Nations in Transit - Tajikistan (2005)

Capital: Dushanbe
Population: 6,600,000
Status: Not Free
PPP: $180
Private Sector as % of GNI: na
Life Expectancy: 68
Religious Groups: Sunni Muslim (85 percent), Shi'a Muslim (5 percent), other (10 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Tajik (65 percent), Uzbek (25 percent), Russian (4 percent), other (6 percent)

Executive Summary

Transitioning from Communism, according to social scientists Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, differs from earlier forms of regime change and movements toward democracy such as those that swept across southern Europe and Latin America decades ago. Post-Communist transitions appear paradoxical: even though new rulers gained power rather quickly, regime consolidations have been "lengthy, conflictual, and inconclusive." Those adjectives suitably describe Tajikistan's 13-year journey into the unknown of post-Communism. During 2004, one could sense that the principles and agenda enshrined in the 1997 peace accord that formally ended a bloody civil war (1992-1997; estimated 50,000 dead) between the ex-Communists and the Islamist-dominated United Tajik Opposition appeared to have stalled. Little progress has been made to expand democratization and pluralism. On the economic front, transition has been anything but smooth. The free market prosperity that many had envisioned has been slow and still out of reach for most of the populace. Though Tajikistan's annual gross domestic product grew by an impressive average of 9.5 percent during the past five years, as reported by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank estimates that as much as two thirds of the population is living below the poverty line. It appears that the already substantial gap between the rich and the poor only widened in 2004. Impressive macroeconomic growth in Tajikistan and its neighboring states, coupled with centralized power and estranged relations between the citizenry and the state, has led to what Peter Sinnott, a professor at Columbia University, has referred to as a sense of "false stability" in the region.

As the country prepared for the February 2005 parliamentary elections, the government began a harassment campaign against active opposition parties, and it continued to formulate novel ways to prevent the registration of new opposition groups. Furthermore, in 2004 the government still dominated the media, especially television stations, and put forth politically motivated obstacles for the journals and newspapers associated with the opposition. In what appeared to be a move to ensure a successful bid for yet another seven-year term in office for President Imamali Rahmonov, who has held the position of head of state or president since 1992, the government was able to extradite and arrest the former minister of the interior, Yaqub Salimov, and the head of the country's drug control agency, Ghaffor Mirzoyev, who may have potentially posed obstacles to Rahmonov's reelection plans. The two have been charged separately for a variety of alleged crimes, including corruption and intent to overthrow the government.

Thanks in large part to its nonpolitical activities, civil society was able to strengthen and expand during 2004. Women-run nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), soliciting both the president and the Parliament, introduced legislation against domestic violence and human trafficking that was later approved. Others worked on a variety of issues and projects such as education on countering human trafficking, promotion of microfinance schemes, ensuring food security, and advocacy of open media. Some NGOs, such as the Mountain Societies Development and Support Program (MSDSP), continued their emphasis on strengthening and building on existing social and community structures, such as mahalla (neighborhood) councils. Mahallas, one of the smallest and most basic community structures in Central Asia, are still not recognized and used officially by the Tajik Constitution and government administrative bodies.

Owing to international pressure and its desire to follow suit with other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Tajik Parliament (after urging from the president) passed a moratorium on capital punishment in May 2004, in effect banning the death penalty in Tajikistan. Human rights organizations and victims' advocates welcomed this move while acknowledging the large amount of reform still necessary in the country's legal system, prisons network, and human rights arena. In 2004, the government continued with the surveillance and arrest of members of alleged Islamic extremist groups. Among the people who were detained, subsequently tried, and given prison sentences were dozens of alleged members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamist group whose followers advocate the nonviolent overthrow of Central Asian regimes in favor of a pan-Islamic caliphate.

National Democratic Governance. In power for the past 13 years, President Rahmonov has failed to lead his government to expand on the 1997 peace accord signed with the umbrella opposition group. As a result, political and ethnoregional cleavages have not mended, and patronage and clan politics continue to play heavy roles in Tajikistan's political arena. In addition, the government has failed to substantially curtail the country's widespread poverty. Based on a 2003 World Bank study, Tajikistan still ranks as the poorest among post-Communist states, with nearly two thirds of the population living below the poverty line. Still, in 2004 a comprehensive security and economic treaty worth US$2 billion was signed with Russia, promising the construction of two hydroelectric dams that have the potential to radically expand future revenues via the export of electricity to neighboring states. The Russian deal also includes the construction of a new aluminum production plant. Tajikistan's new rating for national democratic governance is set at 6.00. There have been more setbacks than progress in democratic governance in the past several years, with the president wielding additional powers and continuing to use patronage and clan politics. Though poverty still prevails, national security has improved since the signing of the peace accord. The October 2004 security/economic treaty with Russia is likely to lead to a stronger economy, with trickle-down effects to households and individuals.

Electoral Process. Despite many inflated promises, in 2004 the government continued to foment obstacles for existing and potential political parties in order to minimize the opposition's chances to successfully challenge the pro-government People's Democratic Party (PDP) in the February 2005 parliamentary elections and the 2006 presidential election. By using trumped-up charges and by applying the law selectively, in May 2004 the government refused to register the Unity Party on minor technical grounds. In August 2004, it arrested the deputy of the unregistered Development Party. The government continued to monopolize TV airwaves, and it intensified a campaign to prevent timely and regular printing of opposition newspapers. Owing to the denial of registration to several new political parties, the obstruction of rightful political activities of existing opposition groups, and the abuse and imprisonment of several opposition figures in 2004 all of which contributed to an unfair and intimidating atmosphere prior to the 2005 parliamentary and 2006 presidential elections Tajikistan's rating for electoral process worsens from 5.75 to 6.00.

Civil Society. In 2004, the activity of NGOs and advocacy groups in Tajikistan has strengthened. The country's largest NGO, the MSDSP, successfully expanded its rural, self-help, socioeconomic, food security, and educational projects. Women's NGOs were heavily involved in assisting female-headed households and enhancing women's rights, and they were able to successfully lobby the government to introduce the new draft law On Social and Legal Protection from Domestic Violence. International NGOs, including the United Nations agencies, played a vital role in efforts to improve public security and promote political pluralism. Given the strengthening of local NGOs, as well as the variety and depth of their activities in 2004, Tajikistan's rating for civil society improves from 5.00 to 4.75.

Independent Media. Despite the relative freedom available to independent media as compared with that in other countries in Central Asia, Tajikistan's government still exerts a high degree of pressure and intimidation on journalists deemed to be critical of the state's activities. Tajik law allows for the incarceration of anyone who defames the president, thus discouraging criticism of the regime by individuals and independent media outlets. Though there are several opposition-aligned newspapers, as well as a handful of independent radio stations, the government has a near complete monopoly over the state-run television stations, which it uses copiously during national plebiscites and elections to promote its own agenda and candidates. Because of the continuous pressure exerted by the government on the handful of opposition newspapers, harassment of individual journalists, and the enforcement of stricter criteria for new media applications, Tajikistan's independent media score worsens from 5.75 to 6.00.

Local Democratic Governance. The mahalla, or neighborhood, has for centuries acted as a de facto community council and the smallest body of governance (aside from the nuclear family) in Central Asian societies, including Tajikistan. Despite the importance of the mahalla, the Constitution of Tajikistan dating back to 1994 has failed to institutionally recognize and benefit from this traditional formation. Based on the government administrative categories, the smallest local entities of governance are the jamoats, or local councils, nearly all of which are responsible for too large a constituency. The jamoats are not democratically structured, and they lack sufficient revenue. The MSDSP's project of village organizations is a successful attempt by a civil society entity to induce local democratic governance while using the existing mahalla networks. Currently, 400 village organizations (VOs) throughout Tajikistan engage in a wide variety of socioeconomic and community development projects, including revenue generation, agriculture, and rural development. Despite some success in local democratic governance induced by civil society, Tajikistan has a long way to go toward empowering local communities and promoting pluralism and good governance on the local level. Aside from the mahalla', higher levels of local democratic governance are enshrined in Tajik law, but citizens are normally not able to choose their local leaders freely and democratically. Furthermore, participation and decision-making are often contingent on business, political and ethno-regional connections, with many decisions made in non-transparent manner. Tajikistan's new local democratic governance rating is thus set at 5.75.

Judicial Framework and Independence. In both law and practice, the executive branch of the government has excessive amounts of control and influence over the legislature and judiciary. Several of the 56 constitutional amendments that passed in the June 2003 plebiscite exacerbated this problem by weakening the checks and balances necessary in a democratic society. That said, in 2004 the government did make what many would consider progress in the judicial system. To placate international criticism and mimic reforms made in Russia and other CIS countries, the Tajik Parliament passed a moratorium on the death penalty in May. Furthermore, the government made some concrete steps in educating the staff of its ministries and security structures in the fight against human trafficking. At the same time, however, the government arrested several individuals accused of belonging to the Islamist Hizb ut-Tahrir and was criticized for not providing sufficient due process to detainees. The government continued to draw criticism for its generally backward prison conditions, which regularly put the lives of prisoners in danger. Tajikistan's rating for judicial framework and independence remains at 5.75 owing to remaining shortcomings, although the government's ensuring in 2004 that new legislation was in line with international standards and educating government employees to uphold the law hold promise for visible results in the coming year.

Corruption. According to the World Bank, Tajikistan is the poorest of post-Communist states. Along with many other CIS countries, Tajikistan is experiencing serious problems with income inequality and corruption. In 2004, Transparency International rated Tajikistan among countries where corruption is "perceived to be pervasive," though with some improvement in ranking as compared with 2003. The World Bank contends that as much as 80 percent of Tajikistan's small businesses pay bribes to tax officials. Many pay extra fees to venal bankers in order to receive a legitimate loan, and traffic police regularly use extortion on ordinary citizens to allow passage from point A to point B. The pervasive and increasing drug traffic originating from Afghanistan is another serious source of corruption. Tajikistan's corruption rating remains at 6.25 owing to the government's insufficient steps to curb corruption, including the dismissal of some state officials and prosecution of only a selected few low-level officials. Though there were improvements in the tax laws and collection of taxes, in addition to an increase in the use of banking services, which indicated a degree of improvement in pubic trust in state structures and financial institutions, corruption remains widespread, hindering much needed democratic and economic reforms.

Outlook for 2005. The government is likely to take advantage of macroeconomic growth and the current sense of stability to further maintain centralized power through patronage and clan politics. It will ensure its grip in the February elections through a near sweep of seats in the lower house of Parliament, where the pro-government PDP will continue to dominate. Depending on the results of Eastern European and other CIS elections, a postelection coalition of civil society and opposition parties could emerge, aiming to pressure for political reforms and voice demands for fair presidential elections in 2006. Furthermore, international pressure in 2005 will force the government to allow existing and possibly new mass media to function, initiate serious legal and prison reforms, and increase awareness of human trafficking and other social ills. Owing to the high rates of poverty and unemployment, however, one can predict an increase in illegal trafficking of Afghan drugs. At the same time, improvements in Tajikistan's macroeconomy along with Russia's immigration-unfriendly policies will lead to a slowdown in the rate of annual emigration of Tajik nationals from Russia and other CIS countries. The promised Russian investment in the energy and aluminum sectors of Tajikistan will begin to yield small positive results in local employment toward the end of the year. Overall, 2005 could be a year of opportunity for Tajikistan, but owing to the government's established consolidation of power, major moves toward democracy and freedom are unlikely save for unforeseen circumstances including the influence of pro-democracy international demonstration effects, such as the Georgian Rose and Ukrainian Orange Revolutions, or increased political pressure by influential states and international organizations.

National Governance (Score: 6.00)

"Poverty, corruption, and a slow pace of reform," according to a 2004 report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, are eroding President Imamali Rahmonov's "image as peacemaker." Indeed, it now appears that the momentum that surrounded the signing of the 1997 peace accord with the Islamist-dominated United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which promised to bring forth a more pluralistic and democratic Tajikistan, has largely diminished. President Rahmonov's image, however, may be tarnished only within the international community, which has repeatedly criticized his government for rescinding the spirit of the peace accord and its principles of pluralism and openness. International bodies have also been unhappy with the pace of governmental reforms in Tajikistan, including a much needed anticorruption campaign. Even so, Rahmonov remains largely popular at home thanks to the post-civil war period of peace and stability, which the public associates with his reign.

Despite pockets of opposition, the president still enjoys widespread popularity among the citizenry, many of whom rightly credit his government with ending the civil war and bringing a large degree of peace and stability to neighborhoods throughout the country. In the 2003 plebiscite, which approved 56 amendments to the Constitution, the government reported that 96 percent of the voting population participated, with 93 percent approval rates for the president. Though voting results favoring the government may very well be exaggerated by Tajik officials, still, the above percentages seem to reflect actual trends and are corroborated by independent opinion surveys and anecdotal evidence. Furthermore, most voters appear to be indifferent to political party details and, if anything, view the agenda of opposition parties as not too different from that of the government. With memories of the civil war still fresh, the public relishes the current peace and appears to believe that political change will cause Tajikistan to revert to instability and violence.

As has been the pattern in Central Asian states in general, Tajikistan's president has striven to amass power at the expense of weakening the checks and balances necessary for a democratic government. The 2003 plebiscite, among other things, increased the power of the presidency, which already had overwhelming control over the legislature and judiciary. Judges, for example, depend on the executive for their appointments. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the lack of an independent legislature and judiciary has had negative consequences for the political and economic well-being of the country.

Rahmonov has so far successfully used existing ideological and regional cleavages in his favor. He has, for example, taken advantage of the fall of the Taliban and the U.S.-led coalition's antiradical Islam stance and the "war on terror" to clamp down not only on suspected religious extremists, even with no evidence of violent intent, but also on old rivals who were signatories to the 1997 accord. He has even arrested some of his former allies on various charges. Rahmonov has reduced the number of Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) members from the top echelon of government bureaucracy to significantly less than the 30 percent required by the peace accord, and most recently, he has advanced legislation that prevents women from attending and praying in mosques, likely fearing the potential radicalization of women, who unlike men have so far not actively participated in opposition political activities. By targeting religiosity and Islam, however, the government risks alienating segments of the disenfranchised population, which may eventually seek more extreme means of expression and political change.

Regionalism and patronage are still at play in Tajikistan. As has been the trend since the civil war, the government has favored the policy of "Kulobization," or the disproportionate assignment into key government positions of individuals of Tajik ethnicity or those with family ties to the southern Kulob zone of Khatlon province – President Rahmonov's home region. This de facto government policy has troubled opposition parties and peoples from under-represented regions and ethnicities of Tajikistan. It is important to keep in mind that regionalism and clan politics dating back to the Soviet era were among the key factors behind the 1992-1997 civil war.

Health care and education in Tajikistan remain in disarray. Despite impressive economic growth since the late 1990s, according to a 2003 poverty assessment report by the World Bank, about two thirds of households (64 percent) live below the poverty line on less than US$2.15 per day, making Tajikistan the poorest among post-Communist transitional states. According to a United Nations Children's Fund study released in 2004, Tajikistan is the leader in child mortality and malnutrition among Central Asian and Caucasus countries, with 78 children per 1,000 not surviving until the age of one and 106 in 1,000 not living to the age of five. Furthermore, the country has the highest rate of severe (36 percent) and chronic (5 percent) malnutrition among children under five.

Approximately one fifth (21 percent) of those polled in the 2003 World Bank study said that their lot has worsened in the past five years. The average monthly salary in 2004 is estimated to have been no more than the equivalent of US$13-$16. Owing to paltry salaries, thousands of teachers have left their profession, and many having immigrated as laborers to Russia. This, along with a rise in truancy, has led to an increasing number of semiliterate and even illiterate young people in a country with a historically high rate of literacy. Furthermore, any progress in reducing poverty is hampered by the emergence of new challenges – the expanded reach of disease, including tuberculosis and AIDS, growing environmental problems, and the destabilizing influences of crime and drug and human trafficking.

In October 2004, Tajikistan signed a comprehensive agreement with Russia worth up to US$2 billion, a positive development likely to increase economic security and reduce poverty several years down the road. As a result of the agreement, two Russian energy and industrial conglomerates are scheduled to build two hydroelectric power stations and a new aluminum smelter in the southern part of Tajikistan. The deal also includes clearance of more than US$300 million of foreign debt owed by Tajikistan to Russia (about 30 percent of Tajikistan's total foreign debt). In exchange, the Russian Federation and Russian business entities will own major stakes (possibly in the form of majority shares) in future Tajik hydroenergy and aluminum production. Additionally, the Russian military is now allowed to use Tajikistan as a permanent base to house at least 5,000 soldiers of its 201st Rifle Division – the same company that has de facto used Tajikistan as a base since the end of World War II.

The agreement has also given Russia a 49-year lease on an antimissile warning system at Nurek, a town with mostly cloudless skies (7,300 feet above sea level) located to the south of the capital, Dushanbe. The deal with Russia could potentially launch Tajikistan as a regional economic power but can also entrench existing political forces, which may use the opportunity to refuse and rescind political reforms toward democratic openness and equitable economic development. There's also a danger that the continuing economic growth, coupled with the centralization of power and a politically detached citizenry, may have led to what Peter Sinnott of Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs has referred to as a sense of "false stability."

Electoral Process (Score: 6.00)

The current leadership of Tajikistan dates back to the country's independence. Rahmonov was appointed by the Supreme Soviet (or Parliament) of Tajikistan as chairman in November 1992. Prior to his appointment, he had been a onetime kolkhoz (Soviet agricultural cooperative) leader and later chair of the executive committee of the Communist Party (CP) in the southern Kulob region. Most important, Rahmonov had been an avid supporter and one of the chief organizers of the Kulobi-dominated Popular Front militia, which fought the UTO during the civil war. By March 1993, all opposition parties had been banned, leaving the CP as the sole legally functioning political entity. Rahmonov managed to stand as a candidate for the office of presidency in two controversial victories in 1994 and 1999. In the earlier of the two elections, Rahmonov ran against onetime prime minister (1992-1993) Abdumalik Abdullojonov in a one-sided race marred by irregularities and possible corruption, which also barred the participation of the opposition parties forming the UTO.

The September 1999 plebiscite resulted in the approval of a series of constitutional amendments allowing, among other things, an extended presidential term limit from five to seven years, the introduction of a bicameral parliamentary system (a 63-member Council of Representatives and a 33-member National Council), and the formation of political parties based on religion. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), this last amendment meant to satisfy the terms of the 1997 peace accord by making the IRP (the core political body forming the UTO) eligible to compete in the parliamentary and presidential elections.

Though the September 1999 plebiscite approved by 70 percent of voters was thought to have been generally free and somewhat fair, the ensuing November 1999 presidential election was marred by irregularities. Leading up to the election, the government began a systematic harassment campaign of opposition groups. These tactics included disqualifying newly legalized or newly formed independent parties based on trumped-up charges and minor technicalities. Most of these disqualified parties had vied to nominate their own presidential candidates. Furthermore, some provincial and local administrations reportedly fired or demoted employees upon their refusal to join the People's Democratic Party (PDP), the pro-government entity chaired by Rahmonov. As a result of government interference, two of the three remaining opposition candidates decided to boycott the election, and the government's candidate, Rahmonov, won the presidency with reportedly 96 percent of the vote.

Leading up to the February 2000 parliamentary elections, six parties qualified, with three obtaining more than 5 percent of the vote, the threshold required for receiving parliamentary seats. Those parties were the PDP (winning 65 percent of the vote and 30 parliamentary seats), the then government-allied CP (21 percent; 13 seats), and the opposition IRP (8 percent; 2 seats). The OSCE criticized the 1999 presidential election as having insufficient "transparency, accountability, [and] fairness," and Human Rights Watch questioned its integrity due to "extensive and egregious violations" during the campaign and referred to specific cases of fraud committed by pro-government polling station staff. Likewise, the OSCE described the 2000 parliamentary elections as not having met "minimum international standards."

Following the trend of other states in Central Asia, Rahmonov has further concentrated power into his own hands. In June 2003, a national plebiscite overwhelmingly passed a package of 56 constitutional amendments. The amended form of Article 65, for example, gives the sitting president the option to run for two additional seven-year terms, creating the legal possibility for Rahmonov to remain in power until 2020. Other amendments forbid anyone who has not lived continuously in Tajikistan for the past 10 years to compete in the presidential election thus eliminating some potential rivals to Rahmonov, such as the self-exiled Abdumalik Abdullojonov, who is still popular, especially in his native northern Soghd province. Despite valid criticisms of the 2003 plebiscite, voter turnout was reportedly quite high, with a near unanimous vote in favor of the amendments.

Still, to ensure an even tighter grip on power, in February 2004 the government was able to extradite from Russia and imprison Yaqub Salimov, an ex-ally of Rahmonov and the former minister of the interior and chairman of Tajikistan's customs committee. In August, the government arrested Ghaffor "Sedoi" ("the Gray One") Mirzoyev, a prominent ex-military commander and former head of the Presidential Guard, who had been serving as director of the country's drug control agency. The range of charges against Mirzoyev included murder and possession of illegal weapons. The president has also accused Mirzoyev of planning bomb attacks, including the two that occurred outside the Ministry of the Interior in 2004, as well as secretly hoarding weapons and explosives in order to stage a coup d'état.

Furthermore, in December 2004, in Moscow, Russian authorities heeded a demand by the Tajik government to detain Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, the leader of Tajikistan's opposition Democratic Party (DP). Though the government claims Iskandarov's arrest was related to the alleged embezzling of millions of dollars while he served as head of the national gas company, as well as his supposed links to organized terror groups, DP officials argue that their party leader's arrest was a convenient way for the government to eliminate potential rivals ahead of the February 2005 parliamentary elections.

Lower house parliamentary elections were set for February 2005, and the pro-government PDP was expected to win a near sweep of seats, with the Communists winning some and the IRP and the DP taking as few as one each. An opinion poll conducted in the capital by Sharq Research at the end of 2003 concluded that the PDP enjoys the greatest number of supporters (32 percent of the population) a rise of about 6 percent as compared with 2002. The same poll showed support for other parties as follows: CP, 27 percent; DP, 6 percent; IRP, 4 percent; and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), 2 percent. (The apparent low public support for opposition parties, especially the IRP, is likely an underestimation, as a large portion of the IRP's male constituency people of Gharmi ethnoregional origin consists of Tajiks working in Russia.)

In 2004, the leaders of the DP and the SDP accused the government of interfering with their legitimate campaigns. They also claimed that the government's monopolistic control of media outlets was the reason behind widespread public indifference toward opposition parties. Indeed, leading to the February 2005 elections, the government conducted a multifront campaign to eliminate potential rivals to PDP candidates, thus severely restricting the activities of registered political parties and blocking the registration of newly formed opposition parties. As a result of such interference in the democratic process, an attempt was made in 2004 to form an opposition political bloc as a way to defeat Rahmonov and PDP candidates by ensuring free and fair elections in 2005 and 2006. The proposed bloc (Coalition for Just and Transparent Elections) was meant to unite the disparate opposition groups of the IRP, SDP, Socialist Party, and CP. However, bickering among the various opposition leaders and a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the public apparently unaware of the opposition bloc's goals or unconvinced that they differed substantially from Rahmonov's policies – were cited by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) as likely reasons for the bloc's failure.

Civil Society (Score: 4.75)

In contrast with some of the transitional societies of southern and Eastern Europe where trade unions, political parties, and interest groups were developed years before the dissolution of the Iron Curtain the formation of groups independent from the state, aka civil society, was seen as antagonistic to Soviet socialism and largely nonexistent in the USSR. Formal private groups did eventually take hold, especially as noticeable reforms were undertaken in socialism under the Gorbachev premiership. Although the conceptualization and eventual formation of a vibrant civil society was not as clear in Tajikistan as it was in the Baltic and Eastern European states, according to Shirin Akiner of the University of London, "a new spirit of self-confidence, a receptiveness to new ideas, and a determination to challenge the existing order" were already under way. Just prior to independence, several informal "discussion groups" were formed, such as Ru ba Ru (Face to Face) and Ehyo (Renewal), each comprising as many as 90 members, most belonging to the country's intelligentsia. These groups were associated with anti-Communist political forces and served as citizen forums for the expression of free speech and ideas.

Western-style nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) first came into existence in Tajikistan in the mid-1990s, when international donors began initiating programs and providing funds. Since then, various forms of civil society have been on the rise. Though still a bureaucratic, expensive, and time-consuming process, the act of forming an NGO in Tajikistan has been somewhat simplified in the past few years. Based on forecasts by the UN, more than 2,000 NGOs were registered with the Ministry of Justice in 2003, with only a fraction actually functioning. The number of local NGOs did not increase substantially during 2004, but they do appear to have gained strength. Among the most successful NGOs active in Tajikistan are those associated with the Geneva-based Aga Khan Foundation (AKF, a modern Islamic faith-based umbrella organization that supports a series of projects and sister agencies worldwide). AKF is renowned in Tajikistan for funding local self-governance projects, such as the promotion of small-business enterprises in both urban and rural areas (through repayable or in-kind loans) and experiments in democratic self-rule via community and village governance (see Local Democratic Governance, below).

Although women are not widely represented in the government, they have been playing increasingly important roles in civil society. More than one third of all Tajik NGOs are headed by women. This is at a time when the status of women in post-Soviet Tajikistan is under serious threat. The civil war created 25,000 widows, many of whom became head of their household. The UN reports that up to two thirds of women in Tajikistan (over 1 million) have been victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse. In 2004, a coalition of Tajik women's NGOs and Parliament members proposed draft legislation against human trafficking and violence that was subsequently approved by the Parliament. The new legislation provides protection for victims and punishment for the guilty up to 12 years' imprisonment for those recruiting people for exploitation and 25 years' imprisonment for rapists. Underage prostitution and human trafficking are also problems in Tajikistan. One local NGO has even cited the alleged case of 14 Tajik girls sold into sexual slavery to an entity in a Persian Gulf sheikhdom state for US$20,000. During 2005, the NGO Modar (Mother) will be conducting workshops on how to fight human trafficking for a spectrum of government and public agencies, including law enforcement, courts, prosecutor's offices, border guards, and tourist agencies. Also in 2004, the female-headed NGO Oshtii Melli (National Reconciliation) planned to train and provide independent election observers for use in the ensuing 2005-2006 national elections.

Civil society in Tajikistan is also addressing the problems of labor migration. According to government estimates, as much as half of all Tajik households or some 3.5 million people depend on remittances sent from family members working abroad. A survey conducted by the International Labor Organization showed that a great number of Central Asian labor migrants in Russia, a disproportionately large number of whom are from Tajikistan, are exposed regularly to various forms of forced labor and dangerous working environments. Many fear for their lives because of threats from the police, organized crime, and hate groups. One highly publicized hate crime was the fatal stabbing of the nine-year-old daughter of a Tajik immigrant in St. Petersburg by a gang of teenage Russians.

The large majority of Tajik nationals working in Russia are employed in government enterprises, but only 15 percent have legal status. Most are young to middle-aged males, but occasionally women travel abroad in search of work. Many of the Tajik men who have migrated to Russia some already married with children in Tajikistan have established second families there. To help potential Tajik labor migrants avoid the pitfalls and dangers of working abroad, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), with funding from the OSCE, set up special offices in Tajikistan in 2004 where information is made available on the realities of transit and destination countries.

Central Asians, according to Peter Sinnott, are "outperforming" their leaders by strengthening and building civil society. NGOs and informal civil society groups in much of Central Asia have become increasingly activated, attempting to aid their respective local populations in a variety of services, especially in areas where central and local governments have failed in their traditional responsibilities. Central Asian NGOs, including those in Tajikistan face a double challenge, however: working under relatively difficult conditions and at times dealing with government hostility. Government suspicions, according to Ian Bremmer of the U.S.-based Eurasia Group, result from Central Asian NGOs promoting the nonmaterial concepts of openness, pluralism, and free media, unlike most NGOs in neighboring Afghanistan, for example, which heavily promote reconstruction and economic activities. Governments are becoming less tolerant of international organizations and internationally funded NGOs that criticize their performance and regularly aid opposition groups, especially given the current booming macroeconomy of the region.

The 2003 Georgian Rose Revolution, which toppled the authoritarian Eduard Shevardnadze with assistance from Western-funded NGOs, is clearly in the minds of Central Asian leaders, including President Rahmonov. Not surprisingly, in 2004 the government of Uzbekistan closed the Soros-funded Open Society Institute (OSI). Further, as of fall 2004 some of Tajikistan's pro-government print media had begun a slander campaign against OSI's work in Tajikistan. There is a Persian-Tajik saying: "Kas nazanad bar derakhte beebaar sang!" ("No one throws a stone at a fruitless tree!"). Periodic government hostility, therefore, could be perceived as an indicator of the strengthening of civil society in Tajikistan.

Independent Media (Score: 6.00)

In contrast with the Soviet era – when periodicals were cheap, plentiful, and widely read – Tajikistan today is much diminished in its sources of public discourse, thanks largely to the multiple pressures of poverty, relatively high taxes, and the emigration of much of the cosmopolitan citizenry of Tajikistan. Still, as compared with neighboring Central Asian states, Tajikistan has a good number of independent newspapers and several TV and radio stations – albeit with constant but unspecified government monitoring and rules, including state harassment of journalists and de facto censorship of media. The government has legalized most of the once banned opposition parties and their respective print media outlets, but the dissemination of opposition platforms through the media is limited. Some articles critical of state structures have occasionally been published, but journalists have understood that reporting on sensitive political topics can be problematic and even lethal. Therefore, nearly all apply self-censorship to their work.

The government limits the political content of the media through a variety of tactics. It has managed to pass at least one law detrimental to free media: Article 137 of the Tajik penal code stipulates up to five years' imprisonment for insulting or defaming the president. Other methods for controlling nonstate media have included the holding of informational "guidance" (read "intimidation") sessions for journalists. It has also imposed burdensome licensing and tax procedures for media and, more recently, barred access to government-owned and private printing houses for opposition newspapers.

Not all has been bleak, however. In December 2003, a new private Tajik news agency, Avesto, began operations; and in January 2004, Mehvar, a magazine belonging to the pro-government PDP, released its first issue. Although there were no new radio stations in 2004, in 2002 the authorities granted operating licenses to at least two independent radio stations based in Dushanbe: an FM station operated by a private news agency, Asia-Plus, and Radio Vatan. They have become the most popular radio stations in Dushanbe. Asia-Plus had applied for its radio license as early as 1998 but was repeatedly refused by the Ministry of Communications. The government's reversal is thought to have been due to international criticism of its de facto ban on private and opposition media.

Tajikistan was one of the last countries to connect to the World Wide Web (January 1999), and use of the Internet has expanded slowly. Although extremely expensive by local standards, at least four Internet service providers are functioning in Tajikistan, and Internet centers can be found in all major metropolitan areas. One clear shortcoming of both the state and the opposition media is that of insufficient ethnic minority voices (of the non-Russian variety). Though nearly a quarter of Tajikistan's population is ethnic Uzbek, for example, Uzbek music is allowed on TV and radio at a disproportionately low rate, and the ethnic Uzbek newspaper Tong, printed in the northern Soghd province, is generally known to be pro-government.

Regardless of one's political persuasion, journalism can be a dangerous profession in Tajikistan. Since independence, there has been a series of assassinations of both pro- and antigovernment journalists, though none occurred in 2004. In the early to middle 1990s, scores of journalists were victims of random violence or assassinated as a result of civil war rivalries. Among them were the assassinations of Muhiddin Olimpur (1995), a reporter with ties to the BBC; Viktor Nikulin (1996), a reporter for a Russian station; and Saifullo Rahimov (2000), head of the State TV and Radio Committee. In 2003, the government claimed to have caught the killers of Olimpur and Nikulin in what Human Rights Watch cited as a "rare departure from the pattern of impunity." Few details on the motives behind the killings were provided by the government; however, one of the accused is supposedly currently in a Russian jail, and another mysteriously died in Tajikistan.

In January and July 2004, Rajab Mirzo, editor of the independent weekly newspaper Ruzi Nav, was attacked by unknown assailants in an apparent message of political intimidation. Ruzi Nav had published a series of articles accusing the Rahmonov government of corruption and nepotism and had questioned the government's legitimacy. In July, vocal government critic Dodojon Atavullayev – renowned journalist, publisher of Cheroqi Ruz, and owner of www.tajikistantimes.ru – finally visited Tajikistan; however, fearing for his life, he stayed only a few days and then fled back to the relative safety of Russia, where he lives in self-exile.

Furthermore, in early 2004 the editor of Nerui Sukhan claimed that because of the "heavy tax burden," most publications in Tajikistan regularly conceal their real circulation numbers from government authorities. In August 2003, the National Association of Independent Media of Tajikistan, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, appealed to the government to ease taxes on the media. In March 2004, Rahmonov proposed a "print media expansion strategy" designed as a tax break for newspapers, including an exclusion from paying the 20 percent value-added tax. The government's revenues and duties committee, however, expressed reluctance to implement the proposition without a new tax code law.

Early in 2004, the government issued verbal warnings to the editors of Ruzi Nav and Nerui Sukhan, accusing them of slander and insulting government figures. Both papers had had their share of conflicts with the state-run printing house, Sharqi Azad, which had earlier stopped their printings for alleged contractual violations – a political vendetta for reporting criticism of the government may have been the real motive. In August 2004, the government again attempted to prevent the publication of opposition papers, this time accusing a leading private printing house, Jihonkhon, of violating the tax code. Jihonkhon had regularly published four weekly opposition papers, Nerui Sukhan, Ruzi Nav, Odamu Olam, and Najot (the official voice of the IRP).

Local Governance (Score: 5.75)

For centuries, the chaikhona (teahouse) and the masjid (mosque) have been focal points of local community dialogue on self-governance in many Muslim majority societies of Central Asia. The social organization behind such self-governance has been traditionally referred to as the mahalla (neighborhood, or council). Soviet rule, however, attempted to impose its own system of administration on local communities. In Tajikistan – which was a near total illiterate territory upon its inception in 1924 – the Soviets, among other things, formed likpunkty, or centers of combating illiteracy. They also systematically discouraged and occasionally banned public expressions of religious worship and even introduced "Militant Godless Leagues," as a result of which, according to Shirin Akiner, knowledge of Islam nearly disappeared, save for the occasional semifolk, semi-Islamic practices and rituals. The informal mahalla, however, never really went away. As it had for centuries, the mahalla now continues with its engagement in organized activities such as hashar (community mobilization), repairing neighbors' homes, building local facilities, or helping with wedding and burial preparations. This informal institution in Central Asian communities helped to preserve a private space outside the control of Soviet authorities and now continues to foster communal identity and solidarity.

Tajikistan's post-Communist Constitution, formulated in 1994 and approved by a nationwide referendum, confirmed the Soviet territorial and administrative division of the country into a series of viloyats (provinces), nohiyas (districts), towns, settlements, and qishloqs (villages). There are three provinces that technically uphold their own regional governments. The capital city and a series of districts surrounding it are, in essence, two additional provinces. There are also 62 districts and, below them, 356 jamoats, or local councils (somewhat similar to municipalities in Europe and North America). A jamoat is defined in the Tajik Constitution as a "system of organizing public activities&to address issues of local importance autonomously and at their own discretion" in accordance with the Constitution. Ironically, however, the smallest self-organizing body, the mahalla – corresponding to the 3,500 villages in the country and various urban neighborhoods – is not institutionally recognized by the Tajik Constitution.

According to a UN official in Tajikistan, patronage exercised by the national government in appointing province and district administrators discourages independent decisions and policy making outside of the capital. Furthermore, because of the central government's dominance, rampant corruption, and the stagnant economy of outlying regions, most local administrative bodies in the provinces, districts, and especially jamoats face serious budgetary and resource constraints. Despite its pitfalls, Communism did provide a sense of volunteerism and community order; in contrast, the subsequent introduction of capitalism has brought loss of direction, passivity, and, ironically, a massive lack of capital, especially in rural areas, notes Caucasus expert Sabine Freizer. It is estimated that as much as 85 percent of the taxes generated at the regional level goes to the state, with a mere 15 percent remaining at the district level. To generate funds for its staff and for community projects, jamoats may spend as much as two thirds of their time collecting often arbitrary property taxes and transportation duties and fees. However, mahallas and even jamoats are devoid of any real power on the national scale and remain largely outside the nation's economic and political decision-making process.

Provincial and district heads are appointed by the president of Tajikistan in consultation with the governors and jamoat leaders (through the head of their respective district hukumat, or government). Though council members have the right to veto appointments, they seldom if ever do so. Not surprisingly, central government political organizations, such as the ruling PDP apparatus, nearly always dominate province, district, and jamoat bodies. Opposition parties, such as the IRP, see real change occurring in Tajikistan if and when free and fair elections ultimately occur at the jamoat level.

To overcome the accumulated entropy in local governance in Tajikistan, elements of modern civil society have come to the rescue. Tajikistan is home to as many as 350,000 followers of the Aga Khan, leader of the several million Ismaili Muslims of the world. The majority of Tajikistan's Ismailis live in the eastern mountainous Badakhshan province. The AKF-funded Mountain Societies Development and Support Program (MSDSP) is an example of a successful experiment with civil society intervention in local governance. The MSDSP is the largest NGO in Tajikistan in terms of its project portfolio (over US$8 million) and number of staff (over 400) and aims to provide self-help programs to communities living in and near the highland areas of Tajikistan (93 percent of the territory of Tajikistan is mountainous). Among other things, the MSDSP has used the existing social structures of Tajikistan, such as the mahallas, to induce self-reliance and sustainable economic development, especially in outlying areas.

In doing so, the MSDSP has managed to formulate more than 400 village organizations throughout the country; in reality, these organizations are a more formal and resourceful version of the mahallas whose members are in essence the same as those serving on the mahalla councils. Among the concepts introduced by the MSDSP is the mandatory membership of women, largely welcomed by local communities. Local governments at the jamoat and district levels have been highly receptive to the concept of village organizations, partly because of the income-generating effect they have had in the regions and the increase in associated tax revenues. Prosperity for post-Communist transitional states of Central Asia, including Tajikistan, may ultimately lie in the empowerment of local communities and the use of existing structures and cultural capital such as mahallas.

Judicial Framework and Independence (Score: 5.75)

Human rights in Tajikistan tend to be "bought and sold rather than guaranteed," according to an OSCE official working in the country. Indeed, Tajikistan's record of upholding human rights – especially given the atrocities committed by the government and antigovernment factions during the civil war immediately after independence – is not in any way a shining example of progressive governance and respect for the law. There is, nevertheless, far greater freedom of expression and association allowed today in Tajikistan when compared with such neighboring states as authoritarian Uzbekistan and near totalitarian Turkmenistan. There is also evidence that Tajik authorities are highly sensitive about their image in the global arena and do respond to international criticism.

One example is that of the death penalty. In 2003,23 known executions were conducted in Tajikistan by order of the judicial system, with some prisoners shot by authorities in secret. In April 2004, during a televised speech, President Rahmonov said that "the right to life is natural, and nobody has the right to deprive any other person of [it]." A few weeks later, Rahmonov submitted to the Parliament a draft law moratorium on the death penalty, which passed with an overwhelming majority. This turnabout followed several years of criticism by the OSCE and Human Rights Watch of Tajikistan's lack of proper due process and concern for the rights of the accused. More important, however, there was also a "demonstration effect," in that the moratorium came at a time when similar halts on capital punishment had been passed by at least eight other former Soviet states, including Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and even Turkmenistan. In November 2004, the lower house approved the introduction of life imprisonment instead of capital punishment for five categories of crime – aggravated murder, aggravated assault, terrorism, biocide, and genocide. (As of the end of 2004, out of the 55 member states of the OSCE, only the United States, Belarus, and Uzbekistan still retain the death penalty.)

The Tajik Constitution allows for individual freedoms, including freedom of privacy, assembly, speech, press, association, and religion. However, the government often breaks the law by arbitrarily harassing and arresting those suspected of antigovernment thoughts and actions. Among many flaws is a court system that tends to presume guilt rather than innocence when trying individuals. There is plenty of corruption in the legal system, and lawyers are not allowed to meet defendants until the accused has accepted the prosecution's indictment or has been interrogated successfully by the prosecution.

Among laws being considered by the president and the Parliament in 2004 was the bill On Social and Legal Protection from Domestic Violence, proposed by a coalition of women's groups in Tajikistan (Association of Women with Higher Education, Tradition and Modernity, League of Tajik Female Lawyers, Gender and Development, and Modar). The coalition gathered more than 6,600 signatures in favor of the legislation, which included 34 articles with preventive and educational components toward combating domestic violence. A serious issue facing Tajik women and girls is the danger of human trafficking. The government criminalized human trafficking in August 2003, but according to the U.S. State Department's 2004 report, Tajikistan has no national plan of action to fight the problem or to provide solace and counseling to victims of trafficking, though it does cooperate with the antitrafficking educational campaigns of the IOM in Tajikistan.

As in neighboring Uzbekistan, but to a much lesser degree, support for political Islam is on the rise. Even though Tajikistan is the only country in the CIS that has a legal Islamist party, the IRP, some among the disenfranchised Islamists no longer see the IRP as radical enough to bring about social justice and economic prosperity. One group that appears to have gained some ground is the outlawed Hizb ut-Tahrir, a transnational radical Islamist organization advocating the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia. The government has accused Hizb ut-Tahrir of planning for the violent overthrow of the state and even having ties to al-Qaeda. (Estimates indicate there are 10 Tajik nationals imprisoned by the U.S. military in Cuba. In 2003, the Tajik government requested the release of 8 of them, claiming they were refugees in Afghanistan from the era of the Tajik civil war and arrested by mistake.)

Since 1999, as many as 500 alleged Hizb ut-Tahrir members have been arrested and imprisoned by Tajik authorities. In 2004, the government announced the arrest of about 70 individuals linked to Hizb ut-Tahrir and a new group known as Bay-at – the latter thought to have been responsible for a series of murders, including that of Baptist pastor Sergei Bassarab in the Soghd region. There is some evidence that the heavy-handed tactics of neighboring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in combating the activities of alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir may have enticed some activists to relocate their operations to Tajikistan's northern Soghd province, reported EurasiaNet. Some international groups have accused the government of violating the rights of the accused, many with alleged connections to Hizb ut-Tahrir, including through the use of torture and forced confessions. Prison conditions are also far from ideal. Thanks to overcrowding, lack of sufficient nourishment, inclement heat and cold, and the widespread occurrence of diseases such as tuberculosis, many inmates die in prison before the end of their sentences.

Corruption (Score: 6.25)

"Do tsarya daleko, do boga vysoko!" ("The czar is far away, and God is in heaven!") Substitute "czar" with "law" and this Russian proverb applies to much of today's CIS, especially the southern-tier Caucasus and Central Asia. Misappropriation of public assets, patronage or the dispensing of state benefits, influence peddling, bribes, and extortion: All fall under the umbrella of abusing public office for private gain, aka corruption. According to the World Bank, there is a substantial amount of "high corruption" (graft and state capture by state officials) and "petty corruption" (chiefly solicitation of bribes and extortion by civil servants) in the seven poorest CIS members: Tajikistan, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Despite some optimism, in recent years the international donor community in Tajikistan has expressed dissatisfaction with the government's pace in promoting democratization and fighting corruption. According to the U.S. ambassador to Tajikistan, for example, when two firms had expressed interest in building a five-star hotel in the capital city of Dushanbe – which currently lacks such an amenity – both encountered Tajik authorities seeking hefty bribes in exchange for permission to commence the project. Additionally, the head of the Swiss Cooperation Office in Tajikistan stated in 2004 that the Tajik government had not provided sufficient information to ensure a transparent system of funds management.

Since 2001, repeated pledges of financial assistance to Tajikistan have been held up by international donors because of insufficient economic and political reforms, the perceived weak management of government structures, and allegations of corruption. Furthermore, experts believe that of the US$900 million pledged by the international community in May 2003 for various socioeconomic development projects in Tajikistan over a four-year period, only a fraction will actually materialize. This is thought to be due mainly to the international community's displeasure with the Rahmonov government for not having implemented sufficient economic and political reforms, as well as other pressing crises of the world – such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Asian tsunami – overshadowing the humanitarian concerns of tiny Tajikistan.

A legacy of state corruption in Soviet and pre-Soviet eras, combined with a lax rule of law following independence and massive income disparities, have all contributed to the culture of corruption in Tajikistan. According to a survey administered by the World Bank's International Finance Corporation (IFC) released in 2004, an estimated 80 percent of small businesses in Tajikistan admit to paying regular bribes to tax officials, and 75 percent pay bribes for government licenses and permits. Businesses in need of credit are also known to pay as much as 12 percent of the total sum of the loan as a bribe to bank officials. The IFC believes that growth in Tajikistan's industrial sector has not necessarily helped to reduce poverty and cites corruption as a major impediment to accelerating socioeconomic development. According to Transparency International's 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index, Tajikistan scored 2.2 on a scale of 1 – 10, where 1 is "most corrupt," putting the country in the same bracket as Angola, Congo, Georgia, and Turkmenistan; still, this is an improvement over the 2003 score of 1.8.

Land reform – the transfer of formerly state-owned farms to private use and eventual ownership – has also been problematic. There have been widespread complaints of misappropriation, bribe taking, and favoring the relatively well-to-do in the distribution and/or sale of state farmland. The president has publicly acknowledged and criticized such practices and, as a result, in 2004 ordered the government's Land Reclamation Committee to conduct audits of selected local districts. A poverty and social impact analysis by the World Bank has indicated that farm privatization has had both a positive and a negative impact on the Tajik population. The International Monetary Fund claims that farm privatization increases incomes and the general welfare of farmers, provides foreign exchange funds to government coffers via tax revenues generated from cotton exports, and at the same time lowers losses from rent seeking, as privatization weakens the control of vested interest groups. Critics of Tajikistan's privatization program have claimed, however, that children and farmworkers have been negatively affected by the process, as social services – kindergartens, schools, and hospitals – that had existed under socialist farming have dramatically deteriorated or are nonexistent in a privatized setting. Furthermore, there now is a large monetary debt estimated at over US$160 million owed primarily by state and private farms engaged in cotton farming to (mostly Swiss) creditors.

Still, there are some signs that overall corruption may be decreasing – albeit slowly. In 2004, for example, the government formed a special department for combating corruption in the Office of the Prosecutor-General. Though Central Asia's banking sector has been described as being among the world's riskiest, with poor transparency, weak capitalization, large business concentrations (such as the cotton, aluminum, gold, oil, and gas industries), and vulnerability to economic and political shocks, according to RFE/RL, reform efforts have returned some credibility to Tajikistan's banking system. A positive sign is the apparent increase of public trust in financial service institutions. In 2004, an estimated US$150 million is thought to have been wired through the banking sector to Tajikistan from as many as 800,000 Tajik migrant workers in Russia. This amount is believed to have been a significant increase from past years. Another sign is a noticeable increase in tax collection, owing mainly to greater government efforts, a rise in private sector incomes, and a newly reformed two-tier tax law.

In a televised speech in January 2004, President Rahmonov emphasized that his government's top priorities will be working toward food and energy self-sufficiency, overcoming the country's "communication isolation," speeding up economic and land reforms, and "resolutely" fighting against all forms of corruption to attract additional foreign investment. In November, the president stated that his government should pay more attention to alleviating poverty, promoting the market economy (including the expansion of private ownership), and ensuring transparency in government activities, including the upcoming elections. The opportunities are certainly there to do so. Like the rest of the commodity-exporting Central Asian countries, Tajikistan is now facing an export boom. The associated double-digit economic growth rates – averaging 9.5 percent for the past five years (2000-2004), according to the EIU – have been due to prudent government macroeconomic policies and higher commodity export prices for cotton and aluminum.

Though most analysts consider sustained economic growth necessary for ending poverty and corruption, according to a senior economist from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, there is also room for caution. Increased government revenues in certain economies may very well boost the confidence level of existing regimes, but they also work as a disincentive for those in charge to pursue equitable and sustainable economic reforms, promote democratization, and fight corruption. In the case of Tajikistan and similar transitional states, even though economic growth and increased public wages will likely reduce corruption, these are not foolproof solutions. Some of the most corrupt state structures, such as the police, require alternative and radical cures. The problem may very well be one of institutional or state culture. According to Transparency International, factors such as business transparency, press freedom, and public and cultural pressure, all acting together, can work as effective checks against corruption.

Author

Payam Foroughi is a Ph.D. student in comparative politics at the University of Utah in Salt Lake City, USA, where he was an Eccles Fellow in Political Economy in 2004-2005 academic year.