Assessment for Cabinda in Angola

Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

The people of Cabinda have three of the conditions that encourage rebellion: an ongoing rebellion, territorial concentration, and continuing government repression. Factors inhibiting conflict are efforts at negotiations, a transnational support for a settlement to the conflict, and the 2002 ceasefire in the civil war that had been raging in the rest of Angola. Protest activity may increase as Angola prepares for elections in 2004 or 2005 (the first since 1992), and restrictions and repression against the group continue. On the other hand, attempts have been made by the Angolan government to open dialogue with the people of the oil-rich province. War-weariness and a weakening of Cabinda-based rebel groups may greatly assist in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Analytic Summary

The Cabinda people are concentrated in the Cabinda province, which is separated from the rest of Angola by a strip of land belonging to the Democratic Republic of Congo (GROUPCON = 3). It is bordered to the North by Congo and to the West by the Atlantic Ocean. The Cabinda people are thus physically isolated from other people in Angola. The Bakongo ethnic group makes up the majority in Cabinda and is also found in the rest of Angola. The Mayombe ethnic group lives in the mountain forests of Eastern Cabinda and is a small minority in the province. The Bakongo speak Kikongo and the Mayombe speak a closely related dialect of Kikongo. Unlike the majority of Angolans, people in Cabinda are predominately Roman Catholic.

The main issue in the Cabinda conflict is oil. The Cabinda province is rich in oil reserves and has immense economic potential; however, the area, like the rest of Angola, is beset by grinding poverty. A separatist movement for the independence of Cabinda has been waged since 1961. It started with the formation of three groups that merged to form the Front for the Liberation of Cabinda (FLEC) in 1963 (REB75X = 4). Subsequently, the FLEC split into numerous factions. Cabinda separatists claim that, unlike mainland Angola, Cabinda was never a Portuguese colony. It was, rather, a protectorate, subject to only 90 years of colonial rule, in contrast to the 500 years experienced by Angola. They also claim that the enclave has its own distinct and separate identity, history and culture, and that it was illegally occupied by the ruling MPLA government following independence in 1975. The Angolan government dismisses this argument and says that mixing and intermarriage in Cabinda has made notions of ethnic distinctions irrelevant.

Separatists have in recent years called on the former colonial power, Portugal, to intervene in the situation. However, the Portuguese have historically seen the Cabindan issue as an internal Angolan problem. Moreover, the kidnapping of several Portuguese workers in the enclave during 1999 and 2000 by both FLEC-FAC and FLEC-R did not help the separatists' case with the former colonial power.

Cabinda residents are also critical of the role of major oil companies in the province. In 1999 an oil spill near the Malonga oil base dealt a severe blow to the struggling local fishing industry (DMENV99 = 2). Oil giant Chevron-Texaco gave about $2000 to 10 percent of the affected fishermen. Cabindan fishermen have attributed reduced fish stocks to continued pollution. Many Cabindans say that they expect oil companies to contribute more to the development of the impoverished province.

Thus far, Cabindan interests have been represented only by militant groups (GOJPA03 = 4). The Angolan government has long alleged that the rebel groups receive support form neighboring countries. A military report to the Angolan Assembly in 1999 identified Togo, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Zambia. FLEC has, for years, used territory in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Congo-Brazzaville as rear bases from which to launch attacks into Cabinda.

The separatist conflict is unrelated to the civil war between the MPLA and UNITA, which terminated in 2002. It has also been waged at a much lower intensity than the latter. Since the UNITA war ended, however, the Angolan government has concentrated its forces in Cabinda, with a resulting increase in civilian killings and repression. In October 2002, the Angolan government launched a new military offensive in the Buco-Zau military region, in northern Cabinda (REP2002-03 = 1, REP2102-03 = 3, REP2202-03 = 3). The aim of the counter insurgency was to attack the FLEC-FAC, a splinter group of the original FLEC movement, which posed the most serious military threat. It is widely alleged that the counterinsurgency was accompanied by numerous human rights abuses and repopulation movements; that is, the settlement of Angolans into Cabinda areas. Amidst reports of the surrender of several FLEC-FAC senior officers, it is believed that the rebel groups are much weakened. Many experts believe that the rebels have an estimated force of no more than 2,000 troops. Despite their public intransigence on secessionism, it is unlikely that the separatists will be able to continue withstanding Angolan forces (REB03 = 6).

The Angolan government has indicated that it is willing to engage in dialogue, but it is unlikely that it will allow Cabinda to secede. Cabinda's oil reserves make it a valuable region for the Angolan government. Oil revenues constitute 45% of the country's GDP and more than half of its exports. Nonetheless, a peace agreement would probably entail some amount of regional autonomy.

It is unclear what level of support FLEC and other factions enjoy with the people of Cabinda. Nonetheless, for any peace to be sustained, levels of repression and discrimination (POLDIS03 = 4, ECDIS03 = 3) would have to fall substantially and attempts made for a more equitable distribution of the province's vast oil reserves.

In 2003, efforts were made at a political settlement. In January 2003 government representatives met with FLEC-FAC in France to conduct exploratory talks. The Angolan government has said that it is interested in holding dialogue, although reports of severe repression and human rights abuses continue. As the rebel groups steadily lose strength, some form of peace settlement seems more likely. A long-term solution to the economic problems of the region will be more difficult to attain.

References

1. British Broadcasting Corporation. http://news.bbc.co.uk/

2. CIA World Factbook 2003. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ao.html

3. Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=africa&c=angola

4. Lexis-Nexis Academic Search (through 2003). http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe