Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Eritrea

Overview: The Government of Eritrea continued to make regular public statements about its commitment to fighting terrorism. Eritrea also continued and broadened its support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen; it allowed military elements of the coalition to base in Eritrea.

In May 2016, the United States re-certified Eritrea as "not cooperating fully" with U.S. counterterrorism efforts under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. In considering this annual determination, the Department of State reviewed Eritrea's overall level of cooperation with U.S. efforts to counter terrorism, taking into account U.S. counterterrorism objectives and a realistic assessment of Eritrean capabilities.

The Government of Eritrea has been under UNSC sanctions since December 2009 as a result of past evidence of support for al-Shabaab and regional destabilization. UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1907 (2009) and 2013 (2011) continued an arms embargo on Eritrea and a travel ban and asset freeze on some military and political leaders, calling on the nation to "cease arming, training, and equipping armed groups and their members, including al-Shabaab, that aim to destabilize the region." While the Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group's (SEMG's) 2016 report found no evidence that Eritrea is supporting al-Shabaab, the SEMG found that it could not make a determination that Eritrea is in compliance with the requirements of the UNSC resolutions because the Government of Eritrea continued to refuse to allow SEMG inspectors to enter Eritrea.

The Government of Eritrea's lack of transparency means there was no clear picture of the methods it used to track terrorists or maintain safeguards for its citizens. For a number of years, members of the police have refused to meet with security officials from western nations to discuss policy matters, although the United States had informal contact with some law enforcement counterparts in 2016.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Eritrea's penal code, grandfathered into its present-day law from Ethiopia's 1957 code, contains a number of statutes that can be used to prosecute various types of terrorist activity, including conspiracies carried out by organized armed groups and the use of bombs, dynamite, explosives, or other methods constituting a public danger. Other sections of Eritrean law are sufficiently broad to apply to terrorism cases, including acts related to offenses against public safety, property, and the state and its national interests.

The Government of Eritrea does not share information about its ports of entry, law enforcement actions, and arrests or disruptions of terrorist's activities or prosecutions. Entities including the Eritrean Defense Forces, the National Security Agency (NSA), the police, and Immigration and Customs authorities all potentially have counterterrorism responsibilities. There are special units of the NSA that monitor fundamentalism or violent extremism. Chain of command may work effectively within some security and law enforcement elements, but there are rivalries and responsibilities that overlap between and among the various forces. Whether information sharing occurs depends on personal relationships between and among particular unit commanders. Many soldiers, police officers, and immigration and customs agents, are young national service recruits or assignees, performing their jobs without adequate training.

The Eritrean government closely monitors passenger manifests for any flights coming into Asmara and scrutinizes travel documents of visitors, but does not collect biometric data. Government officials lacked the training and technology to recognize fraudulent documents.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Eritrea is not a member or observer of a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Assessing terrorist financing risks in the country is challenging due to Eritrea's general lack of transparency on banking, financial, and economic matters. The lack of basic banking infrastructure, such as credit cards and online banking technology, and the fact that the Eritrean currency is nonconvertible, limit Eritrea's ability to engage in international financial markets. There is no available information to indicate that Eritrea has identified any terrorist assets or prosecuted any terrorist financing cases.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Countering Violent Extremism: In official meetings and in its public statements, Eritrean officials cited their record in opposing violent extremism and stated their commitment to fighting it in the future. It is unknown whether the Government of Eritrea has established a Countering Violent Extremism National Action Plan. While Eritrea's laws and the public statements of Eritrean officials stressed the importance of preventing violent extremism in Eritrea, the lack of transparency from the government made it impossible to assess whether they have implemented initiatives aimed at prevention, counter-messaging, or rehabilitation and reintegration.

International and Regional Cooperation: Eritrea is a member of the African Union and an inactive member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism. In 2016, Eritrea continued to increase its military cooperation with the Gulf States and increased its political support for the Saudi Arabia-led military campaign in Yemen. Eritrea would like to reactivate its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); however, Eritrea's return to IGAD is opposed by Ethiopia and Djibouti, both of which had military conflicts and have ongoing border disputes with Eritrea.