Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala: Exit and Return

1.   INTRODUCTION

The Central American region has experienced internal strife throughout the 1980s leading to the migration of nationals from Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. For the most part, this migration has been northward. At times, changing political circumstances, as in the case of Nicaragua, have resulted in fewer people leaving and more people returning through voluntary repatriation. In Nicaragua, this phenomenon could have been the result of the election of Violeta Chamorro in February 1990 (The U.S. Committee for Refugees Jan. 1991, 5). However, other Central Americans, principally from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, continue to flee their countries of origin. Those who depart are viewed within the region as falling under the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees which describes them as:

persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order (Cartagena Declaration on Refugees Nov. 1984, 34).

This report examines issues central to the exit and return of Central Americans from El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, including why they cannot remain in countries of first asylum, forcible return, and deterrents to flight encountered along the route northward. This report further examines the safeguards provided for returnees as well as prospects for strengthening the reintegration process of returnees.

2.                EXIT

The recently promulgated constitutions of Honduras (1982), El Salvador (1984) and Guatemala (1986), guarantee the right to freedom of movement. For example, the Constitution of Honduras guarantees the "right to move freely within the national territory as well as leave, enter and remain in it" (Blaustein and Flanz 1984, 16).

Legal exit from these three countries requires possession of a valid national passport (Embassy of Honduras 23 Sept. 1991). An exception applies with regard to Guatemalans entering Mexico, as described below.

In Honduras, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues passports to nationals pursuant to a clearance from the taxation authorities (Embassy of Honduras 23 Sept. 1991). Passports are issued in the capital, Tegucigalpa, and in the city of San Pedro Sula. Exit visas are also required but can be denied if the applicant "is wanted in connection with a crime or has not paid his taxes" (Country Reports 1990 1991, 671).

In El Salvador, the General Directorate of Migration in the capital, San Salvador, issues passports to nationals. The possession of a birth certificate is a prerequisite for the issuance of a passport. Americas Watch has observed that "displaced persons frequently have no identification papers...[since they]...have fled their homes in haste, under fire [or] with no time to gather their belongings or papers" (Americas Watch 1987, 90). During periods of increased violence, the number of passport applications has also increased, as demonstrated by the 1,500 applications per day in December 1989 compared to the 400 applications per day before the guerrilla offensive of November 1989 (Refugee Reports 29 Dec. 1989, 2).

In Guatemala, the General Directorate of Migration in the capital, Guatemala City, issues passports upon presentation of a tax clearance, birth certificate, cedula de ciudadania (enumeration card for voting in general elections), and cedula de vecindad (identity card). Upon departure from the country, a standard departure tax of 20 Quetzales is levied (approximately CDN$ 4.68) (Embassy of Guatemala 30 Sept. 1991).

Guatemalans entering Mexico must possess a passport, visa and tarjeta de turismo (tourist card). The tarjeta de turismo is issued by the Consulate of Mexico in the country of residence (Embassy of Mexico 21 Nov. 1991). Guatemalans who reside close to the border of Mexico, however, are not required to present a passport upon entry into the country, as they may obtain a "temporary licence," valid for 72 hours, from border officials. The "temporary licence" is issued upon presentation of a numerically-coded identity card, which indicates border area residence (Ibid.). The source also stated that until 1982-83 "temporary licences" were issued to non-border area residents as well; and that migration laws at the bilateral level are occasionally changed (Ibid.).

Of the approximately one million Central Americans who have been displaced outside their national borders since the early 1980s, the majority have departed without proper travel documentation (Ferris 1986, 8). In all three countries, centralized government services, and a general distrust of central authority amongst those from the countryside or areas of conflict, make it difficult to obtain travel documents.

However, proper documentation does not necessarily guarantee a smooth flight. In Central America, the need to flee zones of conflict often means the eschewance of formal procedures at border crossings, which in effect renders the individual without proper documentation, illegal in the country of first asylum. Without a passport and supporting documentation, those who flee have no status in the country of asylum (whether first or second). The commonly-used term indocumentados refers to those who have left or entered by way of puntos ciegos (unrecognized border crossings) (Embassy of Honduras 23 Sept. 1991).

The principle of non-refoulement was agreed to by the Central American states and Mexico when they became signatories to the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Cartagena Declaration on Refugees Nov. 1984, 34). As signatories, these states should provide a temporary status to protect undocumented persons against refoulement. Non-compliance with the principle of non-refoulement by these states acts as a deterrent for those who wish to flee their country of origin and for those who wish to find a solution outside the country of asylum. However, for many in Central America, this risk outweighs the benefits, especially during times of increased tension as was the case in El Salvador in December 1989. At the height of the most recent Salvadoran exodus the Guatemalan Directorate of Migration reported that 5,000 Salvadorans had legally entered Guatemala, but it was widely believed that "many more [had] entered without proper travel documentation" (Refugee Reports 29 Dec. 1989, 2).

Despite the fact that Guatemala is signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, in the absence of an eligibility procedure, asylum seekers are required to approach the General Directorate of Migration to obtain short term permits to remain in the country (UNHCR, Guatemala City 30 Sept. 1991). The most frequently used document to enter Guatemala by Hondurans and Salvadorans is the tourist visa. The time limit to legally remain in Guatemala on this visa is 30 days, after which, if the individual has not regularized their status or arranged an extension (criteria for which are decided by the General Directorate of Migration on an individual basis), a daily fine of ten Quetzales (approximately CDN$ 2.34) is imposed (Embassy of Guatemala 30 Sept. 1991).

In Guatemala, asylum petitions can be presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but since 1979, the Guatemalan authorities have not granted asylum to anyone (UNHCR, Guatemala City 30 Sept. 1991). This might be considered irrelevant because asylum is a seldom sought after option since the political and economic environment in Guatemala is not attractive to asylum-seekers from the rest of the isthmus. Refugee status is determined by the UNHCR, but since 1989, the authorities have stated that they will implement legislation making them active participants in the refugee determination process (Ibid.). The UNHCR also believes the current procedures should be revised to include Guatemalan authorities (Ibid.).

In Honduras, the General Directorate of Migration must also be consulted in order to regularize immigration status after the tourist visa expires. Prorroga (extensions) can be applied for but officials demand monthly payments for temporary permits (UNHCR 27 Sept. 1991). The uncertain status of Central Americans in Mexico is evident even for those in UNHCR-assisted camps, who are officially referred to by Mexican Interior Ministry officials as "economic migrants rather than political refugees" (Friedland and Rodriguez y Rodriguez 1987, 27). Entry into Mexico is regulated by visa requirements and tarjetas de turismo (tourist cards). Guatemalans and Hondurans must apply for visas, which require a fee, and a tourist card, which does not require a fee, from the Consulate of Mexico in their native country or country of residence. Proof of employment and a record of financial solvency -- for example, a bank statement -- are required before a visa is issued (Embassy of Mexico 26 Sept. 1991). Salvadorans are exempted from visas but are required to hold tourist cards. These entry requirements cannot be fulfilled at border crossings into Mexico (Ibid.). Exit formalities at Salvadoran, Honduran, and Guatemalan border crossings are strictly enforced, including the presentation of valid passports (Embassy of Guatemala 30 Sept. 1991).

3.               THE NATIONALITY QUESTION

Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala guarantee, constitutionally, the possibility of naturalization for Central American citizens -- citizens of states composing the former Federation of Central American States, i.e., Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Naturalization procedures in theory reflect this possibility. Naturalization applications can be submitted to the government departments concerned after one year of legal residence (two years in the case of Guatemala) (Embassy of Guatemala 3 Sept. 1991). Furthermore, naturalization by marriage is also permitted but not granted automatically (Ibid.). In the case of Honduras and El Salvador, decisions regarding naturalization are more often than not decided arbitrarily (UNHCR 27 Sept. 1991).

In Honduras, the process is expedited for persons with sufficient resources to cover the payment of legal fees and tramitadores (intermediaries) (Ibid.). Guatemalan authorities often respond negatively to naturalization applications as they view them as precedent-setting, leading to potential applications from large numbers of Central Americans residing in Guatemala (UNHCR, Guatemala City 30 Sept. 1991). This means of regularizing status in an asylum state benefits the wealthy, who pay well to receive favourable treatment from the local authorities.

Under Mexican law, naturalization is possible but stringently controlled. For example, children born of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico are not given Mexican birth certificates, to which they are legally entitled, as this could lead to the

parents [obtaining] an FM-2 visa which could lead to permanent residenc[e] or [they] could [become eligible for] privileged naturalization, which is an expedited form of naturalization (Friedland and Rodriguez y Rodriguez 1987, 30).

4.            HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

Among the many causes that may motivate or oblige individuals to leave their countries of origin, human rights violations have played a major role. For example, Amnesty International Report 1991 provides details concerning illegal detentions, beatings, torture, disappearances and extrajudicial executions in Honduras (1991, 110-112). Targets of these abuses include trade unionists, human rights workers, priests, students and campesino leaders (Ibid.). Ramon Custodio, president of the Honduran Human Rights Committee (CODEH), has warned recently of the

possibility of a sudden upsurge of human rights violations...highlighted by the army's refusal to investigate more than 100 cases of people who were arrested by military personnel and then just...disappeared (Inter Press Service 14 Aug. 1991).

The President of Honduras, Rafael Leonardo Callejas, however, responded to accusations of human rights violations made by Americas Watch in a report of June 1991 by stating that "there was no basis for [the] report that says human rights continue to be violated routinely in Honduras" (The Associated Press 6 June 1991).

With regard to Guatemala, despite newly-elected President Serrano's pledge to respect human rights, Amnesty International Report 1991 delivers accounts of violations on a regular basis with "the perpetrators of human rights violations appear[ing] to operate with impunity" (1991, 102). Victims of harassment, detention, beatings, torture, disappearances, kidnappings and extrajudicial executions include peasants, human rights activists, academics, students, journalists, trade unionists and opposition politicians (Ibid., 102-104). The army has been condemned as the perpetrator of gross human rights violations, including the killing, on 2 December 1990, of 14 Indian protestors in Santiago, Atitlan (The Christian Science Monitor 11 Dec. 1990). Death squads and security forces members are held responsible for the above-mentioned human rights violations. However, during his term in office (1986-1990), former President Cerezo failed to prosecute "a single soldier for human rights violations" (Latin American Weekly Report 6 Dec. 1990; The Christian Science Monitor 11 Dec. 1990). Guatemalan Congressional Deputy, Edmond Mulet, observed that the difficulty lies in attempting "'to limit the army's influence...[to the extent that]...whenever the Minister of Defense or Army Chief of Staff gently mention something, the civilians [in government] say...let's not confront them'" (Ibid.).

In El Salvador, the pattern of human rights abuses is similar to that in Guatemala. Amnesty International notes that

the number of killings by death squads linked to the armed forces rose sharply between January and August [1990] with a total of 51 cases reported - more than double the figure for the same period in 1989 (Amnesty International 1991, 84).

In response to the allegations before the conviction in September 1991 of armed forces members in the November 1989 assassinations of six Jesuit priests, the armed forces stated that it

supports the efforts of those whose goal it is to achieve justice in our country, but oppose those who want to take advantage of this tragic event to prosecute, harm or punish an entire institution which has been the main defender of democracy and freedom in our country (El Rescate July 1991, 23).

5.          ROUTES

Hondurans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans most commonly use the land route northward when leaving their respective countries. It allows the majority to circumvent the travel requirements, including documentation and the higher financial cost of conventional routes, for example, air travel.

Salvadorans and Hondurans must transit northwards via Guatemala. Before August 1990, Salvadorans were required to present a national identity card upon entry to Guatemala; as of August 1990, Salvadorans must enter Guatemala with valid passports (Embassy of Guatemala 30 Sept. 1991). Guatemala's General Directorate of Migration imposes daily fines for individuals who remain beyond the 30-day stay permitted by the entry visa. Guatemala's political and economic problems, coupled with the inability of asylum-seekers to obtain work permits, reduce its attractiveness as a country of first asylum.

The route through Guatemala brings Salvadorans and Hondurans to the Guatemala-Mexico border transit point of Tecun Uman, also known as "Little Tijuana" (The Los Angeles Times 8 Jan. 1991). Crossing the border entails crossing the Suchiate River usually by raft, a route that has taken its toll in human lives (Ibid. 28 Aug. 1989). At this point, Salvadorans and Hondurans join the 30,000 to 50,000 Guatemalans who cross the border yearly (Central America Update 4 July 1990). The Los Angeles Times recently reported "daily, direct bus[es] across Guatemala" to the Guatemala-Mexico border from western San Salvador (8 Jan. 1991).

The success of the northbound journey to the three most frequently used border crossings -- Matamoros, Mexico, Brownsville, Texas and Tijuana, Mexico -- and from there into Southern California is, for the individual trying to avoid detection by Mexican Immigration authorities, largely dependent upon the adeptness of coyotes or polleros (smugglers) (Central America Update 28 Sept. 1990). The smugglers "can earn from $1,500 to $3,000 per person for a trip from San Salvador or Guatemala City to Los Angeles" (The Los Angeles Times 28 Aug. 1989). Others remain in Mexico to work in order to collect enough funds to continue the journey north (U.S. Committee for Refugees Jan. 1991).

Political asylum in Mexico is rarely granted and, therefore, not a viable option for the majority:

...The Interior Ministry...in the early 1980s, [granted] just over 100 Central Americans...this status; none have been granted asylum in the last four years (U.S. Committee for Refugees Jan. 1991, 7).

Extortion, bribery and theft are prevalent throughout the journey to the extent that ten of the 89 immigration agents in the Tapachula sector in Mexico were laid off in April 1989 because they allegedly took bribes (The Los Angeles Times 28 Aug. 1989). The extent to which government authorities are involved in bribery, extortion and issuing fraudulent travel documents is illustrated by the case of the Mexican Consul General in Calexico, California, who was charged with forgery and abuse of authority on 6 September 1989 (Ibid. 7 Sept. 1989).

For the estimated 300,000 undocumented Central Americans in Mexico City alone, the threat of deportation has increased since the election in 1989 of Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and the adoption of stricter measures against undocumented Central Americans. An example of these measures is the "number of deportations [which increased] 500 percent between 1988 and 1989" (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1991, 1).

In January 1989 the United States Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), in cooperation with the Government of Mexico, implemented "Operation Hold the Line," to reduce "the flow of Central American migrants" through Mexico into the United States (Ibid., 4). This operation included the "establishment of checkpoints along transit corridors and the deportation of intercepted Central Americans" (Ibid.). The results reflected by

INS apprehension statistics show that fewer Central Americans have been caught crossing into the United States in 1990 than in 1989...[with]...the clearest single factor causing the decline [appearing] to be the significantly larger numbers being apprehended in Mexico and deported to Guatemala (Ibid.).

Equally, the number of Salvadorans, Guatemalans and Hondurans apprehended in Mexico increased by 26 percent from 1989 to 1990 (Ibid., 5).

It is reported that 200,000 Central Americans have been deported to Guatemala from Mexico in the past two years (The Los Angeles Times 25 June 1991). Article 33 of the Constitution of Mexico allows the authorities "to deport without any legal process or prior order [thus making] it difficult to stop a deportation" (Friedland and Rodriguez y Rodriguez 1987, 47).

In 1987, the U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO) studied the situation of Salvadorans who returned from the United States to El Salvador through deportation, voluntary departure or otherwise, and whether they were "targeted for violence or persecution upon their return" (USGAO 12 May 1987, 1). The report based its conclusions in part on data collected by the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), which at the time of the report provided a "reception and counselling service for Salvadorans required to leave the United States" (Ibid., 5). The ICM determined through "interview[s] or correspondence with the returnees that 70 of the 271 reported personal security problems...[including]...violence and persecution" (Ibid., 7). Five of the 70 Salvadorans in question

were subsequently accepted for resettlement in third countries [including Canada] for humanitarian reasons (i.e. the individuals were determined to be in life-threatening situations from government security or guerrilla forces) and that 32 others were awaiting resettlement decisions (Ibid.).

Furthermore, the ICM attributed the death of three returnees to "personal security factors involving civil strife" (Ibid.). One of the three reported fatalities had received from ICM "an application for the Canadian humanitarian resettlement programme," but died nine days before "the ICM received his last questionnaire, which said that his situation was worsening" (Ibid.).

The USGAO concluded that ICM information used to determine the extent of problems faced by returned Salvadorans was "limited due to data collection and documentation weaknesses" (Ibid., 8). Information collected from human rights organizations working in El Salvador could not be used since the data did not "separate returnees from general population in their reports on violence or persecution" (Ibid., 9).

A report on repatriations and deportations to El Salvador, issued in September 1991, corroborates the above information on deportation (Jesuit Refugee Service/Canada Sept. 1991, 41-44).

6.       RETURN

Voluntary repatriation for Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in Central America has been made possible with the adoption of multilateral accords and the presence of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the field.

A major effort in this regard was initiated with the signing on 7 August 1987 of the San Jose Peace Accords. This step led to the establishment of National Reconciliation Commissions, with the exception of Honduras, to deal with, among other issues, the voluntary repatriation question (Washington Office on Latin America 21 Sept. 1987, 2).

The most comprehensive plan of action to "encourage the voluntary return of refugees and other persons displaced by the crisis, under conditions of personal security and dignity that would allow them to resume a normal life," came about with the adoption of the Declaration and Concerted Plan of Action in Favour of Central American Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in May 1989 (CIREFCA May 1989, 4). The plan provides for development projects to facilitate reintegration in the communities of origin (Ibid., 10). This integrated approach, although still in the primary phases of implementation, will provide measures for protection and development programmes for returnees. Provided that the political will of the area's returnee recipient countries is strengthened and the financial backing from donor countries continues, the plan will provide an opportunity for the returning refugees to re-establish themselves in their countries of origin.

The first group to benefit from the CIREFCA plan has been the refugees returning to El Salvador principally from refugee camps in Honduras (Colomoncagua, San Antonio, Mesa Grande). The 11,000 Salvadorans repatriated in 1990 under the auspices of the UNHCR constituted the "largest repatriation in the history of Central America" (Country Reports 1990 1991, 671). A UNHCR official in San Salvador added that to date, Salvadorans who were not recognized as refugees before their return would not benefit from UNHCR repatriation assistance programmes (UNHCR, San Salvador 30 Sept. 1991).

Once within their country of origin, returning Salvadoran refugees are viewed with suspicion by the Salvadoran armed forces, who believe that the refugees support the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1991, 83). Refugees have also been caught in the crossfire during clashes between insurgency groups and the armed forces, as was the case on 11 February 1990 when five returnees were killed (Ibid., 83-84).

The establishment in El Salvador of a United Nations International Verification Commission (ONUSAL) to investigate and monitor human rights abuses could, in the future, play an important role in safeguarding the rights of returnees (Central America NewsPak 3-16 June. 1991b, 5). However, the Commission has met opposition from the outset, as manifested by the publicized threats from the Salvadoran Anti-Communist Front (FAS), who consider the Commission's presence as interventionist and inclined to "undermine the sovereignty of the state" (Ibid., 5).

Voluntary repatriation continues as a less than widely accepted option for the 43,000 Guatemalan refugees in Mexico. Security concerns as a result of political violence continue to pose major stumbling blocks. As in the case of El Salvador, the government (more specifically, the Guatemalan armed forces) views the refugees as "having positions similar to those of the guerrillas [which] could result in safety problems [for the refugees] once they return to Guatemala" (Central America NewsPak 15-28 July 1991, 12).

The peace talks between the National Revolutionary Unit of Guatemala (UNRG) and the Guatemalan government are seen as positive developments in the negotiation of an end to the thirty year-old guerrilla war. Nonetheless, after four rounds of talks the stalemate continues, with human rights issues remaining at the top of the agenda (Inter Press Service 20 Sept. 1991).

In Honduras, as with the other Central American states in question, the right to "enter and leave" is entrenched in the constitution. Guarantees of return were reinforced with the passage of a general amnesty law in July 1991. The law was expected to benefit 300 exiled Hondurans, but as of September 1991 only 41 had decided to return (The Associated Press 6 June 1991; UNHCR Fax 19 Sept. 1991). The physical safety provisions of the amnesty law were placed in doubt, especially after the murder, in April 1991, of a former campesino leader who was a member of the Central American Workers Party (PRTC), and who had returned from several years in exile (El Tiempo 8 Apr. 1991). Further concerns were expressed in July 1991 when a member of both the Honduran Human Rights Defence Committee and the Committee of the Relatives of Missing Detainees in Honduras was shot and killed. He had been forced to leave Honduras for a year after receiving death threats, but was killed one month after his return (BBC Summary 25 July 1991).

7.      FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

The recent agreements reached between the Salvadoran authorities and the guerrillas superficially, at least, provide hope for an eventual cease-fire and the commencement of a reconciliation between the disenfranchised segments of Salvadoran society (FBIS-LAT-91-189 30 Sept. 1991a, 7-9). However, until something substantive in the way of guarantees for personal safety is in place, speculation as to the plan's success will unlikely prove to be a strong pull factor in motivating Salvadorans to return and stopping others from leaving.

In Guatemala, an end to the longest civil war in Latin America is also unlikely in the near future. In both Guatemala and El Salvador the activities of extremist groups opposing the peace efforts will most likely continue.

In Honduras, calls by the opposition parties and the labour movement for the modification of the armed forces structure to come under "the direct control of the president of the Republic" reflect the will to change the current power structure (FBIS-LAT-91-192 3 Oct. 1991a, 19-24). It is too early to tell if these changes will be implemented.

In the three countries in question, if political changes reflecting respect for human rights are to have any impact on the respective societies, they must be accompanied by social and economic reforms. For the over one million Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Hondurans estimated to be currently outside their national frontiers, and for others who may be contemplating departure from these countries, the imposition of stricter immigration controls in transit states does not appear to be an insurmountable obstacle.

Central Americans have, in general, learned to endure adverse conditions when seeking to establish themselves in more secure and improved lifestyles outside their countries of origin. This pull factor can be counteracted but will require the establishment of confidence-building measures for all sectors of society in the countries of origin. Recent events point towards this trend but prospects for improvement indicate long-term rather than short-term benefits.

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