Nations in Transit - Azerbaijan (2005)

Capital: Baku
Population: 8,300,000
Status: Not Free
PPP: $710
Private Sector as % of GNI: na
Life Expectancy: 72
Religious Groups: Muslim (93.4 percent), Russian Orthodox (2.5 percent), Armenian Orthodox (2.3 percent), other (2.3 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Azeri (90 percent), Dagestani (3.2 percent), Russian (2.5 percent), Armenian (2 percent), other (2.3 percent)

Executive Summary

Azerbaijan went through a highly unstable period immediately after gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, as it fought a bloody war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian-populated region in Azerbaijani territory. Hostilities ended in 1993 with the election of President Heydar Aliyev, a former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party. A peace agreement has yet to be signed, and the massive social problems resulting from the war some 1.5 million refugees remain unresolved. Aliyev's rule between 1993 and 2003 brought a period of political and economic stability, though at the expense of democracy in many instances. The elder president pursued an independent foreign policy and struck deals with major multinational companies to receive substantial investment in the country's energy sector.

A member of the Council of Europe (COE) since 2001, Azerbaijan has yet to have a free and fair democratic election. Aliyev orchestrated a carefully planned succession to pass power to his son, Ilham Aliyev, following a sudden decline in his health. Ilham became president in October 2003, after a controversial election with the support of his father's ruling team, and consolidated his authority in 2004. Azerbaijan continues to enjoy a high level of economic growth thanks to the country's promising natural resources, but a large segment of the population remains in poverty. The energy sector's overwhelming share of the national economy makes the country vulnerable to shocks in global energy markets. Meanwhile, the Aliyev administration has so far failed to demonstrate the necessary political will to pursue a genuine democratization program. There were only minor improvements in 2004, with marked deterioration in the areas of electoral process, civil society, media freedom, and judicial framework and independence.

National Democratic Governance. The president continued to enjoy overwhelming and uncontested authority in Azerbaijan's governmental system in 2004. The ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) remained united behind President Aliyev, enabling him to move smoothly through domestic policy making and personnel changes in the government, while tensions among the ruling elite were more apparent than under the elder Aliyev. The Milli Majlis, Azerbaijan's legislative branch, maintained a low profile in 2004, effectively serving as a rubber-stamp authority for the president. Although the legislature appeared to play an important role in September, when public reaction forced the government to cancel NATO peacekeeping exercises slated for Azerbaijan on September 13, it generally seemed careful not to weaken the president's absolute authority in policy making. The administration also continued to exert substantial pressure on its political opposition. Azerbaijan's rating for national democratic governance is 6.00, which reflects the government's continued reliance on an authoritarian regime and use of force rather than democratic institutions and the rule of law.

Electoral Process. The December 17 municipal election was the first national poll since the beginning of President Aliyev's term and only the second held in Azerbaijan since independence. International and local observers deemed the election fraudulent and below international standards. The Parliament amended the Law on Political Parties in May 2004, but these changes facilitated political party closures by the courts. The government also failed to carry out recommendations by the COE Venice Commission to make the Central Election Commission (over which the government has tremendous influence) into a representative body. Although there were a number of improvements to increase the transparency of the election, problems in the candidate registration process and continued intimidation of political opposition favored ruling party candidates. Azerbaijan's rating for electoral process declines from 6.00 to 6.25, owing to the government's continued dominance of the municipal election campaign, irregularities reported during the registration process, and the government's move to facilitate closure of political parties.

Civil Society. Little progress was made in 2004 in Azerbaijan's civil society sector, with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) still facing registration, tax, and funding problems. The government's campaign against the Juma mosque community and its leader, Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, who supported the opposition in the 2003 presidential election, has demonstrated a fresh example of government intervention into any grassroots activity. Azerbaijan's rating for civil society declines from 4.50 to 4.75, owing to continued government refusal to register some NGOs and pressure on the Juma mosque congregation.

Independent Media. The media continued to operate under governmental and legal pressure, with most opposition outlets facing substantial financial hardship in the face of unreasonably high libel penalties and limited resources. Print media remained divided into either pro-government or pro-opposition camps, while the independent Press Council appeared to make some progress in resolving problems with the government and improving professional and ethical standards among journalists. An important development was the formation of a new public broadcaster, but the government's latest law envisions higher governmental authority over the broadcaster than advised by international observers. Azerbaijan's rating for independent media falls from 5.75 to 6.00, due to the government's continued mistreatment of opposition journalists and press after the fall 2003 election and into 2004.

Local Democratic Governance. Local governance in Azerbaijan is not democratic, as the government continues its practice of directly appointing local administrators. The influence of municipal councils, which are formed through elections, remains limited. Reported irregularities in the registration of opposition candidates in the December municipal election, in which the ruling party nominated almost 10 times as many candidates as all opposition parties, reflected the government's unwillingness to democratize the local regime. This unwillingness was also demonstrated by the significant pressure on local activists and opposition groups that criticized local administrators in the Nakhichevani Autonomous Republic and Musalla and Geranboy regions. As a result, the YAP maintained its political monopoly in city councils, following a boycott of the municipal election by major opposition partieswith the exception of the Azerbaijan National Independence Party, which failed to strengthen its standing. Azerbaijan's rating for local democratic governance is thus 6.00, reflecting the ruling party's continued dominance in local governance and local executives' unwillingness to liberalize the political environment.

Judicial Framework and Independence. The government maintains substantial authority over the judiciary. This is reflected in the continued intimidation through politically driven investigations and legal or other harassment of opposition parties, independent journalists, and any other critics of the government or local authorities. The right to assemble publicly is considered a privilege by the authorities, as local executive committees hinder, prohibit, or break up opposition rallies. Public trust in judicial and law enforcement bodies is low. Azerbaijan's rating for judicial framework and independence declines from 5.50 to 5.75, owing to the judiciary's continued lack of independence and violations of political rights and civil liberties.

Corruption. Corruption remained one of the most problematic issues in 2004, permeating society from top to bottom and creating a major impediment to economic development. There remains a culture of intolerance toward any discussion of government corruption. The auditing capacity of the legislative is weak, and government investigations of civil servants are usually politically driven. Legal and other harassment is commonplace for persons who publicly allege corruption on the part of government officials. Azerbaijan's rating for corruption remains unchanged at 6.25, as the government still does far too little to combat corruption despite some improvements.

Outlook for 2005. Ilham Aliyev's administration will further consolidate its position in 2005, while continuing to enjoy substantial oil revenues that will no doubt steadily increase when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline opens midyear. There will be some reorganization of political opposition, with a broad alliance among major opposition parties possibly occurring ahead of the November 2005 parliamentary election. The Aliyev administration will face increased international pressure from the COE and the U.S. government to hold free and fair elections, but it is uncertain whether that will result in a more representative and vocal legislature. There will likely be little progress toward resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2005, although a military standoff between Azerbaijan and Armenia also seems unlikely.

National Governance (Score: 6.00)

Azerbaijan has a highly centralized presidential system, in which stability is frequently maintained by violating democratic principles. The executive branch is made up of a president, his administration, a prime minister, and the cabinet of ministers. The president enjoys overwhelming authority over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. President Ilham Aliyev rapidly consolidated his position in 2004, but his regime has continued to use undemocratic means lacking both transparency and the rule of law. Nonetheless, his first year as president has reversed prior concerns that the departure of his father, Heydar Aliyev, from the political scene would cause an implosion of the Azerbaijan government and the ruling party and lead to a period of chaos and instability.

President Aliyev appeared to be extremely cautious in making changes to his father's team in the period immediately following the election. The second half of his first year in office saw a more emboldened Aliyev, as he began using his control of senior government appointments to increase the power of his own team of loyalists. He replaced controversial communications minister Nadir Ahmedov with Ali Abbasov and appointed career diplomat Elmar Mamedyarov as foreign minister. He also appointed new deputy ministers in several key agencies, including the Tax Ministry, the State Customs Committee, and the Ministry for Ecology and Natural Resources. In July, the president encountered no apparent difficulty when replacing Namik Abbasov, the influential former national security minister. In November, he made the politically risky decision to substantially increase domestic energy prices (in a onetime hike rather than a gradual approach, as recommended by the IMF). This particular issue has dominated the IMF-Azerbaijan relationship over the last three years and was one his father's administration resisted confronting in order to avoid a public outcry.

Meanwhile, Presidential Chief of Staff Ramiz Mekhtiyev remained influential in the administration, perhaps even more so since the departure of Heydar Aliyev. But he also encountered heightened criticism from his political opponents, communicated through a pro-government press that seemed less restricted than during the former president's term in its reporting of intentional leaks about the ruling elite. Mekhtiyev nonetheless maintained his influence over personnel changes, as Ilham Aliyev moved against a segment of the old guard by dismissing some ministers and other senior figures from his father's administration, including former national security minister Namik Abbasov, who had been viewed as a potential contender for the presidency.

While the ruling party and the administration were initially united behind the president, factional lines based on either regional or generational differences became more visible during his first year in office. In response, Aliyev appeared to distance himself from the increasingly public conflicts within his administration and factions of the ruling party. At the same time, he did not exert clear and undisputed control over all political and economic processes in the country and in the future is likely to share power and influence with other actors possibly with influential nonpolitical figures such as State Customs Committee chairman Kemaleddin Heydarov, Azpetrol chief executive Rafik Aliyev, and State Committee on Securities chairman Heydar Babayev. Ilham Aliyev's apparent recognition that he must deliver on his pledge to improve socioeconomic standards demonstrated by huge wage and pension increases in 2004 is promising for securing political stability, but only in the long term. The administration and the ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) continue to dominate and monopolize power to the exclusion of all other forces.

Despite the controversy over the October 2003 elections, which were deemed as fraudulent and below international standards by observers, Ilham Aliyev managed to create a power base among a significant part of the population that desires stability, given the country's socioeconomic problems and the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. Provided the government successfully continues its current energy development policies, which have led to some improvement in the welfare of Azerbaijani citizens, there appears to be no major challenge to Aliyev's authority. The time frame for Ilham Aliyev's formal policy agenda increasing state spending to reduce poverty and bolster employment as well as his less visible agenda of furthering generational change in the cabinet is likely being driven by Azerbaijan's next parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for November 2005. While the pursuit of a genuine democratization program ahead of the polls is not likely to emerge as a priority, Aliyev aims to lead the YAP into these elections with some tangible achievements and ideally some level of real popularity.

There will be significant international pressure on the administration to hold free and fair elections in November 2005. Given that pressure from the international community, including the U.S. government and the Council of Europe (COE), was ineffective in compelling the authorities to hold a sound election in October 2003, it is difficult to predict whether such intervention will pay off in 2005. However, two factors may increase the chances that the elections will be more free and fair than those held in October 2003 and December 2004. First, the administration will enter the polls under a strengthened president, which makes a more representative legislature less threatening, particularly given its limited role. Second, the 2004 changes in government in Georgia and Ukraine, both of which were triggered by public frustration and, perhaps more important, received clear Western support may force the administration to take steps to liberalize the political environment to a limited extent in order to keep international support. On the other hand, the impact on Azerbaijan of the developments in Georgia and Ukraine could have the opposite effect, leaving the Aliyev administration increasingly skeptical of Western support for sound elections.

These speculations aside, there is a serious likelihood that the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh will threaten political stability in Azerbaijan in the medium or long term. The conflict remains a significant source of popular discontent, and all opposition parties frequently exploit the continuing occupation of Azerbaijani territory to apply pressure on the regime. Aliyev has taken a hard-line stance regarding Karabakh since coming to power; his rhetoric has been notably more hawkish than that of his father. His stance was seriously challenged when public uproar over long prison sentences given to six members of the Karabakh Liberation Organization (KLO) for storming a hotel room in June to protest Armenian participation in NATO exercises forced the president to cancel the exercise. This episode may be viewed positively as an example of the president's willingness to alter policy based on the expression of public opinion. Yet it also dashed hopes that Aliyev could use his presidential term (which lasts until October 2007) to bring about the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement that eluded his father. Aliyev should be able to resist calls by a small but growing minority for a military solution to the conflict, but political and societal trends do not bode well for long-term stability.

Nagorno-Karabakh is a highly emotional issue for Azerbaijanis, and the administration is forced to reckon with public opinions that severely restrict its ability to negotiate a solution. The February killing of an Armenian officer by a 26-year-old Azerbaijani counterpart during a NATO training program in Hungary, and the somewhat supportive public reaction to the event the YAP formed a parliamentary commission to protect the Azerbaijani officer's rights was a remarkable indication of the problems that lie ahead. The deep hatred of Armenians among the younger generation, coupled with Azerbaijan's growing oil wealth, increases the risk that political support for retaking Nagorno-Karabakh militarily may become too strong for any government to resist, if there is no settlement to the conflict in the next 10 to 15 years.

The president serves as the commander in chief of the Azerbaijani armed forces. In this capacity, he oversees defense and security efforts undertaken by the prime minister and the ministers of defense, internal affairs, and security. Former president Heydar Aliyev created a Defense Council in 1993, which reports to and advises the president in supervising the activities of the armed forces.

The legislative branch consists of the 125-member Milli Majlis (Parliament). Members are elected for five-year terms, with 100 elected from territorial districts and 25 elected from party lists. Azerbaijan's first Parliament was elected in 1995; the current Parliament was elected in November 2000. The legislative branch remains subordinate to the executive. A majority of parliamentarians are from the YAP, or are pro-government independents, and the opposition frequently boycotts parliamentary sessions. In January, Speaker Murtuz Alaskerov threatened to discipline deputies who miss 30 consecutive parliamentary sessions, with the possibility of stripping them of their mandates. While the move was directed at the Ali Kerimli-led reformist wing of the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (AXCP), which had boycotted sessions since August 2003, the threat was not carried out possibly because many YAP members welcome the absence of opposition deputies in parliamentary sessions.

The parliamentary sessions are generally open to the media, but there were instances where journalists from opposition newspapers were denied entry. There is limited public or expert input in the legislative process, as many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the general public are not invited to committee hearings. It is also difficult for the public or NGOs to obtain copies of draft laws and deputies' voting records, as these are not published in a consistent and timely fashion. The Parliament has not conducted any investigations of the government so far, although amendments were made in 2002 requiring the prime minister and the Cabinet of Ministers to present an annual report to the Parliament. The Parliament's Chamber of Commerce has not been effective in auditing governmental functions, and the Ministry of Finance has initiated only a few investigations into the financial work of several oil industry enterprises and Azerbaijani embassies abroad. These investigations have revealed some irregularities in financial accounting, yet no major sanctions have been imposed. Overall, the public and media have little direct access to the financial operations of the government.

Electoral Process (Score: 6.25)

Elections in Azerbaijan have been marred by fraud and government control over the voting process since independence, with the exception of the June 1992 election, where Abulfaz Elchibey, leader of the nationalist opposition AXCP, was elected president in a generally free and fair vote. Elchibey was ousted from power by a military coup in 1993 and replaced by former first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Heydar Aliyev. The 1993 presidential elections (in which Aliyev received 99 percent of the vote), 1995 parliamentary elections, and 1998 presidential elections (in which he won more than 70 percent of the vote) were characterized by serious election fraud.

The 2000 parliamentary elections, 2002 referendum on constitutional amendments, and October 2003 parliamentary elections were deemed not free and fair and below international standards for democratic elections by monitors that included the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the U.S. State Department. Ilham Aliyev, Heydar Aliyev's son, who was appointed prime minister after his father's health suddenly declined in August 2003, won the elections with 79 percent of the vote. His closest rival was opposition Musavat Party chairman Isa Gambar, who received 12 percent of the vote. International observers reported mass electoral fraud, including ballot stuffing, serious flaws in the counting and tabulation of voters, limitations on election observation by domestic NGOs, biased media coverage favoring Ilham Aliyev, and pressure on voters on election day.

Despite international criticism, the Aliyev administration failed in 2004 to take steps to improve the restrictive Law on Political Parties and the composition of election commissions, which at present clearly favor the ruling party. The Aliyev administration later failed to carry out the COE Venice Commission March 2004 recommendation to amend the composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC) ahead of the municipal election on December 17,2004. Currently, the ruling YAP has 6 representatives on the 15-person CEC and can count on the support of 3 other members from small pro-government political parties, giving it a two-thirds majority. On May 25,2004, the Parliament approved amendments to the Law on Political Parties that empower local courts to suspend the registration of political parties (an action that in the past could be taken only by the Constitutional Court). According to the Constitution, parliamentary deputies lose their position when a party is banned or decides to disband.

Azerbaijan's mainstream opposition parties were significantly weakened after the presidential election and are unlikely to recover, at least during 2005. The authorities unleashed a crackdown against the opposition and detained nearly 700 opposition supporters after violent clashes between security forces and demonstrators in Baku on October 15 and 16, in which at least one person was reportedly killed and several hundred were injured. Among those arrested were opposition party leaders and supporters who had not been directly involved in the preceding days' violence, along with many election officials who refused to certify fraudulent election results. Seven prominent opposition figures, including two Musavat deputy chairmen and Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) general secretary Serdar Jalaloglu, were arrested for their roles in protests following the October 2003 election and were sentenced in November to prison terms ranging from two to five years.

The government's restrictive attitude toward political opposition continued throughout 2004 ahead of the December 17 municipal elections. The opposition candidates repeatedly faced registration difficulties and were not allowed to hold political demonstrations to protest government policy, let alone conduct a serious and forceful election campaign. Under persistent pressure from the authorities, and with limited popular support, three major opposition parties Musavat, the reformist wing of the AXCP, and the ADP boycotted the municipal election, while another major opposition party, Etibar Mammadov's Azerbaijan National Independence Party (AMIP), chose to participate.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Economic Development retreated from an August 2004 agreement in which it offered to make premises available for the AMIP. The party was evicted recently from its temporary headquarters, a year after being evicted from its longtime headquarters. The AMIP appealed the ministry's decision, but the Economic Court refused the appeal on August 26; this verdict was upheld by the Court of Appeals on October 23.

Boycotting the local election arguably also cost the mainstream opposition parties some international credibility. U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan Rino Harnish was among those who criticized the opposition's boycott; EurasiaNet.org reported that he said it made the opposition look out of touch with voters. Given the weakness and disarray of the national democratic opposition, there is a growing possibility that over time, political discontent will be channeled in other, more radical directions, including radicalized political Islam. The emergence of Ilgar Ibrahimoglu (former chairman of the now closed Juma mosque) and Iskender Hamidov (nationalist former interior minister who was released from prison in 2004 by presidential decree) as plausible political figures is potentially a significant development. If the government does an effective job delivering economic growth to the population on the strength of rising oil revenues, it is likely that these tendencies can be contained for some time.

Civil Society (Score: 4.75)

Both Article 58 of the Azerbaijani Constitution, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights that came into force in Azerbaijan in 2002, recognize and protect freedom of association. Yet the state does not protect the rights of an independent civil sector. The majority of civil society organizations are weak and outside the political process. The Aliyev administration continues to exert a dominating influence over grassroots activity, while the Parliament shows little willingness to engage NGOs in the legislative process or invite their input on draft legislation.

Azerbaijani authorities use highly difficult registration procedures, and applications are often rejected. The government has made commitments to improve NGO registration before COE membership, but a new registration law has not yet been adopted. Aliyev signed a decree in April 2004 that accelerates and clarifies the registration process, although the Justice Ministry has so far failed to finalize a law on the issue.

There are approximately 200 active NGOs in Azerbaijan. The strongest and most active (approximately 50 to 60) are concerned with Nagorno-Karabakh refugees, health and children's issues, human rights and women's rights, and environmental and ecology issues. Local financial support to NGOs is limited, as the tax code does not allow tax-deductible contributions. The code does provide tax exemption to charitable organizations, unless they engage in entrepreneurial activities. Therefore, most NGOs rely primarily on foreign grants to continue their activities. NGOs that receive foreign funding are banned from sending representatives to monitor ballot counting during elections.

The Law on NGOs prohibits civil society organizations from providing political parties with financial and other kinds of assistance, although they can carry out advocacy activities to improve law and regulation. The internal capacity of NGOs remains underdeveloped, with too much reliance placed on single individuals (rather than institutional capabilities) and nontransparent financial management. The Human Rights Center of Azerbaijan (led by Eldar Zeynalov) and the Institute of Peace and Democracy (IPD, led by Leyla Yunus), both internationally credible organizations, experienced ongoing harassment from the government and certain nationalistic groups, such as the KLO. The Justice Ministry has yet to register the IPD, which was founded in 1995. Azerbaijan's Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, another credible organization headed by Arzu Abdullayeva, was registered in 2001 after a nine-year struggle and pressure placed on the Ministry of Justice by the COE.

The government founded the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA) in 2001 to reregister religious groups. It also gave SCWRA chairman Rafik Aliyev sweeping powers over these groups, including control over religious literature. Muslim religious groups must receive a letter of approval from the state-dominated Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB), a body that appoints Muslim clerics to mosques and monitors sermons, before they can be registered. The Juma mosque community in central Baku where Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, a charismatic cleric, has attracted a significant number of followers has so far refused to apply for registration owing to concerns that the government could interfere in its ability to worship freely and argues that its 1993 registration should remain in force.

The police surrounded the Juma mosque on June 30,2004, to carry out an earlier order for the eviction of the mosque community from their current location because of Ibrahimoglu's political activities. At the same time, CMB chairman Allahshukur Pashazade announced that Surkhai Mamedov would replace Ibrahimoglu (who was not appointed by the CMB) as the Juma community's imam. Ibrahimoglu's followers continued to resist the eviction effort, resulting in clashes on July 4 and 5 between the police and worshippers who visited the mosque for evening prayers. Dozens suffered injuries and the authorities arrested 26 people, some of whom were reportedly beaten severely in custody. Unknown assailants assaulted Mamedov on August 8. Members of the mosque have filed an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights protesting the eviction, while local and international human rights groups protested the government's action.

Members of the Juma mosque community maintain that the eviction action was politically motivated designed specifically to silence Ibrahimoglu, a religious moderate with a human rights advocacy background. Ibrahimoglu has been a prominent critic of the administration and announced before the 2003 election that he would vote for Musavat Party chairman Isa Gambar. He received a five-year suspended sentence for his alleged role in the postelection clashes in Baku and was released after serving three months in prison. The authorities refused on October 13 to permit Ibrahimoglu to leave the country for Poland, where he hoped to attend a meeting convened by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The authorities portrayed Ibrahimoglu as a religious radical who seeks to undermine political stability. Ibrahimoglu's methods diverged from the practices of the CMB, such as abolishing fees for religious services (including funeral rites) and organizing an annual blood drive, thereby threatening Pashazade's influence over the community. Meanwhile, the SCWRA created the Forum of Religious Communities, criticized by Pashazade as state interference in private life.

Azerbaijan's educational system includes approximately 4,600 primary and secondary schools, 180 technical high schools, 90 colleges, and 27 institutions of higher education (including 8 universities and 5 academies). Education is compulsory for at least eight years according to the Constitution and is guaranteed by the state. The Ministry of Education is the central body that develops state education policy and manages the educational system. Since independence, the Azerbaijani educational system has not undergone major structural changes. Those changes that have occurred include the reestablishment of religious education, banned during the Soviet Union's hegemony. Changes to curriculum emphasize the use of the Azerbaijani language and eliminate Marxist-Leninist content. Although appointments to government-controlled academic positions depend heavily on political connections, several tenure-track professors are also active in opposition parties and academic freedom is generally respected.

Independent Media (Score: 6.00)

Azerbaijan's Law on Mass Media was adopted by the Parliament in 2000. It guarantees freedom of speech, support for media, access to information, and protection of journalists' rights. In practice, though, Azerbaijan's media sector encounters numerous obstacles to conducting its work and maintaining independence. Television is the dominant media source, with many Azerbaijanis reportedly using various TV channels much more than radio or newspapers, according to data from the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) 2004 survey Public Opinion in Azerbaijan. There are two state television stations (AzTV-1 and AzTV-2), four private stations, and nine regional stations. The most popular channels are Lider TV (84 percent of viewers surveyed), AzTV-1 (79 percent), Space (77 percent), ANS (75 percent), and ATV (25 percent). The private stations Space TV, Lider TV, and ATV are reportedly controlled either by family members of President Aliyev or by people close to the Aliyev family. ANS is owned independently and takes a pro-government stance in its programming.

Four foreign TV channels (two Russian and two Turkish) operating in Azerbaijan are also frequently watched the Russian channels by 51 percent of viewers surveyed and the Turkish channels by 49 percent. In addition to the BBC World Service and the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Azerbaijani Service, which encounter government restrictions in reporting, there are seven radio stations, four with their own Web sites. The most popular radio stations are Lider (20 percent), ANS (19 percent), and Space (15 percent).

The Parliament passed a new law establishing a public television broadcaster in October after a months-long debate over earlier drafts, but the law falls short of COE demands. Initially hopeful, the COE called for the new broadcaster to provide programming that will be independent, fair, and impartial. Contrary to a COE recommendation that the new public broadcaster be based on both state channels, the authorities will preserve AzTV-1 and license the new independent public broadcaster under AzTV-2, which shares premises and broadcasting equipment with AzTV-1. The new law also failed to incorporate a proposal to broadcast 15 minutes per day in minority languages, arguing that ethnic minorities make up less than 10 percent of the national population. An earlier draft, which proposed that the president appoint the chairman of the nine-member Broadcast Council, was criticized by the COE.

Of the 200 newspapers published in Azerbaijan, the most popular are Yeni Musavat (7 percent of readers surveyed), Zerkalo (7 percent), Azerbaycan (5 percent), Xalg Gazeti (5 percent), Azadliq (4 percent), Ekho (4 percent), and Azerbaijan Maullimi (4 percent). The Russian dailies Ekho and Zerkalo are generally considered to be neutral and bipartisan, but less so now because of rising government pressure since the 2003 election. Other popular newspapers such as Yeni Musavat and Azadlig serve as the political mouthpiece of certain opposition parties and are increasingly inclined toward unprofessional reporting. The pro-government, state-funded newspapers Xalg Gazeti and Azerbaycan cover only the ruling party's position on issues.

Since the formal abolishment of censorship in 1998, the print media in Azerbaijan have remained freer than television and radio outlets, although they too are generally biased in their coverage. However, the same 2004 IFES survey found that 75 percent of the public believe private media is at least somewhat objective, and 58 percent have similar opinions about state media. In Baku, 49 percent think that state media is objective and 45 percent do not.

Regardless of their political party affiliation, the Azerbaijani press is highly nationalistic on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. The editors of most of the major media outlets issued a statement on September 3,2004, against the planned participation of Armenian military personnel at the NATO maneuver scheduled to begin on September 13. The two-week peacekeeping exercise was to involve small units from several NATO members and countries that are included in the Partnership for Peace program; Azerbaijan boycotted a similar maneuver that was held in Armenia in 2003. The independent ANS television station ceased broadcasting for three hours on September 4 in a move to protest planned Armenian participation in the NATO exercise, while seven print publications left their front pages blank.

The overall quality of journalism and reporting remains unprofessional in Azerbaijan, as most newspapers cover scandal-oriented political news as opposed to social or economic developments. In 2003, the independent Press Council, a self-regulatory body, was established to resolve the problems of journalists and improve the overall quality of journalism. The Press Council made some progress in 2004, despite initial concerns over its financial sustainability only 25 percent of its founding members have paid their annual dues.

In January 2004, the Press Council founded the Permanent Commission for the Investigation and Elimination of Conflicts Between the Mass Media and the Authorities. The commission includes representatives of the Interior Ministry, the Justice Ministry, and the Prosecutor-General's Office and meets monthly to review complaints. The Press Council also managed to strike a deal with the Interior Ministry over the treatment of journalists covering political demonstrations. The authorities will distribute 500 special jackets to editorial offices to make it easier to distinguish journalists who cover demonstrations from the protesters themselves.

The Press Council also aims to eliminate blackmail, which involves a journalist fabricating an article incriminating a selected target, who is then invited to pay a substantial sum to avoid having the material published. Ganimat Zakhidov, Press Council member and editor of the Azadlig daily, estimated that of 1,300 registered newspapers in Azerbaijan, 1,000 engage in blackmail. Chairman of the Press Council Aflatun Amashov said in March that the council would publicly point out publications that have been engaged in blackmail, reported RFE/RL. In April, the council began to distribute press cards to media outlets, such as Zerkalo and Azerbaycan, which comply with standards of ethics and sign formal employment contracts with their journalists. As in this case, some activities of the Press Council are similar to those of a labor union, with the goal to improve the quality of the media as much as improve living standards for all journalists (including those who are not members of the council).

The administration has provided some financial support for independent media outlets in the form of grants. It also gave a three-year extension in 2003 on the deadline for newspapers to pay their debts to the state publishing house. But print media in particular remain extremely vulnerable financially. The independent Yeni Zaman has suspended publication owing to financial problems, while the opposition-oriented Hurriyet whose readership dropped from 8,000 in December 2003 to 3,000 in February 2004 because of distribution difficulties outside Baku closed down. In recent years, government officials have frequently brought libel suits against opposition media outlets, and the courts have generally imposed unreasonable fines that have pushed newspapers to the verge of bankruptcy.

Yeni Musavat suspended publication indefinitely on December 31,2004, when a court froze the newspaper's assets and bank account until it pays libel damages totaling nearly 800 million manats (approximately US$160,000) to government officials. These include Defense Minister Colonel General Safar Abiyev, Azerbaijani ambassador to Turkey Mammad Aliyev, and Agil Aliyev, the president's uncle. The damages stemmed from seven different defamation lawsuits launched mainly by government officials against the paper between 2000 and 2003. A local court imposed a US$6,000 fine for each of two journalists with the newspaper Millet for insulting Lachin district official Muradcan Cabbarov.

The authorities also regularly resort to harassment, intimidation, and even violence against journalists. Sadig Ismaylov, a journalist with Baki Khabar, was arrested on January 5,2004, on charges of participating in the postelection clashes, which event he had been assigned by his editor to cover. Ismaylov was kept in pretrial detention for three months. This action prompted the international NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) to write a protest letter to the Prosecutor-General's Office.

A Baku district court fined two journalists in February 2004 for picketing for the release of Yeni Musavat editor Rauf Arifoglu (also the deputy chairman of the Musavat Party) and Ismaylov. The RSF also appealed in a June 2004 statement to Vasif Talibov, chairman of the Parliament of the Nakhichevani Autonomous Republic, to halt official harassment of two journalists. Four masked men abducted Aydin Guliev, chief editor of Baki Khabar, and held him hostage for a few hours in July 2004, to coerce him into abandoning his journalistic activities. He later received a one-year suspended prison sentence for allegedly slandering President Aliyev's uncle Jalal Aliyev. Eynulla Fatullaev, a journalist for Monitor who wrote numerous articles criticizing the leadership, was assaulted on July 26,2004. A local court decided in December 2004 that the property of Fatullaev's parents would be confiscated after he failed to pay a 150-million-manat fine (about US$30,000) for insulting Defense Ministry representatives; the charge was brought against him after he published an article on corruption within the military.

The government also imposes occasional fines on publishing companies. SCWRA chairman Rafik Aliyev announced on September 24,2004, that fines had been imposed on unnamed publishing houses for printing works considered offensive against Islam, reported Zerkalo, a daily Russian-language newspaper published in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, independent publishing house Chap Evi faced eviction when it failed to pay US$12,000 to the electricity distribution company Barmek for new power cables after its own were damaged. The publishing house was forced to suspend publication twice until it moved offices in May. Chap Evi had agreed to print six opposition newspapers Azadlig, Yeni Musavat, Baki Khabar, Hurriyet, Yeni Zaman, and Nave Vremya after the state printing house refused to do so between November 2003 and January 2004.

Internet access remains free of governmental control and influence, but a mere 5 percent of the country is actually connected to the Internet, according to the International Telecommunications Union. There are currently 15 to 18 computers per 1,000 people in the country. The number of Internet cafés around the country has increased rapidly, but there were a few instances where owners were harassed by the authorities. Negative factors are impacting the growth of the Internet sector, including the Communication Ministry's monopoly position, the lack of an Azerbaijani alphabet for the Internet, and poor legislation in the information technology sector. The Communications Ministry submitted to the Parliament the State Program on Information Communication Technologies Development in Azerbaijan for 2004-2008, which aims to expand Internet use in educational institutions and among the general population, according to the Open Society Institute's Azerweb.com.

Local Governance (Score: 6.00)

Local executive committees (excoms) and municipal councils share power at the local governmental level. The president appoints the members and heads of the excoms, as required by the Constitution, whereas municipal councils are composed through municipal elections, which are held every five years. The government set up municipal councils for the first time in 1999 and held elections for the posts that same year. The second and most recent elections were held on December 17,2004. Although the Constitution defines municipalities as bodies for local self-government, the municipal councils lack a complete legal framework and proper funding and are subordinate to the excoms.

The municipal elections held in December 2004 brought little change to the insignificant role of municipalities in the governance process. The Elections Monitoring Center, a Baku-based NGO, stressed in a May 2004 report that small budgets and an inadequate legislative code limit the city governments' scope and ability to act apart from the central government. In May 2004, Finance Minister Avaz Alekperov announced a fivefold reduction in the state budget for city governments, from 25 billion manats (US$5 million) to 5 billion manats (US$1 million), according to EurasiaNet.org. The government subsidizes a portion of municipality budgets, and the balance of revenues comes from local taxes. For the most part, municipalities are engaged primarily in construction activities and social services.

The December 2004 municipal elections were characterized as "not free and fair" and "falling short of international standards" by the OSCE. Voter turnout remained generally less than 50 percent overall and as low as 20 percent in some municipalities. The YAP maintained its strong position in the polls, facilitated by the fact that an overwhelming majority of the candidates came from the YAP ranks and most mainstream opposition parties boycotted the election. YAP executive secretary Ali Ahmedov announced on October 22 that the YAP nominated nearly 10 times as many candidates for the 2,735 municipal councils as the opposition, which claimed only 6 percent of all registered candidates even before the boycott.

The Aliyev administration took a number of steps to make the election process more transparent. It received support from the United Kingdom and Norway for 2,500 clear plastic ballot boxes to replace the ones used in the October 2003 presidential election. The earlier versions were not big enough to hold the ballots, some of which listed up to 100 candidates, according to an RFE/RL Caucasus Report. Nevertheless, there were serious and widespread instances of ballot stuffing, protocol falsification, voter list tampering, and pressuring of voters on election day, according to the OSCE Baku office. The government's attitude toward the opposition in the lead-up to the elections also demonstrated a lack of political will to guarantee free and fair elections.

The AMIP complained in a press statement on October 15 that local election commissions required prospective candidates to produce as many as 40 separate documents for registration. Some local election commissions reportedly refused to register opposition candidates on various pretexts, the most common being challenging the validity of required signatures. The Center for Democratic Development (DIM), which unites the branches of Musavat, AXCP, AMIP, and ADP in the Nakhichevani Autonomous Republic, issued a statement on September 21 that protested efforts by local authorities to exclude DIM representatives from a conference on preparations for December's local elections. Residents of one village in the Shahbuz-Babek district in Nakhichevan announced on October 19 that they would boycott the election because the district election commission refused to register any opposition candidates.

The Baku Mayor's Office rejected an AXCP-Musavat-ADP request to hold an opposition demonstration on October 2, citing the demonstration's proximity to densely populated areas of the city. A more striking refusal came from the Baku Municipal Council, which denied AXCP requests in May and June to hold demonstrations. The demonstrations planned to call for the authorities to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and meet the COE's democracy standards. The council stated that the government was making progress toward both goals, so there was no need for the demonstrations, reported RFE/RL.

Meanwhile, the regional heads of excoms enjoyed de facto immunity from any scrutiny of their activities. Ahad Ahadov, an opposition activist who launched a campaign in August 2004 to publicize blatant corruption on the part of Masally district governor Ahad Abiev, was arrested alongside members of his family for what appeared to be fabricated charges of illegal possession of drugs. Ahadov claimed that Abiev had appointed to senior positions members of his close family who had illegally appropriated land and embezzled up to 15 million manats (US$3,054) from the local budget.

Some 40 residents of the village of Negram in Nakhichevan were arrested on January 26 after a four-day protest attended by 1,000 locals against a rise in electricity prices. Some were released soon after, but a district administrator refused to free the remaining detainees until villagers paid the increased monthly electricity tariffs, which were raised from 15,000 manats (US$3.07) per household to 40,000 manats (US$8.19). The tensions between villagers in the Geranboy region and local officials escalated into violence on April 16,2004. Some 150 police attacked and arrested 11 villagers, who protested that officials had allegedly commandeered all available water resources to irrigate private plots of land that belonged to the officials themselves.

It has been almost impossible for the small number of opposition representatives elected to municipal councils in 1999 to challenge the local strongmen and their supporters. Even Presidential Chief of Staff Mekhtiyev acknowledged the overwhelming influence of local strongmen in a press conference, warning unnamed local officials that they should not behave like mini dictators, reported RFE/RL. The Nakhichevani branches of the major opposition parties created DIM in April to contest Vugar Safarov, head of the Nakhichevan Municipal Council, in the municipal election, but they were unsuccessful. Several days after the election, the local police broke into DIM headquarters in Nakhichevan and warned activists to abandon their activities and stop protesting socioeconomic problems.

There was no progress in the peace talks over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2004, despite a number of face-to-face meetings between President Aliyev and President Robert Kocharian of Armenia and between Foreign Minister Mamedyarov and his Armenian counterpart, Vartan Oskanian. The Azerbaijani government continued to have no administrative control over the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the seven surrounding regions (Kelbajar, Gubatli, Djabrail, Fizuli, Zengilan, Lachin, and Agdam) that are occupied by Armenia. This area constitutes about 17 percent of the territory of Azerbaijan.

Judicial Framework and Independence (Score: 5.75)

The Azerbaijani Constitution, adopted in 1995, provides a wide range of human rights protections, yet these rights are often violated in practice. Although the Constitution recognizes the division of power among the legislature, executive, and the judiciary, the president is the sole guarantor of judicial independence. Judicial power is implemented through the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, Economic Court, and the ordinary and specialized law courts. The judges of the high courts are appointed by the Parliament on the recommendation of the president and remain heavily dependent on the executive branch. There have been numerous reports of executive branch pressure on judges to rule on the arrest of opposition activists. The president appoints and dismisses the prosecutor-general of the Azerbaijan Republic.

There is no jury system in Azerbaijan, and almost all court hearings are open for public attendance. Judges are generally appointed in a fair and unbiased manner, but the rapid change in legal procedures after independence and particularly COE membership has made it difficult to provide judges with adequate legal training. Detainees are presumed innocent until found guilty, but harassment, intimidation, and evidence gathered under physical pressure are not uncommon. Access to lawyers for defendants is generally respected, but there have been cases where detained individuals were not allowed to speak to their lawyers and were held longer than allowed or required. This was particularly true among the arrests in connection with the Baku events following the presidential elections in October 2003. Several opposition activists were detained for months, and some of them received sentences of one to three years in prison for obstructing the work of electoral commissions.

The most high-profile court verdict came on October 22,2004, when Azerbaijan's Court for Serious Crimes passed sentence on seven leading opposition politicians charged with inciting clashes between police and protesters in the wake of the 2003 presidential election. Opposition Musavat deputy chairman Rauf Arifoglu, who is also editor of the newspaper Yeni Musavat, and a second Musavat Party deputy chairman, Arif Hadjili, were sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment; People's Party of Azerbaijan chairman Panakh Huseinov and ADP secretary-general Serdar Djalaloglu were sentenced to 4 1/2 years; Musavat deputy chairman Ibrahim Ibrahimli and Umid Party chairman Igbal Agazade received 3 years; and Etimad Asadov, head of an organization representing veterans of the Karabakh war, was sentenced to 2 1/2 years' imprisonment. The prosecution had called for prison terms of between 4 and 7 years for all seven men. The seven accused men claimed that prosecutors distorted their testimony; they also repeatedly protested procedural irregularities and glaring discrepancies in the prosecution's own testimony. In an October 22,2004, statement, the OSCE office in Baku expressed deep concern over the severity of these sentences.

Human rights groups documented torture during the pretrial detention of four of the seven political prisoners, and prosecution witnesses said that during the legal proceedings, police and prosecutors used physical means to pressure them to make statements incriminating the opposition leaders. More than 100 opposition supporters were arrested and charged in the days following the protests after the presidential election. Within six months all of them were convicted of participating in the violence, and more than 30 were sentenced to prison terms ranging from two to six years. In a sharp contrast, the government did not prosecute any law enforcement or security agents for torture or excessive use of force during the election fallout.

Meanwhile, the case involving six members of the nationalist KLO resulted in significant pressure on court rulings and further weakened the judiciary's independence. A local court originally sentenced the men to three to five years in prison for their participation in a protest against the presence of two Armenian military officers at a NATO-sponsored conference in Baku. The decision led to a major public outcry and was criticized by the Parliament, almost all opposition parties, and government officials, including President Aliyev. The Supreme Court on September 22,2004, commuted the original court's decision to suspended sentences of one to three years. Legislative, executive, and other governmental authorities do not always comply with judicial decisions, as demonstrated when electricity distribution company Barmek disregarded an Economic Court order in February 2004 to restore power to the independent publishing house Chap Evi. In this case, Barmek was likely influenced by government authorities who wanted to force Chap Evi to relocate its offices.

Although the issue of political prisoners continues to be a problem in Azerbaijan, the situation showed some improvement in 2004, with President Aliyev granting amnesty to over 1,000 prisoners. The majority of the released were considered "political prisoners" by the COE. Nonetheless, the president's amnesty decrees excluded most recent political prisoners who participated in the postelection events in October 2003, estimated at around 700.

A presidential decree in January 2004 granted amnesty to over 160 prisoners, including Iskender Hamidov, who was the controversial minister of internal affairs in the Elchibey government from 1992 to 1993. Aliyev signed another decree on March 17,2004, pardoning 129 prisoners, including former colonel Suret Huseinov, who spearheaded the June 1993 insurgency that culminated in the fall of the AXCP-led government, after which he was named prime minister by then acting president Heydar Aliyev. (Technically, Heydar Aliyev was "acting president" between June 1993 and October 2003, when he was elected president; a referendum was held in between, in August 2003, to formally depose former president Abulfez Elchibey.) The elder Aliyev fired Huseinov in October 1994, accusing the prime minister of attempting to overthrow him. To mark the birthday of his father, President Ilham Aliyev pardoned another 363 prisoners, including former acting head of the Baku Naval College Djanmirza Mirzoev. Mirzoev was sentenced in 2001 to eight years' imprisonment on charges, which he denied, of arranging the murder of Rear Admiral Eduard Huseinov in 1993. Mirzoev claimed at his trial that he was sentenced in retaliation for his campaign to expose corruption within the Defense Ministry.

A September 2004 decree pardoned 266 prisoners, including Alikram Gumbatov, who in June 1993 declared an independent Talysh-Mughan Republic on Azerbaijan's southeastern border with Iran. He was sentenced to death in February 1996 for crimes against the state; that sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. A COE Parliamentary Assembly monitoring committee report for Azerbaijan called on September 20 for the immediate release of seven oppositionists, but the administration failed to follow the recommendation. President Aliyev said that the events were very recent and that the administration had no doubts they were guilty. By year's end, none of the seven had been given amnesty. Prosecutor-General Zakir Garalov solicited the Court of Appeals to reopen the cases of 11 former special police officers sentenced in November 1997 on charges of plotting a state coup.

The authorities took a number of steps to improve Azerbaijan's harsh prison conditions in 2004, renovating some facilities and building five new prisons. The majority of prisoners depend on their families for basic needs, such as food and medicine, with tuberculosis the primary cause of death in prisons. Official figures suggest that nearly 800 detainees were undergoing treatment for tuberculosis at the end of 2003, reports Human Rights House Network, while some political prisoners are reportedly denied treatment. Due to an insufficient number of doctors, prisoners often must pay for doctor visits, for medicine, and to undergo treatment in an outside clinic. Some pretrial detainees are kept in solitary confinement, where interrogators reportedly deprive them of food and sleep to secure confessions without physical evidence of abuse.

Corruption (Score: 6.25)

Corruption remains one of the most problematic issues in Azerbaijan. Bribery and nepotism have intervened at all levels of society from the education system to the workplace to government and continue to hinder the development of the country and the eradication of poverty. The increasing gap between rich and poor and the continued reliance on excessive state involvement in the economy have allowed bribery and corruption to become the social norm, one not widely condemned by the broader society. The most prominent reasons for corruption are low salaries for civil servants, a lack of accountability and transparency for government bureaucrats, and the high number of licenses required in business and commerce.

Most people prefer to pay small bribes instead of the much higher fees imposed by the state. Thirty-three percent of Azerbaijanis report that they have paid bribes in the past; 20 percent say that they have been asked for bribes but have not paid; and 33 percent say that they have not been asked for bribes in the past. Among Azerbaijanis who have paid bribes, the most common occasions are for medical care (12 percent) and higher grades for their school-age children (6 percent). Not surprisingly, those who have paid bribes or been asked for bribes report that this occurred most often in public health institutions (20 percent) and in schools and universities (11 percent), states the IFES 2004 survey Public Opinion in Azerbaijan. A strong executive power and the lack of proper audit mechanisms over government expenditures create opportunities for widespread corruption. The Parliament's Audit Chamber remains weak and inefficient, and NGOs and media lack access to information about its activities or statistics regarding government revenues and expenditures.

So far, the state has failed to enforce an effective legislative or administrative process to investigate the corruption of government officials and civil servants, a process that would at the same time be free of prejudice against political opponents. It has, however, come up with a number of anticorruption initiatives. The government appears intolerant of any public debate over corruption allegations regarding government officials. The state apparatus intimidates whoever publicizes corruption on the part of high-profile officials with what appear to be fabricated charges of their own. For example, Ahad Ahadov, an opposition activist, alleged that Masally district governor Ahad Abiev appointed to senior positions close family members, who then illegally appropriated land and embezzled up to 15 million manats (US$3,054) from the local budget. Ahadov was later arrested alongside members of his own family for illegal possession of drugs.

Another remarkable example was the treatment of former Baku mayor Rafael Allahverdiyev, who threatened in July to make public certain materials implicating Presidential Chief of Staff Mekhtiyev in corruption. On August 8, police broke into Allahverdiyev's hotel room at a mountain resort and accused him of attempting to rape his female companion, who was in fact his daughter.

Almost all politicians participate in the economic life of the country, investing corrupt money into local businesses. The law prohibits such activities for members of Parliament, yet the practice is widespread throughout the legislature. There is no public disclosure of the income and assets of politicians. There are no adequate laws requiring financial disclosure and disallowing conflict of interest. Azerbaijan was not among the 16 countries selected to receive funding from the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account in 2004; it failed to fulfill at least 50 percent of the relevant criteria for fighting corruption required to qualify for such funding. Neighboring Armenia and Georgia were both chosen to receive funds from the account in 2004. Azerbaijan's rating in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index stands at 1.9,140th among 147 countries (that is, near the end of the scale that signifies the highest level of corruption perception).

Author

Kaan Nazli is an analyst at Eurasia Group, focusing on Emerging Europe and the Caspian region. He is a regular commentator on the region on CNN and CNBC and has written for the Financial Times, the National Interest, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Investor Turkey, Insight Turkey, and EurasiaNet.