Georgia, Russia jockey over separatist territories

Molly Corso 12/08/06

Russia has moved another step closer toward recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Russian parliament, or State Duma, adopted two non-binding resolutions on December 6 concerning the separatist territories. In one concerning South Ossetia, the Duma urged the Kremlin to "build a policy" around Tskhinvali's "expression of free will" – a reference to an early November referendum in which a majority of Ossetians expressed a desire for independence.

While South Ossetian leaders in Tskhinvali have lauded the statement as an "important step" toward the recognition of independence from Georgia, political analysts believe the Duma may have undermined Russia's diplomatic position in the dispute.

Georgian lawmakers were quick to condemn the Duma's dual statements of support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In a response on December 7, the Georgian parliament accused Russia of being an "aggressive supporter" of the separatist governments and claimed the Russian Duma is seeking to stir tension in the conflict zones. Meanwhile, a statement posted on the Georgian Foreign Ministry website asserted that the Duma action should disqualify Russia from acting as a mediator in conflict-resolution efforts. "Through such biased approach the Russian State Duma not only puts under serious doubt the role of Russia as an impartial mediator and facilitator, but also undermines the moral and legal basis for the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zones," the Georgian statement stated.

Zurab Bendianishvili, an expert serving on the Georgian parliament's temporary commission on territorial integrity issues, noted that the Duma's resolutions would have little practical impact on the existing situation because the parliament doesn't wield influence over Russian foreign policy. However, the resolution is indicative of a double game being played by Moscow, he asserted. "Russia is trying to play with two hands," he said. "It wants to be recognized on the level of the international community ... but on the other hand – the Duma hand – it is making declarations that are completely unacceptable for the international community."

Bendianishvili disputed the notion that support in South Ossetia was overwhelmingly in favor of independence, citing the results of two referenda held in November. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. According to those votes, sentiment in favor of a break with Georgia is indeed high in areas dominated by ethnic Ossetians. But in Georgian-controlled areas of the territory, an alternate referendum revealed that a preference for the status quo.

Two separate presidential elections in South Ossetia were held at the same time as the referenda. In the one organized by pro-independence forces in Tskhinvali, Eduard Kokoity won reelection as South Ossetia's chief executive. Meanwhile, the alternate vote elected Dmitri Sanakoyev, an obscure 37-year-old politician, as president. Thus, the unrecognized republic of South Ossetia now finds itself with two unrecognized governments.

On December 5, the battle lines between these competing governing factions came into sharper focus, as Sanakoyev's new "government" announced its intention to participate in the four-sided Joint Control Commission that is in charge of promoting the South Ossetia Peace Process. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. According to Uruzmag Karkusov, a top representative of the alternative government, Sanakoyev's team has just as much right to representation on the JCC as Kokoity's separatist leadership. "We will take a place in all negotiations that concern our republic," Karkusov said in a telephone interview. "The negotiation process was originally two sided, and then enlarged to include South Ossetia and European partners. So the mechanism exists. When and how [we will participate] we do not know."

Sanakoyev's team is widely viewed as a creation of Georgian officials in Tbilisi, which wants to blunt the South Ossetian leadership's independence drive. Officially, however, Tbilisi is keeping its distance. Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution, Merab Antadze, stated in early December that Tbilisi didn't recognize either Kokoity's or Sanakoyev's authority. At the same time, Antadze maintained that Tbilisi was interested in conducting a dialogue with both entities.

"Now it is difficult to say who is more supported by South Ossetian residents, Kokoity or Sanakoyev," the Itar-Tass news agency quoted Antadze as saying. "Time will tell with whom we should hold the dialogue."

In certain aspects, Georgia, with the appearance of Sanakoyev's team, turned the tables on Moscow. During the Soviet era, the Kremlin often tried to create alternate sources of authority in states where the entrenched leadership steadfastly opposed Moscow's foreign policy aims. In doing so, Moscow sought to undermine stability in the particular state in question, and thus get its own way on contentious policy matters. For example, during the political crisis in separatist-minded Lithuania in early 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev's Kremlin attempted to create a "Committee of National Salvation" when confronted with the intransigent desire of the Lithuanian government under Vytautas Landsbergis to pull the republic out of the Soviet Union. In this particular case, Moscow's plan failed miserably, and the botched Soviet crackdown in Lithuania hastened the demise of the USSR later that year.

Officials in Moscow have been clearly chagrined to see old Soviet tactics used against them. Russian diplomats have criticized Georgia for its perceived support for the alternative government. "It is clear that Georgia is continuing its course, creating new barriers on the way to conflict resolution," reads a Russian Foreign Ministry statement. "This proves that our previous contact with Georgia on high and the highest levels did not bring any positive results."

Kokoity's de facto government in Tskhinvali, incensed over Tbilisi's apparent support for Sanakoyev, has flatly refused to negotiate with any representatives from the alternative government.

It would appear that the Georgian government wants to scrap the existing JCC system and replace it with a negotiating framework more favorable to its own political interests, i.e. the reintegration of South Ossetia into Georgia.

According to Antadze, the current JCC format does not "respond" to the demands of the peace process. "Reality dictates the basis for making a decision about the creation of a direct dialogue under the auspice of the OSCE," he said on December 5 according to Regnum.ru. Both the United States and the European Union are pushing for the OSCE to take a more active role in the conflict resolution process.

"As long as these countries [Georgia and Moldova] remain torn apart from within, and as long as open support for separatist regimes continues from without, these societies will find it harder to realize their potential," US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns said December 4 during an OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Brussels. Burns noted that the OSCE should extend its monitoring to the contested Roki Tunnel.

Thea Kentchadze, a research fellow at the Georgian foundation for Strategic and International Studies, said Sanakoyev's team has done an effective job in dispelling the notion that Kokoity's leadership spoke for the overwhelming majority of South Ossetia residents.

"Before that [the elections] the [Kokoity's] regime claimed that it was the only representative of the local population," Kentchadze added. "All of their political steps were determined, as they kept saying, by the will of the South Ossetian people. And now what we see is there is another portion of local population who actually voted for another person."

Editor's Note: Molly Corso is a freelance reporter and photojournalist based in Tbilisi.

Posted December 8, 2006 © Eurasianet