeeping bill, this approach would be based as much on common sense as a new spirit of internationalism.</p> <p>The war in Iraq is hopefully the high water mark of post 9/11 U.S. unilateralism in issues of international peace and security. As the presidential candidates campaign on the promise of change in Washington DC, and at least two on the promise of drawing down U.S. forces in Iraq, attention must shift to post-Iraq policy, to a post-Iraq “peace dividend” and a commitment to use a good portion of this to substantially increase U.S. capacity for diplomacy and development. The development and effective implementation of a comprehensive new global engagement strategy will require bipartisan political consensus. It will require more than piecemeal adoption by various agencies and departments. It will ultimately depend upon strong presidential leadership, and regular, constructive consultation with Congress, in order to garner popular support and to reconcile competing bureaucratic interests.</p> <p>Building bipartisan consensus to reinvent the way America engages with the rest of the world will not be easy. A single “success demonstrator” may well be the key to advancing the process. Africa is a relatively low-cost investment for the U.S. and reinventing Africa policy should not place undue demands on other budgetary priorities. Doing a few things well in Africa, and doing the right thing in Africa, can have a positive impact on 53 UN member states, help uplift 80% of the world’s poorest people, and win friends and influence in the most under-governed continent in the world. In other words, if the establishment of AFRICOM, the strengthening of the State Department’s Africa Bureau and USAID programs in Africa can be seen to produce really positive results, the effort could serve as a pilot project for the grander scheme of global engagement.</p> <p><b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The President, working with Congress, must strengthen U.S. civilian professional capacity to carry out diplomatic and development operations to improve efforts to build stable, prosperous democracies. Benchmarks should be set for allocating funding to address the current 17 to 1 spending imbalance in staffing and resources between defense and diplomatic/development operations, and for rolling back the over-reliance on contractors to deliver on foreign assistance programs.</li> <li>• The next President should conduct a thorough assessment of both civilian and military capacities to advance national goals as a step toward modernizing the National Security Act and the Foreign Assistance Act.</li> <li>• The President and Congress should mandate a thorough review of U.S. Africa policy and then provide sufficient funding and manpower resources to the Department of State to strengthen its Africa bureau to engage regionally as well as bilaterally in Africa; to provide direction for civilian capacity building programs in the governance and security sectors; and to support African peacekeeping operations and regional conflict management mechanisms.</li> <li>• Beyond counter-terrorism efforts, AFRICOM should focus on two roles to strengthen peace and security in Africa, namely a) assisting African countries with defense sector reform; and b) supporting Africa’s regional organizations in building conflict management and standby force capacity. These roles will require both State Department and DOD involvement and collaboration.</li> <li>• Until a review of civilian and military capacities is conducted and an overall foreign aid strategy is developed, the Congress should defer the permanent</li> </ul>	<p><b>The next president should conduct a thorough assessment of both civilian and military capacities to achieve developmental goals.</b></p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEEINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>40</p>

<p><b>AFRICOM should create... a core of civil-military expertise within the Command staff for constructive engagement with and support to UN peace operations in Africa.</b></p>	<p>authorization of and the requested substantial increase in funding (from \$300 to \$750 million) for the Department of Defense Section 1206 train or equip program, to ensure full Congressional oversight and compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act's provisions on aid to repressive governments.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Department of Defense should develop, in concert with State and AID, a draft strategy paper that explains exactly how AFRICOM's role in security sector reform supports the U.S. development and good governance goals. With a clearly articulated strategy, AFRICOM will be better positioned to convince Congress that a consistent level of funding dedicated to Africa is needed to permit the U.S. to take a longer-term view on development needs, holistic security sector reform, sustained engagement with partner nations, and in building peace and security capacity more effectively.</li> <li>• AFRICOM's planning should take into account the African Union's detailed plans for the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010. The Command's plans should incorporate some of the detail of the African Union's ASF Policy Framework Document and its Roadmap for Implementation.</li> <li>• The President and the Congress should provide funding and support for security sector reform and AFRICOM's mission should prioritize those processes and programs that have been clearly identified by the UN Secretary-General as an essential prerequisite for successful war to peace transitions and to permit the drawdown and ultimate withdrawal of expensive peace operations in Africa.</li> <li>• Coordinating security sector and peace-keeping assistance should be a priority in AFRICOM's mandate. A lack of coordinated international donor support for SSR in the DRC threatens that country's</li> </ul> <p>peace process. Moreover, the AU and the sub-regional organizations in Africa lack the capacity to analyze and absorb the plethora of uncoordinated assistance initiatives emanating from various coalitions of donor countries. AFRICOM would be uniquely poised to act as a focal point for liaison and coordination between African countries and organizations and their multiple peacekeeping and security capacity-building 'partners'.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AFRICOM should create, as a matter of urgency, a core of civil-military expertise within the Command staff for constructive engagement with and support to UN peace operations in Africa – particularly in those dimensions of operations where expertise and resources are sadly lacking yet absolutely essential for stabilization and reconstruction – like DDR and Rule of Law.</li> <li>• The Administration should work with Congress to create a transparent, inter-agency budget-building process for AFRICOM to allocate the money to implement a comprehensive U.S. military and political strategy in Africa. This process should involve the Department of State and the Country Teams, USAID, the Commander AFRICOM, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.</li> </ul>
<p>41</p>	<p>U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA</p>

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
APS	Africa Partnership Station
ASF	African Standby Force
BTU	Brigade Training Unit
CBR	<i>Centres de Brassage</i>
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
EUCOM	U.S. European Command
EUSEC	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
EUSEC FIN	European Union Security Financial Mission
FARDC	<i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i> (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
FDLR	<i>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i> (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda)
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
GRC	Governance Reform Commission
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IET	Initial Entry Training

	<p>IGP            Inspector General of Police</p> <p>IMET        International Military Education and Training</p> <p>IPRS        Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy</p> <p>JPB         Joint Personnel Board</p> <p>LNP        Liberia National Police</p> <p>MCC        Millennium Challenge Corporation</p> <p>MONUC     <i>Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo</i> (UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)</p> <p>NATO       North Atlantic Treaty Organization</p> <p>NDAA       National Defense Authorization Act</p> <p>NSPD       National Security Presidential Directive</p> <p>ODA        Official Development Assistance</p> <p>ODC        Office of Defense Cooperation</p> <p>OECD       Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</p> <p>PACOM     U.S. Pacific Command</p> <p>PAE        Pacific Architects and Engineers</p> <p>PEPFAR    President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief</p> <p>PKO        Peacekeeping Operations</p> <p>PMI        President’s Malaria Initiative</p> <p>PNC        Congolese National Police</p> <p>QRU        Quick Response Unit</p> <p>SSR        Security Sector Reform</p> <p>SSTR       Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction</p> <p>TSCTP     Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership</p> <p>UNAMSIL   United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</p> <p>UNMIL     United Nations Mission in Liberia</p> <p>USAID     U.S. Agency for International Development</p> <p>WHO        World Health Organization</p>
43	U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> British attention to fragile states actually antedates 9/11 and the “global war on terrorism.” It originated in experiences in Sierra Leone and other African countries during the 1990s, which persuaded the UK Department for International Development (DFID), in particular, that violent conflict posed a significant obstacle to development. DFID’s White Paper of 2000, *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalization Work for the Poor*, made this connection explicit, identifying personal security as prerequisite for sustainable livelihoods.

<sup>2</sup> Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States*, International Peace Academy, New York, 2007, p 1.

<sup>3</sup> Source: Congressional Budget Office for FY2008.

<sup>4</sup> Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2007*, London, IISS, 2007, p 28.

<sup>5</sup> Bill Rigby, “Defense stocks may jump higher with big profits,” *Reuters*, April 12, 2006.

<sup>6</sup> *The Washington Post*, 5 December 2006.

<sup>7</sup> Patrick and Brown, op cit, p 54.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p 35.

<sup>9</sup> Statement of General William E. Ward, USA, Commander, United States Africa Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on 13 March 2008, p 3.

<sup>10</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, *The Next Frontier*, The Atlantic, 1 November 2007.

<sup>11</sup> SIPRI Yearbook, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007.

<sup>12</sup> William D. Hartung, *Bush Military Budget Highest Since WW II*, Common Dreams, 10 February 2007. <http://www.commondreams.org/views07/0210-26.htm>

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> David Roodman, *An Index of Donor Performance*, Center for Global Development, April 2004. [http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/\\_active/cdi/](http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/)

<sup>15</sup> *Real Aid: Making Technical Assistance Work*, Action Aid, 5 July 2006, pp 5-6.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p 24.

<sup>18</sup> Robert M. Gates, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 15 April 2008, op cit.

<sup>19</sup> Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance within the Department of State (State/F). The Director of this Office – the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA) – serves concurrently as the USAID Administrator and has authority over all USAID and Department of State foreign assistance funding and programs.

<sup>20</sup> *Paying the price: Why rich countries must invest now in a war on poverty*, Oxfam International, Oxford, 2005.

<sup>21</sup> The U.S. channels about 12% of its funding through local procurement systems (against an international average of 38 %) and 10 % of its funding through the public finance management systems, such as budget execution, financial reporting, and auditing of recipient countries, compared with 75 percent for the UK and an average across all major donors of 33%. *OECD 2006 donor survey overview*, OECD, Paris, 2007, p 82.

<sup>22</sup> For example, the HELP Commission, the 2006 Task Force on Transforming Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century, the 2007 Smart Power Commission, and the 2004 Commission on Weak States.

<sup>23</sup> Patrick and Brown, op cit, p. 10.

<sup>24</sup> National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, December 7, 2005. Archived at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Robert M. Gates, “Landon Lecture (Kansas State University),” 26 November 2007. <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199>.

<sup>27</sup> Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, Report to Congress on the Implementation of DOD Directive 3000.05 *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Washington DC, 1 April, 2007, p 1. Own emphasis added to tasks that are patently civilian in nature.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, p 2.

	<p>29 According to USAID, the characteristics that differentiate TSCTP activities from traditional development are targeting and timeframe. Remote at-risk geographic regions and at-risk populations are targeted based on vulnerability to influence by extremists. This targeting can come from a variety of sources. The development portion of the TSCTP will be implemented in an abbreviated timeframe because the program needs to keep pace with DOD and DOS interventions. USAID, Request for Task Order Proposals (RTO), “Peace Through Development”, 2007, p.4</p> <p>30 Correspondence from James Bishop, Vice President, Humanitarian Policy &amp; Practice, InterAction, 18 April 2008.</p> <p>31 Section 1206 authority initially provided funds to the Pentagon to train and equip military and police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan without State Department involvement. It was later broadened to allow for paying the costs, with State Department concurrence, of training and equipping other countries, including Algeria, Chad, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen. In FY2006, DOD and State jointly approved 8 programs in 11 countries totaling approximately \$100M. In 2007, 39 programs were approved in 47 countries, at a total cost of \$280M.</p> <p>32 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) gives the Department of State primacy over how and when to provide military assistance to foreign governments. Over the last 46 years, Congress has added conditions to the FAA that require the State Department to consider the recipient state’s record on human rights and democracy, before disbursing military aid. Congress deliberately placed the responsibility for providing military assistance with the State Department in order to ensure that assistance is granted in accordance with long-term U.S. foreign policy goals.</p> <p>33 Robert M. Gates, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 15 April 2008, op cit.</p> <p>34 Ibid.</p> <p>35 U.S. Government, <i>National Strategy for Countering Terrorism</i>, September 2006, p 16.</p> <p>36 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee hearing on “Building Partnership Capacity and the Development of the Interagency Process,” 15 April 2008.</p> <p>37 This will be the first time in 12 years that USAID will hire above its attrition rate. USAID had as many officials deployed in Vietnam in 1969 as it does worldwide today.</p> <p>38 Robert M. Gates, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 15 April 2008, op cit.</p> <p>39 War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency, RAND Corporation, February 2008.</p> <p>40 See, for example: Jim Thomas, <i>Sustainable Security: Developing a Security Strategy for the Long Haul</i>, Center for New American Security, April 2008. <a href="http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?1924">http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?1924</a>.</p> <p>41 Leo Hindery Jr., Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Gayle Smith, “Appendix 11: Additional views by commissioners,” in <i>Beyond Assistance: The HELP Commission report on foreign assistance reform</i>, US Commission on Helping to Enhance the Livelihood of People Around the Globe, 2007.</p> <p>42 U.S. Government, <i>Summary and Highlights – International Affairs Function 150</i>, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request, p 44.</p> <p>43 A 2005 RAND Corporation study found that UN-led nation-building efforts are more successful — and cheaper — than comparative American-led efforts. Since the start of the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the UN has quietly assumed responsibility for managing a growing number of conflicts, not only in Africa, but worldwide. The flare-up in Haiti in 2004 and the July 2006 fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, for example, were both mitigated by sending UN peacekeepers, very few of whom were from the United States. Of the over 90,000 UN troops and police that were deployed to 20 missions worldwide, only 293 were American.</p> <p>44 Mark Bellamy, Kathleen Hicks, and J. Stephen Morrison, <i>Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case</i>, 5 March 2008. <a href="http://www.csis.org/component?option=com_csis_progj/task/view/id,1160/">http://www.csis.org/component?option=com_csis_progj/task/view/id,1160/</a></p> <p>45 The AC-130 is basically a Hercules C-130 transport plane fitted with an awesome array of armament – ranging from 20mm Vulcan cannons and 40mm Bofors cannons to 105 mm howitzers and a 25 mm Gatling gun that can fire 1,800 rounds per minute. The firepower of the AC-130 is devastating.</p>
45	U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA

46 The Tomahawk is a long-range subsonic cruise missile for attacking land targets. It is approximately 20 feet long, and weighs around 3,000 pounds. Each Tomahawk costs around US\$ one million, and can be fitted with a warhead containing 1,000 pounds of conventional explosives — or a nuclear warhead equivalent to 20 thousand tons of conventional explosives.

47 U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request, op cit, p 45.

48 The FY 09 PKO request reflects ongoing funding requirements for GPOI, TSCTP, a new counter-terrorism program (EARSII) in East Africa, and multi-lateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations, as well as security sector reform programs in Somalia.

49 U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request, op cit, p 45.

50 Ibid, p 46.

51 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. (Capstone Doctrine Draft 3), UN DPKO, 29 June 2007, par 54.

52 Government of Liberia, An Act to establish the National Security Council of the Republic of Liberia, 12 March 1999.

53 Article VII Sections 1(b), 2 (a – d) and 3 of the CPA, 2003, pp 15-16.

54 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1509 (2003), S/RES/1509 (2003), 19 September 2003, p 4.

55 Article XXXV, Section 1(e) of the CPA states that: “All suspended provisions of the Constitution, Statutes and other laws of Liberia, affected as a result of this Agreement, shall be deemed to be restored with the inauguration of the elected Government by January 2006...”

56 Articles 51 and 54 (e) of the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia, 1986.

57 However, a meaningful, long-term process of security sector reform must consider the extent to which the constitution too must be reformed. The issue of overlapping responsibilities of security institutions highlights the need to provide constitutional backing and clarification for all statutory security institutions. Moreover, the present Constitution encourages abuse of power, especially by the President, who appoints virtually all the leaders of these security apparatus.

58 Liberia: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, IMF Country Report No. 07/60, February 2007, p 32. <http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cro760.pdf>

59 Amos Sawyer was the President of the Interim Government of National Unity in Liberia from 22 November 1990 to 2 March 1994. He left Liberia in 2001, after the militiamen of President Taylor attempted to murder him and his colleague, Conmany Wesseh of the Center for Democratic Empowerment.

60 Dr. Amos Sawyer, Chairman of the Liberia Governance Reform Commission, Monrovia, 21 August 2007.

61 Thomas A. Dempsey, Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Restructuring the Ministry of National Defense, unpublished information paper, 17 June 2007. Thomas Dempsey, a retired U.S. Army colonel, served on the SSR Program team as Director of Ministry of Defense Reform and Training.

62 Amos Sawyer, op cit.

63 Ibid.

64 The national budget for 2006 was a paltry \$123 million; for 2007 it was \$199 million. Even if Liberia were to attain and sustain an economic growth rate of 10% per annum, the baseline is so low that it would take 25 years for the Liberian economy to return to the level it was at in the 1980s.

65 RAND Report, op cit, pp 26-28.

66 Ibid, pp 25-26.

67 Sean McFate, The Art and Aggravation of Vetting in Post-Conflict Environments, Military Review, July-August 2007, p 82.

68 Ibid, p 82.

69 At present, no single ethnic group makes up more than 15% of the AFL.

70 Sergeant Major Spike Roberts (USMC retired), Director of Training, Camp Ware, Monrovia, 30 August 2007.

71 Briefing by Lieutenant Colonel William Wyatt, Monrovia, 28 August 2007.

	<p>72 The Government of Liberia (Ministry of Defense) is responsible for paying the monthly salary of all members of the AFL, according to agreed salary scales ranging from US\$90 for a private to \$170 for a Sergeant-Major. This compares well to the basic monthly salary for the civil servants, which is \$50 per month. Interestingly, all members of the Band are paid at a rate of \$140 per month, regardless of rank. Recruits undergoing basic training receive a salary of \$40, until such time as they graduate as riflemen.</p> <p>73 For example, the UK has offered to train company grade officers and has seconded an advisor (a lieutenant colonel) to the program. This officer is currently assisting the Ministry of Defense. William M. Wyatt, op cit.</p> <p>74 Ibid.</p> <p>75 Telephone interview with Andy Michels, former head of DynCorp's Security Reform team in Liberia, 7 August 2007.</p> <p>76 DynCorp took up assignment in Liberia in August 2005. According to DynCorp, delays in the start of the program were predicated by certain actions of the national government, including the slow pace of voluntary relocation of civilians living in Camp Schefflin.</p> <p>77 DynCorp took up assignment in Liberia in August 2005.</p> <p>78 William M. Wyatt, op cit.</p> <p>79 According to Lieutenant Colonel Wyatt: "The AFL is not replacing UNMIL. That is the job of the police. The AFL can assume the UNMIL border responsibilities, but that does not entail 15,000 peacekeepers." Similarly, Jacques Klein, the former UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Liberia, suggested shortly after taking up his post that Liberia should abolish its army altogether, and that Liberia could make do with a decent police force and a well-trained border security force of 600 to 700 men.</p> <p>80 According to the latest UN assessment, the pace of the drawdown process should be linked to the following core benchmarks: (a) completion of the basic training of 3,500 personnel of the Liberian National Police by July 2007; (b) completion of police operating procedures by December 2008; (c) completion of the formation of the 500-strong Police Quick Reaction Unit by July 2009; (d) equipping of police personnel and their deployment to the counties, as well as building of police infrastructure by December 2010; (e) finalization of the national security strategy and architecture and their implementation throughout the country by December 2008;</p> <p>and (f) training and operationalization of the first and second Armed Forces of Liberia battalions by September 2008 and September 2009, respectively. UN Security Council, Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2007/479, 8 August 2007.</p> <p>81 For example, there are controversies around DynCorp flying missions to eradicate coca fields in Colombia. However, the company really shook the peacekeeping community in 2001, when Kathryn Bolkovac, a UN Police Officer, filed a lawsuit in Britain against DynCorp for firing her after she reported that DynCorp police trainers in Bosnia were paying for prostitutes and participating in sex trafficking. Many of the DynCorp employees were forced to resign under suspicion of illegal activity. None were prosecuted, since they enjoyed immunity from prosecution in Bosnia.</p> <p>82 Ezekiel Pajibo and Emira Woods, <i>AFRICOM: Wrong for Liberia, Disastrous for Africa</i>, Foreign Policy in Focus, 26 July 2007. <a href="http://fpif.org/fpifxt/4427">http://fpif.org/fpifxt/4427</a></p> <p>83 Amos Sawyer, op cit.</p> <p>84 Ibid.</p> <p>85 The elections were a huge logistical accomplishment. MONUC facilitated the registration of some 25 million people throughout the country, as well as the road, air and river transport of ballots. The first and second round of Presidential elections were held on 30 July and 19 October 2006; National Assembly elections on 30 July 2006; Provincial Assembly elections on 19 October 2006; Indirect Senatorial elections on 19 January 2007; and Indirect Gubernatorial elections (27 January 2007).</p> <p>86 Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the name used for the Congolese national army since the beginning of the transition.</p> <p>87 U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request, op cit, p 46.</p> <p>88 International training support was provided to the FARDC in the CBRs as follows: Belgium – Kisangani; Angola – Kitona; Belgium and South Africa – Kamina; Netherlands and South Africa – Nyaleke; Netherlands and South Africa - Mushake (Rumangabo); and the EU – Luberizi.</p> <p>89 Lt. Gen. Babacar Gaye, Force Commander's Directive 01/07 on Protection of Civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC OpsSp 01/07, 10 March 2007.</p>
47	U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA

- <sup>90</sup> Hans Hoebke, Stephanie Carette and Koen Vlassenroot, EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Brussels, IIRI-KIIB, 2006.
- <sup>91</sup> There is no system in place for validating the total number of personnel serving in the FARDC.
- <sup>92</sup> France, the UK, and the USA – plus Angola and South Africa.
- <sup>93</sup> U.S. security interests on the African continent have hitherto been overseen by three different combatant commanders: the commander of the European Command, based in Stuttgart, Germany, has been responsible for North Africa and much of sub-Saharan Africa; the commander of Central Command, located in Tampa, Florida, with primary responsibility for the Middle East has had oversight over the Horn of Africa; and the commander of Pacific Command, located in Honolulu, Hawaii has been responsible for the islands off the west coast of Africa.
- <sup>94</sup> Nigeria; Country, Gulf of Guinea and AFRICOM, Africa News 22 November 2007.
- <sup>95</sup> Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, State Department Foreign Press Center Briefing, June 22, 2007. <http://www.eucom.mil/africom/transcript221110Ljun2007.asp>
- <sup>96</sup> Statement of General William E. Ward, USA, Commander, United States Africa Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on 13 March 2008, pp 8-9.
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid, pp.7-8. Emphasis added.
- <sup>98</sup> CENTCOM established CJTF-HOA in late 2002 to disrupt the flow of jihadis from the Middle East to East Africa in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. It soon became clear, however, that the region encompassing the African states of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan contained less of an al-Qaeda presence than once feared. CENTCOM therefore amended CJTF-HOA's mandate. The Task Force based at Djibouti's Camp Lemonier soon took on an increasing number of quick impact projects aimed at "winning hearts and minds" and thought to be addressing the root causes that "breed jihadis". See Robert G. Berschinski, AFRICOM's Dilemma: The "Global War on Terrorism," "Capacity Building," Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa, SSI Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2007. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB827.pdf>
- <sup>99</sup> Daniel Volman, AFRICOM: The new United States military command for Africa, <http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=16418>
- <sup>100</sup> The CJTF-HOA provided intelligence to Ethiopia in support of its invasion of Somalia in January 2007 and used military facilities in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to launch its own attacks against alleged al-Qaeda members involved in the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia in January and June of 2007.
- <sup>101</sup> Donna Miles, Navy Mission to Set Tone for U.S. Africa Command—USS Fort McHenry to work with West African, European nations, American Forces Press Service, Washington DC, 15 October 2007.
- <sup>102</sup> Press Conference by General William E. Ward, African Union Building, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 8 November 2007. <http://www.AFRICOM.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1582>
- <sup>103</sup> Statement by Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Permanent Representative, in the Open Debate on Strengthening the Relationship Between the UN and Regional Organizations, in the Security Council, April 16, 2008.
- <sup>104</sup> \$50 million in 2007 and nearly \$57 million for 2008.
- <sup>105</sup> Statement of General William E. Ward, USA, Commander, United States Africa Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on 13 March 2008, p 18.
- <sup>106</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>107</sup> Mark Bellamy, Kathleen Hicks, and J. Stephen Morrison, Strengthening AFRICOM's Case, March 05, 2008. [http://www.csis.org/component/option,com\\_csis\\_progji/task,view/id,1160/](http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_progji/task,view/id,1160/)
- <sup>108</sup> The UK, for example, has joined the efforts of DFID, the FCO and the MOD through the establishment in 2001 of the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP). The ACPP, supported by the Treasury and coordinated at Ministerial level by the Cabinet Office, serves as a tool for joint analysis, financing and coordination in areas where collaboration between the three departments can add value to UK conflict prevention activities. Objectives and priorities are laid out in a jointly agreed UK Sub-Saharan Africa Strategy for Conflict Prevention. The ACPP budget for FY 2005/6 was £60m, of which MOD spent around £30m.
- <sup>109</sup> Senator Russell Feingold, Creation of a U.S. Africa Command, Congressional Record, Senate, 10 January 2007, page S352.





**REFUGEES  INTERNATIONAL**

A POWERFUL VOICE FOR LIFESAVING ACTION