

INDONESIA:

Support needed for return and re-integration of displaced Acehnese following peace agreement

A profile of the internal displacement situation

19 July, 2006

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OVERVIEW

Support needed for return and re-integration of displaced Acehnese following peace agreement

In the wake of the peace agreement signed in August 2005 between Acehnese separatist rebels and the government, putting an end to 30 years of conflict in Indonesia's westernmost province of Aceh, thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs) who were forced to leave their homes during the conflict started returning. Most of these returns have taken place to former conflict-affected areas spared by the tsunami of December 2004 but where years of fighting and lack of development have disrupted the livelihoods of all civilians. Assessments conducted by the World Bank in the past months among conflict-affected communities have revealed pressing needs with regard to housing, food, health care and livelihood assistance. Also, while the assessments concluded that it was important that assistance be provided in these areas to benefit the community as a whole, those who have been made more vulnerable by the conflict, such as IDPs, should be provided with compensation for conflict-related destruction and loss. With little money available for non-tsunami-related aid programmes and many conflict-affected areas not accessible to foreign organisations until after the signing of the peace agreement in August 2005, most aid agencies have only recently started working in these areas where tens of thousands of people are still displaced and have seen little of government assistance in the past years. Ensuring a fair distribution of the assistance between all regions of Aceh and between all who have suffered from the conflict will help prevent jealousies and tensions between communities and contribute to the success of the peace process.

Tension in Papua province has remained high throughout the first half of 2006 with occasional clashes between security forces and armed groups, but also protests turning violent and causing limited displacement in the province capital, Jayapura. A ban on foreign media and NGOs has since 2003 prevented any independent monitoring of the human rights situation, which is feared to have deteriorated in the context of an increased military presence during 2005 and heightened tensions between the local population and settlers. Elsewhere in Indonesia, former hotspots such as Maluku, Central Sulawesi and Central Kalimantan have been in a post-conflict recovery phase since 2003 with no significant new displacement recorded in the past two years. Although there are officially no conflict-IDPs left in the country since the government's reclassification of the remaining displaced people as "vulnerable" in January 2004, it is estimated that between 200,000 and 350,000 people remain displaced or living in situations akin to displacement. Tens of thousands of people, mainly in Maluku province and Central Sulawesi, were reportedly still waiting for a government termination or empowerment grant in early 2006, nearly seven years after being displaced. Return to Central Kalimantan is still reported as problematic for Madurese IDPs living in east Java, mainly because of the continued hostility of the local population.

Background and main causes of displacement

Large-scale displacement of population is a recurrent feature in Indonesia's recent history. Mainly caused by natural disasters, such as the December 2004 tsunami or more recently by the May 2006 Java earthquake, forced displacement is also often the direct or indirect consequence of development projects. While the exploitation of natural resources has a direct impact on the daily lives of many indigenous groups throughout the country, forcing many to abandon their land and way of life, the demographic and political consequences of other development programmes took longer to materialise as they planted the seeds of future conflicts.

In the wake of the financial crisis that hit Indonesia in 1998 and the fall of the Suharto regime the same year, religious and ethnic violence started to spread throughout the country. Against a backdrop of economic recession, widespread political discontent fuelled separatist aspirations. The resulting unrest saw more than 1.4 million people displaced between 1999 and 2002 throughout the country. The collapse of the Suharto regime triggered a process of political transition and democratic opening-up that resulted in a more participatory and open electoral process and an increased level of political participation from the civil society. In October 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became Indonesia's fourth president since Suharto.

The root causes of most conflicts and displacement in Indonesia come from transmigration programmes undertaken under Suharto's rule with the stated aim of reducing demographic disparities between different regions. The relocation of large groups of people, often from Java to less populated areas, led to growing ethnic imbalance and an increasing number of disputes over land and resources. These deepening tensions broke out into open conflicts when the political vacuum created by Suharto's fall triggered new local political aspirations and power struggles. In Central Sulawesi and Maluku province, these struggles led to conflicts, which followed religious lines, whereas ethnic identities were the dividing streak in Central Kalimantan.

Separatist struggles in Aceh on the north-western tip of the island of Sumatra and in Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) are rooted in the impoverishment of the local population and their perceived or real exploitation by local elites closely linked to the central government. However, transmigration programmes have also played a role in both conflicts, in particular in Papua where the transfer of an estimated 800,000 settlers from Java and Sulawesi with a different ethnic and religious background has created strong resentment among the local population.

The Indonesian army (TNI), traditionally a key political player in Indonesia, has been both an important stabilising force in the various conflicts which have affected the country, such as in Central Sulawesi or Maluku province, as well as a major agent of displacement in vertical struggles opposing the government to insurgents groups, such as in Aceh or Papua province. The TNI has vested interests in both provinces, which have for years provided the army with important sources of income, mostly through illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, prostitution or illegal mining and logging (HRW, 14 March 2005).

From an estimated 1.4 million in mid-2002, the total number of displaced fell by almost 50 per cent to around 500,000 at the end of 2003. This significant reduction was mainly the result of more favourable conditions for return with many conflicts ending, but also of a more effective implementation of the government's IDP policy issued in September 2001. Since 2004, the government has considered its IDP problem largely solved, in spite of the challenges remaining for those who have returned as well as for those who have been unable to do so. Some returns did not take place because of the continued hostility of ethnic/religious groups, others because the promised termination or empowerment grant has not been disbursed yet. There are currently no reliable estimates available on the number of people displaced by conflict in the country. Information reviewed for this update suggests that this number could range from 200,000 to 350,000.

Peace agreement opens door for return of Aceh's conflict-IDPs

The earthquake and tsunami that devastated Aceh and North Sumatra provinces on 26 December 2004 wiped out entire cities and villages along the coastline, killed at least 160,000 people and displaced half a million. Aceh's physical infrastructure and socio-economic situation, already weakened by 30 years of conflict, suffered considerable damage and loss, estimated to amount to \$5.8 billion. While destroying over 100,000 houses, the tsunami also took away the livelihoods of an estimated 600,000 Acehnese as the giant wave destroyed fisheries, agricultural

land and killed hundred of thousands of domestic farm animals. Prior to the disaster, 40 per cent of Aceh's population was already living below the poverty line (Laksamana.net, 29 October 2003). The tsunami made half of Aceh's population dependent on food aid (Government of Indonesia, UN, WB, December 2005, p. 14).

On a more positive note, the tsunami and the subsequent assistance effort had a major beneficial influence on the separatist conflict in Aceh. Faced with a humanitarian crisis beyond its capacity to manage, the government was forced to allow access into Aceh to foreign humanitarian organisations whose presence there had been severely restricted since the beginning of a major military offensive launched by the government in May 2003. The arrival of foreign and national aid agencies helped the population cope in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, but it also played an important role by introducing impartial observers and bringing the spotlight on the conflict-ridden province. Indeed, the sudden international attention given to the region proved decisive in encouraging both the separatist rebels of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) – the Free Aceh Movement – and the government to return to the negotiating table.

On 15 August 2005, eight months after the tsunami struck the province, both parties signed a peace agreement putting an end to a conflict which had caused some 12,000 deaths and displaced more than 500,000 people over the previous decade. The rebels agreed to abandon their armed struggle and to put aside their independence demand in exchange for local self-government. On the other hand, the government agreed to remove all non-local police and soldiers from the province and to allow GAM to take part in a future political process, which was to get a fresh start with local elections scheduled to take place during 2006. Since August 2005, the European Union and ASEAN-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) have overseen the withdrawal of more than 30,000 Indonesian troops and the demobilisation of GAM members, including the surrendering of their weapons. As part of the agreement, some 2,000 political prisoners were released and together with more than 3,000 demobilised GAM rebels, they returned home to reintegrate into civilian life. Their return sometimes coincided with the return of other members of their communities who were displaced during the conflict.

Indeed, while the decline in incidents of fighting throughout the province was already notable in the months following the tsunami and may have encouraged some early returns of conflict-IDPs to their homes, it is the peace agreement and its implementation, in particular the removal of non-local troops and the presence of the AMM, perceived as a neutral arbiter, which appears to have been what most people displaced by the conflict had been waiting for to make the journey home (ACF, May 2005, p. 28; Samuel Clark, Yustinatawy Hasibuan, Buchari, HY, November 2005, p.7).

Who are the conflict-IDPs?

Based on various figures available, it is estimated that the total number of people displaced since 1999 in the Aceh conflict ranges from 500,000 to 700,000. This figure includes displacement within Aceh but also to other provinces, namely North Sumatra where a large number of ethnic Javanese have sought refuge since 1999. The majority of those who fled in the early years of the conflict and sought refuge within the province in the proximity of their village returned shortly after their displacement. They have since managed to restore their livelihoods and rebuild their homes or at least their needs would be hard to distinguish from those of the rest of the population who have also suffered from the effects of the conflicts. Most of those who left the province, such as the estimated 120,000 ethnic Javanese who fled to neighbouring North Sumatra between 1999 and 2004 are unlikely to return en masse, as they have taken up jobs and settled in the province's capital, Medan.

The displaced who have returned since the signing of the ceasefire can be broadly divided into two categories based on their different needs in the return and rehabilitation phase. While both

groups share similar return and rehabilitation needs, IDPs of the second category require additional attention with regard to their protection needs.

The first category includes people displaced to neighbouring villages or in the relative proximity of their homes during the 2003-2004 military offensive. This group is mainly composed of ethnic Acehnese who fled fighting and the militarisation of their villages, but also ethnic Gayonese who fled their homes in Central Aceh. The official number of people displaced during the 2003-2004 military campaign stands at 125,000 (RSC, July 2005, p.14). However, the real number is likely to be higher as this figure probably failed to capture the full scope of the displacement caused by the military operation. Although the majority returned shortly after their displacement, nearly all experienced a severe loss of livelihood upon return and have since struggled to survive under very difficult conditions (IOM-GoRI, September 2004, pp.16-17). While all civilians living in areas affected by the conflict have suffered from its effects, these have been particularly devastating on the displaced. Many of them have had their houses and property destroyed and have had their livelihoods undermined by their inability to work on their land while displaced.

The second category includes mainly ethnic minorities, such as the "transmigrant" ethnic Javanese who were specifically targeted by the GAM because of their perceived association with the government, or ethnic Gayonese, who generally did not support the GAM. Some ethnic Acehnese, such as those who lived in Central Aceh, can also be included in this group. Some 30,000 ethnic Acehnese were forced to leave Central Aceh and Bener Meriah in 2001. Most sought refuge in the adjacent district of Pidie and Bireun where they remained until the peace agreement. In addition to assistance needs often similar to the rest of the conflict-affected population, these IDPs also have protection needs when they return to areas in which their ethnic group is in minority.

Until a systematic assessment of the number and needs of conflict-IDPs in Aceh is undertaken, estimating their number will remain a difficult exercise. What is clear is that out of the hundreds of thousands of people who have been displaced in Aceh since 1999, ten of thousands still live in situations akin to displacement across the province, with the majority in former conflict-affected areas situated in the mountainous inland of Aceh. A survey conducted by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in early 2006 among IDPs living in host communities throughout the province revealed that almost 20 per cent had been displaced by the conflict (UNORC, 28 March 2006, p.2). The survey used a working figure of 70,000 IDPs living in host families, which could mean that up to 14,000 of these are actually conflict-IDPs. In addition World Bank research conducted at the end of 2005 found a high number of returnees and conflict victims in former conflict areas, although no figures were available (WB, 13 December 2005, p.4).

Impoverishment in former conflict areas particularly affects IDPs

Prior to the tsunami, assessments in the province had shown that years of conflict had disrupted the livelihoods of all civilians in Aceh, with the displaced particularly affected (UN Inter-Agency Mission, 15 January 2003; WFP Livelihood Survey, June 2002). The 2003-2004 military operation further aggravated living conditions, disrupting food, electricity and water supplies, schooling and access to healthcare for hundreds of thousands.

Although most of the displaced were able to return after relatively short stays in the camps, they often found little left of their homes and property (Eye on Aceh, April 2004, p.10; ICG, 23 July 2003, p.5). The impoverishment of the displaced was confirmed by a survey conducted during 2004 by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the government which revealed alarming drops in income and livelihood opportunities among the displaced following their return and high levels of food insecurity (IOM-GoRI, September 2004, pp. 16-17).

More recently, assessments conducted at the end of 2005 in former conflict areas across the province revealed that almost all villages surveyed shared pressing needs with regard to housing, food security and access to health care. Other more long-term needs included access to capital to restart a livelihood and improved infrastructures, with sanitation and health structures particularly damaged (WB, March 2006, pp.60-69; EC, 15 December 2005, p.5). While there were often important disparities noted between different villages, some having suffered more than others from the fighting and destruction, these differences in needs could also be found at the village level with some villagers losing their houses and property and means of subsistence, while others managed to keep their houses and livelihoods relatively intact. The displaced, for example, generally had greater needs with regard to housing or the rehabilitation of their farms and lands, which they had not been able to return to in months or sometimes years. Often left un-assisted by the government despite repeated promises, they also tended to view assistance as something they were entitled to in view of the damage suffered by their property and for which they expected compensation (Samuel Clark, Yustinatawaty, Buchari HY, 12-23 November 2005, p. 10). In early 2006, a UN assessment of the needs of Acehnese who recently returned to central Aceh showed livelihood assistance and shelter to be critical needs (UNORC, January 2006, p.2).

Often the most-affected by displacement and destruction or looting of their property were found to be people belonging to the ethnic group in minority in the area as they were specifically targeted during the conflict for their perceived association with one of the warring parties. This was the case with many ethnic Javanese or Gayonese in East Aceh, but also Acehnese in Central Aceh, who fled anti-separatist militia activities (WB, 16 January 2006, p.3). Return and reintegration of these displaced appeared often more problematic as their rehabilitation problems were often compounded by persistent feelings of distrust towards other groups and fear that if the conflict resumed they might have to flee again (Amri Yakob, Luthfi Ashari, Roslina Johari, November 2005, p.21).

Indeed, while all returnees share common needs to make their return sustainable, such as housing, employment, assistance to restart a livelihood or access to health care, the displaced returning to areas where they are in minority require additional attention as they also have protection needs and often feel more insecure about their future. In December 2005, an estimated 5,000 Acehnese IDPs displaced from Central Aceh and Bener Meriah decided to return collectively to their homes. With no transportation or humanitarian assistance from the government, and reportedly faced with intimidation threats by the military and police and acts of violence from local groups resisting their return, half of the displaced reportedly returned to their host families in Bireun and Pidie while the rest settled in improvised camps and mosques (Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, 3 May 2006, p. 2).

Ethnic Javanese expelled from their homes in East Aceh but who remained near their villages were reportedly less inclined to rebuild permanent shelter because they had to cope with the emotional trauma of their expulsion and feared future threats by GAM (Amri Yakob, Luthfi Ashari, Roslina Johari, November 2005, p. 21). Little is known about the return intentions of the over 100,000 ethnic Javanese displaced to North Sumatra province between 1999 and 2004. If more than expected do return, this could potentially create problems related to property and land disputes in areas of return (WB, 23 August 2005, p. iv).

Discrimination in assistance provided to tsunami and conflict-IDPs

In the wake of the disaster, the international community provided a response of unprecedented generosity, with more than \$8.8 billion pledged for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Aceh and North Sumatra (ADB, February 2006, p.1). The largest humanitarian assistance effort in history proved decisive in helping to avert any major health or food crisis. Though slow to get underway, it aimed towards solving the immense task of rebuilding the devastated province while

helping hundreds of thousands of people regain some form of livelihood. Progress has been steady, albeit slower than expected, and much remains to be done to achieve the reconstruction of the province and restore the livelihood of those affected by the tsunami. But the challenges are even more considerable in the inland mountainous areas affected by the conflict. It is only after the signing of the peace agreement in August 2005 that the government and foreign aid agencies started planning to extend humanitarian and reconstruction programmes to communities living in these areas which had seen very little if any assistance during the conflict and in the aftermath of the tsunami.

From the moment the tsunami struck up to the signing of the peace agreement, conflict-IDPs were largely ignored by the international community, and few international aid agencies were ready to challenge the government on an issue which was deemed too sensitive (HRW, 27 May 2005). Things started to change slowly following the peace agreement and with the increasing interest of donors in supporting the peace process. Towards the end of 2005, the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) – the government-appointed agency overseeing the coordination of assistance to Aceh and the nearby island of Nias – was tasked with assisting in the rehabilitation of conflict-affected areas (ADB, February 2006, p.2). In February 2006, the provincial government established the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA) as the key body to coordinate post-conflict programming (WB, 19 April 2006, pp. 4-5). The extent to which the BRA will be able to respond to compensation demands from victims of the conflict, in particular from internally displaced people, remains unclear. As of May 2006, the coordinating body was reportedly working on clarifying the procedures and criteria for eligibility (WB, 26 May 2006, p.4).

While local NGOs have long been working with people displaced by the conflict, it was not until quite recently that UN agencies or international agencies such as IOM and the World Bank started getting involved with conflict-IDPs. The World Bank, through its recently-launched new Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas (SPADA) programme aiming at incorporating conflict-areas into the reconstruction process, has started including an IDP component (WB, 6 April 2006). The Office of the United Nations Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias (UNORC), UNDP and UNICEF did provide some degree of assistance to conflict-IDPs in early January 2006 when collective return movements of IDPs to Central Aceh and Bener Meriah managed to attract attention and forced the government and international agencies alike to respond to their needs. But this was largely done on an ad-hoc basis and lacked a long-term strategy with clear return mechanisms (UNORC, January 2006; WB, 18 February 2006, p.2)

While the peace process is now firmly on track, it is critical to put an end to the existing discrimination in the distribution of aid between tsunami-affected and conflict-affected populations. In order to avoid creating tensions within the affected communities, assistance should be distributed in a fair and equitable way which also takes into account the specific needs of the most vulnerable among them, in particular the displaced. In areas where minority groups, such as the ethnic Javanese or Gayonese in East Aceh or the Acehnese in Central Aceh, are returning, targeted assistance for the displaced should also include security guarantees as well as peace-building activities aimed at rebuilding trust between communities.

Efforts are currently underway to more systematically include conflict-IDPs in the collection of data on the internally displaced. CARDI has in May 2006 taken over a project started by NRC to collect data on numbers, location and needs and to feed it into a steadily updated database hitherto handled by the United Nations.

Military build-up in Papua raises fear of abuses against civilians

While the government of Indonesia has opted for dialogue and negotiations to deal with the separatist aspirations of Aceh, it has so far resisted the same shift in its approach to the

secessionist aspirations of Papua province. While troops were leaving Aceh in the wake of the peace agreement, a significant military build-up in Papua province during 2005 raised widespread concern about its potential disastrous human rights consequences. In February 2006, Human Rights Watch expressed grave concern about the lack of access for press and NGOs to Papua amidst reports of widespread displacements and human rights abuses (HRW, 10 February 2006).

During 2006, tension remained high in the region with several protests turning violent in the province (Washington Post, 25 June 2006). In March 2006, a protest against the US-operated Freeport mining company degenerated into riots causing up to 1,200 students to seek refuge in the hills surrounding the province capital, Jayapura. Fleeing the repression from the Indonesian police, the students were reportedly without food and in need of medical attention (ABC, 23 March 2006).

Elsewhere in the province, occasional clashes also took place between the military and unidentified armed men (Jakarta Post, 11 April 2006).

Little information is available regarding the situation of the displaced in Papua, but it is believed that counter-insurgency military operations initiated in the second half of 2004 in the central highlands continued during 2005. As many as 20,000 people reportedly fled counter-insurgency operations conducted between August and October 2004 against rebels of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and sought refuge in the forests where more than 6,000 remained at the end of 2004 (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, August 2005, p. 19; Dateline, 16 March 2005; DPRIN, 17 November 2004). Travel bans imposed by the military to some areas affected by displacement have restricted the conduct of needs assessments and reportedly prevented humanitarian assistance from reaching the IDPs (RFK Center for Human Rights, March 2005). Local sources reported that the displaced were short of food and medicine and too afraid to return to their villages (Elsham News Service, 21 December 2004; AI, 6 December 2004). A UNDP mission concluded in August 2005 that widening social disparities and growing tensions between the local population and settlers had increased the potential for conflict in the region (UNDP, August 2005, p.2).

Return and reintegration still problematic in many regions

Elsewhere in Indonesia, the relative calm and stability observed in the country's former hot spots has allowed for major returns since 2002 and the lifting of the IDP status for many displaced after the reception of termination or empowerment grants from the government. However, many have not received the promised assistance, either because of a lack of funds, the mismanagement of that money or a lack of reliable data on the number of displaced people entitled to receive assistance (Jakarta Post, 3 February 2006; UNDP, 2005, p. 54; Jakarta Post, 20 August 2004). Others have used the termination grant to return but still face difficulties in restarting their livelihood or regaining their property and houses occupied by others in their absence (Duncan, Christopher, 2004, p. 4).

In most regions, complex issues which are vital to ensure the sustainability of return and resettlement, remain to be addressed. These include land and property rights, housing, access to education, reconciliation between communities, protection and security and the availability of economic opportunities (CARDI, December 2005, p.2; UNDP, 2005, p. 55; SIDA, 9 August 2004, pp. 81-82).

Areas where return has been possible since 2003 include Central Sulawesi, North Maluku, and to a lesser extent Maluku Province and Central Kalimantan, where local hostility to the return of displaced Madurese is still an obstacle. The estimated 26,000 East Timorese refugees living in West Timor and unwilling to return home have since the beginning of 2003 lost their refugee status and been offered Indonesian citizenship as well as the same resettlement options as IDPs (UNHCR, 16 December 2005). At the end of 2005 when UNHCR closed down its operation, an

estimated 10,000 people were still living in camps near the border, while 16,000 had been resettled in other areas of the province. Other estimates by local NGOs put the number of people still living in camps at close to 40,000. The main problem facing the ex-refugees is access to land, which is making it difficult for them to earn a living (ICG, 4 May 2006, p.2; Writenet, February 2005, p. 22). They are also waiting for the government to offer them compensation for assets left behind in East Timor (Jakarta Post, 20 December 2005).

In Central Sulawesi the signing of the Malino peace agreement at the end of 2001 put an end to three years of conflict between Christian and Muslim communities that displaced some 150,000 people. Since 2002, reconstruction and reconciliation efforts have been insufficient to help the province fully recover from the negative impact of the conflict and the province remains one of the poorest of the country (Jakarta Post, 21 February 2006). The return and rehabilitation of the displaced has also been hampered by the embezzlement of relief funds, unresolved land disputes and the persistence of tensions (CSM, 11 January 2006). Occasional eruptions of violence in the province during 2005 have sometimes caused small-scale displacement. In November 2005, a few hundred people were temporarily displaced to Palu after clashes between the police and followers of a sect leader (Jakarta Post, 8 November 2005). The same month, the government deployed more troops to the province in response to increased communal tension (DPA, 6 November 2005). The situation is so far contained by the presence of security forces, but many fear that violence may flare up again when they pull out. The society is still polarised between Christians and Muslims and few envisage a return to mixed communities. In 2006, there were no reliable figures available on the number of people still displaced or inadequately assisted in the province, but it is believed that this number could still be around 40,000, with the majority of people living in Poso district (OCHA, 30 April 2005).

Return and resettlement has been ongoing in North Maluku for the last four years and the focus of assistance is now on durable solutions and economic empowerment. It is estimated that only 15,000 people remain displaced in the province, mainly concentrated in Ternate and Tobelo towns (CARDI, 21 December 2005) (See map). The majority of IDPs do not desire to return and it has been recommended that priority be given to the resolution of land ownership problems and economic development to allow them to resettle locally (OCHA, 30 June 2004). Housing, food and water, and sanitation needs are reported to be inadequate in many of the displacement sites where IDPs also lack income-generating activities (CARDI, 21 December 2005, p.3). A study focusing on the relationship between the displaced and their hosts recommended that camps should be closed and that schemes to empower the poorest IDPs be developed (Duncan, C., 2005, p. 42). From a mixed population prior to the eruption of violence, North Maluku is now becoming a more religiously divided province. Muslims are settling in Muslim communities while Christians are staying with Christians.

In April 2004, renewed violence between Christians and Muslims in the capital of Maluku province, Ambon, claimed the lives of 38 people and caused the displacement of some 10,000 (ICG, 17 May 2004, p.7). Since then, tension has remained high in the capital, where invisible demarcation lines have been drawn between the two religious communities, exacerbating already existing obstacles to return.

Of the more than 500,000 people displaced in Maluku province since 1999 by inter-communal violence, an estimated 60,000 individuals remained unassisted as of end-2005. The majority live in Ambon city, with the remainder scattered over six districts (CARDI, December 2005). Although some cases of malnutrition were reported in IDP camps in Ambon in mid-2005, overall the humanitarian needs of the displaced and returnees have been met and the most pressing needs are for durable solutions and economic empowerment (Jakarta Post, 22 June 2005). Lack of coordination, limited funding and corruption have reportedly constrained the provision of return packages to all IDPs (Jakarta Post, 19 July 2004; Jakarta Post, 20 August 2004; JRS, 23 August 2004). Those who have received the assistance and returned were reported to have still faced

significant challenges including land ownership disputes, hostility from local communities and unrehabilitated social services in their area of return. For those living in relocation sites, lack of job opportunities and shortage of land were reported as common problems. Of the estimated 12,000 IDPs (or 3,193 IDP households) who were assisted during 2004-2005, 40 per cent returned to their former communities while the rest opted for resettlement. The 60,000 people who remain unassisted are likely to pursue the same options (CARDI, December 2005, p. 2). Of the six international NGOs still working in Maluku province in 2005, only two – Consortium for Assistance and Recovery Towards Development in Indonesia (CARDI) and Médecins Sans Frontières-Belgium – were still there in early 2006.

In East Java, some 100,000 Madurese displaced from Central Kalimantan due to ethnic tensions in 2001 are waiting for safety and security guarantees before returning home. Between 30,000 and 57,000 people managed to return to Central Kalimantan during 2004 (OCHA, March 2005; U.S. DOS, 28 February 2005, sect. 5; ECHO, 22 December 2004, p. 2). The absence of a clear government policy on the return of the Madurese to central Kalimantan and the continued hostility of the provincial government to their return make it difficult to envisage any large-scale return in the near future (OCHA, 9 April 2004, p.14; WB, February 2005, p. 45). In the meantime, the Madurese have to struggle to make ends meet on Madura island, an overcrowded island with limited resources. A UN assessment mission conducted in June 2004 concluded that virtually all IDPs on Madura wished to return and that they cited lack of funds as the main obstacle. Further, living conditions in camps and private housing were described as below acceptable standards (OCHA, 30 June 2004; ECHO, 22 December 2004, p. 2). It is estimated that 90 per cent of the displaced are unemployed (WB, February 2005, p.11). The lack of an integrated approach in a region where the local population is as much deprived and in need of assistance as the IDPs is reported to have created serious tensions between the two groups.

The majority of the remaining IDPs in Indonesia are those who resulted from cross-provincial movements and cannot or do not want to return because of the continued hostility of the ethnic/religious groups that forced them to flee. It will be important to ensure that they are properly resettled or that they are assisted in integrating into the new environments where many have now lived for years. IDPs in East Nusa Tenggara (West Timor) and East Java (Madura island) all need alternative solutions to a return that is often not possible in the near future. Others in Maluku province are willing to return but require better information on their entitlements and more assistance.

National response

Since the lifting of IDP status in most provinces in early January 2004 in line with the government's IDP policy formulated in 2001, the displaced are no longer considered as IDPs but only as "poor" or "vulnerable people" and no central government funding is made available to address their specific needs (Bakornas & OCHA, July 2003, p.27). Instead, the ex-IDPs are included in general poverty alleviation programmes and responsibility for their well-being has been delegated to the provincial level. In provinces where large number of people remained displaced and unassisted as of early 2004, such as Maluku and Central Sulawesi provinces, and where the needs of the displaced were obviously still considerable, the deadline for the lifting of the IDP status was repeatedly delayed until the end of 2005 while the situation of the displaced appears not to have improved much. In the last two years, corruption, lack of reliable data on the displaced, lack of funding and insecurity were still reported as the major obstacles to the return and reintegration process in these provinces (Jakarta Post, 3 February 2006; Asia News, 16 January 2006). In most displacement-affected provinces, the implementation of the IDP policy has been fraught with obstacles and problems (Sweeting, Patrick; Conway, George; Hameed, Nabila, September 2004).

The IDP definition used by the government seems to have included only people who are still displaced, while excluding those who *have been* displaced (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p.39). Also, when the displaced did qualify for assistance, the policy of providing termination grants in exchange of the IDP status meant that no further displacement-related claims could be made by the displaced after accepting the deal. Thus, once returned or resettled, the displaced are considered as having no further needs and they cease to be recognised as IDPs (RSC, July 2005, p.10). However, in many provinces of the country, returned or resettled populations continued for years to face important humanitarian and reintegration challenges. When assistance was provided, it often proved insufficient or did not reach all those entitled to receive it. During the 2003-2004 military operation in Aceh, assistance provided to the displaced upon return was considered by half of the returnees as insufficient to help them recover from their displacement (IOM-GoRI, September 2004, p. 18). In the wake of the tsunami, the assistance needs of these IDPs were almost completely ignored by the government and the international community, although assessments conducted during 2005 showed access to basic services, housing and reintegration needs to be significant in former conflict areas (WB, March 2006, pp.61-69). In North Maluku, it was reported that the most serious problem faced by the returnees was that not everybody had received the housing package, even when entitled to it, and that funding for the reconstruction of houses was largely insufficient (UNDP, 2005, p.55; SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 13). In some cases, people have returned to their villages but have been unable to regain their land and property as it was now occupied by others, often IDPs themselves (Duncan, Christopher, 2004, p. 5). Some have also returned to find out that houses constructed for them were below acceptable standards or simply did not exist (Asia News, 16 June 2005). Corruption and embezzlement of relief funds has also been reported as major obstacles to the return and rehabilitation of the displaced in many conflict-affected provinces, such as Central Sulawesi or Maluku province (CSM, 11 January 2006; UNDP; 2005, p.55, UNDP, July 2004, p.15).

A lack of coordination between provinces has also been reported as a serious problem. The decentralisation programme under way throughout Indonesia since 2000 and the absence of implementing guidelines issued with the national IDP policy in 2001 often resulted in considerable discrepancies between provinces in the assistance provided to the displaced and led to confusion among IDPs about their entitlements. The lifting of the IDP status has given more autonomy to the provinces in dealing with the IDP problem and has required them to cooperate better with each other to manage the return of inter-province IDPs. However, this has often not been the case with local governments of North Maluku and North Sulawesi provinces reportedly unable to reach administrative and financial agreements with regards to the return of cross-province IDPs. Coordination problems have also occurred between provincial and district authorities hampering the return of the displaced in North Maluku (UNDP, 2005, p.55).

By declaring the IDP crisis solved and overlooking the needs of some groups of displaced, the government runs the risk of jeopardising the transition from emergency assistance to economic recovery and undermining the reconciliation efforts undertaken in the past years. Only when this transition is successful can the empowerment, relocation or return of the displaced also be a success and their displacement end.

International response

The United Nations and international NGOs have helped the Indonesian government assist the displaced since the conflicts erupted in 1999. Prior to the tsunami, the international community's support for the handling of the IDP crisis reached \$81 million between 2001 and 2004, the majority of which was channelled through three successive UN appeals (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 9). The United Nations agencies and the Red Cross movement have been the main actors, supported by the NGO community. Among the donors, Sweden, Australia, the Netherlands and

the European Union have been the strongest supporters of programmes assisting the displaced (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 35).

The official lifting of the IDP status in most provinces as of early 2004 also coincided with the ending of the Consolidated Appeal process as a mechanism to channel assistance to the displaced in Indonesia. Since 2004, most projects targeting conflict-induced internally displaced people and supporting their recovery from the socio-economic impact of their displacement have gradually phased out. With the exception of Aceh, where conflict-induced forced displacement was ongoing until after the tsunami struck the province, and Maluku province where renewed tension caused displacement in April 2004, the United Nations has since 2004 considered that the country no longer hosted any conflict-IDPs, although it continued to provide targeted assistance to the displaced and the host communities in many provinces of the country.

The European Commission, through its "Aid to Uprooted People programme", has remained a strong supporter to the displaced and will during 2007 continue to fund projects targeting the needs of the displaced and the host community in five provinces among the most affected by displacement, including the Maluku provinces, Central Sulawesi, and Central Kalimantan. CARDI, which has assisted conflict-IDPs in various provinces of the country since 2001, will continue implementing projects targeting IDPs during 2007. Originally focused on humanitarian assistance and protection to displaced persons in Indonesia, CARDI's goal has broadened to facilitate the transition of conflict-affected populations to a sustainable peace through community-based interventions aiming at improved social cohesion and good governance.

Recent major natural disasters, such as the December 2004 tsunami and the May 2006 earthquake, as well as the ongoing humanitarian reform process have largely shaped the current framework of the international response to internally displaced people in the country, in particular those displaced by natural disasters. Large scale support is provided by the United Nations for the government's plan for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the tsunami-affected areas, through the Office of the UN Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias (UNORC), established in September 2005.

Following the May 2006 earthquake on the island of Java and in line with the UN humanitarian reform agenda, the Humanitarian Coordinator, together with other humanitarian partners, is applying the "cluster approach" aimed at ensuring greater predictability and accountability in the response. Cluster leads were designated for the following sectors specifically relating to IDPs: emergency shelter (IFRC), child protection and education (UNICEF) and early recovery (UNDP) (OCHA, June 2006, p. 23). Since no large camps were envisaged for the displaced, no agency was formally designated as the lead for camp management and coordination (CMC), although it was agreed that the International Office for Migration (IOM) would take up that role should the need arise. It is naturally too early to assess if the new approach has improved the humanitarian response. Also, given the nature of the emergency and the absence of major protection issues such as those found in conflict situation, it will be difficult to use this case as a test to know if the new coordination arrangements will in the future better address gaps in the protection needs, which have been observed in many of the different situations of internal displacement Indonesia has experienced in recent years.

Between 2001 and 2005, the UN Development agency (UNDP) conducted the North Maluku and Maluku Recovery Programme (NMMRP) aimed at supporting the post-conflict recovery needs of the affected population, including the sustainable reintegration needs of IDPs. Plans for 2006-2010 do not include any specific assistance to conflict-IDPs and focus mainly on strong support to the government for the recovery of Aceh and North Sumatra provinces as well as for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Government of Indonesia & UNDP, May 2006, p.6).

The extent of the damage and destruction created by the tsunami warranted a strong response from the international community to provide assistance to the large number of victims. However, by creating a situation where an enormous amount of money and resources have been channelled towards one particular group of IDPs (the tsunami-affected) within one particular IDP situation (Aceh), the response of the international community has tended to overlook the needs of other groups of displaced in the country who are still in need of support from the government and from the international community to make their displacement end. With an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 people still displaced or inadequately assisted, it is important that the extraordinary support enjoyed by people displaced by the tsunami in Aceh does not come at the expense of other IDPs elsewhere in the country, but rather serves as a standard for other IDP situations.

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Background

General causes of displacement (August 2004)

- Two main type of conflict have produced displacement in Indonesia: "horizontal" and "vertical".
- 'Horizontal' conflict refer to religiously or socially based violent conflicts between communities in the same regions, e.g. West Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku, Central Sulawesi
- 'Vertical' conflicts refer to conflicts between rebels fighters and the security forces, e.g. Aceh or Papua.

SIDA 7 August 2004, pp. 76-77

"Displacement is closely linked to the phenomenon of conflict. Violent conflicts in Indonesia have taken on forms that can be broadly grouped into 'vertical' and 'horizontal' conflicts. The 'horizontal' conflicts refer to religious or socially based violent conflicts between communities in the same region, such as in the violent conflict between the Malay and Dayak against Madurese in West Kalimantan, the Dayak against Madurese in Central Kalimantan, and the Moslems versus Christians in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku. The 'vertical' conflicts refer to violence between the rebel fighters and state security agencies in Aceh and in Papua, and recently in Maluku.

The causes are multifaceted. The evaluation has identified, based on a UNDP commissioned INSIST report and on World Bank SCRAP background papers, as well as other analyses and the team's observations in Indonesia, three relevant proximate causes of displacement due to violence:

Within the population, the changing and complex relationships to natural resources and land; political entrepreneurs seeking to manipulate voting, the cultural susceptibility to agents provocateurs which leads to sudden outbursts of collective violence against neighbours of different identity;

The deterioration of social capital as a bridge between different communities with very sharply defined identities and different economic roles; the poor level of public debate, and the growing lack of common goods shared between the communities"

The inclusion of the population in insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare, and the low level of appreciation by the general public of administrative attempts at resolving disputes; this all exacerbated by the still poorly implemented body of national law regarding land rights, national identification, and dispute resolution.

Related to this is the lack of clarity of the implementation of decentralisation which, according to the World Bank (2003)⁴⁴, is due to the weaknesses of Law no 22/1999 and 25/1999 on the regional autonomy and financial balance of central and regional government respectively. Some laws and presidential decrees which were passed after these two laws have further added to the

confusion. These laws not only conflict with the spirit of regional autonomy and blur the autonomy of different government levels, but also lack sensitivity to their potential for exacerbating conflict."

The transmigration programme (1976-1986)

- Transmigration programmes aimed at transferring populations from the poor and overcrowded areas of the central islands (Java, Lombok, Bali and Madura) to less densely populated areas of the outer islands (Borneo, New Guinea and Sumatra).
- Initiated by the Dutch, this policy was implemented on a large-scale under Suharto's regime with financial support by the World Bank.
- From 1976 to 1986, the WB lent 500 million dollars to fund the project. Some 7 million people were transferred during this period, half of them on their own initiative.
- Critics of the programme claim that the main objective was geopolitical, i.e control indigenous peoples of the outer islands through forced integration. Also, it is argued that the project violated ground property rights of the indigenous peoples and forest dwellers; it was far too costly and contributed to a considerable increase in foreign debt and poverty; it played a part in serious damage to the outer islands' environment through massive forest destruction and did nothing to solve.

Toussaint, Eric, 18 October 2004

"The transmigration project, implemented under the Suharto regime and financially and politically supported by the World Bank, was not a new idea. In fact, the old Dutch colonial masters and the newly independent government had played a part in the migration of many Javanese. This project aimed to displace millions of poor Indonesians from the densely populated central islands (Java - the most densely populated area on earth -, Lombok, Bali and Madura) towards the less densely populated outer islands (Borneo, New Guinea and Sumatra). The official motives were as follows:

Relieve pressure on the island of Java where many peasants were landless;
Reduce poverty by enabling displaced persons to cultivate new lands on the outer islands and ensure them an adequate basic infrastructure, contributing to the economic development of the islands in question;
Promote a more balanced national and regional population distribution.

The World Bank lent 630 million dollars to fund the project between 1976 and 1986 but approximately 130 million dollars would be cancelled. This reduced the Bank contribution to 500 million dollars. The Bank contribution was not limited to financial support alone. It also provided political support, attracting tens of millions of dollars in further support to the project (aid from the Dutch, German, US governments; from the Asian Development Bank, from the United Nations Programme for Development and the World Food Programme). According to Bruce Rich, in 1983, the Bank lent 734 million dollars more (loans to agriculture) to fund settlers.

According to Rich, between 1976 and 1986, 3.5 million people were displaced and 3.5 million others left on their own accord, motivated by government propaganda and advertising. WB loans made it possible to re-settle 71,000 families. 335,000 people were re-settled in Sumatra and Kalimantan. They also funded planning and selection of 400,000 families, or at least 2 million people. Thus, the Bank played a key role in this project. However, its impact was negative and irreversible. Human rights and environmentalist NGOs [22] revealed the covert motivations underlying this massive population displacement project.

Their main criticisms were as follows:

Families were displaced according to a geopolitical objective. Ninety percent of Indonesia's surface area is inhabited by non-Javanese. This creates an unstable political situation. Thus, this project was a national security priority and enabled the government to control indigenous peoples of the outer islands through forced integration.

The transmigration project violated ground property rights of the indigenous peoples and forest dwellers. Transmigratory sites were established on indigenous peoples' lands without their consent or compensation and the latter had to change their ways of life. The implementation of the project led to many acts of resistance, leading to violent situations and human rights abuse.

The average cost of displacing a family was 7000 dollars, according to World Bank estimates [23] (in the mid 1990s. That amounts to 13 times the annual income of most families in the inner islands. This project seems most unprofitable and contributes to a considerable increase in foreign debt and poverty. In fact, according to a 1986 World Bank study, 50% of the displaced families were living below the poverty line and 20% below the subsistence level. Other studies proved that 80% of the project sites proved a failure in terms of improving people's living conditions.

The project was a failure in that it did not contribute to the improvement of poor people's lives in the inner islands. It left the transmigrants in a worse situation than before due to an utterly unfit planning and preparation of sites, a limited access to markets and neglect of land and water ownership. The latter are essential to develop a farming economy. Indeed, according to Rich, the land set aside for the migrants was among the poorest soil on earth.

Nor did this solve Java's population density problems, on the contrary.

Indonesia's outer islands are home to ten per cent of the tropical forests still standing on earth and the transmigration programme has been a very important source of institutional pressure on these islands' environment. In fact, the project played a part in serious damage to the outer islands' environment through massive forest destruction. This project was proven to be the main cause of the country's deforestation, estimated at 1.2 million hectares per annum in 1991. [24]

The World Bank denies all these allegations. In 1994, it decided to carry out an internal review [25] of the projects it had funded, in order to determine any possible responsibilities.

In this report, the World Bank admits that the Sumatra project had "negative and probably irreversible effects" (check English original) on the Kubu people. The Kubu are a nomadic people whose survival depends on the cultivation of fallow lands, hunting and forest gatherings. The audit states that "although the Kubus' presence in the project zones was known since the planning phase, little effort was made to avoid problems" (our translation)."

From the 1998 anti-Chinese ethnic riots to the spectre of national disintegration (1998-1999)

- 1998 witnessed a series of riots throughout Indonesia targeting the ethnic-Chinese minority and leading to the displacement of thousands of ethnic-Chinese Jakarta residents.
- At the end of 1999, Indonesia was confronted with the spectre of disintegration as the peripheral regions, like Aceh or Irian Jaya, were asking for more autonomy and redistribution of the country's wealth. Other regions like East Kalimantan and Riau, also impoverished by the "internal colonialism", were demanding a more decentralized type of government.
- In the Moluccan islands, inter-community violence starting in January 1999 escalated into a regional conflict fought along religious lines while elsewhere in Indonesia conflict between

local communities and "transmigrants" resurfaced in 1999 in West Kalimantan between the Dayaks and the Madurese.

John T. Sidel, December 1999, sect. 1.2

"[...] the early months of 1998 had seen a series of riots in various parts of the Indonesian archipelago, targeting the business establishments, residences, and houses of worship of the country's ethnic-Chinese minority, and in May of that year violent riots in Jakarta and Solo led to more than one thousand deaths, dozens of rapes of ethnic-Chinese women, and the sudden flight of thousands of ethnic-Chinese Jakarta residents to safe havens elsewhere in Indonesia and overseas. Yet as predicted in the preceding reports, fears of continuing anti-Chinese rioting and violence and of a major refugee crisis proved unfounded. The latter half of 1998 saw virtually no anti-Chinese riots, and in 1999, despite widespread fears of campaign-related disturbances and violence, a peaceful election was held with little more than minor scuffles between the supporters of rival parties in the streets. The fear of riots and of anti-Chinese violence has receded into the background of Indonesian politics.

Yet as 1999 draws to a close, Indonesia is once again haunted by the spectre of "disorder", this time manifested in the threat of "disintegration" due to regional "unrest" of various kinds. Indeed, the past year has witnessed a dramatic deterioration of government authority in Aceh, and the increasingly popular assertion of demands for independence for the province. The referendum now promised, however vaguely, to the Acehnese, some commentators suggest, might also work to encourage separatist elements in Irian Jaya, where a small armed movement called *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM or Free Papua Organization) has long been active. Other resource-rich peripheral islands with impoverished populations resentful of Jakarta's "internal colonialism", such as Riau and East Kalimantan, have already seen rising demands for decentralization, for a more federal structure of government in Indonesia, and for a redistribution of government revenues from the national to the provincial level.

Meanwhile, inter-community violence has claimed hundreds of victims in Ambon in the Moluccan islands. Beginning in January 1999, groups of Christians and Muslims in Ambon have engaged in periodic attacks on local communities in a cycle of inter-faith violence that has yet to subside. These clashes herald the prospect of religious and "primordial" conflict elsewhere in an archipelago where tensions between Muslims and Christians, and between established local communities and newcomer "transmigrants", have been on the rise since the early 1990s. Bloody clashes between Dayaks and Madurese in West Kalimantan left hundreds dead in 1996-1997 and again in early 1999, for example, and with the recurring violence in Ambon some commentators have warned of possible communal fratricide elsewhere in the ethnically and religiously diverse Indonesian archipelago.

Indeed, the past year has seen considerable violence and social dislocation in Aceh and in Ambon, with local refugee crises displacing thousands of poor and vulnerable Indonesians. There is little evidence, moreover, of any movement towards an enduring resolution of the conflicts between the Acehnese people and the central government, or between Christians and Muslims in Ambon. More worrying still is the prospect of a backlash by the military establishment against the curtailment of its powers in recent years and the attempted assertion of military authority in Aceh, which would certainly lead to further bloodshed, suffering, and dislocation among the province's beleaguered population. "

The challenge of regional separatism (May 2000)

- Following the fall of Suharto and the independence of East Timor, demands for regional autonomy re-emerged and gained momentum in Aceh and West Papua.

- These demands stemmed from issues like the lack of control over the designation of the political elite, the economic exploitation of regional resources by the centre, the failure to take into account the local culture and traditions and the general feeling of domination by the Jakarta elite.
- These demands triggered a debate between those who favored federalism and those who advocated for a unitary state.

ICG 31 May 2000, p. 12

"The prospect of national disintegration has always been a matter of anxious concern for Indonesians. The population is made up of diverse ethnic communities living in an archipelago stretching from Aceh in the West to Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) in the East. In the past it was common for ethnic communities in the Outer Islands to complain of Javanese domination and during the 1950s Jakarta faced a series of regional revolts. In several cases, Aceh and Irian Jaya, as in East Timor, armed resistance movements fought for independence. Under Soeharto's authoritarian rule, however, demands for regional autonomy were repressed. These concerns re-emerged after the fall of Soeharto and were heightened by the referendum in East Timor which stimulated demands for referenda in Aceh and Papua.

With the lifting of authoritarian constraints, demands for regional autonomy and even independence were again openly raised in other parts of the Outer Islands. Although often encapsulated as a general resentment against 'Javanese domination', the main themes included protests against the effective appointment of regional heads of government by the centre, the economic exploitation of regional resources by central interests, the failure to take account of distinctive regional cultures and traditions, and the role of the army as the ultimate guarantor of central government power. In fact the central government was by no means entirely Javanese in composition and many Outer Islanders held important positions in the central cabinet, the bureaucracy and the armed forces. It was more a case of domination by the Jakarta elite - which included both Javanese and non-Javanese - that was felt as much in the provinces of Java as it was in the Outer Islands.

The issue of regional autonomy triggered a debate between supporters of federalism and those who preferred to retain the unitary system. In the past the concept of federalism was discredited in Indonesian nationalist eyes because it had been proposed by the Dutch during the anti-colonial revolution in the late 1940s as a means to obstruct full independence. The supporters of the unitary state claimed that federalism is really a first step toward national disintegration. On the other hand, the supporters of federalism argued that the establishment of a federal system might be the only way to prevent national disintegration. The unitary state found its strongest support in Java within the nationalist PDI-P and the military while federalism had more support in the Outer Islands although the most prominent advocate of at least considering federalism was the PAN leader, Amien Rais, himself a Javanese.

Taking a middle path, the Habibie government introduced radical legislation in 1999 providing for wide regional autonomy within the existing unitary constitution. The law on regional government in principle decentralised authority over all fields except foreign affairs, defence and security, justice, monetary and fiscal policy, religion and a number of broad economic-policy areas including macro-developmental planning, state economic institutions, development of human and natural resources and high technology. The new powers, however, are not devolved to the 27 provinces but to over 300 districts throughout the country. The law explicitly envisages that the districts will be responsible for such fields as public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, communications, industry and trade, investment, the environment, land matters, cooperatives and labour. The role of provincial governments will be limited to the administration of central-government affairs in the regions, cross-district matters, and functions that the district administrations are not yet ready to handle because of the lack of trained staff. Another

fundamental reform provides for the election of regional heads - provincial governors and district heads - in contrast to the practice of the Soeharto era when they were in effect appointed by the centre after transparently manipulated elections.

[...]

The extent to which the regional autonomy laws will satisfy regional demands will only be known after the implementation of the laws. However, it is clear that the autonomy laws will not be sufficient to overcome the deep resentments felt in two provinces - Aceh and Papua - where armed separatist movements have been operating for decades. In Aceh an armed resistance movement had resisted rule from Jakarta in the 1950s but had been largely subdued in the 1960s only to be revived in the late 1970s. In Papua armed rebels have conducted sporadic operations since the transfer of the territory from Dutch to Indonesian rule in 1963. The special nature of both Aceh and Papua was recognised in 1999 when the MPR called for legislation granting 'special autonomy' to the two provinces.

[...]

Apart from Aceh and Papua, no other province possesses a credible independence movement. In oil-rich Riau in Central Sumatra, local leaders have occasionally called for independence but they are urban politicians who are hardly likely to opt for armed resistance in the jungle if their demands are not met. On the contrary, the Riau leaders seem more concerned with gaining a larger share of oil revenues for their own province. In South Sulawesi, also, students have occasionally raised the independence slogan in demonstrations but their protests were usually triggered by what they saw as insults to provincial pride such as when President Habibie failed to be re-elected as president and when President Abdurrahman dismissed a prominent South Sulawesi minister from his cabinet. In other provinces, including oil-rich East Kalimantan, local demands seem to have been mitigated, at least so far, by the new laws on regional autonomy.

Despite speculation in the international press about the possible 'Balkanisation' of Indonesia, the fact is that only two provinces - Aceh with a population of 4 million and Papua with 2.5 million out of a total Indonesian population of 220 million - have separatist movements that could conceivably succeed. In both provinces popular sentiment strongly favours independence. However, in contrast to Soeharto's heavy reliance on repression, the Abdurrahman government, like the Habibie government before it, has emphasised the need for dialogue and a political approach in both provinces and hopes to reach compromises on the basis of extensive and special autonomy. Whatever the outcome of these dialogues, the prospects of Jakarta permitting either province to break away still seem remote. But even if one or both did succeed in winning independence, this need not lead to 'falling dominoes' as there are hardly any serious independence movements in other provinces."

See also:

"The Challenge of Separatism and Ethnic and Religious Conflict", Chapter 4, in [Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia](#), by Angel Rabasa & Peter Chalk, 2001

The political role of local elites and the manipulation of ethnic identities (2002)

- Dr. van Klinken contends that similar to what happened in Central Kalimantan, local elites in other conflict-affected areas of the country have played an important role in the building of an ethnic discourse and the stimulation of ethnic conflicts with the objective to deflect democracy and gain access to local leadership.

Van Klinken, 2002, pp. 1-3

"All over Indonesia, post-New Order political violence is taking ethnic forms. The Indonesian discourse (inappropriately) calls this 'horizontal violence.' Everywhere the question is asked: What has happened to the Indonesia we thought we knew? The Central Kalimantan vignette suggests we should look for an answer among local elites, who seem to be playing new roles in an unfamiliar script.

Similar vignettes could be drawn from West Kalimantan, Maluku, Poso in Central Sulawesi, Papua or Aceh (the latter two even less 'horizontal' than the others). Even where there has been little or no violence, local elites, from Flores to Gorontalo, from Minahasa and Banten to Riau, are building an exclusive discourse of ethnicity such as has not been heard so publicly in Indonesia before.

One strong perspective on these elites and their constituencies is offered by Jack Snyder. Under certain circumstances (but not others), ethnic conflict or ultra-nationalism can break out as countries emerge from an authoritarian regime. The democratic space that opens up is then occupied less by true democrats than by anti-democratic elites, who manipulate ethnic sentiment in order to deflect popular demands for democracy. Democratisation is likely to fail under circumstances where democratic institutions are weak and where elites are not adaptable to democracy. Serbia, which gave the world the term 'ethnic cleansing', is an obvious example, and Snyder includes a chapter on this country's history before World War I.

When Snyder traces ethnic conflict in transitional situations to anti-democratic elites who take advantage of weak institutional controls, he is taking positions in at least two broader theoretical debates, one on the nature of politicised ethnicity, and another on the political role of elites. In both these debates his positions are at variance with those often taken either in the Indonesianist literature or at least the mass media hitherto.

On the issue of politicised ethnicity, the view still most commonly heard in the mass media (though now rarely in the scholarly literature) is the primordialist one, in which ethnicity is an ancient and fundamental reality. Over against this view, instrumentalists such as Snyder see ethnicity as something much more flexible and subject to (re) invention by elite opinion-makers. In the same spirit, for example, Paul Brass has written a brilliant description of the way such elites in India manipulate ethnic feeling to promote communal violence at certain moments critical for their own needs.

Snyder also takes a position on the political role of elites. The theoretical literature here is broadly divided between functionalists, who view them as a natural part of any social system and essential to its proper functioning, and Marxians/ Weberians, who view them as essentially parasitic. Elites have always played a central role in the study of the strongly hierarchical societies of Southeast Asia. In the past, the functionalist view has dominated, also in Indonesianist literature. Using the language of integration rather than of conflict, elites were represented as the best to which a society gives birth. Modernisation, and lately democratisation, were good things being done by enlightened middle class elites.

However the alternative view, of elites less as society's best servants than as its worst exploiters, experienced a remarkable resurgence in Indonesia following the 1998 crisis. Tim Lindsey, for example, wrote in 2000 that 'elite bad faith' had torpedoed legal reform. They had conducted their real business in a 'shadow system' behind the scenes, and with their military friends had turned Indonesia into a 'black state.' This was by no means an extreme view. The orthodox American free-marketeering opinion of the 1997-98 Indonesian economic crisis was that it was caused by Suharto's cronyism. Even inside the country, exasperation with the 'power elite' was almost the main theme of Indonesian newspaper headlines in the months before Megawati Sukarnoputri finally replaced President Abdurrahman Wahid on 23 July 2001.

The image of parasitic elites who deflect democratisation by stimulating ethnic conflict provides a leitmotif for our inquiry into Indonesia's new ethnic elites. However, it is important to add one more dimension to our inquiry, namely that these are local elites and not national ones. They are not competing for the ultimate prize of national leadership, but for local leadership - at the level of the province. They are 'subaltern' elites, who need to maintain relations upwards, in the capital, as well as downwards, among their chosen constituencies."

Regional governments and autonomy

- Since implementation of the regional autonomy in January 2001, power has been devolved to district governments with a greater control of the elected local assembly over the local executive.
- Implementation of the regional autonomy has led to tensions between the regional governments and the central authorities. There are concerns that the central authorities will try to keep a control over the regions in the absence of effective local democratic institutions.
- Discriminatory recruiting policies favouring native applicants may lead to tensions in regions where Javanese are numerous.

EC, March 2002, p. 22

"43. Regional autonomy in Indonesia has caused significant changes in local government at the provincial and district levels since implementation began on 1 January 2001. Power has been devolved to district governments in a range of sectors, with the provincial government responsible for oversight and policies that influence the province as a whole. Most significantly, accountability of provincial governors and district heads is no longer hierarchically based but through the regional parliaments allowing the exercise of local democratic control by an elected local assembly over the local executive. The mission was told that in many cases the oversight role of the parliament is dominated by corrupt practices to further political and personal interests. Moreover, competition for the position of governor and district head has been accompanied by the mobilisation of supporters of different candidates that has led to violent clashes, and the mission was told of concerns over forthcoming election in West Kalimantan and Maluku.

44. Regional autonomy has led to significant conflict between regional governments and the centre over a variety of issues, in particular the fiscal equalization scheme under regional autonomy, but without an institutional mechanism to mediate these conflicts. This is particularly important for resource-rich provinces such as Riau, where ethno-nationalistic sentiment is growing and where the province has a strong bargaining position with Jakarta. The intervention by the Minister of Home Affairs in the recent sacking of the Mayor of Surabaya by the local parliament, and the reported intention of the President to have power under certain circumstances to dissolve regional parliaments has led many to conclude that central government is seeking to regain control over the regions in the absence of effective local democratic institutions.

45. Regional autonomy has also been accompanied by new policies and rules that are discriminatory, including the issue of '*putra daerah*' (literally translated as 'sons of the region') in which civil servants from a particular region are given preference for jobs over non-native applicants. This may create problems for the many Javanese civil servants working in regional governments who are presently protected from being dismissed by regional governments, and lead to increasing ethnic tensions."

SIDA 7 August 2004, p.77

"Related to this is the lack of clarity of the implementation of decentralisation which, according to the World Bank (2003)44, is due to the weaknesses of Law no 22/1999 and 25/1999 on the

regional autonomy and financial balance of central and regional government respectively. Some laws and presidential decrees which were passed after these two laws have further added to the confusion. These laws not only conflict with the spirit of regional autonomy and blur the autonomy of different government levels, but also lack sensitivity to their potential for exacerbating conflict."

See also:

[Decentralization and Violent Conflicts: The Case of North Maluku, Indonesia](#), World Bank, April 2004

[Indonesia: Managing Decentralisation and Conflict in South Sulawesi](#), IGC, 18 July 2003

Communal violence in the Maluku islands

Basic facts about the Maluku islands

UNDP March 2000, p. 3

"The Maluku archipelago is located in the eastern part of Indonesia, and consists of 1208 islands. It is located between latitudes 3°N and 0.8°S and longitudes 124 and 135°W. In area, it is the largest province of Indonesia, covering some 850,000 km², of which only some 10% constitutes land area.

The population in 1999 was just over two million - less than 1% of the total population of Indonesia - of which more than 830,000 in North Maluku.

The Maluku inhabitants are followers of three major religions: Islam (59%), Christian Protestant (35.5%), and Catholic (5%).

In October 1999, the then Maluku province was divided into two provinces, North Maluku with its capital in Ternate and Maluku with Ambon as its capital. North Maluku Province has yet to be fully functional, since it has not elected its provincial parliament (scheduled for June 2000 followed by election of governor), nor established other government agencies. Previously, Maluku was administratively divided into four districts (Southeast Maluku, Central Maluku, Central Halmahera and North Maluku) and one municipality, the city of Ambon.

The land of the Maluku islands is fertile and Maluku is still a main producer of spices in Indonesia and the sea is rich of fish and other seafood. The Moluccans mostly work as farmers, fishermen and in wood industry, mining and on plantations as well as for the government as civil servants. They are considered by others to be easy-going and friendly but with a strong temperament.

Since the independence of Indonesia, the population of Maluku has significantly increased, especially through the influx of migrants coming from Buton Island in the neighboring province of South-East Sulawesi, and the Bugis and Makassar from South Sulawesi as well as those coming from Java and Sumatra. The migration has largely been spontaneous, but some migrants have arrived as part of the national transmigration programme.

Up to now, the highest concentration of economic activities has been in Ambon Island (about 761 km²) or only less than 1% of the total land area of Maluku. Ambon City is the center for industry, trade, education, tourism, and has a relatively dense population of 330,000 or some 15% of the total Maluku population.

Before the arrival of the colonialism (Portuguese and Dutch), the majority of the population were Muslims. During the colonial period, the number of Christians significantly increased. The principle of equality for all was instituted at the time of independence, giving an equal opportunity for all to get an education, in work opportunity and to start a business."

Background to the conflict in Maluku province (1950-1998)

- Population of indigenous Ambonese has, since the sixteenth century, been relatively evenly divided between Christians and Muslims.
- Factors contributing to the degradation of community relationship include the war in 1950 between the government and the Christian-led RMS and the steady influx of migrants from other parts of Indonesia resulted in the establishment of new settlements outside the traditional alliance system.
- In 1974, local leadership was gradually transformed from a clan-based system to a territorially based system of village heads who enjoyed less authority, with the consequence that when conflict broke out, there were fewer people at a local level with the ability to stop it.
- As Christians were eased out of the positions they had traditionally held in the local government, teaching profession, and police, they began to feel that their political, economic, and cultural existence in Ambon was threatened.
- In 1999, both communities set up posts ("Posko") with networks of mosques and churches, intended to alert the respective communities to any danger of provocation. In fact, once a fight broke out, they served as much to spread rumors and mobilize communities

HRW March 1999, sect. II

"Ambon is the name of a city and an island, and the term 'Ambonese' describes a cultural area that embraces many of the islands in the district of Central Maluku, Maluku province, Indonesia. Those islands include Ambon, Saparua, Haruku, Buru, Manipa, Nusalaut, and Ceram. The population of indigenous Ambonese since the sixteenth century has been relatively evenly divided between Christians and Muslims. For the most part, the two live in separate *negerior* villages, and even within mixed villages, they tend to live in separate *kampungs* or neighborhoods. In addition, many ethnic Butonese migrants from southeast Sulawesi, a large island to the west of Ambon, and ethnic Bugis and Makassarese, from south Sulawesi, have settled in their own *kampungs*. These migrants are overwhelmingly Muslim, and they dominate small-scale retail trading and transportation networks.

Tension between Muslims and Christians in Maluku province had been growing for decades, the result of the declining influence of traditional authority mechanisms; the influx of migrants; and the "greening" or perceived Islamicization of the central government in Jakarta. The outbreaks of communal violence elsewhere in Indonesia in the aftermath of President Soeharto's resignation in May 1998 served to heighten distrust between the two communities.

Both the *pela* alliance system and the authority of traditional local leaders, called *raja*, had been undermined long before the current conflict erupted. The *pela* system had received a fatal blow at the time of Indonesian independence in 1949, when a largely Christian political elite, many with military or administrative ties to the Dutch colonial administration, opted to establish the Republic of the South Moluccas (RMS), rather than join the new Indonesian state. A brief war ensued which the RMS lost in December 1950. In the course of the conflict, many Muslim villages were razed by RMS forces, and the destruction was not forgotten. In addition to the war, a steady influx of migrants from other parts of Indonesia resulted in the establishment of new settlements that were completely outside the *pela* system, which applied only to Ambonese Christians and Muslims.

In 1974, with the passage of a new law on local government, local leadership was gradually transformed from a clan-based system, represented by the Ambonese raja, to a territorially based system of village heads, the lowest rung on the Indonesian administrative ladder. In one sense, the new system was more egalitarian, because it opened up the possibility that migrant communities of ethnic Bugis, Butonese, and Makassarese could be represented, and some candidates for village head appealed to these communities for votes. On the other hand, it meant that many of the village heads lacked the authority the old raja had enjoyed, and when conflict broke out, there were fewer people at a local level with the ability to stop it.

The migrant influx also tipped the demographic balance in favor of Muslims. Migrants from Sulawesi had been coming to trade in Ambon since the sixteenth century, but migration picked up sharply in the 1970s, and with it, increasing tension with the Ambonese population. Ethnic Bugis, who had traditionally settled along the coast in self-contained communities, began to settle in the city of Ambon, displacing other traders, taking over the transportation sector, and in the view of some Ambonese, creating slum areas and contributing to urban crime. Bugis also began to make themselves felt politically in the 1980s and 90s, with tightly organized Bugis associations that local politicians ignored at their peril. Their political rise coincided with what Ambonese Christians saw as an affirmative action policy undertaken by the national government in the early 1990s to redress the marginalization of Muslim entrepreneurs in comparison to their ethnic Chinese competitors. Whatever the rationale for this policy in Muslim majority areas, in Ambon it created anger and frustration among Christians, as they saw not just economic opportunities but also civil service jobs going more and more to Muslims, many of them migrants. As Christians were eased out of the positions they had traditionally held in the local government, teaching profession, and police, they turned to the private sector, only to find that migrant groups from Sulawesi, among others, had sewn up the market. Christians began to feel that their political, economic, and cultural existence in Ambon was threatened.

Communal relations, then, were not good, even before the violence erupted, and everyone we talked to in Ambon spoke of regularly recurring fights between Muslim and Christian kampungs. The neighborhoods seemed to live in a state of barely repressed hostility, but the frequent fights were quickly settled.

The atmosphere, however, changed perceptibly for the worse after a series of possibly provoked communal incidents broke out elsewhere in Indonesia in late 1998. On November 22, 1998, a dispute between local gangs over a gambling establishment, at which Christian Ambonese acted as security guards, turned into a communal riot as rumors spread that the Ambonese had destroyed a local mosque, and Muslims youths trucked into the area then burned some two dozen churches. On November 30, a Christian youth congress in Kupang, West Timor, held a congress, followed by a march, to protest the church-burnings. In the middle of the march, a truckload of youths appeared whom no one seemed to know, and in no time an ethnic Bugis neighborhood, including the mosque, was burned to the ground.

Both incidents were widely believed to have been provoked by the military, because the army in particular was perceived to be the beneficiary of civil unrest: a traumatized population might see the army, rather than a democratically elected government as Indonesia might have next June, as the only guarantor of security. The local government warned religious leaders around the country, as Christmas and the Muslim fasting month approached in December 1998, to be on alert for provocation and to resist being influenced by rumors.

One meeting of religious leaders was held in Ambon in mid-December. The atmosphere was so tense, according to one participant, that the Muslims left convinced that the Christians had decided that the only way to address the problem was to rid the province of Muslim migrants. Leaders of both communities set up "*posko*," an acronym defined either as "communication post"

or “command post” depending on the militancy of the definer. These posts, with networks of mosques and churches connected by cell phone or regular telephone, were intended to alert the respective communities to any danger of provocation. In fact, once a fight broke out, they served as much to spread rumors and mobilize communities.”

Overview of North Maluku conflict and displacement situation (1999-2000)

- The conflict period in North Maluku was both shorter and more intense than in Maluku.
- The escalation of violence was linked to political manipulations surrounding the separation between the two provinces, which took place later that year, in October 1999.
- Localized conflict that started in August 1999 in the Kao area between the local population and Makianese settlers over the formation of a new kecamatan resumed 2 months later and rapidly spread to Ternate and other parts of the province.
- The conflict took a religious tone when Muslim Makian IDPs fleeing the Kao area arrived in Tidore amidst rumors that Christians were preparing a 'holy war'. Muslims attacked Christians in Tidore who fled to Ternate and then North Sulawesi.
- In late 1999, early 2000, violence returned to Halmahera causing more casualties and displacement until June 2000 when the province was placed under a civil emergency and troops brought in to end the conflict.

UNDP, 2005, pp. 18-20

"The major period of conflict in North Maluku was much shorter, almost half the deaths occurring within the space of one month (December 1999), but also much more intense (see Figure 2). Throughout the first half of 1999, when central and southern Maluku were ablaze with communal conflict, the northern islands remained remarkably calm. Although the outbreak of violence in North Maluku predates the announcement of its separation from Maluku, the escalation of violence is generally linked to political machinations surrounding the separation, which revived and intensified the old rivalries between Ternate and Tidore. In August 1999, localized conflict emerged in the Kao area between the local population and the Makianese settlers over the formation and control of a proposed new kecamatan, Malifut. The intervention of the Sultan of Ternate brought about a brief peace, but conflict resumed in October 1999, when North Maluku was officially created, and quickly spread to Ternate and other parts of the new province.

At this stage, the violence – which in Malifut had been primarily ethnic – took on religious overtones, triggered by the arrival of Muslim Makian IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) from Kao and by the circulation of propaganda, including a pamphlet purportedly signed by the synod chairman of the Maluku Protestant Church, GPM, calling on Christians to join in a holy war. Muslim warriors (known as ‘White’ forces) gathered in Tidore, where they attacked and killed Christians. Christians moved to north Ternate, seeking the protection of the Sultan of Ternate; many fled to north Sulawesi. In Ternate city, Christian ‘Yellow’ forces formed. The White forces consisted mainly of ethnic groups from Tidore, Makian and migrants from Gorontalo in North Sulawesi, while the Yellow forces included supporters of the Sultan of Ternate, the political party Golkar and Christians from Halmahera. They fought a pitched battle in December 1999.

About the same time, violence returned to Halmahera following rumours that Jihad forces had arrived in Galela, which was mostly Muslim, and that an attack on Christian villages in Tobelo was imminent. In December 1999, Christian fighters travelled from Kao to Tobelo and attacked Muslims in Tobelo; a day later violence broke out in Galela. Violence and destruction spread to Bacan, Obi and Morotai and as far as Ibu, Sahu and Jailolo. In South Halmahera, the violence

spread in May 2000 when Jihad forces, both local and outside from Ternate and Tidore, attacked Christian villages. Although this is well known as a Muslim area, both Christians and Muslims suffered during the violent conflict. The Christians fled to the forest and some Muslims fled to Ternate. After more than 100 Christians were killed by Laskar Jihad militias in June 2000, North Maluku (along with Maluku) was placed under civil emergency and extra troops were shipped into the province, bringing an end to major conflict. Unlike Maluku, North Maluku has remained relatively peaceful since, largely due to the demographic dominance of the Muslim population, although tensions remain high in some areas."

Conflict and large-scale displacement hit the Maluku provinces (1999-2002)

- Fighting in Ambon started in January 1999 and rapidly spread to the rest of the province. Casualties of the civil war were as high as 5,000-10,000 and at least 700,000 people fled their homes. Although the level of violence has declined since and some IDPs have been able to return, in particular the Muslim IDPs in North Maluku, tensions remains high in Ambon and surroundings islands.
- The arrival of the Islamic Laskar Jihad and several thousands fighters in mid-2000 aggravated the conflict, inflicting high casualties on the Christian side and forcing thousands to flee. A civil emergency was imposed on Maluku and North Maluku in June 2000. By early 2001, most of the fighting had subsided and the provinces were partitioned between Christian and Muslim communities.
- Laskar Jihad seem to have shifted from direct attacks on Christian villages to more involvement in religious and social welfare activities in Maluku.
- Its has been suggested that continuing emergency conditions give security personnel lucrative opportunities and that they may have a hand in the low level violence that continues to prevail in Maluku.
- The main obstacle to peace seems to be still limited trust between the two communities. Furthermore, the Muslim demand that those masterminding the violence (supposedly the Christians) be prosecuted while the Christians see the presence of Laskar Jihad as an obstacle to peace.

ICG, 8 February 2002, p. i-ii

"The fighting that broke out between Christians and Muslims in Ambon, the capital of Indonesia's Maluku province, on 19 January 1999 triggered a virtual civil war that soon spread to other parts of the province. At least 5,000 people (perhaps as many as 10,000) have been killed and close to 700,000 – almost one-third of the population of 2.1 million – became refugees. Peace has yet to be achieved although violence has declined sharply during the last year. Refugees are beginning to return to predominantly Muslim North Maluku (which was separated from the old Maluku province in September 1999) but tensions remain high in Ambon and surrounding islands that are the core of the new Maluku province.

During the initial phase, each side inflicted heavy casualties. But in mid-2000 there was a qualitative change when a Java-based fundamentalist Islamic militia, Laskar Jihad, responding to the perception that Muslims were getting the worst of it, sent several thousand fighters to Ambon. They had received basic military training from a small group of sympathetic officers within the Indonesian National Military (TNI – Tentara Nasional Indonesia) and were supplied with modern weapons after their arrival in Maluku.

Supported by elements in the security forces, the Laskar Jihad put the Christian militias on the defensive, inflicted casualties on the Christian community and forced thousands of Christians to flee, causing the national government to impose a civil emergency in the two Maluku provinces in

June 2000. Although Muslim offensives continued, by early 2001 the level of violence was declining and most of the population had been partitioned into Christian and Muslim zones.

The security forces failed dismally to contain the conflict during the first eighteen months partly because they were hamstrung by the competing sympathies many Christian and Muslim personnel felt for co-religionists. After the introduction of the civil emergency, however, the military adopted a new strategy involving establishment of a Joint Battalion (Yon Gab – Batalyon Gabungan), a centralised mobile reserve drawn from elite forces of the three services that could be sent quickly to conflict areas. In a context where Muslim militias – backed by Laskar Jihad and some military and police personnel – were gaining ground, the Yon Gab found itself usually confronting Muslim forces and soon gained a pro-Christian reputation. The Yon Gab appears to have contributed to the decline in fighting but credible allegations about the brutality of some of its members besmirched its reputation and aggravated Muslim antagonism. In November 2001 it was withdrawn and replaced by army special forces (Kopassus).

In contrast to North Maluku and the southeast part of the Maluku province, shootings and bomb explosions continue on Ambon and nearby islands although attacks on Christian villages and direct armed confrontations are now rare. Laskar Jihad is less openly involved in launching direct attacks on Christians and seems to be concentrating more on religious and social-welfare activities in Maluku although it continues to provide military training and has sent fighters to Poso in South Sulawesi.

Laskar Jihad and another, smaller and more secretive, Muslim militia, the Laskar Mujahidin, have been suspected of links to terrorist organisations outside Indonesia including Al-Qaeda though ICG has found no strong evidence suggesting a significant foreign connection to the troubles in Maluku. In addition, military and police deserters – Christian and Muslim – appear to be involved in occasional attacks. On the Christian side, youth gangs are ready to retaliate if the violence rises. Local speculation suggests that some elements in the security forces tolerate, or even support, a low level of continuing violence in order to induce property-owners to pay protection money. Continuing emergency conditions also give security personnel other lucrative opportunities.

During the last year there have been signs that at least some Muslims are losing enthusiasm for Laskar Jihad. In the past Maluku's Muslims have not been especially attracted to "fundamentalist" movements, and most do not identify closely with Laskar Jihad. However, many are grateful for its role in fending off Christian militias. Muslims lack confidence in the security forces to maintain order and fear that Laskar Jihad's withdrawal would leave them vulnerable to revenge attacks. However, Christian leaders see its presence as the key obstacle to a more permanent peace.

An effective peace agreement still seems far off in Ambon where Muslim leaders and Laskar Jihad are convinced that the Christian side started the fighting and demand that its leaders apologise on behalf of their community and the brains behind the conflict be prosecuted. Christians are equally convinced that Muslims started the conflict. They also have only limited confidence in the TNI's capacity to protect them.

The government's main priority is to ensure that large scale fighting does not resume. To preserve the present "peace", it is essential that the security forces behave in a professional and neutral manner. In Maluku, however, the reality is that local forces, both the military and especially the police, are highly vulnerable to "contamination", partisan alignment with their own religious community. Although Yon Gab contributed to the decline in violence during 2001, its brutal excesses alienated Muslims. The force that replaced it has yet to win the confidence of both communities.

In North Maluku return to “normalcy” is much more advanced, partly because the Muslim majority is too large to feel threatened politically. Although some of the worst massacres took place on Halmahera in North Maluku, it is now increasingly possible for refugees to return. The security forces are needed to prevent revenge attacks but it is hoped that a “natural” reconciliation process can take place.

In Maluku, especially Ambon, government and military emphasise that reconciliation should not be “forced” and should proceed “naturally”. This means the partition of Ambon and other regions into Christian and Muslim zones will not be ended soon. But the longer partition lasts, the harder reconciliation will be. Meanwhile, limited steps have been taken to provide more opportunities for the communities to meet naturally such as establishment of markets in “neutral” areas of Ambon where Christian and Muslims can intermingle. The Baku Bae (reconciliation) movement has sponsored informal meetings between leaders. However, these initiatives are still in early stages, and there is no expectation that natural reconciliation will be achieved quickly.

In January 2002, the national government persuaded leaders of both communities to participate in a peace conference the following month but the gap between the sides remains wide, and the search for peace is far from over."

Chronology of the Maluku conflict **UNDP, 2005, pp.15-17**

"The chronology of the conflict in Maluku is fairly well established. The conflict in Maluku broke out on 19 January 1999, the last day of Ramadan, when a fight between an Ambonese Christian bus driver and an immigrant Bugis Muslim passenger sparked off two months of inter-communal violence in and around Ambon that claimed up to a thousand lives (see Figure 1). Violence resumed and intensified in July 1999, spreading to other parts of the province and continuing into January 2000. By this time Ambon itself had been effectively divided into Christian and Muslim zones, the former controlling around 60 percent of the city, the latter 40 percent.

In May 2000, the Maluku conflict entered a new phase. This second phase was characterised by two developments: the greater involvement of security forces on both sides of the conflict, but predominantly on the Muslim side; and the influx of Muslims from across Indonesia, but primarily Java, under the aegis of the newly formed Laskar Jihad, a militia organisation formed after massive protests against violence towards Muslims in Maluku, which received tacit and possibly active support from sections of the military. The fight was militarised, as handmade weapons and bombs were replaced by professional weapons of unknown provenance; at the same time, power shifted, as the conflict, previously more-or-less evenly balanced, turned decisively in favour of the Muslims.

Amid continuing violence, Maluku was placed under Civilian Emergency status in June 2000, thousands of army and BRIMOB (Brigad Mobil, Mobile Brigades) were deployed into the province, and police and security forces were given greater powers, including curfew. Although many witnesses accused these forces of partiality, the presence of the forces appeared effective as violence subsided. The successful conclusion of the Jakarta-sponsored Malino II peace agreements in February 2002 added to further optimism that the worst was over for Maluku and that reconciliation and reconstruction could take centre-stage (see Figure 1).

While Maluku as a whole has avoided a return to major conflict, Ambon in particular has experienced periodic upsurges in ethnic and religious tensions, occasionally breaking out into violence. The most serious outbreak occurred in April 2004, when over 40 people died in rioting following the raising of the RMS flag at the home of Alex Manuputty, a prominent Christian leader

of the Maluku Sovereignty Front (Front Kedaulatan Maluku, FKM), accused of being a front for the revival of the RMS. Communal conflicts beyond Ambon have also occasionally escalated into violence, such as a fight between Wakal and Mamua groups in Central Maluku that left one person dead and seven injured in December 2004 and more recent villages clashes in Maluku Tenggara Barat. What is important to note here, however, is that these conflicts did not escalate."

Chronology of the North Maluku conflict
UNDP, 2005, pp. 18-20

"The major period of conflict in North Maluku was much shorter, almost half the deaths occurring within the space of one month (December 1999), but also much more intense (see Figure 2). Throughout the first half of 1999, when central and southern Maluku were ablaze with communal conflict, the northern islands remained remarkably calm. Although the outbreak of violence in North Maluku predates the announcement of its separation from Maluku, the escalation of violence is generally linked to political machinations surrounding the separation, which revived and intensified the old rivalries between Ternate and Tidore. In August 1999, localized conflict emerged in the Kao area between the local population and the Makianese settlers over the formation and control of a proposed new kecamatan, Malifut. The intervention of the Sultan of Ternate brought about a brief peace, but conflict resumed in October 1999, when North Maluku was officially created, and quickly spread to Ternate and other parts of the new province.

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Situation in the Maluku stabilised, but tension remains high after April's new eruption of violence (June 2004)

- 5 weeks after the eruption of violence that killed 40 people, destroyed 847 houses and displaced 10,000 in April 2004, the situation in Ambon remained tense.
- On 25 April a ceremony commemorating the 54th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of the South Moluccas triggered violence in Ambon city for several days.
- In the 2 years before the April 2004 renewed violence, Ambon city had known some isolated bomb incidents but they did not trigger further violence or conflict and the situation had become more stable and conducive to finding durable solutions for IDPs.

OCHA 1 June 2004

"The situation in Ambon city remained tense five weeks after the violent confrontations between Muslims and Christians that shook Ambon City in late April. The violence left 40 people dead and over 300 people injured. Several bombs exploded in public places while police defused a number of unexploded bombs. Muslim and Christian communities have drawn invisible demarcation lines dividing Ambon city along the religious lines. The Government has reported some 10,000 newly displaced people while the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) put this number at 4,000 IDPs. Many of these people have been displaced for a number of times and lost their belongings time and again, and will continue relying on the assistance programmes for some time to come. According to Maluku Governor's report to Jakarta, at least 847 housing units (589 unit belonging to recent returnees) and 4 schools including a UNDP funded reconciliation school were destroyed or badly damaged."

ICG 17 May 2004, p. 1

"The city of Ambon, in Maluku (Moluccas), which had been relatively quiet for two years, erupted in violence on 25 April 2004 after a small group of independence supporters held a ceremony commemorating the 54th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of the South Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS).

As of 5 May, the death toll had reached 38, about two-thirds of whom were Muslim. The fact that many were killed by sniper fire has led to a widespread belief that the violence was provoked. Two churches, a Muslim high school, the office of UN humanitarian agencies, and hundreds of homes were set on fire. Close to 10,000 people have been displaced from their homes, adding to the some 20,000 displaced during earlier phases of the conflict who remain unable to return to their original dwellings. (The newly displaced were all from the city of Ambon; the 20,000 figure is for Ambon island, including the city. Several observers noted that the longer term displaced, many of them unemployed youth, provide a ready pool of recruits for violence.) Until 5 May, the deaths and arson had been confined to Ambon city; religious and community leaders had kept many previously hardhit communities elsewhere on the island and in the central Moluccan archipelago from exploding, a tribute to the reconciliation efforts over the last two years. But that day, gunmen killed two people on Buru island, and there have subsequently been isolated outbreaks elsewhere, although the city itself has returned to a tense calm. The longer it takes to uncover the perpetrators of this latest round of violence, the greater the danger of a new eruption."

OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 18

"Over the last two years, the situation has become more stable and conducive to finding durable solutions for IDPs. While some isolated bomb incidents continued, they did not trigger further violence or conflicts. The apparent shift in atmosphere, from tension and fear to hope and optimism for stability and peace, is strengthened by the decline in the number of communal revenge attacks and violence as a result of security incidents, and replacement in Ambon City of military check posts by mobile patrols consisting of special military and police personnel. Initiatives to organise joint meetings and sports events/activities between religious groups have been intensified with the help of international humanitarian organisations to facilitate dialogue

among deeply divided communities. In a Presidential Decree number 71/2003, as of 15 September 2003, the three years old "Civil Emergency Status" of Maluku has finally been lifted, which clearly indicates the improved security situation in the province and may encourage more returns."

See also:

[Preliminary Report of Human Rights Violation in Ambon, Maluku, Masariku Network, 16 May 2004](#)

["Who is behind the Maluku violence?", Aljazeera, 13 May 2004](#)

Matrix showing the national and international humanitarian response: [Humanitarian Assistance to Conflict Affected Population, OCHA-Maluku, 1 June 2004](#)

Despite continued tension, overall security situation improved during 2005 (December 2005)

- In March 2005, two bombing incidents took place in Ambon and dozens were injured in sectarian violence.
- Ambon residents were reported to flee to safer places in anticipation of the RMS jubilee which caused violence and the displacement of thousands of Ambonese in April 2004.
- No significant incidents reported on RMS anniversary on 25 April.
- Despite several incidents, the overall security situation improved during 2005.

Violence erupts in March 2005

UNOHC, 31 March 2005

"Sporadic violence has continued and tension between the two communities has remained high in Ambon and several of its surrounding small islands. The violence has resulted in some injured, but no death. President S.B. Yudhoyono has ordered National Police Chief Gen. Da'i Bachtiar and Military Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto to launch intelligence operations to apprehend the perpetrators of the violence. Police last month sent a team of elite snipers to reinforce Ambon anticipating unrest ahead of the Republic of South Maluku separatist group's "independence day" on April 25."

AP, 22 March 2005

"Nineteen people were injured in sectarian violence in the eastern Indonesian province of Maluku, police said Tuesday.

The violence erupted late Monday, when a hand grenade hurled by two unidentified men on a motorcycle exploded in a Muslim neighborhood in the provincial capital, Ambon, injuring five residents, said local police chief Lt. Col. Leonidas Braksan.

Muslims angered by the blast attacked a bus carrying Christians in the nearby Kapaha neighborhood, damaging the vehicle and clubbing its passengers. They also attacked motorcycle taxi drivers, injuring a total of 14 people.

Witnesses said police fired warning shots to disperse the Muslim attackers. Some of the injured were reported to be in serious condition.

Braksan declined to speculate on the motive for the bombing, and said the situation had returned to normal.

The blast was the second this month in Ambon, about 2,600 kilometers (1,600 miles) northeast of Jakarta. On April 5, unidentified attackers hurled a grenade at a group of motorcycle taxi drivers in a Christian district, injuring three.

Maluku province was ravaged by Muslim-Christian fighting between 1999 and 2001 that left at least 6,000 people dead. A peace deal stemmed the worst of the fighting, but sporadic violence continues in the region."

Ambon resident take refuge in safer areas ahead of RMS anniversary (April 2005)

Jakarta Post, 25 April 2005

"Fearing a repeat of last year, many Ambon residents were taking refuge in safer areas as Monday's anniversary of the separatist group, South Maluku Republic (RMS) is likely to be celebrated. "We fear that riots will again take place in the city. For our own safety, we're going to take refuge in a safer place," said Dodi Passal, 32, a resident in Waringin area in Ambon city on Saturday.

Dodi's fear might be justified as his house is located right on the border of the Muslim and Christian sectors of the religiously divided town, an area prone to sectarian conflict, especially as most Christians support RMS and most Muslims currently residing here do not.

The area became a warzone between Muslims and Christians during sectarian riots that broke out in January 1999 and lasted for several years, as well as the relatively smaller rampage on April 25 last year. Dozens of people were killed and hundreds of others were injured during sectarian rioting last year that was triggered by the commemoration of the RMS' 54th anniversary. (...)

People normally stay with relatives on the outskirts of Ambon or other nearby islands.

In an ominous sign of possible trouble in the Waringin area, a Muslim area, women and children have already been sent away to safer places, while the men have stayed put, according to Achmad Hatala, 41.

(...)

Police officers are apparently aware of the gravity of the situation, so they began sending reinforcements to the area on Friday. They have also built new posts in some areas considered to be RMS strongholds, such as the Kudamati area in Nusaniwe district. "

No major incidents reported during RMS anniversary

OCHA, 1 May 2005

"The self-proclaimed South Maluku Republic (RMS)'s 55th anniversary on 25 April passed by without significant incidents. The city of Ambon was reported relatively quiet, with most people staying at home or taking refuge in safer areas for fear of sectarian violence. Authorities have placed Ambon on high alert for this year's anniversary, with nearly 800 police, two anti-terror units and special mobile teams deployed in the city. Police were also reportedly conducting helicopter patrols around rebel strongholds and other remote areas. A minor bomb explosion occurred few days before near a police station that caused panic and traffic snares in Ambon, but there were no casualties or damages."

Overall level of violence minimal during 2005

CARDI, December 2005, p. 2

"An improved security condition ushered in a sense of normalcy that contributed to improved social integration in Maluku. However, it is still unclear whether this improvement resulted from

durable, bottom-up reconciliation amongst communities or reactionary, top-down initiatives by the elites' strong security approaches. Improved access, produced by stabilized security conditions throughout the islands, increased economic activities. Yet, signs of improvements largely appeared in more established regions like Ambon city and Central Maluku district. In addition, the latest data provided by the provincial authority in 2005 shows that 46% of Maluku's total population still live below the national poverty line, much higher Indonesia's national average rate of 32%.

(...)

Security – The general security situation in Maluku improved during 2005. Though communal clashes did occur following several incidents and provocations, the overall level of violence in Maluku was minimal. In total, 29 incidents occurred and caused 14 fatalities and 97 injuries. Bomb explosions, armed-attacks and village clashes caused the most damage. 10 bomb explosions occurred and caused no fatalities but 31 injuries. 5 armed-attacks caused 10 fatalities and 3 injuries. 4 village clashes caused 4 fatalities and 63 injuries, while also damaging at least 16 houses.

Brief Security Analysis (Motives and Trend) – Ongoing police investigations revealed that terrorist interests motivated most of the major incidents of armed attacks. Despite several successful police raids, police believe that a "Mujahidin group" is still active. In addition, networks of Muslim militia were established during the 2000-2002 conflict, have links to Poso (Central Sulawesi), and are believed to still operate today. Of course, many suspected leaders and members of the RMS (South Maluku Republic) movement were arrested in 2004, effectively crippling its operations."

Struggle for autonomy in Aceh

Renewed independence aspirations after Suharto's resignation (1998-1999)

- In the context of the the Reformasi movement , the fall of Suharto and the political liberalization in 1998, aspirations for change and social justice in Aceh grew stronger. In August 1998, the military operation status of the province was terminated and promises were made to demilitarize Aceh.
- In early 1999, Acehnese students initiated a campaign for a referendum on Aceh's political status and while the initiative was gaining ground through the province, GAM intensified its activities to undermine the authority of the local government.
- The violent military response to these claims further contributed to undermine the local authorities as well as the prospect of resolving the province's problems in the framework of an unitary Indonesian state.
- The election of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri to the presidency and vice-presidency, in October 1999, contributed to renewed hope and dynamism in the struggle for independence. Demonstrations and pro-independence rallies brought the province to a virtual standstill in November.

John T. Sidel December 1999, sect. 2.2

"[...] the emergence of the *Reformasi* movement in early 1998, the resignation of President Suharto in late May of that year, and the subsequent period of political liberalization and uncertainty under the transitional Habibie administration heralded the possibility of momentous change in Aceh. Human rights activists and assorted civilian groups grew more vocal in their demands for the prosecution of human rights abuses under the Suharto regime, and revelations of atrocities in Aceh were widely published and aired by the media both in Jakarta and in Aceh itself. In August 1998, the then Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief and Defence Minister General

Wiranto announced the termination of Aceh's status as a *Daerah Operasi Militer* and promised to withdraw extra-territorial troops from the province. Yet following a riot in the city of Lhokseumawe on 31 August in which local residents stoned TNI troops, the process of demilitarization in Aceh slowed considerably, and progress towards the prosecution of human rights cases against military offenders ground to a virtual halt.

Frustrated by the lack of substantive change on the ground in Aceh, and emboldened by the climate of political liberalization in Jakarta, the moves towards a referendum for East Timor, and the forthcoming national elections, Acehnese student activists who had mobilized in early 1998 behind the banner of *Reformasi* and in support of the removal of Suharto rechannelled their energies in new directions in early 1999. In late January 1999, for example, Acehnese student activists initiated a campaign for a referendum on Aceh's political status, which rapidly gained support throughout the troubled province. Meanwhile, the guerrilla forces of the GAM had stepped up their activities, and the authority of the central government in Aceh began to crumble, as suggested by the overwhelming success of the campaign to boycott the national elections in June.

The predictably inept and violent reaction of the TNI to these trends in Aceh further contributed to the deterioration of local support for the government and local faith in the prospects for reform within the framework of Indonesia. On 3 May 1999 TNI troops killed more than 40 persons when they fired on pro-independence demonstrators, and on 23 July security forces massacred more than 50 Acehnese in an attack on a religious school in West Aceh. The following month security officials announced plans for renewed counterinsurgency operations in Aceh, while in Jakarta military representatives in the national parliament initiated legislation that would allow for the declaration of a state of emergency and martial law powers in provinces suffering from severe security problems.

In the context of these deteriorating conditions and ominous signs of further violence, the election of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri to the presidency and vice-presidency, respectively, in late October 1999 provided the occasion for renewed mobilization in support of independence in Aceh. On 28 October, for example, tens of thousands of marchers and convoys of cars, trucks, mini-buses, and motorcycles converged on Banda Aceh, the provincial capital, and other locations in a massive demonstration demanding a referendum and independence for Aceh. On 8 November, moreover, a pro-referendum and pro-independence rally in Aceh drew an estimated two million supporters and brought the province to a standstill. In Aceh, the dramatic effect of this rally was immediately palpable, as indicated by reports that government functions in the province had virtually ceased and pronouncements by members of the local assembly in the province, the vice-governor, and even the provincial governor in favour of a referendum for Aceh.

Meanwhile in Jakarta, tension over the central government's policy towards Aceh intensified in the course of November and December, with little sign of resolution of the problem as the end of 1999 drew near. On the one hand, President Wahid made repeated offers of a referendum for Aceh, and, while remaining characteristically vague and evasive with regard to the timing of the referendum and the options to be provided in it, initiated moves towards negotiations with various Acehnese groups, including the leadership of GAM. While civilian figures like the DPR speaker and Golkar chief, Akbar Tanjung, and the MPR speaker and leader of *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN or National Mandate Party), Amien Rais, criticized Wahid for exceeding his brief and made equally vague statements with regard to the prospects for a referendum, they followed Wahid in calling for a peaceful resolution of the problems in Aceh and initiated a parliamentary investigation into human rights abuses in Aceh which led to hearings in which high-ranking active and retired TNI officers were summoned to provide testimony.

On the other hand, various statements by ranking security officials and manoeuvres by forces on the ground indicated that the TNI had not abandoned their heavy-handed approach to separatist

aspirations and activities in Aceh. TNI officers, both retired and active, have been quoted as opposing a referendum - or independence - for Aceh, and, more generally, the various proposals for greater local autonomy or federalism presented by various civilian political figures. Moreover, high-ranking security officials including the Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, General Wiranto, have called for a declaration of a state of emergency in Aceh and for a military crackdown in the province. Meanwhile, in some areas of Aceh, TNI troops have responded to the increasingly openly hostile climate with wanton acts of violence against the local population.

As 1999 draws to a close, no peaceful resolution of the conflict in Aceh appears to be on the horizon. Demands for a referendum have won enormous popular support in Aceh, leading to a highly effective campaign of civil disobedience and a virtual implosion of government authority in the province. By most accounts, only a referendum which included the option of independence would be acceptable to the Acehnese population in the current climate, and if such a referendum were held, an overwhelming vote in favour of independence would be most likely. Adoption of the policy favoured by the TNI would entail a declaration of a state of emergency in Aceh and martial law in the province as a justification for a harsh crackdown on the streets and counterinsurgency operations in the hinterlands. If the past is any guide, such policies are likely to lead to considerable human rights abuses, large numbers of casualties, tremendous human suffering and social dislocation, as well as an even further hardening of local sentiments against the central government and in favour of independence for Aceh."

For more details on the reasons behind the explosion of violence in Aceh and the support to the pro-independence movement GAM, see HRW, "Indonesia: Why is Aceh Exploding ?" [[External link](#)], August 1999.

Fighting and human rights abuses force people to flee (1999-2001)

- 1999 witnessed large-scale displacement of Acehnese in Aceh following intense repression by the military and the police as well as clashes between the security forces and GAM. Most displaced remained within the province and sought refuge in mosques and schools. The number of IDPs dramatically increased in the months preceding the general election of October 1999 with people fleeing both GAM and the military.
- In February 2000, sweeping operations by the police and military led Acehnese to flee their homes.
- In May 2000, GAM and the Indonesian authorities agreed on a "humanitarian pause" (opposed by the military). On June 1, one day before the pause was to take effect, more than 6,000 people fled their homes in North Aceh because of continued fighting.
- Although globally ineffective in stopping the violence, an extension of the humanitarian pause was signed in January 2001.
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USCR January 2001, pp. 13-14

"In 1999, large numbers of Acehnese began fleeing their homes in response to brutality by the military and police, or out of fear of being caught up in clashes between the security forces and GAM. Although some Acehnese—particularly those with financial means—fled outside of Aceh (often to Medan), most remained inside, usually in camps that formed around mosques and school compounds. The months preceding Indonesia's general election in October 1999 saw a dramatic increase in the number of internally displaced persons, not only because of the violence but because some GAM members reportedly ordered Acehnese to leave their homes and set up camps to avoid being forced by the military to vote. The Acehnese may therefore have feared

both the military and GAM. Some villagers sought to avoid both by fleeing to the forests and mountains.

January 2000 saw mounting pressure on Indonesia's new president, Wahid, to end the violence and human rights abuses in Aceh and to hold trials for those accused of atrocities. Although prior to his election he had publicly supported an East Timor-like referendum in Aceh (allowing a choice between autonomy within Indonesia or independence), once in office he asserted that the referendum should only address whether Aceh should be governed by Sharia (Islamic law).

In February 2000, GAM's military commander in Aceh, Tenguku Abdullah Syafi'ie, publicly announced the rebels' willingness to negotiate a cease-fire if the army and police discontinued "sweeping" operations in Aceh (operations that include roadblocks, door-to-door searches, and other techniques ostensibly to locate GAM members but also reportedly used to intimidate civilians and extort money). Many displaced Acehnese have said that such operations, or even rumors that such would begin in their villages, led them to flee their homes.

That same month, the military and police launched the latest in a series of post-DOM operations in Aceh. As the deaths and disappearances of human rights activists began to increase (and as the bodies of the dead showed signs of torture), international NGOs increased their calls for impartial investigations. In mid-February, General Wiranto was removed from his new post as security minister for his alleged role in military-sponsored human rights abuses in East Timor.

April 17, 2000 marked the beginning of long-anticipated human rights trials of 24 soldiers and one civilian for their roles in a July 1999 massacre in Aceh. The trials were conducted by a joint civil-military court (to the dismay of many Acehnese and some international human rights groups). More than 1,000 soldiers were sent to safeguard the proceedings because of an increase in arson attacks and bombings in the area. The eventual outcome was a guilty verdict for all 25 suspects and a sentence of eight to ten years in prison—a sentence regarded as too light by much of Aceh's population.

Wahid announced in early May 2000 that his government and GAM's leadership (based in Sweden) had reached an agreement on a "humanitarian pause" to the violence in Aceh. Agreement was reached during talks in Geneva facilitated by the Henri Dunant Foundation. The pause, strongly opposed by the Indonesian military, was to commence on June 2 for an initial period of three months and be regularly reviewed for renewal.

The day before the pause was to take effect, more than 6,000 Acehnese reportedly fled their homes in North Aceh because of continued fighting. The next day, the leader of a splinter GAM faction was shot at point blank range in a restaurant in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur. GAM accused military intelligence agents of the murder, and the military cast blame on GAM. In the second week of June, as prospects of a genuine cease-fire seemed grim, Wahid dismissed the governor of Aceh and replaced him with a senior minister viewed by many Acehnese as condoning human rights abuses in the region.

The following months saw continuing sweeping operations in Aceh as well as ongoing clashes causing displacement and general unrest. The new governor said authorities had been unable to implement the truce since they had not received the funds earmarked for humanitarian assistance. Both Wahid and GAM leaders proposed an extension of the pause to allow assistance to reach the internally displaced persons.

Despite charges by Indonesia's defense minister that the humanitarian pause is "too advantageous" to GAM, in late September the two sides signed an extension of the agreement through January 15, 2001 (the pause formally lapsed from September 3 to October 15; however,

the lapse made little difference because violence had continued and even intensified during the pause).

November 2000 proved especially violent in Aceh, as military and police clashed with hundreds of thousands of Acehnese demonstrating at a two-day pro-referendum rally in the provincial capital. Outside the capital, as many as a million more were stranded on roadsides or in camps as soldiers blocked their efforts to attend the rally. Although the official death toll was in the 30s, several human rights groups said more than 200 Acehnese had been killed within a one-week period. Another 500 were reported missing.

As of December 2000, the situation in Aceh remained at a violent stalemate, with both sides saying the humanitarian pause would not be extended past January 2001. A referendum on independence appears unlikely, and most Acehnese say promises of greater autonomy are meaningless. While many Acehnese do not support all of GAM's tactics, and may even have reason to fear some elements of GAM, most appear to support the insurgency in general, given their common enemy—the Indonesian military. GAM has also engendered support by rebuilding homes burned by the military and providing some level of security. Often, however, civilians are targeted for their real or perceived support for GAM, or they simply become victims of the cross-fire. As the violence continues, Acehnese continue to flee their homes."

Agreement on cessation of hostilities signed in December 2002 (2001-2003)

- Military offensives were launched in Aceh in April 2001 against GAM. "Special Autonomy" was conferred to the province in July 2001. Hundreds of people (mostly civilians) were killed during the height of the fighting in Central Aceh.
- Both sides are responsible for committing atrocities.
- Representatives of GAM and the Indonesian government met in Geneva on 2-3 February 2002 where they agreed to turn the armed conflict into a political dispute and involve other Acehnese groups than GAM in the discussions.
- The Indonesian government's policy in Aceh is one of balanced military action with political and economic devolution measures aiming at reducing people's grievances against the government. The main problem remains the unaccountability of the military and the police.
- On 9 December 2002, an agreement on cessation of hostilities in Aceh was concluded in Geneva resulting in a dramatic drop in the level of violence.
- The agreement is a framework for negotiating a resolution of the conflict, and it remains extremely fragile
- On 9 February 2003, the two sides moved into a five-month implementation phase with major differences unresolved

ICG 30 January 2002, p. 1

"Indonesia's efforts to end the separatist rebellion in Aceh entered a new phase in April 2001 with the launching of a military offensive against the guerrillas of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Three months later, the government passed a law conferring "special autonomy", or limited selfgovernment, on the province. This briefing paper charts recent events in Aceh, updating two ICG reports in 2001 which analysed these two strands of Indonesian policy: military force and the offer of autonomy.

The military offensive has done some damage to GAM but the guerrillas do not seem close to defeat. The majority of the war's victims are civilians and both sides are thought to have committed atrocities in the last year, including mass murder. One of the worst periods of violence

was in the district of Central Aceh in mid-2001, during which hundreds of people were killed by GAM, the military or local militias.

The military has had some success in improving its battered public image in Aceh, though soldiers still seem largely unaccountable to the law, and reports continue of civilians being killed. This lack of accountability is also true of the police, who have an even worse reputation. As for GAM, parts of the movement have degenerated into banditry, costing it some support in Aceh. Although civilian views are hard to assess in the midst of the conflict, disillusionment and despair appear widespread.

Against this gloomy background, the meeting between representatives of the Indonesian government and GAM in Geneva on 2 and 3 February 2002 was a welcome development. They agreed to turn the armed conflict into a political dispute and involve other Acehnese groups than GAM in the discussions. However, previous agreements along these lines were violated by both sides, and there is a risk the current round of talks will meet the same fate. There is a need for concerted international pressure on both sides to continue talking and to uphold any future agreements that are reached, or the war is likely to drag on for some time at great human cost.

Indonesian policy aims to balance military action with political and economic measures to win back the loyalty of Acehnese who favour independence. In practice, military action is still the dominant factor. The implementation of special autonomy, intended to reduce Acehnese grievances against the government, is still in its early stages, and progress on fleshing out the law with local regulations has been slow. The implementation of autonomy is likely to take some time, and its final shape is far from clear. Given that GAM cannot force Indonesia to leave Aceh and the lack of international support for self-determination in the province, some form of autonomy still offers the only realistic chance of an eventual compromise peace. Such a plan is unlikely to work, however, without further reform of the Indonesian military and bureaucracy, which are still largely unaccountable for their actions to the Indonesian public and to the law."

Hopes raised in December 2002 by an agreement on cessation of hostilities

ICG 27 February 2003, p. 3

"On 9 December 2002, an agreement on cessation of hostilities in Aceh was concluded in Geneva, bringing hope that an end to the 26-year-old conflict between Indonesian government forces and guerrillas of the pro-independence Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) was in sight. Since then there have been many positive developments, most strikingly, a dramatic drop in the level of violence.

The agreement, however, is not a peace settlement. It is rather a framework for negotiating a resolution of the conflict, and it remains extremely fragile. The first two months were supposed to be the confidence-building phase of the accord, but far from generating confidence, they may have actually reinforced each side's wariness of the other's long-term intentions.

On 9 February 2003, the two sides moved into a five-month implementation phase with major differences unresolved. These include how the Indonesian military will relocate as GAM places an increasing percentage of its weapons in designated locations. The leadership of GAM may have accepted the concept of autonomy as a starting point for discussions but not as a political end, and there remains little incentive for the guerrilla group to reinvent itself as a political party working within the Indonesian electoral system.

The Indonesian army is not likely to sit quietly indefinitely if the reduction of violence leads, as appears to be the case, to more organising in support of independence, whether or not that organising constitutes a formal violation of the agreement. The provincial government of

Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) also constitutes an obstacle to lasting peace because it has such low credibility and is so widely seen as corrupt. As long as it is seen to embody "autonomy", as granted to Aceh under an August 2001 law, many Acehnese will continue to see independence as a desirable alternative.

The 9 December 2002 agreement, brokered by the Geneva-based non-governmental organisation, the Henri Dunant Centre (HDC), was the outcome of three years of tortuous negotiations and interim efforts to end the violence that worked briefly and then collapsed.

This agreement is different from all those that preceded it. It has international monitors in place. Its structure for investigation and reporting of violations is already far more transparent than those in the previous accords. It is backed at the highest levels of the Indonesian government and by a broad range of international donors. It is the best – and maybe the last – chance that the 4.4 million people of Aceh have for a negotiated peace. It may also be their best chance to get international backing for local government reform and substantial post-conflict reconstruction aid. If the agreement holds, not everyone wins, but if it fails, everyone loses."

See full text of the ['Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement Between Government of the Republic of Indonesia and The Free Aceh Movement'](#), 9 December 2002

Military operation in Aceh results in forced displacement and human rights violations (May 2003-December 2004)

- Human Rights Watch has documented widespread human rights violations in Aceh province since the start of the military operations.
- Thousands of civilians have fled their homes and been forcibly relocated by the military for operational reasons.
- Displacement is often triggered by the proximity of armed conflict or direct acts of violence against civilians and has been used as a strategy of war by the parties to the conflict.
- Forced displacement is openly used by the military to separate GAM insurgents from the civilians.
- GAM forces have reportedly forcibly collected identification cards from villagers, thereby putting civilians at risk.
- New identity cards are being issued to all Aceh residents.

AI, 7 October 2004, p. 3

"Data collected by Amnesty International about the human rights situation under the current military operations demonstrates a pattern of grave abuses of human rights that closely match both the pattern and the intensity of the human rights abuses committed during the height of the DOM period. Indeed, many of those interviewed by Amnesty International described the recent military emergency as "DOM 2".

The stated objective of the latest military campaign is to "crush" GAM and restore security to NAD. The methods employed to achieve this, in common with methods employed in previous operations, have frequently been in contravention of international humanitarian and human rights law which forbid the derogation of certain basic rights, including the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment. Such methods include unlawful killings, "disappearances", arbitrary detention, torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. GAM has retaliated with the taking of hostages, unlawful killings and other abuses.

A strategy of civil-military cooperation has been employed in which the civilian population is enlisted to provide support to the military operations. Measures have also been put in place, which have had the effect of controlling the population, restricting access to the province and preventing the gathering and dissemination of information about the human rights situation.

These strategies have resulted in considerable hardship for the population, including internal displacement, disruption to economic activity, denial of access to humanitarian assistance, and disproportionate restrictions on movement and freedom of expression.

Under the civil emergency, which has been in place since May 2004, military operations are continuing as before and civilian casualties are still being reported. Indeed, unlawful killings appear to have been sanctioned by the Head of the Regional Civil Emergency Authority (who is also the Provincial Governor), who stated in June 2004 that "unidentified, suspicious looking people" will be shot on sight.⁽¹⁴⁾ In the meantime, many hundreds of political prisoners, tried in unfair trials and in many cases convicted primarily on the basis of evidence obtained under torture, remain in prison. Arrests of "GAM suspects" are still continuing and those detained are at grave risk of torture and ill-treatment. Moreover, an existing ban on access to NAD by foreigners has been extended, with the result that international humanitarian and human rights agencies are still unable to carry out their work in the province."

HRW, April 2004, p. 4

"The current military offensive in Aceh began on May 19, 2003, after a six-month ceasefire failed to resolve the longstanding conflict in the province. The Aceh offensive is Indonesia's largest military campaign since the country's invasion of East Timor in 1975. The operation involves an estimated 30,000 troops, who are opposed by approximately 5,000 armed members of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM).

Human Rights Watch has documented widespread human rights violations in Aceh province since the start of the military operations in the province in May 2003. Based on testimony from Acehese refugees in Malaysia there is substantial evidence documenting the role of Indonesian security forces in extra-judicial executions, forced disappearances, beatings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and drastic limits on freedom of movement in Aceh. There is also a clear pattern of security forces singling out and persecuting young men, who the military claim to be members or supporters of GAM.

The renewed fighting has also caused massive internal displacement. Thousands of civilians have fled their homes and been forcibly relocated by the military for operational reasons. The military has used heavy artillery to attack rebel bases, causing more displacement of nearby villages as thousands flee their homes. The influx of troops has been accompanied by new and revived military tactics that are directly affecting civilians' daily lives. The stepped-up operations include patrols and "sweepings"—a set of tactics to identify separatists or their supporters through vehicle searches and document checks, moving systematically from one village to the next. In many incidents described to Human Rights Watch, security forces beat and abusively interrogated local residents. Other tactics under martial law include forcing villagers into compulsory night guard duty, and establishing a military presence at the village level, primarily through temporary posts manned by troops from outside Aceh. In all of these tactics young men are being singled out for harassment and abuse."

ICVA, 5 September 2003

"Displacement is often triggered by the proximity of armed conflict or direct acts of violence against civilians. The number of civilian casualties is unconfirmed as the lack of access and independent monitoring mean that the numbers available are impossible to verify. Reports, however, indicate that while men are the primary targets for torture and execution, women are

targeted for kidnapping, rape, and interrogation as a way to get information about their husbands or family members. Children become witnesses to violence.

The humanitarian community is also concerned that displacement has been used as a strategy of war by the parties to the conflict. Affected communities have had to leave their villages with no time to prepare and with little information about where they would be displaced to, for how long, and with no guarantee for the security of their property in their absence.

Movements to flee conflict have also been inhibited. Several layers of checkpoints have been established on the internal border between Aceh and North Sumatra where those seeking refuge in the neighbouring province are required to submit travel documents and their identity cards."

Military forcibly relocate civilians

HRW, 5 June 2003, pp. 3-4

"In an effort to identify GAM members, the Indonesian military has reportedly engaged in operations to physically separate civilians from suspected armed separatists. Human Rights Watch has received credible accounts from Banda Aceh of the creation of camps for this purpose.

General Endriartono Sutarto, the commander of Indonesia's armed forces, has publicly stated that hundreds of thousands of Acehnese may be forced from their homes and interned in camps. He is reported as stating that local government officials were already preparing such facilities, but with an allegedly benign motive: 'Our first priority is to separate GAM from the people, because we don't want any people to get hurt. If we have to move them to win this war, we will, but that's a last resort.'

Up to 200,000 people may be moved from their homes and placed in special camps under military guard. Indonesia's Minister of Social Affairs is reported to have said: 'We are waiting for an order from the military administration. Should they want to comb a certain area, we will move people from their homes.'

On June 3, Colonel Ditya Sudarsono, spokesman for the martial law administrator, told reporters that, "It is quite possible for troops to have forced them [civilians] to leave their homes as part of security operations to distinguish them from GAM rebels. But once troops finished combing the area, the residents may return to their homes. Our objective is to protect civilians and to keep them from becoming victims of GAM." He went on to say that security forces would regard villagers who refuse to be moved as GAM because "that means they are protecting GAM and that makes them GAM members or its supporters."

Human Rights Watch is concerned about potential mistreatment of civilians who refuse to leave their homes and the use of population movements for military convenience--not, as General Endriartono suggests, as a last resort or solely for the protection of civilians. Human Rights Watch reminds the Government of Indonesia that mass relocation or displacement of civilians solely for the purpose of denying a willing social base to the opposing force is prohibited by international humanitarian law. The government of Indonesia should refrain from ordering the displacement of people unless there are genuine concerns for the security of the civilians involved, or there are imperative military reasons that demand such action be taken. Should such displacements be carried out, all possible measures should be taken to ensure that the sites to which they are relocated offer satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.

Human Rights Watch has also received accounts from NGOs and press sources that GAM forces have been forcibly collecting identification cards from villagers. According to these sources, GAM has done this to protect its members and supporters from arrest by making it impossible for Indonesian forces to separate individuals on government lists of GAM members and supporters from other Acehnese. However, this tactic may put all young males--the most obvious source of potential GAM supporters--at risk of being accused of membership in GAM and suffering ill-treatment as a result.

Human Rights Watch has already received reports that soldiers have accused civilians without identification cards of being GAM supporters. The Indonesian authorities have responded by announcing that all Acehnese will be issued with new identification cards."

RSC, July 2005, p.11

"In short, martial law signaled a new round of armed conflict in Aceh during which internal, indeed forced, displacement of civilian populations emerged as a deliberate strategy of war. As a result, the Indonesian authorities have failed, on several grounds, to ensure adequate provisions for the protection and safety of IDPs during martial law, whether at the point of evacuation, encampment, or return. As indicated above, such failures cannot merely be put down to lack of discipline, training or resources on the part of implementing military or para-military forces. Instead, the so-called 'Integrated Operation' launched with the declaration of martial law and military emergency featured the deliberate and systematic relocation of civilian populations into camps without putting into place mechanisms to ensure the protection and safety of internally displaced persons and their property. Indeed, the so-called 'humanitarian component' of this Integrated Operation was invoked by the Indonesian authorities as evidence that international humanitarian assistance, which may have contributed to identifying and strengthening such mechanisms, would not be required during martial law in Aceh. In the changing security context after 9/11, the government in Jakarta thus embarked upon a strategy of war, which, in part, relied upon practices not unlike 'hamleting,' or the forcible relocation of entire populations into designated 'villages' or camps, familiar from another dark era of counter-insurgency campaigns in Southeast Asia."

Militias manipulated by the military spread terror and displacement (October 2004)

- Counter-insurgency operations in Aceh have made extensive use of civilians, including as militia, civilian defence groups who are reported to have carried out human right violations.
- In March 2003, hundreds of people displaced by the actions of militias in Central Aceh demonstrated to denounce their activities.
- With the imposition of martial law in May 2003, the number of militias reportedly increased as they became an integral part of the military strategy.
- In the wake of the Tsunami, islamic militias were reportedly flown in Aceh by the government to act as a third force in the conflict

AI, 7 October 2004, p. 4

"Counter-insurgency operations in Indonesia have historically made extensive use of civilians, including as militia, civilian defence groups and military auxiliary units. The current military operations in NAD are no different in this respect. Vigilante and militia groups are reported to have been set up in several areas and there are reports that they have carried out human rights violations with impunity. All adult males must participate in compulsory night guard duty and there are reports of civilians, including women and children, being used during military operations as scouts and spies.

The concept of civilian defence is well-established in military doctrine in Indonesia where the use of military and police auxiliary units and other civil defence groups have been integral to military operations in the past in NAD, in East Timor (now named the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste) and elsewhere. The legal basis of this concept is found in Indonesia's 1945 Constitution that states that civilians have both the right and the duty to participate in the defence of their country.⁽¹⁵⁾ Moreover, Law 23/1959 on States of Emergency, also provides the military with authority to instruct inhabitants of a region under a military emergency to perform compulsory labour in the interests of security and defence.⁽¹⁶⁾

(...)

There is no evidence that militia in NAD have carried out human rights violations on the scale seen in Timor-Leste, but given the history of the use of militia by the Indonesian military, the lack of clarity of their command and control structures and absence of accountability mechanisms, their existence in NAD is a cause for serious concern."

Eyes on Aceh, July 2004, p. 1-6

"In Aceh, the Indonesian military is seeking to crush an armed separatist group by employing the use of proxy armies. The presence of such militia groups is not a new phenomenon in conflict in Indonesia. It is an old strategy that has been used to manipulate conflict throughout the archipelago. From very small and relatively localised beginnings, these proxy armies have become an arm of the security forces that operate out with the law and instil fear and terror among the local population. These groups of armed civilians conduct military style 'search and destroy' operations, leaving a trail of destruction to the social and economic fabric of Acehnese society that is costly not only to Indonesia, but also to the broader regional economic and security environment.

It is a common secret in Aceh that many of these militia groups have been 'recruited, trained and armed by the military, and often operate in conjunction with them... There is in fact strong evidence to link the [Indonesian] army's Special Forces command, Kopassus, with the militia.' (Asia Times, 5 July, 2002) In addition, some members of Aceh's government administration and local businesspeople are also known to be involved. Support allegedly given to militia groups includes training, financing and logistics such as weapons, food and housing.

On 18 March 2003, the Jakarta based Kompas newspaper reported that a demonstration had taken place in the capital Banda Aceh that for the first time, publicly condemned the presence of militia in the province and called for such groups to be disarmed. The 300 demonstrators were part of a group of 700 villagers driven from their homes in Central Aceh due to militia activity in the area. The villagers demanded security for the communities of Central Aceh, and chanted 'we need peace, not militia.' (Ratusan Pengungsi Datangi JSC, Kompas, 18 March 2003)

(...)

The increase in militia activity seen in the closing months of the CoHA ceasefire continued and escalated with the introduction of martial law. With Aceh under the full control of the military, the mobilisation of militia throughout the province quickly expanded, groups emerged in almost all districts.

Adopting a declared position of 'You are either with us or against us' the Indonesian military implemented martial law in Aceh with an enthusiasm rarely seen in that organisation. An integral part of the martial law strategy was the mobilisation of civilians: to gather intelligence for the military and to help achieve this objective. (Pikiran Rakyat Daily, 6 November, 2003)

These new militias declared themselves as 'anti-GAM' groups. Throughout Aceh thousands of people were mobilized to attend ceremonies to celebrate the establishment of groups such as the Anti Aceh Separatist Front (FPAS GAM) in Aceh Besar and Bireun; the Anti-Free Aceh Movement Front (FAGSAM) in Aceh Jaya; the Anti-Separatist Movement (GPSG) in South Aceh;

Geurasa in Pidie district, and the People's Fortress to Fight Aceh Separatists (Berantas) in North Aceh.'(The Jakarta Post, 19 January, 2004)

Once captured and under suspicion as a member of GAM, death, torture or disappearance were the most likely outcomes. In June 2004, a search operation by militia near Takengon, the main town in Central Aceh left 20 people dead. Of the 20 victims, local people say that none were actually members of the separatist movement. Eyewitnesses report that all had refused to reveal the whereabouts of GAM in the area: the price of their silence was death.

(...)

Mariani had been living in a communal shelter in the capital Banda Aceh for more than two years when she was interviewed by a local journalist. She told how her family had been chased from their farms in Central Aceh: 'It was the militia who burned our houses. They said that if we didn't want to leave, they would kill us.' (Kompas, 26 May, 2003) Many of the 600 homeless taking shelter in the same place told similar stories, the pattern of threats followed by violence was always the same, and in several incidents the militias were accompanied in their operations by troops from local military battalions."

Islamic militias reported to be flown to Aceh as a third force in the conflict (2005)

The Australian, 12 January 2005

"The arrival in Aceh of militant Islamic fundamentalist groups has raised the prospect of conflict with foreign aid workers and troops, including Australians, who are helping the tsunami relief operation. Indonesian and Australian authorities have claimed the Islamist organisations do not pose an immediate threat, and that the Indonesian military (TNI) can provide sufficient security.

But this was the claim made in East Timor in 1999, when the TNI actively supported militias. There are some parallels with Aceh.

The leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) has already threatened foreigners by saying un-Islamic behaviour in public, such as drinking alcohol, will not be tolerated. The even more militant Laskar Mujahidin (LM), which is also in Aceh, has engaged in sectarian warfare against Christians in Ambon and Central Sulawesi.

The presence of these organisations in Aceh has disturbed many Acehnese, not least the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), which has rejected them as corrupting Islam. While GAM members are devout Sunni Muslims, GAM itself is not an Islamic organisation and it rejects Islamic fundamentalism.

Radical Islamist organisations have attempted to work in Aceh in the past, in particular the Laskar Jihad and, more recently, Jemaah Islamiah. GAM rejected their advances and they found no support among local Acehnese.

For a province that has suffered almost three decades of conflict, the presence of TNI-backed militias is not new, and many see the FPI in particular as just another imported militia organisation. The FPI began life in August 1998 as a civilian militia, organised by military leaders to attack pro-democracy protesters.

(...)

There is an increasing view in Aceh that these organisations have not been brought in to help, but to act as a third force in the conflict between GAM and the TNI.

This view is supported by official Indonesian Government financing of the organisations to travel to Aceh. The strategy of introducing militias has proven effective where predominantly Javanese militias operate in central Aceh. But the Javanese have not been welcomed in the more

populated coastal areas. Hence the arrival of groups that some believe can appeal to the Islamic faith of the local population.

Meanwhile, the TNI is trying to present GAM as the only security threat to the aid program. It has claimed that GAM guerillas have dressed as TNI soldiers and redirected refugees and aid. The TNI has a history of being less than frank about its own activities and it is unlikely that GAM has the capacity or interest in dressing as TNI, especially when it is currently under sustained TNI attack."

Continued human rights violations in the wake of the tsunami (2005)

- Tsunami shifted the dynamic of the conflict by creating a humanitarian window and forcing both warring parties back to the negotiation table.
- A study by the University of Berkeley in October 2005 found that despite huge improvements, human rights abuses were still rife in Aceh in the wake of the tsunami. These included violation of social and economic rights, property rights, freedom of speech and arbitrary displacement.
- Women and children were found to particularly vulnerable to these violations and generally their special needs had been ignored

WB, 31 October 2005, p.39

"Whilst not changing the fundamental political and social context of Aceh, the tsunami and subsequent relief efforts have had a major impact. The tsunami itself was of such a scale that it suspended preceding norms and expectations. More directly, both GAM and TNI are thought to have suffered losses to their own cadres, to family members, and to income generating opportunities. TNI and other government bodies, as well as Indonesian organisations and volunteers from across the country, have been involved in the relief effort.

Since the tsunami, a major international presence in Aceh has shifted the dynamic of the conflict. It makes more overt infringements and abuses by all parties harder, and brings international attention to peace measures as well as to reconstruction. Although it is thought that both the government and GAM were prepared to meet to talk about peace before the tsunami happened, the tsunami created a humanitarian window that silenced many hard-line voices on both sides.

Other positive factors mentioned by interviewees included: potential for an economic 'peace dividend'; reduced corruption and increased accountability; increased confidence in government; more willingness to improve by using international good practice; and more scope for civil society involvement.

Negative factors were also mentioned: risk of raised tension through unequal resource distribution, especially since the poorest areas actually lie outside the tsunami-affected regions; local tension exacerbated by unequal aid provision between neighbouring villages; drift of good staff from local to international agencies; and, potential for increased corruption given major aid inflows."

East-West Center/HRC of University of Berkeley, October 2005, pp.30-40

"The tsunami brought about a major change in access to Aceh. The government, which for decades had insisted on its sovereignty and security as a reason to "quarantine" Aceh, suddenly was forced to open the doors of the province to "outsiders" from other areas of Indonesia as well as to foreign parties. Civil society, NGOs, INGOs, international bodies, and foreign militaries, all responded to the needs of the Aceh people for assistance. The government of Indonesia admitted its inability to manage the unprecedented scale of destruction and loss of life and

allowed these actors to enter—although with increasing caution over time. These actors, together with national and local governments as well as the TNI/POLRI, Indonesia's military and police forces, collaborated in the rescue and relief of the survivors and the reconstruction of the province.

Our study found that the post-tsunami IDPs could be categorized into four groups according to where they were taking refuge/residing: (1) IDPs living in barracks constructed by the government, usually with military assistance, (2) IDPs in temporary camps, (3) IDPs who were taking shelter with family members, and (4) a growing number of IDPs who were returning to their homes and starting to rebuild with or without the assistance of the authorities or civil society.

The study found that the following groups remain the most vulnerable in Aceh.

Women

Women's rights have been significantly restricted. Throughout the conflict they have borne the brunt of losing male family members to the conflict; further, they have been the direct objects of violence. Women were also the majority of casualties during the tsunami. Several explanations for their high mortality have been offered: Women were not trained to swim or climb trees; they tended to be at home at the time; and they were likely to be more protective of their parents and children. Thus many did not run to seek safety when the water came. Unfortunately, since the tsunami, their special needs (in facilities, health, education, and protection) have largely been ignored. In the aftermath of the tsunami they are as vulnerable to abuses as ever, if not even more so.

Children

After the tsunami, many parties were concerned about the possibility of trafficking in women and children, especially as so many children lost parents. These fears did not come to pass. However, aside from protection against trafficking, these survivor children have many other unmet needs, such as trauma healing, recovery of childhood, and access to nutrition, health care, and free education.

Adult males

The conflict has made young and middle-aged men vulnerable, since they can be victimized as GAM suspects or government sympathizers. Either way, these men are prone to discrimination, abuses, and killings. This pattern has been noticeably lessened in the aftermath of the tsunami, especially in coastal areas; but the concern is that the pattern will resume. Our study found that in the rescue and relief phase as well as in the reconstruction phase, vulnerability to human rights violations exists due to: (1) lack of coordination between actors, (2) the role of the military in relief and reconstruction, (3) rampant corruption and abuse, and (4) lack of community participation. These areas of concern not only lead to the failure to maximize assistance for the victims but also escalate their vulnerability to violations of their rights.

(...)

IV. Conclusion and recommendations

Our research revealed that human rights violations are rife in Aceh in the wake of the tsunami. These range from violations of economic and social rights to curtailment of freedom of speech and assembly. The danger of arbitrary displacement persists due to the continued threat by authorities of cutting aid distribution to force people to leave camps or stay in barracks. The government has failed to provide an adequate standard of living, whether in the form of accessibility to aid or of means to earn a livelihood in the barracks. In addition, property rights have been threatened because of the absence of a clear system for obtaining identity cards and land certificates. Some villages, for example in the Lamno area, actually disappeared and have now become a part of the sea, and villagers have been unable to get clear information about compensation and resettlement. These problems are exacerbated by the lack of participation by

local people in decision-making, including involvement in key decision-making positions in organizations working in Aceh."

Conflict-IDPs no longer receive any attention in the wake of the tsunami (2005)

- The estimated 125,000 to 150,000 people who became internally displaced by the military operation between May 2003 and December 2004 have been completely forgotten by the government and the international community's humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.

HRW, 27 May 2005

"On Dec. 25, 2004, eighteen people were reported killed in Aceh during clashes between the Indonesian military and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). This brought the official number of fatalities since martial law and full scale military operations were declared in the province in May 2003 to 2,300.

In that same period, between 125,000-150,000 had become internally displaced persons (IDPs), living in deplorable conditions beyond the reach of international aid workers, as access to Aceh for international humanitarian and human rights workers had been forbidden by government authorities, who wanted to prosecute their war in the dark.

Twenty-four hours later the eighteen killings, the huge number of "conflict IDPs," and the conflict itself had been almost completely forgotten. It is time to wake up to the full reality of Aceh.

The Dec. 26 earthquake and tsunami and the massive human loss and physical devastation it has wrought on Aceh has rightly been at the forefront of Indonesian and, indeed, world concern. Over 127,000 people were killed in the space of minutes, with another 37,000 still missing, presumed dead. Over 500,000 people were displaced by the disaster, many of whom continue to rely on help from outside the province (and the country) for basic necessities.

(...)

However, while international sympathy and attention have focused sharply on aid and reconstruction for tsunami and earthquake victims, collective amnesia and indifference characterize the reaction to civilian suffering from the three-decades-old conflict that continues to devastate much of Aceh. While the government and GAM are scheduled to have their fourth round of peace talks in Helsinki in late May, in Aceh the killings continue.

(...)

While the Indonesian government has been congratulated for allowing largely unfettered access to tsunami hit areas of Aceh, since it resumed military operations in May 2003 access to conflict areas for humanitarian workers, journalists, and human rights monitors has been almost completely cut off. The large majority of the province remains closed to humanitarian workers and human rights monitoring.

And it is in these parts of the province that the conflict continues, largely hidden from view, and without scrutiny. The handful of foreign journalists who ventured into Aceh's hinterland in January and February to cover conflict related stories were met with resistance, obstruction, and, in some cases, detention and interrogation from Indonesian security forces.

Prior to the tsunami, conflict IDPs had taken up residence in government camps, mosques, and spontaneous shelters inside Aceh and North Sumatra. During this period the international aid community, including the UN, had been persistently trying to gain access to the province to provide the same kind of assistance it is now offering to tsunami victims. The Indonesian government refused.

Now largely forgotten, these IDPs remain in urgent need of assistance and support. Yet they are off the radar and agenda of the Indonesian government and the thousands of humanitarian workers in Aceh now delivering assistance to tsunami survivors."

MoU signed between GAM and government ends 30 years of conflict (July 2006)

- On 15 August 2005, the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement signed a Memorandum of Understanding putting an end to a 30-year old conflict.
- At the end of 2005, the weapon decommissioning of the GAM was completed.
- In March 2006, 100 monitors of the AMM mission left, leaving 85 monitors in Aceh who are to remain until September 2006.
- In July 2006, the House of Representative enacted the Aceh governance bill into law, drawing mixed reaction from the civil society in Aceh who claimed that the law fails to guarantee the promised autonomy. Local elections are due to take place within 3 months.

Memorandum of Understanding signed between the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement

BBC, 15 August 2005

"The Indonesian government and rebels from the Free Aceh Movement (Gam) have signed a peace deal aimed at ending their nearly 30-year conflict.

Representatives from each side signed the official document in Helsinki.

(...)

Under the agreement, whose details were only released on Monday, the rebels have put to one side their demand for full independence, accepting instead a form of local self-government and the right eventually to establish a political party.

In turn, the Indonesian government has agreed to release political prisoners and offer farmland to former combatants to help them reintegrate into civilian life.

A human rights court will be established, as will a truth and reconciliation commission.

Non-local Indonesian troops and police will leave Aceh, and Gam rebels will disarm, in a process which will be overseen by a joint European Union and Asean monitoring team."

[Link to the full text of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, 15 August 2005](#)

The implementation of the peace process

UNORC, 15 January 2006, p. 1

"On 19 December, the fourth and last weapons decommissioning phase took place. Given that the Peace Agreement/MOU was only signed on 15 August 2005 this represented a remarkable achievement. A ceremony was held in Blang Padang Sportsfield in Banda Aceh to mark the successful completion of the decommissioning as stipulated in the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (Mou). Blang Padang Sportsfield was the site where the first weapon collection took place on 15 September. With the hand over of a total of 840 weapons to Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), GAM fully complied with the decommissioning obligation in the MoU. On 20 December, the GAM leadership confirmed in writing the non-existence of weapons under its command in Aceh. GAM officially disbanded its military wing (TNA) on 27 December."

Global Exchange, March 2006, p.8

"The Aceh Monitoring Mission, AMM, has an office in every district of Aceh staffed by unarmed monitors from the EU and ASEAN. Monitors have various backgrounds including military, police, and human rights specialists. For the first three months the mission focused on meeting with local administrations, villagers, police and the public. In Pidie District, AMM met with 5,000 people in four months. AMM's mandate is to address only those instances of brutality and human rights violations that have occurred after August 15, 2005. Each AMM office conducts weekly meetings with the highest-ranking GAM leaders, the Chief of Police, and military officials to discuss the transition and resolve any conflicts. In Pidie District five GAM members, five TNI (Indonesian military) and five POLRI (Indonesian police) plus the chief of police and the head of the TNI attend the weekly meetings. Common discussion topics are extortion, previous local conflicts, GAM reintegration and implications of the peace agreement; the issues covered in these meetings are localized. The AMM is facilitating public talks about the MOU by the heads of GAM and the police and or military in each district. These talks are part of the larger effort to socialize the peace agreement to general Acehnese villagers. They provide a mechanism for local leaders to prove to their communities their commitment, accountability and understanding of the peace agreement and in turn give the villagers an opportunity to question both GAM and the armed forces on the MOU."

UNORC, 31 March 2006, p.1

"More than 100 monitors of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) left Aceh in mid-March. From 15 March, approximately 85 monitors are remaining in Aceh to continue the mission which has been extended until 15 June. The remaining monitors from 5 ASEAN countries and 12 EU member states are stationed in the Banda Aceh headquarters and 11 district offices (Lhokseumawe, Bireuen, Meulaboh, Tapakutuan, Takegon, Langsa, Kutacane, Balangpidie, Calang and Banda Aceh). AMM donated part of office equipment and furniture to local community institutions where they closed offices."

UNORC, 16 May 2006, p.1

"On 12 May, the European Union gave favourable consideration to the request by the Gol for the final extension of AMM until the date of the local elections in Aceh, but no later than 15 September."

AFP, 20 June 2006

"The European Union is unlikely to extend beyond September a peace monitoring mission in the Indonesian province of Aceh but will send election observers, the head of the mission said Tuesday.

"Unless I get completely new guidance from the (EU) ambassadors here, this extension has been the last one and we think that this is sufficient," Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) head Pieter Feith told reporters in Brussels.

"The two parties seem to share this view," he said, in reference to the Indonesian government and the rebel Free Aceh Movement (GAM), which signed a peace agreement on August 15, 2005.

Under the peace pact, prompted by the devastating 2004 tsunami which killed 168,000 people in Aceh, the GAM agreed to drop demands for independence in return for partial self rule, ending three decades of conflict.

Nearly 200 monitors were initially stationed in Aceh after the pact was signed, but about 100 left in March when the mission was scaled back.

Feith said the EU would send observers, possibly in September, to help monitor local elections which are likely to take place in October at the earliest, once the Indonesian parliament has passed a law on governing Aceh."

Many important issues remain to be solved to ensure the success of the peace process

ICG, 29 March 2006, p.1

"Just past the half-year mark of the agreement to end the conflict in Aceh, several long-anticipated problems are surfacing.

(...)

The problems include differences between Jakarta and Aceh over the concept of self-government; efforts to divide the province; questions over who can run in local elections and when those elections take place; urgent employment needs of returning GAM members; and oversight of funding for reintegration programs.

The most contentious issue is the draft law on governing Aceh that is supposed to incorporate the provisions of the 15 August memorandum of understanding (MoU) and replace a 2001 law that gave Aceh "special autonomy" within the Indonesian republic. The ministry of home affairs watered down a draft produced in Aceh through a wide public consultation and submitted the diluted version to the Indonesian parliament. Concern over the weakened bill is not confined to GAM but is shared among all in Aceh – and there are thousands – who took part in the original drafting or in subsequent discussions. Intensive efforts are underway to restore key provisions of the Acehdraft, and there is still a chance a reasonable compromise could emerge.

The campaign to carve two new provinces out of Aceh remains an irritant but appears to have no support from the Yudhoyono government.

Another issue, repeatedly flagged by Crisis Group, is the reintegration of GAM members. Securing adequate livelihoods for the 3,000 combatants mentioned in the August agreement was going to be difficult enough, given the massive needs in Aceh after the tsunami. It has become increasingly clear, however, that there are more GAM members needing and expecting reintegration assistance than was previously thought. How to allocate reintegration payments budgeted for 3,000 among a much larger number is as much an issue for GAM as for the government and international agencies, but the program set up to address this in Aceh may cause as many problems as it solves.

A final issue is the role of the European-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) if local elections are delayed, as now seems inevitable. Originally scheduled for 26 April 2006, they are now likely to be postponed until late July or August, given both delays in passing the above law and the logistics of post-tsunami registration. This means they will almost certainly take place after the AMM's newly extended term expires. The AMM is now scheduled to leave Aceh on 15 June 2006. Many Acehnese are concerned because the pre-election period is precisely when clashes requiring a neutral arbiter may erupt."

House of Representatives enacts Aceh governance bill (July 2006)

Xinhua, 12 July 2006

"Mixed reactions have arisen over the enactment of the Aceh governance bill into law by the House of Representatives on Tuesday, as legislators, officials and peace monitors declared that it paved the way for greater autonomy, but the conflict-torn province just gave a cool response.

The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) hailed the law in what it saw as a key to creating peace in Aceh following the signing of peace deal between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Helsinki, Finland last year.

The AMM was studying the content of the newly-enacted law based on the principles of the peace accord signed on August 15, 2005 to end three-decade-long conflict in Aceh, its spokesman Faye Belnis was quoted by local media as saying on Wednesday.

(...)

Speaking after a House plenary session to endorse the bill, Aceh Governor Mustafa Abu Bakar said the provincial administration would speed up the drafting of over 90 qanun (specific laws).

"The first batch of qanun would concern the local election. We expect it to be completed later this month so that the poll can take place no more than three months later," Mustafa told reporters.

However, Tuesday was marred by a general strike in Aceh by those who dismissed the law as biased in favor of the central government.

Dozens of NGOs in Aceh, including the Center of Information for Aceh Referendum (SIRA), Aceh Anti-corruption Movement (Gerak), Linkpeace and Acehnese Youth Alliance, urged the public to oppose the law. They argued that it watered down the Helsinki peace accord that was signed by the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement last August.

The groups claim that the law fails to provide the promised autonomy for the resource-rich province and allows interference from the central government.

The Article 11 of the law stipulates that the central government sets the norms, standards and procedures and also monitors all affairs of the Aceh regional administration.

The demand of the Acehnese to manage their own natural resources, oil and gas in particular, is only partly met, with Article 160 stipulating that the management of oil and gas in Aceh will be done jointly by the provincial administration and the central government.

The provision is a departure from a draft proposed by Acehnese councillors and a compromise between political factions at the House, which had given the Acehnese complete control over the energy resources, the Jakarta Post said on Wednesday."

Central Sulawesi (Palu & Poso)

1,000 people killed and 100,000 displaced in inter-religious violence in Central Sulawesi (1998-2001)

- Fighting broke out in December 1998 after a Christian stabbed a Muslim in Poso.
- Underlying economic, ethnic, and religious tensions were soon compounded by the actions of political rivals, some of whom encouraged and exploited the violence.
- In the following 4 years 1,000 people were killed, with many more injured and one hundred thousand displaced.
- Although the violence reflects social tensions, the fact that it has persisted for so long with such a high human toll is a product of systemic government failure, both local and national.

- Failure of the government to protect citizens also gave credibility to hard-liners on both sides and facilitated the arrival of the radical Muslim group Laskar Jihad, based hundreds of miles away on Java.
- 5 phases: outbreak (December 1998), intensification of Muslim attacks (April 16, 2000 to May 3, 2000), counterattacks by Christian communities (May 23, 2000 to July 2000), displacement and destruction (June to December 2001), and the Malino peace process and its sometimes violent aftermath (January 2002 to the present)

HRW 4 December 2002, pp. 3-4

"On December 24, 1998, a young Protestant in the town of Poso in Central Sulawesi province, Indonesia, stabbed a Muslim in the arm. Fighting broke out around town, and a spiral of violence was unleashed. The Poso region proved fertile ground for communal violence: underlying economic, ethnic, and religious tensions were soon compounded by the actions of political rivals, some of whom encouraged and exploited the violence.

Over the next four years, Muslim and Christian groups mounted extended attacks on opposing neighborhoods and villages. For most of that time there was no effective response from authorities. Although it is difficult to determine the precise scope of the violence, it has been extensive: the most credible sources estimate that 1,000 people have been killed, with many more injured and one hundred thousand displaced.

This report provides a comprehensive account of the violence, culled from eyewitness interviews and data compiled by local organizations. It analyzes the Indonesian government's response and the reasons violence has continued to erupt periodically in Poso for four years running. Although the violence reflects social tensions, the fact that it has persisted for so long with such a high human toll is a product of systemic government failure, both local and national. According to many residents, an effective and unbiased deployment of police or military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI), supported by a justice system that could hold perpetrators individually accountable, could have ended the problem when it began in 1998.

Residents of Poso allege that, in many cases, cycles of recrimination and revenge have been fueled by local or outside provocateurs, and conspiracy theories are rife. Although provocation has played a role in other incidents of unrest in Indonesia and there are signs of such efforts in Poso, this report does not attempt to address all such claims, many of which are based more on speculation than evidence. As noted below, it is clear that, whatever the merits of such claims, authorities have had the capacity to take decisive action to stop the violence and have failed to do so.

In several different cases, highlighted below, eyewitness observers report that when security forces were deployed and acted professionally, outbreaks of violence were sometimes halted in a matter of hours. Other attacks were allowed to proceed over the course of several days. In some cases, when the police or military did act, they exacerbated conditions by firing on protestors or committing human rights violations as a form of retaliation, a frequent phenomenon in conflict areas in Indonesia. Only a handful of people were prosecuted for violent crimes, with sentencing often inconsistent. Many of the worst crimes have gone unpunished, and several subsequent outbreaks were explicitly linked to frustration over the lack of arrests for prior violence.

Conflicts eventually broke out in more than half of Poso's subdistricts. As the conflict escalated, the number and sophistication of weapons increased and the death toll grew higher, creating new ranks of aggrieved victims seeking revenge in the absence of justice. The failure of the government to protect citizens also gave credibility to hard-liners on both sides and facilitated the arrival of the radical Muslim group Laskar Jihad, based hundreds of miles away on Java.

There has been a great deal made of the role of Laskar Jihad in exacerbating conflicts in Maluku and elsewhere, and our research confirms that Laskar Jihad's presence helped fuel conflict in Poso. As Muslim leaders told us, however, Laskar Jihad had this effect in part because local Muslim communities had lost all faith in the security forces and saw Laskar Jihad's presence as instrumental to their security. As this report was being finalized, Laskar Jihad announced it was disbanding and that members in Poso would soon leave the region.

Central Sulawesi has also gained attention recently as the site of a possible al-Qaeda training center. Although this report summarizes the information that others have gathered, Human Rights Watch did not research the question and came across no firsthand evidence on the subject during the course of our research in Poso. The role of underground international Islamist networks in Indonesia clearly merits attention, as the October 12 bombing in Bali that killed some 180 people tragically demonstrates. It is important, however, that such analysis does not obscure the factors responsible for conflicts such as Poso. As in Maluku, the conflict in Poso reflects local and domestic Indonesian political dynamics that would exist with or without outside agitators, let alone an international terrorist training center. Indeed, the causal arrow may point in the opposite direction: the chaos that destroyed so many lives in Poso is the very environment that groups such as al-Qaeda seek out as bases for their operations.

This report begins with an overview of the religious, political, and economic roots of the conflict. Religion became the predominant idiom of the conflict, yet participants recognized and were eager to emphasize to Human Rights Watch that many other factors have been at play. Significantly, Poso has long had a religious mix, with indigenous and migrant Muslim populations, as well as locally rooted Protestant and Catholic communities. Relations among these different communities were relatively peaceful in the years prior to 1998. As in Maluku, however, the nearly even split of Poso's population between Muslims and Christians meant that violent cleavages, once they emerged, could be expected to persist absent decisive intervention by security authorities.

As in other areas in Indonesia, the power vacuum created by the resignation of Soeharto in May 1998 opened the doors to new, often unruly social forces. More than three decades of militarism and authoritarian rule had left civilian institutions discredited and in disarray, and had made military and police institutions fundamentally suspect in the minds of many local inhabitants. Local political battles also fueled the conflict. In a number of cases, noted below, outbreaks of violence were directly connected to competition for local political office and the accompanying economic spoils. The Poso conflict was also exacerbated when it became a national issue, and partisans, in particular members of Laskar Jihad, came to Poso for reasons having more to do with national than local political dynamics.

After providing an overview of the context, the report offers a chronological account of the violence. Largely following the framework used by local residents when describing the Poso conflict, this report divides the conflict into five phases: outbreak (December 1998), intensification of Muslim attacks (April 16, 2000 to May 3, 2000), counterattacks by Christian communities (May 23, 2000 to July 2000), displacement and destruction (June to December 2001), and the Malino peace process and its sometimes violent aftermath (January 2002 to the present). As the first three phases have been covered elsewhere,² this report focuses on the last two.

In the first two phases, urban Muslim migrants and their rural allies in villages along the coast dominated. There were fewer fatalities than in later phases, but many neighborhoods were badly damaged. While the third phase saw casualties on both sides, it was largely a vendetta by Protestants and a few Catholic migrants, and Muslim casualties were particularly high.

Many local sources describe the fourth phase as having begun in June 2001 with a new wave of house burnings, a massacre of Muslim women and children, and numerous clashes. The arrival

of Laskar Jihad in July 2001 and the widespread destruction of villages that followed eventually prompted intervention by Jakarta."

See also, "Towards peaceful development: rebuilding social cohesion and reconciliation, Central Sulawesi and North Maluku", UNDP, July 2004, pp.13-14

Security improves after signing of Malino Declaration and return is ongoing, but process remains fragile (2001-2005)

- Security situation reported to be calm as of March 2005
- In October 2003, residents fled their homes after masked attackers killed 10 people in mainly Christian villages. Most returned shortly after.
- Insecurity is still preventing significant return with periodic criminal actions and violence. Few Christians are willing to return to Moslem-dominated areas and few Moslems are ready to return to Christian-dominated areas.
- Improved security situation have enabled returns, but situation remains fragile.
- Signing of Malino Peace agreement in December 2001 and deployment of 8,500 soldiers has helped calm down the situation in Poso.
- Many IDPs fear that the stability is only temporary and want to stay where they are.
- Under the auspices of the Government, 50 representatives of both sides signed the Malino peace Declaration in December 2001.
- Some IDPs have taken advantage of the better security situation to go back to their area of origin

Police force strengthened ahead of June 2005 elections

OCHA, 31 March 2005

"Security situation in the Province remains calm. Some 600 Mobile Police Brigade officers have been deployed in Poso District to strengthen security and safeguard the area during direct regional elections in June. Currently, some 2,400 regular police officers and TNI soldiers are stationed in the area."

Unknown number of residents fled their homes in Poso district following attacks that killed 8 people (October 2003)

AFP, 15 October 2003

"Residents have fled their homes after masked attackers killed 10 people in mainly Christian villages in eastern Indonesia's Central Sulawesi province, police said Wednesday.

The gunmen descended on three coastal villages in the religiously divided district of Poso on Sunday, killing eight people, most of whom were Christians. Armed attackers also killed two people and burned homes elsewhere in the province last Thursday, police said.

The attacks raised fears of a major flare up in Muslim-Christian violence which has beset the district since 2000 and claimed some 1,000 lives. About 2,000 Indonesian police and troops have been deployed in Poso to prevent further attacks.

'Some wanted to flee but security authorities have assured them that they will be protected. Some of them left anyway,' Poso deputy police chief Rudy Trenggono told AFP of the villages which were attacked Sunday.

He said he did not know how many people had abandoned their homes. The evening Suara Pembaruan newspaper said Wednesday the villagers already had returned to their homes."

Periodic violence continues to prevent returns while government plans to fragment districts (July 2003)

OCHA & Bakornas July 2003, p. 18

"The continuing precipitating factor preventing significant returns is security. The uneasy peace settlement signed in South Sulawesi (Malino I) is punctuated with periodic criminal actions on both sides elongating tensions. It is still uncertain as to whether the present relative present calm is enduring because the community wants security, or due to the heavy presence of security forces. There are still automatic military weapons in the possession of some community members, and attacks by masked provocateurs are still common. The communities want the military to stay, while trying to activate their own security arrangements.

The Government has instituted a process of district fragmentation to alleviate the inter-communal rivalries over district leaders that many believe initially fed the violence. But, it is believed that this will not be a solution and may only intensify the divisions. Still, today, due to trauma, very few Christians are prepared to return to Moslem-dominated areas, and very few Moslems are prepared to return to Christian-dominated communities."

Malino Declaration and deployment of security forces bring relative peace and stability to Central Sulawesi

ACT, 31 May 2002

"This agreement [Malino Declaration] indeed brought relative peace and generated hopes for a brighter future in Central Sulawesi. The peace process was strengthened by the deployment of large numbers of security forces to the area. The Malino Declaration coincided with the GoRI policy on handling IDPs which introduced three options to end IDP crisis: return, local empowerment, and transmigration. In Central Sulawesi the return option has proved to be more successful with continued support from the government at all levels. Thus far, out of 31,326 families (143,354 persons), a total of 25,790 families (107,283 persons) have returned to their places of origin, and have begun to resume their lives.

The mission found that the trend is positive and that the return process continues, although at a slower pace than expected. This is due to the fragility of the situation, mistrust that exist within communities, the fact that many IDPs have been displaced three or four times over the last two to three years, and lack of resources and basic social services." (Bakornas & OCHA March 2003, 2)

"Since the signing of the peace agreement in Malino, South Sulawesi, on 21 December 2001, Christians and Muslims have ceased hostilities. The situation in Poso town has cooled down, especially since the government deployed 8'500 soldiers belonging to the Special Armed Forces and Navy in the area.

However, many of the displaced are very hesitant and mistrustful of the security situation in Poso, especially when the soldiers leave the area in June. These people are highly traumatised after suffering three major attacks during the period 1998-2001. Furthermore, they have not much confidence that the government will handle the situation in an even-handed manner. Many of the

displaced have decided to settle permanently in the places which have afforded them shelter over the last 3 years. However, many of the more vulnerable families still lack any means of restarting their lives and others need further assistance to enable them to again become self sufficient."

***For an analysis of the latest attacks in Central Sulawesi, see:
Indonesia backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, ICG, 3 February 2004 and
also "A Peace from Within: Support for Reconciliation and Recovery in Poso, Central Sulawesi, UNDP, January 2004***

'Administrative fragmentation' policy creates new communal divisions and conflict in West Sulawesi (May 2005)

- Violence claiming 5 lives and leaving 5 houses burnt in Mamasa district in West Sulawesi raise fear of another outbreak of violence.
- International Crisis Group's analysis points to the new 'administrative' divisions and personal gains for local elites as the main cause of the violence
- In October 2004, some 1,500 Christians fled Muslim attacks sparked by the inauguration of new West Sulawesi province.
- In September 2003, an estimated 8,500 people fled their villages when a dispute opposing 'pro' and 'kontra' villages degenerated into violence.

ICG, 3 May 2005

"Violence -- five people killed, five houses burned -- on 24 April 2005 in Mamasa district, a remote area of West Sulawesi, is raising concerns that Indonesia faces another outbreak of serious communal conflict.

The Mamasa conflict is administrative, rooted primarily in the desire of local officials for personal gain. No one from the area interviewed by Crisis Group believed religious differences were the cause. But because Mamasa is majority Christian and the 26 villages where opposition was initially concentrated are majority Muslim, the perception persists elsewhere in Indonesia that it is a communal struggle, and it has attracted the attention of Muslim radicals from outside the immediate area. The Indonesian government clearly recognises the danger of polarisation along religious lines and has moved quickly to make arrests and send additional security forces to the area. If communal conflict is to be prevented, however, the underlying administrative dispute needs urgently to be addressed.

The roots of the Mamasa conflict are in a by-product of Indonesia's decentralisation program known as pemekaran, literally "blossoming" -- a process of administrative fragmentation whereby new provinces and districts are created by dividing existing ones. Mamasa district was formed out of the district of Polewali-Mamasa (Polmas) in 2002, one of over 100 such divisions that have taken place since 1999 and have increased the total number of provinces and districts in the country by roughly 50 per cent.

During the campaign for the district, which began in 1999, villages in several sub-districts expressed opposition to their inclusion. The most persistent opposition was from 26 of 38 villages of Aralle, Tabulahan and Mambi sub-districts, known collectively as ATM. Supporters of incorporation in these sub-districts were dubbed "pro", while opponents were called "kontra".

When the national parliament passed a law to form Mamasa without regard for a compromise reached at local level to exclude the 26 villages, a system of parallel governments emerged.

Opponents received support from the government of the "mother" district, Polmas, which continued to pay the salaries of civil servants who refused to work for the Mamasa government and maintained an administrative structure in the three sub-districts. Mamasa established its own government structure in the subdistricts, so that there were two sub-district heads and often two village heads in the same place. Children were forced to go to different schools based on their parents' political affiliation.

The tensions associated with the pro-kontra divide, conflated with a local land dispute, led to three murders in late September 2003, triggering major displacement. No effective action was taken to resolve the conflict, however, and three more people died in October 2004 after another clash. By then, when the central government sent an independent team to evaluate the district boundaries, issues of displacement, segregation and justice loomed large, and the conflict had become much more than an administrative dispute.

There are now indications that youths previously involved in the nearby Poso conflict may have come into the area to stir up trouble. The site of serious communal violence from 1998 to 2001 and sporadic trouble ever since, Poso has been an incubating ground for terrorism -- several of those implicated in the 9 September 2004 bombing in front of the Australian embassy in Jakarta were Poso veterans. A repeat of this pattern in Mamasa needs to be prevented at all costs.

Mamasa is a case study of what can happen when there is not a clear procedure to resolve a dispute in the pemekaran process, the central government is too beset by other problems to find and implement solutions, and the law is not promptly and transparently enforced against those who commit violence. The latest deaths underline the dangers of allowing a low-level conflict to fester. The costs could be disastrous if militants decide the conflict is now ripe for exploitation."

1,500 people flee violence in newly created West Sulawesi province (October 2004)

AsiaNews, 21 October 2004

"Last Saturday, October 16, hundreds of Christians fled their homes after an attack by Muslim activists. Burnt out shells is all that is left of homes and churches torched during clashes between Christians and Muslims in Salu Assing, a predominantly village in Mambi district. Uhailanu, a village in Aralle district, is also predominantly Muslim. Here, too, people were attacked, 11 of them jumping in a nearby river for safety.

Mambi, Aralle and Tabulahan are three districts in the newly-created West Sulawesi province. They were recently incorporated into Mamasa, a new regency created out of Polewali Mamasa regency which was split into Mamasa proper and the new Polewali Mamasa.

This forced integration is at the root of the recent clashes since the new entity is predominantly Christian and local Muslims oppose the decision. They are afraid that the Christian community would deny them the right to attend mosques and deprive them of employment opportunities.

Mamasa is 400 km south of the South Sulawesi capital of Makassar. The new regency was created by the Megawati government in 2002 but was in the planning since 1997.

The violent incidents were triggered by the inauguration of a new West Sulawesi province on October 16. Home affairs Minister Hari Sabarno, who was present at the ceremony, asked Oentarto Sindung Moewardi, the governor of the new province, to intervene and put to a stop to the unrest that has been affecting the area for some time. During the ceremony, residents from mostly Muslim Mandar demonstrated against the minister.

The spark that triggered the violent incidents came from local leader Andi Jalilu who raised banners in anti-annexationist Muslim villages proclaiming that Mambi, Aralle e Tabulahan districts were now part of Mamasa regency.

He and another 11 people have been arrested by police and charged with causing disorder and attacking an anti-annexationist village. In several villages, police also confiscated 50 home-made firearms, 100 spears, machetes and arrows.

Tensions remain high in Aralle and Mambi districts. Ali Baal, Polewali Mamasa Regent, confirmed that about a thousand people fled northern Aralle seeking refuge in Mambi's Natula village. Altogether about 1,500 people have fled from the border area between the two districts leaving it almost deserted."

More than 8,000 people flee violence opposing 'pro' and 'kontra' villages (September 2003)

ICG, 3 May 2005, p. 4

"In April and May 2003, a series of assaults on houses began to produce new physical boundaries, as pro or kontra adherents began leaving areas dominated by the rival group. For example, in Salurindu, Aralle sub-district, five pro-Mamasa families whose houses were attacked departed. In Aralle village, Pattabulu, one of only several pro-Mamasa residents was twice assaulted and then fled to Salutambun village after his house was attacked on 14 May. He had been accused of attempting to gather Christian inhabitants from surrounding villages into a new village. The increasing segregation meant that some farmers could no longer tend fields they owned in areas controlled by rival communities. Some were forced to sell their produce in new markets within their community's territory; children were even refused access to school on the basis of their parents' political affiliation.

The brewing conflict reached its first climax in September 2003, as three people were killed in a dispute between Salurindu (kontra) and Bumal (pro) villages. The violence did not spread beyond these two isolated villages, which were also locked in a land dispute, but the murders and their aftermath triggered an exodus of at least 8,460 people."

Communal violence in West and Central Kalimantan

Ethnic violence and displacement in West Kalimantan (1996-2004)

- In late 1996 and early 1997, violence between Dayaks and Madurese led to the displacement of 15,000 people (most of them Madurese).
- At the end of 1997, 20,000 Madurese were thought to remain displaced and too afraid to go back.
- In March 1999, violence between the Dayaks and the Madurese erupted once again in Sambas district. As a result, at least 200 Madurese were killed and more than 35,000 Madurese were displaced to the provincial capital Pontianak, while others fled to Java.
- In 2001, Madurese IDPs were evacuated from the city of Pontianak following threats by local Dayak and Malay people.
- In 2004, most IDPs have been resettled in relocation sites

1996-1997: ethnic violence displaces between 15,000 and 20,000 Madurese

USCR, June 1999

"In late 1996 and early 1997, communal violence erupted in the province of West Kalimantan (on the island of Borneo, which Indonesia shares with Malaysia). The violence was between indigenous Dayak people and migrants from the island of Madura, off the coast of East Java. Under Indonesia's "transmigration" policy, the government helps residents from the overcrowded island of Java to migrate to outlying islands, usually by giving them land there. Acehnese view this policy as Jakarta's attempt to spread the influence of Javanese culture. In West Kalimantan, Dayaks and other tribes blame the transmigration for the loss of jobs and tribal land.

As a result of the violence, more than 15,000 people, almost all of them Madurese, were displaced. According to UNHCR, it was not known how many Madurese or others in West Kalimantan remained displaced at the end of 1998 as a result of the previous year's violence. UNHCR noted, however, that "the province still indeed harbors a potent threat of unrest due to a simmering feud" between the Madurese and the Dayaks."

HRW, December 1997, Chapter IV

"As of April 1997, the press reported that 3,054 homes had been destroyed, and more than 15,000 people, almost all of them Madurese, had been displaced. Those figures were probably low, as it was difficult to make an accurate count. Some Madurese returned to Madura, others moved in with relatives in other parts of West Kalimantan, some were housed in temporary barracks at army posts and in other holding centers. The districts of Sambas and Sanggau were the worst affected, with respectively 5,000 and 3,122 known displaced, although again, the figures are almost certainly too low. An Australian paper quoted Transmigration Minister Siswono Yoduhusodo as saying that at least 20,000 Madurese remained in refugee camps and were "too traumatized by the violence" to go back to their homes.

West Kalimantan Governor Aspar Aswin said that the provincial government would try to resettle them elsewhere in the province, and that 950 houses were under construction, as well as 450 homes inside existing transmigration centers. He also noted that there was a problem with the agricultural land the displaced people had owned. If they could not or did not wish to return, the government would sell it and turn over the proceeds to the former owners, he said. But with reports of Dayaks already moving on to Madurese land, the problem was not going to be as easily resolved as the governor suggested. Moreover, Indonesian officials at all levels also have a poor record in handling land disputes, and few landowners would like to see the government act as their sales agent."

1999: violence displaces 35,000 Madurese**USCR, June 2000**

"In March [1999], communal violence erupted once again in the province of West Kalimantan, on the island of Borneo, which Indonesia shares with Malaysia. Indigenous Dayaks and local Malays carrying machetes, spears, and guns attacked Madurese transmigrants (whom they blamed for the loss of jobs and tribal land) in the coastal district of Sambas. The attackers burned homes, decapitated people, and revived the tradition of eating the organs of the vanquished. The Indonesian military sent hundreds of troops to restore order.

The ethnic Madurese, who are predominantly Christian, come from the island of Madura, off the western coast of Borneo. Indonesia's former president, Suharto, began moving many Madurese to West Kalimantan in the 1960s to alleviate overpopulation on Madura. Since then, eight conflicts have broken out between Madurese and Dayaks, and one between Madurese and ethnic Chinese.

As a result of the renewed violence, at least 200 Madurese were killed and some 35,000 others (35 percent of the Madurese population in West Kalimantan) fled to the provincial capital, Pontianak, and other nearby towns. Others fled to Java.

(...)

Indonesian security forces escorted some of the fleeing Madurese in convoys, although ethnic Malays and Dayaks set up road blocks to stop them. In Pontianak, the displaced were housed in a converted sports center and other facilities. Others sought shelter with family or friends. Although local and national agencies provided some assistance, the facilities were reportedly poor and health problems were rampant. By June, almost 80 children under age five had died in the centers. "

2001: Madurese IDPs forced to evacuate camps in Pontianak

World Vision, 4 July 2001

"Local government began evacuating Madurese Internally Displaced People (IDPs) from the city of Pontianak, West Kalimantan, on Saturday, following a threat by local Dayak and Malay people of further bloodshed if they refuse to leave by July 1. Around 137 families were evacuated. They will be relocated to areas outside Pontianak city, namely Sei Asam and Tebang Kacang.

The Governor of West Kalimantan Aspar Aswin confirmed the evacuations, though the exact number of Madurese IDPs to be relocated is not known. Many IDPs are still being persuaded to join the relocation program.

Hundreds of IDPs families who took shelter in one Pontianak local sports stadium became the target of attacks by local people last Sunday (24/6), after the alleged murder of one local boy by four IDPs near the IDPs' compound.

Almost 100,000 Madurese settlers fled Sambas, a three-hour drive from Pontianak, after violent ethnic clashes broke out two years ago. Madurese IDPs have been accommodated in several small and large public buildings serving as shelters in Pontianak city."

2004: Most Madurese IDPs have been relocated

OCHA, 9 April 2004, p. 21

"A conflict between ethnic Malay and Dayak groups on the one side, and ethnic Madurese migrants on the other, erupted in 1999 in Sambas and Singkaweng, West Kalimantan, causing 78,000 Madurese to flee from their homes to the provincial capital Pontianak where they were accommodated in public facilities until June 2002. After the murder of several Madurese who had returned to Sambas to dispose of their property, the possibility of a general return of the IDPs was ruled out. Therefore the GoRI, through the Department of Manpower and Transmigration and the Department of Resettlement and Regional Infrastructure, provided relocation housing for most IDPs in 12 relocation sites. In addition to housing, the GoRI also provided 11,000 families of agricultural background with two hectares of agricultural land per family. Since their move to relocation sites, IDPs are being referred to as "Settlers". A total of 1,259 households have chosen the alternative option of a government local settlement ("empowerment") package of IDR 5 million (US\$ 600) per family to arrange their own accommodation and living."

Ethnic violence and displacement in Central Kalimantan (2001-2005)

- In February 2001 inter-ethnic violence started in Sampit, Central Kalimantan and rapidly spread to other regions, namely Palangkaraya. Some 180,000 Madurese were displaced back to their home island of Madura.
- As of 2002, over 100,000 Madurese were living in difficult conditions on Madura Island where they have sought refuge since 2001.
- While an estimated 40,000 Madurese managed to return to Central Kalimantan during 2002 and 2003, the majority of the displaced-estimated at 130,000 people- remain displaced in East Java (mainly on Madura Island) as of 2004.
- Central Kalimantan's authorities continue to resist the return of the Madurese in 2005

HRW, 28 February 2001

"The violence in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, started on the night of February 17-18 when a Dayak house was burned down. Rumor spread that an ethnic Madurese was responsible, and immediately, a band of Dayaks went into a Madurese neighborhood and began burning houses. In the ensuing violence, a Dayak and a Madurese were killed. This sent the clash to a new level, and in a matter of days, the violence had spread to Kualakayan, a subdistrict 110 km north of Sampit, and to Palangkaraya, the provincial capital of Central Kalimantan, some 220 km away. (...)

The violence is reported to have been linked to an effort to restructure the office of bupati, or district chief, in the district of Kotawaringin Timur, central Kalimantan. Two local officials, who apparently believed they were going to lose their jobs in the restructuring, reportedly paid Rp.20 million to two "coordinators" to start the violence in Sampit, the largest timber port in Indonesia. One official was the head of local forestry unit (Kepala Resort Pemangku Hutan or KRPH) for the Tumbang Manjul area; the other was a staff member of the local Bappeda or regional planning office in the district, according to local police quoted in the Banjarmasin Post, a local newspaper. ("Dua Pejabat Kotim Diburu," February 20, 2001.)

In the restructuring, according to the bupati, Wahyudi K. Anwar, several departments would be joined together and only one person could be head. But he said no one would lose his job; rather, those who could not be retained as heads of department would still rise to the next rank in the civil service.

This is not the first time that a struggle over local posts at the district level has led to major violence. One factor in the outbreak of communal violence in Poso, Sulawesi, in May 2000 that left close to 300 dead was the competition between two men of different faiths to be bupati.

But there was a more immediate source of tension in the Sampit area. In the same district that was facing restructuring of the local administration, Kotawaringin Timur, there was an outbreak of violence between ethnic Dayak and Madurese in mid-December 2000. It centered on the village of Kareng Pangi, subdistrict Katingan Hilir, some 200 kilometers from Sampit. In that instance, the violence arose after a dispute about a gambling locale. One local source told Human Rights Watch on Monday that it started as "purely criminal," but after two Dayaks were killed, it erupted into a full-scale attack on the Madurese community. In August 2000, a similar clash had taken place in the neighboring district of Kotawaringin Barat, leaving several dead.

In the Sampit outbreak, the death toll from February 18 through February 26 was well over 200, and estimates are ranging as high as 600. (The local government said on Monday the main hospital in Sampit had recorded 210 deaths, but many of the people killed were never brought to the hospital.) The number of Madurese displaced from their homes was estimated at 24,000. By Tuesday, there were reports of at least three Madurese killed in Palangkaraya, many Madurese houses had been burned down, and thousands of Madurese were using every available form of transportation to leave because of rumors of a Dayak attack. The government sent ships to

rescue many of the displaced in Sampit, and both they and Madurese from elsewhere were streaming into the East Javanese city of Surabaya.

As of Sunday night, five battalions of Indonesian army troops had been sent to the area, as the police seemed totally unable to control the violence. According to local press reports today, the bodies of 118 Madurese were found in the subdistrict of Parenggean, apparently killed by Dayaks as they tried to get to the city center in order to be evacuated by security forces."

At least 100,000 Madurese have fled to Madura Island (2002)

RI, 15 April 2002

"Indonesia's Madura Island, with limited resources for education, employment, and farming for its own population, is facing the consequences of an influx of over 100,000 displaced people. Madurese from Sampit, Central Kalimantan, fled to Madura Island as a result of conflict between Dayaks and Madurese in February 2001. To date, little international attention or assistance has been invested in Madura Island's bleak IDP situation. Humanitarian assistance focusing on development initiatives promoting self-sufficiency is essential to the survival of the displaced Madurese.

The Madurese who lived in Central Kalimantan either migrated there or were moved there as part of Indonesia's transmigration program. They have ethnic links with Madura Island, which is located off the coast of East Java. Host families on Madura Island readily accepted Madurese fleeing the February 2001 violence into their homes, and the remainder, nearly 30,000, are residing in IDP camps. IDPs have received limited information about their prospects for return or prospects for integration into Madurese communities. In addition, IDPs have little or no opportunities for employment or education, and suffer from severe trauma, according to NGO reports. Most IDPs would like to return to their homes in Sampit, though return has been made impossible by continued mistrust between the Dayaks and the Madurese, with fear of continued violence."

Situation as of 2004

OCHA, 9 April 2004, p. 14

"A majority of the 180,000 people, displaced from Central Kalimantan to East Java province during the conflict between Dayaks (indigenous population) and Madurese (migrants) in early 2001, remain in displacement on mainland East Java and Madura Island (Sampang and Bangkalan districts). The IDPs are spread over 140 villages and mainly reside with host families and in camps (a smaller number) provided by the government and private institutions. Most IDPs have expressed the wish to return to their villages of origin once the security situation allows for their return. During 2002 and early 2003, some 43,400 IDPs have managed to return with nominal or no assistance from the government to selected places where the communities were ready to receive them and/or have found other solutions.

The provincial government has committed itself to finding alternative solutions in 2004 for the remaining 130,000 IDPs. The government has also issued regulations aimed at assisting the return of IDPs to the most severely affected districts through allocating financial resources, enhancing inter-provincial coordination, and promoting inter-community dialogue."

Most displaced Madurese are likely to remain on Madura island (2005)

WB, February 2005, p. 18;37

"It is impossible to imagine the displaced Madurese returning peacefully to Central Kalimantan without special security provision and the guarantee of safe return from Dayak authority figures. As this is unforthcoming from both the government and Dayak leaders, the majority of displaced Madurese are most likely to remain in Madura. While some Madurese have attempted to return in small numbers, mostly to sell land and visit relatives, they have been repelled by similar acts of violence to those in 2001. For the displaced to return at all would require very careful mediation at all levels between community leaders, the government, the security sector and above all the local Dayak community; but there is no prospect for this to happen in the near future, if at all."

Between 30,000 and 40,000 returned to Central Kalimantan during 2004 (March 2005)

OCHA, March 2005

"OXFAM and the World Bank informed that some 30,000 – 40,000 Madurese have returned to the areas along Kahayan River, Central Kalimantan, with assistance from local NGOs. No significant problems and incidents during the return process were reported. Considering sensitivity of local community, a low profile approach should be continued."

Violence and displacement following independence vote in East Timor

Violence and threats cause displacement prior to the popular consultation (February-August 1999)

- Flight, especially hiding in the hills, has been a long-standing coping mechanism of the East Timorese given the political tensions and serious violations of human rights.
- Mass displacement did not begin only after the results of the popular consultation were announced but also occurred in the months leading up to the ballot.
- As of February 1999, 60,000 fled mostly from isolated villages to district towns and, often, onwards to the capital Dili, following a campaign of intimidation and violence launched by pro-integrationist militia against persons and communities considered to support independence.
- Since many displaced people had lost their ID documents UNAMET introduced a system whereby IDPs could register to vote.
- 98 per cent of the registered electorate voted and 78 per cent of the voters rejected the government's autonomy offer.
- A number of people reportedly voted and then immediately fled into the hills.

CHR, 6 April 2000, pp. 4-5

"11. In East Timor, displacement is not a recent phenomenon. Flight, especially hiding in the hills, has been a long-standing coping mechanism of the East Timorese given the political tensions and serious violations of human rights that have characterized the Territory's history since its annexation by Indonesia in 1975. During that period, the Representative was informed, a large number of people also were forced by the Indonesian authorities to move from their traditional homes in the mountains into urban areas. This report, however, focuses on the heightened displacement crisis associated with the popular consultation on the Indonesian Government's offer of autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia, held on 30 August 1999. Mass displacement, it is important to underline, did not begin only after the results of the popular consultation were announced but also occurred in the months leading up to the ballot.

A. Prior to the popular consultation

12. As early as February 1999, following the Government's proposal in January for either greater autonomy or independence for East Timor, a campaign of intimidation and violence launched by pro-integrationist militia against persons and communities considered to support independence began to generate significant internal displacement. An estimated 60,000 persons became internally displaced, fleeing mostly from isolated villages to district towns and, often, onwards to the capital Dili. Initially, those fleeing tended to be taken into the homes of relatives and friends. As their numbers increased, churches became principal centres of refuge.

(...)

15. Regarding the apparent aim of the intimidation, the Representative received reports of internally displaced persons being forcibly grouped together by militia for the purpose of indoctrinating them to vote pro-autonomy, with this occurring five to six weeks before campaigning was officially allowed to begin. And yet, the very fact of being displaced presented obstacles to the exercise of the right to participate in the popular consultation. The process of voter registration required the presentation of two forms of personal identification – documents that for many of the internally displaced had been destroyed or lost in the course of displacement. In an important initiative to overcome this problem, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), which was charged with overseeing the popular consultation, introduced a system whereby an affidavit from the village chief, priest, or other community leader from either the area of origin or the area to which the person concerned had been displaced was sufficient to enable internally displaced persons to register to vote.

16. Notwithstanding the intimidation and violence characterizing the period leading up to the vote, the high voter turn-out - 98 per cent of the registered electorate - indicates that they did not keep people from voting, or from voting to reject the Government's offer of autonomy, as did 78 per cent of the voters. Indeed, the Representative was informed that one of the highest voter turn-outs was by a community of internally displaced persons, all of whom (save two persons, of whom one was giving birth) courageously participated in the vote despite the severe intimidation and risks to their personal security. In another indication of the importance that the population attached to their participation in the popular consultation, it was reported that a number of people reportedly voted and then immediately fled into the hills."

Violence and displacement following the announcement of the results of the popular consultation (September 1999)

- Displacement occurred after the announcement of the results of the ballot was characterized by systematic and widespread violations of human rights, violence and mass destruction unleashed by prointegration militias with the collusion of elements of the Indonesian security forces
- 80 per cent of the population was displaced by violence following the announcement of the results.
- 500,000 fled within East Timor, mainly in the hills while 240,000 fled or were forcibly relocated in West Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia.
- The mass removal of some 250,000 persons from East Timor to West Timor was reportedly prepared in advance by the military, in cooperation with the police.
- It aimed at discrediting the process of popular consultation by signalling that a sizeable portion of the population disagreed with the results and thereby calling into question the legitimacy of the outcome.

CHR, 6 April 2000, pp. 4-7

B. Following the announcement of the results of the ballot

17. In the days and weeks following the announcement on 4 September of the results of the ballot, the displacement crisis escalated dramatically, affecting an estimated 80 per cent of the population of East Timor. Displacement occurred in two major patterns: some 500,000 persons fled within East Timor, mostly going into hiding in the hills and usually only a few kilometers from their homes, while an estimated 240,000 fled or, as is reported to have been most often the case, were forcibly relocated, principally to West Timor but also to other parts of Indonesia. Displacement also occurred to other countries: some 1,500 persons were assisted by the international community in being evacuated to Australia.

(...)

19. As has been well documented in other reports, the general context in which displacement occurred after the announcement of the results of the ballot was characterized by systematic and widespread violations of human rights, violence and mass destruction unleashed by pro-integration militias with the collusion of elements of the Indonesian security forces. Many people spontaneously took flight both within and outside of East Timor, in an effort to escape these conditions of severe physical insecurity. However, displacement was also systematic, such that large numbers of persons did not flee but were forcibly relocated, that is, deliberately moved against their will. In several cases, people reportedly were ordered from their homes and, often at gunpoint, herded onto trucks, ships and planes, destined principally for West Timor but also for other parts of Indonesia. From the point of view of logistics alone, the operation appears to have been highly organized, with advance planning having been required. Indeed, the Representative was informed of documentary evidence indicating preparations on the part of the military, in cooperation with the police, in advance of the announcement of the results of the popular consultation, for the mass removal of some 250,000 persons from East Timor to West Timor. The displacement and evacuation of people, along with the intimidation, terror and destruction of property that occurred, the Commission of Inquiry has concluded, "would not have been possible without the active involvement of the Indonesian army, and the knowledge and approval of the top military command" (A/54/726-S/2000/59, para. 138).

(...)

22. To a certain extent, the wave of violence and destruction unleashed after the announcement of the outcome of the popular consultation was a reaction of rage and revenge on the part of pro-integrationist forces to the results of the ballot, which clearly were not in their favour. These feelings were undoubtedly magnified by what, it was suggested, must have been a sense of shock and disbelief at the overwhelming size of the pro-independence majority. Acts of spite appeared to be intended to ensure that independence for East Timor would come at a heavy price, including in terms of denying East Timor the benefits of the infrastructure and other material investment that had been made over the years, thereby undermining its successful development as an independent nation. It was also a widely held view that the actions of the pro-integrationist forces in East Timor were intended to serve as a foreboding message to secessionist movements elsewhere in the Indonesian archipelago. While East Timor may be considered an exceptional case given its history, it is believed that the Indonesian military nonetheless were, through their actions there, giving a warning signal to insurgent movements in a number of places in Indonesia, most notably in Aceh.

23. Regarding both flight and the measures of forced relocation to West Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia, a number of overriding political factors appear to have been at play. The sudden mass movement of large numbers of people from East Timor, including both pro-integrationists who fled for fear of their own security and persons supporting independence who were forcibly relocated, appears to have been aimed at discrediting the process of popular consultation by signalling that a sizeable portion of the population disagreed with the results and thereby calling into question the legitimacy of the outcome. If the hope was that the ballot accordingly would be redone, it was suggested that it was likely believed that the electorate would by that point have been so terrorized as to ensure a radically different result. It was also suggested that the mass

displacement would assist in fostering the impression that East Timor was on the verge of civil war and descent into chaos against which Indonesia could act as a stabilizing influence. The most widely held view was that the mass forced relocation was undertaken in order to ensure for pro-integrationist forces a constituency or power base in West Timor and even a potential "bargaining chip" in future negotiations. This last reason would appear to best explain why, as will be explored below, displaced persons in West Timor continue to be impeded from returning even months after the Government of Indonesia accepted the results of the ballot."

Between 10,000 and 40,000 former East Timorese refugees still displaced in West Timor (2006)

- In May 2003, a Presidential Decree provided the former refugees with two options: register as Indonesians citizens or accept temporary resident status
- Government no longer tolerates refugees living in camps and they have been told to move – either to return immediately to East Timor or resettle elsewhere in Indonesia.
- Rumour mill and the absence of unbiased and appropriate information in West Timor continue to pose obstacles for those who wish to return.
- With violence no longer a threat, a cessation clause on refugee status has been invoked by UNHCR
- As of early 2005, an estimated 28,000 ex-East-Timorese remain in West Timor. 12,000 have been relocated elsewhere in West Timor and 16,000 remain in camps near the border.
- In 2006, estimates on the number of former East Timorese refugees still living in a situation akin to displacement ranged from 10,000 to 40,000

Oxfam G-B, January 2003

"Amidst the violence that followed the UN-sponsored referendum on East Timor's (now Timor-Leste) independence in September 1999, some 280,000 East Timorese crossed the border into the Indonesian side of Timor island. Some fled to escape violence, but many were coerced to leave their homes and cross the border by armed militia. Living under the noses of militia in rudimentary refugee camps in West Timor has meant limited access to reliable information on the situation back at home. So the process of refugee return has been a slow and painful one. As of early 2003, most refugees have managed to make their way home to East Timor. But 30,000 others remain behind.

Living alongside an equally poor local population in West Timor, in January 2003 these East Timorese are now, once again, stuck between a rock and a hard place. The government of Indonesia will no longer tolerate refugees living in camps and they are being told that they must move – either to return immediately to East Timor or resettle elsewhere in Indonesia. The fact that refugees have chosen to stay in the camps despite the poor conditions and in spite of this government policy is indicative of the vast uncertainties associated with leaving the camps.

Oxfam GB, in collaboration with a local partner, Centre for Internally Displaced People Service/CIS, and Jesuit Refugee Service, organised a survey to find out what is blocking the pursuit of successful durable solutions and to offer the refugees a chance to voice their concerns.

On the one hand, although repatriated refugees have successfully re-integrated into their home communities in East Timor, our interviews revealed that the rumour mill and the absence of unbiased and appropriate information in West Timor continue to pose obstacles for those who wish to return. Despite the keen desire to return home, many remain sceptical – even fearful – of what lies in wait in East Timor.

On the Indonesia side, the basic requirements have yet to be met. There is no infrastructure, basic services or options for getting a livelihood. Nor is there any acceptance by the local population of the need to accommodate the refugees, and help them get a viable and secure standard of living. Already there have been several cases of locally resettled refugees abandoning settlement sites as a result of friction with the local population.

What is clear from our interviews is that not only do the refugees lack durable solutions, they simply do not have enough information to know which option holds the best chance for a secure future. Lack of information leaves refugees vulnerable to continued deprivation as well as potential intimidation and coercion.

In the meantime, as of January 2003, with violence no longer a threat, a cessation clause on refugee status has been invoked by UNHCR, UN refugee agency. This means that the East Timorese in Indonesia are no longer entitled to international protection as refugees."

OCHA, 9 April 2004, p. 17

"A Presidential Decree adopted in May 2003 and subsequent instructions from the Department of Home Affairs provided the former refugees in West Timor with an opportunity to register either as Indonesian citizens or accept temporary resident status (in anticipation of future return). The registration is combined with the issuance of relevant documentation, including Identity Cards."

Writenet, February 2005, p. 22

"Following a five-point strategy put forward by the UNHCR, the Indonesian government relocated approximately 12,000 people from camps along the border, but only to other parts of West Timor rather than other parts of Indonesia, which left some 16,000 individuals near the border. Overall, there does not appear to have been any large movements of people out of West Timor; nor has border demarcation been finalized."

UNCHR, 22 March 2005, p. 14

"The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are still some 28,000 East Timorese who have not returned to Timor-Leste. This represents 10 per cent of those who fled or were forced to flee the violence in 1999. UNHCR also estimates that, of those remaining in Indonesia, many have chosen to do so. UNHCR continues to assist this group by assuring access to nationality rights, shelter, school and water projects. As of 15 November 2004, 248 people had returned during the year."

ICG, 4 May 2006, p. 2

"Following the 30 August 1999 referendum in which East Timorese voted to separate from Indonesia, four broad groups crossed the border into West Timor: members of Indonesian army-sponsored militias, along with their families and supporters; Indonesian civil servants, both Timorese and non-Timorese; those forcibly deported by the militia or Indonesian military (TNI); and those independently fleeing the post-poll violence. Many of the some 250,000 swiftly returned, according to UNHCR figures, 126,000 in the first three months. Those who stayed longer were initially considered refugees but lost that status at the end of 2002 and are considered Indonesian citizens. These former refugees can still go back to Timor-Leste but the rate of returns is now modest. In 2005, only around 500 took part in the repatriation program, and a scheme that provided incentive funding for repatriations has now ended.

Most of those who have elected to stay live in two districts: Belu, which borders Bobonaro and Covalima in Timor-Leste, and Timor Tengah Utara (TTU), which borders Oecusse. Precisely how many there are is a matter of debate. Before it wound up its operations in West Timor at the end of 2005, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that about 10,000 former refugees were "living in conditions of concern", while 16,000 others had been resettled within West Timor. Other estimates are higher: a local NGO, CIS Timor, says

9,000 families (approximately 40,000 people) are in camps; the Belu district government lists 7,734 families still living in emergency housing in that district alone, while East Nusa Tenggara Governor Piet Tallo cited a figure of 104,436 individuals remaining in West Timor."

Struggle for Independence in Papua

Natural resources-rich Papua ranks lowest in Indonesia with regards to human development

- Despite immense natural resources, most Papuans remain poor and human development indicators place Papua province behind all other provinces of the country.

UNDP, August 2005, pp. 6-7

"Papua constitutes a major region within Indonesia - with 42.2 million ha of land, it represents 22% of the total land area of Indonesia. In the 2000 census by BPS, the total population of Papua was 2.23 million, of which 580 thousand (26%) were living in urban areas, and 1.65 million (74%) in rural areas. According to BPS data from 2003, the population had increased to 2.35 million, of which 646 thousand (27.5%) were living in urban areas population and 1.7 million (72.5%) in rural areas. According to the same source, only one third of the population in urban areas is indigenous Papuan, while in rural areas they represent threequarters of the total population.

Papua is endowed with abundant forest, water and mineral resources, which, combined with its many vibrant cultures, give Papua a unique identity. Although Papua enjoys Indonesia's fourth highest level of GRDP per capita of over Rp.11 million largely from natural resource-related industries, these economic successes have not been shared by most Papuans and have not translated into corresponding levels of human development. Papua is the province with Indonesia's highest incidence of poverty with 41.8% of Papuans living on less than US\$1 per day, more than double the national average of 18.2% (Indonesia Human Development Report, 2004).

Papuans recognize that they live in a rich natural environment, and one from which some have extracted considerable material wealth. Rather than describing the majority of Papuans as poor, some CSOs have suggested that Papuans are impoverished and "belum beruntung", or "not yet fortunate". These local perceptions provide insight into some of the frustrations and aspirations that Papuan people have regarding their human development situation. An examination of other social indicators that relate to a more holistic picture of human development further reveals the depth of poverty endemic in the province.

For many non-economic indicators of poverty, including those measured by the MDGs, Papua lags behind most other provinces. According to the recently released Indonesian Human Development Index (HDI 2004), Papua ranks lowest in Indonesia. It stands out as one of the few 'declining' regions, actually suffering deterioration in HDI status, which is mostly attributed to declines in education coverage and income levels. The government's Demographic Health Survey in Papua (1997) showed an infant mortality rate at 65 per 1000 live births, and child mortality at approximately 30 per 1000. An indicator for maternal health, the percentage of births assisted by trained medical personnel is just 50.5% in Papua (Provincial Health Service, 2005). The BPS census of 2000 indicated that only 82% of children in Papua attend primary school (SD), 47% attend junior secondary school (SLTP), and 19% attend senior secondary school (SMU). These figures place Papua far below national levels and paint a much more serious development situation than the GRDP data above.

Although these indicators are useful for comparisons across regions and countries, especially with regard to the MDGs (see inset), they may not be especially salient to Papua's particular cultural and socio-economic contexts. Debate concerning the nature of poverty in Papua is vigorous, especially as it relates to what are viewed by some development actors as externally imposed indicators of poverty."

Background to the independence struggle (1828-2004)

- Dutch retained Western New Guinea after Indonesia gained independence. After an intensive lobbying from Indonesia and with the help of the United States, the Netherlands were forced to abandon the province in 1962. They did, however, take measures to foster the colony's passage towards self-rule by overseeing elections for a New Guinea Council, which inaugurated a flag and regalia for a future West Papuan state on December 1, 1961
- Indonesia managed to get the UN mandate to oversee the 'Act of Free Choice' held in the province six years after Indonesia took control of it in 1963.
- Papuan representatives carefully selected by the Indonesian government overwhelmingly decided in favour of integration into Indonesia in 1969.
- An armed movement fought for independence in the following three decades.
- In 1999, 100 provincial leaders presented then President Habibie with a demand for West Papua's independence. A Papuan National Congress was created in 2000.
- Instead of independence, the central government strongly suggested to opt for special autonomy. The 2001 special autonomy law (UU No. 21/2001), provides the province with a greater share of the territory's vast natural resource earnings.
- In early 2003, legislation was passed to divide the province into three parts: West Irian Jaya, Central Irian Jaya, and what effectively would be east Irian Jaya, the only part to retain the name Papua. The reason was to weaken and divide the independence movement

East West Center Washington, 2004

"The Indonesian province of Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) is a territory whose political status has long been subject to debate. Western New Guinea first appeared as part of the Netherlands Indies in official documents issued in 1828 and 1848; yet neither the Dutch, nor the Tidoran sultans, whose rule over the "Papuan Islands" provided the basis for the Netherlands' claims, exercised effective control in the territory. It wasn't until 1898 that the Indies government established the first permanent post. This situation changed following World War II, when the Dutch retained western New Guinea after the rest of the Indies gained independence as the Republic of Indonesia. In the Round Table Agreement of 1949, a clause stipulated that the territory's fate would be decided within a year. When bilateral talks broke down, Indonesia lobbied for the recovery of the territory, which it called West Irian, first through diplomacy then by threatening war. The Netherlands initially responded by accelerating the colony's passage towards self-rule. Dutch officials oversaw elections for a New Guinea Council, which inaugurated a flag and regalia for a future West Papuan state on December 1, 1961. Eventually, the Netherlands yielded to American pressure and agreed to a settlement with Indonesia. The New York Agreement of 1962 called for western New Guinea's transfer to the United Nations, then Indonesia, which was to hold an Act of Free Choice in which the territory's inhabitants would chose between independence and integration into the republic. On May 1, 1963, Indonesia took control of the territory, and in 1969, 1022 carefully supervised (some say intimidated) individuals voted unanimously in favor of integration. An armed separatist movement waxed and waned over the first three decades of Indonesian rule, accompanied by military reprisals and widespread reports of human rights violations. After the resignation of Indonesia's President Suharto on May 21, 1998, the independence movement took on a more inclusive, nonviolent form. At a February

26, 1999 meeting in Jakarta, a Team of 100 provincial leaders presented then President Habibie with a demand for West Papua's independence.

Back in the province, pro-independence activists convened talks that coalesced in the Papuan National Congress of May 21-June 4, 2000. The Congress resulted in a resolution confirming the leadership of the Papuan Presidium Council and directing this executive body to pursue independence through peaceful dialogue. Following the Congress, the central government launched a crackdown involving the arrest of proindependence leaders and the banning of the West Papuan flag. On November 11, 2001, Theys Eluay, the Presidium chairman, was found murdered; members of the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) later were convicted of the crime. During the same month, the Indonesian legislature passed a bill based on a draft prepared by a group of Papuan intellectuals granting the province special autonomy and a new name. The fate of the 2001 special autonomy law (UU No. 21/2001), which provides the province with a greater share of the territory's vast natural resource earnings and calls for the founding of an indigenous upper house, came into question in January 2003, when President Megawati Sukarnoputri signed an instruction (Inpres No. 1/2003) ordering the immediate implementation of a 1999 law (UU No. 45/1999) dividing Irian Jaya into three new provinces. Between August 23 and September 7, 2003, rioting between pro-and anti-division groups in the mining town, Timika, cost five people their lives."

Jones, Sydney, 29 March 2004

"From the time Soeharto fell in May 1998 through the brief Habibie presidency until halfway through the Gus Dur administration, Papua independence supporters were on a roll. They had the Papuan congress, and a Papuan presidium. They were free to mobilize and express pro-independence support as never before. They got rid of the hated "Irian Jaya" for the province and got it renamed Papua. They got agreement that the Morning Star flag could be flown, although always in conjunction with, and lower than, the Indonesian flag.

It was to stave off the growth of this nationalism, particularly in the aftermath of what from Jakarta's perspective was the East Timor debacle, that Jakarta in 2001 offered a Special Autonomy package.

The offer was immediately rejected by pro-independence leaders, but many leading Papuan intellectuals, and much of the provincial leadership, were willing to give the idea a go and take part in a drafting process which ultimately produced a very strong law. It gave the Papuans a much larger share of locally generated revenue than in the past, granted a special allocation that was to be spent on health, education, and infrastructure, and mandated the establishment of a Papuan People's Council, known in Indonesian as the MRP. It was this body, initially seen as a second house of the provincial legislature and then turned into more of an advisory body to ensure the protection of Papuan rights, that the Megawati government began to have serious second thoughts about. If the MRP were allowed to develop as planned, it had the potential to become an engine for the independence movement, despite its advisory role.

So what happened? First, the government sat on the implementing regulation that would have allowed the MRP to come into being. Then, by fiat from Jakarta, otherwise known as a presidential instruction or inpres in January last year, it divided the province into three. "Cut like a cake" as one Papuan leader described it, with three not-so-vertical lines creating West Irian Jaya, Central Irian Jaya, and what effectively would be east Irian Jaya, the only part to retain the name Papua.

The official reason given for the division was to improve administrative efficiency and delivery of services in a huge province. The real reason was to weaken and divide the independence

movement, at a time when the Indonesian government believed that international developments could coincide with the onset of autonomy to turn province-wide institutions, such as the proposed MRP, into powerful motors for Papuan nationalism."

Influx of migrants put pressure on land and force Papuans from their homes (1969-2000)

- Influx of migrants dramatically transformed the social and demographic makeup of Papua province.
- Settlers began to dominate the modern sector of the economy.
- Due to an increase of new migrants, population growth exceeded 3 percent annually over a three-decade period, resulting in a near tripling of the total population.
- These large population movements soon put pressure on land and spurred competition over resources.
- Development legal framework took little account of the unique systems of customary law (adat) and communal landownership (hak ulayat) that were central to social organization in Papua.
- As a result, traditional ways of life were undermined, intensifying the clash between modernity and tradition, leading to the widespread displacement and dislocation of Papuans from their traditional lifestyles.

East-West Center Washington, 2004, pp. 19-20

"Of all the changes that were to make an impact, however, it was the influx of thousands of migrants that transformed the social and demographic makeup of the province. Papua became a new frontier for many Indonesians who were attracted to the economic opportunities. Settler communities began to dominate the modern sector of the economy. Essentially the rapidly growing economy pitted new settler communities in competition with local Papuan tribes. The latter, particularly those living in the highlands, continued to pursue a subsistence lifestyle and had little exposure to the trappings of modernity. Not surprisingly, settlers were better prepared to take advantage of the new opportunities.

In 1970, the government lifted its restrictions on free movement into Papua following the Act of Free Choice in 1969—a move that resulted in a sudden influx of new migrants. The new policy had an immediate effect. Shipping figures showed a twofold increase in migrants to Papua from 5,000 in 1971 to 10,000 in 1972 (Garnaut and Manning 1974: 39). Population growth exceeded 3 percent annually over a three-decade period, resulting in a near tripling of the total population. (Tripling the population of the United Kingdom to its present total, by contrast, has taken 100 years.) Compared to the figures for Indonesia, the levels of population growth in Papua were nearly double the national average. The economic crisis in Indonesia in 1997–98 did little to stem the flow of migrants. By February 2004 the total population for the province was 2,352,518.15

Such large population movements soon put pressure on land and spurred competition over resources. Transmigration settlements and ambitious resource projects became the subject of controversy due to land disputes with local communities who claimed traditional ownership. Development was highly centralized through five-year national plans. It was also regulated by national laws in forestry, agriculture, mining, and transmigration—laws that took little account of the unique systems of customary law (adat) and communal landownership (hak ulayat) that were central to social organization in Papua. The New Order's centralized planning process not only proved unresponsive to local needs but undermined traditional ways of life, intensifying the clash between modernity and tradition.

Taken together the effects from such large inflows of migrants were to result in widespread displacement and dislocation of Papuans from their traditional lifestyles. These pressures have not only been translated into contemporary conflict between indigenous and Papuan communities but have also generated pro-independence mobilization."

Centre for Peace and Development Studies, August 2005, p. 25

"According to Dutch colonial records, the 1960s population of Papua numbered around 700,000. After integration with Indonesia in 1969, an open door policy was declared and settlers from other provinces flocked to Papua: the population tripled from the 1970s to 2000, from 700,000 to 2.2 million, of which 1.5 million were Papuan. In the 1970s, the Summer Institute of Linguistics inventory of local dialects noted extinction of various local dialects (and hence speakers) as Papuans took up Indonesian but also due to decimation of ethnic groups. Low swampland areas, home to nomadic Papuan food gatherers, have also experienced a natural decrease in population.

Papuan population growth in regions on the outskirts of provincial and sub-district towns is less than 0.5% per year, and high infant mortality figures indicates a still-decreasing trend. According to the late Dr Michael Rumbiak, the very slow growth means 150 years would be needed to double the Papuan population, with infant mortality rates of 70 per 1,000. City rates are higher due to higher proportions of migrants. Population growth of Papuans in isolated mountain villages, swamplands and city outskirts is still zero.

According to Rumbiak, formerly a leading demographer at Papua's Cenderawasih University, development is aimed only at certain targeted regions, but it leads to impoverishment and marginalization of Papuans. It's lop-sided and not people-oriented. Rumbiak argued that the government must assess if development has been beneficial or destructive.

Development programs that threaten local society need cancellation or revision. Studies are needed into local social, cultural and geographical conditions, and how to increase population and improve quality of life among the Papuans.

(...)

The migration program is a national government policy to develop the regions but it leads to a sharp inequity between migrants and locals. Papuans are becoming a minority in their homeland, unable to compete and being further stressed. Official transmigration programs and spontaneous migration alike have led to a rapid increase of the non-Papuan population in Papua, outstripping the Papuans, especially in district towns like Jayapura, which is immediately apparent in areas like shopping centres.

Michael Rumbiak's findings indicate that transmigration programs have led to impoverishment of locals. The local communities lost their traditional land rights, so where do the clans go? In transmigration regions such as Arso in Jayapura district, for example, the 1970 local population numbered no more than 1,000. By 2000 the Arso population had reached around 20,000 and Papuans became a marginalized minority. Transmigrants were more numerous and stronger, pushing Papuans into the barren hills. Transmigration has led to the loss of traditional lands and forests where once local tribes used to hunt and gather food. There is no transfer of knowledge and technology to substitute for lost basic rights."

Armed resistance, human rights abuses and displacement in Papua (1998-2000)

- In 2001, tensions were high in Papua, with an escalation in violence, including at times lethal security force operations against independence supporters as well as attacks on migrants by Papuan militants.
- From 1998 to 2001, a broad, civilian-based Papuan independence movement started to emerge along side the guerrilla fighters and, for the first time, poses a serious challenge for Indonesia.
- While promising, yet not delivering, special autonomy, the central government has returned to a hardline approach since 2000, sending thousands of new troops to the province and engaging in counter-insurgency tactics often accompanied by human rights abuses.
- Until October 1998, the province was designated as a Military Operations Area (DOM) and security forces were given a free hand to combat the guerrillas, resulting reportedly in widespread killings and human rights violations against civilians.

HRW, July 2001, pp. 2-3

"The political situation in Irian Jaya (also known as West Papua or Papua), Indonesia's easternmost province, is fundamentally unsettled. Papua is remote from Jakarta and home to only two million of the country's more than 200 million inhabitants, but what happens in the resource-rich province is likely to have great importance for Indonesia. Like Aceh, Papua is home to an armed insurgency against the Indonesian government. Although far less violent than Aceh at present, the province is seen in Jakarta as a front line in national efforts to defend Indonesia's territorial integrity against newly energized separatist movements and growing communal conflict.

On the surface, Indonesian security forces appear to be in control, having forcibly subdued the broad independence movement that emerged into public view in the province after the fall of Soeharto in May 1998; below the surface, however, Papuan sentiment remains overwhelmingly opposed to rule from Jakarta. Tensions are high and recent months have seen an escalation in violence, including at times lethal security force operations against independence supporters as well as several ugly attacks on migrants by Papuan militants, a disturbing development that suggests more trouble ahead.

Segments of the Papuan population have been demanding independence for decades, but, until recently, resistance to Indonesian rule was limited to small bands of guerrillas loosely organized under the names Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM) and National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional or TPN). The insurgents have mostly staged relatively small-scale hit and run attacks on Indonesian military posts and, on a few occasions, have taken hostages to draw attention to their cause. In the three years since Soeharto fell, however, a broad, civilian-based Papuan independence movement has emerged along side the guerrilla fighters and, for the first time, poses a serious challenge for Indonesia.

The Indonesian government has made important political overtures to Papuan leaders since the ouster of Soeharto and has promised, though not yet delivered, substantial autonomy for the province (Otonomi Khusus, literally 'Special Autonomy', to distinguish it from the devolution of central authority now taking place across Indonesia). At the same time, military and police authorities have returned to a hardline approach. Since June 2000, authorities have sent thousands of new troops to the province, intimidating and at times attacking civilians in areas where rebels are believed to be active; the government has banned even peaceful expression of support for Papuan independence; security forces have moved aggressively against independence demonstrators, in many cases killing or seriously injuring them; key Papuan leaders have been arrested; and prominent civil society groups, including human rights organizations, have been subjected to increased surveillance and harassment.

With the crackdown has come a return to many of the abusive practices of the past. For nearly thirty years, from 1969, when the territory was formally incorporated as part of Indonesia in a still

controversial U.N.-supervised process, until October 1998, five months after the fall of Soeharto, the province was formally designated a Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer, or DOM). Under the DOM, in effect in Papua far longer than anywhere else in Indonesia, security forces were given a free hand to combat the guerrillas. Papuans claim that thousands of civilians were terrorized and often tortured and killed during counterinsurgency campaigns. Not only did the army's heavy-handed tactics fail to extinguish the guerrilla struggle, but, as in East Timor and Aceh, they created made many new enemies among the civilian population."

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, August 2005, p. 2

"Regardless of a change in leadership in Jakarta following the fall of Suharto in 1998, human rights abuses committed by the security forces persisted as Papuans showed greater boldness in testing the limits of the new era of reformasi. The late nineties saw numerous peaceful demonstrations for dialogue and selfdetermination. The response has been brutal repression and the deployment of thousands of new troops, support for pro-Jakarta militias and incitement of conflict between Papuans and between Papuans and non-Papuans. A plan was even drawn up to crack down on the separatist movement, in a "top secret" document issued on 8 June 2000. The plan included the formation of militias, targeting human rights defenders and "black operations" against independence leaders.

A "culture of impunity" exists in Indonesia which sees its highest manifestation currently in Papua and Aceh. Military operations have led to thousands of deaths and continue to cost lives, yet the Republic's armed forces act as a law unto themselves with no real accountability for crimes against the Papuan population."

Military operations displace thousands in Papua province (August 2004-August 2005)

- As a result of operations taking place in October 2004, an estimated 6,000 civilians have been forced to seek refuge in the forests, their villages, livestock and food gardens destroyed. They have reportedly been denied access to food and medicine.
- In December 2004, it was reported that the military had intensified their operations against civilians in the Central Highlands started in August 2004.
- In February 2005, military troops have reportedly attacked 500 people taking part in a religious ceremony in Yomdori district, causing many to seek safety in the forest.
- HRW reported a significant build-up of troops and continued widespread displacement of civilians during 2005
- Report by the University of Sydney published in August 2005 concludes that Indonesian military are "the main source of suffering and instability in the province"

DPRIN, 17 November 2004

"Free Papua Organization (OPM) rebels armed with axes and swords attacked a government convoy in the Puncak Jaya region of Papua, killing a police officer and injuring 12 officials, police said Saturday.

About 100 OPM insurgents ambushed the group Friday as they traveled to Mulia, local military commander Maj. Gen. Nurdin Zainal told El-Shinta radio. "Rebels attacked the officials with axes, swords and arrows and then ran off into the jungle," said Zainal. "I've ordered soldiers to help police in searching for the rebels."

The group was visiting refugees who had fled their villages last month following a rebel attack that killed six migrant workers, Antara said. Activists have accused the military of fomenting the

violence in Puncak Jaya, saying they want the area declared an emergency area so that they will be able to control generous funds granted by the central government under regional autonomy.

Christian sources in the Puncak Jaya area told Radio Australia that as many as 20,000 people in the area had been displaced following raids by Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) troops. Pastor Socrates Sofyan Yoman, president of the Fellowship of Baptist Churches in Papua, said the military killed a clergyman, the Reverend Eleesa Tabuni on September 14.

Shortly afterwards, the pastor said, troops in a helicopter fired on people gathering food in a garden, killing two of them. Many people fled to the mountains, leaving troops in control of the area."

Elsham News Service, 21 December 2004

"Despite President Yudhoyono having expressed a willingness to find a sustainable solution to the four decade long conflict in West Papua, since August a military operation in the highlands area of Puncak Jaya has led to the displacement of up to more than six thousand indigenous tribe members and the deaths of at least twenty three, mainly children and babies, from starvation.

Having been forced from their villages by the Indonesian military, the Papuan refugees have been denied access to food and medicine and have had their villages, livestock and food gardens destroyed. According to Reverend Sofyan Yomans of the Papuan Baptist church, the villagers "are too frightened to return to their homes, fearing they will be accused of being separatists or supporters of the OPM, and killed" (OPM stands for Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or Free Papua Movement.)

(...)

The highlands area has become a militarized zone where access is denied. Church officials previously allowed freedom of movement have now effectively been barred from offering aid and solace to their congregations, which have been dispersed over the last four months. Journalists have also been barred."

RFK Centre for Human Rights, January 2005

"As reported in the December West Papua report (...), the Indonesian military (TNI) reportedly has broadened and intensified the attack operation it launched in August 2004 in West Papua's Central Highlands (Puncak Jaya District). According to reliable sources in West Papua, including Pastor Socrates Yoman, President of the Fellowship of Baptist Churches in West Papua, TNI forces have continued operations in the area, forcing thousands of Papuan civilians to flee into the forests where lack of food, shelter and medicine have caused deaths and extensive illness. Sources on the ground also indicate that the TNI has significantly expanded its operations into the neighboring districts of Jayawijaya, Nabire and Tolikara. Reports parallel initial accounts of the military operations in Puncak Jaya District with the notorious special forces (Kopassus) as well as the militarized police (Brimob) assaulting villagers, destroying homes and killing livestock. Among those villagers missing and feared dead is church and village leader Awuru Wanimbo of Wurineri village in Jayawijaya District.

Indonesian police and military claim that the Free Papua Movement (OPM) freedom fighters are responsible for the killings that opened the door for the military operation now underway. Religious and tribal leaders and human rights defenders in West Papua contend that the TNI is behind the shootings. These claims are backed by the Jakarta Post, according to which reliable sources told its reporter that Kopassus special forces were involved in the initial killings that prompted the military offensive."

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, August 2005, p. 2

"While the period of the mid nineteen seventies is often referred to as the era of greatest suffering, as Indonesia's military used Papua for its combat training exercises while simultaneously conducting a genocidal campaign in East Timor, the current situation is referred to as a "silent genocide". Villages are destroyed by TNI through arson, following "incidents" blamed on the OPM guerilla movement, but the incidents themselves are staged and guerillas (if any) are manipulated by the TNI. Civilians are then forced to take refuge in areas away from their food gardens, where they perish from malnutrition and exposure. From the Baptist Church's investigations during the first months of 2005, out of approximately 6,300 persons displaced in the Puncak Jaya operation which began in 2004 who have not been able to return to their former villages, over sixty had succumbed to the elements while hundreds more were at serious risk of disease and malnutrition, having being denied access to emergency aid.

For Papua, high rates of infant and maternal mortality, the uncontrolled spread of HIV/AIDS and military operations against the community are accepted as the indigenous Papuans' lot despite over forty years of Indonesian governance in a "liberated" Papua. Researchers at Yale University's Law School concluded in a report released in November 2003 that the issue of genocide has become serious in Papua. Xenophobia and racism have contributed to a sense of a lack of inclusion of Papuans within the Indonesian Republic, a unitary state with an unaccommodated diversity of cultures, religions and races. As the health and security of the population are supposed to be the responsibility of the government, Papuans can be forgiven for thinking that the government's policy towards Papua is one of ethnocide. It is the conclusion of this report that the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) in Papua are the main source of suffering and instability in the province.

Military involvement is common in illegal and corrupt activity and manipulation of the local political and security situation to justify and enhance further penetration of TNI and its Jakarta-based business cronies into the decision making processes and administration of Papua. This section will discuss a number of areas of Indonesian security forces involvement, including:

1. Illegal logging – a case study of the Telapak/EIA report
2. Other business activity, including infrastructure and construction works
3. Destabilization – manipulation of local politics and orchestration of attacks blamed on pro-Papuan independence groups
4. Introduction of illegal arms, and militia training and recruitment
5. Prostitution and the spread of HIV/AIDS"

RFK Centre for Human Rights, 10 August 2005

"Separate visits by language-qualified Team members in recent months have verified reports by Papuan civil society leaders and respected human rights organizations which tell of continuing military operations in the central highlands area which have killed dozens of civilians, left burned homes and churches and forced thousands into neighboring forests or to squatter status in neighboring towns.

Military-imposed travel bans have prevented humanitarian assistance from reaching these displaced persons. The central government continues to pursue a massive military buildup in West Papua, with publicly stated goals of increasing the troop presence in West Papua by 12,000 to 15,000 troops. Such a buildup, which would bring total force deployment to between 30,000 to 40,000, is unjustified by any conceivable security needs. The Indonesian military describes the tiny armed Papuan opposition to Indonesian rule as comprising only 600 individuals with 150 modern weapons. Moreover, there is no external threat in the region. This militarization of West Papua contradicts the desire of Papuans, expressed by civil society leaders, for a demilitarization of the area and its transformation in to a "zone of peace."

(...)

Recent visits by Advocacy Team members also confirm that central government policies are continuing to marginalize the Papuan people. The central government continues to provide extensive informal support to the migration of peoples into West Papua. This informal continuation of notorious "transmigration" policies displaces Papuans from their native lands and local employment and severely undermines self government."

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, August 2005, pp. 19-29

"The human rights situation has continued to deteriorate over the last two years. Particularly destructive have been the series of military operations which began in the Kiyawage area in 2003, then in the Puncak Jaya region in 2004/05 and since January 2005 in the Tolikara regency. According to the results of an investigation released by the Baptist Church of Papua in May 2005, military operations such as these have been cynically engineered by the TNI.

Apart from the operations making large numbers of people homeless and leading to scores of deaths, the impacts have been exacerbated by poor delivery of aid to the refugee communities.

(...)

On 7 October, a militia group under the TNI/Kopassus, the Wonda Marunggen group, with Anton Tabuni, shot and killed a primary teacher named Kius Wenda. On 13 October an unknown group shot six civilians. It is still unclear whether the information about the dead bodies is correct or not, because no family has yet said they've had a relative killed. Subsequently six school buildings were burnt down by Kopassus. These were the schools at Wonaluk, Yarumungun, Dondo, Yamo, Pagarugom, and Ambitmbit.

In addition, 371 homes of indigenous inhabitants have been burnt down by Kopassus. The number of refugees still taking refuge in the jungle as at end of 2004 was 6393. To compound the hardship of the Lani tribes who were made refugees by this operation, all the pigs owned by the community, valued as a form of currency when traded and an important food and source of protein, were loaded onto trucks and sold by Indonesian soldiers. The chickens were shot by the soldiers, the fences and gardens were smashed and burnt.

In Monia, soldiers have occupied a church building of the Indonesian Gospel Church as a post or living quarters for Indonesian soldiers carrying out the Puncak Jaya operation. A woman who wanted to return to her village was stripped and raped so returned to the refugee camp, a case reported by Baptist church officials.

The TNI is behind numerous incidents which result in military operations, catastrophic to local communities. These incidents are used to justify the deployment of new troop reinforcements, which in turn lead to greater human rights abuses, reaction from aggrieved Papuans, then further militarization. A dangerous and destructive spiral is thus perpetuated.

In February 2005 the villages of Panaga, Bolobor and Wunin have been the scenes of destruction of property including schools and houses. According to local government sources Brimob and Kodam 10 are responsible for the arson. Local people are becoming increasingly radicalized and divided. 700 additional troops were recently deployed to thirteen new military posts in the central/western highlands. A further 15,000 Kostrad troops are being deployed to Papua beginning this year."

See also:

Significant military build-up in Papua during 2005 amid reports of increased military activity and human rights abuses, including forced displacement (June 2006)

- Human rights situation has declined markedly between 2003 and 2005, in particular due to military operations against rebels, causing displacement of civilians.
- Causing many to flee their homes, military have also prevented aid to reach the displaced. More than 6,000 IDPs were stranded in the forest at the end of 2004.
- Abuses against civilians and IDPs by the military have reportedly included destruction of property, looting and rape.
- During 2005 and 2006, the continued lack of access to the province and further reports documentaing deterioration of the human rights situation have caused international human rights groups to publicly raise concern about Papua
- In March 2006, up to 1,200 srudents fled their homes in Jayapura to seek refuge in the forest. The displacement followed a demonstration against the US-operated Freeport mining company, which turned violent.

Human rights groups and journalist raise concern about the deteriorating human right situation and the lack of access to the province (2005-2006)

RFK Centre for Human Rights, February 2006, p. 2

"A senior UN official, in the context of a public warning about conflicts in several African countries that could become genocidal, expressed concern about developments in West Papua. Juan Mendez, a special adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, told Voice of America on 27 January that "West Papua in Indonesia" was among 'countries of concern where indigenous populations are at risk of extinction.'

The Australian media carried an interview on 1 March with Mendez in which he expressed concern that the Indonesian government was preventing human rights observers from monitoring the situation in West Papua amid 'worrying' reports of abuses there. He added that the UN was prepared to step in and mediate a solution to the long-running tensions in the province. 'It's very worrying and there's evidence about violence that's continued since 1963. It's important that we look closely at the conflict now and make sure it's not getting out of hand,' he told the Sydney Morning Herald. Asked if he was prepared to act as a mediator between the government and separatists, Mendez said 'absolutely,' although he noted that that would require invitations from both parties."

HRW, 10 February 2006

"These recent statements confirm what has effectively been a ban on access to Papua for a wide range of foreign organizations since 2003. The Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club has stated concern that no foreign journalist has had official access to Papua in the past eighteen months. In that period there has been a significant build-up of troops in Papua with reports of widespread displacement of civilians, arson, and arbitrary detention in the central highlands region."

HRW, 18 January 2006, p.2

"There was a significant build-up of troops in Papua, the easternmost part of the country, with reports of widespread displacement of civilians, arson, and arbitrary detention in the central highlands region. In August a reported 10,000 Papuan protestors held the largest ever

demonstration in the province over the failure of the government to implement special autonomy as mandated in a 2001 agreement. In October the government finally set up the Papuan Peoples Council (MRP) in accordance with provisions in the 2001 Act on Papuan Special Autonomy and a subsequent government regulation."

IHT, 10 January 2006

"Since the tsunami, the number of Indonesian troops in West Papua has grown to an estimated 50,000. The Indonesian military's power is further augmented by police forces and local militias that they fund and protect.

This escalation of military activity is ostensibly to bolster security in the region, even though the vast majority of indigenous Papuans remain true to their ideal of a land of peace. The Free Papua Movement has never been known to attack civilians during 42 years of Indonesian oppression. Yet Indonesia has labeled the movement a terrorist organization, enabling the Indonesian military to regain military support from the United States, Britain and Australia that had been withheld after the East Timor massacres in 1999.

West Papua's coalition of 250 tribes has repeatedly asked the Indonesian military and its militias to lay down arms and show respect for human rights so that conflicts can be resolved peacefully, through dialogue, to no avail. If Indonesia was willing to talk peace in Aceh, why not in West Papua? There are three major reasons.

First, foreign journalists and most researchers and aid workers are still banned from West Papua. Unlike in Aceh after the tsunami, no one is looking.

Second, peace in West Papua is not what the Indonesian military wants. It earns millions selling security services to resource companies such as the gold-mining company Freeport-McMoRan - as documented by Jane Perlez and Raymond Bonner in the IHT (Dec. 28) and The New York Times - and conflict is good for business.

Third, most of the military's revenue does not come from the government but is generated from all kinds of businesses, legal and illegal. Under the auspices of its own network of foundations, the military generates income from private security contracts, extortion, prostitution, smuggling and illegal logging.

(...)

In 2005 Yan Christian Warinussy, West Papua's only indigenous independent human rights lawyer, described human rights abuses "carried out with total impunity by members of Indonesia's armed forces" including "torture, rape, summary executions, arbitrary arrests, disappearances, the killing of indigenous leaders and civilians alike, the displacement of indigenous populations and confiscation of their lands."

In 2005, the U.S. Congress condemned human rights abuses in Papua, and parliamentary committees in Britain, Ireland and New Zealand also expressed concerns about injustice, crimes against humanity and military impunity.

The Jakarta Post, 3 December 2005

"Papuans have continued protesting the presence of security forces in villages across their troubled province, which they say has caused them to live in perpetual fear, despite the four-year implementation of the autonomy law.

Two members of the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) from Papua, Ferdinanda Ibo and Max Demetow, joined the chorus of protests during an interactive dialog between the government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) here on Friday.

They said the government needed to address Papua's most urgent problem: That the majority of Papuans continue to live in fear due to the mobilization of military and police officers across the province. "The military has even deployed more personnel to Papua," said Ferdinanda.

The two said Papuan people were unable to voice their political aspirations freely and that villagers living in remote areas were restricted in their movements for fear of being branded separatists. "Many people have been shot dead, arrested, or branded separatists after speaking about politics or protesting government policies," Ferdinanda added.

She said the security authorities treated Papua as a military operation zone and the indigenous population was subjected to intimidation."

Tapol, 20 October 2005

"The human rights situation in West Papua continues to give cause for grave concern. That concern is exacerbated by severe restrictions on access to the territory, which mean that human rights organisations, humanitarian agencies, and journalists are unable to carry out their work properly and effectively, if at all. Local human rights defenders and political activists are regularly threatened with violence or their lives. In the past year, numerous reports have emerged of military operations in the central highlands, which have displaced thousands and claimed an unknown number of lives through extra-judicial killings and the starvation and exposure of villagers forced to flee their homes.

In August 2005, the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney issued a report, 'Genocide in West Papua?', detailing a series of concerns which, if not acted upon, may pose serious threats to the survival of the Papuan people. They included increased military deployments and operations, an HIV/Aids explosion, and persistent under-development in the face of a large influx of migrants from Java and other parts of Indonesia.

The Papuan people are ill-served by the Indonesian justice system which perpetuates impunity for security forces personnel accused of human rights violations and imposes lengthy prison sentences on Papuans involved in peaceful protests and non-violent political activities. Most recently, two senior police officers were controversially acquitted of involvement in the killing of three Papuan students and the torture of dozens more in December 2000. A few months earlier, two activists were jailed for 15 and 10 years simply for organising peaceful celebrations of West Papua's national day, 1 December, and raising the national 'Morning Star' flag."

Protest in the province capital -Jayapura- against the US-operated mining company Freeport in March 2006 turns violent; 1,200 students flee to the hills to escape police violence

ABC Online, 23 March 2006

"Up to 1,200 students are reported to be hiding in the hills around Jayapura, the capital of Indonesia's Papua province, fearful of revenge attacks by members of the Indonesian Police Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB).

BRIMOB has a reputation for brutality in dealing with separatist conflicts in places such as Papua and Aceh and has been strongly criticised by international human rights groups on many occasions.

A student rally last week demanding the closure of the giant US operated Freeport Gold and Copper Mine deteriorated into a riot that police say has left six people dead including five members of the security forces.

Elsham human rights group spokesman Aloy Renwarin says the 1,200 students who live in dormitories at the state-run Cendrawasih University, which was at the centre of the clash last week, are in hiding.

He says they are hungry and some are in need of medical attention.

The university remains closed and the streets are tense.

However, when asked to go on tape, he refused, saying he feared reprisals.

Local student association spokesman Hans Magel spoke by mobile phone from Timika near the site of the mine that the students say is polluting the environment, and is tacitly condoning human rights abuses by the Indonesian Security forces it pays to protect it from locals displaced by the operation.

'The students are hiding in the jungle because they feel threatened. They are short of food, the conditions are not sanitary... it's an emergency situation,' he said."

News.com.au, 26 June 2006

"The Peace and Justice Secretariat of the Catholic diocese in West Papua's provincial capital, Jayapura, alleges cases of physical and mental abuse, and intimidation of prisoners.

The claims coincided with the Batam summit between Prime Minister John Howard and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, called over Australia's policy towards West Papua asylum seekers.

The 23 were arrested after the March 16 and 17 student demonstrations outside Jayapura's Cendrawasih University.

The protesters had demanded the closure of the giant US-run Freeport copper mine because of environmental damage and the lack of benefits going to local Papuans.

Four policemen, an air force soldier and a civilian were killed in the riots, prompting hundreds of students to flee their homes and dormitories in fear of reprisals by security forces.

The Peace and Justice Secretariat said its staff and representatives from other church groups interviewed three of the 23 detainees at the regional police cells in Jayapura.

The prisoners said wounds on their faces were sustained during days of police interrogation and they were being kept in crowded cells, the report notes.

One prisoner said they had been tortured for information during the first few weeks and a senior police officer had threatened to shoot him and had aimed a gun at his mouth."

Papua's autonomy package remains fragile (March 2006)

- According to the International Crisis Group, the Papuan People's Council (MRP), the centerpiece of the autonomy package granted to Papua in 2001, could collapse only 5 months after its establishment due to its lack of authority, and also tensions around the issue of the West Irian Jaya province and of the US-operated Freeport mining company.

ICG, 23 March 2006, p. 1

"There is serious risk the long-awaited Papuan People's Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP) is about to collapse, only five months after it was established, ending hopes that it could ease tensions between Papuans and the central government. The MRP was designed as the centrepiece of the autonomy package granted the country's easternmost province in 2001. Almost as soon as it came into being, however, it was faced with two major crises – stalled talks over the legal status of West Irian Jaya, the province carved out of Papua in 2003, and violence sparked by protests over the giant Freeport mine – while Jakarta marginalised its mediation attempts. To revive genuine dialogue and salvage the institution before autonomy is perhaps fatally damaged, President Yudhoyono should meet the MRP in Papua, thus acknowledging its importance, while the MRP should move beyond non-negotiable demands and offer realistic policy options to make autonomy work.

Papuan leaders had envisaged the MRP as a representative body of indigenous leaders that would protect Papuan culture and values in the face of large-scale migration from elsewhere in Indonesia and exploitation of Papua's natural resources. Jakarta-based politicians saw it as a vehicle for Papuan nationalism and deliberately diluted its powers, then delayed its birth. By the time it emerged, the province had been divided into two, many Papuans were disillusioned with autonomy and some were already questioning how the MRP could function under such circumstances.

The MRP's authority remains uncertain. If it can manoeuvre its way through these two crises, it may yet be able to take on other outstanding grievances and become what Papua has always lacked, a genuinely representative dialogue partner with Jakarta. If it fails, not only will its own legitimacy be diminished, but local resentment against the central government will almost certainly increase."

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, August 2005, p. 13

"Failure of Special Autonomy. According to the Chairman of the Dewan Adat Papua, Tom Beanal, no noticeable change has taken place since the Yudhoyono government came to power in 2004. He says Special Autonomy has given nothing, and symbols of Papuan nationalism, such as the Morning Star flag and anthem (Hai Tanakuh Papua), which were promised in the Special Autonomy law of 2001, have been taken out. In addition the government's proposal for an all-Papuan upper house of the local parliament has greatly diluted the powers envisaged for it in 2001. Also it provides for only 42 representatives in three categories: adat (tribal society), church and women. There may be disaffection in some quarters, especially among West Papua's 250 tribal groups, who will feel they are inadequately represented by this MRP model.

Deadline for revision of the Special Autonomy law. It has been mooted that the statement by the Papuan Customary Council (Dewan Adat Papua) of 4 February 2005 (see Appendix C) giving August 15 as a deadline for correcting the deficiencies of Special Autonomy, could lead to violence. The state apparatus may become involved in the orchestrating of incidents in the period around the deadline in an effort to demonstrate that the idea of Papuans having more control over their own affairs and a cessation of military operations is unrealistic. There is a fear that this statement can be used by certain groups, such as fake OPM operatives, to organize attacks on government buildings because the deadline was not met. Military retribution is sure to follow.

Efforts can be made by the government to confuse the international community about where the Papuans themselves stand on Papua's autonomy and the future."

POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE

Global figures

Between 200,000 and 350,000 people still displaced by conflict in Indonesia in 2006

- Information reviewed for the July 2006 update suggest that between 200,000 and 350,000 people could still be displaced in Indonesia.
- According to the Ministry of Social Affairs, some 155,000 IDPs were "handled" during 2004, bringing the total number of conflict-induced displaced down to 342,000 IDPs as of March 2005.
- The United Nations has during 2004 used a working figure of 535,000 IDPs although the government, since January 2004, considered the displaced as "vulnerable people".
- The 535,000 figure is the result of UN-Government assessment missions conducted in all IDP-affected areas during 2003 and of a workshop on management of IDPs held in mid-2003.

Situation in 2006

There are currently no reliable estimates available on the number of people who are still displaced or living in situations akin to displacement. There are officially no conflict-IDPs left in the country since January 2004 and the government no longer issues comprehensive national IDP figure.

Information reviewed in 2006 for this update suggests that the number of IDPs could range from 200,000 to 350,000.

Here is a breakdown by province using a variety of sources:

Aceh: 14,000-150,000 (including North Sumatra) [UNORC, 28 March 2006; RSC, July 2005, p.14-15]

Papua: at least 1,200 [ABC, March 2006]

West Timor: 10,000-40,000 [ICG, 4 May 2006, p.2]

Central Sulawesi: 40,000 [OCHA, April 2005]

North Maluku: 15,000 [CARDI, December 2005]

Maluku: 60,000 [CARDI, December 2005]

East Java: at least 63,000 [EC, 22 December 2004, p.2]

More detailed information on these figures can be found in the following regional "Population and Profile" sections of the Internal Displacement Profile.

People included in the IDP category should include:

- 1) Those who are still unable to return to their homes, due to continued hostility of the local population, land disputes or lack of reconstruction assistance (Madura Island, Maluku province).
- 2) Those who have yet not received the government termination grant, due to corruption, invalid data on the displaced (Maluku province, Central Sulawesi).

3) Those who have returned, have been resettled or helped to integrate locally, but who have ended up in sub-standard housing, with little or no access to basic services and without livelihood assistance opportunities (Aceh).

Situation in 2005

According to the Ministry of Social Affairs, some 155,000 IDPs were "handled" (or assisted) during 2004, leaving a total of 342,000 people displaced throughout the country, as of March 2005. These 155,000 IDPs received assistance consisting of "termination" or "empowerment" grants helping them to return, resettle or integrate in their area of displacement -the three options made available to them by the October 2001 government's [Policy on the Handling of Internally Displaced People in Indonesia](#).

The two provinces where the highest number of IDPs were assisted during 2004 are East Java, with 94,000 IDPs (Madurese from Central Kalimantan) assisted and Maluku, with 45,000 IDPs handled.

Source: Bureau of Social Assistance for Social Disaster Victims, Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs, in IDP report on Social Disaster in Indonesia, Komnas HAM, March 2005

It should be noted that IDP figures in Indonesia are notoriously weak and inconsistent, due to registration problems, poor access to some areas and an "IDP category" which excludes those who have returned but are still in need of assistance. Therefore these figures should be considered as approximations.

Furthermore, the above table does not include people who have been displaced by the armed conflict in Aceh province since May 2003, estimated at more than 125,000. Although most had returned by the end of 2004 and were assisted by the government in the process, it was reported that this assistance was insufficient to help them recover from their displacement. Also this figure is likely to be an under-estimation of the real number of people displaced as many are reported to have avoided the official IDP camps.

In mid-2004, a report commissioned by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) estimated the total number of IDPs to stand at around 600,000. (see below)

Situation in 2004

SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. iii; 9; 71

"From 1998 displacement increased dramatically in Indonesia, following the economic crisis and subsequent conflicts. The number of IDPs peaked in 2002 with a reported 1.4 million persons affected. It has since decreased; although estimates indicate a current number of some 600,000 (this estimate is an extrapolation on continuity in figures provided by OCHA for 2003, corroborated by reports by the Provincial authorities and the agencies working with IDPs). The drop is due to successful reintegration, but also reflects a limited understanding of displacement. Many, displaced over a short period of time and for short distances, are not included, and the figures are weak (the Consolidated Appeal for 2004 and the OCHA maps of June 2003 mention 535000 – but the Bakornas/OCHA seminar of the same month mentions 586769). The emergency was declared over by the government at the end of 2002 (then delayed to the end of 2003), and in the current central policy IDPs are assimilated to the poor (statements by Minister Jussuf Kalla).

(...)

The statistical indicators provided by the UN agencies (ICRC and IFRC do not publish figures of their own) are partly misleading. All reports mention registration problems, poor access to certain areas, and frequent changes, to explain that the figures are approximations. They also reflect people who are away from their home areas for prolonged periods of time, and do not include people moved from their homes for a few days, or people who have returned to their area but are unable to return to their homes which are occupied by intruders."

Situation in 2003

Between December 2002 and April 2003, Bakornas PBP and OCHA conducted joint missions in all IDP-affected areas to assess the current conditions of IDPs as well as their numbers. These visits concluded that there were an estimated 740,000 IDPs left in the country. In June 2003, the figures were revised and reduced to 535,000.


OCHA, 9 April 2004, pp.6-7

"Between February and May 2003, the Coordinating Board for Disaster Relief and IDPs/Refugees (BAKORNAS PBP) and OCHA-Indonesia conducted joint missions to all major IDP locations, namely Central Sulawesi, East Java/Madura, East Nusa Tenggara (ENT, also known as Nusa Tenggara Timur or NNT), Maluku, North Maluku (North Sulawesi), North Sumatra and West Kalimantan. The main purpose of the missions was to ascertain the number of IDPs and discuss the current situation, achievements, and remaining needs with officials, IDPs and humanitarian actors in the field. The missions confirmed a reduction by over 50% in the number of IDPs since late 2002 and found that peace-building initiatives by UN agencies and NGOs had contributed significantly to improving stability. UNDP and UNICEF's support for peace building and peace education activities in Maluku and North Maluku enabled youth from Muslim and Christian communities to stage joint cultural events and encouraged a participatory approach to problem solving. The missions also identified six common continuing concerns: reconciliation; protection and security; land ownership and housing; coordination, information and data collection; assistance; and longer term planning for economic recovery and development. The findings of the missions were shared and discussed with senior government officials, donors, UN agencies, international organisations and NGOs at a "Follow up Workshop on the Management of IDPs in Indonesia" held in Sukabumi on 19-20 June 2003. The workshop made a number of recommendations for future action. Two of the broad themes were: 1) the need to provide long-term assistance and general support for the populations and areas affected by conflict; and 2) the need to reconcile communities divided by conflict. These themes have been weaved into the strategic goals/objectives of the CHAP for 2004.

Source: OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 8

Most of the 535,000 people who remained displaced in mid-2003 have lost their productive assets as a direct consequence of conflict or in exchange for food and will require humanitarian and recovery assistance during 2004. Security concerns and the lack of resources in areas of origin constitute the largest constraints to the return process. The weak capacities of the administration, inter-communal tensions, poor or non-existent social facilities and services, and corruption, are other obstacles to finding durable solutions to the plight of IDPs and affected communities. Although the GoRI has made significant efforts to find solutions to internal displacement by the end of 2003, considerable numbers of people remain displaced, particularly

in Madura and Maluku. In Central Kalimantan for instance, Dayak communities continue to oppose the return of the Madurese who fled in early 2001. In Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku, lingering hatred, fear and revenge are major obstacles to the return of IDPs to their home areas. As of 01 January 2004, Central Government funding for IDPs will no longer be available, and it will be up to each affected Province to deal with the remaining problems. While GoRI recommends reclassifying the remaining IDPs as "vulnerable people" in order to reduce the feeling of dependency, their classification as IDPs will continue to apply for the purpose of this Common Humanitarian Action Plan."



Source: *The Global IDP Project, 2004*

Note: *This graph shows the variation of IDPs number from February 2000 to December 2003. The figures are based on the WFP/VAM Unit monthly "IDP Source and Recipient Regions" maps up to October 2002. The May 2003 figures reflects the findings of the joint Bakornas PBP-OCHA missions conducted from December 2002 to May 2003. This figure has been reduced to 586,769 during the June 2003 workshop and later in the year to 535,000.*

General description and demographics of IDPs in the WFP Survey (June 2002)

- Almost half of the displaced live in rural settings and the other half in urban areas.
- 39% of the IDPs reside in camps the other living with relatives, friends, or in a self-owned or rented house..
- The average age of the displaced is 40.5 years.

- The average duration of displacement for IDPs households is 18 months, ranging from 1 to 69 months.

The following information is taken from a survey documenting livelihood aspects of internally displaced persons (IDPs) throughout fourteen provinces and fifty districts of Indonesia. The survey was commissioned by the World Food Programme in coordination with Bakornas, with assistance from the provincial and district authorities, and international and national NGOs and released in June 2002.

WFP, June 2002, p. iv

"The survey includes a total of 5,506 IDP households (comprising 26,012 individuals). The synthesis includes 5,461 households. Of this total, the proportion living in rural settings is about equal to those living in urban environments (52 and 48 %, respectively). A large number of the IDP households reside in camps (39% or 2,123 households) while the remaining households live in various non-camp settings with relatives, host households, or in a self-owned or rented house. There are 689 IDP families living with non-relative host households (12% of the sample) and 1,229 (22%) living with relatives. The remaining 1,263 (23%) IDP families live in their own house, or rented accommodation. The average age of IDP household heads is 40.5 years. The average duration of displacement for IDP households is 18 months, ranging from 1 to 69 months. Fewer than 2 percent of IDPs have been displaced longer than 31 months.

Overall, 977 households (18%) have access to land for growing food. Of these, 344 households live in a camp setting and 633 households live outside of camps, accounting for 6.3 percent and 11.6 percent of the sample population, respectively. Of the 4,484 households (82%) that do not have access to land, 1,779 households are living in camps and 2,705 live with host households or in their own homes (39% and 49% of IDPs overall, respectively)."

Table 1: Ethnic Grouping of IDP Households


Ethnic Grouping	Number of Households	Percent of Total Sample	Composite Ethnicities (n)
<i>Acehnese</i>	150	2.7	Acehnese
<i>Batak</i>	44	.8	Batak (37) + Toba (7)
<i>Bima (NTB)</i>	45	.8	Bima
<i>Bugis</i>	311	5.7	Bugis
<i>Butonese</i>	381	7.0	Butonese (364) + Muna (17)
<i>Flores</i>	70	1.3	Flores (50) + East Flores (1) + Alor (19)
<i>Javanese</i>	577	10.6	Javanese (538) + Sundanese (34) + Baniense (5)
<i>Madurese</i>	1161	21.3	Madurese
<i>Makassarese</i>	25	.5	Makassarese
<i>Manadonese</i>	135	2.5	Manadonese (92) + Minahasa (9) + Gorontalo (34)
<i>Melayu</i>	32	.6	Melayu
<i>Moluccan</i>	1289	23.6	Moluccan (1080) + Sangir (85) + Tobelo (84) + Halmahera (21) + Ambonese (12) + Ternate (4) + Bacan (2) + Tual (1)
<i>Papuan</i>	64	1.2	Papuan
<i>Poso/Pamona</i>	168	3.1	Pamona (85) + Poso (43) + Mori (16) + Kaili (24)
<i>Sasak (Lombok)</i>	84	1.5	Sasak (62) + Lombok (22)
<i>Timorese</i>	471	8.6	Timorese (460) + Rote (11)
<i>Sub-total</i>	5007	91.7	
<i>Others</i>	454	8.3	
<i>Total</i>	5461	100.0	

Source: WFP June 2002, p. 5

WFP, June 2002, p. 5

"The households participating in the survey represent 60 ethnic groups from Indonesia. Seven ethnic groups (Madurese, Moluccan, Javanese, Timorese, Butonese, Bugis and Acehnese) comprise nearly three-quarters of the sample population. Of the remaining 53 ethnic groups in the sample, 6 comprise less than 2 percent each of all households and 47 groups comprise less than 1 percent."

Figure 1: Age of sample population by gender.



Source: WFP June 2002, p. 7

WFP, June 2002, p. 6

"The 5,461 households in the sample comprise 26,012 individuals, of which 13,352 or 51.3% are males and 48.7% are females. Figure 1 provides the age of the sample population by age strata. The overall age of IDP head of households is 40.5 years, and family size averages 4.8 per household (Table 3). Ages and household sizes are nearly identical for camp and non-camp households."

Table 3: Summary of Basic Statistics for IDP Households

	Measure	Overall	Male	Female	Camp	Non-camp
# of Respondents	n	5461	4955	506	2123	3338
Age of HH Head (yrs)	Mean	40.5	40.0	45.9	40.7	40.5
	Median	39.0	38.0	45.0	39.0	38.0
Sex of HH Head (%)	Male	90.7			89.9	91.3
	Female	9.3			10.1	8.7
# of HH Members	Mean	4.8	4.8	3.9	4.8	4.7
	Median	5.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	4.0
Marital Status (%)	Single	1.3	1.0	3.6	0.9	1.5
	Married	89.2	96.5	17.8	88.8	89.5
	Divorced	1.3	0.3	10.9	1.6	1.1
	Widowed	8.2	2.1	67.8	8.7	7.9
Religion (%)	Muslim	65.4	65.4	66.6	64.4	66.1
	Christian	34.5	34.6	33.4	35.6	33.8
Level of Education of HH Head	None	15.5	13.8	32.0	16.1	15.2
	Never completed primary school	16.5	16.7	15.2	17.2	16.1
	Completed primary school	28.8	28.8	28.9	29.7	28.3
	Completed lower secondary school	15.3	15.7	12.1	15.4	15.3
	Completed upper secondary school	21.1	22.1	11.1	19.6	22.0
	Attended tertiary school	2.7	2.9	0.8	2.0	3.2
# of Relocations	One	50.0	49.9	51.4	46.0	52.6
	2-4	48.6	48.7	47.8	52.9	46.0
	5 or more	1.4	1.4	0.8	1.1	1.4
Average length of displacement	Mean	18.4	18.4	17.9	20.4	17.1
	Median	20.0	20.0	19.0	21.0	18.0

Source: WFP June 2002, p. 9

Displacement from Maluku province

Tens of thousands of IDPs still waiting for assistance (February 2006)

- In February 2006, the Jakarta Post reported that the deadline for solving the IDP issue has been extended until 31 January 2006
- In October 2005, the media reported that the authorities would recount the number of displaced people in Ambon, estimated at 15,788 IDP families or 60,000 individuals
- In December 2004, the Maluku IDP Coalition, a organisation of IDPs from Ambon, estimated the number of IDPs in need of assistance to stand at 60,000
- Media reported in August 2004, that based on data from the Maluku Social Affairs Office, some 164,000 IDPs were still scattered throughout the province.
- As of mid-2004, the total number of IDPs in the Maluku province was estimated by the government of the province at 127,000 displaced individuals or 26, 981 IDP families.
- As of October 2003, the figures presented by the Government showed a total of 180,000 IDPs who have not yet received compensation.

- As of June 2003, the remaining number of IDPs in the Maluku province was estimated by Bakornas/OCHA at 202,000

As of early 2006, it is believed that some 15,788 families, or 60,000 individuals, are still in need of assistance in Maluku province. A lack of reliable data on IDPs is seen as a major obstacle to the effective implementation of assistance programmes to IDPs.

Jakarta Post, 21 February 2006

"The number of people living in displaced persons camps has dwindled in recent years in line with the steadily improving security situation in the area. The government has set a deadline of December this year for local governments in Maluku to provide assistance to the refugees so that they can return home."

Jakarta Post, 3 February 2006

"Seven years since a bloody Muslim-Christian conflict first erupted in Ambon in January 1999, thousands of victims are still crammed into makeshift shelters for displaced persons.

Presently, 15,788 families are still living in makeshift camps for in Ambon city, waiting to be relocated or sent back to their hometowns.

Long queues of refugees can be seen regularly at local government offices, asking officials whether the building materials or construction aid the state is supposed to provide them are ready.

Head of the Maluku Refugees Coalition, Pieter Pattiwaelapia, told The Jakarta Post recently that the situation in Ambon was probably the longest-running internal refugee problem in the country.

Despite holding yellow cards, which entitle them to receive assistance, the displaced people have been led on a bureaucratic wild-goose chase, and are confused by the many layers of procedures they have to navigate, Pieter said.

The provincial administration earlier declared the refugee problem would be solved by Jan. 31 this year, an extended deadline after it failed to meet its earlier promise to completely bring an end to the problem in December.

But while the provincial and local administrations say they have taken steps to improve the situation, Pieter says little has changed."

Situation in 2005

Lack of reliable IDP data constrain assistance; Authorities to recount IDPs in Ambon (February 2006)

Jakarta Post, 3 February 2006

"The displaced people are disappointed by the lack of an effective system -- with the government neglecting its technical guidelines for the reconstruction of their houses. And an incomplete database means thousands of families are not getting the help they need, he said.

The houses that have been built are not integrated into the proper facilities the government promised in its reconstruction blueprint, which envisioned incorporated schools, health centers and places of worship, Pieter said. As a result, many of the houses have ended up abandoned.

Maluku councillor Abdurrachman blamed the delays on lack of detailed data about the refugees, which he said had frustrated officials' attempts to determine what groups had already received assistance.

Earlier, the deputy speaker of the Maluku provincial council, Jhon Mailoa, also blamed a lack of valid data for the repeated deadline extensions. "We have a special committee to deal with refugees, but we've discovered that its numbers vary from those registered with the administration," he said, without giving details of the numbers."

CCDA, 9 October 2005

"Authorities will recount the number of displaced people in Ambon to help smooth the distribution of delayed financial assistance to them. Thus is reported by The Jakarta Post newspaper. Contradictory refugee counts have caused delays in the distribution of aid in the form of building materials to help displaced people, such as in the Poka and Rumahtiga area, on the shore of the Bay opposite the city of Ambon. According to data from the provincial administration, there are 1,000 displaced families in the Poka and Rumahtiga area, whereas data from the district show that 2,200 houses have been burned down during the conflict. So where are the uncounted families staying, whose houses were also burned down?"

Another problem is the often poor quality of the resettlement houses built by contractors that are assigned by the government. "I am doubtful about the work of the contractors who were only interested in making big profits. The houses are not fit for people to live in, maybe for animals. However, if we refuse to live there where else will we stay?" thus was said to The Jakarta Post by Hartaty Mulyaty, a displaced woman from Larier.

An assistant to the Maluku provincial secretary, Rahman Soumena, who also heads the Maluku Refugee Relief Agency, promised to prosecute unscrupulous contractors who pilfered refugee funds."

60,000 IDPs left as of October 2005

CARDI, December 2005, p. 1

"The latest figures provided by the provincial-IDP Task Force (Posko) in the last quarter of 2005 show 15,788 households (hh) of remaining Malukan-IDPs dispersed throughout Indonesia and 14,438 IDP hh(s) still scattered throughout the 6 Districts and 1 City in Maluku Province.

Almost 10,000 (66%) of the IDPs reside around Ambon city, Central Maluku and West Seram districts."

UNOHC, 15 September 2005, p.5

"The Jakarta Post reported 14 September, that the local government of Maluku has extended the deadline for resolving IDP problems from 15 September to the end of 2005. Official number from the local government shows that there are 15,788 IDP families in the province living in camps and waiting for relocation and return to places of origin. Since August, the central government has disbursed approximately, IDR61 billion out of IDR170 billion (US\$17 million) to help solve this

problem. The remaining funds are expected to be disbursed on 19 September. The local government says an accurate IDP number remains a problem."

"Some 15,788 families, living in several displaced persons camps across Maluku following sectarian riot between 1999 and 2002, have not been able to return to their places of origin or relocated by the local government despite the government's target date fast approaching. Based on data from the Maluku Social Affairs Office, there were still 36,878 families remaining in shelters for displaced people at the end of 2003.

(...)

The central government is continues to allocate money so the families can return to their homes. It has pledged another Rp 170 billion from the budget for the purpose this year. An initial Rp 60 billion has been disbursed, while another tranche of Rp 110 billion is already in the hands of the Ministry of Social Affairs.

Maluku Vice Governor MA Latuconsina said that the Rp 170 billion had been allocated for the 15,788 refugee families. However, should the issue not be resolved, it would be handled by the local administrations, either the regency or municipality in question. He reiterated that he could not guarantee that the problem would be resolved within the targeted time frame. "Let's not be rigid about the Sept. 15 deadline, but let's try to complete it at some point this year. If the problem is still not solved, we have to handle it thoroughly," he explained. (Jakarta Post, 27 August 2005)

NRC, 16 March 2005

"The Maluku IDP Coalition estimates the IDP figure in Maluku to be approximated at 15,788 HH (60,000 people or more). This figure is also supported by in the Maluku strategic plan presentation held in December 2004. As at the close of 2003, the IDP figure stood at 33,159 households. By December 2004, 17,371 households had received assistance to return or relocate."

Maluku IDP Coalition, 9 December 2004, p.1

"For your information, there are still 15,788 HH (60,000 people or more) who are still living in an uncertain life. People had to under go living in an IDP camps for 5 years with uncertainty whether our problem will be solved."

113,000 IDPs left at the end of 2004 according to the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM)

Source: Bureau of Social Assistance for Social Disaster Victims, Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs, in *IDP report on Social Disaster in Indonesia*, Komnas HAM, March 2005

The above table shows that from a total number of 181,640 IDPs left in Maluku province in early 2004, 45,250 people have been assisted during 2004, leaving 113,440 unassisted at the end of the year.

Situation in 2004

22,688 IDP households still in need of assistance as of October 2004 according to local government

OCHA, November 2004

"The local government of Maluku admitted that the problems confronting IDPs cannot be settled by the end 2004 and some USD 33 million (IDR 300 billion) is required to provide for the needs of remaining 22,688 IDP families in the Province. The central government has allocated USD 8 million (IDR 70 billion) this year to help some 6,900 HH, while another 15,788 HH will receive assistance from next year's budget."

174,000 IDPs left in August 2004 according to media reports

Jakarta Post, 20 August 2004

"According to data from the Maluku Social Affairs Office, about 70,051 families, or 331,979 refugees, fled the sectarian conflict in 1999. At least 33,673 families, or 174,570 refugees, have been resettled, while the remaining 36,378 families, or 164,189 people, remain scattered across Maluku province.

The government has provided hundreds of billions of rupiah to repatriate and relocate the refugees. In 2003 alone, over Rp 176 billion was allotted from the state budget for this purpose, on top of Rp 18 billion in additional funds.

But thousands of refugees still have not received assistance. There have been recent reports of local officials accused of misappropriating assistance funds for the refugees."

26,981 displaced families (~121,400 IDPs) as of June 2004: government of Maluku province

Source: Government of Maluku province, 4 June 2004

202,783 IDPs as of early 2004:UN

OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 18

"Though limited, the return and resettlement/relocation of IDPs have started to areas where the GoRI has provided housing or to other areas where individuals are welcomed. However, according to GoRI's figures, 202,783 persons are still displaced, most of whom live in IDP camp sites, temporary housing provided by the authorities, with friends and relatives, or in abandoned private company premises in and outside of Ambon City. Also, some IDPs who took refuge in East Java and North Sulawesi, South East Sulawesi, North Maluku and Papua are still waiting to return to Maluku."

Situation in 2003

180,000 IDPs as of October 2003: Government of Indonesia

Source: Government of Indonesia, October 2003

Of the 331,979 displaced, a total of 152,438 (79,123+73,315) have received compensation from the government that are: House Material [HM] and Living Guarantee [LG] in the form of money. This leaves a remaining 179,541 unassisted IDPs in the province.

202,800 IDPs as of July 2003: OCHA & Bakornas PBP

Bakornas & OCHA, July 2003, p. 13

"Of the some 332,000 IDPs (64,000 families) displaced within Maluku, around 129, 800 IDPs (24,940 families) had returned, of the remaining 202,800 IDPs/ 39,000 families, 19,400 (34,500 families) plan to return in the near future. Assistance packages in accordance with the Government's programme of 3.75 million IDR per family, provided by both the Department of Social Affairs and the Department of Manpower and Transmigration, had only been received by 10,000 families as at the end of 2002 from the total estimate of 64,000 families entitled to assistance. Of the 13,800 IDP families that were displaced within Ambon, some 7,000 families had returned home, and around 3,500 had been relocated.

However, it is recognised some data is unreliable due to re-registrations and false registrations. Creating accurate data sets and eligibility criteria for assistance are now major priorities for the *Pokja*."

332,548 IDPs in Maluku province as of April 2003

Bakornas & OCHA April 2003, p. 1

"Over the last two years, the situation has become more stable and conducive to finding durable solutions for IDPs, though the security situation especially in Ambon city remains tense. Though limited, the return and the resettlement/relocation of IDPs have started to the areas where the Government has provided housing or to other areas where individuals are welcome. The latest number of IDPs provided by the Governor's office is: 332,548 persons (63,971 families). Most of them remain in IDP camps/sites, temporary housing provided by the Government, abandoned private company premises in and outskirts of Ambon city or houses of friends and relatives."

Details on the number and locations of IDPs in Ambon Island (June 2004)

- According to the government, the April 2004 violence displaced an estimated 10,000 additional people in Ambon, although PMI reports only 4,000 displaced.
- The IDP population in Ambon is estimated at 160,000 as of June 2003
- Conflict has reinforced a trend to mono-community areas, and segregation between Christians and Moslems is now very high.
- 34% of the total population of Ambon Island is displaced.
- The most important concentration of IDP is found in the Kelurahan-town (the proportion of IDP versus local population is usually above 50%).
- Around 20-25% of the IDP population is living in camps therefore in precarious situation.
- In Ambon 86% of the IDPs originate from the island

April 2004 violence claims 40 lives and displaces between 4,000 and 10,000 people on Ambon Island

"The violence left 40 people dead and over 300 people injured. Several bombs exploded in public places while police defused a number of unexploded bombs. Muslim and Christian communities have drawn invisible demarcation lines dividing Ambon city along the religious lines. The Government has reported some 10,000 newly displaced people while the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) put this number at 4,000 IDPs. Many of these people have been displaced for a number of

times and lost their belongings time and again, and will continue relying on the assistance programmes for some time to come." (OCHA 1 June 2004)

IDP FIGURES AFTER CONFLICT ON 25 APRIL 2004

No.	Location	Amount			
		Households	Individuals	Babies	Infants
I. T. A. BAGUALA sub-district					
1	Halong Inn	83	300		
2	Rimba Raya	42	167		
3	Lata - Poka	70	270		
4	Lata RumahTiga	56	209		
5	Gudang Sipur	54	200		
	Sub Total	305	1146		
II. NUSANIWE sub-district					
1	BAPELKES	28	112	3	2
2	THR/ Kel. Waihaong	197	789	31	30
3	Ktr. Imigrasi	13	64	4	2
4	Asmil OSM	23	118		
5	Manakartika	38	134	8	5
6	Kusu-kusu Sere	7	25		
7	RT 001/Kel. Wainitu	41	185		
8	Balai POM	27	106	11	6
9	SPK	38	164	3	2
10	SDN 8, 14 Kudamati	30	170	7	4
11	Mangga Dua	36	88		
12	Stasiun Pemancar Radio	21	229	5	7
13	Rumah Kel. Tuasikal	65	81		
14	Rumah Kel. Hiariey	25	158		
	Sub Total	589	2423	72	58
III. SIRIMAU sub-district					
1	Al Fatah	117	586		
2	Kapahaha	7	28	5	3
3	Jayanti / SMP 1	17	77	4	18
4	SKB	12	32		
5	Kel. Honipopu	47	176	16	19
6	Kebun Cengkeh	21	105	4	2
7	Jakarta Baru	8	42		
	Sub Total	229	1046	29	42
	Total	1123	4615	101	100

Source: PMI-Maluku, 4-8 May 2004

"Ambon Island generalities

Main generalities about Ambon Island:

The Island surface is 763 Km² (42km length on 22km width). From the center of the town it takes 2.5 hours to reach by car the most distant village (the roads are in good conditions in general except the mountains roads and some remote areas).

Ambon Island is divided in two districts (Ambon Kotamadya and Maluku Tenggara). (See map: *Administrative limits*).

Two sub-districts (Salahutu and Leihitu) depend on Maluku Tenggara district (which capital is Masohi situated in Seram Island). The three other sub-districts (Nusaniwe, Sirimau and Teluk Ambon Baguala) depend on Ambon Kotamadya (Ambon municipality district).

Ambon Island is composed of 50 villages -Desa- (villages themselves composed of many sub-villages -Dusun- (around 100 in all Ambon)) and 20 Kelurahan.

The segregation is very high in Ambon. The map: *Ambon Desa-Kelurahan and community division* shows how the island is divided into Moslem and Christian areas. This kind of division was already existing before the conflict (i.e. area predominant Christian around Ambon town; predominant Moslem in the north of Ambon) but the conflict has reinforced this trend to mono-community areas.

Ambon Island population: Local, IDP, Returnees and Resettled

According to the above table few general remarks:

The total population of Ambon Island is estimated at more than 95,000 families (475,000 people) including the IDP.

34% of the total population of Ambon Island is IDP (1/3 of the Island population).

Compared to the situation before 1999 (before riots), the local population demography has decreased of more than 15,000 families. It could signify that more than 100,000 people have been displaced within Ambon Island.

(not in the table) The most important concentration of IDP is found in the Kelurahan-town (the proportion of IDP versus local population is usually above 50%).

IDP camps, resettlement and returnees situation in Ambon Island (May-June 2003)

According to the above table few general remarks:

17% of the IDP population is living in camps therefore in precarious situation. We can estimate that this data is higher in reality, around 20/25% (isolated families living in a destroyed or empty building). The other IDPs are living in their own house or with relatives.

According to the total number of IDP families living in Ambon we can observe the very low rate of families resettled (4%) and already returned to their original place (2%).

The observation of the map: *IDP camps, resettlement & returnees site in Ambon* shows a concentration of IDP mainly camps in town and from the town until Passo (the Isthmus and crossroad of the Island). An important proportion of resettlement site are found in the periphery of Ambon (Stain area) due to the space available there. This area should be even denser in the future.

NB: in Ambon 86% of the IDPs are originating from the island." (ACF June 2003)

See also:

[Map showing locations of IDPs after 25 April 2004](#), OCHA-Maluku, June 2004

[Map showing IDP camps, resettlement and returnees sites in Ambon Island](#), ACF, June 2003

Displacement from North Maluku province

An estimated 15,000 people remain displaced in North Maluku province (2006)

According to the international NGO CARDI, as of early 2006, the large majority of the estimated 200,000 people who fled North Maluku between 1999 and 2001, have returned home or have resettled elsewhere in the province and only 15,500 people remained displaced in the province. Over 60 per cent of the remaining IDPs, (or 9,500 IDPs), are located in North Halmahera (Tobelo, Galela and Morotai) while nearly 30 per cent, (or 5,000 IDPs), are concentrated in Ternate city. (See the map: "[Number of IDPs in North Maluku as of September 2005](#)", CARDI, December 2005)

The estimated 13,000 IDPs who were still displaced in North Sulawesi in 2004 are considered by CARDI to have returned or resettled, either through governmental programmes or voluntarily. Some displaced appear, however, to continue living in camps in North Sulawesi, although their number is unknown. For more information on IDPs in North Sulawesi and issues of return and resettlement, see "[The Politics of Going Home: The Future of North Moluccan Internally Displaced Persons](#)", Christopher R. Duncan, 2004

UNDP, 2005, pp.38-39

"The conflict in North Maluku led to the displacement of over 200,000, more than one-third of the province's total population.⁷⁴ In general, those displaced were minorities in particular parts of the province where they lived, with Christians fleeing Muslim majority areas such as Ternate and Bacan, and Muslims fleeing Christian majority areas such as Tobelo. The first displacement occurred in August 1999. Most displacement in North Maluku then occurred in the following months as the conflict spread across the province. For example, when violence broke out in Ternate, about 12,000 Christians living there moved to North Ternate to seek the protection of the Sultan of Ternate and then fled to North Sulawesi, while Moslems from Tobelo fled to Galela, Morotai and Ternate. This pattern was repeated across North Maluku, leading to almost complete segregation of religious communities in mid-2000. Christians from Bacan fled to Bitung, Manado, Seram, Tual, Samlaki and Sorong, while Muslim migrants returned to Java, Buton and other points of origin.

Roughly two-thirds of the displaced were located in just four areas – Ternate (Muslim IDPs), North Sulawesi (Christian IDPs), Tobelo (Christian IDPs) and Jailolo (mixed). While the number of IDPs in other areas was relatively small, in some sub-districts such as Galela, Gane Timur, Loloda, Kao/Malifut and Sahu, displaced people represented over half the resident population. Although almost all areas of North Maluku were in some way affected by the conflict, the majority of refugees came from the northern areas."

OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 20

"The province of North Maluku followed a positive trend towards recovery throughout 2003. Of the over 200,000 persons displaced by the conflict in North Maluku, approximately three-quarters have returned, with some 34,166 persons remaining displaced within North Maluku and another 13,000 persons in North Sulawesi."

Displacement from Aceh province

Tens of thousands still displaced and in need of assistance (May 2006)

- Up to 150,000 people could be considered as conflict-IDPs in Aceh in 2006 (including IDPs who fled to North Sumatra)

On the basis on information reviewed for this update, it is believed that between up to 150,000 people could be considered as conflict-induced IDPs in Aceh in 2006. This figure includes an estimated 120,000 ethnic Javanese who fled Aceh to North Sumatra between 2001 and 2004 and who retain the right to return to their homes. It also includes more than 30,000 Acehnese forced from their home in central Aceh in 2002/2001. It is also believed that many of the estimated 125,000 people displaced by the military operation in 2003/04 were inadequately assisted by the government and did not manage to recover from their displacement (IOM-GoRI, September 2004, p.18).

For more detailed information on these figures, see also "[Between 500,000 and 700,000 could have been displaced from Aceh since 1999](#)"

Survey shows 18% (or 14,000 individuals) of surveyed IDPs living with host communities were displaced by the conflict.

UNORC, 28 March 2006, pp.2-8

The Transitional Settlement Monitoring Mechanism (TSMM), implemented jointly by the United Nations Office of Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias (formerly OCHA) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), gathered indicative, quantitative data on IDPs in all types of settlement (Self Settlement Areas, Early Return Areas, Temporary Living Centres/Barracks, Tents and Host Communities) from July through October 2005.

While this information was useful at the earlier stages of the recovery, specific gaps in qualitative data on IDP households residing with relatives, friends and host families in host communities necessitated a re-direction of efforts. Acknowledging the dearth of information on this often-neglected section of the IDP population, OCHA (Geneva) and UNORC (Banda Aceh) prioritised NRC to conduct a rapid sample survey of this IDP group in December 2005.

Data from last year's survey generated much interest amongst the donor and humanitarian-recovery community in Aceh, and prompted demand for more information about host communities. Hence NRC was commissioned to perform a follow-up survey, delved deeper in certain subjects such as compensation or integration plans, and sectors such as livelihood, assistance and shelter. In addition, a sub-questionnaire targeting former host families was added to provide insight on issues, from the host families' perspective, that affected living conditions and decisions of the IDP households.

Key findings of the survey include:

(...)

5. More conflict-affected IDPs were engaged in the follow-up survey, 18% of respondents compared to 5%. They were relatively neglected in humanitarian aid distribution, making up only 2-4% of respondents who received assistance of cash, food or household items, and are equally traumatized by their experiences.

Causes of Displacement

In both rounds, the vast majority of respondents were displaced by the tsunami/earthquakes. Overall, slightly less than 10% of total respondents were initially displaced by the conflict and then by the tsunami.

The second round survey however found more conflict-affected IDP households (18% of respondents) than the first round (5%). This is presumably because the geographical coverage of the second round survey extended to North-Eastern and Central Aceh districts such as Bireuen, Aceh Utara, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Timur and Aceh Tengah where the conflict was more intense. (Chart 3.1)

Host Community Locations and Displacement Causes

Almost a quarter of IDP households displaced by natural disaster (24% - R2) reside in communities in North-Eastern Aceh (Chart 3.2). Field monitors found that these IDPs tend to fall in humanitarian assistance gap as the post tsunami assistance does not reach these areas.

70% of conflict-affected IDP live in host communities along the West Coast region (chart 3.3). Field monitors observed that these IDPs were displaced by the conflict from Central Aceh and have been living with host communities since."

Hedman, Eva-Lotta E, 3 May 2006, p.2

"In this context, it is all the more striking that the lives of IDPs have remained, in important respects, defined by their displacement. On the one hand, after more than a year, only a small fraction of the more than half a million people displaced by the tsunami have been able to return to their homes and communities, or to become active participants in the processes involved in the rebuilding of their lives. On the other hand, even with a peace process well underway, the right to return has yet to be successfully realised for thousands who were forcibly displaced due to militarised conflict in the years preceding the tsunami.

(...)

Until quite recently, another category of host community IDPs had remained largely invisible in the wider context of post-tsunami Aceh – those displaced by conflict during the militarised campaigns of counter/insurgency. While the IOM had reported that some 1,800 conflict IDPs were still in camps only days before the tsunami,ⁱⁱⁱ for example, there was no corresponding figure for those who had sought refuge from militarization and violence with relatives or friends. This is not surprising, given the informality and fluidity of such arrangements compared to the official registration and regulation of IDPs in designated shelter areas. Nonetheless, host community conflict IDPs outnumbered by a considerable margin their encamped counterparts at the time."

UNDP, May 2006, p.1

"An initial group of IDPs undertook spontaneous return to Central Aceh from the adjacent district of Pidie. These Acehnese who migrated to Central Aceh 50 - 60 years ago consider Central Aceh to be their homes. In 2000/01, 32,000 were forced to leave Central Aceh due to the conflict,

fearing pressure and discrimination. They fled primarily to Pidie, Bireun, Aceh Barat and Aceh Utara where they have been since. They have been trying to get the local governments in Aceh Tengah/Bener Meriah to respond to their plight with little success. An initial caseload of about 2,000 households returned, quickly followed by other families."

Lack of accurate data on returning IDPs in Central Aceh Province and Bener Meriah

WB, 16 January 2006, p.7

"Data is a significant problem in handling the IDPs in Bener Meriah and Central Aceh. Until now, there is no accurate data that can be used to calculate the current and future needs of IDPs. This is largely because the situation is constantly changing and therefore the data collected so far quickly becomes redundant. The Dinsos office has distributed questionnaires to the IDPs, however the data is questionable. The Government of Bener Meriah admitted frankly that they do not have the capacity to record the data in an accurate way. They have requested that independent NGOs collect data on conflict IDPs both in Bener Meriah and Central Aceh. On discussion between the World Bank team and the District Government, the Bupati of Bener Meriah's Second Assistant stated that the government would officially write a letter to the World Bank requesting assistance in collecting data on conflict IDPs, including not only Acehnese but also other ethnic groups who are part of the conflict-affected population.

The data collection conducted by the head of IDPs with the help of CHSE is relatively good. Those claiming to be IDPs are required to have two letters to verify the status: the first is an admission letter issued by the village head of where they are currently staying; and the second is the questionnaire of Dinsos, which requires the signature of the village head of where they plan to return.

Many problems emerge when IDPs try to obtain the village head's signature of their destination village. Many villages have been divided (pemekaran) in recent years and, also, many village heads have changed and therefore do not recognize those IDPs wishing to return."

UNORC, January 2006, p.2

"Data is incomplete and contradictory. We received incomplete and sometimes contradictory data on returns, hectares of destroyed land and housing needs from the IDPs, district officials, camats and village heads. Also it was difficult to verify numbers because of the fluidity of the situation. The local NGO supporting the Ronga Ronga movement said there were upwards of 5,000 "long marchers" who had come from Pidie and Bireun; however government registration figures showed less than 1,200. The difference in numbers can be possibly attributed to Id Al Har and people moving to be with family; others deciding to go it alone; others moving elsewhere to work; and others who were not actually from that area, but had decided to take their chances and seek assistance"

WB, 14 November 2005, p.4

"In November the first round of the World Bank's GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment was completed in three areas: Aceh Selatan, Aceh Tengah & Bener Meriah, and Aceh Timur. The findings from this in-depth field work are generally positive (see Box 2). These include:
(...)

High numbers of returnees, conflict victims and high conflict damage

The research showed that in most areas the number of returnees and conflict victims is higher than expected. This has significant implications for post-conflict programming."

CSIS, October 2005, p. i

"Camp for internally displaced people, Tapaktuan, Aceh Selatan

The camp was set up in July 2003 when a military offensive was launched in the nearby mountains. Villages became unsafe and residents moved down to the town of Tapaktuan. The villages are still unsafe, and around 500 people remain in the camp although others have moved on to live with relatives or start a life elsewhere. Those that remain get a little support, infrequently, from government rice provision; an NGO doctor visits monthly and schooling is available. Adults work as casual employees in construction and fishing, but since the tsunami in December 2004 there is less to do. The living barracks are long, dark, dilapidated, with a single entrance at either end. They house about five families each."

WB, 23 August 2005, p. 10

"At the height of the military offensive serious battles meant whole villages were forcibly moved. In South Aceh, TNI relocated five villages – over 7,000 people – to barracks in the district capital, Tapaktuan. Since then, the majority have returned home, but almost 500 still remain in destitute housing (see cover photo). They are afraid of returning and their abandoned homes are largely destroyed.

WB, 23 August 2005, p. iv

"Over the course of the conflict, large numbers of transmigrants and Acehnese fled the province. Their return post-August 15th could cause problems relating to property, including land, left behind. Although the numbers of returnees is unlikely to be high in the short-run, the conflict may have weakened the capacity of village level mechanisms to handle these issues.

At least

Between 500,000 and 700,000 people could have been displaced from Aceh since 1999

- Between 500,000 and 700,000 people could have been displaced from Aceh since 1999
- Between 125,000 and 150,000 people were displaced between May 2003 and December 2004 according to official figures. Of these only 1,800 people remained displaced prior to the 26 December tsunami.
- Official figures likely to have captured only a fraction of total displacement as they did not include those who were temporarily displaced, those who have fled the province and those who sought refuge with family and friends.
- Given the inadequacy of the assistance received by the displaced upon return to their homes and livelihood, which were often destroyed and looted, it could be argued that a large number of the returnees can in fact still be considered as 'displaced' and in need of assistance.
- Tsunami has overshadowed the conflict-induced displaced who are no longer a matter of concern
- It is estimated that between 500,000 and 700,000 have been displaced from Aceh since 1999

The total number of people displaced since 1999 is likely to range from 500,000 to 700,000. This figure would include displacement within Aceh but also to other provinces, namely North Sumatra. The main displacement movements took place in 1999, when some 200,000 Acehnese fled an escalation of violence within the province. The same year, at the height of the independence campaign, tens of thousands of ethnic Javanese were driven out Aceh by GAM. The majority fled to neighbouring North Sumatra, where by early 2003, they

numbered around 120,000 (JRS, June 2003, p. 40). In 2001, more than 30,000 Acehnese in Central Aceh province fled insecurity and persecution and sought refuge in adjacent provinces (UNDP, May 2006). From 2001 to 2003, displacement continued in the province, albeit on a smaller scale and was marked by sudden increases when fighting occurred and decreases when it subsided (see graphic below, WFP 2000-2002). In April 2003, Aceh's local government released IDP figures showing a total of 570,000 IDPs in the province. This figure included 20,000 people living in settlement at the time and 550,000 returnees (see table below). Finally, between May 2003 and December 2004, more than 125,000 people were displaced by the military operation launched by government and which lasted until the tsunami struck the province (RSC, July 2005, p. 15).

At least 125,000 people displaced by the military operation between May 2003 and December 2004

Prior to the tsunami, the official conflict-induced displacement figures for Aceh stood at a total of 1,874 IDPs, all of them staying in camps spread mainly between Aceh Selatan and Aceh Singkil provinces. Based on official figures, it was estimated that between May 2003 and December 2004, 125,000 to 150,000 people had been displaced in Aceh. These figures did not include many of the displaced who have sought refuge outside official camps or have fled the province, nor have they been independently verified.

RSC, July 2005, pp.8-9

"In the early phase of martial law, there were numerous reports by local journalists describing mass displacement of civilians, including entire villages, and, within two months of the declared state of military emergency, official government sources put the sum total of IDPs in Aceh at 40,000. By August 2003, the International Office for Migration (IOM) identified a total of thirty-eight camp locations, with a combined population of displaced persons at 24,730. It further estimated some 80,000 returnees from the camps at this time, thus counting a 'grand total' of 104,730 IDPs since the beginning of martial law (IOM 2003). At about the same time, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) office in Kuala Lumpur recorded a marked surge in registered arrivals of Acehnese asylum seekers in Malaysia, with May showing the highest one-month total of the year. By the end of October 2003, the UNHCR reported a total of 3,757 new such cases, compared with 633 for the entire previous year (HRW 2003a, p.10). Almost a year into martial law, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that there were more than 100,000 IDPs in North Sumatra, the neighboring province to which Acehnese have been fleeing from conflict and violence in large numbers since 1999 (OCHA 2004).

While difficult to verify, and while allowing for a great deal of fluctuation over time, one recent estimate claims a sum total of 120-150,000 IDPs in Aceh since the declaration of martial law in May 2003 until December 2004 (Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)/Global IDP Project May 2005). This figure, which is considerably higher than official counts based on the IDP registration lists collected by the Indonesian authorities, would seem to make allowance for the displaced who, perhaps out of fear for their safety and property, sought refuge with relatives, in unregistered camps, and/or in the forest (JRS 2003b; People's Crisis Centre (PCC) 2003). Overall, the number of internally displaced persons in Aceh peaked in the early phase of the military emergency, continued to rise and fall in cycles of forced displacement and involuntary return in places, but decreased over time, with official Indonesian government sources counting 6,946 IDPs in June 2004, and the International Office for Migration (IOM 2004) reporting some 1,800 IDPs, all of whom remained in camps, by late December, only days before the Asian tsunami."

IOM data shows 1,874 people displaced in Aceh as of 20 December 2004

Source: IOM, 20 December 2004

RSC, July 2005, p.p.14-15

"During the implementation of Martial Law, more than 123,000 people in sixteen districts were displaced. They sought refuge in internally displaced persons' (IDP) camps prepared by the Martial Law authorities. There are two main modes of displacement during Martial Law: evacuation by the Indonesian security forces or more spontaneous movement by people fleeing, or fearing, conflict and violence."

Assessment shows 8 per cent reduction in Aceh's population compared to pre-displacement figures with Nagan Raya district particularly affected

GoRI-IOM, September 2004, p. 25

"Estimates from community leaders showed a reduction of 8 percent in village population compared to pre-displacement figures. The bulk of population movement was in Nagan Raya where village population dipped by 92 percent after displacement. Lack of security remained the primary reason for people not to return to their local communities, followed by economic reasons (lack of job and/or livelihood), presence of family in other villages and provinces, and death. Of the estimated number of people in communities after displacement, approximately 92 percent were returnees/ex-IDPs while the rest were non-IDPs."

During 2004, the number of people displaced declined with only a few thousands living in the camps at a time

OCHA 12 June 2004

"IOM reported that the current number of IDPs is 6,946 persons (2,520 persons of them have been registered in South Aceh, East Aceh, and Aceh Jaya, while another 4,426 persons were not registered by SATKORLAK as they were staying outside the camps with relatives in West Aceh, Aceh Singkil, East Aceh, and Nagan Raya districts)."

OCHA 30 April 2004

"Over the last several months, there was gradual decline in the IDPs number (some 2,500 IDPs) in camps. However, temporary displacement and people displaced but living with friends and relatives are not accounted for in the IDP statistics."

OCHA 3 April 2004

"IOM reported that as of Wednesday (31 Mar.), the total number of IDPs is 2,590 persons (615 HH) in several camps all over the province."

106,000 people officially displaced in the first 3 months of the offensive

ICVA 5 September 2003, p. 1

"As of 19 August 2003, according to IOM/Satkorlak figures, there have been 106,758 internally displaced persons (IDPs), of whom 88,206 have returned. Groups of IDPs remain, reportedly scattered, in 26 camps in South Aceh (6,737 persons), Aceh Jaya (2,534 persons), Aceh Tamiang (1,777 persons), Aceh Singkil (1,159 persons), and West Aceh (1,145 persons). According to IOM reports, the number of IDPs Bireuen district, which used to have the highest number of IDPs, has dropped dramatically."

These numbers, however, only include IDPs in designated camps; many displaced have sought refuge with relatives or are in camps that are not managed by the martial law administration. For example, 3,780 persons from Pasie Raja Sub-district in South Aceh sought refuge with host families. There have also been reliable reports of people fleeing into the forests. Furthermore, the figures do not account for displacement to other regions of Indonesia and asylum-seekers in other countries."

A total of 570,000 IDPs in Aceh province as of April 2003 according to the provincial authorities of Aceh

In April 2003, prior to the launching of the military operation, the number of persons displaced in settlements in Aceh was estimated by the Bureau of Nation's Unity and People's Protection to stand at 20,238 IDPs. According to the table below, some 550,488 persons are considered as returnees. However, these are cumulated figures over the last years and do not reflect the current displacement situation.

Source: Head of Bureau of Nation's Unity and People's Protection, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam
Province, 9 April 2003.

Between 200,000 and 700,000 still displaced by the tsunami one year later (December 2005)

- The use of different IDP definitions creates confusion as the number of tsunami-IDPs in Aceh, who range between 200,000 and 700,000
- Number of casualties of the tsunami likely to reach well over 200,000 while more than half a million people were forced out of their homes and spread over 21 districts.
- The vast majority is hosted under tents and with family/friends and only 30,000 were living in temporary barracks/dwellings as of mid-March 2005.
- IDPs are mainly concentrated in the northeastern districts of the province, namely Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Pidie and Aceh Barat

FAO/WFP, 22 December 2005, p.21

"The current estimates of Internally Displaced People (IDP), range between 200 000 and 700 000. This wide range in estimates is mainly due to differences in definitions used for IDPs. By some organizations, the number reflects the estimate of people affected by the tsunami and March earthquake, irrespective whether they reside in temporary shelters such as tents and barracks, at host families, families hosting IDP, and people badly affected by the tsunami. In addition, many people have set up makeshift shelters near or on their land but remain connected to temporary living centre in order to qualify for humanitarian assistance programmes. In the strict sense of the word they are not IDPs but are living in temporary shelters. The proximity to their lands will facilitate their livelihood recovery.

The current estimate of IDPs according to BRR are 371 691. The BPDE (Badan Pengelola Data Elektronik) data from August 2005 estimates the number of IDPs at 477 416. According to these data, the majority of IDPs are living with host families, namely 250 874. A total of 65 580 IDPs reside in TLCs or public buildings and 58 366 are categorized as IDPs in self settlements. It records, 109 860 IDP households consisting of 36 397 children under five year of age, 193 304

male and 181 516 female. The highest number of IDPS are recorded in Simeulue, Banda Aceh and Pidie and Aceh Besar, which have more than 40 000 registered IDPs each. However, it is generally agreed that the BPDE list is not up-to-date and contains incorrect listings of IDP families. Co-operating partners for the General Food Distribution Programme of the WFP have been using a list which includes host families and people affected by the tsunami. The WFP is currently reducing the number of beneficiaries in line with the BPDE data and has requested co-operating partners to review their caseload in order to take account of the progress achieved in livelihood recovery and the reestablishment of functioning markets. Several criteria are used for reducing the number of beneficiaries in line with the BPDE data: (i) all people living in temporary shelters; (ii) people who lost their homes and are living with host families, (iii) single female or children headed households and; (iv) handicapped as a result of the tsunami."

EU, 15 December 2005, p.2

"More than 550,000 people in Indonesia were left homeless. Of these, some 65,000 are living in Temporary Living Centres (TLCs), which are camps organised by the Government of Indonesia; more than 150,000 are living in self-settled tent camps and the rest (some 300,000) are either living with host families or have returned to their land. Among the latter, 100,000 victims have already moved into temporary or permanent houses."

Government of Indonesia, 12 April 2005, p. 1

"In Aceh and Nias, the earthquake and tsunami wave damaged the most part of Aceh's coastal areas, claiming heavy casualties, destroyed infrastructure, settlements, social facilities such as schools, health centers, security, social and public economic, and government buildings. This disaster also affected the social and economic condition of the people, including their psychological condition and welfare level.

Based on recent information obtained from the National Coordination Agency for Disaster Mitigation and Refugee Management (Bakornas PBP) on March 21, 2005, the fatalities in 20 kabupatens in the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) are estimated to reach 126,602 people killed and interned, and 93,638 people missing. The number of fatalities in the Province of North Sumatra is estimated to reach 130 people killed and 24 people missing. Based on the same source of information, the number of scattered refugees is 514,150 people in 21 kabupaten/kota the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam."

The following map shows that the IDPs are mainly concentrated in the northeastern districts of the province, namely Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Pidie and Aceh Barat.

Source: Government of Indonesia, 12 April 2005, pp. 2-3

Official statistics on IDPs exclude conflict-IDPs and do not reflect real needs of tsunami-IDPs (December 2005)

- In a letter sent to the Aceh Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency in December 2005, the UNORC coordinator challenges the official government figures on IDPs demonstrating that they result from a biased methodology and do not reflect real needs.
- IDP definition used was based on whether respondents at the time of the survey identified themselves as IDPs or not. Cultural, psychological and linguistic reasons can explain why a large number of IDPs no longer wished to be identified as such.

- Of the 312,463 people who identified themselves as former IDPs and were therefore no longer included in the official statistics, most probably did not have their livelihood restored or were living in permanent shelter.
- Provincial government decree of August 2005 identifies IDPs as "people who are residing in temporary settlements due to disaster."
- WFP/Dinos agreement in September 2005 excludes conflict-IDPs from food assistance

UNORC, 2 December 2005, pp.1-3

"Data on what UN Agencies and NGOs define as internally displaced persons or IDPs has represented a major problem in analyzing the post-tsunami humanitarian situation in Aceh and Nias. Credible data on these categories have been difficult to obtain due to the dispersed nature and mobility of affected communities and the varied arrangements of camp management, all preventing a uniform registration process of IDPs from occurring.

(...)

The most recent, and comprehensive, source of information on population traits in Aceh and Nias has been produced by the Bureau of Statistics (BPS), which launched some results of the 2005 Population Census for Aceh and Nias (SPAN) on 29 November 2005. SPAN is a special census funded by foreign donors to provide reference data on population. Data collected for the census have been based upon a survey of all households in Aceh and Nias during August and September 2005.

According to the SPAN, the total number of current IDPs amounted to 192,055 in Aceh during August and September 2005 when fieldwork was undertaken. It is difficult, however, to arrive at consistent figures on IDPs for Nias as the tables presented in the slide presentation of the census varied from other hand outs provided during the SPAN presentation by the Bureau of Statistics (BPS) on 29 November 2005.

The figures for Aceh in any case are far lower than the numbers previously produced by Satkorlak and Dinsos. This seeming discrepancy may be attributed among other things to differences in definition addressed below.

The definition of IDPs in the SPAN census is based on whether respondents at that time identified themselves as an IDP. The question posed to respondents was "Apakah saat ini anda sebagai pengungsi?" Engl: Are you an internally displaced person at this time? This question was necessarily subjective, as data were collected through questioning household heads on whether they self identified as IDPs.

Significantly, the census also records that 312,463 tsunami/earthquake survivors who once identified themselves as IDPs no longer do. The follow up question that was posed to respondents who answered no to the previous question of whether they were an IDP was "Apakah Anda pernah mengungsi setelah gempa/tsunami?" Engl: Have you ever been displaced as a result of the earthquake/tsunami?

This large number of Tsunami-earthquake survivors having once but no longer identifying themselves as current IDPs does not imply that they automatically no longer require support from relief and recovery agencies in Aceh and Nias, quite the contrary. For example, many survivors are not recorded as IDPs, but are still living in tents or ad hoc structures on their own lands.

There may also be cultural, psychological or linguistic reasons why such a large number of people who once considered themselves IDPs no longer want to identify themselves as such. Two possible explanations stand out. Firstly, many tsunami/earthquake survivors have gone back to their own lands and now consider themselves as having returned home and therefore no longer an IDP regardless of the living conditions they experience. Secondly, being labelled a

“pengungsi” or IDP in Aceh may carry a negative connotation which many tsunami survivors probably want to avoid.

While we maintain the primacy of census data over other sources, these issues suggest a need to review our usage of the category of IDPs in the Aceh-Nias case. In fact, focusing on IDP figures can be quite misleading, particularly if it is interpreted to mean that they are the only ones who need relief and other types of support.

It is evident from the 312,463 people in Aceh who define themselves as former IDPs that few of them have obtained proper shelter in the form of new houses nor have many had their livelihoods fully restored. Simply put, the distinction between current IDPs and former IDPs is not meaningful in terms of planning to address demands for assistance."

UNORC, 30 september 2005, p.2

"The provincial government recently redefined the criteria of official IDP status. Decree available at:

<http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/sumatra/mediacentre/press/doc/GovInfo/PeraturanGubNADttgKriteriaPengungsi.pdf>

The definition covers:

- Persons living in all forms of temporary shelters, including those built by NGOs/UN agencies, and the government (barracks/TLCs)
- Persons living on their own land but in temporary shelters
- Persons living in tents
- Persons living in public buildings
- Persons living with host families – but no longer qualify for official IDP status after six months.

The WFP and Dinas Sosial have also signed an agreement defining food assistance beneficiaries. The WFP is committed to providing food aid to all persons meeting the above criteria and will also continue food support to:

- Disabled people and female single headed households as a result of the tsunami who do not meet the above criteria.
- Persons who receive permanent shelter from government/NGOs will continue to receive food assistance for a period of two months after moving.

Document available at:

<http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/sumatra/reliefrecovery/IDP/docs/IDPCriteriaLetterToLocalGovernmentHeads.pdf>

Persons displaced by the conflict are not covered by food assistance, as this does not fall under the official mandate of the WFP in Aceh/Nias. However, this may change depending on common approach from UN agencies. BRR has also asked the WFP to support returning combatants, but this is currently under discussion"

28,000 IDPs yet to receive the empowerment grant in North Sumatra (March 2005)

- Figures by the Ministry of Social Affairs show 28,000 IDPs still waiting for the empowerment grant at the end of 2004.
- In November 2002, a mapping survey had identified 60,000 IDPs scattered around Langkat district alone.

- As of July 2003, 22,320 IDP families were recorded in North Sumatra, 12,000 of whom had already received the termination grant
- According to the latest figures by the Government of Indonesia, the total number of IDPs in North Sumatra at the end of October 2002 was estimated to stand at 122,265.
- In addition to displacement in Aceh, IDPs have also fled to North Sumatra. The non-Acehnese (mainly Java trans-migrants) felt threatened by the GAM or native Acehnese and are now unwilling to return. 500 of them arrived in Medan in January 2000. Other IDPs include native Acehnese who have fled the military violence.


Based on figures of the Ministry of Social Affairs and used as working figures by the National Human Rights Commission, an estimated 28,000 IDPs were still waiting to receive the empowerment grant at the end of 2004

"Through a mapping survey in Langkat District in November 2002, IMC identified 12,800 households (62,230 IDPs) scattered across Langkat District. The provincial government has promised to pay a 'termination fund' amounting to approximately US\$ 1,000 per family in order for them to forfeit their status as IDPs, but this is yet to be paid to significant numbers of the IDP community. Whilst some IDPs have relocated to Riau and South Sumatra provinces, the remainder continues to live in poorly constructed, overcrowded housing, with poor access to essential health care and basic water and sanitation facilities, leading to high morbidity. The economic capacities of both IDPs and the host communities remain very low, preventing communities to address these needs independently. In order to build on existing coping mechanisms, there is an urgent need to implement livelihood programmes and strengthen existing health structures through capacity building of GoRI health staff and village (Desa) Volunteers (kaders) – Community Health workers (CHWs) and Traditional Birth attendants (TBAs)." (OCHA, 9 April 2004, p. 37)

"Previously 24,747 IDP families were recorded from Aceh, this then, after district verification, declined to 22,320 families. The Provincial Government verifications indicate that there are 15,277 IDP families of whom 5,546 families/ 22,184 persons have the right to receive assistance. Another 2,000 families, who are claiming the IDP status, require further verification while a total of 12,000 families have already received the termination grant.

As in other places the Government is concerned over frequent fraudulent claims and in one particular case is taking legal action against the alleged offender. When 7,643 families had been paid, the Department of Social Affairs suspended assistance for another 3,000 families until their claims are properly verified. These families have demonstrated against the suspension. If the problem of verification and fraud can be quickly solved the Provincial Government is confident that the IDP problem can be resolved by year's end." (Bakornas & OCHA, July 2003, p. 17)

The following graphic illustrates the variations on the number of IDPs in North Sumatra from February 2000 to October 2002, based on figures provided by Bakornas and Satkorklak and used in the WFP/VAM Unit "IDP Source and Recipient Regions" maps.



Displacement from Central Sulawesi province

Nearly 40,000 IDPs still waiting for government assistance in Central Sulawesi (April 2005)

- SATLAK Poso reports that as of April 2005, 4,700 displaced households (or 21,000 individuals) are still waiting to receive the empowerment funds and 3,151 families were to receive housing assistance.
- Ministry of Social Affairs data shows only 13,755 people still displaced in Central Sulawesi as of end-2004.
- Following a workshop on IDP management held in June 2003, some 90,000 were found to still be in need of assistance.
- OCHA/Bakornas mission conducted in March 2003 estimated the IDP figure at 36,000.

In April 2005, SATLAK Poso district reported that 4,742 families (or ~21,000 IDPs) were still waiting for the empowerment funds from the government while 3,151 families were to receive housing construction material. On the other hand, the Ministry of Social Affairs (cited by Komnas HAM) reported 13,755 people displaced in Central Sulawesi at the end of 2004.

Nearly 8,000 IDP households still waiting for government assistance as of April 2005

OCHA, 30 April 2005

"With regard to IDP situation, the Poso Social Affairs Office is verifying data of 4,742 families who will receive empowerment funds and 3,151 families who will receive housing construction materials. The Poso District Government is going to build 100 houses for returnees in Lombogia and 100 in Kayamanya. All funds are expected to be ready in May 2005."

OCHA, 31 March 2005

"With regard to the IDP situation, SATLAK Poso District has informed that 4,742 IDP families have not received empowerment funds. A request for additional funds has been addressed to the central government. The district government of Poso is going to build 100 low-cost houses in several sub-districts to accommodate IDPs currently living in camps. Previously some 70 houses were provided for Muslim IDPs in Sintuwulemba sub-district."

OCHA April 2004

"Of the registered IDPs in Poso 4,000 households remain that have not received the JADUP/BEDUP allowance. This assistance for the IDPs is being provided by the Central Government through the Social Ministry."

Satkorlak reported 90,000 IDPs still waiting for livelihood and capital assistance as of April 2004; lack of reliability of figures

OCHA 9 April 2004, p.15

"After four years of intermittent violence, large-scale property destruction and displacement (temporary, partial and continuing) of some 157,000 people, the province is gradually moving towards normality. Some 50% of destroyed homes have been rebuilt, markets, schools and government facilities have re-established services, and movement is generally safe and free from harassment or intimidation at least during daylight hours. SATKORLAK reported that more than 18,070 families (90,350 people) are still waiting for livelihood and capital assistance from the government, but many of these are thought to have left the district or the province altogether. Like in many other provinces in Indonesia, the lack of reliable and consistent data remains a key obstacle in determining IDPs numbers and their needs in Central Sulawesi."

Bakornas BBP & OCHA July 2003, p. 18

"During the course of the violence over the last four years IDP figures in Central Sulawesi have fluctuated with both partial and full returns followed by new waves of displacement, as violence re-flared. Currently the Provincial Government's total estimate is 31,326 families, of whom 13,256 families have received livelihood and capital assistance, leaving a balance of 18,070 families (90,350 persons). In addition, around 5,000 are displaced in neighbouring provinces."

Bakornas & OCHA March 2003, p. 2

"In Central Sulawesi the return option has proved to be more successful with continued support from the government at all levels. Thus far, out of 31,326 families (143,354 persons), a total of 25,790 families (107,283 persons) have returned to their places of origin, and have begun to resume their lives.

The mission found that the trend is positive and that the return process continues, although at a slower pace than expected. This is due to the fragility of the situation, mistrust that exist within communities, the fact that many IDPs have been displaced three or four times over the last two to three years, and lack of resources and basic social services."

OCHA 19 November 2002, p. 12

"In late December 2001 representatives of the Christian and Muslim communities signed a peace agreement (Malino I). By this time 110,000 persons were displaced, and 60 schools and 11,000 homes damaged or burnt to the ground. Between January and June of 2002 there were no major

incidents. This period allowed for a significant number of returns (approximately 40,000). In June 2002, several incidents of unprovoked attacks led to the resurgence in community fear and general instability, including more displacements. The situation remains tense and humanitarian action in the short-term will be constrained by this volatility.

Return and resettlement choices are made on the basis of security and the economic incentive of returning to productive assets. In many cases children and wives are left behind for schooling and house garden production while the husband (there are also a significant number of widows) returns to agricultural work at the place of origin. But most IDPs wish to make a permanent return. The majority of IDPs are currently living with host families (54,500) in the Poso District, where some 30% of the population have been displaced. Some 11,000 IDPs have been "housed" in crowded purpose-built barracks and the remainder fled to other districts, and to North and South Sulawesi."

Displacement from West Kalimantan province

Majority of the 78,000 displaced ethnic Madurese has been relocated in 12 sites and become "settlers" (2004)

- Of the estimated 78,000 ethnic Madurese displaced in 1999 and accommodated in public facilities in Pontianak up to June 2002, most have been relocated to 12 sites and been referred to as "settlers". Some 1,259 households have chosen to avail from the government empowerment package.

OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 21

"A conflict between ethnic Malay and Dayak groups on the one side, and ethnic Madurese migrants on the other, erupted in 1999 in Sambas and Singkaweng, West Kalimantan, causing 78,000 Madurese to flee from their homes to the provincial capital Pontianak where they were accommodated in public facilities until June 2002. After the murder of several Madurese who had returned to Sambas to dispose of their property, the possibility of a general return of the IDPs was ruled out. Therefore the GoRI, through the Department of Manpower and Transmigration and the Department of Resettlement and Regional Infrastructure, provided relocation housing for most IDPs in 12 relocation sites. In addition to housing, the GoRI also provided 11,000 families of agricultural background with two hectares of agricultural land per family. Since their move to relocation sites, IDPs are being referred to as "Settlers". A total of 1,259 households have chosen the alternative option of a government local settlement ("empowerment") package of IDR 5 million (US\$ 600) per family to arrange their own accommodation and living."

Displacement from Central Kalimantan province

At least 63,000 Madurese remain displaced on Madura Island (2005)

- At least 63,000 people remained displaced on Madura Island as of early 2005.
- Out of the 180,000 displaced from Central Kalimantan in 2001, only 43,000 have been able to return as of end-2003, leaving an estimated 130,000 people displaced

From a total displaced population of 120,000 people in June 2004, 57,000 returned before the end of the year. As of 2005, it was therefore estimated that 63,000 people remained displaced in Madura Island. This figure does not include people displaced on East Java's mainland, estimated to number 43,000 in February 2003.

OCHA, March 2005

"OXFAM and the World Bank informed that some 30,000 – 40,000 Madurese have returned to the areas along Kahayan River, Central Kalimantan, with assistance from local NGOs. No significant problems and incidents during the return process were reported. Considering sensitivity of local community, a low profile approach should be continued."

EC-ECHO, 22 December 2004, p. 2

"Data collected by the Government at the beginning of 2004 showed that some 130,000 IDPs (Internally Displaced People) remained in Madura at that time.

In June 2004, an OCHA led UN inter-agency mission assessed the situation of the IDPs in Madura and found that living conditions in the camps and private houses were below standard and that "the IDPs in Madura were in a worse condition than anywhere else in the country". The mission reported that there was a caseload of 120,000 IDPs and that virtually all of them "desperately want to return" but lacked the necessary funds. The mission recommended "to support the return process in a low-key manner in order to avoid a recurrence of the violence that erupted in February 2001". In the months that followed OCHA's mission, the Government started to distribute a return assistance package (some EUR 300 per person) that prompted the return of some 57,500 people. It is foreseen that the Government's assistance will continue until December 2004. The impoverished status of the IDPs makes additional humanitarian assistance necessary in order to sustain livelihoods of both IDPs deciding to return and those deciding to remain in Madura after December 2004."

OCHA 9 April 2004, p 14

"A majority of the 180,000 people, displaced from Central Kalimantan to East Java province during the conflict between Dayaks (indigenous population) and Madurese (migrants) in early 2001, remain in displacement on mainland East Java and Madura Island (Sampang and Bangkalan districts). The IDPs are spread over 140 villages and mainly reside with host families and in camps (a smaller number) provided by the government and private institutions. Most IDPs have expressed the wish to return to their villages of origin once the security situation allows for their return. During 2002 and early 2003, some 43,400 IDPs have managed to return with nominal or no assistance from the government to selected places where the communities were ready to receive them and/or have found other solutions.

The provincial government has committed itself to finding alternative solutions in 2004 for the remaining 130,000 IDPs. The government has also issued regulations aimed at assisting the return of IDPs to the most severely affected districts through allocating financial resources, enhancing inter-provincial coordination, and promoting inter-community dialogue."

OCHA February 2003, pp. 2-3

"The SATKORLAK Secretary of the Provincial Government of East Java identified the IDPs in East Java into two groups:

- a. East Java Mainland IDPs
- b. Madura Island IDPs

The IDPs are spread out in approximately 140 villages. They have been residing with their own families, integrated with the community and host families, or are in temporary housing facilities built by the government or private companies in IDP sites/ camps. Out of the total number of IDPs, only 5% (approximately 600 households) are in IDP camps. The majority of the IDPs are integrated with their families and the community. Because of this, data of the number of IDPs in the community is difficult to monitor.

A. East Java Mainland

The number of IDP families in the East Java mainland as provided by the Satkorklak dated January 2003 is **45,050 IDPs** (14,504 households), in at least 10 districts (excluding Mojokerto).

(...)

B. Madura Island

There is a total of **128,919 IDPs** in Madura Island, spread out in four districts, with the majority in Sampang District, as follows:

Sumenep District 1,951 people

Pemangkasari District 2,459 people

Bangkalan District 38,248 people

Sampang District 86,261 people"

Displacement from East Timor

Uncertainty over number of former East Timorese refugees still displaced in West Timor (May 2006)

- As of 2006, UNHCR estimates 10,000 former East Timorese refugees still live in "conditions of concern", while 16,000 had been resettled.
- Local NGOs and local authorities claim between 40,000 and 100,000 people continue to live in situation akin to displacement.

ICG, 4 May 2006, p. 2

"Most of those who have elected to stay live in two districts: Belu, which borders Bobonaro and Covalima in Timor-Leste, and Timor Tengah Utara (TTU), which borders Oecusse. Precisely how many there are is a matter of debate. Before it wound up its operations in West Timor at the end of 2005, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that about 10,000 former refugees were "living in conditions of concern", while 16,000 others had been resettled within West Timor. Other estimates are higher: a local NGO, CIS Timor, says 9,000 families (approximately 40,000 people) are in camps; the Belu district government lists 7,734 families still living in emergency housing in that district alone, while East Nusa Tenggara Governor Piet Tallo cited a figure of 104,436 individuals remaining in West Timor.

Harian Berita Sore, 18 April 2005

"According to data compiled by the East Nusa Tenggara provincial administration, an estimated 60,000 East Timorese are staying in makeshift shelters in the province."

UNCHR, 22 March 2005, p. 14

"The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are still some 28,000 East Timorese who have not returned to Timor-Leste. This represents 10 per cent of those who fled or were forced to flee the violence in 1999. UNHCR also estimates

that, of those remaining in Indonesia, many have chosen to do so. UNHCR continues to assist this group by assuring access to nationality rights, shelter, school and water projects. As of 15 November 2004, 248 people had returned during the year. In March, one case of assault against a returnee in Aileu district was reported, and three men were indicted in connection with this incident."

Writenet, February 2005, p. 22

"Following a five-point strategy put forward by the UNHCR, the Indonesian government relocated approximately 12,000 people from camps along the border, but only to other parts of West Timor rather than other parts of Indonesia, which left some 16,000 individuals near the border. Overall, there does not appear to have been any large movements of people out of West Timor; nor has border demarcation been finalized."

West Timor NGO coalition, September 2003

- "1) At the beginning of displacements 1999: ± 284.000 person
- 2) Regristration result of 6 June 2001: 184.148 person (some IDPs are following repatriation program already)
- 3) Year 2002: most realistic numbers are ± 50.000 person, with the huge amount of repatriation last 2002.
- 4) Year 2003: Estimation used is ± 43.000 person and an estimated 35.000 person is in West Timor.
- 5) Last data acquired from Karo Binsos NTT: there are **9085 households/± 28.000 IDPs** which populated the camps is West Timor,
- 6) The information from the Department of Population (kependudukan): amount of in NTT is approximately **28 –38 thousand person**
- 7) West Timor NGO coalition data Data for the spread of IDP in 4 districts and 1 kodya n the area of West:

It is not known the result from the IDP registration done in September 2003, except for **Kota Kupang: 2608 HH/12078 person and Kupang District ± 4000 HH"**

Displacement from Papua province

Papuans displaced by military operations and police repression usually seek refuge in the forest (March 2006)

- In March 2006, following a protest in Jayapura that turned violent, up to 1,200 student fled attacks from the police and sought refuge in the hills and forest surrounding the capital.
- An estimated 6,000 to 20,000 people are reported to have fled their homes since August 2004 in the Central Highlands in Papua provincedue to military operations, with most seeking refuge in the forest.

ABC, 23 March 2006

"Up to 1,200 students are reported to be hiding in the hills around Jayapura, the capital of Indonesia's Papua province, fearful of revenge attacks by members of the Indonesian Police Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB).

BRIMOB has a reputation for brutality in dealing with separatist conflicts in places such as Papua and Aceh and has been strongly criticised by international human rights groups on many occasions.

A student rally last week demanding the closure of the giant US operated Freeport Gold and Copper Mine deteriorated into a riot that police say has left six people dead including five members of the security forces.

Elsham human rights group spokesman Aloy Renwarin says the 1,200 students who live in dormitories at the state-run Cendrawasih University, which was at the centre of the clash last week, are in hiding.

He says they are hungry and some are in need of medical attention.

(...)

"The students are hiding in the jungle because they feel threatened. They are short of food, the conditions are not sanitary... it's an emergency situation," he said.

Dateline, 16 March 2005

"Human rights activists in West Papua's Central Highlands secretly filmed footage showing villages which had been ransacked and destroyed by the Indonesian military, leaving an estimated 6,000 people homeless."

Elsham News Service, 21 December 2004

"Despite President Yudhoyono having expressed a willingness to find a sustainable solution to the four decade long conflict in West Papua, since August a military operation in the highlands area of Puncak Jaya has led to the displacement of up to more than six thousand indigenous tribe members and the deaths of at least twenty three, mainly children and babies, from starvation."

DPRIN, 17 November 2004

"Christian sources in the Puncak Jaya area told Radio Australia that as many as 20,000 people in the area had been displaced following raids by Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) troops."

"In Indonesia, at least three people are dead, and as many as 20,000 may have been displaced, after raids in Puncak Jaya district in Papua province. Thousands of Papuans who fled the raids, allegedly by Kopassus Special Forces, are sheltering in the Highlands and badly in need of food." (ABC Radio Australia, 8 November 2004)

RFK Center for Human Rights, October 2004

"A senior Papuan Christian leader reports that extensive Indonesian military operations in the vicinity of Mulia, capital of the Puncak Jaya region in West Papua's central highlands, has forced thousands (perhaps as many as 5,000) of local residents to flee into the forests. The TNI operations, which began in mid-October, have also led to the closure of 22 churches in the area."

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

Displacement from Maluku Province

Inter-communal violence forced people to flee within Maluku province and to Southeast Sulawesi (1999-2000)

- Total of 500,000 people displaced by the violence between 1999 and 2000.
- 160,000 people returned to the areas where they originally migrated from (mainly Southeast Sulawesi)
- 330,000 people were displaced within the province, mainly in Ambon.

Bakornas & OCHA, July 2003, p. 12

"The IDP crisis in Maluku commenced following severe conflict between different religious communities starting in early 1999. In the following 12 months nearly all of the areas in Maluku were affected; some 30,000 homes and public infrastructure were destroyed. Displacement occurred to neighbouring Sulawesi, where the lives of IDPs have partially normalised. Apart from the large numbers of recent migrants or their descendants that returned to Sulawesi, around 332,000 fled to other parts of Maluku, or were displaced within Ambon. Further categories are those persons that fled from rural areas to other rural communities where they felt safe, and those persons that moved to Maluku from other provinces similarly affected by violence, notably North Maluku (just over 1,000 families)."

OCHA, 14 February 2003

"The communal conflict has created a permanent change in the social fabric and mind-set of nearly every citizen of Maluku. Large sections of the population of 1.3 million have been affected by the violence. In Maluku, 330,000 people still remain in IDP camps and other temporary, inadequate accommodation. Another 160,000 fled the violence to the areas where they originally migrated from (mainly Southeast Sulawesi). Most IDPs continue to live in overcrowded and under-serviced conditions. Full economic, infrastructure and service recovery in Ambon, remote areas, and IDP influx sites are still many years distant."

Displacement from North Maluku

Destination of displacement from North Maluku followed religious lines (July 2003)

- Thousands of Christians fled to neighbouring North Sulawesi and to Tobelo from all over the province, and thousands of Moslems were displaced from Tobelo and other areas to towns such as Ternate.
- From the initial estimate of more than 220,000 persons having fled either within the Province or to North Sulawesi, the majority have returned, to or nearby their original place of residence.

UNDP, July 2004, p. 12

"The conflict in North Maluku led to the displacement of almost 300,000 people, over one-third of the province's total population of 794,000 people. The process of displacement and return marks a major experience of the conflict for many people in the province and is likely to have had a major influence on attitudes in post-conflict North Maluku. Most displacement in North Maluku occurred in the final quarter of 1999 as the conflict spread across the province. In general, those displaced were minorities in the particular areas where they lived, with Christians fleeing Muslim majority areas such as Ternate and Bacan, and Muslims fleeing Christian majority areas such as Tobelo. This pattern was repeated across all areas of North Maluku affected by the conflict leading to an almost complete segregation of religious communities by mid-2000. Christians from Bacan fled to Bitung, Manado, Seram, Tual, Samlaki and Sorong, while Muslim migrants returned to Java, Buton and other areas from where they had originated.

Roughly two-thirds of the displaced relocated to just four areas – Ternate (Muslim IDPs), North Sulawesi (Christian IDPs), Tobelo (Christian IDPs) and Jailolo (mixed). While the numbers of IDPs in other areas was relatively small, in some sub-districts such as Galela, Gane Timur, Loloda, Kao/Malifut and Sahu, displaced people accounted for more than half the total of the resident population. Although almost all areas of North Maluku were in some way affected by the conflict, in terms of displacement, greater levels of displacement occurred in the northern areas. "

Bakornas & OCHA, July 2003, p. 13

"From August 1999, North Maluku was ravaged by inter-communal strife, similar to that affecting Maluku. The roots of the violence contained its own local dynamic but the way it spread, pitting members of two religious communities against each other throughout the Province in the succeeding months, set off similar consequences to those suffered in Maluku. Thousands of Christians fled to neighbouring North Sulawesi and to Tobelo from all over the province, and thousands of Moslems were displaced from Tobelo and other areas to towns such as Ternate. Many areas still remain segregated along religious lines. The Provincial Government however has been able to encourage the return of the majority of the population, and in other instances different types of assistance have been provided. In North Maluku the major focus has been on returns, and from the initial estimate of more than 220,000 persons having fled either within the Province or to North Sulawesi, the majority have returned, to or nearby their original place of residence, many of them spontaneously, shortly after the end of the conflict."

Displacement from Aceh

New dynamics of displacement caused by the military operation (July 2005)

- At least 123,00 people displaced by military operation from May 2003 to December 2004. Their displacement patterns differed from patterns observed in previous years in Aceh.
- During the military operation people were ordered by the military to leave their homes and evacuated to camps by trucks. Stays in the camps were relatively short. This strategy of forced displacement aimed at separating the civilians from GAM militants.
- While the majority of people in Greater Aceh, Pidie, Bireun, and North Aceh were moved by the military to camps, most of the displacements in Nagan Raya and South Aceh were made spontaneously in response to intimidation and threats to life.
- In South Aceh, many people fled intimidation and threats by GAM. In other districts, such as East Aceh and Bireun, people also fled the threat of armed clashes.
- Out of fear of becoming targets for the military, many men reportedly avoided the official camps and sought refuge in the forests or mountains.

- Suspecting GAM of hiding militants in the camps or recruiting new members, the authorities have reportedly conducted search operations in the camps

RSC, July 2005, pp.13-17

"More than 123,000 people were displaced during the implementation of Martial Law. There were peoples who were ordered to leave their villages, part of the strategy used by the security authority to separate civilians and GAM. Others fled from their villages due to the threats to their lives. Some only had to stay in camps for a short period while some had to live for long periods in such refugee camps.

The dynamic of displacement during Martial Law was different compared to the period of early democratisation in Indonesia (1999-2002).

(...)

In the beginning of Martial Law, the military often ordered villagers to leave their villages so that the military could go after suspected GAM bases. The process was part of the TNI's anti-guerrilla strategy against GAM, aiming to separate the civilian population from GAM fighters.

Displacement caused by military orders occurred especially in GAM stronghold areas. By mid-June, more than 15,000 persons from Juli sub-district, Bireun, were ordered to an IDP camp at Cot Gapu at a time when the military were conducting high profile attacks against the base of Darwis Jeunib, GAM Military Commander of the Batee Ilek area. A week later, people from Laweung village, in Muara Tiga sub-district, Pidie, were evacuated to Keunire camp. By the end of June, villagers from Seumirah, Alue Papeun and Alue Dua in Nisam subdistrict, North Aceh, were suddenly told to evacuate themselves to Cot Murong. The army sent in fifteen large trucks and ten smaller pickups to transport 4,500 people from these villages. The security forces also moved 119 santri (students) from Raudhatul Ulum, a pesantren, or Islamic religious boarding school, in Kuala Batee sub-district to the Persada Field camp in Blang Pidie sub-district, Aceh Barat Daya.² Having captured the principal of this school as a suspected GAM supporter, Indonesian soldiers then moved the students away, allegedly to protect the pesantren from guerrilla revenge attacks. In August 2003, security authorities moved 460 people from Siron Blang and Siron Krueng villages, both GAM strongholds in Greater Aceh.

The military strategy of evacuating people caused the number of people displaced by the conflict to shift constantly as some people were allowed to go home while others were ordered to leave their villages. A main characteristic of this strategy was that it made for relatively short periods of displacement. For example, the peoples of Siron Blang and Siron Krueng (Greater Aceh) could return to their villages after one week in the IDP camp. People from Sawang (North Aceh), Tiro (Pidie), and Juli (Bireun) spent about two to five weeks in the camps.

In Aceh Jaya and West Aceh, the TNI also evacuated villagers, particularly between June and August 2003. In Kaway XVI and Meurebo sub-districts (West Aceh) more than 6,000 people from several villages were moved to Alue Penyareng camp. In Aceh Jaya, 6,600 people from Panga, Sampoinet, and Krueng Sabee were moved to Kuala Mersi camp. Most of the IDPs in Aceh Jaya and West Aceh could return within two weeks although some 2,000 other people in Aceh Jaya and about 1,000 in West Aceh had to stay in the camps for more than three months. However, even when people left the camps, some reports showed that many were not able to return to their villages, as the returnees still had grave concerns about security.

While the majority of people in Greater Aceh, Pidie, Bireun, and North Aceh were moved by the military to camps, most of the displacements in Nagan Raya and South Aceh were made spontaneously in response to intimidation and threats to life.

In the first week of June 2003, some 5,800 peoples from thirteen villages in Samadua sub-districts, South Aceh, sought refuge with other villages and families. In addition, 1,300 persons in

this region had been displaced a week before the declaration of Martial Law and the launching of a massive military campaign in Aceh by the Indonesian government. Unidentified armed groups burnt their houses and intimidated the local people, who are mostly of Aneuk Jamee descent and live in rural areas. By mid-June 2003, the number of IDPs in South Aceh had reached some 12,000, with additional displaced people from Sawang (1,314), Tapak Tuan (362), Pasie Raja (1,818), Kluet Tengah (386), Kluet Timur (485), Bakongan (740), Trumon (691), and Labuan Haji Timur (606). In early August 2003, more than 2,300 people from eleven villages in Trumon sought refuge at four IDP sites. By early September 2003, there were a total of 5,340 IDPs in West and East Trumon sub-districts.

The main reason for all of these displacements was intimidation from GAM. The IDPs were also afraid of being caught in the middle of armed clashes between government and rebel forces. In Nagan Raya, for example, 800 people from four villages ran for their lives and sought refuge in Ujung Fatehah camp in June 2003, when GAM kidnapped and killed a villager. Most of the people targeted by GAM in this vein were Javanese transmigrants. From mid-2001 to December 2002, they were also displaced when GAM ordered them to leave the villages. In early August 2003, 400 people from Baharu, Blang Pidie sub-district, Aceh Barat Daya, sought refuge in a camp. They were afraid of the armed clashes between the security forces and GAM, as well as of threats from GAM, which did not allow them to conduct their regular neighbourhood watch.

There were many other instances of displacements due to fear of armed conflict elsewhere, such as in Tamiang, East Aceh and Bireun. In early June, a total of 4,356 persons from Seruway sub-district (Tamiang) spread into Sungai Yu and Seruway camps. Some of the IDPs had been displaced after their houses were burnt by unidentified persons in early May, while the rest were afraid of the armed clashes.

(...)

While the people who are moved to the camps by the military tend to stay in the camps for short periods, IDPs who leave their villages because of fear tend to stay longer. At the time of writing, the IDPs in Nagan Raya have been refugees since June 2003. Only a few were able to return to their village in February 2004, soon after the military built a post in that village. The IDPs from Tapak Tuan and Pasie Raja sub-districts in South Aceh still remained in the camp three months after having been forced to flee their villages in September 2003. They did not want to return because they could not work, as the security situation did not allow them to work."

Many IDPs reported to have avoided the official camps since the launching of the military operation

Eye on Aceh, April 2004

"In an attempt to separate GAM from ordinary civilians, tens of thousands of villagers were forced by the military to leave their homes and live in camps. The logic behind removing all civilians from these targeted areas was that anyone not in the camps must be members or supporters of GAM. Fearing they would become easy targets, many men did not go to the camps, but instead fled to the forests and mountains. In this way the military actually 'pushed' people to live with, and perhaps join, the separatist movement, leaving the most vulnerable groups as the majority of the camp population. The authorities now suspect that some of these camps have become areas for GAM to hide and recruit new members. Search operations have become frequent occurrences, resulting in increasing levels of fear and insecurity for the residents. In addition, living conditions are poor, with residents complaining that food and water is in short supply."

Two distinctive patterns of displacement for Aceh IDPs (July 2005)

- 2 patterns of displacement: temporary displacement (mostly Acehnese) within Aceh province following armed clashes and long-term displacement to North Sumatra (mostly Javanese)
- Following armed clashes between government forces and GAM rebels, the villagers usually anticipate the return of these soldiers and flee until it is safe to return.
- Displacement in Aceh thus tends to be short-term and localized.

UNOCHA 14 February 2003, p. 26

"The conflict has led to two distinctive patterns of displacement. Within Aceh Province, local people have in general been temporarily displaced when their villages were under (threat of) attack, and have been sheltered in mosques or community halls. These displaced persons have usually returned to their villages within a few weeks and started reconstructing their houses and livelihoods. At the same time, thousands of transmigrants, mostly of Javanese origin, who had settled in Central Aceh where the Government had provided each family with three hectares of land for agriculture and housing, were forced to leave for North Sumatra. These IDPs, whose numbers are estimated at close to 100,000, remain displaced in North Sumatra, and although they wish to return to Aceh, they do not yet believe that the situation is sufficiently secure."

A) DISPLACEMENT WITHIN ACEH

Displacement under the May 2003-December 2004 military operation

RSC, July 2005, pp.7-9

"On 18 May 2003, at midnight, the Indonesian government under President Megawati Sukarnoputri declared a state of military emergency and martial law in Aceh. Sanctioned by Presidential Decree 23/2003, the largest military campaign since the invasion of East Timor in 1975 was launched on 19 May, with hundreds of Indonesian soldiers parachuting into Aceh on the first day of martial law, and a massive increase in the overall deployment of government troops in the province. In the wake of this, initially highly publicized and formalized, militarist turn of events, Aceh was, in a sense, 'disappeared' into an environment of secrecy and impunity. In addition to grave and widespread human rights violations, including arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, sexual violence, and extra-judicial execution, martial law also featured forced evacuations and involuntary relocation of displaced populations into camps at the hands of the military.

(...)

While conflict and violence in the pre-martial law era also produced flows of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, forced displacement took on added significance with the public declaration of a military emergency and the official launch of Operasi Terpadu ('Integrated Operation') on 19 May 2003. This was the first time the Indonesian government publicly announced plans for the mass evacuation of civilian population to form part of counter-insurgency operations in Aceh. As part of the so-called 'humanitarian component' of this massive military crackdown, forced displacement and involuntary relocation thus became officially enshrined in government discourse and military strategy alike.

(..)

Already, before the declaration of martial law, for example, national government projections of the number of anticipated IDPs due to the impending military campaign in Aceh ranged from 100,000 to 200,000 people. As part of the so-called 'humanitarian component' of this war effort, moreover, early plans for temporary shelters and basic food stuffs were announced for West Aceh, East Aceh, North Aceh, Pidie and Bireun (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2003a, p.5). Once martial law was announced, a reported US\$ 48 million (Rp.400 billion) was allocated for this humanitarian component of the military campaign, "including for camps to be prepared for people deliberately displaced to protect them from hostilities" (ICG 2003b, p.4, emphasis added).

In the context of murkier operations already well underway by a military mobilizing for full-scale war in Aceh, such public projections of mass displacement by top-ranking civilian government officials in Jakarta thus put local populations on high flight alert (e.g., Jakarta Post 17 May 2003; Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) 2003a). In the early phase of martial law, there were numerous reports by local journalists describing mass displacement of civilians, including entire villages, and, within two months of the declared state of military emergency, official government sources put the sum total of IDPs in Aceh at 40,000. By August 2003, the International Office for Migration (IOM) identified a total of thirty-eight camp locations, with a combined population of displaced persons at 24,730. It further estimated some 80,000 returnees from the camps at this time, thus counting a 'grand total' of 104,730 IDPs since the beginning of martial law (IOM 2003)."

AI, 7 October 2004, p. 11

"Although the numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) never reached the governments' projected figure of 200,000,(26) tens of thousands of people have been displaced, the majority during the first months of the military emergency. In some cases the displacement was under threat of force. Several people interviewed by Amnesty International described how the military or police came to their village and ordered them to leave, sometimes without giving sufficient time to pack their belongings. One man from Juli Sub-district in Bireun District said that the military had come to his village in August 2003 and told all the villagers to leave or they would be considered to be members of GAM. They had to leave within 24 hours and were only permitted to take a small bag of clothes with them." (AI 7 October 2004, p. 11)

Displacement prior to 2003

JRS, June 2003, pp. 34-36

"The major influx of IDPs in neighboring villages within Aceh occurred in the middle of 1999, when the conflict built in intensity and where an estimated 200,000 IDPs had been forced to seek refuge in mosques and public buildings.

(...)

During flight, the IDPs usually stopped by meunasah's to rest and pray before moving again. Depending on their resources, some of them managed to rent a truck to transport them away from their homes. Sometimes, a truck just arrived without the IDPs knowing who was facilitating the move. "We were so tired and confused that we just obeyed what others told us to do, without knowing where we were going or what would happen next," one woman explained.

Others had to walk for one or two days to reach safety and had to avoid the main roads for fear of encountering either TNI or GAM patrols. Since most of the IDPs managed to bring only their clothes, those who walked relied on food they foraged along the way to feed themselves.

Most of the IDPs in Aceh fled to relatives' homes and public spaces, such as mosques, markets, and school buildings. Human Rights Watch reported allegations that many of the IDPs were purposefully pushed to flee to the latter destination. GAM members reportedly discouraged "people from going to stay with relatives instead of in a large centralized camp."¹⁴ HRW suggested that motives for this policy could have included that massive displacement would draw attention to the problems of Aceh and that camps could provide opportunities "for GAM to recruit and travel among the wider community."¹⁵ The information collected during this research, however, neither confirmed nor discredited such claims.

Some IDPs reported feeling utterly disappointed when they arrived at the larger sites, especially public markets and school buildings where they had to share their space with other IDPs and where the physical and sanitary conditions were unacceptable to them. Acehnese who managed

to bring some of their financial savings along rented meager accommodation such as single room units. Eventually many IDPs had to abandon these rooms when the money ran out."

SCHRA, 12 September 2000

"Every time there is a clash in Aceh, especially when there are casualties in the security forces, the security forces return and attack the village where the clash took place and brutalize the villagers. Because of incidents such as these, villagers have simply become so afraid of the military/police that they now leave their village as soon as they hear a military or police unit heading its direction, after an armed clash, or after a soldier or a policeman is injured or killed in or near their village. The villagers gather in mosques, schools, or open fields until they feel safe enough to return. As a result, the number of IDPs may suddenly swell from 30 000 to 60, 000 within a few days and dwindle down gradually, as they return, to the more constant figure of 30 000 or so IDPs. This cycle has been repeated itself several times, which explains the great fluctuations of figures you read from various reports. These figures are not necessarily inaccurate but must be analysed in view of the moment in the cycle of flight-and-return which give them meaning."

HRW, May 2000

"Whole villages have been displaced by the fighting. Displacement in Aceh tends to be a short-term, localized phenomenon. Typically following a nearby clash between security forces and separatists, or simply the appearance of troops in the area, rural inhabitants travel to the nearest market town, often the subdistrict capital. They typically stay on the grounds of the mosque for days or months until they feel it is safe to return."

B) DISPLACEMENT TO OTHER PROVINCES (NORTH SUMATRA)

Checkpoints between Aceh and North Sumatra established since May 2003 reported to create difficulty for leaving Aceh

RSC, July 2005, pp.8-9

"At about the same time, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) office in Kuala Lumpur recorded a marked surge in registered arrivals of Acehnese asylum seekers in Malaysia, with May showing the highest one-month total of the year. By the end of October 2003, the UNHCR reported a total of 3,757 new such cases, compared with 633 for the entire previous year (HRW 2003a, p.10). Almost a year into martial law, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that there were more than 100,000 IDPs in North Sumatra, the neighboring province to which Acehnese have been fleeing from conflict and violence in large numbers since 1999 (OCHA 2004)."

Hedman, Eva-Lotta, January 2004

"(...) Acehnese have also found themselves the target of new forms of government surveillance and control. For example, the Indonesian military has established checkpoints to monitor the internal border between Aceh and North Sumatra. Such checkpoints, where travel documents and the new national identity card are required for inspection, create considerable difficulties for those seeking to leave war-torn Aceh for North Sumatra. There are also reports of a wider climate of fear and intimidation for the many thousands of Acehnese currently living in North Sumatra as IDPs."

23,000 families reported to have left Aceh for North Sumatra since 1999

Bakornas PBP & OCHA, July 2003, p. 17

"The neighbouring Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam has suffered conflict during many decades, including violence in conjunction with a separatist movement since 1976. As a result many earlier migrants from other parts of Indonesia, had fled from this Province to North Sumatra, seeking refuge from the conflict or intimidation. An estimated 23,000 families have sought refuge in North Sumatra since the violence escalated in 1999."

JRS, June 2003, pp. 38-39

"The majority of the IDPs who fled to Langkat District in the vicinity of the North Sumatran capital of Medan were ethnic Javanese - ninety-one percent of the respondents interviewed for this study were ethnic Javanese who had left East Aceh District. In Aceh itself, the majority of the IDPs were ethnic Acehnese.

(...)

When they fled, IDPs who did not have the means to rent vehicles to help with their evacuation walked to the border between Aceh and North Sumatra. Some Javanese IDPs reported that during flight from their homes they were derided and mocked on the road as they passed villages occupied by Acehnese.

Before arriving to their places of refuge, IDPs heading to North Sumatra had to brave the journey out of Aceh, which meant encountering checkpoints along the way. In one instance, a convoy carrying IDPs to North Sumatra was caught in crossfire between the guerrillas and the Indonesian army. The IDPs jumped out of the cars and ran to the paddy fields until the fighting ended. Another convoy managed to reach North Sumatra safely because it was heavily guarded by Indonesian army troops. The convoy consisted of 29 cars, of which the IDPs occupied.

When they arrived in North Sumatra, most of them took shelter in public buildings such as a former military camp and a sports center. At times, the government helped to transport some of the IDPs, mainly from villages where the army had a presence and where the perpetrators were alleged to belong to GAM. In one case officials in North Sumatra helped IDPs to move. In August 2001, the Langkat District Social Welfare Department helped to transport IDPs from the large site at the Stabat sports center to other smaller communities in the district.

Many of the IDPs moved from site to site at first, often staying in one place for a few days only to move again. Some finally settled in one site once they began receiving assistance from local NGOs. Others just moved on, even to other parts of Indonesia."

Displacement in Central Sulawesi

IDPs in Central Sulawesi have mainly fled to regions where members of their religion make up the majority (March 2004)

- Demographic changes in Central Sulawesi have led to tensions and eruption of violence in 1998 and May 2000 between Christians and Muslims.
- Some 170 persons have been killed and 140,000 displaced.
- Residents fled to areas where members of their religion made up the majority: Muslims went to Palu, Poso town, and the coastal town of Parigi, while Christians fled to Tentena and Napu in the mountains, or Manado in North Sulawesi.

Aragon, Lorraine V, March 2004

"Between December 1998 and the end of 2002, an estimated 100,000 Christians and Muslims fled their villages in the wake of physical attacks and threats of further attacks. In some cases, volunteers working with the Protestant Crisis Centre team, whose goal and accomplishment was to save lives, evacuated civilians and even military troops from the crossfire. The leader of this team, Reverend Rinaldy Damanik, is currently in jail on a trumped up weapons charge. It seems Reverend Damanik has aggravated people in high places by complaining that his team was doing dangerous work that should have been undertaken by the security forces deployed before and after the Malino Accord.

Christians generally were evacuated south from Poso to Tentena, a virtually all-Christian highland lake village developed by Dutch missionaries in the late 1800s. They also fled to other Christian majority regions such as Manado or Napu. Muslims caught in fighting south of Poso were evacuated north to the southern border of Poso City, and were then directed by security forces to the now virtually all-Muslim coastal capital of the district, Poso City. Muslims also fled to Muslim-majority regions such as Palu, South Sulawesi, and Java, if they had family connections in these locations.

About 15,000 Christian IDPs still live in the sub-district around Tentena. At least 3,000 of them reside in small houses that they built from local forest resources on a former mission airfield presently owned by the Central Sulawesi Protestant Church (Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah or GKST). Environmental conservation specialists note the negative impact this dense settlement has had on local forests, Poso Lake, and nearby watersheds.

Several hours drive north, thousands of Muslim IDPs live scattered along the east-west road running through Poso, some in longhouse type barracks built by army soldiers at government expense. There are also an undetectable number of IDPs who just took refuge in the distant private homes of family or economic patrons. Many of these 'privately distributed' IDPs have less incentive to return to the Poso District. Many continue to believe that Poso is still 'on fire', just as it was when they first began their traumatic exodus. Some are damaged, potentially vengeful people."

Bakornas & OCHA March 2003, p. 1

"Central Sulawesi is the largest province in the island of Sulawesi covering an area of 68 km² and inhabiting 2.1 million people. In addition to those who were settled through the GoRI transmigration policy of 1970s, economic migrants continued to arrive in Central Sulawesi throughout 1980s, mainly from neighbouring south Sulawesi. These new migrants purchased land and property and become part of the local population changing the demographic situation of the province. This demographic change caused economic and political competition which resulted in increased tension especially after the emergence of financial crisis.

These worrying trends led to the eruption of communal violence in several parts of Poso district in December 1998, which escalated in April and May 2000, killing some 170 people and injuring many others. The violence caused substantial property destruction and population displacement (70-75,000 IDPs and then to 143,354 IDPs as of March 2003). Many Moslem and Christian villages were totally destroyed, and many houses, Churches, and Mosques were burned down during the conflict. The situation was further aggravated by the reportedly arrival of the so-called "outsiders" - members of a militant Moslem group "Laskar Jihad" in late 2001. Entire villages were razed and the communities were divided deeply along religious lines. In August 2002, a relatively small incident caused the burning of Mattako village prompting IDPs to postpone the decision to return to their places of origin."

HRW, 4 December 2002, p. 39

"With each new wave of violence, residents fled to areas where members of their religion made up the majority: Muslims went to Palu, Poso town, and the coastal town of Parigi, while Christians fled to Tentena and Napu in the mountains, or Manado in North Sulawesi. As of January 2002, just after the Malino Declaration was signed, the government's office for coordinating humanitarian response to the conflict estimated a total of 86,000 displaced persons in Central Sulawesi. The Central Sulawesi Christian Church estimated 42,000 displaced persons in Christian areas of the province. If these estimates are accurate, there were roughly even numbers of displaced people from both groups."

Displacement from Central and West Kalimantan

Ethnic tensions trigger massive displacement of ethnic Madurese within West Kalimantan (March 2004)

- In March 1999, some 78,000 Madurese were forced from their homes in the Sambas region of West Kalimantan by threats by a combination of Dayaks, Chinese and Malays. The displaced sought refuge in various temporary shelter and public buildings in Pontianak, where many stayed for up to 2 years.

CRS, 31 March 2004

"In mid-March 1999, in the Sambas region of West Kalimantan, over 78,000 Madurese were expelled from their homes and villages by a combination of Dayak, Chinese and Malays. This resulted in catastrophic violence with mass killings (officially about 200 people) and property destruction. Due to this conflict, the Madurese fled to Pontianak, the main city of West Kalimantan and the provincial capital, and camped in several sports facilities, government-built barracks warehouses and other public buildings. Living conditions in these places were poor, yet due to a lack of alternatives, many Madurese Internally Displaced People (IDPs) stayed for more than 2 years. Tensions engendered by the perceived negative effects of their presence (occupation of public spaces, increased crime, strain on public services) between the Madurese in the temporary camps, and the local people occasionally turned violent during that time."

USAID, 26 February 2002

"Tensions between Dayaks and Madurese have occasionally erupted into violence. In 1999, Dayak attacks on Madurese in West Kalimantan resulted in the displacement of at least 60,000 Madurese to the provincial capital of Pontianak. The influx to Pontianak increased tensions in the area, and under pressure from Dayak and Malay communities, the GOI began resettling the Madurese IDP population to outlying areas of the province during 2001. In early 2001, Dayak attacks in Central Kalimantan caused several hundred deaths and the flight of more than 80,000 Madurese to Madura Island and other parts of Java."

Ethnic Madurese flee violence in Central Kalimantan to seek refuge in East Java and Madura Island (2001)

- Between March and April 2001, at least 100,000 Madurese migrants under attack by indigenous Dayak fled Central Kalimantan to seek refuge in East Java and Madura Island.

USAID, 15 May 2001

"For several decades, Kalimantan has experienced civil unrest because the indigenous population has not accepted the settler populations generated by the transmigration policies of the central government in Jakarta. Economic competition and ethnic discrimination have contributed to resentments among the indigenous population toward the settlers. In the past, several revolts have resulted in the displacement of thousands of people, hundreds of deaths, and human rights abuses.

A recent escalation in violence occurred during March and April 2001, when indigenous Dayaks attacked Madurese migrants in Central Kalimantan. The violence quickly spread from Sampit to nearby towns, resulting in more than 500 deaths and approximately 100,000 evacuees. Most of the IDPs fled Kalimantan for Madura Island and other locations in Central and East Java. Currently there are about 62,000 IDPs at Sampang and another 17,000 at Bangkalan, both on Madura Island. According to U.N. reports, Dayak gangs continue to target Madurese migrants and burn homes in Kalimantan to prevent those who have fled from returning home."

Displacement from Papua

Military operations in West Papua's Central Highlands force civilians to go into hiding in the forest (August 2005)

- Military operation at the end of 2004 and during 2005 forced thousands of Papuan residents into hiding in the forest.

Survival International, 31 August 2005

"Lani tribesman Benny Wenda, who is living as a refugee in the UK, reports today that the people of his home village in Pyramid, Papua, are still in hiding after the army attacked in July.

The small village of Moragame has been abandoned since the army attacked as the people are hiding in the jungle, too afraid to return to their homes. Soldiers continue to patrol the area, intimidating people.

Earlier this year, at least fifty people died from starvation and disease when forced to flee their homes and gardens in a similar incident in the village of Nggweyage in which three people were killed.

Soldiers attacked Moragame and shot two men, who disappeared into the jungle and have not been seen since. They also cut the face and body of Benny's brother Petto Wenda with a razor and a knife before pouring petrol on his head and setting him on fire. He is recovering slowly."

RFK Center for Human Rights, January 2005

"According to reliable sources in West Papua, including Pastor Socrates Yoman, President of the Fellowship of Baptist Churches in West Papua, TNI forces have continued operations in the area, forcing thousands of Papuan civilians to flee into the forests where lack of food, shelter and medicine have caused deaths and extensive illness. Sources on the ground also indicate that the TNI has significantly expanded its operations into the neighboring districts of Jayawijaya, Nabire and Tolikara. Reports parallel initial accounts of the military operations in Puncak Jaya District with the notorious special forces (Kopassus) as well as the militarized police (Brimob) assaulting villagers, destroying homes and killing livestock."

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Physical security (Maluku)

IDP women victims of sexual and domestic violence (2005)

- Many women in both Maluku and North Maluku province reported to be increasingly victims of violence.
- IDP women in North Maluku camp reportedly raped and humiliated by security forces

UNDP, 2005, p.47

"Violence against women has been an issue consistently pointed out as an impact of ethno-communal conflict in both provinces. Violence (both in the public and the private spheres) has taken many forms, from intensified domestic violence in IDP camps to sexual harassment and rape. According to information gathered by the UNDP Gender Thematic Assessment team, in the Sayoan IDP camp on Bacan Island in North Halmahera complaints were made about the rape and humiliation of women by the security forces. Beyond the camps, women in both provinces report frequent harassment and sexual violence in particular by security forces. Many unwed mothers were left behind when the security forces departed.

The gender perspective highlights the fundamental paradox of peace-building in the two provinces: a strong military and police presence is widely considered necessary to prevent further outbreaks of violence, but the presence of these security forces has a negative impact on the broader human security situation. In the consultative workshops held in both provinces for this assessment, female participants were uniformly more ambiguous in their attitudes towards the security forces than the male participants, who tended to view them positively."

Physical security (Aceh)

Level of fighting and human rights violations decline drastically in the wake of the peace agreement (May 2006)

The following graph shows the number of GAM-Government incidents between and April 2006. As the graph clearly shows, these incidents started to decrease significantly between June and August 2005. Since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, on 15 August 2005,

Source: WB, 26 May 2005

AcehKita, 4 January 2006

"The earthquake and tsunami at the end of 2004 and the signing of the peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in August 2005 has resulted in a drastic decline in the number of human rights violations in Aceh.

According to Mashudi, from the research and policy analysis division of the Aceh Coalition of Non- Government Human Rights Organisations (Koalisi NGO HAM), the tsunami and the Helsinki memorandum of understanding (MoU) were the two principle factors in this decline. In 2005 there were only 311 cases of violence in Aceh, far lower than 2004 when there were as many as 779 cases. "The decline was more than 50 percent", Mashudi told Aceh Kita at his office on Wednesday January 4.

In 2005, out of a total of 311 cases of human rights violations, the majority of victims were civilians, totaling 217 people. Meanwhile 41 victims were from the Indonesian Military (TNI) or police and 53 from GAM. The most prominent cases were the mistreatment of civilians, which was as high as 136 cases. Meanwhile there were 25 cases of mistreatment of TNI/police officers and only nine against GAM.

Also this year, there were only 101 cases of killings while in 2004 the figure was as high as 373. "These represent the cases that have declined most in 2005", said Kurdinar, the head of the coalition's campaign division."

WB, 23 August 2005, p. 13

Conflict impacts concentrated in four districts

As for conflict incidents, impacts from conflict in 2005 – in terms of death, injuries and destruction – are concentrated in four districts. The newspaper data notes that 75 percent of deaths occurred in these areas: South Aceh (34%, 60 deaths), North Aceh (16%, 28 deaths), Bireuen (15%, 26 deaths), and East Aceh (11%, 20 deaths). Figure 7 shows the GAM-Gol related conflict impacts for each district, clearly indicating that in the past four months the highest impacted districts are these four. It should be noted that this concentration of impacts is for 2005 only, with other districts (such as Pidie and Central Aceh) seeing high impacts in previous years, and impacts spread across the province during the martial law period after COHA collapsed.

Contradictory reports as to protection needs of returnees in Central Aceh and Bener Meriah (February 2006)

- According to the WB, tension observed in early 2006 between locals and returning IDPs in central Aceh and Bener Meriah turned out to be isolated incidents. Long-term assistance remains, however, a significant concern.
- UN mission in January 2006 to Bener Meriah reported hearing about security incidents without being able to confirm the information

Security concerns for returning IDPs Central Aceh and Bener Meriah subside

WB, 18 February 2006, p.2

"In last month's Update we noted the return of conflict-affected IDPs to Bener Meriah and Aceh Tengah. Since then, the situation appears to have stabilized but concerns remain. Local governments in the two districts have encouraged IDPs to move from the camps to their villages of origin. A large number appear to have done so. There have been some reports of tensions over this return. In a number of cases in Kesol sub-district, there has been fighting between local youths and returning IDPs, and local leaders have refused to provide security guarantees. However, these cases have been isolated and remain small in scale. In most cases, IDPs have returned without incident.

However, a number of concerns remain. First, while initial needs have been met, it is unclear how long these will last. The Government's plan is to replace initial assistance with longer-term livelihoods programs and with a house building program. However, development programs relating to other parts of the peace process, such as the reintegration of GAM, have not progressed beyond design stage; it is unclear that programs for IDPs will be operational any quicker. Second, data for targeting purposes is poor. The situation is complicated by the fact that the IDP population is very fluid—many have returned to Pidie and Bireuen, and other newcomers have arrived. Further, while the December returnees were predominantly ethnic Acehnese, other Gayonese and Javanese IDPs have been arriving more quietly, and will also need to receive benefits. Third, tensions in central Aceh remain higher than in other parts of the province. Returnees and villagers express a strong desire for peusijek (traditional ceremony of welcome or forgiveness) to be held, but local elites have yet to organize these. While concerns about a humanitarian or security crisis have subsided, ongoing monitoring of the situation is essential."

UNORC, January 2006, pp. 1-2

"The United Nations agencies, through the coordination of the Office of the United Nations Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias, responded recently to a request for assistance to a population of displaced persons returning to their homelands in Bener Meriah and Aceh Tengah. As the situation in central Aceh region evolves, UNORC continues to discuss how best to undertake a coherent UN strategy that addresses basic needs and longer-term community-based approaches in support of the peace process.

(...)

2. The majority of people feel secure and are being accepted by their villages of return. Still some friction remains between the recent returns and government officials as to provision of reintegration assistance. The majority of returns have met with village leaders and have paperwork proving they reside in that particular village. In some cases, women have moved with host-families while the men live in tents. The returns clear their fields during the day with whatever tools available, and return to camps and families in the evening. Most expressed some trauma from the past, though said they wanted to move on with their lives and were hopeful for the future. Government officials were supportive of the returns, saying "we are all family," however they did express frustration that the Ronga Ronga returns amassed in groups and sought "hand-outs," while older returns came quietly and have not sought attention. We didn't go to Aceh Tengah, but only in one case in Bener Meriah did we hear of a security incident and we were unable to verify the veracity of the event. People showed awareness of the MoU and we saw MoU posters and banners throughout Bener Meriah and in Takengon. Yet uncertainty remains regarding actual program implementation and how district governments will receive reintegration assistance financing.

3. Many people have returned quietly home to their villages. These people tend to be Gayonese, whereas the more recent returns are Acehnese. The Ronga-Ronga returns were more organized, had higher numbers and received more attention, however they are far from the first returns since the signing of the MoU (and perhaps even before). We were told that the majority of "early" returns were Gayonese who were reluctant to request help from government. In Timang Gajah sub district, the vast majority of the community stayed in their village instead of fleeing to neighbouring areas such as Pidie, Bireun or Aceh. According to the Camat, The population is 85% Javanese, 10% Gayo and 5% Acehnese."

Significant security concerns reported for returning IDPs in Central Aceh and Bener Meriah

WB, 16 January 2006 (A), p.2

"While Sekda and his groups were conducting the meeting inside the mosque, the IDPs did not realize that military trucks and public buses were available outside of Ronga-Ronga camp ready to bring them to their destination villages. After the meeting the situation became tense. The military and police entered the camp and forced IDPs to board the trucks or buses as quickly as possible. Using microphones, they shouted the name of sub-districts (Timang Gajah, Rimba Raya, Pinto Rime Goyo, etc.) and IDPs had no other choice but to get on the bus, despite their lack of preparation. Some people felt happy because they thought this was a sign of progress. Other IDPs felt apprehensive as they were unaware of what the government was planning.

At the same time, in the IDP coordination site, police intelligence were interrogating the volunteers of the local NGO that had accompanied the IDPs. The police confiscated all data, bags, ID cards, and volunteer cards. The condition got worse when two IDPs were taken by the police and brought to their office. When they returned it was discovered that they had been beaten while in police custody.

(...)

2. Violent incidents cause concern amongst IDPs

On January 7 and incident took place in Blang Mancong Ateuh village, Ketol kecamatan, Central Aceh, when villagers beat eight IDPs who were attempt to obtain the village head's signature, required for their return. Three motorbikes were ruined. The incident was triggered by a rumor that these IDPs were GAM members who wanted to extort money from the village head. The incident was resolved when the Police, AMM and members of the local legislature visited the village. However, despite the fact that the case is being processed by the local police, there still exists a lot of speculation and fear amongst the IDPs that similar incidents will occur when they attempt to return and reintegration with receiving communities. IDPs assume that irresponsible elements unhappy with the peace process are behind the incident.

Another incident, as mentioned above, occurred in Ronga-Ronga camp on January 8, 2006, when police arrested two IDPs and beat them in their offices. Unfortunately this does not serve to demonstrate to IDPs, nor the wider community, that Police behavior and attitudes have changed since the MoU.

3. Security Concerns

In many areas IDPs remain unwilling to return primarily because of security concerns. Until January 14, IDPs who wanted to return to remote areas such as Blang Mancong, Puteng, Jangong Jaget and Alue Itam in Central Aceh as well as Blang Rakal, Pondok Baru, Permata and Weh Pesam in Bener Meriah were reluctant to do so until they had proof from the government that their security would be guaranteed. In Blang Rakal in particularly there is rumours that militia groups exist and for this reasons IDPs are restricting there movements after 3pm. Similarly, most of IDPs stated that they only visit their garden in a groups 20 or more in order to prevent militia attacks. Similarly, IDPs in Pondok Baru stated their desire for the police to issue a letter guaranteeing security, signed by the Camat."

WB, 16 January 2006 (B), p.3

"In December the return of conflict-affected IDPs to Bener Meriah and Aceh Tengah brought on a serious and ongoing humanitarian problem. On around the 9th December, approximately 4,500 conflict IDPs gathered in Bireuen and Pidie to begin to return by foot and largely unassisted to homes they fled between May and July 2001. They fled leaving almost all their belongings because of security concerns relating to GAM and militia reprisals amongst the ethnically heterogenous highlands.⁴ The Centre for Humanitarian and Social Empowerment (CHSE), a small local NGO based in Pidie, is facilitating the return. A week following their return, over 60 people, including women and children, collapsed from exhaustion and starvation. Currently the humanitarian situation has stabilised with the provision of limited food assistance by the local and

provincial government. The situation has the potential to explode, as reports suggest this ethnically "Aceh Pesisir" IDP group are not welcome in the largely Gayo and Javanese highlands.

At the time of writing, the military had begun to force the IDPs to return. Approximately half have now returned to Bireuen and Pidie but about 800-900 remain in eight locations. These are in the Blang Rakal, Timang Gadjah, Pante Raya and Balai Hakim areas. These eight groups are camped outside the villages they fled and are currently in negotiation with the villagers and the local Camat (Sub-district head) over their return.

Women and children particularly vulnerable in the post-tsunami situation (March 2006)

- Precarious living conditions in the camps make it difficult for women to have privacy and security

Global Exchange, March 2006, pp.6-7

"Women and children are in highly vulnerable situations in post-tsunami, postconflict Aceh. After the tsunami some Ulama - religious leaders - began spreading the message that the tsunami was caused by women's sins, insisting that Acehnese women must now conform to strict Islamic laws to avoid another disaster. These leaders point to the fact that more women and children were killed by the tsunami than men and that most women found dead or alive after the tsunami were less covered by clothing than permitted by Shariah law. One-year later, the conservative Ulama still promote this message during Friday prayers at many mosques throughout Aceh, turning women into scapegoats for the disaster and burdening them with feelings of guilt. It is common in Aceh to find banners on the side of roads sponsored by conservative Ulama saying, "Disaster has happened, so women cover yourselves up." Although widely accepted at first, this message is now being questioned, and local and international NGOs have sought to counter it with scientific evidence of the tsunami's origins and earthquake education. NGOs have begun to counter these messages with roadside banners of their own thus helping to break the guilt and shame forced upon Acehnese women.

The situation for women in the temporary barracks is dismal. The barracks are made of thin plywood on all four sides and corrugated metal roofs. The plywood walls that separate each unit do not even reach the ceiling by a foot or so, offering no privacy. Toilets and bathing areas are not separated for men and women and are a walk away. Some barracks do not have any bathing facilities and residents have to walk to rivers nearby, making women and girls more vulnerable to abuse and sexual assault. There have been many accounts of domestic violence spreading from unit to unit in the barracks and many rumors of prostitution. We were told of one confirmed case where a husband was forcing his wife to prostitute herself for money. Luckily this incident was brought to the attention of a women's NGO forum and they were able to end the forced prostitution and get the woman assistance."

Human rights are not properly addressed by the MoU and the Aceh draft law (March 2006)

- The Human Rights Court and Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be established in Aceh in line with the provision contained in the MoU will only have the capacity to address human rights abuses committed after the signing of the MoU.
- The government's version of the draft Aceh law dilutes its human rights provisions

Government's draft law on governing Aceh further dilutes human rights provisions

ICG, 29 March 2006, p. 5

"The government version dilutes the human rights provisions of the Aceh draft by removing any reference to past abuses, being studiously vague about a separate human rights court for Aceh, and eliminating the possibility that UN special rapporteurs could be invited to investigate allegations of human rights violations. But while human rights groups raised concerns, these provisions did not appear to be make or break for the law, and several Acehnese said privately this might not be the time to press for them. The changes, nevertheless, were instructive. The Aceh draft said the government at all levels was obliged to uphold human rights standards as laid down in international covenants. The government version mandated upholding only "those human rights standards in international covenants that have been adopted as [Indonesian] law".

The Aceh version states that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "derived from" the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission would formulate the nature of reconciliation efforts and also "clarify past human rights violations". The government version says the National Commission will establish the Aceh Commission and restricts the latter's functions to reconciliation – as did the MoU. Since the National Commission does not yet exist and may not any time soon, the matter may be moot. But for many Acehnese, the issue of past abuses centres on demands for compensation, and those may increase as groups from tsunami victims to former combatants are seen as receiving economic benefits while victims of the conflict are not. A neutral, thorough, well-documented record of the past is essential if claims for compensation are to be addressed fairly.

The Aceh draft calls for a human rights court in Aceh, although an ad hoc human rights court in Medan, with the ability to hear cases of serious human rights violations from the provinces of North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau, Jambi and Aceh, was established in 2000. The government language says a court will be established not "in Aceh" (implying a separate institution), but, more ambiguously, "for Aceh". In any case, the court would not have retroactive jurisdiction, so it could only hear cases dating from after the law's passage.

Finally, the government was clearly unhappy with a clause in the Aceh draft that "in the event there is no guarantee that a fair investigation of serious human rights abuses can be conducted in the territory, the government may give the opportunity to a special rapporteur or other official of the United Nations to enter Aceh". It deleted the entire clause."

Global Exchange, March 2006, pp.9-10

"Past human rights abuses are not being discussed at this stage. The AMM can only address abuses that occurred after August 15th 2005—the date the MOU was signed. The MOU stipulates that a Human Rights Court and Truth and Reconciliation Commission be established in Aceh. All of the local human rights groups we met with expressed their support for the peace process, but feel past abuses must be addressed in order to secure lasting peace and reconciliation. They were adamant that in order for true reconciliation of the conflict to happen current laws need to be bolstered in order to provide full justice for victims and fair binding sentences for abusers. Human Rights groups want to see the Indonesian government taking real responsibility to stamp out impunity of human rights abusers in Aceh unlike how they handled prosecuting abusers in East Timor."

Military operations and human rights abuses continue despite the disaster (January 2005)

- Despite very limited humanitarian access , AI had received many reports of human rights violations committed by the military prior to the tsunami.
- These included inter-aliaextra-judicial executions, rape, torture and arbitrary detention.
- In early January, AI continued to received reports that despite the tsunami, the conflict and patterns of human rights violations continued in the province.

AI, 19 January 2005, pp.11-12

"Amnesty International has previously expressed grave concerns about the human rights situation in NAD, particularly since the declaration of the military emergency in May 2003.

Although limitations on access have largely prevented independent human rights monitoring, the human rights violations committed by the Indonesian military and the police in NAD, and reported to Amnesty International, include extra-judicial executions; rape and other crimes of sexual violence against women; torture and ill-treatment; and arbitrary detention. Other human rights concerns include the forced participation of the civilian population in military operations or other activities in support of the ongoing military campaign against GAM and the disproportionate restrictions on freedom of expression and association.(12)

Amnesty International has also previously expressed concerns about human rights abuses reported to have been carried out by GAM, including the taking of hostages and the use of child soldiers. The authorities have also accused GAM of carrying out unlawful killings.

Optimism has been expressed that the current disaster which has caused widespread devastation and suffering may provide the impetus for an end to hostilities in NAD and for renewed efforts to resolve the situation in NAD through dialogue rather than force. However, in order for any agreed resolution to the conflict to be durable, it is important that human rights are not sacrificed in the search for peace and security.

In the interim, reports from NAD indicate that both the conflict and the pattern of human rights abuses continue.

A local non-governmental organization reported that just hours after the tsunami, members of the Combined Intelligence Task Force (Satuan Gabungan Intelijen) based in Gandapura stopped a local man by the side of the road and beat him until he bled. He was then reportedly taken away and arbitrarily detained, even after it was realised it was a case of mistaken identity.

A journalist near LhokNga village witnessed members of the military fire shots in the air to prevent a man suspected of being a GAM member from fleeing. The journalists witnessed members of the military hit the man across the face and threaten him with a rifle butt, before detaining him.(13)

News agencies reported that the at least seven alleged members of GAM were shot dead near Lampuuk village, 25 kilometers from Banda Aceh. Several local villagers told journalists that the men were not members of GAM but villagers who had gone to the beach to collect motorbikes from among the wreckage. The men's bodies were allegedly found face up in a rice field, naked except for their underpants.(14)

According to a UK newspaper, police beat and shot dead an unarmed member of GAM who had returned to Banda Aceh after the earthquake/tsunami to see whether his family was still alive.(15)

The Indonesian authorities allege that since the earthquake/tsunami, members of GAM have carried out kidnapping and looting and have interfered with the delivery of aid. To Amnesty International's knowledge, these allegations have not been independently confirmed.

The current situation in NAD provides no justification for human rights abuses. Likewise, it provides no justification for a failure to investigate and bring to justice those responsible for human rights violations. Indeed, in circumstances where the Indonesian military have assumed a central role in the coordination and direct delivery of humanitarian aid, it is particularly important that the civilian population be able to access that aid without threat of violation."

Displaced women still at risk of sexual abuses in the post-tsunami period (March 2005)

- Surviving males far outnumbered surviving females.
- Aceh-based women groups say that many women face sexual threats in the camps.
- Cases of rape or sexual abuses were very difficult to confirm.
- According to Amnesty International, there is a long-established pattern of rape and other crimes of sexual violence against women by the security forces in the villages of the region.
- Media report that 1,000 female Acehese IDPs, who fled to neighboring North Sumatra from Aceh, have been forced to become sex workers.
- Representative of IDP women blamed their fate on the lack of assistance from the government.

Reuters, 26 March 2005

"Women in Indonesia's tsunami-devastated Aceh province who lost their homes when the massive waves hit face dangers of sexual harassment in their temporary shelters, women's groups say.

The Dec. 26 earthquake sent walls of water smashing into Aceh. More than 220,000 were killed or are still missing. According to international aid group Oxfam, surviving males far outnumbered surviving females.

An Oxfam survey released on Saturday even found a village where for every male who died, four females perished.

Aceh-based women groups say the misery of the surviving females continued in the camps for the half a million survivors who have lost their homes.

'Harassments against women usually come about when they have to go to the bathrooms,' said Mia Emsa, the head of the Aceh Gender Transformation Working Group.

Most bathrooms in camps for the displaced are not segregated by sex and many young male survivors like to hang out near those places to kill time.

'In a camp that has bathrooms for women, there are peep holes used by the men,' Emsa, a Muslim woman who wears a headcover, said in a discussion with women activists.

Asked about fears women are vulnerable to more serious sexual abuses in those camps, the activists said they have heard many reports from women ranging from being stripped naked to rape, but confirming them was almost impossible.

'There were cases of rape by men from out of the camps against the female settlers, but when we asked the community elders, they said the men and women performed sexual acts on the basis of mutual consent,' said Wanti Maulidar, head of Women's Solidarity of Aceh."

WB, March 2006, p.67

"The issue of sexual harassment of women villagers during the conflict is a particularly sensitive topic in Aceh. The issue was raised in 3 of the 4 villages visited in Aceh Barat Daya, suggesting that it was a serious issue during the conflict. Respondents in two of the villages claimed that the Indonesian armed forces had raped women from those villages. One of these women was a sister of a GAM combatant. The sensitive nature of these issues was highlighted by questioning of a village official about the incidence. At first reluctant to answer the question, he then stated that he had heard rumors that a rape had occurred but the woman in question had subsequently left the village and so it could not be pursued.

(...)

In another village, villagers claimed that non-organic troops would frequently bring women back to their barracks and that this made the villages uncomfortable.

(...)

Given the difficulties that villagers normally have in discussing these issues openly, it can be assumed that the cases reported represent only a fraction of the actual cases and that sexual harassment was a serious concern for women during the conflict."

AI, 8 December 2004

"Women have been among the thousands who have been unlawfully killed, tortured or arbitrarily detained by the security forces during their 28-year conflict with the armed pro-independence group, the Free Aceh Movement, in the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.

Many women have been made destitute by the years of armed conflict in the province. Thousands of men have been unlawfully killed, have "disappeared" or have fled the region, leaving wives and other women relatives to face severe economic hardship as family breadwinners and heads of households.

There is also a long-established pattern of rape and other crimes of sexual violence against women by the security forces in the villages of the region. During the current military operations, which began in May 2003, such abuses have continued to be reported. In August 2003 soldiers allegedly raped a 12-year-old girl in a village in North Aceh. Local military and civilian authorities reportedly refused to consider a report of the assault made by villagers. Women have been detained, effectively as hostages, in place of male relatives from the Free Aceh Movement who have avoided arrest. According to reports, women have been forced to strip naked for members of the security forces to check their breasts for tattoos said to indicate membership of the group.

During the current military operations, a few allegations of crimes of sexual violence by the military have been investigated. Following prosecutions before military tribunals, the longest sentence handed down so far has been three and a half years for rape. However, a growing body of opinion opposes the use of military courts to try members of the armed forces for offences under international law, because they lack or appear to lack independence and impartiality in such cases. Despite repeated allegations of crimes of violence against women by the security forces during previous military operations, only one case is known to have been investigated, and no one is known to have been brought to justice."

The Jakarta Post, 23 September 2003

"At least 1,000 female Acehnese refugees, who fled to neighboring North Sumatra because of war in their homeland, have been forced to become sex workers but the police are doing nothing about it, activists say.

The women, allegedly being trafficked as prostitutes, are generally aged between 16 and 26, they added.

Ikhwaluddin Simatupang, who leads the Advocacy Forum for Acehese Refugees, said the discovery came about after investigating a number of complaints by parents who reported their daughters had been forced to serve as sex workers. They are part of some 12,000 refugees from the war-torn province of Aceh, who have been languishing in camps across North Sumatra.

"Many of them are trafficked to Riau, while in North Sumatra, the sex workers from Aceh are mostly found operating in cities like Medan, Langkat and Asahan," Ikhwaluddin told The Jakarta Post on Saturday.

He blamed the economic factor as one reason that the Acehese refugees were easily trapped by commercial sex syndicates.

"How could they avert such a trap, while they don't have anything to survive on. Up to now, the government has yet to fulfill its promise of giving the refugees Rp 8,750,000 (US\$1,029) per family in assistance," he said.

Arifany, coordinator of non-governmental organization Pusaka Indonesia, confirmed the trafficking involving Acehese girls."

Civilians in Aceh subject to widespread human right abuses by military and GAM prior to the December 2004 tsunami

- Thousands of civilians, including children and elderly, died Aceh at the hands of the security forces during the DOM period, which ended in 1998.
- From 1999 to 2002, human rights violations were reported to continue with the number of unlawful killings estimated at close to 2,700 by local human rights groups.
- GAM were also responsible of unlawful killings, kidnappings and intimidation of non-Acehese 'transmigrants'.
- AI believes current military operations demonstrate a pattern of grave abuses of human rights that closely match both the pattern and the intensity of the human rights abuses committed during the height of the DOM period.
- Results of the operations include internal displacement, disruption to economic activity, denial of access to humanitarian assistance, and disproportionate restrictions on movement and freedom of expression.
- GAM is reported to have committed human rights abuses against military as well as civilians, including hostage-taking and the unlawful killing of civilians.
- GAM is also reported to recruit children.

AI, 7 October 2004, p. 3

"From the period of the DOM to the latest military campaign, the various military operations pursued against GAM in NAD have in common an almost total disregard for human rights norms and standards. During the first four years alone of DOM it is estimated that 2,000 civilians, including children and the elderly, were unlawfully killed by the Indonesian security forces. By the time the DOM status was lifted in 1998, many hundreds and possibly thousands more civilians had been killed. Several thousand people were arbitrarily arrested during these years on suspicion of supporting GAM. Many of those detained were subjected to extensive periods of incommunicado detention and torture and ill-treatment. Others "disappeared" in police or military custody.

Human rights violations, albeit at times at a reduced level, continued to be reported throughout the period of the peace negotiations and other political initiatives. In 1999, locally-based human rights groups estimated that over 421 people had been unlawfully killed in NAD. By 2001 the figure had more than doubled to 1,014 and in 2002 it increased again to 1,307.(12)

GAM has also committed human rights abuses both during and after the DOM period. According to official Indonesian sources and local media reports, GAM has been responsible for the targeted killing of suspected informers, government officials, civil servants and others with links to the Indonesian administration. It has also taken hostages and is alleged to have been involved in the burning of schools and other public buildings, and in intimidating, harassing and possible unlawful killings of non-Acehnese or "transmigrants."(13)

Data collected by Amnesty International about the human rights situation under the current military operations demonstrates a pattern of grave abuses of human rights that closely match both the pattern and the intensity of the human rights abuses committed during the height of the DOM period. Indeed, many of those interviewed by Amnesty International described the recent military emergency as "DOM 2".

The stated objective of the latest military campaign is to "crush" GAM and restore security to NAD. The methods employed to achieve this, in common with methods employed in previous operations, have frequently been in contravention of international humanitarian and human rights law which forbid the derogation of certain basic rights, including the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment. Such methods include unlawful killings, "disappearances", arbitrary detention, torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. GAM has retaliated with the taking of hostages, unlawful killings and other abuses.

A strategy of civil-military cooperation has been employed in which the civilian population is enlisted to provide support to the military operations. Measures have also been put in place, which have had the effect of controlling the population, restricting access to the province and preventing the gathering and dissemination of information about the human rights situation.

These strategies have resulted in considerable hardship for the population, including internal displacement, disruption to economic activity, denial of access to humanitarian assistance, and disproportionate restrictions on movement and freedom of expression.

Under the civil emergency, which has been in place since May 2004, military operations are continuing as before and civilian casualties are still being reported. Indeed, unlawful killings appear to have been sanctioned by the Head of the Regional Civil Emergency Authority (who is also the Provincial Governor), who stated in June 2004 that "unidentified, suspicious looking people" will be shot on sight.(14) In the meantime, many hundreds of political prisoners, tried in unfair trials and in many cases convicted primarily on the basis of evidence obtained under torture, remain in prison. Arrests of "GAM suspects" are still continuing and those detained are at grave risk of torture and ill-treatment. Moreover, an existing ban on access to NAD by foreigners has been extended, with the result that international humanitarian and human rights agencies are still unable to carry out their work in the province."

Abuses by GAM

AI, 7 October 2004, p. 44

"GAM is reported to have committed human rights abuses against both military and civilian targets both during and prior to the current military operations. Amnesty International condemns unreservedly acts of violence, such as unlawful killings and the taking of hostages, by armed

opposition groups and has repeatedly over the years called upon GAM to uphold and abide by the principals of international humanitarian law.

GAM is believed to have abducted or taken several hundred people hostage over the past year contrary to international humanitarian law. Some 140 people were reported to have been released in May 2004. Among those who have been abducted are individuals suspected of collaborating with the Indonesian security forces; local politicians; civil servants; individuals engaged in government projects, relatives of military or police officers and journalists.

(...)

In addition to the taking of hostages, GAM is also regularly accused by the Indonesian authorities of the unlawful killing of civilians, including of children. The media has also reported cases of unlawful killings by GAM.

(...)

There are many credible accounts that GAM has carried out unlawful killings in the past.(90) However, without access to NAD it is not possible to verify the recent reports.

Children are also reported to have been recruited by GAM. The majority of children involved in GAM are boys, although a number of alleged members of GAM's female unit, Inong Bale, who have been arrested are under the age of 18. According to local NGOs children are involved in a range of tasks including acting as informants, collecting "taxes", participating in arson attacks, providing food and other supplies, cooking and collecting firewood.(91) It is unclear to what extent recruitment is voluntary and there are reports that some children may be forced to join, or are forced to remain in GAM if they joined of their own accord."

National Human Rights Commission reveals gross human rights violations committed by the military in Aceh since May 2003

Jakarta Post, 10 March 2004

"The National Commission on Human Rights' (Komnas HAM) ad hoc team for Aceh has found indications of gross human rights violations in Aceh, most of which were committed by military members.

According to the team's report to the Komnas HAM plenary meeting, a copy of which was made available to The Jakarta Post, indications include accusations of "attacks against unarmed civilians, including victims who were murdered, tortured, sexually abused or raped, or others who the court had not yet proved were rebels."

Other indications were widespread attacks, either committed by the Indonesia Military or the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), in the form of extrajudicial killings, torture, kidnapping, sexual abuse, rape, child abuse, arson and robbery.

"The attacks were systematic. They (the perpetrators) had political or ideological goals and used public and private budgets," the report said. The military operation in Aceh was financed by the state budget.

Komnas HAM's team also found that TNI or police personnel had collected levies from local residents. GAM also collected tax from the local people, which is known as Nanggroe tax.

"The attacks involved high ranking political and military authorities," the report said."

See also:

[Aceh Under Martial Law: Problems Faced by Acehese Refugees in Malaysia, HRW](#), April 2004
["Refugees reveal widespread abuses in Aceh"](#), HRW, 18 December 2003
[Aceh under martial law: Problems faced by Acehese refugees in Malaysia](#), HRW, 4 April 2004
[Aceh: Dirty war uncovered](#), Laksamana.net, 2 October 2003
["100 women have been raped in Aceh"](#), Kompas, 29 August 2003
["Aceh war threatens to tear country apart: right commission"](#), AFP, 4 July 2003
[Aceh under martial law: Human rights under fire](#), HRW, June 2003
[Indonesia: Fear for safety](#), AI, 28 May 2003
[Indonesia: Civilians targeted in Aceh](#), HRW, May 2000

Freedom of movement (Aceh)

Government's plan to relocate 100,000 tsunami-IDPs threatens their freedom of movement (February 2005)

- There have been unconfirmed reports that freedom of movement of IDPs in Aceh was being restricted and people forced to move into semi-permanent barracks.
- Human rights activists denounce this move as a ploy to use the tsunami to gain strategic control of the population.
- Once told to move out from the refugee camps, the names of the displaced are reportedly deleted from the list of food distribution. This gives no choice to the displaced but to obey. Those who refuse are tagged 'GAM sympathizers.'
- International human rights NGOs have denounced the government plans to relocate some 100,000 displaced people, saying it threatens their right to return.

Brookings Institution, 21 March 2005

"Of course it is to be expected that national and local authorities will direct displaced persons to temporary shelters or camps while homes are reconstructed. But it is not in keeping with humanitarian and human rights standards when this is done against their will, without providing other options such as the right to return home, or it is carried out to contain and restrict those suspected of sympathizing with insurgent forces. The Representative of the Secretary-General heard reports that in Aceh, Indonesia, freedom of movement was being restricted, but he was not in a position to confirm or deny these reports and would like to be able to visit Indonesia."

Hong Kong Standard, 20 February 2005

"The message is repeated by others. For people who have lost almost everything, their simple wish is to live in the place they know.

Instead, government and Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) officials are moving the displaced out of refugee camps in their home towns and villages and into semi-permanent 'barracks', part of what human rights activists and others say is a ploy to use the tsunami to gain strategic control over the population in an area long torn by sectarian strife.

'Non-food logistics are under the control of the TNI and they are using it to force people into temporary shelters. The idea behind it is for TNI to control people,' says Wardah Hafidz, coordinator of the Urban Poor Consortium, a Jakarta-based non-government organization active in distributing building materials and other support in Aceh.

'Anyone who refuses to be relocated is then labeled GAM [Free Aceh Movement],' she adds, in reference to the separatist movement which has been at war with TNI for almost three decades.

Once people are told to move into a barracks, she says, their name is deleted from lists at the refugee camps and their daily allocation of food there stops. Clearly, if food is contingent upon moving to a barracks, any notion of choice is irrevocably tarnished.

This schism over where Aceh's distressed survivors must go is the biggest issue facing planners, aid workers and the government.

It is closely related to the other large post-tsunami controversy over whether survivors will be allowed to rebuild their homes on the sea shore. Government planners speak of a 500-metre or even two-kilometer exclusion zone along the coast, presumably to protect people in the event of another tsunami.

But for families who make a living from the sea and have no other asset but the site of their former homes, the exclusion zone seems another ploy to rob them.

(...)

The word that springs to mind is hamletting - the classic counter insurgency technique developed with deadly effect by British forces battling a communist insurgency in 1950s Malaya, and later used by the United States army during the Vietnam War.

The system is simple. When guerrillas of any kind draw sustenance from the local population - the people are like water and the revolutionary army like fish, as Mao Zedong said - the military drains that sea to deprive the guerrillas of support. How to do this? Move the local population into controlled structures called hamlets or barracks or temporary housing.

The Indonesian government insists that any move into temporary housing is voluntary and that international standards of hygiene and comfort have been assured. If located properly and done with local community support, as in Nusa, the idea can work.

But this is an area riven by conflict and, until the tsunami, ruled by the military for almost two years. At the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) referral hospital near Banda Aceh's sports stadium, the 200 or so daily outpatients must sometimes get through military checkpoints in order to get medical care. The hospital is there by permission of the ministry of health, but soon after it was set up a military camp appeared in front, as if to assert who was really in charge. The ICRC has been in negotiations ever since in an effort to keep the aid clean of military influence.

In such an environment, the voluntary nature of a move into temporary housing is dubious, and that's why the international aid community says it will have nothing to do with the process. Some, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council and Catholic Relief Services, are focusing on delivering wood, nails, hammers and other tools directly to refugees so they can rebuild and reoccupy their homes without using intermediary housing."

HRW, 7 February 2005

"The Indonesian government's plan in Aceh to register and relocate more than 100,000 people displaced by the tsunami to semi-permanent camps threatens their right to return home, Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First said today. The Indonesian government needs to ensure that any relocation program in the province fully respects the rights of the displaced people.

The Indonesian government announced that as early as February 15 it could begin to move up to a quarter of the 400,000 people displaced by the tsunami in Aceh into semi-permanent, barracks-style shelters.

Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First expressed concern that the new camps could be misused by the military as a way of controlling the population for military purposes unless human

rights safeguards are put in place. During years of the brutal armed conflict in the northwestern Sumatra province, the Indonesian military has a record of housing Acehnese displaced by the conflict in secure camps where at times their freedom of movement has been unnecessarily restricted and where serious human rights violations have taken place.

Given the military's poor human rights record in Aceh, its prominent role in the transport of thousands of Acehnese from spontaneous camps to the barracks sites, involvement in camp management, and aid distribution within barracks would invariably create fears among the displaced population. This could prevent displaced persons from making a free and informed choice on relocation, including the option of returning to their place of origin. The participation of the police paramilitary brigade (Brimob) would raise similar fears due to its history of abuses in Aceh."

Checkpoints hamper movements of civilians out of Aceh (July 2005)

- Check-points established by the military to monitor the border between Aceh and North Sumatra are creating difficulties for people wishing to flee the conflict-affected province

RSC, July 2005, pp.10-11

"Finally, the restrictions imposed upon the freedom of movement under martial law were further violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. According to the Guiding Principles, internally displaced persons have "the right to seek safety in another part of the country [and...] to leave their country" (Principle 15). As noted in numerous accounts, however, the practices associated with checkpoints, roadblocks and so-called 'sweeping' operations by the Indonesian military and para-military police under martial law posed severe threats to such rights. The "layers of checkpoints" along the internal border between Aceh and North Sumatra, for example, required "those seeking refuge in the neighboring province... to submit travel documents and their identity cards."

Eva-Lotta Hedman, January 2004

"Elsewhere in Indonesia, Acehnese have also found themselves the target of new forms of government surveillance and control. For example, the Indonesian military has established checkpoints to monitor the internal border between Aceh and North Sumatra. Such checkpoints, where travel documents and the new national identity card are required for inspection, create considerable difficulties for those seeking to leave war-torn Aceh for North Sumatra. There are also reports of a wider climate of fear and intimidation for the many thousands of Acehnese currently living in North Sumatra as IDPs. The Indonesian security forces have reportedly been keen to monitor Acehnese communities in many parts of the country, and the police have been particularly active in conducting regular 'sweep operations' in the capital city of Jakarta."

HRW, September 2003

"Reports that the border between North Sumatra province and Aceh is sealed suggest that new IDPs have not been able to seek refuge in North Sumatra since the military campaign began."

ICVA, 5 September 2003

"Movements to flee conflict have also been inhibited. Several layers of checkpoints have been established on the internal border between Aceh and North Sumatra where those seeking refuge in the neighbouring province are required to submit travel documents and their identity cards."

Physical security (West & Central Kalimantan)

Trafficking in human beings identified as a serious problem in West Kalimantan (August 2004)

- While INGOs see the trafficking of Indonesians to Malaysia, Singapore or Hong Kong as a serious problem, the IDP themselves see this as an opportunity for additional income for men and women.
- ICMC says that holding centres in West Kalimantan are places of exploitation and abuse of migrant workers.

SIDA 7 August 2004, p. 18

"In West Kalimantan trafficking in human beings is a problem according to the INGOs working in the area (ICMC, IOM and SC-UK), mostly to Malaysia but also to other areas of Indonesia and to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Saudi Arabia. It was, however, not mentioned as a problem by the IDPs who saw it as a possibility for additional income for men and women, married and unmarried and as new opportunities for the youth. This highlights the need for the inclusion of the notion of deception in the definition of trafficking, promoted by agencies such as the ICMC.

According to an ICMC publication holding centres in West Kalimantan have been cited as places for exploitation and abuse of migrant workers, including restrictions on freedom of movement; accumulation of debt resulting in debt bondage; sexual harassment, abuse and exploitation and violence. In addition the district of Singkawang, West Kalimantan, is well known for the practice of "mail-order brides".

ICMC 2003, pp. 187-188

" In recent years, large numbers of internally displaced persons, primarily ethnic Madurese, have been sheltered in Pontianak, West Kalimantan. Many of these people were displaced when conflict broke out between the ethnic Dayaks in West Kalimantan and the ethnic Madurese who lived in West Kalimantan (originally coming to the province as transmigrants under the Indonesian government policy). Unfortunately, at this time, there have been no studies or research done to determine the vulnerability of these internally displaced persons to trafficking. Anecdotal evidence indicates, however, that many of these persons have been approached by agents, including ethnic Madurese agents, to migrate to Malaysia and Brunei for work. Some of the girls targeted may have ended up in sex work."

Physical security (Papua)

Indonesian military and police accused of rape of IDP woman and physical abuse against students (June 2006)

- Church groups report that students arrested during a demonstration in Jayapura in March 2006 were tortured by the police.
- During 2005, an IDP women trying to return to her village in Monia was reportedly raped by the police

News.com.au, 26 June 2006

"The Peace and Justice Secretariat of the Catholic diocese in West Papua's provincial capital, Jayapura, alleges cases of physical and mental abuse, and intimidation of prisoners.

The claims coincided with the Batam summit between Prime Minister John Howard and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, called over Australia's policy towards West Papua asylum seekers.

The 23 were arrested after the March 16 and 17 student demonstrations outside Jayapura's Cendrawasih University.

The protesters had demanded the closure of the giant US-run Freeport copper mine because of environmental damage and the lack of benefits going to local Papuans.

Four policemen, an air force soldier and a civilian were killed in the riots, prompting hundreds of students to flee their homes and dormitories in fear of reprisals by security forces.

The Peace and Justice Secretariat said its staff and representatives from other church groups interviewed three of the 23 detainees at the regional police cells in Jayapura.

The prisoners said wounds on their faces were sustained during days of police interrogation and they were being kept in crowded cells, the report notes.

One prisoner said they had been tortured for information during the first few weeks and a senior police officer had threatened to shoot him and had aimed a gun at his mouth."

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, August 2005, pp. 19-20

The human rights situation has continued to deteriorate over the last two years. Particularly destructive have been the series of military operations which began in the Kiyawage area in 2003, then in the Puncak Jaya region in 2004/05 and since January 2005 in the Tolikara regency. According to the results of an investigation released by the Baptist Church of Papua in May 2005, military operations such as these have been cynically engineered by the TNI.

Apart from the operations making large numbers of people homeless and leading to scores of deaths, the impacts have been exacerbated by poor delivery of aid to the refugee communities.

(...)

On 7 October, a militia group under the TNI/Kopassus, the Wonda Marunggen group, with Anton Tabuni, shot and killed a primary teacher named Kius Wenda. On 13 October an unknown group shot six civilians. It is still unclear whether the information about the dead bodies is correct or not, because no family has yet said they've had a relative killed. Subsequently six school buildings were burnt down by Kopassus. These were the schools at Wonaluk, Yarumungun, Dondo, Yamo, Pagarugom, and Ambitmbit.

In addition, 371 homes of indigenous inhabitants have been burnt down by Kopassus. The number of refugees still taking refuge in the jungle as at end of 2004 was 6393. To compound the hardship of the Lani tribes who were made refugees by this operation, all the pigs owned by the community, valued as a form of currency when traded and an important food and source of protein, were loaded onto trucks and sold by Indonesian soldiers. The chickens were shot by the soldiers, the fences and gardens were smashed and burnt.

In Monia, soldiers have occupied a church building of the Indonesian Gospel Church as a post or living quarters for Indonesian soldiers carrying out the Puncak Jaya operation. A woman who wanted to return to her village was stripped and raped so returned to the refugee camp, a case reported by Baptist church officials."

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS

General subsistence needs of IDPs throughout Indonesia

Needs of IDPs in Indonesia vary according to the different stages of displacement (August 2004)

- SIDA evaluation identifies the current needs of IDPs into 4 categories: emergency needs; socio-economic livelihoods, exposure to the rule of law in line with national codes; and assistance to vulnerable groups (women, children, elderly).
- Needs vary according to the different stages of displacement, e.g. IDPs are still away from their areas of origin, or ex-IDPs who have returned to their areas, not all of whom may have been able to reintegrate their own homes.
- The different categories of IDPs have a common problem: hostility from local groups or security sector agencies.

SIDA 7 August 2004, pp. 81-82

" The current needs of IDPs in Indonesia can be grouped into the following categories:

1. Emergency needs, more specifically those relating to minimal conditions for survival and continued health and psychological balance.
2. Socio-economic livelihoods, and higher than normal rates of infant mortality, illiteracy, life expectancy.
3. Exposure to the Rule of Law in line with national codes, and all bodies of human rights law and International Humanitarian Law, with particular reference to discrimination, and access to justice. This is due to the erosion of an environment of stability and security.
4. Assistance to particularly vulnerable groups, such as children, women, the elderly.

Different categories of IDPs

Each form of displacement is related to the local situation, presenting a myriad of contrasting scenarios. This evaluation will not attempt to present these scenarios, but the main factors generally include the following:

Widespread fear of communal violence at a given point in time in a location, often caused by agents provocateurs, spreading rapidly by word of mouth and through displacement.

Possibility for long standing grievances to become expressed in the will to reverse previous policies of transmigration

Insurgency and counter-insurgency operations hinging on the control of the population and the popular economy.

Displacement caused by issues of access to natural resources and the communal ownership of land

This evaluation has consequently taken a comprehensive view of well being and survival needs, based on the perspective of those concerned. This has led to a finely graded vision, based on different categories of stages of displacement: IDPs are still away from their areas of origin (for example North Sulawesi for many from North Maluku), or ex-IDPs who have returned to their areas, not all of whom may have been able to reintegrate their own homes.

IDPs who are still in displacement face problems of access to key social and economic services which would give them a secure and sustainable livelihood, in addition to needs concerning compensation for productive resources and other property lost during the conflict. For short periods of time some may also face acute survival needs, such as food, medical assistance, or elementary shelter. At the same time some may have resettled into the new host society, and may have become indistinguishable from the local population.

The different categories of IDPs have however a common problem: hostility from local groups or security sector agencies. These have either caused or been complicit in the displacement. In all cases seen by the evaluation hostile groups have remained in the area of origin, and may even be present in a way in the havens chosen by the IDPs. IDPs often also have to face the jealousy of neighbours, caused by being targeted as IDPs and by receiving assistance to social and economic recovery after displacement."

Poverty rates decline the longer the period of displacement but health situation worsens (August 2004)

- Needs of IDPs differ from needs of very poor.
- Average percentage of IDP households below their district-level poverty line is 55% with almost all districts having at least 30% of IDP households below the district-level poverty line. The overall average district-level poverty in Indonesia is 19%
- Yet, IDPs show greater resilience. Poverty rates of IDP households decline significantly the longer the period of displacement.
- This trend is similar for unemployment rates that decline about 20% over time, from 64% for short duration of displacement to 51% for long.

SIDA 7 August 2004, pp. 75-76

"The needs of the IDPs resemble but do not coincide with those of the very poor. The WFP Livelihoods Survey of June 2002 notes in 45 of 50 districts (90%), daily per capita caloric intake from staples is 50% or more of the daily minimum recommended level of 2,100 Kcal. Sixty percent of all districts (30 of 50) consume between 50% and 70%. In four districts, however, average daily consumption from staples is less than 50% of the recommended daily intake.

The average percentage of IDP households below their district-level poverty line is 55%, and almost all districts have at least 30% of IDP households below the district-level poverty line. This compares unfavorably to the overall average of district-level poverty in Indonesia, according to BPS, of 19%.⁴² Only two districts, Kupang Urban and Manggarai, have poverty levels below 20%. A total of 31 out of the 50 districts (62%) have poverty levels of 50% or higher.

Yet the IDPs show greater resilience. Poverty rates of IDP households decline significantly the longer the period of displacement. For those households displaced for a short time period (nine months or less), 74% are under the district poverty level. This rate drops to 56% and 52%, respectively, for medium (10-18 months); and long periods of displacement (greater than 18 months). This trend is similar for unemployment rates that decline about 20% over time, from 64% for short duration of displacement to 51% for long. Likewise, income increases significantly

the longer households are displaced. The average per capita income for households displaced for nine months or less is 57,000 IDR. Medium term households have almost double this income (104,000 Rp) while those households displaced longer than 18 months have the highest per capita income at 112,000 Rp per month. There is a significant trend in income whereby each month of displacement accounts for an increase in per capita income of 2,127 IDR.

Six indicators from the Human Development Index (HDI) are compared by the WFP team with corresponding indicators from the IDP survey. Results show that IDP households are better off in terms of access to safe water, but fair poorly compared to the general population with respect to access to health services, general health, and school dropout rates. The results for access to sanitation are mixed. The indicators compiled tend to show that the health situation worsens the longer the displacement lasts.

The WFP survey also included proxy indicators of emotional trauma and feelings of insecurity in the IDP site. These were remarkably low, except for some districts in the province of Aceh, Pontianak Urban, and Maluku Utara, which are areas this evaluation has particularly concentrated on."

MALUKU (general)

IDPs in the Maluku express their frustration and ask for more assistance (January 2005)

- In early January 2005, IDPs from Buru went to Ambon to complain about the lack of assistance they have received to return to their place or origin.
- Some 4,500 IDPs from Buru continue to live in Ambon five years after being displaced.
- On the Indonesian national independence day, on 17 August 2004, IDPs in Ambon made a statement criticizing corruption in the disbursement of government IDP assistance

CCDA 13 January 2005

"On January 10, several hundreds of refugees from the large island of Buru went up to the governor's office in Ambon to vent their anger and frustration with the inertness of the government in returning them to the town of Namlea and other places on the island of Buru, which they fled from five years ago.

Since then about 4.500 of them have lived as refugees in Ambon. There was lack of discipline among the demonstrators. Vice governor Mohammad Abdullah Latuconsina promised the mass that he would see to it that their very reasonable request should be responded to as soon as possible. However – he said – the refugees' data were still ambiguous. Other complaints had to do with the inattention of the government to the refugees' needs, such as funds to return and the financial support for rebuilding their houses as they are entitled to receive."

JRS, 18 August 2004

"Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Moluccas express their frustration with the government's inability to facilitate durable solutions. In a statement circulated on August 17, the Indonesian Independence Day, the Masariku Network in Ambon on behalf of IDPs criticizes corruption in the disbursement of government humanitarian assistance. The statement plays with the wording of the original declaration of independence from Dutch colonial rule made by the first President and Vice President of the Indonesian republic, Sukarno and Hatta in 1945. In contrast to the original declaration, the IDP declaration twists words and states that independence has

been taken away from the Internally Displaced population and victims of conflict in the Moluccas, by inadequate government response to their needs.

The original statement of 1945 holds great value in the nation building of Indonesia, and represents a proud moment in Indonesian history, where the Indonesian people rose up against Dutch colonial rule. With this historical background the declaration of the IDPs becomes an important reminder that IDPs are to be treated in accordance with their rights as Indonesian citizens.

The statement from the Masariku Network on behalf of the IDPs reads in full:

Proclamation of the IDPs in the Moluccas

We, the IDPs of the Moluccas, declare herewith that our independence has been taken away from us.

Matters regarding our rights to material assistance to build houses and financial assistance to return home have already been arranged in a manner of accurate corruption within short time.

Moluccas, 17 Augustus 2004

*In the name of IDPs and
victims of conflict in the Moluccas*

Masariku Network Ambon

(Unofficial translation by JRS Indonesia)"

Needs identified by an OCHA/Bakornas mission to Ambon Island and recommendations (April 2003)

- Data collection efforts should be strengthened to obtain reliable IDP figures.
- Complementary assistance should be provided in terms of housing assistance, water & sanitation and income generating activities.
- Need for the facilitation of dialogue between IDP communities and the Governmental Units.
- Need for psychological support for the IDPs.

Bakornas & OCHA April 2003, pp. 3-4

"Strengthening of data collection efforts: It seems that sometimes the number of IDPs provided by the Provincial Government does not match with the number provided by the IDP coordinators in camps/sites. More coordinated efforts in obtaining and verifying the number of IDPs seems necessary.

Complementary assistance to the Government's housing assistance. Often cases, the relocation sites do not have sufficient water/sanitation facilities. Though IDPs have been provided with houses, they tend to go back to IDP camps/sites. Further support in providing basic facilities and assistance for re-establishing their livelihood at return/resettlement sites is essential to make return and resettlement/relocation sustainable. The Government stressed the importance of income generation activities for returnees and resettled families.

Flexible Government's assistance to IDPs who manage to get other financial support to re-establish their lives at relocation sites: 164 families from Buru Island and Ambon city living in

Halong Inn received financial support from a Dutch Christian organization and managed to secure land and start building houses. In this case, the Government's complementary support for water/sanitation facilities and roads/infrastructure would be ideal, as they did not receive housing assistance from the Government.

Prioritisation of sites when building houses: It is understood that the current priority is to build houses in Waai village to allow IDPs to return there as they received eviction order after the security incident at the IDP site in Nimba Raya Paso. However, there are some IDPs living in unacceptably congested sites that need to be relocated as soon as possible.

Facilitation of dialogue between IDP communities and the Governmental Units, especially POSKO and streamlining of information flow. Socialisation of options and entitlements is essential. Some IDPs complain that they filled checklists/forms for the Government many times, but received no response.

Provision of psychosocial support for IDPs: This was identified by the Government.

Recruitment of a Humanitarian Affairs Officer to provide technical assistance to the Maluku Provincial Government and to strengthen the existing capacity to respond to the needs of IDPs in finding durable solutions. The proposal was welcomed by Dr. Umarella."

Food

Media report malnutrition in camps in Ambon (July 2005)

- During the summer of 2005, media reported cases of malnutrition in IDP camps in Ambon.

Jakarta Post, 30 July 2005

"Hundreds of displaced persons living in shelters across Ambon are suffering from malnutrition, a health official says.

Ambon City Health Office head Hans Lisaay said Thursday information from community health centers in the city found most malnutrition cases were found near refugee shelters, especially those in Waihaong Park and Batumerah.

'From our survey two weeks ago, we found some 503 malnourished people, with 200 of them suffering from severe malnutrition,' Hans said.

The Ambon municipal administration, he said, had allocated Rp 27 million (US\$2,842) to provide additional food and milk for the people but the amount would not be enough. Those suffering from severe malnutrition needed to be provided with milk for at least three months, while he estimated the funds would only last for around a month.

'But we'll do our best while waiting for assistance from other caring individuals or groups,' Hans said. "

AsiaNews, 27 June 2005

"Health conditions are deteriorating in camps for displaced people in Ambon in the Indonesian archipelago of the Moluccas. Cases of child malnutrition and malaria are on the rise and parents

hide their children out of shame, depriving them of essential medical care. Both local media and the Crisis Centre of Amboina diocese have denounced this.

While the demolition of temporary settlements is under way to make room for new houses financed by the government, 25 out of 159 children in Waihaong camp are malnourished. The number could be even higher because, as Wendy Pattisahusiwa, head of the medical centre of Waihaong community explains, when "doctors turn up, many parents close the door in their face". Pattisahusiwa is promoting random, door-to-door checks to assess the health situation in camps in the area. To keep on giving assistance to those in need, she has also launched an awareness campaign about the importance of proper nutrition for children.

Malnutrition is aggravating an outbreak of a malaria epidemic in the village of Wawasa in the island of Gorong – east Ceram. Thirty-five deaths out of 800 cases of infection have been reported. The dreadful sanitary conditions of the displaced people, who often do even have clean water available, complete the gloomy picture."

Jakarta Post, 22 June 2005

"The life of refugees in several camps in Ambon city here is deteriorating. Bad sanitation has affected the health of the refugees, especially the children. Meanwhile, malnutrition is also commonplace in the camps as the refugees cannot afford to buy nutritious food for their children.

One among those refugee camps is a refugee camp in the complex of Ambon's People's Amusement Park in Waihaong subdistrict, Ambon city. The refugee camps houses 159 infants, 25 of whom are suffering from malnutrition. It is very apparent that they are suffering from malnutrition as their weight is far below normal.

(...)

The refugee camp currently accommodates 575 families. A small cabin that is two-and-a-half meters square houses a family of between four to seven people. The cabin functions as a living room, dining room and bedroom.

Most of the families in the refugee camp share the same problems as Harun. On top of the malnutrition problem, the camp also faces the problem of clogged drains, leading to the spread of skin related diseases, diarrhea and respiratory diseases.

(...)

Chief of Waihaong Community Health Center, Wendy Pattisahusiwa, said that malnutrition was prevalent in the refugee camp due to parents' lack of awareness of child health."

Health

Health care system in the Maluku devastated by two years of conflict (2005)

- Destruction of health facilities has caused the proportion of self-medicated people to rise from 55% in 1999 to 83% in 2002
- Conflict in Maluku province in 1999 and 2000 greatly impacted on the health care system of the province resulting in sharp reduction in staff, disruption in the supply chain of medical commodities and inability to travel
- Decline in health, education and sanitation standards has longterm implications for children, in terms of growth stunting, opportunities for future employment, and untreated chronic health problems.

- Conflict has restricted transport and humanitarian access.

UNDP, 2005, pp. 40-41

"In addition to fatalities and casualties caused by the fighting in Maluku and North Maluku, conflict has impacted the health of the public. The destruction of health facilities and clinics has decreased access to medicines and doctors with the proportion of the population who self-medicate when ill rising from 55 percent in Maluku in 1999 to a staggering 83 percent and 78 percent in Maluku and North Maluku respectively in 2002 (Table 6). Before the outbreak of the conflicts and the separation of Maluku and North Maluku, infant mortality in the combined province stood at 40 deaths per 1,000 births; by 2002 this figure had risen to 47 and 56 deaths per 1,000 births in Maluku and North Maluku respectively. Less than one third of births in North Maluku is assisted by medical personnel. According to OCHA, "the capacity of the Health Department [in Maluku] to implement basic primary health services was greatly reduced due to a reduction in staff caused by displacement, and a disruption in the Department's supply chain of pharmaceuticals and medical commodities".

OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 88

"The conflict in Ambon during 1999 and 2000 devastated the health care system throughout Maluku Province. The capacity of the Health Department to implement basic primary health services was greatly reduced due to a reduction in staff caused by displacement, and a disruption in the Department's supply chain of pharmaceuticals and medical commodities. Staff movement, displacement, and the inability to travel due to unstable security also hampered the management structure of health services."

OCHA 14 February 2003, p. 16

"Since the conflict erupted there has been a serious decline in health care and educational access and standards. Low levels of potable water and sanitation in many areas, reduced staff and disruptions to supply chains for medical supplies and school equipment add to health risks and have lowered educational outcomes for the Province and IDP influx areas. The decline in these standards has longterm implications for children, in terms of growth stunting, opportunities for future employment, and untreated chronic health problems.

The conflict has restricted transport and humanitarian access. Durable solutions will need to address improving access and logistic systems particularly to remote areas. Other priorities are the re-building of local health and education capacities, replacing food relief with livelihood support, shifting the emphasis to locally-determined and managed solutions and supporting re-bridging initiatives between the divided communities. Infrastructure replacement is key to supporting returns, ensuring livelihood support and returning the province to some degree of normality."

Shelter and non-food items

Corruption and mismanagement result in unfulfilled housing assistance (2006)

- In early 2006, Muslim and Christian IDPs demonstrated in Ambon, demanding adequate assistance to build their houses. Many were still living in temporary barracks almost seven years after being displaced.

- During June 2005 and January 2006, media also reported on IDPs returning to their homes in West Ceram island only to find that houses pledged by the government had not been built. Other returning IDPs complained that they did not received the promised assistance.

Jakarta Post, 21 January 2006

"About 200 displaced Muslims and Christians rallied in front of the Maluku Legislative Council in Ambon on Friday, demanding the authorities build them adequate houses.

They accused regional and central governments of neglecting their welfare after religious violence forced them to flee Ambon in Jan. 19, 1999.

Pieter Pattiwailapia, head of the Coalition of Maluku Displaced People, said many of his group were still camped at temporary barracks in terrible conditions, six years after losing their belongings, homes and family members to the conflict that saw more than 1,000 people killed.

After being scarred or even permanently disabled by the violence, the survivors had lost further dignity by having to live for years in inadequate dwellings, Pieter said.

Because they had not received government help for so long, their plight should be registered with the Indonesian Records Museum, he said.

Pieter believed the neglect was cause by government ignorance and officials' unwillingness to deal with the problem properly.

"No adequate public facilities have been provided by the government, like schools or even the reconstruction of the displaced people's houses," he said.

While many of the displaced people wanted to return to their villages, they could not go home to nothing.

"How can the government be so unprepared?"

This central and regional government neglect had created a new kind of poor, Pieter said."

AsiaNews, 16 January 2006

"Maluku refugees returning to their home villages are finding that the housing pledged by the government has not yet been built. To compound matter, local doctors are on strike. Both problems are symptomatic of a wider problem, that of graft and corruption. In fact according to the Transparency International 2005 report, Indonesia is among the top 20 most corrupt countries in the world.

(...)

One first example is that of more than a thousand people who were internally-displaced as a result of sectarian strife between Christians and Muslims. They have made it back to Lamaha and Haturapa, their home villages on West Ceram Island, only to find that there are no homes for them. They say local authorities had promised new housing but now refuse on the grounds that the responsibility belongs to the province.

Currently, returnees have had to shelter in the former marketplace in poor hygienic conditions and lack enough food. Most of them had fled as a result of the inter-religious clashes that affected the area between 1999 and 2001. Some 5,000 people died in that period and another five million were forced to leave their homes. Since then billions of rupiahs have poured into the region but

have not benefited them. Even those who did get some money did not get as much as promised. Even funds earmarked for local health facilities have turned up missing.

Staff at the Chasasn Bosoiri Hospital in Ternate (North Maluku) has gone on strike to demand the back payment of wages for the last four months. But each time employees have asked for their money, management laconically replied: "We don't have enough money to pay wages . . ."

For the Amboina Diocese Crisis Centre, such examples are but the tip of an iceberg, adding that even 'the mass media are hard pressed to report all the cases of graft and corruption since they are so widespread'.

AsiaNews, 16 June 2005

"The refugees displaced by sectarian strife between Christians and Muslims are going home to the Maluku Islands, but without receiving the compensation promised by the government. What is more, they are moving into poorly built houses.

The Crisis Centre of the diocese of Ambon announced that after four years on the Kei Islands, some 1,500 Christian refugees have returned to Kasui, an island to the south-east of Ceram Island. They are to be immediately followed by another 500 who had found refuge in Ambon City. Recently, 436 families (1,859 people) started to return to the village of Kariu, on island of Haruku (east of Ambon Island).

The refugees were welcomed by Muslim residents but complain that the government has failed to compensate them for their losses and has been unable to build proper housing after their own homes were damaged as a result of sectarian clashes.

The strife, which lasted from 1999 till 2001, caused the death of 5,000 people and 500,000 refugees.

Some 108 families lodged a protest for the government's failure to allocate funds for housing reconstruction; additional hundreds of families have objected to the new housing units because they lacked windows, kitchens and bathrooms.

Governor Karel Albert Ralahalu, who accompanied the refugees on their way home, said he would take the necessary measures against the contractors that built the houses; he also said he would find out the real number of refugees.

Both problems are related to Indonesia's endemic corruption.

Some have even suggested that the May 16 terrorist attack in the village of Loki (Semar Island) was carried out to turn public opinion away from scandals related to reconstruction in the archipelago.

Refugees themselves have also added to corruption problem. Their total number remains unknown. With the aid of complacent local officials, many of them have registered their names several times at different places in order to receive more compensation."

Thousands of IDP families in Central Maluku still wait on government's assistance (July 2004)

- According to the Central Maluku's Social Welfare Office, there are some 12,494 families scattered over 19 districts who still live in difficult conditions having not received aid for resettlement or compensation for homes destroyed.
- Most of the displaced were concentrated in the Teo, Nila, Serua, Amahai (TNS) and Masohi districts.

Jakarta Post, 19 July 2004

"Refugees from the Maluku conflict are still living precariously despite hundreds of billions of rupiah allotted by the central government to alleviate the problem.

In 2003, the government reportedly provided funds of Rp 176 billion (US\$20 million) in addition to Rp 30 billion given in an earlier addition to the budget. This money does not include assistance from non-governmental organizations, donors and foreign aid.

Despite the money, data from Central Maluku's Social Welfare Office reveals there are 12,494 refugee families still in deprived circumstances scattered through 19 districts.

Many of these families say they have still not received any aid for resettlement or compensation for homes destroyed in the conflict.

(...)

Lesane subdistrict head Wahda S. said refugees living in her area would only be assisted if they were listed by the subdistrict and the social welfare office.

She said 62 refugee families in Lesane had received the BBR aid in early 2003, while there were still 399 families or 2,013 people on the waiting list. "The BBR aid will be provided in two stages. Only 62 families have so far been aided in the first stage," said Wahda. She did not say whether the Jamudin family was on the list.

The remaining refugees must report to the subdistrict office with their refugee status documents and land certificates to obtain the second stage of the BBR aid, she said.

Central Maluku Social and Welfare Office head Albert Wattimena said refugees in the Masohi regency numbered 12,494 families spread over 19 districts. Most of them were concentrated in the Teo, Nila, Serua, Amahai (TNS) and Masohi districts.

The office had provided 3,325 families with BBR aid in 2003, Albert said, but it had yet to determine when the families would get their BBR aid this year.

More than 1,000 families in Central Maluku were allocated BBR aid in 2004, which would be distributed to refugees in four districts -- Tehoru, Amahai, TNS and Masohi, he said."

5,460 IDP families in Ambon told to vacate the public and government buildings by July 2004 (April 2004)

- 5,460 IDP families who have been occupying public buildings and facilities in Ambon since 1999 have until July 2004 to leave.
- Lack of funds and of shelters is reportedly preventing the return of the remaining IDPs in Ambon.

The Jakarta Post, 22 April 2004

"The 5,460 families of refugees on the island of Ambon have been given until July 2004 to vacate the public and government facilities they have been camping in since 1999. "The refugees must leave these compounds in the next two months at the latest", Deputy Governor M. Abdullah Latuconsina said in Ambon on April 21 after visiting some camps. The refugees are staying at shop compounds in Batumerah, the athletes' dormitory in Karangpanjang, the Waihaong People's Entertainment Park and several government buildings. They are part of the 36,000 refugee families who are still in camps throughout the province, mainly due to lack of funds for transportation and rebuilding their homes." (CCDA 23 April 2004)

"At least 5,460 families of refugees who fled sectarian fighting in the Maluku islands have been given until July to vacate shops and government facilities they have been camping in since 1999.

'The refugees must leave these camps in the next two months at the latest,' Deputy Maluku Governor M. Abdullah Latuconsina said in Ambon on Wednesday after visiting the camps.

The refugees are staying at shop houses in Batumerah, the athlete dormitory in Karangpanjang, the Waihaong People's Entertainment Park and several government buildings. They were among some 36,828 families who fled the religious fighting and are now in camps throughout the province.

Latuconsina said the July deadline was only effective for 5,469 families of refugees in downtown Ambon, who were staying in public facilities. He said his administration could not set a deadline for other refugees to leave their camps because of a lack of funds to build them houses.

The Maluku government has allocated Rp 400 billion (US\$45.6 million) to send home all the refugees but the money was only enough to build some 10,000 houses for them, Latuconsina said.

'We need more funds from the central government to build many more houses,' he said.

Refugees that still had houses were being offered Rp 10 million a family to return to their villages in order to resolve this problem."

NORTH MALUKU (general)

Situation in North Maluku has shifted from a humanitarian phase to a post-conflict recovery phase (December 2005)

- Local economies remain depressed, resulting in continued scarcity and high levels of unemployment.
- The provision of basic social services such as health, education, and water and sanitation, has been uneven across the province.
- Situation in North Maluku has shifted from a humanitarian phase to a post-conflict recovery phase.
- Emergency humanitarian operations were substantially reduced in 2001 and almost completely stopped in 2002 by both Government and international organisations.
- Aid workers have identified vulnerable groups in inadequate shelters and with poor health services that are seriously at risk of malnutrition, disease and lack of schooling

- UN mission to North Sulawesi in June 2004 concluded that most IDP no longer wanted to return to North Maluku.
- Also the mission stated that these IDPs had received more support than IDPs in other areas of the country.

According to the international NGO CARDI, assistance needs not only exist for the estimated 15,500 people still displaced in North Maluku province as of end-2005, but also for those who have returned home or have resettled in relocation sites in the past years. Both groups remain faced with housing needs, lack of access to water & sanitation, education and health care. Few economic opportunities exist for the displaced who are in need of income-generating and capacity-building programmes.

The needs in the province are of the following types:

- Assistance needs while in transit (shelter, food, clean water, sanitation, emergency education and health care)
- Assistance needs in the return and relocation sites (physical security, food, shelter, sanitation, medical care, education and income generation)
- Assistance for community development (livelihood, capacity building, good governance and property rights)

OCHA 9 April 2004, pp. 20-21

"Despite these notable positive developments, the situation remains fragile and specific vulnerabilities continue to exist. There has been some continuing tension, including angry demonstrations by IDPs in North Maluku, concerning the overall management of the return process and, in particular, the management of government assistance packages. The conflict has severely affected livelihoods of communities through displacement, damage to market areas, and loss of tools and supplies. Local economies remain depressed, resulting in continued scarcity and high levels of unemployment. The provision of basic social services such as health, education, and water and sanitation, has been uneven across the province. In remote areas, especially in the south, most services are not functioning, mainly due to lack of human and financial resources, equipment, and damaged or inadequate facilities.

While assistance to meet short-term needs should continue for some time, the situation in North Maluku has reached a stage where more emphasis is placed on efforts to enhance economic recovery, engage in longer-term capacity building and develop peace building strategies. Support for income generation, livelihood and economic activities is essential for ensuring longer-term sustainable development and preventing the re-emergence of conflict in the future. Such programmes should include support to peace building through education and the media, as well as access to justice and law enforcement. It is also important that protection needs and human rights of IDPs be met at all stages, including after their IDP status was removed at the end of 2003 as per the government policy on IDPs. Increased cooperation on the return of IDPs between the governments of North Sulawesi and North Maluku, agreement between IDPs and recipient communities, the development of linkages, and positive relationships between communities remain crucial for sustainable recovery and minimising the risk of conflict."

UNOCHA, 14 February 2003, p. 19

"Most services are not yet fully functional and the pre-conflict economy is yet to recover. The results of unsanitary crowding, lack of services and inadequate food production will leave long-term community problems such as low education levels, loss of productive assets of the most vulnerable, and chronic health problems including untreated mental health conditions. In general,

however, the situation in North Maluku has shifted from a humanitarian phase to a post-conflict recovery phase. Emergency humanitarian operations were substantially reduced in 2001 and almost completely stopped in 2002 by both Government and international organisations. The Government stood by its position last year not to provide any further assistance to IDPs so as to encourage returns.

Subsequently, aid workers have identified vulnerable groups in inadequate shelters and with poor health services that are seriously at risk of malnutrition, disease and lack of schooling. However, the emphasis for international organisations is now on supporting local Government and communities to facilitate return, on economic recovery and livelihood support and on longer-term capacity-building and peace-building strategies. These focuses will continue into 2003 but with particular attention to the rebuilding of the health and education sectors.

Note: In 2003 OCHA will withdraw its humanitarian co-ordinating function from the UN Resource Centre (UNRC) in North Maluku. Other UN agencies are expected to continue to operate from and manage the UNRC."

**IDPs in Bitung, North Sulawesi no longer in need of international assistance, OCHA
OCHA, 30 June 2004**

"A joint OCHA/UNDP/UNICEF assessment mission to IDP locations in Bitung, North Sulawesi, concluded that the majority of the remaining IDPs no longer desired to return to North Maluku, and that the support they had received from the provincial government in many ways exceeded the support that IDPs received in other parts of the country. The mission recommended that priority be given to resolution of land ownership issues and economic development, but that the IDPs generally were not in need of international assistance."

Assistance in North Maluku should also aim at alleviating the plight of local population (June 2003)

- IDP families in North Maluku are reportedly fragmenting in order to multiply opportunities for assistance.
- There is now a need to assist conflict victims other than the IDPs and move towards general community development in both return and relocation sites to integrate reconstructing communities and avoid the potential for new divisions and jealousies.
- UN is of the opinion that North Maluku is an example of successful handling of the IDP crisis

Bakornas PBP & OCHA July 2003, pp. 14-15

"The assistance of the Central Government has been much appreciated. Although significant progress has been made, provincial authorities are further requesting continued support from the Central Government, particularly for infrastructure renewal. To monitor the progress of the rebuilding programme and ensure an efficient use of funds, the Government has established independent monitoring teams. These teams are confirming earlier indications that families are fragmenting to multiply opportunities for assistance and that sometimes assistance packages for IDPs are generating jealousies with unassisted neighbours.

Future efforts should be broader in scope to mitigate against this trend. Assistance, both governmental, non-governmental as well as international, should now be directed to conflict victims other than the IDPs and towards general community development in both return and relocation sites to integrate reconstructing communities and avoid the potential for new divisions and jealousies evolving. Throughout the villages of Central Halmahera (300 families),

communities now live together, but they do not yet live as neighbours. In all efforts, the village leaders play a key role, as they have the confidence of the population.

The North Maluku authorities are confident all objectives for resolving the crisis can be effectively met by the end of 2003.

[...]

North Maluku is an example of successful efforts for the solution of IDP crises. The national assistance in both provinces are examples of what the United Nations organisations consider to be an outstanding example, by international comparison, of very serious government commitment to IDPs."

ACEH (general)

Former conflict-areas worse off than tsunami-affected areas (April 2006)

- World Bank assessment of the reintegration needs of former GAM rebels showed that the needs of conflict victims were as great and often similar as those of the GAM returnees.
- The most inaccessible parts of Aceh, often former conflict areas, were those where little assistance had been provided. This was seen as a potential problem for the sustainability of the peace process.
- It was noted that in areas of Aceh affected by conflict, and especially those in the mountainous interior, conditions were worse than in areas directly impacted by the tsunami

WB, 19 April 2006, p.3

"In March the World Bank presented and finalized the GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment. The assessment concludes that overall the reintegration of 'GAM returnees' is progressing smoothly but that challenges lie ahead. The research found that almost 75 percent of GAM returnees are currently unemployed and that the vast majority are young men. The provision of livelihood assistance is therefore urgent to keep them occupied and secure them a future. The research also found that the needs of conflict victims and communities are also great and similar to GAM returnees. These findings have important consequences for post-conflict and reintegration programming.

The report makes three sets of recommendations that can provide a framework for facilitating reintegration and consolidating the peace process. First, supporting programs are necessary to sustain an environment conducive to reintegration, including ongoing monitoring, reform of local law and justice sector agencies, and socialization. Second, assistance in the form of both individual benefits (private goods) to specific groups and community benefits (public goods) are necessary. The former should not only be provided to GAM returnees, but also to other "conflict-affected" and vulnerable individuals including widows, IDPs, conflict victims, women and children. Third, the report recommends that community-based mechanisms be used to both identify eligibility for individual assistance and prioritize community needs. These recommendations have been well received by both GAM and the Gol's newly established reintegration agency (see below)."

WB, 31 October 2005, p.14

"There were also references to negative impact, or areas where progress was slight. Several respondents felt that that unequal resource distribution could raise tensions. They found that the most inaccessible parts of Aceh suffer from the most unrest and often demonstrate the strongest current or potential future support for GAM. Unless aid reaches such areas, people there will feel still more marginalised in the face of massive aid elsewhere. For example, whilst support for medical attention is flowing to areas directly affected by the tsunami, other areas get very little. This is a problem as there are displaced people there too (displaced by conflict not natural disaster) and facilities are very poor. This is critical if confidence is ever to be rebuilt. In general, aid must flow across all of Aceh."

WB, 23 August 2005, pp. vii-viii

"The unprecedented response (national and international) to the tsunami has created opportunities for a response to the conflict in Aceh. Human resources and aid delivery mechanisms are already in place. In many parts of Aceh, those affected by conflict, and especially those in the mountainous interior, are now worse off than those who were directly impacted by the tsunami. Villages in conflict-afflicted areas, and particularly in the rural mountainous interior, have received almost no development aid from government, NGOs or international donors while the conflict has raged. The improvement in security that the peace process, if successful, will bring, provides new opportunities for reaching some of the poorest people in Aceh."

WB, 23 August 2005, p.32

"First, the conflict (as well as other factors, notably poor governance and corruption) have meant that few if any development programs reach rural villages. In many cases, the World Bank/Gol Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) was the only development program in informants' village. In such an environment, rewarding those who have inflicted misery on many villagers seems patently unfair to local communities. Second, and related, villagers argue that most people in their communities are poor. Those returning from the hills are not necessarily poorer than those who remained in their village, especially as some GAM members may have materially benefited from extorting the communities to which they are returning.

The MoU appears to take such concerns into account by also offering compensation to "civilians who have suffered a demonstrable loss due to the conflict" (Article 3.2.5), offering them the same benefits as for combatants and prisoners. However, the inclusion of this is problematic. The definition of who is a victim is unclear. An IOM study conducted in September 2004 found that 2,500 families (or approximately 10,000 people) had been affected by the civil war.

Yet conflict has impacted almost everyone in Aceh. During our fieldwork we did not find one informant who did not have a friend or family member who had been killed, or kidnapped, or whose economic activities had not been severely impacted by the conflict. Indeed we found that there was a strong feeling that everyone is poor and a victim (korban) in Aceh, not just those directly affected by the conflict or, for that matter, by the tsunami."

ACF, May 2005, p.28

"This area has been the theatre of a 5 years internal conflict between the Governmental Army and Acehnese Separatist Group, GAM. This open conflict led to several displacements of communities from the mountains towards the coastal area. This area benefits from a very fertile

soil but because of the conflict, the access to the farming land has been reduced and the purchasing power of the population decreased as well.

In addition, displacements of population led to the destruction of economic organizations (cooperatives, markets...) and loss of means of production (for example in Karang Hampa, Arongan Sub District, the population totally lost its cattle), which represented an important source of income.

The conflict isolated these villages. No maintenance of infrastructure (roads, bridges...) was undertaken for many years impeding the trade of cash crops to take place easily. Buyers coming from Meulaboh, Medan or Banda Aceh were limited in term of access to the zone, and this resulted in the fact that the selling prices of the cash crops (which was the main source of income for the population living in conflict area) decreased dramatically (see above) leading to an impoverishment of the people."

GAM reintegration assessment highlights needs of conflict-affected communities (March 2006)

- To respect equity, avoid tensions and foster peace-building, WB recommends to include receiving communities in a comprehensive assistance programme that provides 'public good' to the community in general and 'private goods' to those who need it most (vulnerable including IDPs).

WB, March 2006, pp. xi-xii

"Addressing the needs of receiving communities is important for a number of reasons. First, both GAM and communities feel that equity requires that ordinary citizens who were affected by the conflict should also receive benefits. Second, the provision of benefits to GAM alone may cause tensions or division between GAM and communities. Third, the provision of assistance to a category of affected persons that includes but also goes beyond GAM returnees will facilitate peace-building efforts by reducing the distinction between GAM and receiving communities.

Assistance to receiving communities needs to cover both public and private goods. In order to deliver private benefits, it is necessary to refine the definition of "affected civilians" to determine which individuals and groups in the community are most vulnerable and deserving of targeted support.

The Provision of Public Goods to Conflict-Affected Communities

A large number of villages visited had pressing infrastructure needs. The conflict impacted on the provision of infrastructure such as roads, electricity and irrigation at the village level, particularly in more remote villages. Rebuilding infrastructure damaged by the conflict can be a vital component of a livelihoods assistance strategy and can help solidify reintegration, especially if projects are jointly undertaken by returnees and others in the community.

Communities place a high priority on improving access to services, in particular education and health. Access to health and education is constrained by four inter-related factors: (a) the costs of schooling and healthcare, including transportation; (b) the distance to services; (c) the fact that clinics and, especially, schools were damaged in the conflict or not maintained because of it; and (d) the poor quality of services. Community-wide approaches to improving livelihoods include interventions aimed at improving the local private sector investment climate and improving market linkages.

Continued security is a prerequisite to addressing socio-economic needs. Improving service provision, the operation of local markets, rebuilding houses, creating new jobs: all are dependent on a positive security situation. Despite the current positive environment, challenges remain. In the long-term, law enforcement agencies will require capacity building to address security concerns appropriately. In the more immediate term, there is a need to address transitional arrangements as AMM phases out.

The Provision of Private Goods to Vulnerable Groups

In addition to the community-wide approaches outlined above, more narrowly targeted programs aimed at particularly vulnerable groups who were directly affected by the conflict are also required. Communities themselves are in the best position to identify who is in need of assistance, although this process will require facilitation to ensure that such decision-making doesn't exclude marginalized groups. Vulnerable groups include IDPs, widows who lost their husbands in the conflict, and those whose houses were destroyed by the fighting.

Rebuilding houses destroyed by conflict is a priority, as is the provision of capital and training to those most in need of it and who can best put it to productive use. In addition, there is a need for targeted mental health care."

IDPs living with host communities received less aid after the tsunami with conflict-IDPs particularly discriminated against (March 2006)

- Survey shows nearly 1/3 IDP households living with host community never received any assistance
- Conflict-IDPs were those who received the less assistance

UNORC, 28 March 2006, pp.17-18

"IDPs in host communities receive less aid

Field monitors observed that most IDPs living with host families obtained little humanitarian aid. In fact, 27% of households interviewed did not receive cash, food or household item assistance at all.

(...)

Conflict affected IDPs receive less aid than tsunami-affected IDPs

Field monitors reported that conflict-affected IDPs complain of not receiving as much aid as disaster-affected IDPs did. Although 18% of the sample IDP households were conflict-affected (R2), less than 5% of each type of assistance reached this group (Chart 5.3).

A majority of IDPs assisted by the government during displacement but only half satisfied (September 2004)

IOM-GoRI, September 2004, pp. 14-15

"About 74 percent of returnee/ex-IDP households received assistance during displacement. Such assistance received was mainly in the form of clothing and foodstuff, like rice, cooking oil, instant noodles, canned fish, salt, sugar, and dried and salted fish. The foodstuffs provided complied with the Sphere standard on the provision of culturally important condiments and in the distribution of staple food that is familiar to the population and which does not conflict with religious or cultural traditions.

Health services was also provided in health posts located in IDP camps with no more than 2,500 persons being served by each health unit, based on established national standards. Likewise, potable water and sanitary latrines were provided to IDPs inside of the camps although it was a challenge to consistently comply with standards. About 26 percent of returnees/ex-IDP households did not receive assistance during displacement. The all-return package of Rp21,000 and 15 kilos of hulled rice provided to each person prior to return was in compliance with the standard established by the national government of hulled rice supply good for 30 days and money for side dish good for 7 days.

With regards to satisfaction of the assistance received, respondent households from 51 percent of villages believed it was not enough to satisfy their basic needs."

IOM-GoRI survey shows basic services disrupted in 66 per cent of villages (September 2004)

- IOM-Government assessment shows that conflict caused the displacement of basic service providers and village officials thereby disrupting basic services (health, education, transport and potable water provision) in 66 percent of villages surveyed.
- Only slightly more than half of the respondents had an access to potable water and latrines that is in line with international standards. Returnees with the least access to latrines were in the districts of Pidie and Aceh Barat.
- Infrastructure facilities (roads and bridges, irrigation, and health clinics) were damaged/destroyed in 84 percent of villages as a result of armed conflict.

IOM-GoRI, September 2004, pp. 12-13

"Basic services, like health, education, transport, village administration, mail, and potable water provision, were disrupted in 66 percent of villages. These disruptions resulted mainly from the departure of service providers and village officials for fear of being caught in the armed conflict and the prevalence of kidnappings and hostaging.

About 60 percent of households had access to potable water source that are less than 10 minutes from their house as is the international standard stipulated under the Sphere. Households which complied with the international standard on access to sanitary latrines of less than 1 minute walk (50 meters) from their house is 52 percent.

This is a significant reduction from the 68 percent of households with access to sanitary toilets registered prior to displacement. Full access to sanitary toilet facilities is registered in Singkil and Nagan Raya while the least access are in the districts of Pidie and Aceh Barat.

In terms of access to health services, 47 percent of households availed of services from health personnel on a daily basis, 21 percent on a weekly basis, and 33 percent on a monthly basis.

The lack of access to health services is due to the combined reason of the disturbances in the security situation resulting to health personnel fleeing their area of assignment and the (far) distance of the PUSKESMAS from the villages. By comparing this figure with pre-displacement data, there is not much difference as 31 percent of health care units were already non-operational and 70 percent of villages did not have doctors and maternal staff even before the occurrence of armed conflict.

Only slightly over half of the respondents (53 percent) indicated that basic drugs in the PUSKESMAS were available in sufficient quantity. Prior to displacement, this figure is higher at 69 percent of PUSKESMAS with adequate supply of basic drugs.

Infrastructure facilities, like roads and bridges, irrigation, and health clinics, in 84 percent of villages were damaged/destroyed as a result of armed conflict. Of the existing community infrastructure, 59 percent were non-functional."

The May 2003 military operation disrupted the lives and livelihoods of the majority of civilians in Aceh (September 2003)

- Fighting between the Indonesian military and GAM has disrupted the lives and livelihoods of civilians by cutting food supplies, water, electricity, communications, schooling, and healthcare to thousands.
- Over five hundred schools have been burned down.
- Overall picture from the scant information available is that the population of Aceh faces a shortage of basic supplies and services.
- Military assistance appears to be mainly concentrated in 'show camps,' which are on major routes accessible by journalists.
- Recent information on the conditions in one of the IDP camps suggests inadequate water supply and sanitation

HRW, September 2003, pp. 4-5

"Since martial law began in Aceh, the Indonesian government has restricted U.N. agencies and international NGOs from carrying out their duties in the province. International humanitarian aid agencies have had no access at all to areas outside of Banda Aceh, causing concern that adequate humanitarian assistance is not reaching many of those in need. An independent assessment must be made of the needs of Aceh's civilians to determine their humanitarian needs and provide them with the necessary assistance. Given Indonesia's lack of capacity and experience in handling these types of problems, the role of international humanitarian actors is particularly important, and their forced absence more troubling.

Little is known about the well-being of Aceh's civilian population. Most of Aceh's 4.2 million residents live in relative isolation outside the province's two main towns. Fighting between the Indonesian military and GAM has disrupted the lives and livelihoods of civilians by cutting food supplies, water, electricity, communications, schooling, and healthcare to thousands. Food distribution networks have been disrupted by attacks on food convoys despite recent attempts by the Indonesian military to secure the main routes. Over five hundred schools have been burned down. Electricity pylons in several districts were sabotaged.

Telephone communications outside Banda Aceh have been severely disrupted. The overall picture from the scant information available is that the population of Aceh faces a shortage of basic supplies and services. Conditions are likely to be worse for those who have been forced to flee their homes. Preliminary information indicates that the fighting has forced thousands of civilians out of their homes. The Jesuit Refugee Service and Indonesian media sources have already highlighted reports of poor water and sanitation facilities, malnutrition, and skin complaints amongst this population."

ICVA 5 September 2003, p. 2

"The military structures have sought to prove their ability to cope with the humanitarian needs, but this military assistance appears to be mainly concentrated in 'show camps,' which are on major routes accessible by journalists. Recent information on the conditions in one of the IDP camps suggests inadequate water supply and sanitation. Shelter, where it has been provided, is in barrack-style buildings or large tents, offering no personal space or privacy to the occupants, and raising concern for the security of women and children. The health data on the IDPs being made available by the authorities in Banda Aceh is not exhaustive and is limited to those in camps. Data on food assistance, including reports from reliable local contacts, suggest that the provision of food is not adequate in terms of rations, is provided inconsistently, and does not reach all camps.

Though the government has referred to the relatively high rate of IDP return as a positive indication of an improving humanitarian situation, these IDPs not only remain vulnerable to future violence, but many have returned home to find their property and assets looted or destroyed, thereby inhibiting their ability to re-establish livelihoods following displacement. Those communities that have not been displaced find themselves unable to travel to their fields, markets, places of employment in plantations or factories, or to make use of the family social support networks they may have in other areas, thereby further reducing their capacity to cope with the effects of the conflict."

ICG, 23 July 2003 pp. 4-5

"Despite Rp.400 billion (some U.S.\$48 million) allocated for the so-called humanitarian component of the Integrated Operation, including for camps to be prepared for people deliberately displaced to protect them from hostilities, the preparations have been woefully inadequate.

Local journalists have covered the plight of thousands of displaced in Bireun district who found themselves in a camp in Cot Gapu, Bireun, with inadequate drinking water and sanitation. When as many as 300 people per day were falling ill, medical services in the area could simply not respond to the need.

The story from North Aceh district is similar. On 30 June, villagers from Seumirah, Alue Papeun and Alue Dua in Nisam subdistrict were suddenly told to evacuate to Cot Murong. The army sent in fifteen large trucks and ten smaller pick-ups to move 4,500 people. Some 50 more trucks came the following day. The local government had been preparing for large-scale displacement but apparently had not been given notice of this particular evacuation, and the facilities needed were simply not in place. Drinking water was again a major problem."

Food

Low food supplies in KMAP camp in Bener Meriah district (January 2006)

WB, 16 January 2006, p.6

"The conditions in the new camps are completely different than those in Ronga-Ronga camp. Some have improved whereas some are worse. Generally the situation in the new camps is worse than Ronga-Ronga camp.

(...)

4. KMAP camp in Pondok Baru Bener Meriah

There are 70 IDP HH in KMAP camp, Janarata Village Bandar Kecamatan, Bener Meriah. The food supplies in this camp are also very poor and no rice remains. Fortunately, the accommodation is relatively good as they are using a school building. The IDPs are being helped traders at the Pondok Baru market. Kak Ni, the IDPs camp coordinator, claims that the total number of households that will return to various villages in Bandar kecamatan is around 600. Most of them are still to return from Idul Adha celebrations in Pidie, Bireuen, and Aceh Tenggara."

Conflict-affected areas in Aceh Jaya and Aceh Barat excluded from food distribution (2006)

ACF, 2006, pp.4-8

"Similar to other conditions, access to food varies from one place to the other. While some people received basic food ration from WFP and additional food from other NGOs, some others did not receive any food aid either because they live in a remote zone (e.g. Sampoinet) or they have been excluded from the food distribution (e.g. conflict-affected area). Some people were able to complete the food ration with vegetables because they have already been able to harvest, while some have very little access to vegetable or fruits because these products are not available in the village where they live.

(...)

Populations who were not able to get food by themselves were very vulnerable since they depend on food distribution and they often ignore how long it will go on. On the contrary, to cope with the inaccessibility to food aid, many of the population in the mountain areas have restarted their agricultural activities. It is therefore expected that in the coming months, after the harvest, the food supply in the conflict-affected areas will improve compared with the tsunami-affected area.

(...)

Selling was still a big part of coping mechanism for income. Around 20% of the interviewees have sold their assets in the last two months. The items sold were mainly jewelry and some livestock. Non-affected areas sold more assets than those villages affected by tsunami because of the non-accessibility to humanitarian aid.

(...)

As rice is being produced for food consumption, some farmers in tsunami-affected areas decided not to start agricultural rehabilitation activities knowing there will be food aid distribution. On the contrary, people in the non tsunami-affected areas started to cultivate their lands because they do not have access to food aid anymore."

One-third of the population in Aceh already lived below the poverty line before the tsunami (December 2005)

FAO/WFP, 22 December 2005, p.23

"Pre-tsunami poverty indicators and current malnutrition data indicate that the effected area is a chronic poverty zone. Approximately one-third of the population lives below the poverty line as compared to 17.9 percent for the whole of Indonesia. Almost three quarters of total expenditure is spent on food. Table 10 provides some selected poverty and nutrition indicators at district level.

Malnutrition in Aceh Province is estimated at 20.7 percent. Severe malnutrition is 3.4 percent. According to the Department of Health 113 cases of severe malnutrition were identified during the past months of which 13 have died. Main causes of malnutrition can be identified as poor water and sanitation facilities in many of the camps visited by the Mission, infections, limited nutrition awareness of care providers, poor caring and hygiene practices, insufficient food intake due to poverty, and lack of access to health facilities."

IOM-GoRI survey shows lack of security negatively impacts on food security, in particular for ex-IDPs (September 2004)

- IOM-Government assessment showed almost 40 percent of returnees did not eat 3 meals a day.
- Less than 4 per cent of returnees had food reserves good for one month.
- The main reason for the problematic food security situation is the lack of security which severely hampered the ability of households to engage in farming and livelihood activities.

GoRI-IOM September 2004, pp.11-12

"Only 61 percent of household respondents were eating 3 meals a day. This figure is slightly higher among non-IDP households at 73 percent when compared to returnees/ex-IDP and women households which had only 62 percent and 57 percent, respectively.

(...)

The gravity of the situation of lack of food security was mostly felt in Aceh Utara where only 18 percent of households were eating 3 meals per day. Other districts where less than 50 percent of households were eating 3 meals per day are Pidie and Aceh Barat Daya.

(...)

Households owning livestock that could be used either to generate income or for consumption purposes is also quite low at 20 percent but such is only slightly lower compared to the situation prior to displacement where only 22 percent of households owned livestock.

(...)

The number and proportion of returnee households owning livestock was even lower. Only about 21 percent of returnee households owned livestock that they can resort to either for consumption or income. In Aceh Tengah and Nagan Raya, none of the households owned livestock.

Household access to food reserve good for 1 month was even lower at only 4 percent. Consistently, non-IDP households had a higher proportion owning livestock and with access to food reserve good for 1 month compared to other respondent groups.

(...)

Access to food reserve good for 1 month was also quite low with only 3 percent of returnee households having such access. Bener Meuriah had the highest number and proportion of returnee households with access to food reserve at 17 households and 20 percent, respectively, while none of the returnee households in 60 percent of the districts (9 out of 15) had the same access.

(...)

The main reason for the problematic food security situation in the province is the lack of security which severely hampered the ability of households to engage in farming and livelihood activities."
(...)

The absence of opportunities to engage in economic activities resulted to the absence of/limited purchasing power thereby affecting their food security, among others."

Health

Limited access to health care in the mountainous areas (March 2006)

WB, March 2006, pp.63-69

"Villagers place a high degree of importance on the longer-term improvement of service delivery in their villages and sub-districts. Improving access to education and health are the two areas identified by communities as being most important.

(...)

Villagers, as well as returnees, have problems accessing health services. This is particularly the case in more remote villagers where the Puskesmas (sub-district level health post) is located some distance from the village. In these cases, villagers are reluctant to use these health services for anything except the most serious health issues due to the costs involved in traveling to the clinic.

According to the National Socio-economic Survey (SUSENAS) data, of Acehnese who reported health problems in 2004, 62.3% did not seek treatment. Among those who reported that their ailments had affected their work or studies, only 50.3% sought medical treatment. These numbers were close to the national average (61.8% and 50.8% respectively). However, these were pre-tsunami numbers. The tsunami destroyed or damaged a substantive number of health facilities - including six hospitals and hundreds of village-level public clinics.

(...)

Mental Health Care

In addition to improving health care facilities, and improving overall access to them, there is a need for targeted mental health care. As with GAM returnees, villagers showed signs of suffering from mental health problems as a result of the conflict. The degree of trauma that exists amongst receiving communities varies from village to village and is linked to issues including proximity to armed clashes, whether or not there were non-organic military posts in the village and relationships between different ethnicities within a village."

ACF, 2006, p.2

"In non-tsunami affected areas, most of the people have limited access to health facilities. The situation is even worsened by bad road and high transportation cost. People are seeking help from medical NGOs to extend their support to the people in the mountain areas.

Health structures in Aceh suffered extensive damage due to the tsunami (December 2005)

EC, 15 December 2005, p. 7

"Further to the increased health demands put on the system by the tsunami, the provincial health services saw their ability to cope reduced because of the severe damage suffered by health

structures: seven hospitals were damaged (two destroyed) and 41 health centres were affected (26 totally destroyed). In some areas such as the districts of Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat, Banda Aceh and the islands of Nias and Simeulue, more than 50% of the health facilities were damaged. The shortfall in service provision in the aftermath of the tsunami was successfully overcome by the substitution systems put in place by humanitarian organizations and national agencies of foreign countries. While the current health situation in Aceh is not worse than in other parts of Indonesia, much of the service delivery at district level still relies on foreign agencies, as the provincial system is not yet capable of replacing them in all the affected areas. The input of these agencies will still be needed in the near future (a plan for the transition of services from NGOs to local institutions is now under preparation) if the priorities established by the Ministry of Health are to be respected. These are to have health posts functioning at district level and in camps and providing inpatient and outpatient services, maternal and child health, reproductive health and family planning and nutrition.

Given the scale of the trauma experienced by many of the affected populations, psycho-social and mental health support will be continued where appropriate. Health actions carried out by humanitarian organisations in support of the public health services and in respect of these priorities will be funded under this Decision. These actions will be extended to conflict-affected areas in which health structures have been damaged or basic health services are not being provided in order to ensure an equal coverage of needs.

Lack of preparation to receive IDPs caused many civilian casualties in camps (July 2005)

- KONTRAS claims that there have been too many civilian casualties in the IDP camps due to the low level of preparedness.
- At least 53 IDPs have died in the camps due to diseases between June and October 2003.
- Health care, sanitation and provision of food were reportedly inadequate in many camps.
- Health officials claim there is no food shortage and reported that the government would improve water supplies after officials reported that some refugees are suffering health problems due to overcrowding and a lack of clean water
- Acehese IDPs are suffering health problems due to overcrowding and lack of clean water.

RSC, July 2005, p.17

"Indeed, the authorities had prepared nineteen camps in eleven districts for people deliberately displaced, ostensibly to 'protect them from hostilities.' A total of Rp. 180 billion (c. US\$ 21 million) have been allocated for dealing with IDP problems, further allocations were also to be drawn from Rp. 400 billion (some US\$ 48 million) towards the 'Humanitarian Operation.' The preparations were varied, and some have been woefully inadequate while a few were above international standard. Journalists have covered the plight of thousands of displaced persons who found themselves in camps in Cot Gapu (Bireun), Birem Bayeun (North Aceh), Ujung Fatehah (Nagan Raya), and Lhok Bengkoang (South Aceh), with inadequate drinking water, sanitation, and shelter. When people fell ill, medical services in the area were not able to respond to the need. In Alue Penyareng camp (West Aceh), IDPs stayed in an abandoned housing compound. The camp coordinator in Alue Penyareng encouraged the involvement of the IDPs in managing their camp, while in other camps the participation of IDPs was often denied."

KONTRAS, 11 December 2003

"From the declaration of the Military Emergency to 29 October 2003, at least 53 refugees have died, including 4 babies who had been born in refugee camps. This death rate is too high for the

numbers of refugees who had been prepared for beforehand, and it is worse that not all of those who died were of advanced age. For example in Lhokbengkuang camp in Tapaktuan, Teungku Yusman, aged 38, a refugee from Lhok Sialang village, Pasie Raja district, and the father of four small children, died on the night of Monday 19/8 as a result of diarrhoea and fever. This shows that the refugee committee is not working seriously [to provide healthcare].

At Cot Gapu II refugee centre in Bireuen regency, a 5-month old baby was sprawled out, sick, while his four-year old sibling lay sick beside it. The baby's skin had turned white after nearly a week of illness, he had been treated at Bireuen district hospital for three days, but had been forced to return to the camp as his disease was not improving. Because medicine was difficult to get and medical attention scarce, his mother could only give him traditional remedies. Bariah's mother, with tears in her eyes, gave him "village medicine". "My child was in hospital, but was ordered home. Both my children are sick and I don't know how to treat them," she told the newspaper Serambi. When they met the press, the refugees complained about the lack of food and clean water, the filthy environment, and diseases, particularly those that were attacking their children. Adult refugees were generally suffering from diarrhoea, had trouble breathing, had headaches, fever and rashes. Hundreds of them were taking medicine every day. This was acknowledged by Dokter Asriani, the health worker at the camp.

The refugees said that when they asked for water for cooking, drinking, washing or prayer the camp officials always made problems for them. Many refugees said that they were unable to wash for several days at a time. They wanted humanitarian aid to be provided directly to them and not held for them by others.

For the refugees at a camp in Alue Peunyareng village, Meureubo district, West Aceh, the case was different again. Here hundreds of refugees had come down with diseases. Every day around 60 people arrived at the health care post to get treatment. According to the official at the healthcare post, after 8 days in the camp, on Friday 27/6, 679 people had received treatment. This figure included those who had been treated more than once. The illnesses commonly experienced were rashes, flu and anaemia.

In South Aceh around 150 people also suffered from diarrhoea according to statistics collected on 15 July 2003. In Ujong Fatimah refugee camp, Kuala district, Nagan Raya regency, the problems included an unhygienic location for the camp, and many children suffering from rashes and diarrhoea. Hundreds of refugees in Nisam district, North Aceh, fell victim to a number of illnesses. From the beginning of June to the present at least 251 refugees in high schools in Kedue Amplah, Nisam district, have suffered from diarrhoea and rashes, 64 of them have been taken to Lhokseumawe general hospital.

Meanwhile in Trumon and East Trumon districts, three refugees died of malaria and diarrhoea. Two of them were children aged 12-18 months. M. Khadafi (18 months) from Teupin Tinggi died at Kedue Trumon camp, Maimunah (12 months) from Jambo Dalem died in Krueng Luas camp, East Trumon. At Reuleut refugee camp in Muara Batu district, North Aceh, hundreds of refugees fell victim to a number of illnesses, including coughing, fever, and most of all rashes. Housewives with young children were forced to travel up to 300 metres on foot from the camp to find water to wash their clothes, stained by their sick children's urine."

AFP, 25 June 2003

"Health officials in Indonesia's conflict-hit Aceh province have treated thousands of refugees for illnesses since they were moved into camps around the province to avoid fighting, an official said Wednesday.

Health posts set up within each of the 16 refugee camps have recorded some 14,000 visits by patients since a military operation aimed at crushing separatist rebels began on May 19, said Teuku Muhammad, deputy head of the provincial health agency.

Muhammad listed respiratory ailments, skin disease, bronchitis and diarrhoea among the conditions suffered by the refugees.

"These are ordinary illnesses and we are already treating them," Muhammad told AFP by phone from Banda Aceh. "There are malnourished children." He said 14,000 is the number of visits, not the number of individual patients treated, and he did not consider the figure to be alarming.

"On a daily basis the number of visits is small," Muhammad said, estimating Aceh's total refugee population at about 32,000.

Authorities prepared the refugee camps after the military said it wanted to separate civilians from the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) rebels. Muhammad said the camps are equipped with tents, kitchens, clean water and toilets. There is no shortage of medicine, he said. The government said last week it would improve water supplies after officials reported that some refugees are suffering health problems due to overcrowding and a lack of clean water."

Water and sanitation

Little attention paid to water and sanitation needs in former conflict areas (December 2005)

EC, 15 December 2005, p. 5

"According to IOM's post-disaster damage assessment, 9,122 aqueducts were damaged by the tsunami, of which 83% were destroyed and 6% sustained major damage. During the emergency phase, the relief effort covered most of the water and sanitation needs, albeit to a minimum standard. For example, an ACF/F (Action Contre la Faim/France) assessment in the Districts of Aceh Jaya and Aceh Barat showed that 39% of the people surveyed were still fetching water from the river to drink. Most of the current water supply relies on provisional water supply systems, such as water trucking, that were intended to provide an emergency solution but are no longer appropriate because they are unsustainable, expensive and, eight or nine months after having been put in place, require in many cases repairs. In addition, a rapid assessment conducted by CDC (Centre for Disease Control) and WHO (World Health Organisation) in June warns that water from tanker trucks is prone to contamination.

Under this Decision the Commission will continue to support interventions aimed at replacing provisional water supply systems by permanent ones (dug wells, boreholes, water networks). Sanitation needs in camps and TLCs are better covered and will not be a main sector of intervention in Indonesia under this Decision, although they might be included as an additional component to water supply projects.

Little attention has been paid so far to water and sanitation needs in inland areas affected by conflict. Water structures in many of these areas have been damaged because of the conflict or, in some cases, have not been properly maintained due to the lack of presence of Government technical staff. In addition, some of the conflict-affected areas are now hosting population displaced by the tsunami thus supporting an additional pressure on their water structures. Water supply actions funded under this Decision will cover existing needs in these areas in order to ensure a similar service delivery in tsunami-affected and conflict-affected areas."

Shelter and non-food items

Shelter and livelihood assistance critical for returnees in Central Aceh and Bener Meriah districts (January 2006)

World Bank report finds relatively good conditions in IDP camp in Pinto Rime Gayo sub-district of Bener Meriah district, but important shelter and cash-for-work needs

WB, 16 January 2006, pp. 4-5

"The conditions in the new camps are completely different than those in Ronga-Ronga camp. Some have improved whereas some are worse. Generally the situation in the new camps is worse than Ronga-Ronga camp.

1. Pinto Rime Gayo sub-district, KM 60 village

The living conditions in this camp are relatively good. People have enough food supplies for the next 20 days, UNICEF has already provided them with water tanks, and tents lent by the Bireuen are relatively good. Ramli, head of the IDPs in this location, stated that the total number of people who would like to return to Pinto Rime Gayo is 560 HH or 2,350 people. They plan to separate and return to a number of villages: KM 60 Keude (162 HH), Blang Martona (115 HH), Sejahtera (120 HH), Meunasah Yakin (94 HH), Blang Rakal (115 HH), Singah Mulo (17 HH), Simpang Lancang (27 HH) and Teladan Village (15 HH). Numbers for other villages have not yet been identified; in all, Pinto Rime Gayo kecamatan has 23 villages.

Those IDPs camped outside Keude KM 60 village with 162 HHs are unlikely to face significant difficulties when they return to the village and the village's gardens. This is because 90 percent of village fled as IDPs in 2001 and the village has remained largely empty since. For administrative purposes, the village head came to the camp to make an accurate registration and to fully accept the IDPs as his people. Moreover, the mosque where the IDPs are now staying was built by the IDPs themselves 10 years ago. It is sufficiently comfortable as a place to stay.

Ready for the Second Phase

As the IDPs have found no problem with the emergency situation, including administrative issues and logistical support, they are ready to move to the second phase of building temporary shelter close to their gardens. The IDPs claim that the 7km² coffee plantation in the village belongs to them. There are no signs that other people have occupied the IDPs' land. Some of them have already gone to their gardens to check the condition of plantation. They do, however, need to regenerate their coffee trees as after five years most of the trees have already died and returned to forest. More positively, the IDPs explained that the durian trees, which still remain in their respective gardens, will be ready to harvest next month. Further, IDPs in this camp have already initiated the construction of family tents, however, unfortunately the number of tents is not yet enough. Until now, they still cook in public kitchens.

In comparison to other camps, most IDPs in this camp are wealthy by Acehnese living standards. They have good houses, cars, and coffee gardens of at least three hectares. This will lead to expectations for the government to build them good quality houses. They are likely to expect a nicer house as compensation for their losses during the conflict. They would prefer to have semi-permanent houses, half brick and half wood, similarly to those the government and NGOs have provided to tsunami IDPs.

In the camp, one gets the impression that the IDPs are skeptical that the Bener Meriah government will actually realize the promises it has made. For example, the government has made promises to build houses for conflict affected IDPs, however, many of these actually ended up with Gayonese locals rather than the IDPs. To mitigate these concerns, the IDPs requested that, if possible, the provincial Government should involve them directly in the handling of their problems, because they have experienced bad service from them for many years; there is a strong impression that the local government gives attention to the Gayonese only. They also feel it would be better if the government provided materials for their houses, allowing them to actually build themselves.

The bad experiences of what the militia had been doing have led to significant trauma and a desire for revenge, this is very dangerous if government doesn't wise enough to solve their problem. They claimed that they can do even worse of what militia have done for them, if the militia will disturb them. But now they are already forgive but not forget.

Government promises of assistance made during the visit to KM 60 Keude camp

The Government of Bener Meriah has promised IDPs that on April 2006, the government will begin to build houses and provide jadup (social security payments) for six months. They will also provide agricultural tools. The head of the district legislative, M.R. Tagor, has pledged to build roads and temporary shelters near the gardens. However, if the plans are to move the IDPs into the unoccupied houses the government built in 2002 for conflict IDPs at KM 40, the IDPs will reject it. This is because the quality of the houses is very low, the foundations are weak and, most significantly, the houses are located far from the coffee gardens.

Urgent needs

The first urgent need for the camp is for family size tents. According to IDPs, these have been provided by UNICEF but are still in the Bupati's office. The second need is cash-for-work activities to clean the paths to the coffee gardens."

UNORC, January 2006, pp.1-2

The United Nations agencies, through the coordination of the Office of the United Nations Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias, responded recently to a request for assistance to a population of displaced persons returning to their homelands in Bener Meriah and Aceh Tengah. As the situation in central Aceh region evolves, UNORC continues to discuss how best to undertake a coherent UN strategy that addresses basic needs and longer-term community-based approaches in support of the peace process.

(...)

1. There are no immediate humanitarian emergency, although the situation requires monitoring. It seems that the returns have been treated well and while some remain in camps and could use some tents/sheeting, there appeared to be adequate supplies on sight as well as with the Bupati's office. Some UNICEF supplies have been distributed to the sub-districts, while the remainder is at the Bupati's office. Although provisions are distributed based on requests by village leaders, in some cases IDPs said they weren't getting adequate supplies though village heads said they had requested assistance.

(...)

5. Livelihood assistance and shelter are critical needs. The main needs for IDPs ex-conflict are shelter (Pondok), horticultural seeds including fertilizer, as well as agricultural tools (parang, cangkul, sabit, garpu tanah). Those kinds of tool are urgently needed to start cleaning their farm, which has been abandoned for 5 years since 2001. Jadup (living allowance) is also underlined to be immediately provided to temporarily support the IDPs before they are able to manage their livelihood. Capacity may be a problem due to recent formation of Bener Meriah district, so that there are insufficient skills, funds or infrastructure.

(...)

7.Children have specific needs. Children we spoke with have had sporadic or little access to schooling or vocational training since their displacement. In most cases they remain at home or at the camps or if able-bodied enough, in the fields. Health services are also limited and children seemed to suffer most from the lack of services."

Housing needs of many IDPs remain critical (March 2006)

WB, March 2005, pp.67-68

"Housing continues to be an urgent need in specific areas throughout Aceh. As discussed in the previous section, in several of the villages visited there was substantial destruction of property, including of villagers' houses. In many cases, villagers were forced to find temporary shelter in new villages. Some - in particular in Aceh Selatan and central Aceh - have returned to their original villages following the peace process, while others are still waiting for a greater degree of certainty or have little to return to. The housing needs of many of these IDPs remain urgent. Efforts have been made to address these needs (see Box 5.4). However, these efforts have invariably been less than effective.

Box 5.4: The Problem of Dealing with Housing in Aceh Selatan

In all the research villages in Aceh Selatan there is, to various degrees, a need for housing. The different ways this urgent need is being met highlights some of the difficulties in delivering assistance in a postconflict situation.

In one village, 24 houses were destroyed in 2003. In early 2005, prior to the MoU, the Koramil (subdistrict military post) announced they would fund their reconstruction and requested that the Geuchik provide a list. He did, but it was rejected and GAM households were removed. In the end, the Koramil only built 15 sub-standard, timber houses. The community, particularly GAM households, were particularly bitter and felt the new houses were not adequate compensation.

In another village, all 130 private dwellings were destroyed in 2004. Only the mosque and one public building used as a TNI post was spared. After the TNI withdrew, the government announced they would rebuild 76 houses, using a contractor. Shortly after construction began, the contractor stopped work because the price of materials had risen. The community continues to wait. Villagers are also disappointed with the housing design. They claim the houses are too expensive for what they are and are not high enough above the ground to prevent regular flooding.

In two other villages many houses abandoned during the conflict are still now either seriously damaged, largely from firefights, or are falling apart from disuse. Further, all the villagers' belongings have been looted.

As of November 2005, villagers in both these villages had received no assistance for repairing their homes. One villager, whose house was used as the TNI post, is still bitter that he was forced to pay the house electricity bill while the house was occupied by the TNI.

Most communities, although grateful, tend to see housing assistance as compensation rather than aid, particularly if the funds are from the government. Their expectations, therefore, differ significantly from, for example, tsunami victims. They are more likely to want a say in the type and quality of housing they are to receive."

Some 150,000 people still live under tents one year after the tsunami (December 2005)

EC, 15 December 2005, p. 6

"As mentioned above, estimates of damaged houses range from 118,000 to more than 200,000. The initial emergency response to the more than 550,000 people left homeless by the tsunami was to provide tents and temporary shelter in public buildings, although 50% of the caseload moved into relatives' houses where they were hosted. By February 2005 a transitional shelter initiative was put forward by the Government, which started the construction of shelters in TLCs. However, the barracks have not been generally accepted by the victims for a number of reasons including the long distance of some of them from their villages of origin and the fact that the selected sites were not always the most appropriate to settle in. Currently, only 65,228 displaced (12% of the total caseload) lives in TLCs, while the number of displaced living under tents in spontaneous camps (153,477) is more than double this number. The post-disaster damage assessment carried out by IOM showed that rather than moving to or staying in TLCs, the majority of the displaced want to return to their villages of origin, even if destroyed, in order to continue prior economic activities. In this sense, the displaced expressed their preference to receive either transitional/permanent shelter in their properties or their own building materials. Transitional/permanent shelter projects have been late to start and only 100,000 of the 550,000 displaced have received a shelter in their area of origin.

The situation of the population living in spontaneous camps is the most critical, as the tents under which they lodge, and which were set up during the first two months following the disaster, are starting to rot now that the rainy season is approaching. The BRR has identified transitional shelter and the need to improve the quality of the barracks in TLCs as specific issues of current concern. The Transitional Shelter Working Group has recognized that transitional shelter options will not be in place for the start of the rainy season in October/November and has outlined a strategy in two phases to respond to the situation. In a first phase existing IFRC tent stocks will be mobilised to replace tents in bad condition in order to cover immediate needs; in a second phase a shelter package consisting of construction materials will be distributed to families able to construct or repair their houses."

Vulnerable groups

Women and children in Aceh particularly affected by displacement (September 2004)

- IOM-Government assessment showed conflict and displacement had placed multiple burdens on women who had to take on new responsibilities in the absence of their husbands.
- Children are often needed to augment the family income to the detriment of education.
- As a result of years of conflict, approximately 8,700 female-headed households in Aceh are extremely vulnerable.
- Many of these women are dependent on unsustainable international food aid or on sexual and/or political alliances against their will.
- An estimated 23,000 displaced children and children in host communities in Aceh and North Sumatra facing acute problems.

IOM-GoRI September 2004, p. 11

"Displacement and disruptions in the security situation placed multiple burden and responsibility on women. Some women respondents indicated the loss of the husband/breadwinner as a main reason for reduced income which also placed them in a situation where they would have to perform regular household tasks and raise the children by themselves while at the same time seek employment or engage in whatever livelihood opportunities that would give them income to

provide for the needs of their family. Most women also tended to reduce their food intake in favor of their children thereby contributing to the result where about a quarter of women respondent faced health problems. Given the added responsibility, women were able to increase their influence both in the household and community.

Likewise, the children suffered as a result of displacement. Many of them had to drop-out of school as priority for family expenditures is placed on food. They also had to work to help augment the family income."

Almost a quarter of all households in Aceh headed by women
UNOCHA 14 February 2003, p. 104

"Almost 23% of all households in Aceh are headed by women (174,800 / 760,000). Based on criteria and statistics provided by local NGOs, approximately 8,700 of these households are extremely vulnerable.

These unnaturally high numbers are the result of years of violent conflict (killing and disabling hundreds of males every year) and Aceh's steady movement towards limiting social and economic opportunities of females. Women unable to provide resources for their families are frequently forced to depend on unsustainable international food aid, or much worse, sexual and/or political alliances against their will."

23,000 displaced children face acute problems
OCHA 14 February 2003, p. 111

"The protracted conflict in Aceh has left some 23,000 displaced children and children in host communities in Aceh and North Sumatra facing acute problems. Schools and health centres have been destroyed and lack essential supplies and adequately trained staff. Insufficient awareness on child rights has led frequent violations and lack of accountability for violators. Furthermore, for the past 26 years, children and youth have had little or no opportunity to play a constructive or meaningful role in their communities.

The recent CoHA presents a renewed opportunity for increased presence and programming in the province."

CENTRAL SULAWESI (general)

Significant humanitarian and long-term recovery concerns in Central Sulawesi in 2004 (April 2004)

- In 2004, water and sanitation needs were reported to be significant in urban as well as rural areas. Access to health and education services was also limited.
- There seems to be a consensus that assistance must now support the empowerment of communities rather than extend dependencies on material assistance.
- Majority of IDPs were living with host families (54,500) in the Poso District.
- Displaced women and children in barracks are faced with the most serious problems as they are particularly at risk of malnutrition, poor access to sanitation and health services, and untreated mental health problems.
- Some displaced families who have no access to land and have lost their productive assets are likely to seek resettlement rather than return, and will need livelihood and shelter support during the initial phase.

OCHA, 9 April 2004, pp. 15-16

"There are still significant humanitarian concerns in Central Sulawesi. In towns the water supplies are erratic, and in villages people continue drinking unsafe water from springs, wells, and rivers. To improve the water and sanitation situation in the returnee villages and IDP locations, international NGOs are building latrines and rehabilitating water wells. However the coverage is grossly insufficient. The limited availability and quality of health facilities force people to travel long distances to the nearest towns to get simple medical treatment. The health sector is further affected by lack of health staff and medical supplies. The number of schools, both elementary and secondary, is inadequate and many schools often lack supplies, books, teaching materials, adequate classrooms and access to water and sanitation. As most IDPs consider children's education a priority, ensuring that schools are adequately equipped would promote further returns and help the local community as well.

Some local NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) have significant capacities but would benefit from better coordination with other agencies, technical assistance and financial support through collaborative projects. There is need for a better coordination mechanism that includes grass root organisations, government as well as international agencies. Support of local capacities needs particularly to focus on those areas most affected by the conflict and areas isolated from usual forms of assistance.

In the changing humanitarian context, there is general consensus amongst all stakeholders that assistance must now support the empowerment of communities rather than extend dependencies on material assistance. Programmes in 2004 should therefore focus more on economic recovery and livelihood support. International NGOs are already shifting from direct assistance to soft loans in their livelihood support activities, FFW and training rather than free distributions. Future assistance should also be carefully balanced between religious groups to avoid jealousy. Continuation of advocacy programmes for the protection of IDP rights, minority and vulnerable groups also remains a priority. "

Aragon, Lorraine V., March 2004

"Local needs in Poso and for IDPs are clear. As one IDP put it, 'we don't want continual aid. But given the limits on available land, we need other appropriate work so we can support ourselves. We need schools for our children. And we need real security, so we can get on with our lives without the constant fear of bombs and mysterious shootings'.

Besides local work opportunities, IDPs are asking for their destroyed schools to be rebuilt and re-staffed, with a temporary reduction in school fees for those too poor to attend. There are still gaps in medical aid and post-trauma psychological services. Clean water projects are still lacking. Most IDPs still await the government-promised help with housing costs and one-off cash awards that could help them leave the camps and return to their former villages. Some IDPs have been forced to take 'underground' private loans at scandalous interest rates.

Central Sulawesi locals ask why they cannot be hired to rebuild the region's destroyed houses and infrastructure, why it is always the army or outsiders who are hired and trained to oversee local 'cash cow' activities. Many, for example, would be eager and capable of participating in cooperative businesses that produced and marketed something needed locally, such as school desks. Planning of such work projects, however, should include potential local workers from a wide variety of religious and ethnic groups, plus NGO consultants to assess priorities and impacts on sustainable resources, human rights, and the future of inter-group cooperation."

OCHA, 14 February 2003, p. 12

"Return and resettlement choices are made on the basis of security and the economic incentive of returning to productive assets. In many cases children and wives are left behind for schooling and house garden production while the husband (there are also a significant number of widows) returns to agricultural work at the place of origin. But most IDPs wish to make a permanent return. The majority of IDPs are currently living with host families (54,500) in the Poso District, where some 30% of the population have been displaced. Some 11,000 IDPs have been "housed" in crowded purpose-built barracks and the remainder fled to other districts, and to North and South Sulawesi.

Strategies for addressing the problems will focus on vulnerable groups affected in different ways. Displaced women and children in barracks are faced with the most serious problems: they are unlikely to permanently return to their places of origin in 2003, and are particularly at risk of malnutrition, poor access to sanitation and health services, and untreated mental health problems. Other children in IDP communities are also suffering from poor health and nutrition levels (30% of the children in one district were reported to be malnourished in 2001), and have reduced access to education as school facilities are either overcrowded in influx areas or damaged in areas of origin. Comprehensive support is needed to assist government, civil society and the communities themselves to meet supply and service needs with a focus on health, education and water and sanitation.

Displaced families who belong to minority groups in their places of origin often have no access to land and their productive assets have been destroyed or left behind. They are likely to seek resettlement rather than return, and will need livelihood and shelter support during the initial phase. It is important that assistance for this group bridges rather than divides them from nearby communities. Returnee families, particularly in isolated areas, will need similar support and improved access to health and other necessary public services.

Infrastructure, livelihood support, and the supply of essential services are unlikely to be successful without full attention to assisting the process of reconciliation and re-bridging divided communities. Integral to this assistance is building local capacities to manage and respond to future crises."

WEST KALIMANTAN (general)

Living conditions at the relocation sites partially improved (2004)

- IDPs in Poso who have been resettled in 12 sites are now referred to as "settlers".
- Some 1,259 households have chosen the alternative option of an empowerment package of USD600 per family.
- Improvements of conditions at the relocation sites have been partially successful, thanks to NGO activities.
- Still need for improvements in the health and education sector.

OCHA, 9 April 2004, pp. 21-22

"Since their move to relocation sites, IDPs are being referred to as "Settlers". A total of 1,259 households have chosen the alternative option of a government local settlement ("empowerment") package of IDR 5 million (US\$ 600) per family to arrange their own accommodation and living.

The collaboration between the provincial authorities and international NGOs for the provision of assistance at relocation sites has been partially successful in improving agriculture, basic health and hygiene practices, health monitoring systems, water and sanitation, and public infrastructure. In order to provide clean drinking water, water tanks were installed and the supply systems at the settlement sites rehabilitated. NGO activities significantly supplemented government health services and made it possible to reduce death and malnutrition rates. Some efforts have been made in reconciliation and reintegration of settlers into the host community and thus far no major incident has been reported.

(...)

There are still needs for improvement in the health and education sectors (access to education, raising awareness, teaching aid and teachers training in relocation sites). Priority should be given to programmes with the element of recovery, economic empowerment of the community in self-reliance, income generating activities, skill development/ vocation training and agriculture development/extension projects."

Vulnerable groups

Living conditions more difficult for displaced women and children in West Kalimantan (August 2004)

- Women living in resettlement sites in West Kalimantan face reduced income and a diminished access to health facilities as compared to their previous life in Sambas.
- Problems specific to vulnerable groups such as widows, elderly and children do not appear as issues of major concerns during interviews with the displaced.

SIDA, 7 August 2004, pp. 92-93

"In all the field sites visited, the women participated in agricultural activities and/or worked in the informal sector, and nobody complained about being involved in the workforce or about not being involved in decision making. It was, however, easy to see that the living conditions in the camps put women under stress and that the decrease in income due to the conflict also gave the women problems in everyday life. Also the women living in the resettlement sites in West Kalimantan found life in general more difficult compared to their former life in Sambas due to difficulties in cultivating and selling vegetables and due to a diminishing access to health facilities e.g. hospitals.

(...)

Generally the widows have to provide for their own children without support from extended families, but in the IDP communities visited the widows were not labelled as much more vulnerable than women in general. Among the Madurese in West Kalimantan, however, the widows benefit from a tradition of collective work in the fields belonging to individuals or families, and in an IOM project site a widow were head of a working group. We did, however never get the chance to speak to widows without married and single women around, which may have influenced the responses of the widows.

In the field sites visited the evaluation met no handicapped people, and problems with the elderly and the disabled were not an issue of concern. When asked about the needs for psycho-social support for the children after the conflict, two Madurese women explained that the children in general coped very well, but that they themselves had experienced trauma. Until they received electricity in the relocation site in which they lived they were afraid during the night, and for a long time after they had to flee Sambas they were crying every night. None of the men interviewed talked of serious psychological problems or a need for psychological counselling, but male

respondents in a Christian village in Jailolo district appreciated the psychological counselling offered by the church in the community."

EAST JAVA & MADURA (general)

Tension grows between the host and the displaced community on Madura island (February 2005)

- The arrival of close to 150,000 Madurese from Central Kalimantan on Madura Island and the limited assistance host communities received from the authorities to cope with these arrivals placed an important burden on the members of the host communities, many of whom wished they could return to Kalimantan.
- Provision of emergency rice to the displaced population has created jealousy and tension between the host community and the displaced.
- Absence of information and long-term plans made it difficult for local government officials to make effective plans for longer term security for the displaced.

WB, February 2005, p, 26

"Around 150,000 Madurese from Central Kalimantan were shipped by the government to the island of Madura, lying to the northeast of East Java. The local government provided some of the displaced with temporary shelter and food, but in most areas government shelters were erected nine months after the arrival of the displaced. There was also no provision of emergency services by the government or local non-governmental organizations to the host community to help them cope with the arrival of so many frightened and exhausted people. One year after the arrival of the displaced, local villagers were still feeling the strain. One villager said, 'We feel tired and hopeless about the future if the pengungsi (displaced people) stay here—we have taken in ten of them into our house. They are members of our family, so we had to take them. But they left our village many years ago for Kalimantan. We wish they would go back. That is their home now.'

One of the main sources of tension between the displaced and host communities was over the provision of emergency rice, targeted solely toward the displaced population. Many local villagers already suffered from rice shortages for over six months of the year. One woman said, 'We are as poor as the pengungsi from Kalimantan. Why don't we get free rice too?'

One village head decided to redistribute a proportion of the emergency rice meant for the displaced community to the local Madurese. He said, 'Many people in my village are poor and they need free rice too. If we only gave it to the pengungsi, there would be a lot of problems. I also do this because it is fairer. Most of the pengungsi are living with local families.'

Local government officials had no information on the long term plan for the displaced so could not make effective plans for longer term security for the displaced. One local government official said, 'It's like having your distant cousin to stay. For a while it's good and you feed them and look after them. But then you want your house back for your own family after a while, it's so crowded and you cannot afford to feed them anymore. It just goes on and on, they have to go back, but no one can tell us when.' "

IDPs on Madura Island live in unacceptable conditions (June 2004)

- UN assessment mission reveals that most IDPs wish to return and that in their views lack of funds, not security is the main obstacle to their return
- Food and financial assistance from the government and from WFP, PMI has stopped since December 2002.
- Proposal to extend assistance is still being considered.
- Majority of the IDPs wash and bathe etc. in nearby rivers.
- Free education programs for IDP no longer exists and IDPs are expected to pay fully for their children's education. Many cannot afford to pay for school.
- Many schools treated IDP children like second-class citizens and there were special corners of the classroom intended for IDPs only.
- Employment is scarce on Madura Island.

OCHA, 30 June 2004

"A joint OCHA/UNICEF/WFP mission to Madura concluded that virtually all 120,000 remaining IDPs from Central Kalimantan desperately want to return, that they no longer regard security as an impediment, but only lack the funds necessary to return and find jobs. Their current living conditions in camps and private housing in Madura are below acceptable standards. A concerted effort needs to be made to support the return process in a low-key manner to avoid a recurrence of the violence that erupted in February 2001."

OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 15

"Results from a WFP-conducted IDP sample survey (Aug-Sept 2002) indicate that only 58% of IDPs are engaged in seasonal daily work in informal sectors, 71% of whom earn less than 20,000 Rupiah5 (US\$ 2.3) per day. A significant proportion of their earnings is spent on food. Inadequate education facilities, separate classes for displaced children, higher education costs (tuition and transportation), and, above all, inappropriate curricula are causes of concern for many displaced children. The already poor water supply and sanitation systems that existed within communities have been strained by years of sharing with IDPs and lack of proper maintenance. Insufficiently trained health workers (paramedics/midwives) are running the health care system in rural areas, even though it is often beyond IDPs reach. While increased resources are required to promote a reintegration strategy to facilitate reconciliation and peace building at community levels, assistance in housing, infrastructure development and livelihood recovery would be needed to accelerate the return process."

OCHA February 2003, pp. 3-4

Food

Assistance from the government of rice and side-dish money has stopped since December 2002. Assistance from WFP and PMI has also stopped. The IDPs are finding it difficult to find means to buy food. *Dinsos* has proposed to Central Government to extend food assistance until mid-year. The proposal is still being considered.

Health

Free health services are provided to the IDPs using their red cards (indicates poor people (*rakyat miskin*), not necessarily IDPs. The IDPs are provided with free services at the clinics, and are also sometimes given referee letters to specialist doctors if necessary.

Water and Sanitation

Water tanks in the host communities and the camps/ IDP sites have been provided by IMC. The majority of the IDPs wash and bathe etc. in nearby rivers.

Education

Scholarships of a 6-month duration were given to IDP schoolchildren at the first instance from the government. The programme no longer exists and IDPs are expected to pay fully for their children's education. Many children no longer continue schooling beyond primary school, as the high schools are further to reach and there is no money for transport to the schools. Students also cannot afford books or school uniforms.

Trauma counseling had been provided to the school children of IDPs in Madura Island from specialists and students from the psychosocial programme at Airlangga University (in Surabaya). The counseling was a way to build the confidence of the children and to get them to go back to school. Many of the schools treated them like second-class citizens and there were special corners of the classroom intended for IDPs only. There are limited classes in the schools available. The number of classes cannot accommodate the number of students.

Employment

Employment is scarce in Madura. Some of the men have become 'becak' drivers, and food-stalls and street-vendors are operated mainly by IDPs. Some are low-paid labour workers, but these jobs are very scarce as there is no industry in Madura.

Reconciliation

Reconciliation processes have been made through cooperation between the provincial governments and the international NGO *Common Ground Indonesia*. On the day of OCHA's visit, Common Ground Indonesia held a meeting with the East Java Governor and the Bupatis of the four districts to discuss further the possibility of return to Central Kalimantan.

Go & See, and Come & Tell visits are being arranged by the Provincial Government of both Central Kalimantan and East Java."

Morbidity levels are high for IDPs in East Java (February 2003)

- Some 180,000 IDPs in East Java province, 130,000 of them on Madura Island. Most of them originate from Central Kalimantan and were forced to leave following ethnic tensions with the Dayaks in 2001.
- Length of stay (18 months) is causing tensions with local residents.
- Morbidity levels are above the average for IDPs in other areas. Hosts are also affected by the increased pressure on land and available potable water.
- Government assistance focuses on relocation, resettlement and empowerment.
- IDP representatives estimate that up to 75% of IDPs wish to return to Central Kalimantan once the security situation becomes conducive.

OCHA, 14 February 2003, p. 24

"The East Java Government officially recognises around 180,000 IDPs. Almost 130,000 of these reside on Madura Island. Most of these IDPs are, or descend from, Madurese who had settled in Central Kalimantan, where they came into conflict with indigenous residents, commonly referred to as Dayaks, in the early months of 2001.

The Central Kalimantan IDPs have now resided in Madura for 18 months and tensions are growing between them and the local Madurese. Anecdotal observations by IMC and WFP data indicate that morbidity levels are above the average for IDPs in other areas, with a staggering 50% of sample respondents reporting juvenile diarrhoea during the seven days prior to survey dates. Downward income trends are also being recorded for hosts, along with increased pressure on limited water and productive land.

Little attention is being paid to displaced children out of school and special needs associated with the conflict. Paramedics and midwives provide most healthcare services. Community mental health problems, associated with the witnessing of violence and the "panic of evacuation", are reported as being serious but unmeasured, particularly amongst children.

Government assistance focuses on relocation, resettlement and empowerment. It was reported that some IDPs are not claiming assistance in Madura as it may jeopardise opportunities for an assisted return at a later date. Nevertheless, nearly 5,000 persons (1,150 households) have received housing assistance packages for resettlement on Madura. Officially, other forms of assistance were terminated at the end of 2001, but IDPs continue to receive food rations and other forms of limited service assistance.

IDP representatives estimate that up to 75% of IDPs wish to return to Central Kalimantan once the security situation becomes conducive. Resources are required to facilitate and promote a reintegration strategy, which can be considered as a long-term strategy. Housing, infrastructure and livelihood support will be required on a large-scale to support returns."

Shelter and non-food items

Temporary shelters provided to Madurese IDPs in 2001 have sharply deteriorated (December 2004)

- A UN assessment conducted in June on Madura Island showed that in addition to food scarcity, very limited income generating activities and lack of access to basic health care, the displaced suffered from very poor shelter conditions.

EC-ECHO, 22 December 2004, p. 3

"The condition of Madurese IDPs is very poor according to an OCHA assessment of June 2004. The temporary shelter provided to them in 2001 has deteriorated to the point of not being acceptable for human accommodation and they suffer from scarcity of food and income generation opportunities. As a consequence of the lack of income they are not able to pay the fees required for health services and lack therefore access to basic health care.

An additional consequence of the poor conditions in which IDPs are living is that many of the Madurese that are returning to Central Kalimantan are unable to recover their livelihoods if they are not provided with initial assistance in addition to the Government's package. Their specific needs include, according to needs assessments undertaken by CARE Netherlands and OXFAM Great Britain, shelter for those who have lost their houses, food security, income generation activities and provision of safe water supply and sanitation to the return sites."

Vulnerable groups

54,000 displaced children face acute problems in education, water and sanitation (February 2003)

- Two years after being displaced from Central Kalimantan, some 150,000 IDPs continue to live in difficult conditions on Madura Island.
- Some 54,000 IDP children are estimated to face acute problems in education, water & sanitation.
- Maternal and infant mortality reach high levels.

OCHA, 14 February 2003, p. 99

"Close to two years after brutal violence caused massive displacement of ethnic Madurese from Central Kalimantan, some 150,000 IDPs continue to strain Madura's tight resources and receive only limited humanitarian assistance. An estimated 54,000 displaced children – as well as those among the host population – face acute problems in education, water and sanitation. Maternal and infant mortality rates remain high. While school-age children have swelled enrolment at Madura's existing schools, particularly religious boarding schools (pesantren), out-of-school rates are also reported to be high. Limited water and sanitation facilities have been further stretched by drought. Basic health facilities are lacking, particularly for pre- and post-natal child and maternal care."

EAST NUSA TENGGARA (general)

Former refugees in West Timor face health and nutrition risks and difficulties in securing livelihood (May 2006)

- Limited access to land, which forced the displaced to share crops with host communities and the suspension of food distribution have fostered food insecurity.
- Limited health facilities, lack of clean drinking water, poor hygiene awareness and an unhealthy living environment have created health and nutrition problems for the displaced.
- Child malnutrition has reached alarming proportions, necessitating emergency assistance through NGOs and UN agencies.

ICG, 4 May 2006, p. 2

"A key underlying problem for uprooted people is access to land. Many communities gave land to the newcomers in 1999 on the assumption their presence would be temporary; some are now asking for it back. Local NGOs have had some success in brokering deals with communities for ex-refugees to buy land at below market rates, particularly in Belu district. Access is likely to be a sensitive issue in West Timor for the foreseeable future, however. Without it, many ex-refugees face difficulties earning a living, yet local communities complain of their own loss of access and environmental degradation as a result of increased population.

Tensions between local communities and ex-refugees rarely escalate into violence but they generate pressure on ex-refugees to return to Timor-Leste. A community leader in TTU told Crisis Group any problem involving ex-refugees tended to end in taunts: "This isn't your land; go back where you came from". Ex-refugees acknowledge local resentment but the calls to return to Timor-Leste are particularly galling for many who see their support for Indonesia in the 1999 referendum as the source of their predicament."

The Jakarta Post, 21 October 2005

"While many poor families have started to receive cash aid from the government, more than 1,000 poor refugee families in Kupang are missing out.

Muhazir Hornay, the refugee coordinator at the Noelbaki shelter in Kupang Tengah, Kupang, said on Thursday that all of the refugees had received identity cards and were recognized as Indonesian citizens ahead of the legislative and presidential elections last year. The group are from the former province of East Timor, now Timor Leste.

"When we were declared Indonesian citizens, why didn't we get rice for the poor or cash aid? Is there first and second-class citizens in this country, meaning the local (Kupang residents) receive the assistance while the refugees don't," Hornay said.

He said his people had no land to farm and still lived in makeshift shelters built for them in 1999.

"During the elections, political parties and campaign teams from presidential and vice presidential candidates came and promised that our fate would change if we supported them. But the fact is that now we're being neglected," Hornay said.

Meanwhile, a councilor from East Nusa Tenggara provincial council, Thom Taebenu, blamed the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) for leaving out thousands of poor families and listing rich families instead."

EC-ECHO, 22 December 2004, pp. 1-2

"The drought also affected West Timor (Indonesia). Nutritional data gathered by ECHO partners implementing the Decision ECHO/IDN/210/2003/02000, showed that wasting is over 10% in some of the refugee camps but the information is not statistically representative. CARE Netherlands has informed ECHO that it is currently carrying out a nutritional survey in the area. Depending on the results of the survey, further humanitarian aid might be needed in 2005 once ongoing nutritional projects are finished. "

OCHA, 9 April 2004, p. 17

"As many of the former refugees are farmers and access to agricultural land is limited, they have been crop-sharing with the host community, which has caused food insecurity. In addition, prolonged droughts and floods regularly damage crops. The suspension of general food aid by the GoRI in early 2002 contributed to a worsening of the fragile food balance in the camps and settlements. These problems are also affecting host communities. Supporting community resilience through improved livelihood and food security is key to the successful integration and resettlement of former refugees.

Former refugees and local communities continue to face health and nutritional problems, because the local government has limited capacity to respond to major diseases, and the number of health facilities is insufficient. The situation is aggravated by the inadequate supply of clean drinking water, poor hygiene awareness and habits, an unhealthy living environment, and the absence of reproductive health programmes, including prevention programmes for STDs. Child malnutrition has now reached alarming proportions, necessitating emergency assistance through NGOs and UN agencies. Assistance to the general West Timorese population in this regard is not only a life-saver for many children, but also a necessity in order to avoid jealousy between the host population and the former refugees.

Access to primary health care (preventive and curative) with basic minimum standards and to safe water and sanitation through the installation and rehabilitation of the water supply system and drainage facilities needs to be immediately improved.

After four years, former refugee children are still experiencing difficulties integrating into local schools due to inadequate teacher support and the inability to pay tuition fees and school supplies.

Despite UNHCR's intense efforts over the last three years, 385 cases of children separated from their parents both in Indonesia and Timor Leste continue to be a major concern for the protection of child rights."

PAPUA (general)

Papuan IDPs prevented from returning to their villages reported to be starving in the forest (August 2005)

- 50 IDPs reported to have died from disease and starvation in early 2005 in the village of Nggweyage
- Thousands of displaced Papuans are reported to be living in the jungle after their houses were burnt down by the military.
- Up to 6,000 people displaced by military operations in the central highlands of West Papua province since August have reportedly been denied access to food and medicine and are afraid to return to their homes.

Survival International, 31 August 2005

"Lani tribesman Benny Wenda, who is living as a refugee in the UK, reports today that the people of his home village in Pyramid, Papua, are still in hiding after the army attacked in July.

The small village of Moragame has been abandoned since the army attacked as the people are hiding in the jungle, too afraid to return to their homes. Soldiers continue to patrol the area, intimidating people.

Earlier this year, at least fifty people died from starvation and disease when forced to flee their homes and gardens in a similar incident in the village of Nggweyage in which three people were killed.

Soldiers attacked Moragame and shot two men, who disappeared into the jungle and have not been seen since. They also cut the face and body of Benny's brother Petto Wenda with a razor and a knife before pouring petrol on his head and setting him on fire. He is recovering slowly."

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, August 2005, pp. 6-8

"The Baptist church reported that on 17 August 2004 the army special forces, Kopassus, provoked a conflict situation in Monia village, Tingginambut. On 17 September, Kopassus troops killed the Reverend Elisa Tabuni, a 40 year old male. He was found with his hands handcuffed together in a praying position. His son, Weties Tabuni, also a pastor, fled with his hands handcuffed after seeing his father shot by Kopassus.

Weties was also shot and was wounded in the back of the head. On 7 October, a militia group under the control of TNI/Kopassus, the Wonda Marunggen group, together with Anton Tabuni, shot and killed a primary teacher named Kius Wenda.

On 13 October an unknown group shot six civilians in Puncak Jaya. It is still unclear whether the information about the dead bodies is correct or not, because no family has yet said they've had a

relative killed. Subsequently six school buildings were burnt down by Kopassus. These were the schools at Wonaluk, Yarumungun, Dondo, Yamo, Pagarugom, and Ambitmbit.

In addition, 371 homes of indigenous inhabitants were burnt down by Kopassus in Puncak Jaya. The number of refugees still sheltering in the jungle as at the end of 2004 was 6393 and as of May 2005 these refugees had not returned to the sites of their villages.

To compound the hardship of the Lani tribes who were made refugees by this operation, all the pigs owned by the community, valued as a form of currency when traded and an important food and source of protein, were loaded onto trucks and sold by Indonesian soldiers.

The TNI is behind numerous incidents which result in military operations catastrophic for local communities. These incidents are also used to justify the deployment of new troop reinforcements, which in turn lead to greater human rights abuses, reaction from aggrieved Papuans, then further militarization. A dangerous and destructive spiral is thus perpetuated.

In February 2005 the villages of Panaga, Bolobor and Wunin were scenes of destruction of property including schools and houses. According to local government sources, Brimob mobile police and Kodam 10 troops were responsible for the arson. Local people are becoming increasingly radicalized and also divided. Seven hundred additional troops were recently deployed to thirteen new military posts in the central/western highlands. A further 15,000 Kostrad troops are being deployed to Papua beginning this year."

RFK Centre for Human Rights, June 2005, p. 3

"In the course of military operations provoked by an August 2004 Indonesian military attack on Papuan resistance elements in Mulia, military and military police (BRIMOB) forces in the Central Highlands have burned villages and destroyed gardens that local people depend on for their livelihoods. The military and police occupied church buildings, using them as a base of operations and to bivouac troops. The military has not responded to requests from Papuan church leaders for the troops to leave the churches and allow displaced civilian populations to return to their homes. Thousands of mostly Dani villagers who fled their homes remain in forests or have sought refuge with relatives. Dozens are confirmed dead due to sickness and starvation resulting from this internal displacement."

Dateline, 16 March 2005

"In late January, human rights investigators on a secret mission to West Papua's Central Highlands stumbled into a scene of misery and death
(...)

Questioning these frightened refugees, investigators discovered that thousands more like them were living rough in the jungle.

MAN (Translation) They are at the foot of the mountains. They still haven't gone home they are dying of disease. There's no medicine. It's difficult to get treatment.

This part of West Papua is under Indonesian military control. It's their base for active operations against rebels from the OPM - known as the Free Papua Movement. But their military campaign against the rebels has caused thousands of refugees to flee after their villages were ransacked and houses burned."

Elsham News Service, 21 December 2004

"Despite President Yudhoyono having expressed a willingness to find a sustainable solution to the four decade long conflict in West Papua, since August a military operation in the highlands

area of Puncak Jaya has led to the displacement of up to more than six thousand indigenous tribe members and the deaths of at least twenty three, mainly children and babies, from starvation.

Having been forced from their villages by the Indonesian military, the Papuan refugees have been denied access to food and medicine and have had their villages, livestock and food gardens destroyed. According to Reverend Sofyan Yomans of the Papuan Baptist church, the villagers "are too frightened to return to their homes, fearing they will be accused of being separatists or supporters of the OPM, and killed" (OPM stands for Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or Free Papua Movement.)"

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

Maluku

Education of IDP children in Maluku and North Maluku particularly affected by conflict (2005)

- As many as 44 % of children in Maluku or North Maluku have reportedly dropped out of school

UNDP, 2005, pp. 41-42

"Education has also suffered substantially due to the conflicts, particularly among the displaced population. According to the government of North Maluku, 110 schools were destroyed during the conflict. According to a survey of IDPs undertaken by the World Food Programme, school drop-out rates among school-aged children in IDP camps throughout Maluku and North Maluku are as high as 44 percent, although much lower in the urban areas of Ambon and Ternate (see Table 7). Similarly, in the IDP camps in Buton island, Southeast Sulawesi, populated mainly by refugees from Maluku. Save the Children UK reports drop-out rates of over 40 percent. Higher education in the provinces has also been decimated by the destruction of Pattimura University in Ambon."

"

Aceh

People living in former conflict areas see financial constraints as the main obstacle to sending children to school (March 2006)

WB, March 2006, pp.63-63

"Villagers place a high degree of importance on the longer-term improvement of service delivery in their villages and sub-districts. Improving access to education and health are the two areas identified by communities as being most important.

Villagers want to increase the education levels of their children but are constrained by limitations in being able to access education. This is true both for the families of returnees and the broader community. There are four major factors that constrain access to quality education. First, the cost of schooling limits the ability of village children to attend schools; this is compounded by the distance of schools from many villages. Third, a large proportion of school infrastructure was damaged or destroyed in the conflict. Fourth, schools are lacking resources, including teachers, and this impacts on the quality of education provided.

(...)

The main limitation in improving education standards is the cost burden of sending students to school. This is related to both direct school costs and other costs, particularly for transportation. Villagers understand the importance of education for their children. They are, however, often faced with the very real choice of supporting their children's continued education or withdrawing their children from school and pushing them into the workforce. For this reason, the education

level across the villages visited was generally quite low with most villagers only having completed elementary or, at most, middle school.

The distance of schools from villages is a barrier to education for those in rural villages. In a large number of villages visited, students have to travel some distance to attend school, in particular middle and senior school, and this was identified as one of the main constraints to continued education. Particularly since the fuel price rise in 2005, the cost of transporting children to school has become untenable for many.

One of the reasons that children have to travel so far to attend school is because many schools were damaged or destroyed during the conflict. It is estimated that overall, 527 schools were burnt between the period 1989 and June 2002 and over 500 schools were destroyed in the period following the start of martial law in 2003.

A common complaint throughout the districts visited was related to the quality of education facilities. The quality of education was heavily impacted upon by the conflict. Schools, particularly those in remote locations, found it difficult to attract and keep teachers. In one such village in Kluet Tengah, Aceh Selatan, finding teachers willing to work in what was once a conflict hot-spot is more difficult than rebuilding school infrastructure. Salaries were often subject to the pajak nanggroe tax and teachers, as with many other public officials, were targeted by GAM.

(...)

In the medium- to long-term it will be necessary to provide assistance to villagers to ensure that youths continue their education. Some of the schools burnt in the conflict have been, or are in the process of being, reconstructed. It will also be necessary to assess whether or not new school facilities are required at a village level. It would also be useful to consider increasing the amount of financial assistance provided by the Government for students to reflect the actual amount associated with keeping children in school, including transportation costs."

More than 600 schools burned down since the beginning of the military operation (December 2003)

- More than 600 schools have burnt down in Aceh since the beginning of the offensive.
- The perpetrators of these arson attacks are unclear or unidentified.
- There is a sharp contrast in official figures with regards to the number of repaired buildings and local data, which suggest that out of 603-burnt schools, only 28 units have been fully renovated.
- Government attributes full responsibility of the burning down of schools to GAM and claims it has rebuilt 549 schools.

KONTRAS, 11 December 2003

"The widespread burning of schools as a strategy of war by the two parties to the conflict has left 40 000 children without an opportunity to study, because more than 600 schools (with 4029 rooms, including classrooms and teachers' offices) were destroyed between the start of the Military Emergency on 19 May 2003 and October 27 2003. 400 more had been destroyed before the Emergency, and have yet to be rebuilt. This phenomenon is clearly a 'grand scenario' created by the two parties to the conflict to increase their political bargaining positions, since the idea of burning schools would not appear without some political calculation behind it. Apart from the political interests of the two parties to the conflict, the arsons will have a strong effect on the progress of the younger generation, and Achehnese society will be held back several decades as a result. Acheh will lose its potential to develop itself. A systematic process of creating ignorance like this will have lasting results and weaken the people of Acheh.

(...)

Statistics from the Aceh provincial Education Department state that 130 467 pupils in Aceh have stopped their schooling – the number of illiterate people is not yet counted. In Pidie regency the rebuilding of burnt schools has been delayed, although the regency government claims that 80-100% have been completed. There have been debates over who has authority over the lucrative development projects between the Education Department and the local government, and there has been no efficient use of time, such that there are no signs of the development projects being completed. It's feared that the next school term will be cut short.

(...)

At the moment the education sector in Aceh is truly in a terrible state. It won't belong before Aceh will be ranked most backward of all the provinces, made worse by the prolonged armed conflict. The burnings and destruction of more than 905 schools has left thousands of children studying in emergency makeshift conditions. Shootings of and terroristic threats against teachers have made the education system even worse. Thousands of children are threatened with the possibility of having to give up school. From the Aceh province Education Department's figures, at least 55 000 children have been forced to stop their schooling for various reasons. 15 000 of those were forced to stop their schooling while still in primary school."

ICVA, 5 September 2003. p. 2

"With regards to education, more than 600 school buildings have been burnt and books and other materials have been lost. Returnee students are often having to study in tents with UNICEF-donated school kits. In addition, there is a sharp contrast in official figures with regards to the number of repaired buildings and local data, which suggest that out of 603-burnt schools, only 28 units have been fully renovated while the rest are currently being handled in an emergency manner."

ICG, 23 July 2003, pp. 1-2

"It is still an unanswered question as to which side is responsible for the burning of more than 500 schools across Aceh since the military emergency began. It is clear, from ICG interviews, that GAM members were responsible for some. The alleged motivation may have been to prevent the schools from being used as billets for troops, to prevent them from housing the displaced so that the humanitarian problem would get more international attention, or to ensure that they were not used to turn Acehnese children into Indonesians. But most Acehnese with whom ICG spoke expressed scepticism that so many schools could have been burned so quickly without some level of complicity on the part of government forces."

See also:

[Map showing location of burnt schools in Aceh](#) (Humanitarian Update -Aceh, 19 May-15 July 2003), OCHA, 15 July 2003

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Livelihood opportunities for the displaced in Maluku

Displaced women weaving cloths in Ambon need capital to improve their meagre revenue (September 2005)

Jakarta Post, 30 September 2005

"Living in a shelter for displaced persons has not discouraged women in the conflict-torn Ambon city from working to improve the welfare of their families.

Using whatever is available, these women weave threads of different colors into the patterned cloth known as Tanimbar ikat, which is popular among both local and foreign tourists.

The women, like those who have lived in shelters in Kayu Tiga, Sirimau district for the past six years, receive regular orders. As many of their husbands are unemployed, the orders mean their families are able to scrape by.

(...)

The shelter they live in -- which was built by the government in 2002 -- is shared by 25 families and located on barren land, atop a hill. It is an isolated area but the view of Ambon city with its bay and rolling hills is a sight to behold. It is hard to imagine it was once a scene of devastation after the sectarian conflict in 1999.

The occupants are mostly displaced people from Ahuru in Batumerah subdistrict, Ambon, whose houses were razed to the ground during the conflict.

Some of the weavers worked for UD Lusila, an Ambon-based cottage industry that became the Tanimbar weaving business.

Apart from supplying cloth to the company, the displaced people also take orders, charging less than store prices.

But lack of capital to buy raw materials like thread and dye forces the weavers to ask for a downpayment when they take an order.

Setie said the orders, mostly for shawls, mainly came from foreign tourists.

A shawl can be completed in a day and is priced at Rp 55,000, while fabric for a suit or a dress, which is sold at Rp 300,000 a piece depending on the motif and colors, takes a week to finish.

She said that weavers had encountered problems in marketing their products but they had to stick to the job because there were no other jobs available.

From selling a shawl, a weaver profits Rp 30,000.

Setie said demand usually rose during the peak season from June to September, when many tourists arrived in Ambon.

"Tourist arrivals mean better sales. Tourists who come for a vacation in Ambon usually buy a lot of cloth, but at a higher price because the product passes through many hands. Middlemen buy a shawl from us at Rp 55,000 and sell it to a tourist for Rp 75,000 to Rp 100,000," she said.

Another weaver, Na Slarmanat, 31, said she had become a weaver because her husband Jan had lost his job as a worker at Yos Sudarso Port in Ambon.

"Luckily, I can weave cloth. If not, how would we put food on the table. I didn't know how to weave when I first arrived at the shelter. My mother-in-law taught me," Na said.

Another weaver, Sar Titirloloby, 32, said the weavers' only wish was to be provided with cash assistance to maintain their business, saying any profit they made went straightaway on basic necessities.

She estimated that working capital of Rp 500,000 would be enough to run her business for a year.

"Most of us have no savings. If we were provided with cash assistance we could make productive use of it. The government once provided us with Rp 150,000 per family as start-up capital for conflict victims," said Sar.

She hopes the government will establish a cooperative so that anyone requiring working capital can borrow money or buy raw materials. "And, at the same time, we could use it to market our products," she said."

Livelihood opportunities for the displaced in East Java and Madura Island

Unemployment rate of over 90% among the displaced Madurese (February 2005)

- Close to 90,000 displaced Madurese spread over 140 villages in Sampang district one year after arriving on Madura Island.
- Influx of such a large number of IDPs in a poor district and the ineffective government management of the problem resulted in local conflicts and inter-community tensions.
- Willing to help, the host community grew gradually frustrated by the lack of support they received from the local authorities. Also, government support to the displaced officially ceased in mid-2002.
- Little interaction between host communities and the IDPs as the latter were settled into temporary camps far from the main centers of villages, in remote areas where land was available for the shelters built by the government or host community.
- Tension started to grow between the two groups that started to perceive each other as separate or 'different' groups with distinctive features.
- With very limited economic, educational opportunities and limited access to basic services, the overwhelming majority of the displaced wished to return to Central Kalimantan.
- Islamic leaders manage to act as an internal restraining mechanism on conflict between the two groups

WB, February 2005, p. 11

"According to the district government, 88,501 displaced Madurese arrived in Sampang in the space of a week. By 2002, one year after the conflict, the displaced community were living in more than 140 villages over 12 sub-districts (kecamatan) across the district. It would have been difficult for any Indonesian district to absorb almost 90,000 homeless and traumatized people within a week, but it was especially difficult for the poor and crime-ridden Sampang community.

As a result of the large influx of displaced, and the ineffective government management of the resettlement program, many local conflicts broke out and inter-community as well as state-community relations were tense.

(...)

Many host families were already living at subsistence standards or below when the displaced arrived. Local women identified water shortages, difficulty in accessing water sources and the price of rice as their main livelihood problems. Host communities reported that at first they were willing to support the displaced, but were increasingly frustrated by the lack of support from the local government. In mid-2002, official support to the displaced community had also begun to dry up. Police identified rising levels of crime in Sampang, and correlated this to increased problems in the displaced community as their access to rice was running low. Villagers were worried that the theft of cows would increase if the emergency rice ran out. The fear of rising crime among the displaced against the host community added to inter-group tensions.

(...)

Apart from direct intra- and inter-family relationships between the displaced and their host families, or those who had employment with a local business, there was little interaction between host and displaced Madurese communities. Many of the displaced were settled into temporary camps well removed from the main centers of villages and small towns, in remote areas where land was available for the shelters built by the government or host community. This lack of constructive interaction meant there were many tensions between the two groups. The Madurese hosts believed the displaced considered themselves superior to local Madurese. Part of this perception was due to the higher education levels of the displaced when compared to the local population. Many displaced had been to senior high school, whereas it is unusual for most children to get beyond primary level education in Sampang. Many of the displaced, especially the children, were also unable to speak Madurese fluently as they had grown up entirely in Central Kalimantan, where they learned Indonesian in school. This separated the displaced from the local children and caused further group separation. While most displaced expressed a sense of shame at being a heavy burden on the local community, they also expressed frustration at the severe drop in living standards they faced in Madura, not only in terms of employment, but the quality of and access to food and education.

With an unemployment rate of over 90% among the displaced Madurese, most of them hoped to return to their homes and a better livelihood in Central Kalimantan. Almost all the displaced interviewed reported that they wanted to return to their land, homes and “better life” in Central Kalimantan. This result was repeated even more strongly in the findings of a survey by FK-4, the main IDP advocacy organization in Sampang district, who claimed that 99% of the displaced they had surveyed wanted to return. The arrival of tens of thousands of displaced Madurese into Sampang upset an already fragile economic structure with the sudden increase in competition over very limited resources. Distribution of rice to the displaced community was certainly one of the main sources of tension between the two communities. The District Police Headquarters in Sampang were responsible for overall security in the region. Officers at the headquarters identified a rise in crime of 15-20% since the arrival of the displaced. According to their records, all of the main sources of crime had increased, including murder, cow theft and motorbike theft. They also indicated there had been a rise in the murder rate due to increased social tensions between the displaced and local community, and between displaced groups. Throwing 90,000 displaced people into the mix did not help state-community relations.

(...)

Given the weakness of the formal security agencies, it was up to non-state mechanisms to prevent further violence. As both the displaced and the local population practiced the same branch of Islam, local Muslim leaders (the kyai), who had authority over the local population, also held authority over the newcomers. This factor helped to minimize social and economic tensions between the two groups as the kyai could mediate between them. Furthermore, it meant conflict between host and displaced communities had not escalated to the levels it did in other areas of Indonesia, where large numbers of displaced people from different religious backgrounds flowed

into host communities, such as in Central Sulawesi (see Li 2002). Islamic leaders therefore acted as an internal restraining mechanism on conflict between the two groups.

Livelihood opportunities for the displaced from Aceh

Economic opportunities and rehabilitation of infrastructure identified as main concerns for communities living in former conflict areas (March 2006)

- Lack of economic opportunities, the need for the rehabilitation of destroyed infrastructures and the lack of security were identified by the returnees as their main concerns.
- Need for agricultural assistance ranked high as an urgent concern together with the need to improve the provision of basic services like health, education, water and sanitation, and village administration.
- Only 50% of the displaced surveyed received financial assistance from the government, in addition to food.

WB, March 2005, pp.61-65

"By and large, community needs are similar to those identified for GAM returnees. Some can be addressed through targeting affected communities. Rebuilding public infrastructure damaged or destroyed by conflict is a priority. Improving access to services such as health and education were also identified as being important. Improving the investment climate and market linkages can aid in restarting local economies, and in doing so can help create sustainable employment opportunities. A central requirement for addressing the needs of returnees and communities is the continuation of a positive security climate.

Rebuilding Public Infrastructure

The reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed or damaged during the conflict is a priority for communities. A Conflict Damage Assessment will soon be conducted. However, the present assessment also highlighted the extent to which there is a need for a large infrastructure rebuilding program. Table 5.1 outlines infrastructure damage in the villages visited during the qualitative component of the assessment. The table is based on the 38 qualitative research villages, four of which were hit by the tsunami.

A large number of villages visited have pressing infrastructure needs. This relates not only to conflict damage, but also because the conflict meant that infrastructure could not be built or properly maintained. The conflict impacted on the provision of roads, electricity and irrigation at the village level, particularly in more remote villages. As Table 5.1 above indicates, village roads are needed in 25 of 38 (66%) villages; 24 villages (63%) require the reconstruction of irrigation channels; and seven villages (18%) do not have access to electricity.

(...)

Rebuilding infrastructure damaged by the conflict can be a vital component of a livelihoods assistance strategy and can help solidify reintegration. Large-scale public works programs can help provide short- to medium-term employment for returnees and other villagers. At the local level, involving local labor in the rebuilding of small-scale infrastructure not only provides sources of income, but also visibly shows the benefits of peace. Rebuilt infrastructure can also help improve access to markets and increase productivity.

(...)

Community-Wide Approaches to Stimulating Livelihoods

(...)

Although villagers were able to return full-time to their occupations almost immediately after the start of the peace process, they require assistance to increase productivity. That receiving communities returned quickly to their agricultural and fishing livelihoods soon after the peace, combined with the fact that they were still able to farm to some extent during the conflict, means that villagers generally have a head start on former combatants and released political prisoners. Nevertheless, their livelihood needs are still great.

The conflict had a heavy impact on livelihoods across Aceh. Villagers were not able to maintain their fields. This has meant, in particular, that many plantations have fallen into a state of disrepair with trees no longer producing harvests.

(...)

In all of the districts visited, villagers experienced curfews and restrictions on their movement that limited their ability to farm and fish. The size of harvests declined rapidly as villagers were not able to spend the required time to maintain their fields. Villagers drew on their savings to meet day-to-day needs and investor confidence disappeared due to increased extortion and distorted markets.

(...)

Livelihood strategies for community members also require the provision of capital and training. However, community-wide approaches can also help. Villagers, similar to GAM returnees, often said they want and need capital to restart their livelihoods. It is impossible to provide this for all those in need in Aceh; an approach targeted at individuals in vulnerable groups is needed (see discussion below). However, strategies aimed at improving the functioning of the market can help create livelihood opportunities for communities. Improving the local private sector investment climate, and market linkages, can be effective. This requires interventions at numerous levels. At the provincial and district level, reducing distorting barriers to investment, in the form of erroneous taxes may be helpful. Improving large-scale infrastructure, such as the main roads in Aceh and harbors, is also important. At the more local level, improving smaller roads can help link rural villagers with broader markets.

(...)

Targeted Livelihoods Support: Capital and Training

Capital is identified as the most pressing need for most villagers. As with active GAM, the potential use of capital varies from area to area depending on the economic opportunities in each area. However, villagers are, in general, confident that if the peace continues they will be able to re-build their lives and become economically self-sufficient, dependent on an initial investment of capital.

(...)

It is impossible to give working capital to all villagers who would like to receive it. Providing capital to all is untenable, both because of the cost of such a program and because it is clear that the Acehnese economy could not absorb such an injection of money without significant negative inflationary impacts. As such, it will be necessary to target capital at those most in need and who can make effective use of it.

The potential for capital to be misused means that other types of assistance will also be necessary to ensure sustainability, and that its provision should be closely monitored. Some respondents highlighted the risks of wastage in providing direct grants to villagers. A number of other alternatives were identified that could assist in improving livelihoods. In some instances villages and local level authorities requested assistance to improve the quality of agricultural harvests. This ranged from the provision of better equipment and access to seedlings and fertilizer to expert technical assistance to increase harvest yields. Villagers also requested training on financial management."

"Ninety-nine percent of returnee households indicated the presence of major problems within the community which required assistance in solving. Lack of economic opportunities (jobs and livelihood) was a main concern, followed by the need for the rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure that prevented trade and the sale outside of the village of whatever crops that were produced. Communities also cited the lack of security that resulted to the destruction and/or abandonment of economically productive lands and interrupted agricultural activities leading to the loss of production for the immediate season in the case of short-term crops and long-term crops, such as coffee and fruit tree plantations, as a concern that needs to be addressed urgently. Subsequently, the need for agricultural assistance ranked high as an urgent concern together with the need to improve the provision of basic services like health, education, water and sanitation, and village administration.

Given the range of problems identified as urgent in the communities, returnee/ex-IDP respondents presented several solutions. First is the extension of financial assistance, especially in the area of agricultural production and income-generating activities. Respondents also recommended the rehabilitation of infrastructure facilities, specifically roads and bridges, to improve access to their land and communities and facilitate delivery of goods produced from the villages. The maintenance of security is cited as important in order for the ordinary people to feel secure to work in their land and also confident that their belonging and implements will not be destroyed or their crops harvested by other parties. Also indicated as a major community concern is the inadequacy in the delivery of basic services, like health, water and sanitation, and education.

During displacement, only 74 percent of returnee households received assistance, mainly foodstuff like rice, cooking oil, instant noodles, canned fish, salt and sugar, dried and salted fish. About 50 percent of the returnees also received financial assistance in addition to food. Districts which registered a significant number and proportion of households that did not receive assistance during displacement were Aceh Selatan (55%) and Aceh Jaya (75%).

In terms of satisfaction, returnee respondent households from 51 percent of villages believed that the assistance they received from government during displacement was very poor mainly because such assistance was not enough to satisfy their needs. Close to half of the respondents indicated that the assistance received was acceptable while a minimal proportion (5%) said that the assistance was very satisfactory."

Concerns that long-term reintegration needs of returnees in Central Aceh and Bener Meriah not addressed (February 2006)

UNDP, May 2006, p.2

"If immediate humanitarian assistance remains needed for some of the IDP households, the main programmatic support now needed in is terms of housing and livelihoods.

Support and guidance for a mainstreamed registration process are needed. The data available at the kecamatan and district levels need to be consolidated to be able to quantify and qualify the needs for support.

- From those who have returned: where people came from/where they are going/numbers/needs/potential cleavages
- From those who will return (more research is needed) and there is additional research that should be undertaken to move beyond this information from Bener Meriah.

Immediate livelihoods recovery programmes are needed to facilitate the return and settlement of IDPs, while also contributing to peaceful coexistence with the communities of return.

Assistance must be distributed equitably and take into account the returns that have taken place since the MoU, i.e. mainly Gayo ethnic IDPs who returned prior to the latest IDP caseload."

WB, 16 January 2006, p. 2

"In last month's Update we noted the return of conflict-affected IDPs to Bener Meriah and Aceh Tengah. Since then, the situation appears to have stabilized but concerns remain. Local governments in the two districts have encouraged IDPs to move from the camps to their villages of origin. A large number appear to have done so. There have been some reports of tensions over this return. In a number of cases in Kesol sub-district, there has been fighting between local youths and returning IDPs, and local leaders have refused to provide security guarantees. However, these cases have been isolated and remain small in scale. In most cases, IDPs have returned without incident.

However, a number of concerns remain. First, while initial needs have been met, it is unclear how long these will last. The Government's plan is to replace initial assistance with longer-term livelihoods programs and with a house building program. However, development programs relating to other parts of the peace process, such as the reintegration of GAM, have not progressed beyond design stage; it is unclear that programs for IDPs will be operational any quicker. Second, data for targeting purposes is poor. The situation is complicated by the fact that the IDP population is very fluid—many have returned to Pidie and Bireuen, and other newcomers have arrived. Further, while the December returnees were predominantly ethnic Acehnese, other Gayonese and Javanese IDPs have been arriving more quietly, and will also need to receive benefits. Third, tensions in central Aceh remain higher than in other parts of the province. Returnees and villagers express a strong desire for peusijek (traditional ceremony of welcome or forgiveness) to be held, but local elites have yet to organize these. While concerns about a humanitarian or security crisis have subsided, ongoing monitoring of the situation is essential."

Survey shows returnees face major economic problems that require external assistance (September 2004)

- IOM-Government assessment shows the main problems faced by the returnees are of economic nature i.e loss of productive land, farm implement and livestock in the wake of their displacement and that they could not solve these problems without external help.
- Other problems encountered by the returnees included the damaged physical community infrastructure (roads, bridges) limiting the free movement of people, and goods and the limited availability of health care and education.

GoRI-IOM September 2004, p. 15

"Almost all respondents and villages indicated the presence of major problems in the community that they could not solve by themselves without the assistance from government and other organizations. Foremost among these problems was economic where economically productive lands were destroyed and/or abandoned due to armed conflict and displacement, thus, resulting to the loss of production for the immediate season in the case of short-term crops and long-term crops/investments such as coffee and fruit tree plantations. This was aggravated by the loss of farm implements and the theft, abandonment, or death of livestock which curtailed the households' capacity to produce animal product for sale or consumption. Other related economic problems of the communities was the presence of damaged/ destroyed community infrastructure,

particularly roads and bridges, that prevented the free movement of people and goods to and from the village.

Respondents indicated the prevalence of health and education problems needing immediate attention. Health problems were brought about by the lack of health personnel, limited availability of basic medicines in health care units, damage to health care units, distance of PUSKESMAS from the villages, and poor access to water and sanitation facilities. Education-related services and facilities, on the other hand, had become non-functional as damaged school buildings did not foster an effective teaching-learning environment, availability of teachers became limited, and schools were inaccessible (far from the communities). There had been a high drop-out rate among children of school-going age as parents could not afford to pay for school fees/expenses and children had to work to augment the family income."

Assessment shows drastic reduction in household income after displacement (September 2004)

- IOM-Government assessment revealed a significant reduction in household income after displacement, mainly due to the destruction of means of livelihood.
- The number of households without income rose by 509 percent after displacement. Non-IDP households were largely more affected.
- Underlining all these reasons for loss or reduced household income are disruptions in the security situation.
- Coping mechanisms included working as labourers, borrowing money from others, selling personal belongings and property or engaging in small business and farming activities.

IOM-GoRI September 2004, pp. 10-11

"There has been a significant reduction in household income after displacement. Of the total respondents, 205 households did not have income prior to displacement. However, this number rose to 1,248 households after displacement or an increase of 509 percent. Non-IDP households were largely more affected than the returnees/ex-IDPs and women respondent groups. For households with income, the number dipped from 1,907 households prior to displacement to 864 households after displacement or a reduction of 121 percent.

The bulk of respondent households (85%) cited a downtrend in income change while 14 percent of household respondents indicated no change in household income. Respondent households which experienced an increase in household income after displacement is placed at 1 percent. The destruction of the means of livelihood was the main reason for the reduction in household income. Rice fields became non-functional as such were untended, livestock were either lost or stolen, and houses that could be used for the establishment of small cafes were burned or damaged. Many of the community members did not have jobs or livelihood which were validated through actual observations made by the HPNA facilitators. The facilitators also noted the presence of psychological trauma as shown by the hostile attitude of some community members in Aceh Selatan and which was indicated as a contributory factor to their inability to gain employment. Underlining all these reasons for loss or reduced household income are disruptions in the security situation which hindered community members from engaging in livelihood activities.

To cope with the reduction in income, households performed piecework and worked as laborers - even going out of the village to get temporary employment. Other coping mechanisms included borrowing money from others, selling personal belongings and property, engaging in small business and farming activities, like developing small plots near their house into gardens for the

latter, and breeding livestock. A significant proportion of households had to reduce their consumption of food and other basic needs which subsequently resulted to the obvious prevalence of malnutrition among children in several districts."

Poverty on rise in Aceh since the May 2003 military operation (December 2003)

- Military operations has worsened already difficult living conditions for most civilians in Aceh.
- According to a local NGO, the number of people classified as poor in Aceh in 2001 was 1.2 million. In 2003 it was 1 703 897 people or around 40% of the population.
- Destruction of livelihoods has forced many children to start working in the informal sector in the capital
- According to the Central Statistics Agency of North Aceh, the conflict in North Aceh has caused 15 000 citizens to move to other areas since 1999

KONTRAS, 11 December 2003

"The Military Emergency has helped to worsen economic problems like unemployment, poverty and displacement of people. The people are less productive, as their freedom to make a living has been reduced by the poor security situation. Massive displacement of people has caused many people to stop being active participants in the economy and instead become passive consumers of state subsidies and charity. In the most extreme cases we are seeing the growth of a new class of beggars and vagrants in the cities of Langsa, Lhokseumawe, Bireun, sigli and Banda Aceh.

The loss of employment opportunities and the destruction of the people's economic infrastructure in the villages is very bad for Aceh. People's purchasing power has dropped between 2001 and 2003. The number of people classed as poor in Aceh in 2001 was 1.2 million. In 2003 it was 1 703 897 people or around 40.39% of the population. The number of the poorest people continues to grow in three regencies, namely North Aceh, East Aceh and Pidie. The number of openly unemployed has reached 48.8% of the 2 million-strong workforce.

The destruction of the people's economic livelihood has caused a rise in the number of street children and of children working in the informal sector. Information on children obtained by KontraS shows that there are 306 street children and children working in the informal sector in Banda Aceh. 75 % of these children said they were forced to work or to live on the streets because their families' livelihoods had been destroyed.

The flight of capital and labour power from the regions of Aceh, and from the provincial capital, has weakened the investment climate. Many village workers, accustomed to work in agriculture, plantations, and forestry, have moved to the city, and work in the informal sector as builders' labourers, street vendors, and, indeed, probably, many have become beggars or criminals. According to the Central Statistics Agency of North Aceh, the conflict in North Aceh has caused 15 000 citizens to move to other areas since 1999. The figure was obtained from comparing population projections before and after the election and household registration was carried out. Before the registration census the projection was a population of 467 000. After 90% of the registrations had been carried out, it was estimated that the real population of North Aceh is now 450 000, caused by the exodus from the terror and kidnappings.

The Military Emergency has led to frequent gun battles and other acts of violence which have caused price instability in traditional markets, as many are afraid to travel to work, and the availability of goods is therefore variable. Members of the security forces have become involved in 'mafia' operations smuggling imported goods from Singapore (luxury cars, sugar, etc) through

the Sabang free trade port, which has also worsened conditions in traditional markets. The cost of paying for the TNI and police to guard their goods is borne by the traders, which also leads to a rise in prices. The irregularity of supply of goods to Aceh is a secondary factor in all this - the primary factor is the lack of security for business in Aceh."

Livelihood opportunities for the displaced in West Kalimantan

Displaced Madurese have problems accessing land (August 2004)

- Access to land is very difficult for Madurese IDPs in West Kalimantan who are unable to return to Sambas.
- Many of the displaced who have been resettled by the government were unhappy with the quality of the soil provided near resettlement sites and left.
- Ownership of the land used by the displaced is unclear as it is claimed by the indigenous people.
- the remoteness of many resettlement sites make it difficult for IDPs to sell their products.

SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 91

"For the Madurese still displaced in West Kalimantan, who mainly are farmers, access to land has been a problem as they do not have the possibility of return to Sambas. The local community (for those integrated in a Madurese community in Singkawang district founded after the 1979 conflict between the Dayaks and the Madurese) has provided some land, but not in a scale similar to the land the IDPs used to cultivate. For the Madurese involved in the resettlement programme of the government, it is mainly the quality of the soil that has caused problems and many farmers have left the resettlement sites, because they were not able to get a living from the land offered. According to the IDPs, the land is state owned, but according to IOM staff, running a programme in the least developed sites, there are serious land disputes because some part of the land in the resettlement area, belong to the indigenous people.

Informants also reported that the host community in Singkawang, an old Madurese community who came to West Kalimantan in 1979 and are well adapted into the local culture of Malays and Dayaks, were afraid to be identified with the Madurese from Sambas. They did, however support the Madurese from Sambas when they arrived in Singkawang in 1999 in many ways.

The Madurese who still live in the resettlement sites do not want to be dependent on assistance, but as stated by one respondent from SP1: "We want to receive assistance on how to cultivate the land here in this location enabling us to be independent in the future so we can provide for our families and get a living, because we would now like to stay on this relocation site". The only way to access most relocation sites is by boat; accordingly the farmers have many difficulties with marketing and sale of their agricultural products. Besides this, the output of production per ha is only half of the output they used to have when living in Sambas. The women complained about how difficult it was to produce, transport and sell vegetables."

CRS, 31 March 2004, p. 25

"One of the most pressing issues in the relocation sites was land status. Some groups within the local host communities have made claims that parcels of land that were allocated to IDPs by the government in fact belonged to them. This situation has created disturbances that have negatively impacted livelihoods in some relocation sites. As part of the Peacebuilding program CRS-Gemawan attempted to investigate the root problem of this particular issue. The investigation process entailed conducting visits and interviews with local

community members that had made claims of land ownership, as well as relevant government officials at the village, Kecamatan (sub district), and Kabupaten (District) level. The resolution of the land status issue remains an on going process of discussion among related departments in the government. CRS as part of an alliance of INGOs in West Kalimantan facilitated meetings between IDPs, the affected local community members, and the government."

Livelihood opportunities for displaced from East Timor

Access to land is the main problem for former East Timorese refugees living in West Timor (May 2006)

- Between 28,000 and 100,000 former East Timorese refugees remain in West Timor
- Lack of access to land constrain their capacity to make a living

ICG, 4 May 2006, p. 2

"Most of those who have elected to stay live in two districts: Belu, which borders Bobonaro and Covalima in Timor-Leste, and Timor Tengah Utara (TTU), which borders Oecusse. Precisely how many there are is a matter of debate. Before it wound up its operations in West Timor at the end of 2005, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that about 10,000 former refugees were "living in conditions of concern", while 16,000 others had been resettled within West Timor. Other estimates are higher: a local NGO, CIS Timor, says 9,000 families (approximately 40,000 people) are in camps; the Belu district government lists 7,734 families still living in emergency housing in that district alone, while East Nusa Tenggara Governor Piet Tallo cited a figure of 104,436 individuals remaining in West Timor.

Uncertainty over the figures can take on a political edge: critics of the lower estimates say they are intended to overstate the success of efforts to assist former refugees or designed to downplay the level of support for autonomy (as opposed to independence) in 1999. Opponents of the higher figures say they have been inflated in an attempt to attract extra financial aid – a common practice in Indonesia.

A key underlying problem for uprooted people is access to land. Many communities gave land to the newcomers in 1999 on the assumption their presence would be temporary; some are now asking for it back. Local NGOs have had some success in brokering deals with communities for ex-refugees to buy land at below market rates, particularly in Belu district. Access is likely to be a sensitive issue in West Timor for the foreseeable future, however. Without it, many ex-refugees face difficulties earning a living, yet local communities complain of their own loss of access and environmental degradation as a result of increased population.

Tensions between local communities and ex-refugees rarely escalate into violence but they generate pressure on ex-refugees to return to Timor-Leste. A community leader in TTU told Crisis Group any problem involving ex-refugees tended to end in taunts: "This isn't your land; go back where you came from". Ex-refugees acknowledge local resentment but the calls to return to Timor-Leste are particularly galling for many who see their support for Indonesia in the 1999 referendum as the source of their predicament."

DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

General

ID cards are essential for IDP to buy land, get compensation for lots property and participate in elections (August 2004)

- The legal status of IDPs often complicates negotiations on the sale of the former land and property and compensation for property lost.
- IDPs in West Kalimantan got temporary identity cards that enabled them to participate in the elections.
- It is also possible to buy identity cards on the streets. Prices are however 6 times higher for IDPs. Many can't afford them.

SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 19

"As long as the IDPs do not have identity cards they are not able to buy land. Their legal status also complicates negotiations with the government concerning sale of their former land and other property left behind, as well as compensation for property lost. The IDPs in West Kalimantan managed, however, to get a temporary (during elections) identification enabling them to participate in the election. It is, however, possible to buy ID cards on the black market. The usual price in West Kalimantan is about IDR 5.000, (with the exchange rate of 10,000 IDR = 1 USD, this equals USD 0.5) but if an IDP wants to buy an identity card the current price is 30.000 IDR (USD 3), a cost not affordable for most IDPs. In North Maluku during the election period the IDPs without ID-cards faced many difficulties by being located in other areas than where they were registered. In the end many IDPs boycotted the election or were simply unable to vote and effectively disenfranchised."

Documentation needs (Aceh)

Some Acehnese reportedly required to present identity cards in order to receive humanitarian assistance (January 2005)

- Some Acehnese have reportedly been asked to produce ID cards (known as Red and White cards) in order to get humanitarian assistance.
- The Red and White cards, introduced in the first weeks of the May 2003 military offensive, served the purpose of separating GAM members from the broader community.

AI, 19 January 2005, p. 6

"Since the earthquake/tsunami, there have been reports from NAD that in some cases in order to access humanitarian assistance, Acehnese have been required to present identity cards (known as Red and White cards) and have been first subject to interrogation, on suspicion of being GAM members or supporters.

Red and White identity cards were introduced in the first few weeks of the military emergency with the aim of separating GAM members from the broader community. In order to obtain a card,

Acehnese were required to register at four different local government, military and police offices, undergo questioning and proclaim loyalty to the unitary state of Indonesia. Some Acehnese, particularly those who had been detained previously, did not register for a card because they feared that they would be arrested on suspicion of being GAM members or supporters. To require people to present the cards in order to access aid is unnecessary and discriminatory."

Documentation needs (West & Central Kalimantan)

Madurese IDPs in West Kalimantan denied identity cards and access to welfare assistance (August 2004)

- Madurese displaced from Sambas in 1999 lived in temporary buildings until 2002, when they opted for the reception of the empowerment package.
- In May 2003, assistance from the provincial government was stopped as the displaced no longer qualified as "IDPs".
- They should now be entitled to benefit from food distributions and social security services as "poors", but since they do not have identity cards they cannot avail from these services.
- According to the displaced themselves, the local government does not issue identity cards because they consider the IDPs' stay in the Marhaban village to be only temporary. Giving them ID cards would allow them to buy land.
- Some 78,000 ethnic Madurese who were displaced in 1999 in West Kalimantan and sought refuge in the capital Pontianak, where they stayed for 3 years, have been provided with relocation housing in 12 relocation sites.
- The displaced, who have become "settlers", are still in need of assistance. They have not been issued identity cards by the governments and are often denied access to basic public services.
- Also they don't have legal rights of use of the land and houses they have been allocated.

SIDA, 7 August 2004, pp. 88-89

"There are 30 farmer families living in this Madurese village in Singkawang district. When they had to flee Sambas district in 1999 the Government decided to move the IDPs to this village, where they lived in temporary buildings until 2002 when they decided to receive the empowerment package from the government aimed at integrating the IDPs in local communities of their own choice. As part of the package each family received:

- 5.000.000 IDR for housing cost of which they had to pay 500.000 IDR to administrative costs
- The money was provided in two rates: Nov. 2002 and Marts 2003
- In addition they had to buy land for the house by own means. Price: 1.000.000 IDR
- When the Madurese first arrived in the village they received:
- Water and sanitation assistance from IMC; rice from USAID and Japan
- Health assistance and help to pay additional costs for school attendance from World Vision

The first year the needs were met.

Later there were some time lack (6 months) in the delivery and the male Madurese had to work in a nearby gold mines (an illegal one) in order to survive.

May 2003 the assistance stopped from the state.

June 2003: Food supply from Java Post Group in cooperation with the Chinese community in West Kalimantan.

The women never participated in any activities targeted towards women and children.

After 2003 they were not labelled as IDPs any longer by the provincial government. They are now entitled to receive rice distributed to the poor and to benefit from services from the social security net, but the lack of identity cards makes them unable to receive these services. However, in cases where the head of households (non-IDP) living in the same village has identity papers the possibility exists to put one's name on this household's list.

The reason why the local government does not issue identity cards is (according to the former IDPs) that they consider the IDPs stay in the Marhaban village only temporarily. The IDPs themselves however, want to stay forever in Singkawang district. They rent the land they cultivate from the local government on a sharecropping basis (9/1). They try to sell their former land through middle men, because they can't go back to Sambas, but so far without any success. Because they do not have IDs they cannot buy new land. Not all houses in Sambas belonging to this group of people were burned down during the conflict, and some people try to sell their former houses. Many houses have however been taken over by poor people among the inhabitants of Sambas."

CRS, 31 March 2004, p. 28

"Formal residency status also continues to be a major issue. To date the government has failed to standardize the process that would allow IDPs to receive government issued ID cards (KTP). These ID cards are necessary to establish residency status as well as access government services such as subsidized health care."

OCHA, 9 April 2004, p. 21

"A conflict between ethnic Malay and Dayak groups on the one side, and ethnic Madurese migrants on the other, erupted in 1999 in Sambas and Singkawang, West Kalimantan, causing 78,000 Madurese to flee from their homes to the provincial capital Pontianak where they were accommodated in public facilities until June 2002. After the murder of several Madurese who had returned to Sambas to dispose of their property, the possibility of a general return of the IDPs was ruled out. Therefore the GoRI, through the Department of Manpower and Transmigration and the Department of Resettlement and Regional Infrastructure, provided relocation housing for most IDPs in 12 relocation sites. In addition to housing, the GoRI also provided 11,000 families of agricultural background with two hectares of agricultural land per family. Since their move to relocation sites, IDPs are being referred to as "Settlers".

(...)

While there has been some improvement of services and infrastructure, all problems affecting the settlers as well as the local community are far from resolved. The government has not issued identity cards to the settlers, which has limited or often denied them access to basic public services and determination of their legal status. The settlers do not have legal rights of use or ownership documentation for the government allocated agricultural land and houses at relocation sites."

Citizenship [East Nusa Tenggara]

Ex-refugees in West Timor to choose between Indonesian citizenship and temporary resident status (April 2004)

UNOCHA, 9 April 2004, p. 17

"A Presidential Decree adopted in May 2003 and subsequent instructions from the Department of Home Affairs provided the former refugees in West Timor with an opportunity to register either as Indonesian citizens or accept temporary resident status (in anticipation of future return). The registration is combined with the issuance of relevant documentation, including Identity Cards."

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

Religion and social cohesion in North Maluku

North Maluku marked by social segregation (July 2004)

UNDP, July 2004, p.16

"Generally, North Maluku is marked by social segregation rather than cohesion. Through the use of religious identity during the conflict, religions have been polarised and religious identity has hardened on both sides. In general, people are confident that violent communal conflict will not re-emerge again in North Maluku in the foreseeable future. Respondents gave the example of the latest violence of April 2004 in Ambon, which did not raise tensions in North Maluku. In particular, the Government of North Maluku held a provincial-level dialogue, an important proactive action that played an important role in reducing tensions and preventing conflict.

In villages in Ternate, where both religious groups lived together before the conflict, they are now divided. In Ternate, there is a strong distrust of the youth, a result of previous conflict where certain youth acted as provocateurs and combatants. In the case of Tobelo and Galela sub-districts, for example, people spoke of high levels of trust, association and joint activities before the conflict, but social relations and trust are no longer as before even though many displaced people have returned to their homes. Sports, for example, soccer in Jailolo and volleyball in Kao / Malifut, were popular forms of crosscommunity association but unfortunately these associations were discontinued after the conflict. Interestingly, in villages where adat or traditional customary law remains strong, such as in many adat villages in Sahu and Jailolo sub-districts (West Halmahera), trust and inter-group association can still be found and social cohesion has been maintained even after the conflict. Customary (adat) mechanisms tend, however, to have their limitations and only work for internal community matters.

Evidence from those met during the assessment in these three districts, indicates that there is a lack of integration upon returning and that the building of social relations between groups involved in the conflict has not received sufficient attention. As one experienced community worker put it, "things look normalised in most places, but it is not back to normal". IDPs have, on the whole, returned to their areas, but often they moved to neighbouring villages of the same religion, and public facilities such as schools are now effectively one religion, where previously they were mixed. Social problems have developed with returning IDPs, which cause tension, particularly if they are of a different ethnic or religious culture.

The variation of the impact of North Maluku's conflict on social cohesion from one place to another demands a closer examination."

Family unity in West Kalimantan

Family unity difficult to maintain for mixed marriages in West Kalimantan (August 2004)

- Women in mixed marriages found it very difficult to maintain family unity after displacement.

SIDA 7 August 2005, p. 92

"In West Kalimantan where the ethnic tension is still very high the Madurese didn't have any contacts with former neighbours and friends in Sambas. For **women in mixed marriages** this caused a lot of problems. If the husband was a Madurese, the wife could stay in Sambas if she wished, but all the boys belonged to their father's family and left Sambas together with him. The girls could stay with the mother if they wanted. Madurese women married to Malays or Dayaks were allowed to stay in Sambas. Some women married to Madurese men stayed more permanently in Sambas, but some visited their husbands in the resettlement sites. It was, however, more difficult for women to get jobs in the informel sector in the resettlement sites compared to the possibilities in Sambas and Pontianak, and many women had to live separated from their husbands for economic reasons. Polygamy is very wide spread among Madurese, but it was not possible for the team to find out, if the rate of polygamy had increased due to displacement. We heard, however, about a man having wives in several relocation sites, as intra-village endogamy is not common."

PROPERTY ISSUES

General

Most clashes reported in Maluku province in 2005 linked to land disputes (December 2005)

- During 2005, most of the inter and intra village clashes reported in the province resulted from land disputes, often linked with return and relocation movement of IDPs.
- The housing problem remains unresolved for an officially estimated 63,971 families, or 332,548 people with scores of families are still occupying buildings and shops.
- Only a fraction of new homes have been built by the government compared to the number of refugees.
- Government is providing financial aid for families to build their own homes.
- IDPs are being asked to leave all government facilities, and problems related to the occupation of buildings and homes are likely to arise in a matter of time.
- Lawyers are particularly concerned with the possibility of property disputes when more people return to their homes

CARDI, December 2005, p. 2

"In more rural areas like West Seram, an intriguing issue appeared regarding land right disputes amongst re-integrated communities. One clear example is the recent incident at Taniwel sub-district in November 2005, when returnees of Wakolo were attacked by their neighbouring Lisabata villagers after accusations of land right violations. Historical perspectives and traditional arrangements often complicate the fragile peace and reconciliation among re-integrated communities. In addition, the poor implementation of official land registration policy predates, and likely contributes to, the communal conflict. Still today, sensitive land rights issues are only reluctantly addressed by authorities.

(...)

Investigations revealed that most inter and intra village clashes resulted from land disputes. Land property disputes are often birthed by legislative problems—lack of land certificate ownership and other traditional law and arrangements. Some of these cases are intertwined with recent return and relocation movements of IDPs. Total of 14—nearly half of the 29 total incidents—occurred during the months of March and May."

The Jakarta Post, 13 October 2003

"Whether and when the state of civil emergency was lifted in Maluku was not really of any great importance to many residents.

The final lifting of the emergency status on Sept. 5. was merely official recognition that residents have long been capable of being in charge of their own safety.

Trust in each other has taken root again, though not to the point that Muslims and Christians again want to live among each other ("Maybe in 10, 20 years," says one refugee).

With returned confidence of being able to cross the lines which earlier defined life and death, even well after dark, people shrug off questions about how things are different now than they were under the emergency status.

Earlier this year people were already grateful that they could use land transportation instead of the more expensive speedboats to reach "Muslim" or "Christian" areas.

Now they are more concerned about how the government is taking care of the provision of basic needs.

The housing problem remains unresolved for an officially estimated 63,971 families, or 332,548 people. The capital houses refugees from other areas affected by the war which broke out in 1999 -- and Ambon residents themselves have moved from one area to another within the city.

Scores of families are still occupying buildings and shops, the interiors divided up by planks to separate families. Lawyers and journalists are among those spending their fourth year returning from work to cramped quarters and neighbors' screaming babies. Only a fraction of new homes have been built by the government compared to the number of refugees -- and many of them have remained empty.

Therefore a new scheme was introduced; the provision of financial aid for families to build their own homes.

Since homes often accommodate up to five families under one roof, the 21-square-meter studio homes built by the government were far from appealing. Moreover, only a few refugees trusted authorities' claims that their home villages or neighborhoods were safe enough for them to return.

For thousands of families, it's a long wait to get the promised aid of a few million rupiah (the amount differs according to location) to help them rebuild their homes.

The priority is for refugees outside Ambon, and those whose neighbors in their home villages have said are welcome to return. This confirmation of welcome is crucial because "neighbors" often means those of the same religion as people who attacked the villages, though the attackers may have come from outside the area.

Given this slow development, victims have sought their own solutions -- and part of these efforts could become new sources of conflict. Refugees recall how they escaped fires only with the clothes on their backs -- but eventually some were able to gather enough money to buy abandoned homes.

In a number of neighborhoods such as Batumerah in Ambon, Muslims asked neighbors to buy or sell homes for them.

Problems may arise in the cases of those who have not sold their homes, which have been occupied by others since the buildings were abandoned. This is apart from the refugees living in stores whose owners seem to have no choice but let them live there for free, rather than face resistance from a dozen families or so in each of the three to four-story buildings. And also scores of families living in the Army's dormitory in Tantui district -- leaving soldiers to seek shelter elsewhere, including in shop-houses.

The Army has already asked the refugees to leave, only to get the stubborn, standard answer: "Find us a home first."

Refugees are being asked to leave all government facilities, and other problems related to the occupation of buildings and homes are likely to arise in a matter of time.

Lawyers at the new Baku Bae Legal Aid Office are particularly concerned with the possibility of property disputes. "This will be a new source of conflict," says its director, Anthoni Hutane.

At the moment, occupying empty homes and buildings seems to be the only choice in the long wait for assistance. But sooner or later an increased feeling of safety might lead to more people returning to their homes -- and squabbles with the occupants.

As in a number of cases, the owner should expect to pay a "guarding fee" to persuade the occupant to leave, amounting to several million rupiah for guarding the house for a number of years.

Hutane's office is preparing an inventory of land ownership in case of disputing land claims.

These, then, are some of the issues feared to divide people again in the future. For now, there are several encouraging signs of a community coming together again, as reflected in the vegetable and fish markets, and on the sports grounds where aspiring soccer players practice. "

Land and property rights issue constrain return process in North Maluku (December 2005)

CARDI, December 2005, p. 1

"The viability of government initiatives for IDPs' is uncertain because questions remain regarding the national-provincial-district government's funding and the availability of budget allocations for housing provisions for local contractors. A pattern is also emerging regarding government initiatives for IDPs in 2004-2005. Only 1,354 hh (42%) of the 3,193 IDP hh were found to be returning to their former communities while a greater number, 1,839 hh (58%), pursued resettlement options. It is predicted that this will also be the case for the remaining 15,000 IDPs' hh. This is one of the realities facing Maluku, especially in urban setting like Ambon city where residential segregations developed from the government's relocation strategy and sometimes through personal initiative. In more rural areas like West Seram, an intriguing issue appeared regarding land right disputes amongst re-integrated communities. One clear example is the recent incident at Taniwel sub-district in November 2005, when returnees of Wakolo were attacked by their neighbouring Lisabata villagers after accusations of land right violations. Historical perspectives and traditional arrangements often complicate the fragile peace and reconciliation among re-integrated communities. In addition, the poor implementation of official land registration policy predates, and likely contributes to, the communal conflict. Still today, sensitive land rights issues are only reluctantly addressed by authorities."

Former East Timorese refugees living in West Timor struggle to get compensation for assets left behind in Timor-Leste (December 2005)

- Ex East Timorese refugees now living in West Timor have been trying since 2002 to get compensation for assets left behind since 1999. A total of USD 26 million is asked as compensation.
- Timor-Leste has a long and complicated history of population displacement and illegal occupation of land and property.
- The high level of illegal occupation of land and property in the capital, Dilli, has seriously undermined the possibility to solve these disputes.
- Land and property claims from Indonesian migrants to East-Timor who fled in 1999 are highly sensitive. As foreigners, they cannot reclaim ownership of land and property lost. Although

only 3,000 of such claims exist, it is thought that an additional 10,000 have not been registered so far.

The Jakarta Post, 20 December 2005

"Hundreds of displaced persons from East Timor taking refuge in East Nusa Tenggara province demanded on Monday that the central government compensate them with Rp 263 billion (US\$26.3 million) for the assets they left behind in East Timor following the 1999 autonomy plebiscite.

The displaced persons of East Nusa Tenggara origin raised their demands in a protest outside the provincial council building on Monday ahead of the ending of their status as displaced persons as of Dec. 31 of this year.

In their statements, read by Imanuel Ndun, the coordinator handling displaced persons' assets in East Timor, now known as Timor Leste, the protesters called on President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono not to forget his campaign promises, including not to abandon displaced persons from Timor Leste or their possessions.

"At that time (of the election), he said that if he was elected the President, he would pay attention to our assets like houses, land, vehicles and important documents, but he hasn't," he said.

Some 14,000 families of East Nusa Tenggara origin are now living in the province as displaced persons.

According to Imanuel, the total amount of assets left behind during the period of communal violence that followed the UN-sponsored plebiscite in September 1999 was more than Rp 1.62 trillion. This estimate, he added, was made on the basis that all the assets had been destroyed by fire, plus what remained after the plebiscite.

Head of East Nusa Tenggara provincial administration's social services office, Frans Salem, said the administration has worked to meet the demands of the displaced persons but was hampered by foreign diplomacy problems.

"Governor Piet A. Tallo has conveyed the compensation matter to the central government," he said, adding that all policies related to displaced persons fell under the authority of the central government, not the provincial administration."

Writenet, February 2005, pp. 33-34

"Timor-Leste has a long history of population displacement resulting from foreign invasion and violent conflict. During periods of Japanese as well as Indonesian occupation, those who fled or were forcibly removed from their land and homes often found their property occupied by others on their return, which could then generate new layers of conflict. There is little publicly available information on land and property claims relating specifically to current returnees. This is partly due to the already complicated and overlapping web of ownership disputes, some of which could place returnee claims in conflict with those made by Portuguese era land and property owners. Additionally, returnees as a group appear to have to some extent undermined the political will to resolve their cases, through the high level of illegal occupation of property in Dili following the return of refugees and IDPs. In part this was a result of IOM and UNHCR repatriation activities, which concentrated some 53,000 returnees in Dili and contributed to an urban migration that saw an estimated 50% of houses in the city being illegally occupied.

While an unidentified number of returnees have found their own homes illegally occupied, there have also been cases where returnees have illegally occupied the vacant property belonging to other Timorese, who fled in 1999 and have yet to return. In addition returning refugees and IDPs took over vacated Indonesian government buildings, following the withdrawal of Indonesian civil servants, business people, and local militia members. Inevitably this enabled some to profit handsomely during the early transitional period, by occupying multiple houses and then renting them out to other locals, or to internationals, when rents could range from US\$ 600 to US\$ 3,000 per month.

Many Indonesian migrants, who came to Timor-Leste prior to 1999, also fled during the militia violence and, in practical terms, became refugees in other parts of Indonesia. They lost their property and homes without any compensation, and had no social assistance provided to them by the Indonesian government. Land claims originating from these Indonesian citizens are sensitive, particularly in the case of militia elements and autonomy supporters who have remained in West Timor and other parts of Indonesia, and who have taken up Indonesian citizenship. While it is not legally possible for them to reclaim ownership of land in Timor-Leste, given constitutional provisions barring foreigners from owning land, demands for compensation or access are liable to create highly politicized social conflict. Out of a total of 4,269 land claims made by April 2004, 3,141 were registered by foreigners, 2,016 of which related to property in Dili. It is estimated that approximately 10,000 claims from Indonesian residents have yet to be registered.

Law No 01/2003 on the Juridical Regime of Real Estate Ownership sets out some of the difficulties confronting land claims generally. The law, as well as the Constitution, are fairly clear that illegal occupation of property is a criminal offence with defined procedures for a legal owner to reacquire property. The issue seems not to rest with the legal framework per se (which is still developing), but rather with complicated claims that make it difficult to activate existing procedures, given numerous cases of overlapping and contested legal ownership."

The Jakarta Post, 28 April 2003

"More than 500 East Timorese people still taking refuge in West Timor held a protest recently in front of the East Nusa Tenggara provincial legislative council, demanding the Indonesian government compensate them for the assets they left behind in East Timor.

The protesters said that they had earlier submitted the compensation request to Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare Jusuf Kalla, but had failed to attract his attention.

Should the demand be denied, the protesters plan to boycott the 2004 general election by not voting in it. As a display of affirmative action, the refugees will refuse to comply with the voter registration process.

There are about 5,000 East Timorese households in East Nusa Tenggara.

"For whatever reason, all of the assets that we left in East Timor must be compensated for. Should the government fail to fulfill our demands, all refugees will boycott the election next year," said Imanuel Ndoen, coordinator of the handling of refugees' assets in East Timor.

Chairman of East Nusa Tenggara provincial House of Representatives Woda Pale and his deputy Nicolas Wolly have suggested that protesters review their boycott decision, as the government is still considering the matter.

Meanwhile, head of the Bureau of Social Affairs Stanis Tefa said that the government would soon establish branches to record the assets owned by East Timorese Indonesians. However, he

declined to guarantee that the data collection process would be followed up by payment of compensation, as requested by the protesters.

"We shall submit the demand to the Department of Foreign Affairs in the near future for a reply," he said.

According to Imanuel, the total assets left behind during the period of communal violence that followed the UN-sponsored referendum in September 1999 was more than Rp 1.62 trillion (US\$182 million)."

Land and housing rights in Aceh primarily a problem of scale (July 2005)

UNDP & Oxfam, 14 July 2005, pp. 3-7

The earthquake and tsunami of December 26, 2004, and the subsequent earthquake of March 28, 2005, damaged or destroyed over 300,000 homes and displaced over 500,000 people in NAD alone. Substantial damage was also done to governmental and non-governmental systems of land administration. The government of the Republic of Indonesia (ROI) has identified reconstruction of land rights as a key element of the rehabilitation phase, which is to run from April 2005 to December 2006.

(...)

Land rights in NAD fall into two basic categories: statutory land titles and customary (adat) rights. Most records relating to both types of land rights were damaged or destroyed in the December 26 tsunami. Where no records existed, the social infrastructure underpinning certainty of land rights has also been affected by the deaths of community leaders and the loss, in some cases, of entire communities. These circumstances demand a rapid response to ensure a solid foundation of land rights certainty for the process of reconstruction. This foundation should encompass certificated and uncertificated land, governmental and non-governmental activity. It is important not only to minimise land disputes, but also to provide sufficient legal and social certainty for re-building, shelter, livelihood and credit programs.

(...)

It follows that the situation in NAD may be characterised as primarily one of displacement and the need for sustainable return. While some instances of dispossession will occur, creating the need for judicial processes of restitution, the overwhelming priority must be on governmental and community-based mechanisms for ensuring tenure security in circumstances that demand relatively quick return.

(...)

In summary, it is fair to conclude that the problem of land and housing rights in tsunami-affected NAD is more one of sheer scale than underlying complexity. At the moment the institutions involved in processing the claims of over half a million displaced Acehnese are overwhelmed by the size and urgency of the task."

Many IDPs in Aceh returned only to find their homes destroyed and property stolen (July 2005)

- IDPs in Bireuen regency returning home after staying in a camp found that many of their belongings had been stolen and their homes seized.
- Owners of food and coffee kiosks have lost their stocks while many peasants have lost their livestock or crops while being away from their homes and lands

RSC, July 2005, p.17

"The displaced did not only face difficulties when they were in the camps. In most cases, people returned to their homes only to find everything had gone: their livestock, their televisions, their furniture. It remains unclear who took their belongings."

KONTRAS, 11 December 2003

"In Bireuen regency, the refugees camped at Cot Gapu had lost all their belongings after they fled, as was reported by Serambi. The sufferings these residents of Juli district experienced while in the camp at Cot Gapu have not ended although they were returned to their villages a week ago. Many have become poverty-stricken because their homes and stores have been seized. The security forces say they have not yet received a report on this case of theft that has ruined so many villagers. Because of the seizures the home-owners say they have lost televisions, fridges, tape recorders, bicycles and other household goods.

The same fate has been experienced by the owners of food and coffee kiosks. They've lost stock like cigarettes, snacks, clothes and medicines. They don't know who has taken these things, and they hope the government will enforce the law. As well as the losses in goods and household items, there are not a few who have lost livestock, homes and shops are destroyed, and thousands of hectares of rice-paddy has dried out because the irrigation was not maintained for nearly a month. This was reported by a number of residents of Juli Kedue Dua and Setuy. The keuchik - village head –of Juli Keude Dua added that he lost a 29-inch TV and Phoenix-brand bicycle."

Resettled Madurese IDPs in West Kalimantan face land disputes with local population (March 2004)

CRS, 31 March 2004, pp.25-28

"One of the most pressing issues in the relocation sites was land status. Some groups within the local host communities have made claims that parcels of land that were allocated to IDPs by the government in fact belonged to them. This situation has created disturbances that have negatively impacted livelihoods in some relocation sites. As part of the Peacebuilding program CRS-Gemawan attempted to investigate the root problem of this particular issue. The investigation process entailed conducting visits and interviews with local community members that had made claims of land ownership, as well as relevant government officials at the village, Kecamatan (sub district), and Kabupaten (District) level. The resolution of the land status issue remains an on going process of discussion among related departments in the government. CRS as part of an alliance of INGOs in West Kalimantan facilitated meetings between IDPs, the affected local community members, and the government.

(...)

The ongoing problem of land ownership is multi-layered. At the heart of the problem is an apparent failure on the part of the local government to justly compensate local community members for private land that was designated by the government to be used as part of the relocation sites.

This situation has caused and will continue to cause conflict between the IDPs and the local community. It also inhibits the progress of sustainable agriculture programs that are related to long-term plantation since people are reluctant to work on lands that are not fully owned by them. Resolution of this problem at the government level is being hindered by a lack of coordination between departments and uncertainty in authority/responsibility between the Province and District levels of government."

Land and property issues as well as more accurate information on available options remain to be addressed (2004)

- Despite the adoption of the GPID as a non-binding basis for the government's IDP strategy and policy, the following rights call for special attention in 2004:
- right to accurate and consistent information, especially on available options for durable solutions and types and contents of assistance packages;
- right to citizenship and identity papers;
- right to land/property ownership.

OCHA, 9 April 2004, pp. 7-8

"Although the GPID have been unanimously accepted and serve as a non-binding basis for the government's strategy and policy to address IDP issues, continuous efforts are required to protect the following rights:

right to accurate and consistent information, especially on available options for durable solutions and types and contents of assistance packages;
right to citizenship and identity papers;
right to land/property ownership.

At the Follow-up Workshop on the Management of IDPs in June 2003, the suggestion was made to establish a special committee to deal with land ownership and certification and the recovery of abandoned or surrendered property. If and once established, the committee would be expected to accelerate the return process, as lack of action on this issue has been one of the major disincentives for IDPs to return. Participating departments, donors, UN agencies and NGOs confirmed their commitment to protect IDP rights and to the GPID, which is important given the GoRI's stand that IDPs need to find durable solutions by the end of 2003 and will no longer be considered as internally displaced in 2004.

Challenges for the protection of all conflict-affected persons remain, as human rights violations such as torture, sexual abuses, murder, and limited or denied access to humanitarian assistance continue to be reported in parts of the country."

Most IDPs who fled violence in Central Sulawesi lost property certificates and other legal documents (2004)

- Many of the estimated 124,000 people who were forced to flee their homes during the Poso conflict lost certificates and legal documents.
- Many properties were illegally seized in the absence of the owners while some IDPs had to sell their homes/lands at a fraction of their original value.
- Without the proper legal ownership documents, it is difficult to resolve land disputes.
- One of the root cause of the conflict has been land rights.

OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 66

"The conflict in Poso District displaced over 124,000 people. Most of those displaced were forced to leave their homes in a rush often carrying nothing more than the clothes they were wearing. Most of the IDPs lost certificates and other legal documents that had provided them with access to credit and legal titles. Many of the IDPs had taken credit on their property and after being displaced they defaulted on their loans. In many cases the land title is unclear. The land

certification process is cumbersome and is too often not undertaken by the poor for reasons of cost and awareness.

During the conflict, at the time of greatest displacement, often people on the opposite side in the conflict illegally seized the property of those displaced. In addition, forest and communal land were encroached upon, leading to land disputes. Some IDPs managed to sell their property but in most cases for a mere fraction of the market price. In extreme cases some families lost 90% of the original value of the land. The loss of legal ownership documents made it difficult to resolve local land claim disputes and this has the potential to generate new rounds of violence. Often these disputes are exploited by more radical elements of society.

It is important to note that while the conflict in Poso has manifested itself through inter-communal violence, one of the root causes of the conflict is land rights. Protecting legal entitlements to land and acknowledging indigenous land claims are essential steps if peace in Poso is to be sustained."

No cooperation between Aceh and North Sumatra authorities to protect IDP property (April 2003)

- Most IDPs in North Sumatra would like to return and repossess their property
- Protection of IDP property has not been discussed between source and recipient authorities

OCHA, April 2003

"Most IDPs would like to return to their place of origin, repossess their property but security remains the only impediment for their return. Some IDPs are reluctant and expressed that they will never return due to same security reason and past bitter memory. The second group is much comfortable in their current place of displacement.

(...)

There has been no official communication between provincial authorities of Aceh (IDPs originated from) and N. Sumatra (hosting IDPs) in regard to mutual solution to the problem. Protection of the IDPs properties, repossession rights and/or compensation are important factors should be discussed at the provincial level to establish working relationship in finding durable solution."

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General

1.3 million IDPs returned between 2001-2004

OCHA, 3 September 2004

"A local newspaper, Serambi, quoted Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare a.i., A. Malik Fajar, on Saturday (28 Aug.), saying that the government had managed to return around 1.3 million IDPs during 2001 – 2004 period and will settle the remaining 300,000 people scattered in Maluku and Aceh provinces. Three options given by the government include 1) return to places of origin with cash assistance of IDR 8.7 million (USD 940), 2) remain in shelters provided by the government and working capital, and 3) join transmigration programme. Minister of Social Affairs, Bachtiar Chamsyah, said that most of the IDPs opted to return to their origin villages. It is expected that the remaining IDP problems can be settled within two months."

Maluku IDPs

Majority of those who returned in Maluku during 2004-2005 opted for relocation instead of return (December 2005)

- 58 per cent of IDPs who returned in Maluku province during 2004/05 chose to be resettled instead of returning to their homes.
- CARDI believe this trend will also apply to the estimated 60,000 still waiting to return in the province

CARDI, December 2005, pp.1-2

"The viability of government initiatives for IDPs' is uncertain because questions remain regarding the national-provincial-district government's funding and the availability of budget allocations for housing provisions for local contractors. A pattern is also emerging regarding government initiatives for IDPs in 2004-2005. Only 1,354 hh (42%) of the 3,193 IDP hh were found to be returning to their former communities while a greater number, 1,839 hh (58%), pursued resettlement options. It is predicted that this will also be the case for the remaining 15,000 IDPs' hh. This is one of the realities facing Maluku, especially in urban setting like Ambon city where residential segregations developed from the government's relocation strategy and sometimes through personal initiative."

For more information on areas of return or resettlement during 2004/05, see the following maps:

-[Areas of Return in Ambon Island 2004-2005](#), CARDI, December 2005

-[Resettlement Areas in Ambon Island 2004-2005](#), CARDI, December 2005

-[Areas of Return in Haruku and Saparua Islands 2004-2005](#), CARDI, December 2005

-[Areas of Return & Resettlement in Seram Island 2004-2005](#), December 2005

Limited funding, corruption, insecurity and land ownership disputes constrain return & resettlement of IDPs in Maluku province (October 2005)

- Estimates of the number of people still displaced in Maluku range from 60,000 to 113,000
- Constraints to return & resettlement include insecurity, destroyed houses, land ownership disputes, obtainment of land, lack of job opportunities at relocation sites, discontent of the size of the houses provided and lack of information on possible option for IDPs.
- Deadline for implementation of the National Policies on Handling of IDPs/Refugees in Indonesia issued in October 2001 has been extended to the end of June 2003 and is likely to be extended again.
- Limited funding is also constraining return.

An estimated 60,000 IDPs in Maluku province remain unassisted as of end 2005

UNDP, 2005, p. 54

"In 1999, the Maluku government set up a special coordinating working group (Pokja) to deal with the IDP situation in the province. The Pokja was tasked with overseeing programmes aimed at alleviating the suffering of IDPs and facilitating their return, as well as coordinating with other national institution such as BAKORNAS, the national body for IDP management. Through the Department of Social Affairs and the Department of Manpower and Transmigration, the national government allocated IDR 3.75 million (USD375) per IDP family, to be dispersed through aid and assistance packages. As of end 2002, however, it was reported that only 10,000 out of an estimated 64,000 IDP families had received these funds. More success has been achieved in the rehabilitation of housing; in 2002, around 22,000 of the estimated 49,000 houses destroyed had been rehabilitated, mostly under the auspices of the two departments mentioned above and the Department of Resettlement and Regional Infrastructure.

Acknowledging the slow rate of progress, the government also allocated money to assist returnees to construct their own homes, although this has reportedly resulted in an increase in property disputes. More recently, following the upsurge in violence in April 2004, the government budgeted an additional IDR 33 billion (US\$ 3.3 million) for immediate assistance to the estimated 10,000 new IDPs.

(...)

The respective provincial governments' efforts to resolve the IDP situation in both Maluku and North Maluku have been further complicated by increasing resentment among the non-displaced population against what is seen as preferential treatment of IDPs by the government. A lack of coordination has also been reported between provincial and district authorities in North Maluku. Efforts to resolve the IDP situation have been further complicated by the "confusing deadlines" of the national government. Nonetheless, the experience of IDP management in North Maluku has been broadly successful and has received plaudits from the UN for its "very serious commitment" to the problem. Although the Provincial Government of North Maluku has been relatively successful in handling the IDP situation, the UNDP Governance Assesment of North Maluku found major gaps in local government capacity. Major obstacles facing the complete resolution of the IDP problem include corruption in the management of funds as well as the reluctance of IDPs and host communities to support government relocation initiatives. In November 2004, Suara Pembaharuan reported that IDPs in the village of Waai had not received IDR6 billion (US\$600,000) of allocated aid. IDPs in Waitatiri village in Central Maluku who had fled from neighbouring Banda district reportedly refused relocation to state-built housing until they received repatriation funds. Similarly, intended host communities for relocated IDPs, such as Lisabata in West Seram district, have refused to accept them."

Local government acknowledge USD 33 million still needed to assist remaining IDPs

OCHA, November 2004

"The local government of Maluku admitted that the problems confronting IDPs cannot be settled by the end 2004 and some USD 33 million (IDR 300 billion) is required to provide for the needs of remaining 22,688 IDP families in the Province. The central government has allocated USD 8 million (IDR 70 billion) this year to help some 6,900 HH, while another 15,788 HH will receive assistance from next year's budget."

Maluku government officials accused of embezzlement of IDP funds

OCHA, October 2004

"Ambon Mayor, MJ Papilaja, alleged that officials of the Maluku provincial government may have embezzled IDR 9 billion (USD 957,446) of government assistance for IDPs in Ambon and other cities in Maluku depriving them of the assistance. Meanwhile, the Ambon District Court has opened the trial of a senior Maluku social welfare official charged with misappropriating some 1,975 tonnes of rice worth IDR 4.1 billion (USD 455,555). The rice should have been distributed to IDPs who had fled their homes during the three years of conflict which started in 1999."

Many obstacles to return/relocation

OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 18

"Impediments to the return of the remaining IDPs are identified as follows: 1) security, especially for minority groups in religiously mixed villages/locations; 2) property/land disputes; 3) inadequate social services and economic opportunities at return/resettlement sites; 4) limited local capacity particularly in data collection and information dissemination; and 5) insufficient funding for provision of assistance. Though the security situation has improved in Ambon City, it is feared that many of the IDPs there may not be able to return to their places of origin within the city, as it is still deeply divided and property disputes remain."

Bakornas & OCHA April 2003, pp. 2-3

"Main constraints for return and resettlement/relocation have been identified as follows:

Security: Some IDPs maintain contacts with the former neighbours in the villages of origin, but do not feel comfortable to permanently return. Some expressed concerns that people outside the village of origin may come in and displace them again.

Destroyed or occupied houses

Land ownership disputes: Some IDPs have certificates for their land, but others don't. The land of IDPs has often been occupied by IDPs from different villages, which further complicates the matter. So far, the Government has not done much to mediate the cases.

Identification and obtainment of land: If IDPs wish to be relocated, it is IDPs' responsibility to obtain land at their own cost. Then, the provincial government will build houses for them on the location. Often cases, IDPs do not have enough funds to buy land.

Lack of job opportunities at relocation sites: For those IDPs who work as labourers at harbours in Ambon city, incentives to be relocated far away from the city would be very low. Not all IDPs have experience in farming/agriculture. On this point, the Government has been mapping IDPs' occupations and seeking possibilities of providing vocational training if necessary.

Discontent with the size of provided houses: Dinas PU provides one type of house T21. The house is too small for IDPs as two to three families used to live together in one house. Some

IDPs are not aware of the size of the house they are getting, though they agree to be relocated. (NB: Dinas Social provides housing materials and Dinas Nakertrans also provides housing materials but only partially).

Lack of clear information on possible options for IDPs: Some IDPs heard that others received empowerment/termination funds already, which is not the case. It appears that IDP coordinators individually contact various Governmental units to register their concerns, but their concerns/claims have not gone through the right channel.

Though the deadline for implementation of the National Policies on Handling of IDPs/Refugees in Indonesia issued in October 2001 has been extended to the end of June 2003, OCHA learned that the Provincial Government has requested further extension, as they could only find solutions for 3 districts: West South East Maluku, South East Maluku and Buru within the given timeframe. The Government identified the following constraint in addition to the above:

Limited funding: There are IDPs from Maluku in South East Sulawesi, East Java and North Sulawesi waiting to be returned. Though transportation will be handled by the Provinces of refuge, other support costs have to be provided by the Province of origin, Maluku province."

Many of the houses and barracks built for IDPs are inappropriate and remain empty (April 2004)

- Many of the 35,000 new houses built in Ambon and nearby islands remain reportedly empty because of their small size and lack of facilities.
- Also, many IDPs are reported to spend the cash they receive from the government on luxury good rather than on housing and essential items.

CCDA, 25 April 2004

"According to authorities in charge, up to now about 35 thousand new houses have been built for refugees in Ambon and nearby islands. However, apparently many of these remain vacant, because they are very small and lack facilities like water and electricity. Public facilities are not available either. So a number of refugees have returned to their refugees sites, where they enjoy the luxury of these amenities.

In many cases the government leaves it to the refugees themselves to build their houses, providing for each family a maximum of 10 million rupiahs (± EUR 980,-). However, not seldom the temptation to spend this "unbelievable" amount of money on luxury goods is too strong... That is why they usually receive part of their share in natura : cement, wood, etc. But these materials, too, not seldom are sold to others..."

Goss, Jon, January 2004

"Progress has been made on the return of IDPs, but many remain in camps unsure whether their communities are safe. There is a severe housing problem, with as many as 64,000 families still homeless (Nurbaiti 2003). Most of these are in camps established in Ambon, Ternate and Sulawesi, but squatting is endemic in urban shop houses and government offices. In other cases, people cannot return to their homes, even if their neighbors will accept them, either because they have been destroyed or because they are occupied by others. Sometimes the new occupants are themselves displaced from their villages, and speculative settlers demand "guarding fees" for the right of return. Government built housing has proven inadequate and corruption has plagued assistance programs. Baku Bae representatives express fear that property disputes will "new source of conflict" (in Nurbaiti 2003)."

See also: "[Maluku residents say no to returnees](#)", Jakarta Post, 29 November 2004

North Maluku IDPs

Majority of the displaced in North Maluku have returned (2006)

- As of early 2006, CARDI estimated that some 15,500 people remained displaced in North Maluku.
- As of mid-2004, 75% to 85% of the displaced had already returned. Between 15% and 20% of the total number of displaced remained displaced within North Maluku and another 5% in North Sulawesi
- Most of the Muslims affected by the conflict were displaced to Ternate, while most of the Christians went to North Sulawesi and towns to the North-East of Halmahera island (particularly Tobelo).
- Many families displaced in Manado have decided to stay in North Sulawesi.

According to the international NGO CARDI, as of early 2006, the large majority of the estimated 200,000 people who fled North Maluku between 1999 and 2001, have returned home or have resettled elsewhere in the province and only 15,500 people remain displaced in the province. Over 60 per cent of the remaining IDPs, or 9,500 IDPs, are located in North Halmahera (Tobelo, Galela and Morotai) while nearly 30 per cent, or 5,000 IDPs, are concentrated in Ternate city. (See the map: "[Number of IDPs in North Maluku as of September 2005](#)", CARDI, December 2005)

The estimated 13,000 IDPs who were still displaced in North Sulawesi in 2004 are considered by CARDI to have returned or resettled, either through governmental programmes or voluntarily. Some displaced appear, however, to continue living in camps in North Sulawesi, although their number is unknown. For more information on IDPs in North Sulawesi and issues of return and resettlement, see "[The Politics of Going Home: The Future of North Moluccan Internally Displaced Persons](#)", Christopher R. Duncan, 2004

UNDP, 2005, p.40

"The first returns of IDPs were initiated by the Indonesian Government working closely with the army and local reconciliation teams, at the end of 2000, relatively soon after the violence had receded. Few IDPs returned in 2001 and much of 2002, but the rate increased in 2003, presumably as a result of improved security conditions and the fact that the government's policy on IDP returns was taking effect. The majority of people displaced in North Maluku were displaced for about three years, an experience that had a dramatic impact on all aspects of their lives and that will probably take many years to overcome."

SIDA 7 August 2004, pp. 86-87

"In North Maluku the conflict has been simplified as dividing Muslims and Christians, but deeper causes relate to the complex: competition around natural resources (mines, forest and traditional land entitlement claims), uneven development within the region, as well as marginalisation in Indonesia as a country, ethnic differences, influx of transmigrants, political competition between two Sultans of Ternate and Tobelo, and influence from national religious movements of Islamic and Christian orientation.

From 1999 to 2003 few IDPs have wanted to return because of the fear of new assaults, but when the government in 2001 gave a safety guarantee for some regions, such as in North Maluku, and initiated a reconciliation process people began to return to their villages of origin (for example only 1 village out of 30 refused to return in that province).

(...)

Some of the Christians still living in camps in Ternate city feel less safe than the ones who have returned to the country side, and the Muslim camp dwellers in the city. All Christians in Ternate were displaced during the conflict and the Muslims have now taken over many governmental job positions usually staffed by Christians, and the Christians are now a minority compared to the Muslims living in Ternate (it is estimated by UN staff that the total number of Christians, including Catholics which have not been as affected by the conflict, is 2%). It means that the composition of the labour force has been changed and those who return to governmental jobs now have to cooperate and socialise with new workmates of another religious orientation.

The Muslims affected by the conflict have been displaced to Ternate and most of the Christians to North Sulawesi and towns to the North-East of Halmahera island (particularly Tobelo). Today, however, most of the IDPs from North Maluku have been able to return to their place of origin, although some of the returnees from North Sulawesi are still waiting in camps in Ternate for governmental assistance enabling return. Of the approximately 200,000 persons displaced by the conflict in North Maluku, approximately 75% - 85% have returned. Other 15% - 20% persons remain displaced within North Maluku and another 5% in North Sulawesi.

This process has been further strengthened by increased return of ethnic minorities to religiously mixed communities (e.g. Muslims to Tobelo and Christians to Ternate), although major sources of concern are the uneven and fragile community-level reconciliation and the remaining potential for land/property disputes, the struggle between Sultan Ternate and Makian dominated bureaucracy of North Maluku – especially in controlling the natural resources (Nusa Halmahera Mining; Nickel reservoir; timber etc).

Many families displaced in Manado have decided to stay in North Sulawesi, where some of them have already received permanent houses from the government while others (around 30 households) are still living in a governmental building. Those who have decided to stay have got jobs in the informal sector and find that the job opportunities in Manado are better than in North Maluku. In addition to this, many IDPs displaced in Manado also feel that living in a Christian community is safer than the urban life in Ternate with its mix of ethnic groups and with the Muslims being the majority of the population."

Many returns have taken place to religiously mixed communities

OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 20

"The return process has included an increased number of ethnic minorities returning to religiously mixed communities (e.g. Muslims to Tobelo and Christians to Ternate), although major sources of concern are the uneven and fragile community-level reconciliation, and the remaining potential for land/property disputes. Assistance activities carried out by national and international actors in rehabilitating damaged infrastructure, agriculture and re-establishing provision of services have contributed to the creation of an enabling environment for IDPs to return to their communities. FAO has been supporting IDPs and the livelihood recovery of fishing and farming communities in North Maluku through the provision of basic agriculture inputs, post-harvest equipment and fishing gear as well as training in income-generating activities.

Positive developments have also occurred in terms of the administration of the province of North Maluku, gradually contributing to enhanced confidence in stability and security in the region. The smooth implementation of the establishment of new districts and sub-districts, as stipulated by the

Government Regulation No. 1 Year 2003, and the lifting of the Civil Emergency Status in North Maluku on 18 May 2003 as per the Government Regulation No. 27 Year 2003, to name a few, are indications of a continued move towards normality."

Bakornas PBP & OCHA July 2003, pp. 13-14

"Department of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure has estimated that some 23,300 homes were destroyed during the conflict. Of those displaced as a consequence, over 12,000 families have returned to rebuild their homes. A remaining 1,900 families continue to be displaced in North Maluku, 2,600 families in North Sulawesi (not including those that have received a "Termination Fund") and around 1,100 families fled to Maluku Province. In addition, 329 families of IDPs from Maluku Province fled to North Maluku. The main focus on returns has been rural displacements and IDPs in Ternate (capital city) to Tobelo; and those displaced in Tobelo to their original communities especially Ternate. At this time around 70% of those displaced from Tobelo have returned. Of those who have returned spontaneously to Galela, Obi and Bacan the greater part are civil servants (including teachers). There are still some 4,400 remaining IDP families in Ternate. Assistance for remaining IDPs in North Sulawesi will be provided but costs of repatriation are yet to be settled between the authorities of the two provinces. But there have also been setbacks, such as the clashes in Morotai, causing IDPs to return to their displacement sites in Tobelo."

Majority of IDPs in North Maluku have returned, but lack of funds, corruption and resentment of local population hinder completion of the return process (2006)

- Media report 28,000 people still displaced, mainly because of lack of funds.
- As of October 2003, JRS reports that an estimated at 5,000 individuals remained displaced in camps in Ambon.

UNDP, 2005, pp. 54-55

"Responses to the IDP situation in North Maluku have been more successful, largely due to the spontaneous return of IDPs shortly after the conflict ended. In April 2004, OCHA reported that around three quarters of the 200,000 people displaced by the North Maluku conflict had returned home. Pockets of IDPs remain, however, with around 5,000 families still in Ambon and a similar number in North Sulawesi. Lack of funds for reconstruction of homes has been cited as the main reason for non-return and the governor of North Maluku has stated that he need an additional IDR 70 billion (USD 7 million).

The situation is equally complicated in North Sulawesi, where many IDPs have no desire to return to North Maluku. The local governments of these provinces have been unable to reach agreement on how to manage this situation, both administratively and financially.

The respective provincial governments' efforts to resolve the IDP situation in both Maluku and North Maluku have been further complicated by increasing resentment among the non-displaced population against what is seen as preferential treatment of IDPs by the government. A lack of coordination has also been reported between provincial and district authorities in North Maluku. Efforts to resolve the IDP situation have been further complicated by the "confusing deadlines" of the national government. Nonetheless, the experience of IDP management in North Maluku has been broadly successful and has received plaudits from the UN for its "very serious commitment" to the problem. Although the Provincial Government of North Maluku has been relatively successful in handling the IDP situation, the UNDP Governance Assesment of North Maluku found major gaps in local government capacity. Major obstacles facing the complete resolution of the IDP problem include corruption in the management of funds as well as the reluctance of IDPs

and host communities to support government relocation initiatives. In November 2004, Suara Pembaharuan reported that IDPs in the village of Waai had not received IDR6 billion (US\$600,000) of allocated aid. IDPs in Waitatiri village in Central Maluku who had fled from neighbouring Banda district reportedly refused relocation to state-built housing until they received repatriation funds. Similarly, intended host communities for relocated IDPs, such as Lisabata in West Seram district, have refused to accept them.

The estimated 13,000 IDPs who were still displaced in North Sulawesi in 2004 are considered by CARDI to have returned or resettled, either through governmental programmes or voluntarily. Some displaced appear, however, to continue living in camps in North Sulawesi, although their number is unknown. For more information on IDPs in North Sulawesi and issues of return and resettlement, see "[The Politics of Going Home: The Future of North Moluccan Internally Displaced Persons](#)", Christopher R. Duncan, 2004

CCDA, 21 May 2004

"The commercial SCTV television newsbulletin (Liputan6.com) reports that – though already three years have passed since the unrest in the North Moluccas came to an end – there are still at least some 28.000 refugees spread over North Celebes, the Moluccas, Ternate etc.

Their current situation in many cases is deplorable. The principal reason they are still staying on as refugees or IDP-s is lack of funds for their return and rebuilding their homes. Governor Thaib Armaiyn of the North Moluccas province, says that to this end he needs at least 70 billion rupiahs (about EUR 6.730.000,-). Most refugees say they want to go back as soon as possible, but – they say – they have the impression that the government does not care."

ACT, 29 March 2004, pp. 4-5

"(...)

Problems faced by returnees:

- Income from daily labour (farming, fishery, others) only covers basic daily living needs.
- Below health standard housing conditions.
- Children unable to resume school activities, due to lack of funds for school fees and purchasing school needs. This is very sad as the children have already suffered from disrupted education during the years that they were displaced.
- Many children have to work to help their parents earn money to cover basic needs, especially those who have lost their father or wage earner to the conflict.
- Many returnees still suffer from trauma and psycho-social problems.
- Returnees have not received the 90 days-living expenses they are entitled to."

5,000 IDPs still living in Ambon

JRS, 15 October 2003

"The schedule for returning home for the displaced people of northern Moluccas (Indonesia) remains merely a plan without a clear timetable for its completion, writes JRS Moluccas. Indeed, the return home is long overdue: the original plan had the displaced community returning by 20 August 2003, but the camps in Ambon, housing those displaced from northern Moluccas are still full, without any explanation as to why the return has been delayed. This community of around 1,000 families, or 5,000 individuals, has been displaced for almost four years. In a recent meeting with JRS, the Second Assistant to the Governor of the Moluccan Province, Jafar Soamole, stated that the delay was due to an un-readiness on the part of the North Moluccas Province to receive back the displaced people. This may be due in part to the fact that the North Moluccan government is also at the present moment facilitating the return home of displaced people from North Sulawesi, and the indications are that when this movement is complete the returnees who are now located in Ambon will then follow. Meanwhile in the camps in Ambon the displaced people have been ready to return for some time. With the earlier expectation that the return was

imminent the displaced communities sold most of their possessions - unaware that delays lay ahead. JRS is accompanying members of this community, providing them with services and assisting them in their efforts to return home."

Aceh IDPs

Plans to divide Aceh province may jeopardize peace process and prevent IDP return (May 2006)

Hedman, Eva-Lotta E., 3 May 2006, p.3

"However, the current situation and prospects of these conflict IDPs may also be affected by broader political developments. Significantly, a prospective division of Aceh province, currently debated in the national legislature in Jakarta, could threaten the entire peace process, thus undermining the conditions for a safe return and reintegration to communities in the central highlands. While president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has come out against such a division, there is nonetheless a coalition of local government officials in Aceh and so-called 'nationalist' or hard-line parliamentarians in Jakarta in favour of passing a proposed clause which would allow for the creation of new districts, regencies or provinces.

There is strong indication that conflict IDPs who wish to return to their communities in the central highlands of Aceh view such developments with great alarm. Indeed, the timing of their return movement on 10 December followed on the heels of the 4 December rally in Jakarta where 7 local bupati unilaterally declared their secession from Aceh and their proposal for two new provinces -- 'Aceh Leuser Antara' (ALA) and 'Aceh Barat Selatan' (ABAS) -- to be forged out of Aceh Tengah, Aceh Tenggara, Aceh Singkil, Gayo Lues, and Bener Meriah, and Aceh Barat, Aceh Barat Daya, Aceh Jaya, Nagan Raya, and Simeulue, respectively.^x In the current context of Aceh, it is an open question, and a critically important one, whether local government officials, by pushing for the division of the province, and thus jeopardizing the peace process, may also be in violation of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which state that "[s]uch authorities shall endeavour to facilitate the reintegration or returned or resettled internally displaced persons" "

Survey shows conflict-IDPs living with host communities are more reluctant than tsunami-IDPs to return to their lands (March 2006)

UNORC, 28 March 2006, p. 24

"Conflict-affected IDPs tend to be more reluctant to return to own land

22% of IDPs households who were reluctant to return to their village of origin were conflict-affected. That is a greater proportion compared to the total proportion of conflict-affected IDP households (Chart 7.3).

Survey teams reported instances of conflict-affected IDPs still displaced because their houses were burnt down. They do not intend to return for fear of intimidation and violence against them."

Villages in Central Aceh reported to have set deadlines for return of IDPs (January 2006)

WB, 16 January 2006, p. 6

"1. Balee Hakim Mosque, Laut Tawar Kecamatan, Central Aceh

The IDPs that will return to Central Aceh are concentrated in Bale Hakim Mosque camp (400 HH). The government of Central Aceh and the Camat of Laut Tawar are taking really good care of the IDPs since their removal from Ronga-Ronga camp on January 8, 2006. The government has provided them with proper tents and food supplies, including meat for the Idul Adha festival (January 10th).

(...)

The current status of the IDPs is that they have been brought to locations near to their gardens: in Jagong Jaget, Puteng (120 HH stayed in ex-elementary school), Beureugang (IDPs are staying in community house) Blang Mancong, Bintang Pepara, Batu Lineng, and Beurarang Dewa villages. Most Camat have been informed of the return of IDPs, however, some villages are not yet well prepared. Jagong Jaget village is an exception and is well prepared but is yet to receive any IDPs. In this village, the village head has determined a dead-line of January 14 2006, for IDPs to return. Those who return after this date i.e. those who have temporarily returned to Pidie or Bireuen to celebrate Idul Adha festival, will not be consider IDP returnees but, rather, normal people who want to return to the village where they lived previously. In this case, they need to complete normal registration producers in the Camat's office and will not be eligible for assistance such as food supplies and priority housing. Other villages have not yet set deadlines, however it is likely that this will occur."

Ethnic Javanese displaced to North Sumatra likely to return in trickle in the wake of the peace agreement (August 2005)

- World Bank study suggested that in the wake of the peace agreement, most would adopt a wait-and-see attitude and no massive returns would take place from North Sumatra.
- Some 5,000 ethnic Javanese returned to Aceh in October 2004 and settled in IDP camps where they have been waiting for government assistance.
- Until the 15 August 2005 peace agreement, return to Aceh was not considered as feasible and empowerment was seen as the preferable option given also the fact that many IDPs have since settled in host areas.
- Provincial Government indicate that there are 15,277 IDP families of whom 5,546 families/ 22,184 persons have the right to receive assistance. IDP status is revoked upon reception of the termination funds, but right to return or be relocated remains.

WB, 23 August 2005, p.33

"Over the course of the conflict large numbers of Javanese transmigrants, other non-Acehnese, as well as Acehnese, left the province. Some informants estimate that between 1998 and 2002 approximately 100,000 people left Aceh for North Sumatra. The majority of IDPs/refugees ended up in Medan, Malaysia or other parts of Indonesia, including Jakarta. Many were the rural poor, who left in search of better livelihoods.

However, rural and urban elites also departed because of personal insecurity or taxes on their businesses. Local informants told us that when these groups fled the majority left behind their land and fixed property.

This was the case in Nagan Raya district, which previously had large numbers of transmigrant villages.

(...)

Interviews with IDPs and diaspora suggested that some, particularly the poor, were likely to return if a peaceful solution to the conflict in Aceh was found. They were apprehensive and although

some were prepared to leave immediately after the signing of the peace agreement, the majority will take a wait-and see approach.

(...)

Overall, however, returning refugees/IDPs and diaspora are unlikely to derail the peace process nor cause massive issues in the short to medium term."

OCHA, October 2004

"The likely new president of RI, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, indicated that working on the resolution of the conflict in Aceh and other trouble spots will be his priority in the first 100 days of his duty. He reiterated that resolving the conflict will be based on the concept of the Unitary State of Indonesia. Meanwhile, some 5,000 people (1,300 families) Javanese transmigrants who fled from the Province have returned and are accommodated in IDP camps in Aceh Jaya, Nagan Raya and West Aceh districts while awaiting government assistance to build their houses." (OCHA, October 2004)

Bakornas PBP & OCHA July 2003, p. 17

"As return is not considered a realistic option at this time, and IDP communities have since settled into their host areas, empowerment is the appropriate policy response. At present, no other province is accepting the relocation of IDPs. Most IDPs started to arrive in 1998 and then many more followed in 1999. Previously 24,747 IDP families were recorded from Aceh, this then, after district verification, declined to 22,320 families. The Provincial Government verifications indicate that there are 15,277 IDP families of whom 5,546 families/ 22,184 persons have the right to receive assistance. Another 2,000 families, who are claiming the IDP status, require further verification while a total of 12,000 families have already received the termination grant.

As in other places the Government is concerned over frequent fraudulent claims and in one particular case is taking legal action against the alleged offender. When 7,643 families had been paid, the Department of Social Affairs suspended assistance for another 3,000 families until their claims are properly verified. These families have demonstrated against the suspension. If the problem of verification and fraud can be quickly solved the Provincial Government is confident that the IDP problem can be resolved by year's end.

Given the current military operation in the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, the Provincial Government is also putting in place contingency arrangements for the possibility of new IDPs, but to date only 393 families have arrived, and these persons originated from North Sumatra. It is considered that Acehnese are afraid to cross the border into North Sumatra.

Another strain for North Sumatra is the repatriation of illegal Indonesian workers from neighbouring Malaysia."

OCHA April 2003, pp. 2-3

"By May 2003, the provincial authorities are expected to complete verification of IDPs, transfer by bank accounts the remaining terminations funds to the remaining beneficiaries, and accordingly will request the Central Government for additional funding. Once a family receives termination fund, the provincial authorities no longer consider them as IDPs neither they qualify for further IDP assistance irrespective of the IDPs location of residence and their conditions. Providing funds do not revoke IDPs return rights to the place of origin or alternative settlement. The decision remains up to discretion of individual IDPs for their return, residence and security. The authorities do not have comprehensive plans to resolve the IDP issues other than termination grants provided by the government and nominal assistance from the NGOs.

[...]

Most IDPs would like to return to their place of origin, repossess their property but security remains the only impediment for their return. Some IDPs are reluctant and expressed that they will never return due to same security reason and past bitter memory. The second group is much comfortable in their current place of displacement.

There has been no official communication between provincial authorities of Aceh (IDPs originated from) and N. Sumatra (hosting IDPs) in regard to mutual solution to the problem. Protection of the IDPs properties, repossession rights and/or compensation are important factors should be discussed at the provincial level to establish working relationship in finding durable solution."

JRS 26 March 2002

"In the middle of July 2002, the Indonesian government issued a policy providing a 'termination fund' to the IDPs. The idea was to disburse a certain amount of cash assistance (ranging from 8 million to ten million rupiah) to the IDPs so in turn they would be able to rebuild their lives and 'stop calling themselves IDPs.' Without regard for the socio-economic and political factors underlying the IDP problem in Aceh and the ethnic politics exploited to the hilt by the parties to the conflict, the Indonesian government embarked on a de-facto denial of the IDP problem. A policy flawed from the start, the implementation of the termination fund was marred by corruption and incompetence so that it had to be 'terminated' and is at present being evaluated. Once more, the IDPs were caught in the middle. Desperate and frustrated at the helpless situation that surrounded them, a group of IDPs protested in front of the government office in North Sumatra last year, calling for a fairer implementation of the termination fund. The protest action however, did not help in improving public perception of IDPs as burdens to society. Their limited chance to express their views to the concerned entities was in vain. They are, as it was two years ago, made to wait again."

UN 15 January 2003, p. 9

"The Local Government had considered the three Government programmes to handle the IDPs:

- Return to NAD. However, as the NAD security situation was not conducive, IDPs were not ready to be returned yet.
- Relocation by placing them on a transmigration programme. This option was also not found feasible.
- Local empowerment. In order to terminate the status of IDPs, the Government provides compensation fund of initially Rp 2,750,000 per family, which was increased to Rp 8,750,000 per family due to complaints from the IDPs that the first amount was too small. After receiving the fund, IDPs have to sign an agreement that states the termination of their IDP status and that they no longer depend on the Government. Before termination, IDPs received Rp 1,500 and 4 ons of rice/person/day."

Government's plans to relocate 100,000 tsunami-IDPs into barracks could violate their right to return (February 2005)

- Government announced in early February 2005 that some 100,000 tsunami-IDPs could be moved into semi-permanent barracks.
- Human rights organisations have expressed their concern that this plan could violate their right to return and be used by the military to control the population.
- HRW says that IDPs should be able to make a free and informed choice on relocation, including the option of returning to their place of origin.

HRW, 7 February 2005

"The Indonesian government's plan in Aceh to register and relocate more than 100,000 people displaced by the tsunami to semi-permanent camps threatens their right to return home, Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First said today. The Indonesian government needs to ensure that any relocation program in the province fully respects the rights of the displaced people.

The Indonesian government announced that as early as February 15 it could begin to move up to a quarter of the 400,000 people displaced by the tsunami in Aceh into semi-permanent, barracks-style shelters.

Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First expressed concern that the new camps could be misused by the military as a way of controlling the population for military purposes unless human rights safeguards are put in place. During years of the brutal armed conflict in the northwestern Sumatra province, the Indonesian military has a record of housing Acehnese displaced by the conflict in secure camps where at times their freedom of movement has been unnecessarily restricted and where serious human rights violations have taken place.

Given the military's poor human rights record in Aceh, its prominent role in the transport of thousands of Acehnese from spontaneous camps to the barracks sites, involvement in camp management, and aid distribution within barracks would invariably create fears among the displaced population. This could prevent displaced persons from making a free and informed choice on relocation, including the option of returning to their place of origin. The participation of the police paramilitary brigade (Brimob) would raise similar fears due to its history of abuses in Aceh.

"In the context of the war in Aceh, a military presence at the camps can be a form of intimidation and abusive control," said Neil Hicks, Director of International Programs at Human Rights First. "Although the military has played a sometimes welcome role in the emergency phase after the tsunami, their involvement in the relocations should be minimized and civilian agencies alone should run the camps."

On Sunday, January 30, the Indonesian government began the process of registering people displaced by the tsunami for relocation. The registration appears intended to collect data on this displaced population—also referred to as internally displaced persons (or IDPs)—that in part would be used to identify displaced persons for relocation to the shelters for up to two years.

According to the Indonesian military's 'Broad Plan on Natural Disaster Relief and Control of Displaced Persons in [Aceh] Province,' military forces will be involved in surveying 'numbers and locations of displaced persons (DP), planning/preparations for relocation...[and] displacement of DPs to DP camps that have been developed.'

5,000 IDPs return from North Sumatra province (September 2004)**OCHA, October 2004**

"The likely new president of RI, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, indicated that working on the resolution of the conflict in Aceh and other trouble spots will be his priority in the first 100 days of his duty. He reiterated that resolving the conflict will be based on the concept of the Unitary State of Indonesia. Meanwhile, some 5,000 people (1,300 families) Javanese transmigrants who fled from the Province have returned and are accommodated in IDP camps in Aceh Jaya, Nagan Raya and West Aceh districts while awaiting government assistance to build their houses."

Sulawesi IDPs

2/3 of the IDPs in Central Sulawesi have returned but the security situation remains fragile (July 2004)

- The continuing precipitating factor preventing significant returns is security
- Very few Christians are prepared to return to Moslem-dominated areas, and very few Moslems are prepared to return to Christian-dominated communities.
- Following violence not all affected persons fled, thus reconstruction and service needs as well as the problems of trauma and lost livelihoods affect many more than those displaced.
- Lack of clear instructions from the Central Government as to available funding for reconstruction work, or which departments will take the lead
- Malino Declaration and deployment of security forces in late 2001 have led to the return of 107,000 IDPs out of an estimated 143,000.
- Fragility of the situation, continued mistrust between Christian and Muslim communities and lack of basic social services remain constraints to return.

UNDP, July 2004, p. 14

"Poso and the conflict-affected parts of the new districts of Morowali and Tojo-Una Una have experienced a dramatic improvement in the security situation over the last two years. This improved security situation has facilitated the return of significant numbers of IDPs who had earlier fled their homes. This process of residential segregation has left certain localities religiously homogeneous, for example Tentena, which experienced an influx of Christians and the departure of virtually all of its Muslims. Poso town, by contrast, witnessed the opposite leaving it exclusively Muslim. Other localities have seen greater returns and are now largely mixed. On a day-to-day basis, transport moves freely throughout the area, and individuals, whether vendors, shoppers, or other short-term visitors, generally feel fully comfortable in the "other" area. Though some 40 people have died in targeted attacks since late 2003, local security forces and government officials were successful in capturing most if not all of the alleged perpetrators and preventing retaliatory violence at the community level. IDP returns, which were already slowing down, have more or less halted. In many of these cases, however, remaining IDPs may have decided, or are likely to decide, not to return to their former residences. Though not out of the question, it appears unlikely that large-scale violence and displacement will resume in the short-term."

OCHA, 9 April 2004, p.15

"After four years of intermittent violence, large-scale property destruction and displacement (temporary, partial and continuing) of some 157,000 people, the province is gradually moving towards normality. Some 50% of destroyed homes have been rebuilt, markets, schools and government facilities have re-established services, and movement is generally safe and free from harassment or intimidation at least during daylight hours. SATKORLAK reported that more than 18,070 families (90,350 people) are still waiting for livelihood and capital assistance from the government, but many of these are thought to have left the district or the province altogether. Like in many other provinces in Indonesia, the lack of reliable and consistent data remains a key obstacle in determining IDPs numbers and their needs in Central Sulawesi."

Aragon, Lorraine V., March 2004

"Data from two IDP assessments made in June and September 2003 generated a clear pattern indicating which particular refugees, by religion and IDP location, wanted to return to their pre-conflict villages. Simply stated, those whose losses, however great, were only material property are far more eager to return 'home' than those whose relatives were the victims of physical violence.

'Why', many IDPs asked me, 'have Poso District officials never come to major IDP locations to invite us back to our home areas?' Is it because district leaders are still unable to guarantee safety and the rule of law? Or, is it really because they don't want some ethnic or religious groups to return and undo the 'ethnic cleansing' and religious territorialisation that resulted from the regional warfare?'

Some people think that their leaders are afraid to visit displaced people who might shame them into admitting that government officials have rarely taken seriously their duty of care for all populations in the increasingly multiethnic Poso District. Personal invitations to IDP groups, perhaps even apologies, from district leaders would not be such a difficult or costly step for the Indonesian government, should it be brave enough to confront the needs and demands of local villagers."

Bakornas PBP & OCHA, July 2003, p. 19

"The continuing precipitating factor preventing significant returns is security. The uneasy peace settlement signed in South Sulawesi (Malino I) is punctuated with periodic criminal actions on both sides elongating tensions. It is still uncertain as to whether the present relative present calm is enduring because the community wants security, or due to the heavy presence of security forces. There are still automatic military weapons in the possession of some community members, and attacks by masked provocateurs are still common. The communities want the military to stay, while trying to activate their own security arrangements.

The Government has instituted a process of district fragmentation to alleviate the inter-communal rivalries over district leaders that many believe initially fed the violence. But, it is believed that this will not be a solution and may only intensify the divisions. Still, today, due to trauma, very few Christians are prepared to return to Moslem-dominated areas, and very few Moslems are prepared to return to Christian-dominated communities.

Although many remaining IDP families are yet to receive Government assistance, the scope of the problem is much wider. Following violence not all affected persons fled, thus reconstruction and service needs as well as the problems of trauma and lost livelihoods affect many more than those displaced. In Poso District, the Government's policy of returns, relocation and empowerment can only be achieved through greater security.

The different types of assistance provided by the Government are still a source for confusion. The various tiers of government and humanitarian organisations working in Central Sulawesi need to improve coordination, consistency and transparency of available assistance. If the security environment in Poso and surrounding areas can be strengthened then spontaneous or unassisted returns could be expected. But, significant support will be required for the reconstruction of services and infrastructure. Still, there are no clear instructions from the Central Government as to available funding for reconstruction work, or which departments will take the lead."

Bakornas & OCHA, March 2003, pp. 1-2

"In late December 2001, the GoRI initiated a peace process (led by Minister Kalla) bringing representatives of the Christian and Moslem communities to Malino town of south Sulawesi where a peace agreement called "Malino Declaration" was signed. This agreement indeed

brought relative peace and generated hopes for a brighter future in Central Sulawesi. The peace process was strengthened by the deployment of large numbers of security forces to the area. The Malino Declaration coincided with the GoRI policy on handling IDPs which introduced three options to end IDP crisis: return, local empowerment, and transmigration. In Central Sulawesi the return option has proved to be more successful with continued support from the government at all levels. Thus far, out of 31,326 families (143,354 persons), a total of 25,790 families (107,283 persons) have returned to their places of origin, and have begun to resume their lives.

The mission found that the trend is positive and that the return process continues, although at a slower pace than expected. This is due to the fragility of the situation, mistrust that exist within communities, the fact that many IDPs have been displaced three or four times over the last two to three years, and lack of resources and basic social services."

HRW, 4 December 2002, p. 39

"After the Malino accord, there was some tentative progress. By late February 10,000 displaced persons had returned home, mostly to Poso town, Poso Pesisir, Lage, and Tojo subdistricts. Human Rights Watch found that in March 2002 many families were tentatively sending home male family members to clean up the wreckage and build temporary housing, while waiting to see if the situation remained stable. Some were also waiting for the end of the school year. Since then the number of displaced persons has steadily, but slowly, fallen. The district social welfare agency reported that, as of mid-July 2002, 43,308 persons had returned home, roughly 40 percent of the estimated 110,227 displaced people.

There are two important exceptions to this positive trend. New violence often sends traumatized residents fleeing back to safe areas. For example, clashes in August 2002 forced some 1,200 to seek refuge in Tentena alone. Official or individual efforts to rebuild have been hurt by new rounds of violence throughout the crisis. Several people told Human Rights Watch they had seen their homes destroyed more than once, and the barracks built by the district government and TNI in 2000 were often targeted in attacks. Christians in Tentena also had no plans to dismantle their laboriously built shelters, in case they needed to seek refuge in the future.

The other important exception relates to displaced persons who are minorities in their home areas. Muslim displaced persons from Tentena told Human Rights Watch in Palu that they had no plans to go home, although a remnant of twenty-four Muslims had never left and reported the situation to be safe. Some displaced persons were given access to land in their new areas, such as the Nunu area of Palu, and were able to support themselves through agricultural activities. Christian displaced persons in Tentena built extensive housing and many were able to find work in the market town, which did well economically since travel to other markets was limited. In areas where land or jobs were scarce the conditions were much worse.

A local NGO reported in August 2002 that the basic needs of displaced persons were not being met, noting the poor nutritional status of children, as well as widespread diarrhea, skin infections, and tetanus from gunshot wounds. A 2001 government mental health assessment indicated that more than 55 percent of those displaced suffered from psychological troubles, while the main health problems were malaria, respiratory infections, gastric-intestinal problems, and skin diseases.

The U.N. *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* states that the government has "the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes... or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country." There is a continuing need for local and international NGOs and U.N. agencies to provide assistance in the voluntary return and rehabilitation of displaced persons. Leaders on both sides of the conflict noted the role of revenge

attacks by displaced people in perpetuating the violence, so their voluntary return and reintegration is critical. Those displaced persons from areas in which they were a minority should not be pushed to return until they feel safe. Alternatively, the government can settle them in other areas."

IDPs from East Timor

Between 28,000 and 100,000 ex-East Timorese refugees estimated to remain in West Timor (May 2006)

- As of 2006, uncertainty over figures predominated. 10,000 people continue to live in "conditions of concern" according to UNHCR. Local NGOs and authorities cite figures between 40,000 and 100,000.
- At the end of 2005, the East Timorese government still welcomed the refugees back.
- As of 2005, the government had relocated some 12,000 from camps along the border to other areas within West Timor, leaving 16,000 people still living near the border. Only 500 ex-refugees took part in the repatriation programme.
- 28,000 East Timorese are estimated to remain in Indonesian West Timor as of November 2004
- Pilot project to resettle former East Timorese refugees on the eastern Indonesian island of Sumba expected to begin early 2003.
- As of January 1, 2003, the East Timorese are no longer considered refugees
- Of the 28,000 who remain in West Timor, many are former government employees, police or soldiers and their families.

ICG, 4 May 2006, p. 2

"Following the 30 August 1999 referendum in which East Timorese voted to separate from Indonesia, four broad groups crossed the border into West Timor: members of Indonesian army-sponsored militias, along with their families and supporters; Indonesian civil servants, both Timorese and non-Timorese; those forcibly deported by the militia or Indonesian military (TNI); and those independently fleeing the post-poll violence. Many of the some 250,000 swiftly returned, according to UNHCR figures, 126,000 in the first three months. Those who stayed longer were initially considered refugees but lost that status at the end of 2002 and are considered Indonesian citizens. These former refugees can still go back to Timor-Leste but the rate of returns is now modest. In 2005, only around 500 took part in the repatriation program, and a scheme that provided incentive funding for repatriations has now ended.

Most of those who have elected to stay live in two districts: Belu, which borders Bobonaro and Covalima in Timor-Leste, and Timor Tengah Utara (TTU), which borders Oecusse. Precisely how many there are is a matter of debate. Before it wound up its operations in West Timor at the end of 2005, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that about 10,000 former refugees were "living in conditions of concern", while 16,000 others had been resettled within West Timor. Other estimates are higher: a local NGO, CIS Timor, says 9,000 families (approximately 40,000 people) are in camps; the Belu district government lists 7,734 families still living in emergency housing in that district alone, while East Nusa Tenggara Governor Piet Tallo cited a figure of 104,436 individuals remaining in West Timor."

The Jakarta Post, 28 December 2005

"Timor Leste President Xanana Gusmao said on Tuesday that refugees from his country now living in East Nusa Tenggara province would be welcome to return home.

"It's up to the people to make the best decision. Timor Leste's doors are always open. A few years ago we urged them to come home, but now it is totally up to them to decide," he said during his one-day visit to the province where he met Governor Piet A. Tallo and other officials.

The call came just four days ahead of the end of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)'s humanitarian mission in the province after four years."

UNCHR, 22 March 2005, p. 14

"The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are still some 28,000 East Timorese who have not returned to Timor-Leste. This represents 10 per cent of those who fled or were forced to flee the violence in 1999. UNHCR also estimates that, of those remaining in Indonesia, many have chosen to do so. UNHCR continues to assist this group by assuring access to nationality rights, shelter, school and water projects. As of 15 November 2004, 248 people had returned during the year. In March, one case of assault against a returnee in Aileu district was reported, and three men were indicted in connection with this incident.

Writenet, February 2005, pp. 22-25

"The Indonesian government has indicated that it would look to resettle former Timorese refugees to other parts of Indonesia, allowing only a maximum of 6,000 to reside permanently in West Timor. Coupled with finalization of the border demarcation, such a measure would have greatly increased the sense of border security. Following a five-point strategy put forward by the UNHCR, the Indonesian government relocated approximately 12,000 people from camps along the border, but only to other parts of West Timor rather than other parts of Indonesia, which left some 16,000 individuals near the border. Overall, there does not appear to have been any large movements of people out of West Timor; nor has border demarcation been finalized.

(...)

There are an estimated 28,000 East Timorese remaining in West Timor. Their formal status as refugees came to an end with UNHCR's declaration on 31 December 2002 that the cessation clauses in the 1951 Convention now applied to them. Four categories of people remain across the border: former Indonesian civil servants waiting for government payouts and unlikely to return to East Timor; former security personnel (Indonesian police or armed forces) waiting for government payouts and unlikely to return both for economic reasons and for fear of facing justice for their involvement in the violence of 1999; ex-militia unlikely to return because they fear legal prosecution for actions in 1999; and a small number of people considering return but not yet certain, given ongoing intimidation and misinformation campaigns. The current flow of returnees from West Timor is very low, with monthly numbers from January to August averaging 23, September reported to be a small number, and October estimated at 100, a rate that is likely to continue to the end of the year, as it is estimated there are an additional 3,000 people considering return.

There is little risk of those individuals remaining in West Timor becoming "stateless". The Indonesian government has offered full citizenship to those choosing to remain, and approximately 99% have registered to become Indonesian citizens. Although Indonesian government officials undertook that those seeking citizenship would be resettled to other parts of Indonesia, most of the 14,000 that have moved out of camps along the border have been resettled to other parts of West Timor."

AFP, 15 January 2003

"A pilot project to resettle former East Timorese refugees on the eastern Indonesian island of Sumba is expected to begin early this year, UN refugee officials said Wednesday.

At least seven communities in western Sumba have expressed interest in receiving a small number of the estimated 28,000 East Timorese who remain in Indonesian West Timor, said Fernando Protti-Alvarado, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assistant regional representative.

As of January 1, the East Timorese are no longer considered refugees, meaning they do not get Indonesian or UNHCR assistance to return to their former homeland.

'We feel that in the short to longer-term it's better if the... caseload is resettled away from West Timor and away from the border to avoid potential problems in the future,' Robert Ashe, the UNHCR's regional representative, told reporters.

Protti-Alvarado, speaking at the same press conference, said because most of the 28,000 are expected to remain in Indonesia, the UNHCR is supporting efforts to resettle the East Timorese elsewhere in the archipelago.

(...)

Those who choose to resettle in Sumba will receive household supplies, food for up to nine months, and UNHCR and Indonesian assistance in building their new houses, Protti-Alvarado said. The host community itself will also receive funding based on the number of families it accepts, he said."

IDPs from Central Kalimantan

Between 45,000 and 57,000 Madurese returned to central Kalimantan in 2004 (March 2005)

- According to Oxfam and OCHA, low-profile return of Madurese to Central Kalimantan has been ongoing since early 2005. Between 30,000 and 40,000 people made the journey home.
- During 2004, the number of returnees were estimated to range between 45,000 and 57,000.
- Central Kalimantan government created 4 restrictive categories of Madurese allowed to return in the future.
- Central government's policy on return is unclear.

Between 30,000 and 40,000 Madurese return in early 2005

OCHA, March 2005

"OXFAM and the World Bank informed that some 30,000 – 40,000 Madurese have returned to the areas along Kahayan River, Central Kalimantan, with assistance from local NGOs. No significant problems and incidents during the return process were reported. Considering sensitivity of local community, a low profile approach should be continued."

Between 45,000 and 57,000 Madurese returned during 2004

U.S. DOS, 28 February 2005, sect. 5

"In Central Kalimantan, relations between indigenous Dayaks and ethnic Madurese transmigrants remained poor in the wake of 2001 interethnic violence. However, at least 45,000 displaced ethnic Madurese returned to Central Kalimantan during the year. Relations between the two groups also remained poor in West Kalimantan, where former residents of Madurese descent were obstructed in their attempts to reclaim their property."

UN mission to Madura in mid-2004 confirms 120,000 still displaced
EC-ECHO, 22 December 2004, p. 2

"In June 2004, an OCHA led UN inter-agency mission assessed the situation of the IDPs in Madura and found that living conditions in the camps and private houses were below standard and that "the IDPs in Madura were in a worse condition than anywhere else in the country". The mission reported that there was a caseload of 120,000 IDPs and that virtually all of them "desperately want to return" but lacked the necessary funds. The mission recommended "to support the return process in a low-key manner in order to avoid a recurrence of the violence that erupted in February 2001". In the months that followed OCHA's mission, the Government started to distribute a return assistance package (some EUR 300 per person) that prompted the return of some 57,500 people. It is foreseen that the Government's assistance will continue until December 2004. The impoverished status of the IDPs makes additional humanitarian assistance necessary in order to sustain livelihoods of both IDPs deciding to return and those deciding to remain in Madura after December 2004."

Central Kalimantan government creates 4 categories of Madurese allowed to return in the future, central government's policy on return remains unclear
WB, February 2005, pp. 18-19

"(...) because the central and Central Kalimantan provincial government fear reigniting the conflict, any official return of displaced Madurese remains unlikely. The provincial government has, however, set up various forums to consider the conditions for Madurese return to the province. At an inter-provincial reconciliation meeting in February 2002, a four-part agreement was drawn up between the governors of the four provinces of Kalimantan, the governor of East Java and representatives of the central government from Jakarta. In the provincial government's plan in Central Kalimantan, only four types of Madurese would be allowed to return:

those who held positions in local government;
those who were married to Dayak;
those who held permanent jobs in the province; and
those who had a "good character".

This plan largely overlaps with the position of the most prominent Dayak advocacy group, the Dayak and Central Kalimantan Representatives Association (LMMDD-KT), who wield substantial power in the regional parliament (DRPD). It also corresponds to the position of other Dayak elites.
(...)

The provincial government's policy was to provide no information to the local level on any plan for Madurese return, in order, they said, to avoid stirring things up.

(...)

This confusion between the different levels of government on the official policy on return of the displaced Madurese meant that no clear policy on reconciliation was developed."

Bakornas PBP & OCHA, July 2003, p. 16

"Of the over 93,000 persons that fled to East Java Province in the wake of the violence 43,400 have been assisted in finding durable solutions to their displacement. Most returns have been spontaneous to the 3 districts, where violence was limited to intermittent skirmishes; in the districts affected by severe violence returns have not occurred and the general feeling of the resident community is that the "time is not ready" to receive large numbers of the IDPs that fled. "

Central government policy's lack of clarity curtails possibility of reconciliation between Dayak and Madurese groups (February 2005)

- Lack of clarity of government's policy on return and lack of information provided to the grassroots level are important issues identified by the WB.
- Analyst suggests reason of government not sharing information are that prospects for official Madurese return are not good. If the policy is to abandon prospects for return, then government would face mutiny from the East Javanese and Madurese side. If policy is to facilitate return, they faced mutiny from the Dayak side.
- This absence of information curtails the possibility of reconciliation between the displaced community and their new hosts in Madura.
- IDPs in Madura are classed as "temporary visitors" with no means to achieve full residency rights. Without these they cannot support themselves as they lack jobs, access to public services, and land.

WB, February 2005, pp. 45-46

"The final constraint on the prospects for community-based reconciliation to consider here is central and regional government policy on return of the displaced Madurese to their former homes. Government policy on return frames the prospects for community recovery and reconciliation in both Central Kalimantan and Madura. The main problem with government policy on this issue is that it is unclear. Furthermore, where there has been government action, there has been an almost complete lack of grassroots consultation and participation in the peace-making process. The lack of information provided to the community level has fostered rumor and fear, both preconditions for further conflict.

A good example of the extent to which communication between the government and community had broken down was the stark difference in viewpoints on the peace process between communities and local officials in Central Kalimantan and Madura. In Madura, most local government officials and displaced community leaders believed that the main result of the three peace congresses held in East Java had been a firm commitment from the government for displaced Madurese to return. No community leader in Madura was aware of the conditions that had been set on Madurese return in Central Kalimantan. Meanwhile, in Central Kalimantan, local officials and community leaders believed the outcome of the inter-regional peace processes was a firm commitment to the principle that only certain Madurese would ever be able to return, conditions which had been set by Dayak leaders. The secrecy surrounding the real outcome of the peace congresses and broader government policy on return meant neither side was clear about their future prospects. Rumors and misinformation were rife and the situation did not bode well for hopes of peaceful reconciliation.

Perhaps one of the reasons for government secrecy on the prospects for official Madurese return was the likelihood that this will never take place. It appeared that the national level of government had a strict policy of not providing information out of genuine fear that any information provided to the community level would trigger further conflict. They had a point. If their policy was to abandon prospects for return, they faced mutiny from the East Javanese and Madurese side. If their policy was to facilitate return, they faced mutiny from the Dayak side. Given the history of Dayak rebellion, the latter was obviously to be avoided. But while the deliberate lack of information on return might temporarily pacify the situation in Central Kalimantan, it curtails the possibility of reconciliation between the displaced community and their new hosts in Madura.

Furthermore, the contradictions between the different concepts of, and rights to, residency play out in tragic ways for the ethnic Madurese from Central Kalimantan. However their rights are actually captured by national positive law, no one can practically assert these rights. Migrant

Madurese were evacuated to the place perceived by the regional government and Dayak leaders of Central Kalimantan as their "ethnic homeland". Meanwhile, in Madura, the displaced are classed as "temporary visitors" with no means to achieve full residency rights in what may eventually become their permanent home. Without full residential rights they cannot support themselves as they lack jobs, access to public services, and land. They are thus dependent on the provision of food and shelter from local government and nongovernmental organizations, frustrating the local community who are also very poor. Central government policy limits the possibility of reconciliation between groups by making it practically impossible for those displaced by ethnic conflict to survive in the long term. Such a policy can only fuel further tensions, conflicts, and potentially violence, between continually divided ethnic groups."

Main problems and recommendations from the OCHA mission (February 2003)

- Problem of accuracy on IDP number and movements
- Those who have returned to Central Kalimantan have not been carefully monitored

OCHA, February 2003, p. 5

"VI. Main Problems

Data collecting – for accurate numbers and movements.

Information flow and socialisation of new developments and new information at the grass-root level, and at the top-level from both sides. There are two main independent communication forums set up by the IDPs themselves to represent the IDPs in Sampang (FK4 – Forum Komunikasi Korban Kerusuhan Kalimantan) and FKPB for Bangkalan (Forum Komunikasi Pengungsi Bangkalan). These two groups work together, and with the government to ensure solutions and the socialisation of decisions made, and information to the IDPs.

Those who have returned have not been carefully monitored as the IDPs who have returned are reluctant to report to local governments in Central Kalimantan in case of trouble. If they were to report, the Office of Social Affairs (*Dinsos*) in Central Kalimantan will provide them with food assistance and living costs for the first few months, and return transport costs.

VII. Efforts/ Next Steps and Recommendations

Go and See and Come and Tell visits planned for March

Reconciliation efforts made by international organisations (Common Ground, others?)

Socialisation at grass-root-level of conditions and socialisation of the *Peraturan Daerah* and the *Peraturan Penduduk* at the grass-root level with community leaders in Kalimantan and religious leaders from Madura.

Conditioning of Central Kalimantan Provincial Government to receive the return of the Madurese to Kalimantan.

Socialisation of the Guiding Principles on IDPs."

IDPs from West Kalimantan

Most Madurese IDPs in West Kalimantan have either been resettled or have integrated in Madurese communities (August 2004)

- Madurese in West Kalimantan were displaced twice. First, by violence in 1999, from Sambas to Pontianak. Second, starting in 2002 by the government, from Pontianak to resettlement sites outside Pontianak.
- There seems to be a consensus among all stakeholders on the fact that the Madurese will not be able to return to Sambas for a long period of time, as the local people will not allow them to return due to continued hostility.
- 12,000 IDPs have been relocated to resettlement areas outside Pontianak, while an estimated 45,000 IDPs have benefited from the government's empowerment funds and integrated in Madurese community in Singkawang district or in Pontianak city.
- West Kalimantan regional government has opted for resettlement as the main strategy for the solving the IDP problem.

SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 83

"The Madurese were displaced twice; first within the Sambas subdistricts and subsequently to Pontianak in 1999. According to the Ministry of Regional Settlement and Development 60,000 Madurese were displaced in Pontianak in August 2001 of which 23,000 were living in 10 camps with poor water availability and sanitation. In 2002 the provincial government started implementation of a programme aimed at resettle the IDPs to locations outside Pontianak, the so called resettlement sites. The majority of these sites are located in swampy forest land.

The IDPs in West Kalimantan are all Madurese from Sambas district and the main conflict is with the Malay population, although Dayaks have sided with the Malays in the conflict against the Madurese. Both the Malays and the Madurese are Muslims. It is now generally accepted by the political authorities, by the populations groups living in the conflict area, and the international aid community and the IDPs themselves that the Madurese will not be able to return to Sambas for a long period of time, as the local people will not allow them to return due to continued hostility. The Madurese are now either relocated to new resettlement areas (2,900 Households or 12,000 persons or are integrated in an older Madurese community in Singkawang district and in Pontianak, the capital of West Kalimantan and have benefited from the state's empowerment fund (ca.11,100 Households)."

CRS, 31 March 2004, p. 4

"In an effort to find a solution, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) built resettlement sites outside of Pontianak. Occupants of the temporary camps in Pontianak were offered two options – accept 2.5 million rupiah (equal to US\$ 295.00) and a house and land in the resettlement sites or 5 million rupiah (equal to US\$588.00) to find their own permanent accommodations. Through this assistance program, the temporary camps in Pontianak were cleared, helping to reduce the potential for conflict between the urban locals and the Madurese.

The Local Government was not consistent in providing the Madurese regular emergency needs like food and income generation programs that would allow them to sustain themselves in the underdeveloped resettlement sites. Because of limited livelihood alternatives in the camps, the Madurese had to seek employment and income outside of the camps in Pontianak, Ketapang and other areas. Unfortunately job openings are limited and there is an increasing potential for renewed conflict as many of the unemployed Madurese and local community laborers compete for employment.

As many of the displaced Madurese were previously farmers it was crucial to identify assistance possibilities that provided these families with the required basic needs in the relocation sites that will also allow for income generation and employment potential. Improved sustainable livelihood strategies would reduce the need for the Madurese to seek employment outside of the camps and would reduce the potential for renewed conflict.

To achieve this several immediate needs were identified:

The means to cultivate and till their properties to ensure that crops will develop to full potential and provide cost recovery schemes.

Improvement to infrastructure programs to provide better living conditions.

Training for community based public health and hygiene programming.

Activities that support peace and integration potentials between the Madurese and the local population."

OCHA, 14 February 2003, p. 11

"In West Kalimantan, the regional government has indicated that the strategy opted is the resettlement programme. Various NGOs have agreed that the course of action decided by the GoRI for West Kalimantan is a possible temporary solution to the IDP situation. It should be admitted that the GoRI, especially at regional levels, has limited capacity in dealing with large-scale complex humanitarian crisis.

NGOs believe that the strategy for West Kalimantan can succeed only if there is a willingness and collective efforts from GoRI, local government, local and international NGOs, the IDPs, local communities, and other stakeholders to find and to work together on the best solution, and to resolve the situation. The GoRI has established a number of relocation areas to which IDPs may move. The GoRI has also given the IDPs resources, such as land, housing and food assistance, to build their lives again at the new locations."

Sustainability of living conditions in relocation sites in West Kalimantan called into question (March 2004)

CRS, 31 March 2004, p. 28

"The potential for conflict remains. The long-term sustainability of the IDP relocation sites is still in question due to several factors. The low level of household income is the largest issue. Based on discussions with community members, the problem of household income is interrelated with issues around agricultural output and land title. IDP farmers still require time to fully adapt to the cultivation of wetland soil. So far plantation has focused only on short-term vegetables and long-term trees crops.

Another factor is the lack of market access for agricultural products resulting in farmers being unable to obtain competitive prices for their goods. Barriers to market access include the physical distance from the relocation sites to the marketplace, lack of transportation systems, and an absence of farmer cooperatives that would allow farmers to collectively negotiate with wholesalers for better prices. Generally the income generated from agricultural output cannot support the household income needs. These factors serve as a continuing disincentive for IDP families to

remain in the relocation sites and pursue agriculture-based livelihoods. The alternative would be the eventual migration back to the urban center of Pontianak in search of employment. This scenario would place the IDPs in direct competition with local residents for scarce jobs with a high potential for conflict.

The ongoing problem of land ownership is multi-layered. At the heart of the problem is an apparent failure on the part of the local government to justly compensate local community members for private land that was designated by the government to be used as part of the relocation sites.

This situation has caused and will continue to cause conflict between the IDPs and the local community. It also inhibits the progress of sustainable agriculture programs that are related to long-term plantation since people are reluctant to work on lands that are not fully owned by them. Resolution of this problem at the government level is being hindered by a lack of coordination between departments and uncertainty in authority/responsibility between the Province and District levels of government."

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

Aceh

International organisations permitted to establish a presence in Aceh following tsunami (January 2005)

- Since May 2003, and the imposition of the martial law, humanitarian access to Aceh has been severely restricted for foreign aid agencies and human rights observers.
- Access to areas regarded as GAM strongholds had reportedly been poor or impossible prior to the tsunami.
- Despite the humanitarian access granted in the wake of the tsunami, a number of restrictions continue to apply to journalist as well as aid workers, with access limited to the to the two main cities, Banda Aceh and Meulaboh.
- The distribution of humanitarian aid by the same soldiers whose mission is to crush GAM raises concern that aid will not reach everyone in need.

AI, 20 January 2005, p. 2

"Since shortly after a military emergency was declared, the civilian population has been almost entirely cut off from the assistance and protection afforded by the presence of independent human rights monitors and humanitarian workers. International staff of humanitarian agencies have been required to obtain permits to travel to the provincial capital, Banda Aceh, and to obtain further permission to travel beyond the capital. Permits have only been issued infrequently and, even then, often with strict time and place restrictions. Although there were some improvement in access in 2004 compared to the early days of the military emergency, it remained far from the full, unimpeded access normally required for humanitarian organizations to implement their programs. Access to areas regarded as GAM strongholds had reportedly been particularly poor. Prior to the current disaster, it was believed that there had been no access to some such areas since May 2003.

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, international humanitarian agencies were permitted to enter NAD on request. However, there has been no indication that the regulations which govern access to the province by foreigners have been repealed. Indonesian officials have announced that international staff will again be required to seek permission before moving outside of the city centres of Banda Aceh and Meulaboh and that international agencies may require military escorts outside of those cities.(1) The imposition of these restrictions is said to be based on security concerns and the need to coordinate the relief effort.

Amnesty International acknowledges the obligation of the Indonesian authorities to safeguard the security of humanitarian workers. To date, Amnesty International has not received any reports indicating that the delivery of aid has been hampered by government imposed restrictions. However, Amnesty International is concerned that these broad restrictions may at any stage once again be administered in a manner which unnecessarily restricts freedom of communication and movement, isolates communities from much needed outside assistance and prevents independent human rights monitoring of the ongoing conflict and its impact on the civilian population."

Reporters without borders express concern that reporters were experiencing limited access to some areas of Aceh

RSF, 27 January 2005

"A US journalist has been expelled from Indonesia after reporting from Aceh, the province worst hit by the tsunami. At least five other journalists have been briefly detained or prevented from working by the military. Reporters Without Borders calls on the authorities to let the media cover the affected areas freely.

A month after an earthquake and a tsunami devastated Sumatra island, and especially Aceh province, Reporters Without Borders today said it was very worried by signs of growing Indonesian army intolerance towards the foreign news media, in which at least five journalists have been briefly detained or asked to leave Aceh and new rules have restricted press work.

"It would be very regrettable if we returned to the situation prevailing before the earthquake, when Aceh province was closed to the foreign media," the press freedom organisation said. "Journalists must have access to all the affected areas and no special regulations should be applied to either the local or international press."

(...)

Several hundred foreign journalists have gone to Aceh province since 26 December. Foreign ministry officials in Medan registered about 100 arrivals between 30 December and 15 January. At President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's instigation, the authorities gave the press a great deal of access to the areas hit by the tsunami.

But the Indonesian army announced on 13 January that journalists and humanitarian workers would henceforth have only limited access to the two main cities, Banda Aceh and Meulaboh. And citing security grounds, the authorities threatened to expel journalists who did not inform them of their plans.

Bruno Bonamigo of the state-owned Radio Canada was a few days later prevented by the authorities from going to Sigli, in the north of Aceh province, to follow the work of Doctors Without Borders."

Military reported to obstruct delivery of humanitarian aid out of fear it would come in the hands of GAM rebels

Roosa, John, 11 January 2005

"The Jakarta government took the very positive step of allowing foreign journalists, relief workers, and military personnel into Aceh. Reports indicate that the military is no longer trying to monopolize aid distribution; though they are selling some aid that should be distributed freely, including food. But with foreigners inside Aceh, the military is worried, that the unaccountability it has enjoyed for 19 months may be coming to an end.

Journalists are reporting that the military still checks Acehnese for their identity cards. Soldiers try to determine a person's political loyalty before handing out aid. Soldiers are weeding out people at the refugee camps and taking suspected GAM supporters into detention. The military is being stingy with its aid since it wants to ensure that not a grain of rice winds up in the hands of GAM. Any person carrying more than he or she can immediately consume is suspected of carrying goods for GAM. One journalist, reporting on January 7, observed soldiers at a checkpoint 40 kilometers outside of Banda Aceh: "All morning, troops wearing combat kit had been stopping those heading south, accusing them of forming new supply lines for rebels in the hills."

Most of the some \$4 billion that has been raised worldwide for tsunami relief will likely be devoted to Aceh. The only other country that needs a large amount of aid is Sri Lanka. Both Thailand and India have stated they do not need foreign aid. This means that Indonesia's military in Aceh is now under an international microscope. There is no reason to believe, however, that this will guarantee better behavior.

The last time the whole world was watching, in East Timor in 1999, the military laid a country to waste, accomplishing a level of destruction to rival a tsunami. The TNI worried little about international opinion during that September 1999 scorched earth campaign. It burned down 70% of East Timor's buildings, looted much of the country's wealth, killed hundreds, if not thousands, and forcibly deported about 250,000 people -- all while in the international spotlight. The generals responsible for those atrocities have enjoyed impunity; there has been no international tribunal. The general first appointed to head up Indonesia's Aceh relief effort was Adam Damiri, one of the key commanders responsible for the 1999 destruction of East Timor. The military high command replaced him at the last moment to avoid causing any friction with other governments.

Although foreigners are now in Aceh, one should not believe that they are immune from eviction. Jakarta allowed in international observers in December 2002 after it signed a peace agreement with GAM. It then sent them packing only five months later when martial law was declared. Moreover, the military high command, especially under the army chief of staff Gen. Ryacudu, has cultivated a paranoiac attitude towards foreign governments, arguing that they are fomenting internal unrest in a conspiracy to break up Indonesia."

Civil society and human rights defenders further fragilized by tsunami (January 2005)

- The NGO 'Human Rights First' express concern about the central role of the military in the humanitarian assistance, given the poor record of the Indonesia military in respecting human rights and humanitarian principles

Intimidation of humanitarian workers reported to continue after tsunami

HRF, 10 February 2004, p 4

"Given the long track record of hostility towards IDPs and those working to help them, intimidation or other forms of restriction are a particular point of concern. Local and international NGOs have not reported that restrictions have significantly hampered their ability to operate. At the same time, however, there are signs that some in the military are uneasy with the role played by NGOs, especially local ones.

It has been widely reported that the military has formally restricted access by foreign aid workers beyond the two cities of Banda Aceh and Meulaboh, ostensibly as protection from attack. International NGOs are expected to clear their travel in advance and accept a military escort if required. However, these rules are not strictly enforced, and so far appear to be a form of monitoring rather than control. It is important that these rules are not used to restrict access beyond that required by genuine security concerns. GAM has stated it will not attack foreign aid workers, a pledge that is consistent with its vested interest in a continued international presence in Aceh.

Travel around some west coast towns such as Lamno is especially circumscribed. Indonesian volunteers and one international NGO were prevented from traveling in this region, although this problem was later remedied. Human Rights First has also learned of isolated, but nevertheless worrisome, efforts to intimidate local NGOs.

According to press reports on January 10 in the Mata le section of Banda Aceh, a volunteer was beaten by soldiers and needed stitches.

Several local NGOs have been visited by security officers demanding information on their aid distribution activities. Two of the most active NGOs in Banda Aceh were visited within half an hour on the night of January 22, one by police and one by members of the provincial military command in plainclothes.

Students carrying out a health assessment in Bireuen were approached at an IDP camp by several soldiers. The officers later came to their office and took them to the military post where they were questioned for several hours about their activities before being released.

The head of the watchdog organization Government Watch, Farid Faqih, was detained on January 27 in Meulaboh, accused of stealing supplies donated by army wives. He was badly beaten by soldiers including an army captain. While his role in the disappearance of the supplies is still unclear, his mistreatment is a worrying sign."

Military crackdown on humanitarian workers and human rights activists during military and civil emergency (October 2004)

- Local aid workers accused of providing shelter to GAM rebel reportedly tortured by military to obtain confession
- Komnas HAM set up a human rights monitoring body in Aceh following the imposition of martial law in May 2003.
- On October 20, the Police interrupted a training on human rights requesting the organizers to submit a list of participants. Upon refusal, the training was halted.
- Since martial law was imposed number of NGOs and civil society organizations that used to operate in Aceh have been pronounced illegal and their activists threatened with arrest.
- Because of the increasing level of violence against human rights defenders since the imposition of martial law, several have either gone into hiding or left Aceh to save their lives and avoid being added to the death toll.

Aid workers arrested and tortured for alleged links with GAM

AI, 7 October 2004, para. 6.1

Yusni Abdullah, aged 26, and Mahyeddin, aged 23, are members of the NAD-based humanitarian organization, the People's Crisis Centre (PCC). Established in January 1999, PCC activities are focused around providing assistance to IDPs. The two men are currently serving prison sentences of one year and one year and six months' respectively having been found guilty of rebellion.

According to their colleagues in PCC, Yusni Abdullah and Mahyeddin's arrest and detention is linked to the arrest of a member of GAM who had spent a night in their office among a group of villagers who were visiting the town of Lhokseumawe. PCC frequently provides accommodation for villagers who have travelled to the town and who cannot return the same day because of the long distances and inadequate transportation. The member of GAM was subsequently arrested and is believed to have admitted, possibly under torture, to staying at the PCC office. In the current climate, this single link with PCC appears to have been sufficient to accuse two of its members of involvement with GAM.

Yusni Abdullah and Mahyeddin were allegedly subjected to torture in order to obtain confessions of their links with GAM. Yusni Abdullah was arrested from PCC's office in Lhokseumawe on the morning of 15 December 2003 and taken to a local post of the Combined Intelligence Task Force (Satuan Gabungan Intelijen, SGI). There he was reportedly beaten and questioned about the whereabouts of Sofyan Daud, the GAM Commander for North Aceh. When he said that he did not know, a member of SGI is alleged to have told him "if you do not want to reveal the information, you will be annihilated". He was also ordered to admit that PCC was involved with GAM. Not wishing to implicate the whole organization, he eventually admitted that he had been a member of GAM prior to joining PCC in 1999."

National Human Rights Commission's training in Aceh sabotaged by military

OMCT, 21 October 2003

Since martial law began on May 19th, 2003, KOMNAS HAM has set up a body to conduct human rights monitoring in Aceh, headed by Mr. Billah, the head of KOMNAS HAM's Aceh team. Mr. Billah is also the facilitator of the raided training session that is supposed to take place from October 19th to October 23rd. Before this training course, KOMNAS HAM had informed the regional martial law authority (PDMD) and also Polresta, the Police authority in Banda Aceh, that they would be holding this course.

On October 20th, during the morning session, two military representatives from the PDMD were included in the training programme, based on their request to be included as "participants". At lunchtime, both of them left the training session and at 3 p.m., around 20 troops and 20 police officers came to the Seulawah pavilion where the training session was being held. They turned off the lights in order to sabotage the training programme. The members of the military and the police tried to come in, but Mr. Billah prevented them from doing so. They asked for the lists of participants, but Mr. Billah refused to give it to them and also refused to stop the meeting, leading to an exchange of words and negotiations with the police who wanted to take him to headquarters for questioning.

On October 21st, PDMD troops still occupied the Seulawah pavilion. The police members denied that they had been informed about the training course and members of the military said that permission was needed to hold it. As part of the government, KOMNAS HAM clearly does not require permission to hold such a session. Since that time, the training session has been interrupted.

The Observatory is particularly concerned for the personal integrity of the participants in the training session, as the military are seeking to gain a list of their identities, and there are serious concerns that their integrity may be at risk as a result of this."

Increased level of violence and harassment against human rights organisations since martial law

Laksamana.net 2 October 2003

"Since martial law began, a number of non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations that used to operate in Aceh have been pronounced illegal by the Martial Law Administration and their activists threatened with arrest. Major General Endang [Suwarya], as the martial law administrator in Aceh, on May 20 said he had received a number of names from military intelligence, which he would use as the basis for making arrests. Most of them are human rights defenders and political activists who seek to achieve their goals through non-violence.

Monitoring activities have come to a halt because human rights defenders, including the many activists and volunteers spread across Aceh working for KontraS, have gone into hiding. The number of activists already arrested is not known. The first person known to be detained was Cut Nur Asikin, a prominent women's rights activist of the Srikandi Aceh women's organization. She was denied the right to be accompanied by lawyers because under the terms of the martial law, she was initially accused of terrorism. However, after strong pressure from the national and international community, she is now trial and accused of sedition. Not only local NGOs and activists [are facing difficulties]. Indonesia's Coordinator Minister for Social Affairs, Yusuf Kalla, has said that foreign NGOs will be prohibited from operating any longer in Aceh.

(...)

Because of the increasing level of violence against human rights defenders since the imposition of martial law, several have either gone into hiding or left Aceh to save their lives and avoid being added to the death toll.

The two aforementioned examples signal the new pattern of violence against human rights defenders in Aceh. And we do believe, those examples are a form of psychological [warfare] against other human rights activists in Aceh. The new patterns are:

1. An activist is killed and his/her body is left for other people to find. The impact is that other activists will become silent to avoid joining the death toll.
2. An activist is arrested together with his/her father or family members. The impact is that he/she must stop his/her activities to save his/her family members.

This martial law has not only affected human rights defenders in Aceh, but has also affected outspoken human rights defenders in Indonesia. For example, in Jakarta, the offices of KontraS and PBHI (the Indonesian Legal Aid Association) were attacked by militias known as Pemuda Panca Marga (military youth wing). On this point, it can be concluded that the state, including the military and police, is using civilians to perpetrate acts of intimidation against human rights defenders; while there is no mechanism to guarantee the right of human rights defenders to work in Indonesia.

Several conclusions can be made from the aforementioned events.

1. Martial law in Aceh is being used as a tool to marginalize Aceh from the international community, as inferred from the statement from the Coordinating Minister for Social Affairs and Presidential Decree No.43/2003.
2. Martial law is being used a tool to bring about the collapse of civil society in Aceh, despite civil society organizations urging the government to allow freedom for expression without any hindrances.

Aceh has the greatest record in terms of violence against human rights defenders in Indonesia. Since the downfall of the Suharto regime in 1998 to August 2003, about 129 human rights defenders were victims of various forms of violations, including arbitrary detention, summary killings/executions, forced disappearance, etc. Since martial law was declared on May 19, the Indonesian security authorities and the Free Aceh Movement have violated the human rights of 21 activists. Two cases were perpetrated by GAM (when two journalists were detained by them), and 19 cases were perpetrated by the Indonesian military and police. Unfortunately, none of the cases of gross violations against human rights defenders in Aceh have been investigated or brought to court."

See also:

[Aceh under martial law: Human rights under fire](#), HRW, 5 June 2003

"Amnesty says Aceh offensive brings new dangers for rights workers", AFP, 4 June 2003

Indonesia: Protecting the Protectors: Human rights defenders and humanitarian workers in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, AI, 3 June 2004

"Indonesia: Jakarta Rights Group Attacked for Aceh Stance", HRW, 28 May 2003

Central Sulawesi

Corruption and obstructive practices by the military hamper delivery of aid to IDPs in Central Sulawesi (March 2004)

- Relief funds in Central Sulawesi not reaching many IDPs due to corruption of religious leaders and military obstructive practices

Aragon, Lorraine V., March 2004

"Until the mid-October 2003 village attacks, some of which were led by Javanese Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI) members, Jakarta leaders gave little thought to Poso. In their minds, the Malino Peace Accord orchestrated in December 2001 by Haji Yusuf Kalla, Coordinating Minister for Peoples' Welfare, had solved the region's conflicts.

The Malino Declaration, signed by Muslim and Christian counterparts, did lead to reduced levels of mass violence, and the initiation of several types of aid programs. However, low level violence continued, and much aid money continues to be siphoned off by wealthy businessmen handling development 'projects'. It is also pilfered by under-funded and largely unregulated security troops, and even by some religious leaders who turn aid distribution into a seedy and personally profitable business. This endemic corruption, fuelled by poorly regulated aid and military funding, makes the region conducive for criminal operations and their unholy alliances with ideological extremists.

Newly built stores, facilities, and houses are 're-burned' so that builders can win more lucrative contracts. A few church leaders re-sell rice allotments, housing plots, or even books and cassettes authored by conflict heroes, all for escalated prices. Military checkpoints skim fees from passing drivers. Soldiers demand food, supplies, and sometimes sex from 'hosting' villagers. Even civilian government officials find themselves intimidated by officers appropriating aid supplies. Those who dare to complain about such matters may find themselves forever silenced.

Some Internally Displaced People (IDP) have received absolutely nothing from government aid programs, while others are making 'aid re-sale' a lucrative career. Some IDPs register and collect aid in more than one village, while others are not registered at all and so dare not ask for anything. While there are government and religious leaders who truly are doing their best to ensure that basic aid such as rice and housing materials go to those most in need, others buy new cars and land from profits made through the commodification of conflict and aid.

As local villagers, IDPs, and many non-government organisation (NGO) leaders see it, Poso has become simply a big business project that simultaneously exploits and morally damages an already emotionally traumatised population. Many residents feel they can trust neither the central government that has repeatedly failed to protect them over the last five years, nor the local

politicians and religious leaders who used ethnic and religious affiliations as a means to further their own interests."

Papua

Ban on access for press and NGOs to Papua is raising concern about the further deterioration of the human rights situation (May 2006)

ABC Online, 26 May 2006

"The United Nations refugee agency says it is concerned about reports of human rights abuses in the Indonesian province of Papua but its officials cannot gain access to the region.

The UNHCR's regional representative, Neil Wright, has appeared before a Senate inquiry into Australia's planned immigration law changes.

Mr Wright told the hearing the UN has received an approach from Papuan asylum seeker Siti Wanggai, whose daughter has been given asylum in Australia.

Ms Wanggai, who is in hiding in Papua New Guinea, claims she was forced to make an appeal to have her daughter returned to Indonesia.

Mr Wright would not give further details of the case.

He says the UNHCR has been refused access to Papua.

'I can confirm that, despite repeated requests, the UNHCR has not been given permission by the Government in Jakarta to have access to West Papua,' he said."

The Jakarta Post, 28 April 2006

"Indonesia should not bar the international community and media from visiting Papua to counter one-sided reporting on alleged human rights abuses in the resource-rich province, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry's State Secretary Kjetil Skogrand says.

"There might be reasons for concern about the situation in Papua. However, as long as the international press is not allowed to visit the area, it is difficult to assess the situation," he told The Jakarta Post during the Norway-Indonesia dialog on human rights Thursday.

Skogrand said that he would like to see the possibility of the international community and international press visiting Papua to assess the situation."

HRW, 10 February 2006

"Indonesia's Minister of Defense, Juwono Sudarsono, was reported on February 6, 2006 in the media stating that the government will maintain curbs on foreign media reporting from Papua. He is quoted as saying that:

"We feel that our unity and cohesion are being threatened by the presence of foreign intrusion and concerns so there is a balance between international concerns and sovereignty that we want to strike very peacefully."

Minister Sudarsono was also reported as stating that the curbs should extend to foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and churches, who he thought might create conflict in the province by encouraging Papuans to campaign on issues of human rights. He stated that he feared reporters could be "used as a platform" by Papuans to publicize the alleged abuses.

These recent statements confirm what has effectively been a ban on access to Papua for a wide range of foreign organizations since 2003. The Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club has stated concern that no foreign journalist has had official access to Papua in the past eighteen months. In that period there has been a significant build-up of troops in Papua with reports of widespread displacement of civilians, arson, and arbitrary detention in the central highlands region.

Human Rights Watch is alarmed at efforts by the Indonesian government to ban or limit press coverage of human rights violations and other issues in Papua. Such a ban harkens back to the previous era of autocracy, not the new democracy that your government leads.

Human Rights Watch urges the Indonesian government to respect press freedom and to allow full press coverage of all issues affecting the province.

Human Rights Watch fears that the lack of access and monitoring by independent observers, including the media, will further create a climate in which the armed forces and police believe they can act with impunity and commit abuses, unreported and away from the public eye. Minister Sudarsono admitted that some cases of killing, rapes, and abuses by some soldiers had occurred in the province. An immediate imperative will be to remove restrictions on access to and within Papua. (...)

Human Rights Watch is concerned about the human rights impact of the increasing military presence in Papua. Although the right to freedom of expression under human rights law may be restricted during a state of emergency or to protect national security, as provided by law and as is necessary, the Indonesian government has provided no justifications for the broad-based restrictions on access to Papua by the foreign media and nongovernmental organizations, including international human rights organizations."

Military reported to hamper delivery of aid to displaced people hiding in the forest (2005)

- Indonesian military in Papua are restricting humanitarian access to people who fled into the forests of Central Highlands where they are reported to be starving

RFK Center for Human Rights, March 2005

"The military has also continued its ban on travel to the area [Central Highlands], even by church officials seeking to deliver humanitarian assistance to thousands of people who have sought refuge in the forests to escape the TNI's violent assaults on local population centers."

RFK Center for Human Rights, December 2004

"Pastor Socrates Sofyan Yoman, President of the Fellowship of Baptist Churches in West Papua, who recently visited the affected area, states that TNI personnel killed the Reverend Elisa Tabuni, a clergywoman in the Puncak Jaya town of Mulia on September 14.

According to Yoman, shortly after killing the pastor, troops in a helicopter fired on Papuans who were gathering food in a garden, killing two of them. The reported military attack prompted local villagers to flee their homes for refuge in the forest, where they are starving, because the TNI has destroyed their food crops and blocked humanitarian relief organizations from entering the area.

In addition, the military operations have forced the closure of many churches in the area. Subsequent reporting claims that 147 villages have now been affected by the operation."

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National and international responses to internal displacement in Indonesia

National response

Most observers agree that, by international standards, the response provided by the government of Indonesia to the crisis of internal displacement that started in 1999 has generally been satisfactory. Acknowledging its responsibility for addressing the needs of the displaced, the government made important efforts both at the institutional as well as the practical level to assist an internally displaced population that peaked at 1.4 million in 2002. That year alone the government made an allocation of USD 100 million to address the problem. The international community as well as national non-governmental organisations also made a critical contribution by supporting the government's efforts.

In September 2001, the government established guidelines aimed at solving an IDP problem, which was seen as harmful to the stability and development of the country. The displaced were offered three solutions for which the government would provide its support: return to places of origin, empowerment at the site of displacement or resettlement/relocation to new sites. Return was seen as the preferred solution and only when this was not possible would the two other options be envisaged. This policy was seen as consistent with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, although it raised some concerns among aid groups mainly because of its short timeframe. (IDP Unit, June 2002, p. 3).

Bakornas in charge of coordinating IDP assistance

The September 2001 IDP guidelines illustrated a policy shift from emergency humanitarian assistance to more long-term solutions. The Coordinating Ministry of Social Welfare assisted by BAKORNAS PBP was put in charge of the coordination of the activities of several government departments and the delivery of assistance to the displaced population. In 2001, the mandate of the National Coordinating Body was modified so as to include man-made disaster in addition to natural ones. BAKORNAS PBP became responsible for formulating policies as well as coordinating and providing guidance with regards to the management of IDPs. Composed of all the relevant ministries, BAKORNAS's new role included prevention, relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, shelter, settlement and return/relocation (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 72). In addition to the relevant ministries, BAKORNAS included the chief of the National Armed Forces, the Chief of the National Police as well as governors from affected provinces.

At the provincial level, the needs of the displaced are addressed in all affected provinces by the Executive Coordinating Unit for Disaster Management and the Handling of IDPs (SATKORLAK PBP), a coordinating body headed by the governor. At the district level, SATLAK aimed at implementing humanitarian activities. The only exception is Aceh, where BAKORNAS PBP and a number of departments at the central level have taken over the responsibility for coordinating humanitarian efforts (OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 11).

The line ministries provide assistance in accordance with their mandates, mainly by establishing IDP task forces and budget lines at the central level. These ministries often became the main channel for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 74).

Most IDPs considered as 'poor' since 2004

Initially, the government indicated that the plan should be implemented by the end of 2002. It became, however, rapidly clear that this deadline was unrealistic, given the fact that many conflicts that had created internal displacement had not been solved by then. The deadline was then pushed back until the end of 2003. Beyond 31 December 2003, and with the exception of areas with large IDP or ex-refugee populations, such as Maluku, Central Sulawesi and East Nusa Tenggara, the displaced would be considered as 'poor' and their needs delivered through the government's general social security programmes aimed at poverty alleviation and community development (OCHA & Bakornas, July 2003, p. 27). In line with the government's decentralisation plan, the provinces became the focal points in the search of solutions and assistance programmes.

Since the lifting of IDP status in most provinces in early January 2004 in line with the government's IDP policy formulated in 2001, the displaced are no longer considered as IDPs but only as "poor" or "vulnerable people" and no central government funding is made available to address their specific needs (OCHA & Bakornas, July 2003, p.27). Instead, the ex-IDPs are included in general poverty alleviation programmes and responsibility for their well-being has been delegated to the provincial level. In provinces where large number of people remained displaced and unassisted as of early 2004, such as Maluku and Central Sulawesi provinces, and where the needs of the displaced were obviously still considerable, the deadline for the lifting of the IDP status was repeatedly delayed until the end of 2005 while the situation of the displaced appears not to have improved much. In the last two years, corruption, lack of reliable data on the displaced, lack of funding and insecurity were still reported as the major obstacles to the return and reintegration process in these provinces (Jakarta Post, 3 February 2006; Asianews, 16 January 2006).

Obstacles/limitations to the implementation of the IDP policy

The three-pronged strategy adopted by the government to handle the IDP problem faced a number of problems and obstacles. The most obvious one, as already mentioned was the short timeframe. A second problem was that the strategy appeared to be have been designed to respond to the needs of one unified displaced population with similar constraints and needs. The variety of conflicts and their particularity called for greater attention paid to the specific needs of each displaced population. While some of the displaced managed to return to their homes and were assisted to restart a livelihood, others either did not receive the assistance, received too little or were not allowed to return to their homes. By declaring the IDP problem solved by the end of 2003, the government did not take into account the fact that the needs of each displaced groups varied according to a combination of factors that needed to be assessed separately for each groups. In most displacement-affected provinces, the implementation of the IDP policy has been fraught with obstacles and problems (Sweeting, Patrick; Conway, George; Hameed, Nabila, September 2004).

The IDP definition used by the government seems to have included only people who are still displaced, while excluding those who have been displaced. Thus, once returned or resettled, the displaced are considered as having no further needs (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 39). The IDP definition used by the government seems to have included only people who are still displaced, while excluding those who *have been* displaced (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p.39). Also, when the

displaced did qualify for assistance, the policy of providing termination grants in exchange of the IDP status meant that no further displacement-related claims could be made by the displaced after accepting the deal. Thus, once returned or resettled, the displaced are considered as having no further needs and they cease to be recognised as IDPs (RSC, July 2005, p.10). However, in many provinces of the country, returned or resettled populations continued for years to face important humanitarian and reintegration challenges. During the 2003-2004 military operation in Aceh, assistance provided to the displaced upon return was considered by half of the returnees as insufficient to help them recover from their displacement (IOM- GoRI, September 2004, p. 18). In the wake of the tsunami, the assistance needs of these IDPs were almost completely ignored by the government and the international community, although assessments conducted during 2005 showed access to basic services, housing and re-integration needs to be significant in former conflict areas (WB, March 2006, pp.61-69). In North Maluku, it was reported that the most serious problem faced by the returnees was that not everybody had received the housing package, even when entitled to it, and that funding for the reconstruction of houses was largely insufficient (UNDP, 2005, p.55; SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 13). In some cases, people have returned to their villages but have been unable to regain their land and property as it was now occupied by others, often IDPs themselves (Duncan, Christopher, 2004, p. 5). Some have also returned to find out that houses constructed for them were below acceptable standards or simply did not exist (Asia News, 16 January 2006).

A lack of coordination between provinces has also been reported as a serious problem. The decentralisation programme under way throughout Indonesia since 2000 and the absence of implementing guidelines issued with the national IDP policy in 2001 often resulted in considerable discrepancies between provinces in the assistance provided to the displaced and led to confusion among IDPs about their entitlements. The lifting of the IDP status has given more autonomy to the provinces in dealing with the IDP problem and has required them to cooperate better with each other to manage the return of inter-province IDPs. However, this has often not been the case with local governments of North Maluku and North Sulawesi provinces reportedly unable to reach administrative and financial agreements with regards to the return of cross-province IDPs. Coordination problems have also occurred between provincial and district authorities hampering the re-turn of the displaced in North Maluku (UNDP, 2005, p.55).

By declaring the IDP crisis solved and overlooking the needs of some groups of displaced, the government runs the risk of jeopardising the transition from emergency assistance to economic recovery and undermining the reconciliation efforts undertaken in the past years. Only when this transition is successful can the empowerment, relocation or return of the displaced also be a success and their displacement end.

National NGO response

The conflicts that started in 1999 led to the emergence of many national and local NGOs. There seems to be a difference between how the Indonesian society perceives the work of NGOs and the way the international aid agencies see it. Indonesian NGOs see their work as more useful if conducted over a long period of time and containing strong advocacy and communication components, rather than focusing on the delivery of a specific technical service. NGO capacity is said to vary by regions, those in the western part of the country having more capacity than the one in the east.

National NGOs, seen as those who work in different provinces, usually work on human rights issues and focus their work on lobbying the government. Assistance is generally delivered through branch offices or local partners. During the 1999-2003 emergency phase, most national NGOs delivered their assistance through local ones. During this period, the international

community (NGO, UN, donors) has tended to use the NGOs already established rather than the new ones, especially in areas with limited access (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 24).

International response

The United Nations and international NGOs have helped the Indonesian government assist the displaced since the conflicts erupted in 1999. Prior to the tsunami, the international community's support for the handling of the IDP crisis reached \$81 million between 2001 and 2004, the majority of which was channelled through three successive UN appeals (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 9). The United Nations agencies and the Red Cross movement have been the main actors, supported by the NGO community. Among the donors, Sweden, Australia, the Netherlands and the European Union have been the strongest supporters of programmes assisting the displaced (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 35).

UN response (2001-2004)

The government of Indonesia was quick to acknowledge that the humanitarian consequences of the many conflicts that emerged at the end of 1999, in particular in the Malukus, by far exceeded its own capacity and early on requested the UN to coordinate international assistance for relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation activities (OCHA March 2000, sect. 4.8.1). Coordination mechanisms were supported by OCHA through a Humanitarian Coordination Unit, attached to the UN Resident Coordinator.

Specialised UN agencies took the lead in their respective sectors, WHO took the lead for overall technical coordination and health needs assessments, WFP ensured the lead role in the food sector, while UNDP played a lead role for reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction support and capacity-building. Other UN agencies involved in the assistance to the displaced included FAO, UNFPA and UNICEF.

UN Coordination offices headed by OCHA were established in four conflict-affected provinces (North Maluku, Maluku, Central Sulawesi and Aceh) to strengthen the UN presence, to facilitate the coordination and implementation of programmes and to improve the interaction between international agencies and local authorities.

In the context of a shift from a humanitarian emergency phase to a post-conflict recovery phase, responsibility for the management of the UN Centers, renamed UN Project Coordination Offices (UNPCO), were gradually handed over to UNDP, first in North Maluku in early 2003, then in Central Sulawesi and Maluku in mid-2004.

The first [Consolidated Appeal in March 2000](#) focused on the Maluku crisis, asking for **USD 14 million**. The [following CAP](#), issued in November of the same year, required **USD 11 million** to respond to the crisis. The [2002 CAP](#) extended its coverage to areas outside the Malukus, (Aceh, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan and Madura, Central Sulawesi and Papua) and requested nearly **USD 41 million**. The [2003 CAP](#), revised in June 2003 to include requirements for Aceh, where the government had just launched a major military operation, requested nearly **USD 83 million**. Priority was given to 4 provinces of Central Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and North Maluku. The launching of the 2004 CAP was delayed until April 2004 due to disagreements between the UN and the Indonesian government on the geographical focus of the CAP and on the use of IDP vocabulary. The [2004 CAP](#), which requested **USD 42 million**, acknowledged significant improvements in the situation of the displaced, with the exception of Aceh, and put the

focus on the shift from emergency assistance to recovery and longer-term development. It was estimated by the international community that the 2004 CAP would be the last one.

From early 2001 to 2004, a total of USD 81 million worth of humanitarian assistance was provided internationally to Indonesia, most of it benefiting IDPs. Sixty per cent of this amount was channelled through the UN CAPs (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 9). An additional USD 20 million was pledged during 2004 ([see table](#)), USD 12 million of which was contributed inside the 2004 CAP ([see table](#)).

The official lifting of the IDP status in most provinces as of early 2004 also coincided with the ending of the Consolidated Appeal process as a mechanism to channel assistance to the displaced in Indonesia. Between 2004 and 2006, most projects targeting conflict-induced internally displaced people and supporting their recovery from the socio-economic impact of their displacement gradually phased out. With the exception of Aceh, where conflict-induced forced displacement was ongoing until after the tsunami struck the province, and Maluku province where renewed tension caused displacement in April 2004, the United Nations has since 2004 considered that the country no longer hosted any conflict-IDPs, although it continued to provide targeted assistance to the displaced and the host communities in many provinces of the country.

Between 2001 and 2005, the UN Development agency (UNDP) conducted the North Maluku and Maluku Recovery Programme (NMMRP) aimed at supporting the post-conflict recovery needs of the affected population, including the sustainable reintegration needs of IDPs. Plans for 2006-2010 do not include any specific assistance to conflict-IDPs and focus mainly on strong support to the government for the recovery of Aceh and North Sumatra provinces as well as for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UNDP & Government of Indonesia, May 2006, p.6).

Natural disasters and humanitarian reform process shape current framework of international response (2004-2006)

Recent major natural disasters, such as the December 2004 tsunami and the May 2006 earthquake, as well as the ongoing humanitarian reform process have largely shaped the current framework of the international response to internally displaced people in the country, in particular those displaced by natural disasters. Large scale support is provided by the United Nations for the government's plan for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the tsunami-affected areas, through the Office of the UN Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias (UNORC), established in September 2005.

Following the May 2006 earthquake on the island of Java and in line with the UN humanitarian reform agenda, the Humanitarian Coordinator, together with other humanitarian partners, is applying the "cluster approach" aimed at ensuring greater predictability and accountability in the response. Cluster leads were designated for the following sectors specifically relating to IDPs: emergency shelter (IFRC), child protection and education (UNICEF) and early recovery (UNDP) (OCHA, June 2006, p. 23). Since no large camps were envisaged for the displaced, no agency was formally designated as the lead for camp management and coordination (CMC), although it was agreed that the International Office for Migration (IOM) would take up that role should the need arise. It is naturally too early to assess if the new approach has improved the humanitarian response. Also, given the nature of the emergency and the absence of major protection issues such as those found in conflict situation, it will be difficult to use this case as a test to know if the new coordination arrangements will in the future better address gaps in the protection needs, which have been observed in many of the different situations of internal displacement Indonesia has experienced in recent years.

The extent of the damage and destruction created by the tsunami warranted a strong response from the international community to provide assistance to the large number of victims. However, by creating a situation where an enormous amount of money and resources have been channelled towards one particular group of IDPs (the tsunami-affected) within one particular IDP situation (Aceh), the response of the international community has tended to overlook the needs of other groups of displaced in the country who are still in need of support from the government and from the international community to make their displacement end. With an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 people still displaced or inadequately assisted, it is important that the extraordinary support enjoyed by people displaced by the tsunami in Aceh does not come at the expense of other IDPs elsewhere in the country, but rather serves as a standard for other IDP situations.

NGO response

International NGOs have played a major role in the assistance the displaced. They have been involved from the initial humanitarian emergency phase to the recovery and development phase funding their projects either through the UN CAP or through bilateral contacts with donors.

From 2001 to 2006, many international NGOs have assisted the displaced throughout the various stages of their displacement. These have included *inter alia* Action by Churches Together ([ACT](#)), Action contre la Faim ([ACF](#)), the Consortium for Assistance to Refugees and the Displaced in Indonesia ([CARDI](#)), [CARE international](#), Catholic Relief Service ([CRS](#)), Church World Service ([CWS](#)), Jesuit Refugee Service ([JRS](#)), Save the Children UK ([SC UK](#)), Médecins sans Frontières ([MSF](#)), International Catholic Migration Commission ([ICMC](#)), [Oxfam GB](#), Mercy Corps International ([MCI](#)) and World Vision ([WVI](#)).

The European Commission, through its “Aid to Uprooted People programme”, has remained a strong supporter to the displaced and will during 2007 continue to fund projects targeting the needs of the displaced and the host community in five provinces among the most affected by displacement, including the Maluku provinces, Central Sulawesi, and Central Kalimantan. CARDI, which has assisted conflict-IDPs in various provinces of the country since 2001, will continue implementing projects targeting IDPs during 2007. Originally focused on humanitarian assistance and protection to displaced persons in Indonesia, CARDI’s goal has broadened to facilitate the transition of conflict-affected populations to a sustain-able peace through community-based interventions aiming at improved social cohesion and good governance.

National and international response by province (2006)

MALUKU

National response

Lack of coordination, limited funding and corruption have reportedly constrained the provision of return packages to all IDPs between 2000 and 2006 (Jakarta Post, 19 July 2004; Jakarta Post, 20 August 2004; JRS, 23 August 2004). Those who have received the assistance and returned were reported to have still faced significant challenges including land ownership disputes, hostility from local communities and unrehabilitated social services in their area of return. For those living in relocation sites, lack of job opportunities and shortage of land were reported as common problems. Of the estimated 12,000 IDPs (or 3,193 IDP households) who were assisted during 2004-2005, 40 per cent returned to their former communities while the rest opted for resettlement. The 60,000 people who remain unassisted are likely to pursue the same options (CARDI, December 2005, p. 2).

A special coordinating working group (Pokja) was established by the Maluku government in 1999 to oversee IDP assistance programmes and coordinate with its national counterpart BAKORNAS. Each IDP family was entitled to receive USD 375 in aid and assistance package. Out of the 64,000 IDP families, only 10,000 had received the assistance at the end of 2002. Out of the estimated 49,000 houses destroyed, almost half had been rehabilitated as of 2002. To speed up the return of the displaced, the government then financially encouraged the displaced to construct their own homes, but this reportedly resulted in an increase in property disputes (UNDP, 2005, pp. 54-55).

In 2002, the Malino II talks contained a package of measures including rehabilitation measures focused on 'educational, health, religious, and housing facilities'. The following year, the Maluku provincial government release a 5-year strategic plan divided in 2 phases. The first "Stabilisation and Security phase" phase would run from 2003/2004 to 2005 and would be followed by a "Creating a Competitive Environment" phase from 2006 to 2008 (UNDP, 2005, p. 52).

The government has since 2002 repeatedly extended the deadline for resolving the IDP problem. At the end of 2005, almost seven years after the conflict erupted in Ambon, the government yet again postponed the deadline, citing lack of reliable data on the displaced as the main constraint for assisting the displaced (Jakarta Post, 3 February 2006). In October 2005, the media reported that the authorities would recount the number of displaced people in Ambon (CCDA, 9 October 2005).

The official number of IDPs in the province stood at 15,788 IDP families as of 15 September 2005, although the local government admitted that accurate IDP figures remained a problem (OCHA, 15 September 2005, p. 5). Between 2004 and 2005, at least USD 25 million were allocated by the government to help the displaced (OCHA, March 2005; OCHA, November 2004).

International response

In the last quarter of 2005, 4 INGO's -IMC, ICMC, SCUUK and Mercy Corps- left the province, leaving the following INGOs:

- CARDI (youth empowerment and community rehabilitation)
- JRS (multi sectoral),
- MSF – Belgium (health),
- OXFAM GB (information mapping and health),
- Project Concern International (health),

In 2006, CARDI Maluku will integrate the elements of Economic Empowerment, Basic Services, Protection-Advocacy, and Good Governance, while taking into account its previous experiences and communities' present needs, in order to focus more effectively on youth. Ideas for Protection and Advocacy programmes to address issues regarding the remaining IDPs in Ambon city, Central Maluku and West Seram will be explored as well.

UN agencies include:

- WFP (rice distribution for women participating in trauma counselling),
- UNICEF (health, education, water and sanitation, and child protection),
- UNFPA through the National Family Planning Agency (reproductive health)
- OCHA has supported OXFAM GB for the implementation of "Humanitarian Needs Database Development and Public Health Intervention".
- UNDP (addressing barriers to return by supporting government housing programmes, infrastructure rehabilitation, re-initiation of public services disrupted by conflict and support for resumption of livelihoods).

NORTH MALUKU

National response

Since 2002, return programs have been implemented by the central government and the local government for the displaced.

Assistance has included :

- Transport costs to areas of origin.
- Building materials (non-local) for houses, working tools and building costs.
- Living expenses for 90 days for maximum 5 persons.
- Additional working capital to support family income.
- A cash contribution for every family member who died in the conflict. (ACT, 29 March 2004)

In September 2003, the government launched a major recovery initiative in both Maluku and North Maluku provinces. Presidential Instruction No. 6 (Inpres) instructed coordinating and line ministries to prioritise recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in both Maluku and North Maluku provinces from 2004 to 2007. Inadequate planning from the ministries during 2004 hampered the implementation of the plan and actually resulted in less funding made available by the central government to North Maluku in 2004 than in 2003. In the end, the government allocated IDR 150 billion for IDP-related activities in 2004. The following year, a total of IDR 1,210 trillion was allocated to implement recovery and rehabilitation activities in both provinces, with an additional IDR 250 billion for IDP-related activities (UNDP, 2005, pp. 52-53)

International response

Between 2001 and 2005, the UN Development agency (UNDP) conducted the North Maluku and Maluku Recovery Programme (NMMRP) aimed at supporting the post-conflict recovery needs of the affected population, including the sustainable reintegration needs of IDPs (UNDP,

Local NGOs such as SANRO Foundation, and international NGO's such as ACF, CARDI (School reconstruction, community rehabilitation, and youth empowerment), WVII (Education, Active Joyful Effective Learning, magazine production, and community rehabilitation), IMC, UNDP, IRD and CORDAID (community rehabilitation and HIV Health Survey), Save the Children UK (social protection, peace building and education) and World Bank (District Development Program) provide support to the displaced in the province.

CENTRAL KALIMANTAN AND EAST JAVA (MADURA ISLAND)

National response

On Madura island, the displaced received some level of immediate humanitarian support, but the response lacked a long-term involvement. The provision of rice and side-dish money lasted until the end of 2002. Other assistance measures included free health, water & sanitation assistance (with the help of IMC), temporary free education and trauma counselling for IDP children. The government also organised go&see visits to Central Kalimantan and started reconciliation processes between the provincial governments (OCHA February 2003, pp. 3-4).

The assistance proved largely insufficient and by mid-2004, the living conditions in camps and private housing were seen as way below acceptable standards (OCHA, 30 June 2004). Pressing needs were identified in virtually all sectors, and included: inadequate education facilities, high level of unemployment among IDPs (90%), strained water supply and sanitation system, health care under-ressourced and often out of reach for IDPs , lack of housing and infrastructure (OCHA, 9 April 2004, p15).

Growing tension also started between the Madurese and the local population. The arrival of close to 150,000 Madurese from Central Kalimantan on Madura Island and the limited assistance host communities received from the authorities to cope with these arrivals placed an important burden on the members of the host communities, many of whom wished they could return to Central Kalimantan.

The 2 main obstacles to the return of the remaining number of displaced is the continued hostility of the local population in Central Kalimantan and the lack of funds provided by the government. Mediation efforts by the government between the community leaders, the Dayak community and the displaced have been insufficient so far to allow for the massive return of the displaced (WB, February 2005, p.18).

The measures taken by the central government since 2002 to foster the return of the displaced included the issuing of regulations aimed at facilitating the return to the most affected districts, the allocation of financial resources, the promotion of inter-community dialogue and inter-provincial coordination (OCHA, 9 April 2004, p.9). However, the response provided by the government did little to solve the problem. A study by the World Bank published in 2005 concluded that there was an evident lack of clarity on the government's policy on return as well as a lack of information provided to the grassroots level. It suggested that the government remained intentionally vague as to not face the mutiny from any side. Aware of the continued hostility of the local population to the return of the Madurese, the government preferred not to engage in any direction (WB, February 2005, pp. 45-46). One consequence of this lack of clarity is that IDPs in Madura face constant uncertainty and. IDPs in Madura are classified as "temporary visitors" with no means to achieve full residency rights. Without these they cannot support themselves as they lack jobs, access to public services, and land. This means that they are dependent on assistance provided by the local government and NGOs while straining the already very limited resources of the local community.

It is believed that out of a total of 180,000 Madurese displaced from Central Kalimantan to East Java (Madura island) since 2001, between 73,000 and 83,000 managed to return up to 2005, leaving close to 100,000 people unable to return as of early 2006. Between 2004 and 2005, an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Madurese managed to return Central Kalimantan with assistance from local NGOs (OCHA, March 2005). During 2002 and 2003, an estimated 43,000 made the journey back (OCHA, 9 April 2004, p.14).

International response

During 2005 and 2006, only CARE and Oxfam (with ECHO funding) were still conducting programmes targeting IDPs and returnees in Central Kalimantan and Madura island. As of March 2006, Oxfam was still operating a programme in Central Kalimantan (rural areas of Sampit) serving components of shelter, food security, public health and IGA to an estimated 13,000 community members. The project looked at reaching both the Madurese and the indigenous Dayak in a fair ratio. CARE was active in both areas, but foremost in Madura providing mainly assistance in the sector of public health and food security to some 10,000 IDP households. Both projects were to be phased out by mid-2006. A long-term development approach was seen as the best to further address the needs of the ex-IDPs and returnees in both areas.

WEST KALIMANTAN

National response

In the light of increasing tensions between the estimated 60,000 Madurese IDPs, who had lived for nearly 2 years in various settlements within Pontianak, and the local people, the government

of Indonesia decided to resettle the displaced in areas outside the capital. Resettlement sites were built and the Madurese were offered two options: accept the equivalent of USD 300 as well as a house and land in the resettlement sites, or receive USD 600 and arrange themselves for accommodations.

In relocation sites, many IDPs were engaged in land disputes with locals, the latter claiming ownership of land attributed by the government to the displaced. The long-term sustainability of the sites was also put into question due to low level of income households and the lack of market access for agricultural products. The displaced were also faced with documentation problem as the government failed to provide them with residency status (ID cards), which prevented them from accessing government social and health services (CRS, 31 March 2004, p. 28)

International response

From 2002 to 2004, the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) conducted a "Emergency and Relief Assistance for Displaced Madurese in West Kalimantan" programme. The project, supported by USAID, WFP and OCHA, aimed at assisting vulnerable Madurese IDPs and surrounding host communities through integrated programmatic activities to improve their livelihoods. Although the emergency phase was concluded in March 2004, CRS continued to operate in the relocation areas to provide assistance in the following sectors: agriculture, health, and peacebuilding. Some 1,600 IDP families benefited from the project. CRS also coordinated advocacy activities on the issue of land, which was at the center of disputes between IDP who had received land from the government in relocation sites and the local people who claimed the land belonged to them. CRS facilitated meeting between the IDPs, the affected community members and the government. Other INGOs involved in assistance to IDPs and peace-building efforts included Save the Children, Oxfam and WVI.

CENTRAL SULAWESI

National response

Although putting an end to the violence, the 2001 Malino Declaration did not solve the underlying causes of the conflict. Tension between Muslims and Christians has remained high in the province since 2001. Occasional eruptions of violence in the province during 2005 have sometimes caused small-scale displacement and in response, the government deployed more troops to the province in response to increased communal tension (Jakarta Post, 8 November 2005; DPA, 6 November 2005). The situation is so far contained by the presence of security forces, but many fear that violence may flare up again when they pull out. The society is still polarised between Christians and Muslims and few envisage a return to mixed communities. The return and rehabilitation of the displaced has been hampered by the embezzlement of relief funds, unresolved land disputes and the persistence of tensions (CSM, 11 January 2006; UNDP, July 2004, p. 15).

According to SATLAK Poso, as of March 2005, some 4,742 IDP families (or 21,000 displaced individuals) had still not received the empowerment grant from the government due to lack of funding. In consequence, a request for additional funds has been addressed to the central government (OCHA, 31 March 2005). In addition to lack of funding for them, the displaced are also reported to face significant land and property problems upon return. Most of those displaced are reported to have lost certificates and other legal documents that had provided them with access to credit and legal titles (OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 66).

Local NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) are reported to have significant capacity, although there is a real need to support of local capacities in areas most affected by the conflict and areas isolated from usual forms of assistance. Also, there is need for a better

coordination mechanism that includes grass root organisations, government as well as international agencies (OCHA 9 April 2004, pp. 15-16).

International response

Since 2002, reconstruction and reconciliation efforts have been insufficient to help the province fully recover from the negative impact of the conflict and the province remains one of the poorest of the country (Jakarta Post, 21 February 2006).

Since 2004, programmes have focused on economic recovery and livelihood support and international NGOs were already shifting from direct assistance to soft loans in their livelihood support activities, FFW and training rather than free distributions (OCHA 9 April 2004, pp. 15-16).

International NGOs operating in the province include:

- Mercy Corps (education and income generation)
- CWS (distribution of food items and agriculture)
- IMC (mobile clinics activities and health campaigns)
- CARE (health and nutrition)

UN agencies include:

- [UNDP](#) (support the recovery and reconciliation process).
- OCHA (establishment of a rapid needs assessment database, including training, for the local disaster response unit within the Poso Government."(OCHA 30 April 2004)

ACEH

National and international response

In the wake of the disaster, the international community provided a response of unprecedented generosity, with more than \$8.8 billion pledged for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Aceh and North Sumatra (ADB, February 2006, p.1). The largest humanitarian assistance effort in history proved decisive in helping to avert any major health or food crisis. Though slow to get underway, it aimed towards solving the immense task of re-building the devastated province while helping hundreds of thousands of people regain some form of livelihood. Progress has been steady, albeit slower than expected, and much remains to be done to achieve the reconstruction of the province and restore the livelihood of those affected by the tsunami. But the challenges are even more considerable in the inland mountainous areas affected by the conflict. It is only after the signing of the peace agreement in August 2005 that the government and foreign aid agencies started planning to extend humanitarian and reconstruction programmes to communities living in these areas which had seen very little if any assistance during the conflict and in the aftermath of the tsunami.

From the moment the tsunami struck up to the signing of the peace agreement, conflict-IDPs were largely ignored by the international community, and few international aid agencies were ready to challenge the government on an issue which was deemed too sensitive (WB, 31 October 2005, p.vi; CSIS, October 2005, pp.7-9). Things started to change slowly following the peace agreement and with the increasing interest of donors in supporting the peace process. Towards the end of 2005, the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) – the government-appointed agency overseeing the coordination of assistance to Aceh and the nearby island of Nias – was tasked with assisting in the rehabilitation of conflict-affected areas (ADB, February

2006, p.2). In February 2006, the provincial government established the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA) as the key body to coordinate post-conflict programming (WB, 19 April 2006, pp. 4-5). The extent to which the BRA will be able to respond to compensation demands from victims of the conflict, in particular from internally displaced people, remains unclear. A total sum of US\$ 23 million has been allocated by the government to assist former combatants, political prisoners and victims of the conflict (UNORC, 31 May 2006, p.1). As of May 2006, the coordinating body was reportedly working on clarifying the procedures and criteria for eligibility (WB, 26 May 2006, p.4). (For more information on this and on the criteria used for identifying "victims of the conflict", see also "[Aceh: Now for the Hard Part](#)", ICG, 29 March 2006, p. 7). Following a needs assessment conducted between 2005 and 2006 in former conflict areas, the World Bank recommended that the definition of the term "affected civilians", designated in the MoU as beneficiaries of the reintegration programme, should be refined since it was open to wide interpretation and as such could include almost everybody living in these areas. By clarifying the definition and narrowing down this group, it would then be possible to support them through targeted assistance such as livelihood support or compensation for destroyed or damaged property (WB, March 2006, pp. 60-61).

While local NGOs have long been working with people displaced by the conflict, it was not until quite recently that UN agencies or international agencies such as IOM and the World Bank started getting involved with conflict-IDPs. The World Bank, through its recently-launched new Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas (SPADA) programme aiming at incorporating conflict-areas into the reconstruction process, has started including an IDP component (WB, 6 April 2006). The Office of the United Nations Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias (UNORC), UNDP and UNICEF did provide some degree of assistance to conflict-IDPs in early January 2006 when collective return movements of IDPs to Central Aceh and Bener Meriah managed to attract attention and forced the government and international agencies alike to respond to their needs. The response was, however, very limited and did not include programmatic activities aimed at promoting the safe and sustainable return of the displaced (UNDP, May 2006). It was largely done on an ad-hoc basis and lacked a long-term strategy with clear return mechanisms (UNORC, January 2006; WB, 18 February 2006, p.2).

While the peace process is now firmly on track, it is critical to put an end to the existing discrimination in the distribution of aid between tsunami-affected and conflict-affected populations, which has reportedly created tension between communities in many areas of the province (EC, 15 December 2005, p.5; WB, 23 August 2005). In order to avoid deepening these tensions within the affected communities, assistance should be distributed in a fair and equitable way which also takes into account the specific needs of the most vulnerable among them, in particular the displaced. In areas where minority groups, such as the ethnic Javanese or Gayonese in East Aceh or the Acehnese in Central Aceh, are returning, targeted assistance for the displaced should also include security guarantees as well as peace-building activities aimed at rebuilding trust between communities.

Efforts are currently underway to more systematically include conflict-IDPs in the collection of data on the internally displaced. CARDI has in May 2006 taken over a project started by NRC to collect data on numbers, location and needs and to feed it into a steadily updated database hitherto handled by the United Nations.

WEST TIMOR

National response

The majority of the estimated 250,000 people who fled East Timor to West Timor in 1999, returned in the months following their initial displacement. The estimated 100,000 who did not return were offered refugee status until the end of 2002. In 2003, they became Indonesian

citizens and were offered the same resettlement/integration options as other IDPs in the country. Although the return to East Timor is still an option offered by the East Timorese government, few have done so in the last year (Jakarta Post, 28 December 2005). Only 500 people took part in the repatriation programme during 2005. The programme offered financial incentives to return, but has been terminated at the end of 2005 (ICG, 4 May 2006, p. 2).

International response

After six years of work, UNHCR closed down its operation in West Timor at the end of 2005. With financial support from the European Union, UNHCR helped with the local integration of some 28,000 ex East Timorese refugees. During the initial phase of displacement, UNHCR provided emergency shelter and relief items to the displaced. During the integration and rehabilitation phase, UNHCR provided assistance in the housing, water and sanitation, education and health sectors (UNHCR, 16 December 2005).

As of May 2006, there is uncertainty over the number of ex-East Timorese people who still live in situation akin to displacement in West Timor. UNHCR says up to 10,000 people continue to live in difficult conditions in camps along the border. The local and provincial authorities, as well as a local NGO claim between 40,000 and 100,000 people live in camp or emergency housing, mainly in Belu and Timor Tengah Utara (TTU) districts (ICG, 4 May 2006, p. 2). Lack of access to land is the main problem facing the displaced, who find it very difficult to make a living. Also, as of the end of 2005, the former East Timorese residents now living as Indonesian citizens in West Timor were still trying to get compensation for assets left behind in East Timor (Jakarta Post, 20 December 2005)

PAPUA

National response

While the government of Indonesia has opted for dialogue and negotiations to deal with the separatist aspirations of Aceh, it has so far resisted the same shift in its approach to the secessionist aspirations of Papua province. While troops were leaving Aceh in the wake of the peace agreement, a significant military build-up in Papua province during 2005 raised widespread concern about its potential disastrous human rights consequences. The governments does not acknowledge any displacement in the province and has no assistance available. In 2005, the security forces were accused by church groups in Papua of using money allocated to development and humanitarian programmes to finance their military operations against the rebels (The Age, 16 March 2005).

International response

A ban on media and NGO's access to the province in place since 2003, has prevented any independent assessment of the human rights and displacement situation. UNDP conducting an assessment during 2005, which did not address human rights issues, but noted that widening social disparities and growing tensions between the local population and settlers had increased the potential for conflict in the region (UNDP, August 2005, p.2).

In February 2006, Human Rights Watch expressed grave concern about the lack of access for press and NGOs to Papua amidst reports of widespread displacements and human rights abuses (HRW, 10 February 2006).

References to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Known references to the Guiding Principles as of 2005

- Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
- Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
- Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
- Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation

None so far, but :
"The GPID and the Manual on Field Practices in Internal Displacement have been translated into Bahasa Indonesia and widely circulated among government officials and conflict-affected communities.
Based on the GPID, a cartoon booklet called 'Mereka yang mengungsi' ("Those who are displaced") was developed and distributed in conflict-affected communities for wider recognition and advocacy of the GPID. Although the GPID have been unanimously accepted and serve as a non-binding basis for the government's strategy and policy to address IDP issues (...)" (OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 7)
Sources: OCHA
Date: 2004
Documents: UN Consolidated Appeal 2004 [Internet]

Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

Dissemination of the Guiding Principles: ""The unusually cooperative attitude of the government has encouraged many agencies, particularly the UN system, to concentrate on the advocacy of the social and economic rights of IDPs, particularly by translating and publicising very broadly the UN IDP Guidelines.
These are widely mentioned in Indonesia around the aid projects. Protection activities in relation to the IDP Guidelines, international legal instruments relating to the rights of children, women, and social and economic rights, have been promoted on a growing scale since 2002. There are signs that this is bearing fruit at the level of dialogue with local and national government (for example the repeated objective of finding durable solutions without sacrificing humanitarian principles, mentioned by BAKORNAS-PBP), but there is little evidence of lasting policy impact: the IDP policies are decided separately from the priorities of the agencies. One such policy was the decision to declare all IDP emergencies over in December 2003." (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p. 44)
Sources: SIDA
Date: 7 August 2004
Documents: Evaluation of assistance to IDPs in Indonesia [Internet]

Dissemination of the Guiding Principles: "GoRI involvement in the planning process has created greater space for advocating better practice in public service provision, increasing social service expenditure, and incorporating rights-based approaches into public policy. An example of this is the unanimous endorsement of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement by provincial governments affected by conflict." (OCHA, 14 February 2003, p. 10)
Sources: OCHA
Date: 14 February 2003 (revised version)
Documents: UN Consolidated Appeal 2003 [Internet]

Seminar on Internal Displacement in Indonesia: The Brookings-CUNY Project, in collaboration with the Center for Research on Inter-Group Relations and Conflict Resolution (CERIC), the National Commission on Human Rights (KomnasHAM), OCHA, UNDP and UNHCR, held a seminar in Jakarta, Indonesia to raise visibility to the problem of internal displacement and identify ways of improving the national and international response. More than 130 persons participated (some 30 participants came from 10 of the most affected provinces) from government offices, international organizations, local and international NGOs and research institutions. Participants expressed support for the establishment of a National Commission for IDPs and Community Recovery, called for the creation for an effective information system on IDPs, recommended programs to rebuild trust and solidarity among different ethnic and religious groups, called for the wide dissemination and application of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and urged international humanitarian organizations to expand their presence in affected areas.
Sources: Brookings-CUNY Project, CERIC, Komnas-Ham, UNDP, UNHCR, OCHA
Date: 26-27 June 2001
Documents: Internal Displacement in Indonesia: Toward an Integrated Approach [Internet]

Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages

The Guiding Principles have been converted by OXFAM-GB, Baris-Baru, the EU, OCHA and ICMC into a comic book in order to foster their dissemination among Indonesians and the IDPs themselves.
Date: 2002
Documents: Those who are displaced [Internet] (pdf 6.6 MB)

The Guiding Principles have been translated into the Indonesian language by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
Sources: OCHA
Date: 2001
Documents: UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Bahasa [Internet] (pdf 500 kb)

Training on the Guiding Principles

<p>NRC training workshop: The Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) together with CARDI held a training workshop on the Guiding Principles in Jakarta, Indonesia. In Indonesia, NRC provides support to internally displaced persons through a consortium comprised of the Danish Refugee Council, the International Rescue Committee and Stichting Vluchteling: the Consortium for Assistance to Refugees and Displaced in Indonesia (CARDI). The consortium strives to include protection aspects in its programme, and felt a need to better understand the concept of protection as such, as well as the potential use of the Guiding Principles in such protection work. CARDI and the Global IDP Project therefore invited a number of humanitarian NGOs to discuss protection and the Guiding Principles in a structured workshop addressing questions such as what is protection, which are the different ways of doing it and how can we better include protection concerns in our relief programmes.</p>
<p>Sources: Local/national NGOs, local and national authorities</p>
<p>Date: 28 February-1 March 2002</p>
<p>Documents: Report of the training workshop on protection of IDPs and the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Jakarta, Indonesia [Internet] (pdf 370 kb)</p>

<p>IOM training activities: "Building on its participation in the OCHA IDP Unit, IOM has begun a partnership with Depkeh & HAM on training in the Guiding Principles and protection assessment and monitoring, and development of reconciliation strategies. Based on the results of an initial regional workshop held in Surabaya in 2002, IOM and Depkeh & HAM have developed a capacity building programme with the aim of establishing systematic protection monitoring and response. The programme will address the protection climate in both the area of displacement as well as that of origin, the latter through identification of root causes of conflict and development of strategies contributing to reconciliation and eventual return.</p> <p>Main activities include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">-Training of trainers for 12 Depkeh & HAM officials in Guiding Principles dissemination;-Training of 24 Depkeh & HAM officials in protection assessment and monitoring;-Six regional workshops on Guiding Principles & protection monitoring including practical work to assess situation of IDPs in workshop location and causes of displacement;-Placement of 12 Depkeh & HAM officials from Jakarta to the field to work with government, NGOs and communities in strengthening protection monitoring and response;-Based on regional workshop results, implementation of activities (such as facilitated focus group discussions) to assist in developing reconciliation strategies in five areas of conflict and displacement." (OCHA 14 February 2003, p.76) <p>Achievements during 2003</p> <p>A total of 164 officials from Depkeh & Ham[Department of Justice and Human Rights] (Central and Provincial), Satkorlack, the Police and Bakornas have participated in the Guiding Principles dissemination workshops conducted in five provinces. 68 of those have attended the protection monitoring workshop and have actively participated in the funded field placements. The monitoring and reporting mechanisms that will eventually be institutionalised by Depkeh & HAM are being developed during the field placements. By project completion, Depkeh & HAM's</p>
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capacity to appraise, monitor and report on the protection status of IDPs will have been strengthened, there by contributing to the overall protection climate." OCHA 9 April 2004, p. 128)

Sources: OCHA

Date: February 2003, April 2004

Documents:

Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Indonesia 2003, Revised February 2003, OCHA 14 February 2003 [Internet] (pdf 1,6 MB)

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Training on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement to improve the management skills of SATKORLAK PBP and SATLAK PBP in Aceh

"The IDP Management Training was officially inaugurated on Thursday (25 Mar.) by the Secretary of SATKORLAK PBP and the Head of UN OCHA Aceh. The training is designed by an LNGO, Yayasan Sehat Beurata, in consultation with provincial authorities and UN agencies (i.e. UNICEF, WHO, WFP, and OCHA) to improve the management skills of SATKORLAK PBP and SATLAK PBP in dealing with the IDP issues and disaster management in the province. The training is also covering topics on protection issues (i.e. the rights of IDPs and civilians in armed conflicts) and the Government's responsibilities. This is a two days training and will be conducted in three sessions/rounds consecutively. Some 150 participants from Banda Aceh and other affected districts are attending the training that is funded by the (DFID/AUSAID) Emergency Response Fund/Humanitarian Response Fund." (OCHA 27 March 2004)

Sources: OCHA

Date: April 2004

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