Assessment for Tatars in Russia

Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

Tatars exhibit a moderate risk for violent rebellion. They are territorially concentrated (although large numbers live outside their titular republic of Tatarstan) with a high level of group cohesion. Further, Tatar protest has been fairly persistent, although more moderated recently in comparison to that of the 1990s.

Several factors mitigate the risk for rebellion. First, the Tatar leadership in Kazan, Tatarstan's capital, is committed to remaining within the Russian Federation. The Russian federal government engaged in negotiations in the 1990s leading to widespread autonomy and greater control over Tatarstan's economic resources, which has further legitimated this non-secessionist approach. Tatarstan's close proximity to Moscow (approximately 400 miles away) and its significant share of Russia's military industry also militates against violent rebellion. Furthermore, Tatars are heavily dependent on Russian civilian and military industries for employment. Reportedly, more than 50 percent of the labor force is employed in Russian enterprises, making rebellion not in their economic interests.

Protest is likely to continue in the near future at moderate to high levels. Until Tatars perceive that they are indeed on equal footing with Russians in their titular republic, they are likely to continue agitating for economic and cultural support from the state structure. Potentially volatile for the republic is Russian President Vladimir Putin's increasing control over all regions; this type of protest was born out when Putin's federal district plan was promulgated in the late 1990s.

Analytic Summary

Tatars are descendents of Mongol, Bulgar and other peoples. They are predominantly Muslim. Russia's largest ethnic group outside of Russians, Tatars are approximately 50 percent of the population of Tatarstan (GROUPCON = 2). However many live outside the republic and constitute significant minorities in several other ethnic republics, including Bashkortostan, where they comprise 30 percent of the population.

Russian domination of Tatars began when Czar Ivan the Terrible conquered the Tatar Khanate in 1552 (AUTLOST = 2). Under both imperial Russian and Soviet rule, long periods of forced Russification occurred. Since the late 1980s and peaking in the early 1990s, there has been a resurgence of Tatar nationalism. As a result, group cohesion has increased (COHES80X = 3; COHES9X = 5). Now, Tatarstan seems to be the most independently minded of the 20 autonomous republics within the Russian Federation. Tatarstan first declared its sovereignty in August 1990. While the president and the dominant political clique have expressed commitment to remaining within a federal Russia, they have also freely criticized central government policy during the past decade.

Tatar grievances stem primarily from autonomy grievances, which have grown more vociferous as Putin centralizes power (AUTGR300 = 2, AUTGR301-03 = 1). Cultural grievances remained strong and related to the perceived disadvantaged status of Tatar vis-à-vis Russian (CULGR203 = 1). Economic demands and grievances were previously strong in the 1990s and reflected a perception that both that Tatars did not have equal economic opportunities and that Russia's central authorities extracted too many resources from Tatarstan; however, these grievances have almost completely disappeared from public discourse (ECONGR396 = 1, ECONGR303 = 0; ECONGR596 = 1, ECONGR503 = 0).

Tatars are represented by a variety of groups within Tatarstan, including the Ittifak Party , the Tatar National Congress, and the All-Tatar Public Centre (ORG03NUM = 5). The Ittifak Party and the Tatar National Congress have previously advocated independence, and some members have advocated independence as an Islamic state, although demands for independence were not heard during the 2001-2003 period. The All-Tatar Public Centre, while formerly advocating independence, has softened its stance and now advocates increased autonomy for Tatarstan, especially greater control over economic resources. These organizations have enjoyed relative freedom to organize in Tatarstan, although the Ittifak Party's newspaper, Altyn Urda (Golden Horde), was closed down in April 1998 for inciting inter-ethnic conflict and insulting the president of Tatarstan. In the Republic of Bashkortostan, the All-Tatar Public Centre was briefly banned in the late 1990s, but functions legally now.

The most recent addition to this list is the Tatar National Front (TNF). The TNF, based in Bashkortostan, was created at the 2003 Congress of Tatars of Bashkortostan with the goal of "fighting for the Tatar people's right to its own identity and self-determination within the framework of Russian Federation law." Its president, as of 2003, was Zagir Khakimov. All known Tatar organizations remain committed to conventional politics (GOJPA03 = 2).

Tatars have a long, if interrupted, history of resisting both imperial Russian and Soviet domination. During the liberalizing Kruschev years, Tatars mounted moderate protests (PROT60X = 3). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, protest peaked in the early 1990s (PROT90X = 4) but has since moderated (PROT01 = 2; PROT02 = 3, PROT03 = 2). The protests in 2002 related to two incidents. The first involved some Tatar women picketing municipal buildings demanding the right to have passport photos taken with headscarves; the second related to the anniversary of a 1552 attack on Tatarstan by Czarist forces: Tatars gathered with anti-Russian placards and speeches compared current policies of Russia to those of Ivan the Terrible. Rebellion by the Tatar remains non-existent (REB01-03 = 0).

References

Amnesty International, various reports 2000-2004

Human Rights Watch: World Reports, Briefing Papers, and other reports 1995-2003.

Nexis-Lexis Library Information, 1990-2003.

US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (2001-2003): Russia