Afghanistan: Uncertainties and fear loom day before vote

Aunohita Mojumdar: 8/19/09

Polling for the second presidential and provincial council elections in Afghanistan will open early on August 20 in a milieu of competing hopes and fears, uncertain logistics and precarious security conditions. The 2009 polls also take place in a state of political flux unprecedented since the forced removal of the Taliban in 2001.

How many polling stations will open, where they will be located and how much of the electorate will be able to access the ballots remains as uncertain as the level of anticipated violence. Equally uncertain is the extent of expected electoral malpractice, how much this will compromise the vote's legitimacy, and the tolerance of ordinary Afghans to fraud.

Less than 48 hours before polls open, the Election Complaints Commission said on August 18 that it was "possible that irregularities may occur during polling, and the counting and tallying of votes," and ruled out setting a final date for the results to be released. Reacting to the increase of targeted violence from anti-government elements, including rocket attacks and suicide bombings in Kabul this week, the Foreign Ministry called for censorship on Election Day, urging a blackout of all reporting on violence. "All domestic and international media agencies are requested to refrain from broadcasting any incident of violence during the election process," a statement from the ministry read, in order to "ensure the wide participation of the Afghan people."

Local conditions, interests and security, rather than media coverage, are more likely to determine voting conditions, however.

Unlike the previous elections where a positive outcome for incumbent President Hamid Karzai appeared a fait accompli, this time voters approach a real contest with a widespread appetite for change. One opinion poll, a US government-commissioned survey conducted in July by Glevum Associates, gave Karzai 36 percent support among registered voters, well below the 51 percent mark he needs to stave off a second round of voting. While polls indicated a fair number of undecided voters could change these figures, former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah has emerged as a strong contender at the head of a fragmented opposition.

The four top presidential contesters – running in a field of 41 candidates, including two women – represent both the complex wishes and the competing interests of Afghan voters. Karzai exemplifies the Afghan penchant for deal making by appearing to have secured the support of major power brokers, including a catalog of former warlords. However, the campaign of Dr. Abdullah, who has inherited the Northern Alliance's political movement – the foremost anti-Taliban faction before the US invasion – is challenging the expectation that votes will be delivered solely by strongmen. Another contender, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, represents an alternative facet of Afghan politics today: the western-returned technocrat with strong links to the donor community. The fourth major contender, Ramazan Bashardost, a former planning minister, has made a name for himself by tapping into the public mood of disenchantment with violence, lack of development and corruption.

When Afghans go to the polls, they will do so with a mixture of hope and fear of change. While disenchantment with lack of economic development, delivery of services, increasing insecurity and high civilian casualties has shaped opinion in favor of change, the ongoing conflict also makes voters fearful that the situation could deteriorate further, pushing many to conclude that a known devil is better than an unknown one.

Whatever the outcome, change is unlikely to start merely with a new president. The current administrative and political structure has concentrated all decisions in the office of the president, marginalizing the role of the parliament and depriving provincial councils of any authority. Over the past eight years, the internationally supported central government has set up structures that bypass local decision making in an attempt to administer this large, unwieldy and varied country from a single seat in Kabul. The result has been a powerful presidency that is a source of patronage – by the central appointment of governors and dishing out of development projects – rather than legitimate authority, in the eyes of many Afghans.

Abdullah, calling for a parliamentary democracy more suited to Afghanistan's diverse and disparate population, has presented the most formidable opposition platform. But even if elected, he would find it difficult to dislodge powerbrokers embedded and strengthened through a combination of government backing and international support.

The major difference any of the candidates could bring to office immediately would be in the approach to negotiations with the armed opposition, often lumped together misleadingly under the rubric of the Taliban. A significant section of the international community and the Afghan polity view negotiations with armed groups as the sine qua non of any progress in Afghanistan, and pressure for the resumption of talks is likely to resume soon after the elections.

For the international community, desperate for some sign of progress in an engagement that is becoming increasingly unpopular back home, the elections are a needed signal of the legitimacy of their intervention. To that end, it is unlikely that foreign policy makers will make any significant criticism on the credibility of the vote, even if it is marred by lack of inclusiveness or electoral fraud. However an unquestioning endorsement of the electoral exercise could also be counterproductive. Afghans, who have been repeatedly asked to understand and adopt democracy and eschew conflict, have higher expectations of the democratic process today than in 2004.

Of course, the biggest question before the polling remains: How will the Afghan electorate react? The perception of legitimacy will be even more important than the actual legitimacy of the polls. In a context of growing public disenchantment and low tolerance for fraud, public anger could increase support for violence and other non-peaceful means of changing the status quo. If the August 20 elections and the response both lack legitimacy, those voting with the ballots for the building of Afghanistan's democracy today may vote against it with bullets tomorrow.

Editor's Note: Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for the past 19 years.