R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Ahmed

Publisher	United Kingdom: High Court (England and Wales)
Author	High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
Publication Date	29 April 1994
Citation / Document Symbol	[1994] Imm AR 454
Cite as	R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Ahmed, [1994] Imm AR 454, United Kingdom: High Court (England and Wales), 29 April 1994, available at: https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_HC_QB,3ae6b66a10.html [accessed 30 May 2023]
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R v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT ex parte AHMED

Queen's Bench Division

[1994] Imm AR 454

Hearing Date: 29 April 1994

29 April 1994

Index Terms:

Political asylum -- vexatious application -- earlier application refused -- grant of exceptional leave -- applicant travelled back to home country -- refused leave to re-enter United Kingdom -- application for leave to enter treated as second application for asylum -- refused by Secretary of State as vexatious and without foundation -- special adjudicator upheld decision finding no significant change in applicant's circumstances since previous refusal -- whether adjudicator's decision and approach reasonable. Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 sch 2 para 5(3)(b).

Held:

The applicant for leave to move for judicial review was a citizen of Pakistan whose second application for political asylum had been refused by the Secretary of State and characterised as vexatious. The applicant had previously been refused asylum but granted exceptional leave to remain for a limited period. He had been put on notice that that exceptional leave would lapse if he travelled abroad. During that period of exceptional leave he went back to Pakistan. On his return to the United Kingdom he was refused leave to enter: his application however was treated as a second application for asylum.

That application being refused, he appealed. The special adjudicator upheld the Secretary of State's conclusion that the application was without foundation and vexatious. He reached that conclusion on the basis that the applicant had been unable to demonstrate any relevant and substantial change in his circumstances since the date of the first refusal.

On application for judicial review it was argued by counsel that there had been a change of circumstances, in that the applicant's family had disappeared.

Held

1. The adjudicator did not find the applicant a credible witness: on that basis he was entitled to conclude that there had been no significant relevant change in circumstances.

2. The court appeared to endorse the approach by the adjudicator that, having found there had been no significant relevant changes in circumstances, the claim was vexatious and without foundation.

Counsel:

S Gill for the applicants; I Ashford-Thom for the respondent

PANEL: Judge J

Judgment One:

JUDGE J: This is an application for leave to move for judicial review of the decision of the Secretary of State made on 30 November 1993 refusing the applicant leave to enter this country and certifying that his claim for asylum was without foundation and vexatious.

The applicant came to this country from Pakistan on 30 July 1989. He was given six months' leave to enter as a visitor. On 29 December 1989 he applied for asylum. That application was considered. The Secretary of State was not satisfied that there was a well-founded fear of persecution in Pakistan. On 19 March 1992 the application was refused. However, because of particular personal circumstances, he was granted twelve months' exceptional leave to remain. He did not appeal against the decision refusing him asylum.

In January 1993 he applied for a further period of exceptional leave to remain. That was granted until January 1996. Within a short time of having been granted leave to remain he left the United Kingdom. He went to Saudi Arabia where he spent ten days. He then travelled on to Pakistan where he remained for about three-and-a-half months until June 1993.

Before he left for Saudi Arabia in February 1993 he was told that he could travel outside the United Kingdom if he wished to do so but that:

"You should be aware that, if you travel abroad, the leave you are now being granted will lapse. Any application to return will be considered as an application for fresh leave."

After his return from Pakistan, he sought leave to enter in line with his previous conditions. He was given temporary admission. It was then treated as a fresh application for asylum. He explained in due course how the end result of his visit to Pakistan had been a complete inability to find his wife and children. He had no idea where they were. Of course that was a series of events which caused him considerable distress and anxiety. However, he said himself on his return that there was no change in the basis of this claim for asylum.

What Mr Gill argues on his behalf is that whatever he may have said, there was in fact a change. His domestic situation in Pakistan was quite different. His family had disappeared. That represents an obvious change of circumstances.

Of course in one sense it does. There can be no denying the catastrophic effect of such an event on his life. The question was whether or not it affected his claim that he had a well-founded fear of persecution by the Mujahidin, for his claim is not fear of the authorities in Pakistan but of the Mujahidin organisation.

There was another factor which in a sense was a change. Although he spoke about knocks on the door that his relatives had told him about, he had remained in Pakistan for three months without any direct manifestation of personal danger.

When the matter came for determination, one of the features of the application was that the special adjudicator did not accept the evidence given by the applicant. He did not find him to be a credible witness. As to what had happened in Pakistan, he described the evidence as:

". . . so nebulous that I could not be satisfied, even adopting the lower standard of proof in political asylum cases, that in fact his family were being harassed."

The affidavit sworn in support of this application, to put it no higher, does not make the position any clearer than his evidence did before the adjudicator.

Having reflected on whether he believed the applicant's evidence or not, the adjudicator's conclusion was that having been previously refused asylum in the United Kingdom, the applicant was unable to demonstrate any relevant (I emphasise that word) and substantial change in his circumstances since that date. Accordingly, his application was refused. The adjudicator concluded:

"The Secretary of State has made good his certificate that the appellant's claim is vexatious, and therefore is unfounded."

Although he was asked to make a recommendation that the applicant be granted special leave on this occasion as he had on the earlier occasion when asylum had been refused, he decided that he should not accede to the request.

The basic argument for the applicant is that there was insufficient attention paid to the evidence of changed circumstances deriving from events which the applicant spoke of during his visit to Pakistan at the end of 1993. In my judgment, having considered the determination, that criticism is ill-founded. The adjudicator had to decide whether he believed the evidence of the applicant about these events. He did not believe the basic account. He directed himself to bear in mind the nature of the application, namely asylum, with the importance of considering such claims most anxiously and giving them careful scrutiny and treating the applications with complete fairness.

In the result, having looked at the determination, there is nothing to suggest that the decision is open to criticism on the principles which apply in judicial review cases, nor is the decision of the Secretary of State of 30 November 1993 itself open to criticism.

Accordingly, there being insufficient evidence to sustain an arguable case for judicial review of these decisions, the application will be refused.

DISPOSITION:

Application dismissed

SOLICITORS:

Mohammed Asghar & Co, Southall; Treasury Solicitor