Countries at the Crossroads 2006 - Yemen

(Scores are based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing weakest and 7 representing strongest performance.)

Introduction

In the two years from the end of 2003 until the end of 2005, Yemen's overall performance on democratic governance weakened, with little progress to report on strengthening the rule of law, fighting corruption, and increasing transparency. Yemen's government severely restricted press freedom; security forces intimidated, beat, and arrested dozens of journalists who had expressed criticism of the government. The government also used a restrictive press law to jail journalists and close newspapers that had criticized the government. The government crackdown on press freedom during this two-year period represented one of the most tangible signs of a lack of progress toward democratic governance in Yemen.

Some of the government actions to limit press freedom were related to crackdowns following unrest in the country and a rebellion led by a cleric and former member of parliament. In June 2004, clashes broke out between government forces and supporters of Hussein Badreddin al-Hawthi, a prominent cleric in Yemen's Zaidi community in the northern region of Saada. Al-Hawthi, who formed an opposition group called Believing Youth, had become strongly critical of the Yemeni government's relationship with the United States, accusing the government of taking actions to please the United States at the expense of the Yemeni people.

Hundreds of people were reportedly killed in the clashes in Saada, prompting several human rights organizations to call for inquiries into reports of extrajudicial killings, mass arrests, and incommunicado detentions by government forces. Al-Hawthi was killed in September 2004, but the clashes between his supporters and government forces continued through 2005. President Ali Abdullah Saleh accused several opposition political parties of supporting al-Hawthi's insurgency. In addition to clashes in Saada, Yemen continued to face challenges in maintaining law and order from groups with links to international terrorist organizations.

Serious economic problems, including widespread poverty, continue to plague Yemen. More than 40 percent of Yemenis live below the poverty line, and economic growth has been weak. In March 2005, Yemen experienced two days of demonstrations over the introduction of a sales tax. In July, dozens of Yemenis were killed in riots when the price of fuel increased by nearly 150 percent after fuel subsidies were lifted as part of an International Monetary Fund reform program.

Despite the economic stagnation and worrying signs of backsliding on political reform, the Yemeni government continued to take steps to present the image of moving forward on democratic reform, participating in numerous international conferences on democratic development and hosting an intergovernmental regional conference on democracy, human rights, and the role of the International Criminal Court in January 2004.

Accountability and Public Voice – 2.64

Yemen is a republic headed by a popularly elected president, with a bi-cameral parliament composed of a 301-seat popularly elected house of representatives and a 111-member Shura council. The house of repre-sentatives has legislative authority, and the Shura council serves in an advisory capacity. Members of the consultative Shura council are currently appointed by the president, but in September 2005, the government proposed that half of its members, along with governors and district directors, be democratically elected in the future.¹ Thus far, the legislative framework has not been amended to reflect this proposal.

On the surface, Yemen appears to have a relatively open democratic system. Regular elections have been a key feature of Yemen's political landscape since 1990. With 22 political parties, Yemenis seemingly are free to support a range of political positions. Yet in reality, Yemen's politics are monopolized by the ruling party, the General People's Congress (GPC). In 2003, the GPC increased the number of parliament seats it holds from 145 to 238.² In 1999, President Saleh was elected to a five-year term in the country's first nationwide direct presidential election, winning 96.3 percent of the vote. Saleh's only opponent came from within his ruling GPC party, and his term in office was extended from five to seven years in a 2001 referendum.³

Yemen's April 2003 parliamentary election, its third in the last decade, took place despite concerns that popular unrest resulting from the war in Iraq might lead to a postponement. International election observers noted that Yemen had made substantial improvements in electoral management and administration. On the surface, the elections were competitive, with the opposition Islah party taking seats in constituencies that were former strongholds of the ruling party. However, there were numerous problems with the election. Voter registration involved widespread fraud, and underage voting posed a ubiquitous problem.⁴

During the campaign, the election administration placed limits on the issues candidates could raise and the presentations they could make in televised campaign statements. A single member of the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum (SCER) was the final decision maker on what candidates could and could not say during televised appearances, with no opportunity for appeal.⁵

International and domestic election monitors and Yemeni unions noted that the ruling GPC party used state resources to influence the outcome of the vote. For example, the Ministry of Education allowed the use of schools for campaign activities.⁶ In certain parts of the country, government officials threatened teachers with transfer or the loss of their jobs if they did not help the GPC in its campaign.⁷ In addition, international election monitors noted that elements of the ruling GPC employed "heavy-handed and coercive measures" on Election Day.⁸ Although provision exists in the law for public financing for campaigns, parties are also permitted to raise unregulated funds from private donors, a system that numerous analysts believe favors the ruling party. In addition, the GPC reportedly manipulates votes by arranging for military troops to vote in particular constituencies, even if they are not residents there.

Article 62 of the constitution and Sections 24 and 53 of the Election Law require that the populations of all constituencies be equal in size, with a variation of not more than plus or minus 5 percent.⁹ Nevertheless, as drawn, the boundaries of electoral constituencies do define populations of unequal size. In addition, according to independent domestic election monitors, the judiciary did not thoroughly and carefully review election disputes; it responded to 56 separate complaints in the postelection period, taking only three days to issue its ruling, which prompted complaints that the merits of different election disputes were not carefully considered.¹⁰ Yemen held local government elections in 2001. Although local council members are popularly elected, the 2000 Law on Local Authority allows for the appointment of the chairpersons of local councils by the president. In practice, the chairpersons hold the preponderance of power in the local councils, and the Local Authority Law does not grant substantial decision-making authority to the council members.¹¹

In the 1990s, Yemen embarked on a comprehensive campaign to enhance women's political participation by placing a strong emphasis on registering women to vote. The number of women registered increased nearly seven-fold, from half a million in the 1993 parliamentary elections to over three million in the 2003 parliamentary elections.¹² However, women are vastly underrepresented in most senior leadership positions in government offices. Yemen's government has attempted to increase women's participation in government by instituting a quota system in government ministries, but women's rights activists in Yemen note that these officials are often marginalized because of societal biases against women in the workplace.

The underrepresentation of women is starkest in Yemen's elected offices. Despite the best efforts of women's rights groups to increase the number of women in parliament, only one woman won a seat in the 2003 parliamentary elections, out of a total of 301 seats.¹³ The opposition Islah party did not run a single female candidate in the last parliamentary elections, and the ruling GPC party had only 10 female candidates. Out of a total of 1,400 candidates in the election, only 11 were female.¹⁴ At the local government level, women won only 35 seats out of 6,676 in the 2001 elections.¹⁵ There are no female judges serving in the northern part of the country.¹⁶

Except for certain positions in Yemen's Foreign Ministry, no merit-based competitive selection process exists for civil service positions. Minister of Civil Service and Procurement Khalid Al-Sufi decided in September 2003 to suspend all employment procedures because of corruption and bribes taken by people in charge of the hiring process. In September 2005, with financial backing from the World Bank, the govvernment launched a new identification system in civil service that would eliminate approximately 60,000 ghost employees [people on payroll who do not perform any job] and help in the anticorruption efforts.¹⁷

The constitution provides guarantees to protect the rights of an independent civic sector, and for the most part the government allows civic organizations to conduct their work freely. Overall, donors to civic organizations and public policy institutes are free of pressures from the state. However, the government and parliament do not have well-developed procedures for the regular, organized, and meaningful involvement of outside groups in the formulation of laws and policy.

Security forces and other government bodies reportedly continue to threaten and harass journalists. In addition, because of the relative weakness of the state in certain regions of the country, Yemen's government offers journalists few protections from powerful tribal forces.

Article 103 of the Press and Publications Law outlaws "direct personal criticism of the head of state" and publication of material that "might spread a spirit of dissent and division among the people" or "leads to the spread of ideas contrary to the principles of the Yemeni Revolution, prejudicial to national unity or distorting the image of the Yemeni, Arab, or Islamic heritage." Critics maintain that these vague provisions, combined with the lack of a strong judiciary, create an environment in which the government can use the threat of legal sanction against journalists who are critical of government policies. A new draft media law that would abolish jail terms for journalists who criticize the president is currently under parliamentary debate; however, critics point out that separate provisions in the law could severely restrict journalists in other ways and could be used to silence opposition to the ruling party prior to the upcoming presidential election.¹⁸

The print media do not seem to have a strong impact across much of Yemeni society, which has an illiteracy rate estimated at 51 percent of the adult population.¹⁹ The state maintains a monopoly over the media that matter most – television and radio.

In the two years from 2003 to 2005, Yemeni journalists faced numerous incidents involving violence, death threats, arbitrary arrest, and convictions under weak laws governing the freedom of the press. Despite a call by President Saleh in June 2004 to put an end to imprisonment penalties for press offenses, government authorities used the Press and Publications Law numerous times. These incidents point to a widespread government crackdown on criticism and dissent in this two-year period, in which prominent editors and journalists of opposition and independent newspapers have been threatened, attacked, and jailed. Yemen saw a new incident reflecting a deteriorating press freedom environment nearly every month during the period.

In February 2004, unknown gunmen entered the house of Sadeq Nasher, editor of the Al-Khaleej newspaper, and issued a death threat prompted by Nasher's investigations into the December 2002 assassination of political opposition leader Jarallah Omar. In February, Saleh ordered the release of Najeeb Yabli, who had been detained for writing an article in the Al-Ayyam daily newspaper critical of Saleh's policies. In March 2004, a Yemeni court ordered the release of journalist Saeed Thabet, who had been detained for publishing "false information" on an assassination attempt against the president's son, Colonel Ahmad Ali Abdullah Saleh. Thabet was later fined and banned from working as a journalist for six months by the western court of Sana'a. In April 2004, Ahmed Al-Hubaishy, editor of the newspaper May 22, a weekly that has been critical of Islamic militants, was beaten by unknown assailants.

In September 2004, Abdel Karim al-Khaiwani, editor of the prominent opposition weekly Al-Shoura, was convicted of incitement, insulting the president, publishing false news, and encouraging divisions within society because of a series of opinion pieces criticizing the government's actions in Saada during the clashes with Al-Hawthi's followers.²⁰ Hundreds were killed in the three-month uprising, which was centered in the northern mountains along Yemen's border with Saudi Arabia. Al-Khaiwani was sentenced to one year in prison, and the government suspended Al-Shoura's publication for six months. The government also took steps to withdraw the license of the Al-Hurriya newspaper. The information ministry closed a new weekly, Al-Neda, for violating Article 37 of the Press and Publications Law, which requires a new newspaper or magazine to publish within six months of registration; Al-Neda had missed this deadline by two days.

In December 2004, five journalists received suspended prison sentences for various offenses, including publishing articles that criticized the Saudi royal family and articles that detailed corruption among Yemeni political leaders.

In the spring of 2005, several journalists in Taiz and Al-Dal'e governorates were beaten while working. The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate (YJS) denounced alleged police attacks against Mohammad Abdu Sufian, editor of the Taiz newspaper, Mohammad Mohsen al-Hadad, general manager of Taiz Radio and Television Bureau, and Abu Bakr Al-Arabi, general manager of Taiz Media Center.²¹ In addition, YJS claimed that Mohammed Saif al-Qarari of al-Thawrah Daily and Abdulqader Abdullah Sa'ad of al-Wahdah Weekly newspapers were beaten and their cameras broken by the governor's bodyguards

In August, Jamal Amer, editor of Al-Wasat newspaper, was abducted and beaten by armed men who said they were acting on behalf of military officers. Government security forces ransacked the office of Associated Press journalist Ahmed Alhaj, taking files and a computer. In October, Yemeni police beat a television crew from the Arab satellite channel Al-Arabiya who were covering a strike by textile workers in Sanaa. Al-Thawra, the government-run daily newspaper, ran several editorials in 2005 accusing reporters critical of the government of being foreign intelligence agents.

When considered collectively, these incidents demonstrate a serious lack of commitment on the part of Yemen's government to respecting the freedom of the press, at times in failing to act to protect journalists and other times in actively harassing press activities and agents. In addition, they also point to serious structural weaknesses in Yemen's legal and governance system – the checks and balances that would offset the executive branch's lack of commitment to press freedom are not in place, leading to the jailing, beating, and threatening of dozens of journalists for expressing criticisms and dissenting views.

Recommendations

• The government should follow through on its proposal to make half of the Shura seats, as well as governor and district director posts, elected rather than appointed positions.
• The Yemeni government should amend the Law for Press and Publications to clarify or delete the numerous vaguely worded provisions on outlawed publications in Articles 137 to 153. The current draft law being debated by parliament should be amended and clarified to ensure the press freedom and greater public debate so essential in a democratic system.
• The government should abolish the Ministry of Information and set about developing procedures and regulations to enable the establishment of private and independent broadcast media outlets in order to reduce the state's monopoly on radio and television.
• The government should redraw the electoral constituencies in accordance with the principles set by the Constitution and Election Law, providing for equal and balanced representation.
• The government should establish special mechanisms to expedite the dispute resolution and appeals process at all stages of the election cycle, either by further developing the capacity of the SCER to rule or by setting up special and independent electoral courts to arbitrate disputes in a timely, thorough, and cost-effective manner.

Civil Liberties – 3.35

Yemen's constitution offers protections against arbitrary arrest and detenﾬtion without trial, but it is ambiguous regarding the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Yemen's government has stepped up efforts to reduce the incidence of torture, but violations continue, in part due to a lack of adequate training and awareness among law enforcement officials. At the same time, the government has at times seen fit to look the other way or even perpetrate such violations, all the more so during recent crackdowns related to the al-Hawthi rebellion and the anti-terrorist campaign.

In March 2004, journalist Muhammed Al-Qiri was beaten after being taken into the custody of security forces for photographing arrests made by members of Political Security Unit. During his later interrogation his head was reportedly slammed into a metal bar. There has been no report of an investigation into the incident. In June 2004, certain individuals reported being tortured in pretrial detention, one of them alleging the administration of electric shocks during the interrogation.²²

Prosecution of state officers accused of torturing and abusing prisoners is uneven. All public employees are immune from prosecution for crimes allegedly committed while on duty. The attorney general must provide special permission to prosecutors to investigate allegations against members of the security forces, and the head of the appeals court must lift the immunity before the accused is tried.

By law, detainees must be arraigned within 24 hours of arrest or be released. However, arbitrary detention does occur, sometimes because law enforcement officials lack proper training and at other times because political will is absent at the most senior levels of government.

The global war on terrorism has created pressures on Yemen to exploit all means available to counteract the threat posed by suspected terrorists. After the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and amid evidence of significant al-Qaeda links in the country, Yemen's internal security forces conducted a series of mass arrests, incommunicado detentions, and deportations of foreigners, using methods that sometimes violated international human rights conventions and basic rule-of-law standards.

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, but the government has taken steps to limit this freedom in practice. The 2003 Law of Demonstrations and Strikes limits peaceful demonstrations by requiring groups to obtain advance permission from the Ministry of Interior. In March 2004, thousands demonstrated in major cities across Yemen to protest Israel's extrajudicial killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. However, in September 2004, the government prevented a demonstration planned by opposition parties in Sana'a against government actions in quelling the Saada rebellion. In October 2004, government security forces arrested members of the opposition Liberation Party for conducting a public demonstration.

By law, women are afforded protections against discrimination and provided with guarantees of equality under the Sharia (Islamic law). In practice, however, women continue to face pervasive discrimination in several aspects of life. For example, the Labor Law of 1995 provides safeguards against discrimination against women in the workplace, but in practice discrimination is common and women remain vastly under-represented in the workforce. Women constitute only 22 percent of the workforce, and their participation in government jobs is much lower. Yemen's Education Act ensures equality of access to education, but Yemen has one of the largest gaps in the world between boys' and girls' primary school net attendance rates, at 67.8 percent for boys and 40.7 percent for girls.²³ The law provides for protection of women against violence, but in practice such provisions are rarely enforced. The penal code allows for leniency for persons guilty of violent assault or killing of women for alleged immodest behavior or "crimes of honor."²⁴

Women who seek to go abroad must obtain permission from their husbands or fathers to receive a passport and travel. Women – unlike men – do not have the right to confer citizenship on their foreign-born spouses, and the process for conferring citizenship on children born in the country of foreign-born fathers is in practice more difficult than for children born of Yemeni fathers and foreign-born mothers. Civil society organizations and human rights monitors report that female prisoners are not released at the end of their sentences unless a male relative is present.²⁵

Yemen is relatively homogeneous ethnically and racially. The Akhdam (Arabic for servants), a small group that claims to be descended from ancient Ethiopian occupiers, live in poverty and face social discrimination. The government, however, does not discriminate against this group and in fact has social and economic development programs to support its members.

Likewise, while government disability laws mandate the rights of disabled persons in the workplace, school, and elsewhere, widespread discrimination among the Yemeni public persists. In spite of government programs including the Social Welfare Fund, the Social Fund for Development, and the Fund for the Welfare of the Disabled, access for people with disabilities to services and provisions remains restricted.²⁶

Article 2 of the constitution states that Islam is the religion of the state, and Article 3 declares that Islamic Sharia is the source of all legislation. Although the constitution guarantees the freedom of religion, based on Islamic Sharia, a Muslim converting to another religion is guilty of the crime of apostasy, which is de jure punishable by death. Nevertheless, no instances of government prosecution of citizens for this crime have been reported.

Overall, the state refrains from excessive interference in the appointment of religious and spiritual leaders, but it has taken some steps to prevent politicization of mosques and Islamic religious schools for extremist purposes.²⁷While it offers no special protections to non-believers, it also does not institute policies to discriminate against them and generally respects their rights.

Yemenis have the right to form associations in "scientific, cultural, social, and national unions in a way that serves the goals of the Constitution," according to Article 58 of that document.²⁸ Despite its small size, Yemen has several thousand nongovernmental organizations, according to estimates from the government.

The government respects the right to form and join trade unions, and the General Federation of Trade Unions of Yemen – the main union organization, with an estimated 350,000 members in 14 unions – dominates the landscape. Critics claim that several syndicates are inefﾬfective in protecting the interests of their members and that the government and ruling party elements have recently stepped up efforts to control the affairs of these organizations.²⁹

Recommendations

• The Yemeni government should implement a comprehensive program to train law enforcement, security, and prison officials in the proper procedures for arresting, detaining, and interrogating accused individuals.
• Public officials should not have immunity for crimes committed while on duty.
• The government should amend national laws to ensure that women enjoy full equality in the law, particularly personal status laws on obtaining citizenship.
• The government should introduce laws to criminalize domestic violence against women in Yemen and work with civil society organizations to develop support structures such as shelters and counseling services to assist women who are victims of violence.

Rule of Law – 2.88

Despite efforts in recent years by the Yemeni government to reform the judiciary and enhance its capacity, the court system remains the weakest link of the three branches of government, susceptible to interference from the executive branch and unable to implement its rulings in many parts of the country.

In theory, Yemen's judiciary is independent. Article 149 of Yemen's constitution states that "the judicial authority is an autonomous authority in its judicial, financial, and administrative aspects, and the General Prosecution is one of its sub-bodies. The courts shall judge all disputes and crimes. Judges are independent and not subject to any authority, except the law." In practice, however, Yemen's Judicial Authority Law, which provides further definition of how the judiciary is managed, includes provisions that some legal analysts and civil society leaders argue contradict the constitutional safeguards of the judiciary's independence. Article 104 of this law assigns the president of the republic to the supreme judicial council (SJC), which manages the affairs of the judiciary. In addition to the president, the minister of justice, the deputy minister of justice, and the head of the judicial inspection board, who reports to the minister of justice, all serve on the SJC. These provisions legally enable the executive to maintain a strong degree of control over the judicial branch. More specifically, under the judicial authority law, the Ministry of Justice has a number of powers that constrain the judiciary's independence – supervising the finances, administration, and organization of the courts; reassigning judges and authorizing them to take nonjudicial jobs; selecting the number of members in the Supreme Court and courts of appeal; and defining the location and selecting the jurisdiction limits of primary courts.³⁰

In addition to this most basic issue of limits on judicial independence, the judiciary suffers from a lack of adequate resources, which hinders its ability to hire and train qualified judges and implement its rulings. In rural areas, Yemenis frequently rely on traditional tribal forms of justice. A judicial reform move increased the salaries of judges as a measure to eliminate corruption, but this has not proven to be a panacea for the problem of judges taking bribes.

In January 2005, the SJC appointed 25 new judges, dismissed 22 judges without compensation and benefits, ordered more than 100 judges into early retirement, and moved several judges to different positions in an attempt to advance judicial reforms further. In addition, the Higher Judicial Council appointed 24 people to the Judicial Inspection Commission, a body that monitors the performance of judges. The new appointees included Abdullah Farwan, former chairman of the Central Organization for Control and Audit. These changes represented one of the largest shifts under a judicial reform program begun with support from the World Bank in 1997.

Yemen's law provides citizens with the opportunity for a fair and public trial and guarantees access to independent counsel. There were, however, reports of two trials that did not meet international standards of fairness in 2004.³¹ Three men were sentenced to death in these trials, in which some lawyers withdrew from the defense team in protest at unfair trial conditions. Article 47 of the constitution states that the accused is innocent until proven guilty by final judicial ruling, and no law may be enacted to put a person on trial retroactively for acts committed. In practice, however, this principle is often undermined by the detention of suspects for long periods of time without trial. Article 48 of the constitution prohibits arrests made without warrant issued by a judge or prosecutor. On the other hand, government crackdowns since 2003 have often seemingly ignored the law in practice, with claims of national security overriding personal rights.

The Ministry of the Interior oversees the criminal investigative department of the police, which conducts most criminal investigations and arrests. The Ministry of Interior also maintains oversight of prison conditions for the 10,348 inmates detained in Yemen as of September 2003.³² Prison conditions remained poor, with reports of unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, and a lack of access to medical care.³³ Unlike many other countries in the Arab world, Yemen does not have state security courts. However, the political security office (PSO), Yemen's primary internal security force, operates under the control of the president, with little or no oversight from other parts of the executive branch, the parliament, or judicial authorities.

The 2004 trials of suspects involved in terrorist attacks in Yemen were held in secret, and several human rights groups questioned the fairness of these proceedings, pointing out that defense attorneys were not permitted to meet with their clients in private and were not provided with full access to all of the evidence.

Yemen's constitution and legal framework afford all citizens equal treatment under the law. In practice, the legal system remains highly informal, with personal connections and networks frequently trumping the dictates of the law. The government's record on respecting and enforcing property rights is weak, however, particularly in parts of the country where tribal forces are stronger and government authority is limited.

The military is under the control of the executive branch. Nonetheless, tribal disputes and the prevalence of guns in society present a constant threat to the rule of law. In the 2003 parliamentary elections, police, military, and internal security services mostly refrained from interference in the political process, although opposition sources accused military or security agents of instigating disturbances in areas where opposition candidates were poised to win seats.³⁴ Even more worrying is the increasing frequency of reports of intimidation by military and security agents involving independent and opposition journalists. If true, this demonstrates government willingness to subvert the democratic process in order to maintain power. The upcoming presidential election will serve as an important test of the GPC's oft-voiced commitment to democracy.

Formal procedures as defined by Yemen law govern the rights and acquisition of property, though the reality, as is so often the case in Yemen, may differ markedly. Claims, particularly in southern Yemen, have arisen concerning government seizure of property and violations of property rights, with charges of unequal application of laws being levied.³⁵ These claims are denied by the government.³⁶ Yet questions over property rights extend beyond Yemenis. Skepticism among foreign businesses may discourage much-needed foreign investment.³⁷ In addition, while Yemen law grants its citizens inheritance and property rights, in practice women are routinely deprived of them due to tribal laws and custom.³⁸ A high female illiteracy rate, along with a lengthy judicial process, compounds the problems of legal redress.

Recommendations

• The Yemeni government should take further steps to decrease the potential for the executive branch's interference in the judiciary, such as transforming the SJC into a body appointed by the Shura council rather than by the president.
• Judicial authorities and the police should be more tightly linked and better coordinated to ensure that judicial rulings are fully implemented and respected.
• The government should ensure that all police and security authorities are subject to oversight and investigation from the legislative branch of government and the judiciary, as well as the executive branch.

Anticorruption and Transparency – 1.93

Corruption remains rife in Yemen, a fact recognized both inside and outside the country. Yemen earned a lowly 2.7 rating on Transparency International's 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index, placing it 103 out of 159 countries surveyed – the scale ranges from a most corrupt score of 1.0 to a least corrupt score of 10.0.³⁹ Critics of corruption within the country are not limited to the political opposition but are also senior members of the current government, including the head of Yemen's primary audit agency, the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA), and numerous ministers. Yet despite Yemen's declaring it as a top priority for the past several years, the fight against corruption has seemed to lack the political will necessary to achieve much success. The discrepancy between Yemen's established legal framework and its practical application has meant little tangible progress in this area. When a coalition of opposition parties launched an initiative in the fall of 2005 to encourage political reform in order to fight corruption, the government rejected the plan and accused those who initiated it of trying to overthrow the current regime.⁴⁰ President Saleh himself has downplayed corruption within his government, saying, "Those who raise anti-corruption slogans are themselves corrupt."⁴¹

Yemen's civil service and public administration suffer from overall underdeveloped institutional capacity, inefficient management systems, burdensome procedures, low salaries that tempt civil servants to resort to corruption to supplement their incomes, and an unnecessarily large number of personnel. Yemen has embarked on a reform process to eradicate bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption in the civil service, but the efforts have been impeded in part by widespread poverty throughout the country. In July 2005, the government began a four-stage National Wage Strategy that will reward civil servants based on specific job criteria and will, in stages, increase minimum monthly salaries from 8,000 Yemeni riyals (US$41) to 20,000 Yemeni riyals (US$102).⁴² As yet, it is too early to tell what effect this move will have on reducing government corruption. The government's patronage system involves "employing" thousands of Yemenis in government positions who draw double salaries, thus ensuring their loyalty to the ruling party. Many of these are tribal sheiks and military personnel.⁴³Privatization has been one of the slowest components of the economic reform program, in part because of lack of proper laws and rules governing the privatization process.

Articles 118 and 136 of the constitution prohibit the president and ministers from engaging in private business of any kind. However, because Yemen currently does not require income or financial assets disclosure by government officials, enforcement relies on an honor system dependent on truthful self-reporting and self-monitoring.

COCA serves as the supreme audit institution in the country and conducts a series of regular audits of government ministries and organizations. Even though COCA officials claim that it is fully independent from the executive branch of government, the organization has failed to examine numerous allegations of high-level corruption. When sufficient evidence is gathered pointing to prosecutable cases of corruption, COCA refers them to the public funds prosecution office, as well as President Saleh's office.⁴⁴ Requests for investigations into corrupt government practices often go unanswered for long periods. Moreover, judges presiding over such cases allegedly have been complicit in corrupt practices themselves.⁴⁵

A culture of bribery allegedly permeates the state apparatus including hospitals, schools, and universities, with little legal redress available to victims.⁴⁶ Bribes are often necessary for such basic activities as obtaining hospital treatment.⁴⁷ In fact, those who raise objections publicly often face criticism or even worse. On April 23, 2005, Jamal Amer, the editor in chief of the independent Al-Wassat newspaper, was abducted, interrogated, beaten, and threatened by armed men who claimed to be acting on behalf of military officers; this occurred after Amer's newspaper published an article accusing the Ministry of Education of nepotism in granting government scholarships to study abroad to the children of prominent Yemeni officials.⁴⁸ The Ministry of Interior denied involvement in the six-hour kidnapping and promised to investigate the incident, but to date no charges have been filed.⁴⁹

Corruption costs Yemen substantial amounts of funding both internally and externally. Weak governance results in daily costs and lost revenues – COCA reported that in the first half of 2005, 55 cases of corruption resulted in financial losses exceeding 3 billion Yemeni riyals (US$15 million).⁵⁰ For example, by undervaluing imported goods and taking illegal surcharges on the undeclared amount, officials cost the government significant tax revenues. The World Bank estimates that such informal payments and other gifts necessary to do business in Yemen average nearly 9 percent of sales.⁵¹ Yet such practices go largely unchecked by the auditing and investigative bodies charged by law with fighting corruption. In fact, opposition politicians claim that, as of the beginning of 2006, "not a single official has been punished for financial corruption so far, despite reports by COCA revealing serious financial corruption in state-run organs."⁵²

However, international pressure has been mounting on Yemen to redress corrupt practices and improve governance. With the suspension of large amounts of external aid pending marked improvements in these areas – the World Bank reduced its loans from $420 million to $280 million while the U. S. government suspended Yemen from the Millenium Challenge Account Program for 2006 – positive movement within the Yemen government may be starting to occur.⁵³ At the end of 2005, President Saleh referred two draft anticorruption laws to the government for debate calling for the establishment of an independent national inspection and monitoring commission that would follow up on corruption charges and work closely with local and foreign transparency watchdog groups. However, this anticorruption body, if created, would be supervised directly by the president, bringing into question its independence and effectiveness.

While the budget is formally introduced by the executive branch and debated by the legislative branch, President Saleh and the GPC dominate the budget-making process. Critics argue that Yemen, as one of the world's least-developed countries, spends a disproportionate amount of money on security and military issues and not enough on social issues and fighting corruption.⁵⁴ In addition, the failure to curtail the rampant corruption largely negates any legislative review and scrutiny of the budget.

On the other hand, parliament showed signs of a more active involvement in the political process in December 2004, when it delayed passage of the budget for the first time due to concerns over what opposition members saw as a lack of will within the GPC and the executive branch to institute reform and fight corruption.⁵⁵

Although Yemen's laws require a degree of transparency and public access to information, in practice detailed accounting of expenditures rarely occurs in a timely fashion. The state offers few procedures to ensure transparency, open bidding, and effective competition in awarding government contracts. The government does provide limited information concerning its expenditures on its website; however, as the majority of Yemeni citizens do not have internet access their recourse to the information is limited.

Recommendations

• Yemen's government should introduce requirements of public disclosure of personal finances, including income, assets, and all business interests for all senior public offcials such as the president, senior staff to the president, government ministers, top ministry officials, judges and other senior judicial authorities, and members of parliament.
• The government should establish formal mechanisms, such as an anonymous telephone tip line, by which government employees and individuals can report instances of alleged corruption and misuse of public resources.
• The new national higher authority to fight corruption should be fully independent of the president and the executive branch; it should be able to investigate and prosecute alleged instances of corruption and make reports thereof publicly available without fear of government interference.
• The Yemen government should actively enforce its transparency and public access to information law.

Author

Brian Katulis is Director of Democracy and Public Diplomacy on the National Security Team at the Center for American Progress. David Emery is an analyst at Freedom House.

Notes

1 "Yemen: Year in Brief 2005 – A Chronology of Democratic Developments," IRIN-news.org, 10 January 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=51014, accessed 27 June 2006.

2 "Election Guide" (Washington, D.C: Electionworld.org and International Foundation for Election Systems [IFES]), http://www.ifes.org and http://electionguide.org.

3 "Yemen at a Glance," Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reform – Yemen (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2005), 19, 21, http://www.carnegie endowment.org/files/Yemen_APS.doc, accessed 28 June 2006.

4 "Preliminary Statement of the NDI International Election Observer Delegation to Yemen's April 27 Legislative Elections" (Washington, D.C.: National Democratic Instiﾬtute for International Affairs [NDI], 29 April 2003), 4, http://www.accessdemocracy.org/ library/1584_ye_election03.pdf, accessed 3 July 2006.

5 Interview with representatives from NDI and the IFES, Sanaa, 27 September 2003.

6 Ibid.

7 Interview with Ahmed Al-Sufi and Abdullah Sallam Al-Hakimi of the Yemen Institute for Development of Democracy (YIDD), Sanaa, 25 September 2003.

8 "Preliminary Statement of the NDI," 1.

9 Ibid., 5.

10 Interview with Abdul Majed Al-Fahed, Executive Director of the Civic Democratic Iniﾬtiative Support Foundation (CDF), Sanaa, 26 September 2003.

11 "Yemen's Constitutional Referendum and Local Elections" (New York: Human Rights Watch [HRW], February 2001).

12 Interview with Amat Al-Aleem Al-Soswa, Yemen's Minister of Human Rights, Washﾬington, D.C., 10 September 2003.

13 Ziad Majed, et al., Building Democracy in Yemen: Women's Political Participation, Political Party Life, and Democratic Elections (Stockholm: International Institute for Democﾬracy and Electoral Assistance [IDEA], 2005), 13.

14 "Review of the Annual Strategic Report: Yemen 2002-2003" (Sanaa: General Center for Studies, Research, and Publishing, 2003).

15 Mujahed Al-Mussa'abi, "National Committee for Women: Challenges & Future," Yemen Times, 18-24 November 2002.

16 Interview with Rashida Al-Hamdani, Chairperson of the Women's National Committee, Sanaa, 28 September 2003.

17 "YEMEN: New System to Eliminate Thousands of "Ghost" Civil Servants," IRIN-news.com (New York: UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 12 Sepﾬtember 2005).

18 Joel Campagna, "Attacks, Censorship, and Dirty Tricks: In Yemen, the Press Climate is Deteriorating" (New York: Committee to Protect Journalists [CPJ], 9 March 2006), 1, http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2006/yemen_3-06/yemen_3-06_printer.html, accessed 26 June 2006.

19 Kevin Watkins, Human Development Report [HDR] 2005 (New York: United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2005), 250.

20 Campagna, "Attacks," 3.

21 Yasser Mohammed Al-Mayyasi, "Protests Against Attacks on Journalists Mount," Yemen Times, 12-15 May 2005, http://www.yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=841&p=front&a =1, accessed 3 July 2006.

22 Amnesty International Yemen Report, 2004, http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/ F5AAEDDCA09FE51280256FF100588B2D.

23 "25 by 2005 Country Data: Yemen," Gender Achievements and Prospects in Education, GAP Report: Part One (New York: UNICEF, UN Girls' Education Initiative [UNGEI], 2005), http://www.ungei.org/gap/country.php, accessed 29 June 2006.

24 Interview with Rashida Al-Hamdani, Chairperson of the Women's National Committee, and Ramzia Al-Eryani, Yemeni Women's Union, Sanaa, 28 September 2003; "Yemen Country Profile" (UNDP, 2003).

25 Jamal Al-Admimi, Human Rights (Sanaa: Forum for Civil Society [FCS], December 2002), 48.

26 Samar Mujalli, "Disabled: 'We Refuse to be Like This'," Yemen Times, 8-11 June 2006, http://www.yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=953&p-report&a=1.

27 Ibid.

28 "The Constitution of the Republic of Yemen," Athawabit Journal, A Quarterly Journal of Culture, Development, and Politics (April 2002).

29 Interviews with members of the journalists' and teachers' syndicates, 25 and 29 Sepﾬtember 2003.

30 Jamal Al-Adimi and Faisal Asswfi, "Justice Report: Yemen 2000," Al-Qistas (FCS, 2000), 7.

31 Amnesty International Yemen Report, 2004, http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/ F5AAEDDCA09FE51280256FF100588B2D, accessed 10 July, 2006.

32 Interview with Rashid Jarhoom, Yemen's Deputy Minister of Interior, Sanaa, 29 September 2003.

33 "Kenya; Ordeal in Yemen," Africa News, 20 September 2004, Accessed through Lexis-Nexis, 10 July, 2006.

34 Sheila Carapico, "How Yemen's Ruling Party Secured an Electoral Landslide," Middle East Report Online, 16 May 2003, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero051603.html, accessed 28 June 2006.

35 Jane Novak, "Yemen: Failure or Democracy," Yemen Times, 22-25 December 2005, http://www.yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=905&p=report&a=1, accessed 28 June 2006.

36 "Yemen Envoy Seeks British Asylum," BBC News, 29 April 2005, http://news.bbc .co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4499833.stm, accessed 23 June 2006.

37 "Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006 – Yemen" (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006), 9, http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/en/2006/ MiddleEastAndNorthernAfrica/Yemen.pdf, accessed 28 June 2006.

38 Arwa Al-Anesi, "Yemeni Women Deprived of Family Inheritance," Yemen Times, 1-4 June 2006, http://www.yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=951&p=report&a=4, accessed 28 June 2006.

39 Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2005).

40 "Yemen: Year in Brief 2005 – A Chronology of Democratic Developments," IRIN-news.org, 10 January 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=51014, accessed 27 June 2006.

41 Nabil Sultan, "Yemen: MPs Target Corrupt 'Government of Mass Destruction'," Internet Press Service/Global Information Network, 5 January 2006, accessed through Lexis-Nexis, 23 June 2006.

42 Paul Garwood, "Yemen Under New Pressure to End Corruption as World Bank Cuts Support," Associated Press, 27 October 2005, 2, accessed through Lexis-Nexis, 23 June 2006; Yemen Economic Update (Sana'a: World Bank Group, spring 2006), 3.

43 Kevin Whitelaw, "On a Dagger's Edge," U.S. News & World Report 140, 9 (13 March 2006): 38-45.

44 Interview with Rashid Jarhoom.

45 Christian Chaise, "Corruption Runs Parallel Economy in Impoverished Yemen," Agence France Presse, 7 May 2006, accessed through Lexis-Nexis 26 June 2006.

46 Mohammed Hatem al-Qadhi, "Crackdown on Corruption Needs Commitment," Yemen Times, 28-30 November 2005, http://www.yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=898&p= opinion&a=3, accessed 28 June 2006.

47 Mohammed Al-Asaadi and Abdul-Aziz Oudah, "Collective Efforts to Fight Corruption," Yemen Observer, 9 December 2005, 1.

48 Yasser Mohammed Al-Mayyasi, "Al-Wasat Editor Abducted, and Brutally Beaten," Yemen Times, 25-29 August 2005, http://www.yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=871&p= front&a=1, accessed 28 June 2006.

49 "Military Source Denies Journalist Amer's Accusations," Yemen News Agency, 25 August 2005, accessed through Lexis-Nexis 28 June 2006.

50 Mohammed Al-Asaadi and Abdul-Aziz Oudah, "Collective Efforts," 1.

51 Yemen Economic Update (World Bank), 8.

52 Sultan, "MPs Target."

53 David Finkel, "In the End, a Painful Choice," Washington Post, 20 December 2005, A01.

54 Novak, "Yemen: Failure or."

55 "Yemen: Strengthening Parliamentary Institutions and Increasing Inclusive National Dialogue (04929)," CEPPS/NDI Quarterly Report: April 1 to June 30, 2005 (NDI, 2005), 3, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACF483.pdf. accessed 28 June 2006.