

CIVIL-MILITARY GUIDELINES & REFERENCE FOR COMPLEX EMERGENCIES



United Nations

IASC
Inter-Agency
Standing Committee

“CIVIL-MILITARY GUIDELINES & REFERENCE FOR COMPLEX EMERGENCIES” is the first collection of core humanitarian instruments developed by the United Nations (UN) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on civil-military relationship in complex emergencies. Its aim is to assist humanitarian and military professionals to deal with civil-military issues in a manner that respects and appropriately reflects humanitarian concerns at the strategic, operational and tactical levels - in accordance with international law, standards and principles.

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**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
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*I wish to thank the Government of Norway
whose generous contribution has made this publication possible.*

*John Holmes
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator*

ABOUT THE GUIDELINES AND REFERENCE

The Guidelines and Reference featured in this booklet were endorsed by the members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The IASC was established in 1992 in response to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 that called for strengthened coordination of humanitarian assistance. In 1993, the General Assembly, through Resolution 48/57, affirmed IASC's role as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. A broad range of UN and non-UN humanitarian partners participate in this Standing Committee.

Further information on the IASC can be found at: <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc>.

ABOUT THIS BOOKLET

This booklet was published by the United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) through a collaboration between the Promotion of the Humanitarian Agenda Unit (PHA) of the Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB) and the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) of the Emergency Services Branch (ESB), with the support of the Secretariat of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and advice from the Office of the Military Adviser (OMA) of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

The electronic version is available at: <http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines>.

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OVERVIEW

“**CIVIL-MILITARY GUIDELINES & REFERENCE FOR COMPLEX EMERGENCIES**” is the first collection of core humanitarian instruments developed by the United Nations (UN) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on civil-military relationship in complex emergencies. Its **goal** is to help promote respect for international law, standards and principles in these situations.

Engaging military support for humanitarian operations is not a new endeavour. In today’s security environment, however, the military are ever more involved in the ‘*direct*’ provision of aid, while humanitarian actors are often faced with situations where there are no alternatives but to rely on the military, as a **last resort**, for safety and to access populations in need - at the serious risk of compromising their neutrality, impartiality, independence, and thus their ability and/or credibility to operate.

Combined with the tides toward ‘integration’ and ‘whole-of-government’ approaches, as well as the increased propensity of some Governments to deploy mixed civilian-military teams to provide aid as a ‘tool’ to address security threats, the situation calls for enhanced understandings between the military and humanitarian professionals at all levels.

International law, standards and principles can assist both actors to properly and legitimately discharge their respective missions in far-away lands. Adhering to these and de-conflicting each others’ activities can maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of the respective operations. These tasks are crucial when working in the same area.

Written in a practical, user-friendly style that brings together the essential guidance materials on the subject into a single form, **the Booklet aims to assist professionals to handle civil-military issues in line with such law, standards and principles, in a manner that respects and appropriately reflects humanitarian concerns at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.**

Be it for peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peacebuilding, armed conflict or even war and occupation, readers will find in the **GUIDELINES AND REFERENCE** answers to such questions as:

- ◆ Why are principles of **humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence** and **distinction** so vital to civil-military coordination in humanitarian emergencies?
- ◆ When and how should humanitarian actors coordinate with the military?
- ◆ What is meant by the concept of “**last resort**” when employing military assets to support humanitarian operations?
- ◆ How do we mobilise such assets when necessary?
- ◆ Who should provide armed escorts to humanitarian convoys?
- ◆ When and under what circumstances should these escorts be employed?
- ◆ In what ways can we prevent unnecessary ‘militarisation’ of aid?

The **ANNEX** features a selection of **OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES** for peacekeepers and others that relate to civil-military issues. Most of these were developed outside the IASC context, but within the UN System at large.

Readers are also guided to a collection of **RELEVANT MATERIAL** on civil-military relationship and coordination in UN operations, covering such topics as **integrated missions, use of force, command and control, protection of civilians, field security** and **training** amongst others.

A rich list of civil-military-related **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS** is also provided to familiarise both civilians and military personnel alike.

The Booklet is published by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as the ‘custodian’ of civil-military guidelines and reference endorsed by the IASC. IASC materials reflect common positions held widely across a diverse range of international humanitarian actors.

IASC GUIDING AND OPERATING PRINCIPLES ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP & USE OF MILITARY ASSETS

(EXCERPTS FROM EARLY IASC DISCUSSIONS OF 1995)

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

- ◆ The guiding principles of impartiality, neutrality, humanity and independence from political considerations are the same as those governing humanitarian action in general.
- ◆ The military nature of the assets may, however, require increased attention to be paid to the need to ensure that humanitarian action is not only neutral and impartial in intent but also perceived to be so by the parties directly concerned.
- ◆ Particular caution should be exercised in circumstances where there is a risk that either the motivation for the use of military or civil defence assets or its consequences may be perceived as reflecting political rather than humanitarian considerations.
- ◆ This risk is likely to be greatest in humanitarian actions in countries where military forces are operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, even if the two operations are not considered as integrated.

The **'GUIDING PRINCIPLES'** are excerpts from the *'IASC Guiding and Operating Principles for the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations'* reflected in the *"Report of the Task Force on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations"* of September 1995, endorsed by the IASC Working Group on 27 September 1995. The **'OPERATING PRINCIPLES'** are excerpts from the *'IASC Principles on Military-Civilian Relations'* of January 1995, which became a key basis for subsequent development of IASC material on civil-military issues, including the above Task Force Report of 1995 as well as the **IASC CIVIL-MILITARY GUIDELINES & REFERENCE** featured in this Booklet.

OPERATING PRINCIPLES

- ◆ Decisions to accept military assets must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria.
- ◆ Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in nature or timeliness of deployment, and its use should be a last resort.
- ◆ A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. The operation must remain under the overall authority and control of the humanitarian organization responsible for that operation, whatever the specific command arrangements for the military asset itself. To the extent possible, the military asset should operate unarmed and be civilian in appearance.
- ◆ Countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the code of conduct and principles of the humanitarian organization responsible for that deployment.
- ◆ The large-scale involvement of military personnel in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance should be avoided.
- ◆ Any use of military assets should ensure that the humanitarian operation retains its international and multilateral character.

1

Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies

An IASC Reference Paper
28 June 2004



Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper (IASC REFERENCE PAPER) was endorsed by the members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on 17 June 2004. The paper was issued on 28 June 2004, including the final modifications requested by the IASC.

Document Development and Inter-Agency Process (2003-2004)

Drafting and Process Facilitation:

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UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Figures inserted in the text of this Booklet are not an official part of the original IASC-endorsed Reference Paper.

PREFACE

Humanitarian and military actors have both worked in armed conflicts for centuries. Norms have been developed throughout the course of history to define the optimal relationship between civilians and soldiers, based on the cardinal distinction between combatants and non-combatants. In practice, however, strategic, operational, and tactical challenges continue to pose questions including: when and how, if ever, should humanitarian actors coordinate with the military in fulfilling humanitarian objectives?

In today's reality, aid workers and soldiers at times have little choice but to re-explore their relationship and improvise best ways possible for some degree of potential interaction, while simultaneously responding to the emergency at hand. Clearly, however, much time can be lost if fundamentals are left to be sorted out after being deployed to the field. A shared knowledge and understanding of each others *modus operandi* could facilitate necessary dialogue on the ground and better assist in de-conflicting their respective activities – which in turn would enable both actors to avoid harm and duplication, and work more effectively and efficiently.

It is in this spirit that this booklet has been produced – to provide a user-friendly tool to contribute to increased understanding of the humanitarian approaches to civil-military relationship in complex emergencies. I highly recommend it to all professionals who may become involved in this subject.

'*Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper*' is one of several guidelines and references endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. I encourage the readers to also take a look at the other sections in this booklet as well as the additional civil-military material available through:

<http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines>.

This booklet is available in all official languages of the United Nations.



John Holmes
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and
Emergency Relief Coordinator

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This paper was endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG) as an IASC Reference Paper at its 57th Meeting of 16-17 June 2004. It complements the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003.

The paper was drafted by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in collaboration with members of the IASC, the UN’s Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) and the Advisory Panel of OCHA’s Military Civil Defence Unit (MCDU-AP), as well as academic reviewers and field colleagues in a number of organizations.

The paper will serve as a **non-binding reference** for humanitarian practitioners, assisting them in **formulating country-specific operational guidelines on civil-military relations** for particular complex emergencies. It will be updated as the environment in which we work changes and as new guidance on related issues becomes available.



PART 1 of the paper reviews in a generic manner, the nature and character of civil-military relations in complex emergencies. **PART 2** lists the fundamental humanitarian principles and concepts that must be upheld when coordinating with the military, and **PART 3** proposes practical considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.

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PART 1: INTRODUCTION

A. Initial Remarks

1. Traditionally in complex emergencies, there has been a **distinction** between the military and the non-military domains: an approach built upon the principles of international humanitarian law that make a distinction between **combatants** and **non-combatants**, protecting the latter from armed attacks. In recent history, however, military forces have become increasingly involved in operations other than war, including provision of relief and services to the local population. At the same time, due to the changing nature of modern complex emergencies, the humanitarian community has faced increased operational challenges as well as greater risks and threats for their workers in the field, which at times have compelled some of them to seek the support or protection by military forces on a case-by-case basis¹. Thus, practical realities on the ground have gradually necessitated various forms of civil-military coordination for humanitarian operations.

2. These developments, together with cases of military interventions claimed to be for 'humanitarian' purposes, have led to **an erosion of the separation between the humanitarian and the military space**², and may threaten to blur the fundamental distinction between these two domains. It also raises significant concerns associated with the application of humanitarian principles and policies as well as operational issues. Furthermore these developments necessitate increased communication,

¹ In the last two years alone, military support and/or protection for certain humanitarian operations has been provided in various complex emergencies, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Liberia, Northern Uganda, and Sierra Leone.

² For an explanation on 'humanitarian space' or 'humanitarian operating environment', see paragraph 3 of the "Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies" of March 2003.

coordination and understanding between humanitarian agencies and military actors, and require knowledge of each other's mandates, capacities and limitations.

3. The humanitarian community therefore felt it necessary to examine the broad spectrum of issues arising from civil-military relations, and to come up with a reference paper that extends beyond the individual guidelines already developed, which cover either particular aspects of civil-military relations³ or civil-military relationship in a specific complex emergency⁴.

B. The Goal and Purpose of this Paper

4. This paper has thus been prepared, following the request of the Working Group of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)⁵, with the overall goal of enhancing the understanding of civil-military relations, including the difficulties

³ Existing guidelines on particular aspects of civil-military relations include: "Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies" of March 2003 and "Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys – Discussion paper and Non-Binding Guidelines" of September 2001.

⁴ Existing guidelines on civil-military relations in a specific complex emergency include: "General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq" of 8 May 2003 and "Relationships with Military Forces in Afghanistan – Guidelines for UNAMA Area Coordinators and other UN Personnel" of 2002. "General Guidance for Interaction Between United Nations Personnel and the UN-Mandated Multinational Force in Liberia" and "Relations avec les Forces Armees en Haiti: Ligne de Conduite pour le Personnel des Nations Unies" exist in draft form as of 1 April 2004.

⁵ The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG), at its 52nd Meeting in March 2003, requested OCHA to prepare "...a concept paper on the issue of military and humanitarian interface upon analysing thoroughly the current state of interface."

and limitations of such relations. While numerous complicated questions arise out of this relationship, what remains vital for the humanitarian community is to develop a clear awareness of the nature of this relation, as well as a common understanding on **when and how** as well as **how not to coordinate with the military** in fulfilling humanitarian objectives.

5. The **purpose** of this paper is three-fold. First, it attempts to highlight, in a generic manner, the **nature and character** of civil-military relations in complex emergencies. Secondly, it reviews some fundamental **humanitarian principles and concepts** that must be upheld when coordinating with the military. Thirdly, attention is given to practical **key considerations** for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.


6. The paper will serve as a **general reference** for humanitarian practitioners: a tool to which they can refer when formulating **operational guidelines** that are tailored specifically for civil-military relations in a particular complex emergency, such as the ones developed for Iraq and Liberia during 2003⁶. Any **situation-specific set of guidelines** requires sensitivity to the special circumstances of the particular operation and hence has to be developed on a case-by-case basis.

7. The **focus** of this paper is the relationship between **humanitarian organizations** and **official military forces** (i.e., military forces of a state or regional-/inter-governmental organisation that are subject to a hierarchical chain of command), be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental. Such military presence may include a wide spectrum of actors such as the local or national military, multi-national forces, UN peacekeeping troops, international military observers, foreign occupying forces, regional troops or other officially organized troops.

8. The different mandates, characteristics and nature of these diverse military actors may necessitate that the humanitarian community relate to different groups with **varying degrees of sensitivity** or even with **fundamentally different**

approaches at times. For example, interaction with an occupying force⁷ would have to entail different considerations from that required vis-à-vis national forces, unarmed military observers, or UN commanded peacekeeping operations. The most important distinction to be drawn is whether the military group with which humanitarians are interacting is, has become, or is perceived to be a **party to the conflict or not**. Separate specific papers will be required to address and advise on the particular circumstances and requirements of the relationships between humanitarians and any of these individual categories of military actors. Such policies may be formulated through various mechanisms. The present paper, however, is an attempt to address the subject of **civil-military relations at a generic level**. Therefore, it will not distinguish between the various military actors.

9. The relationship between humanitarian organizations and non-state armed groups⁸, private military, security companies and mercenaries, as well as any national or international police presence, although highly relevant in today's conflict situations, are excluded from the analysis of this paper to avoid dilution of focus. Issues of general security, including operational challenges faced under increasing threats of global terrorism, are also excluded for the same reason.



⁷ For example, such as the Coalition Forces of the Occupying Powers currently deployed in Iraq.

⁸ Field practices on engagements with non-state actors were collected in “*Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners*” and “*Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups*”- published in 2006 and available on-line at <http://www.reliefweb.int>. Relevant conclusions and principles from the Manual may be used to update this paper as appropriate. [Editor's Note (2008): footnote 8 has been updated to reflect the 2006 publication of the Manual and Guidelines, subsequent to the IASC endorsement of the IASC Reference Paper in 2004.]

⁶ For details, see footnote 4 above.

C. Definition of Key Terms

10. In order to facilitate the understanding of the concepts elaborated herein and to avoid confusion arising out of a variety of possible definitions entailed in terminology, some key terms used in this paper are defined as follows:

Civil-Military Coordination:⁹ The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

Complex Emergency: A complex emergency, as defined by the IASC, is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme.”

Humanitarian Actor: Humanitarian actors are civilians, whether national or international, UN or non-UN, governmental or non-governmental, which have a commitment to humanitarian principles and are engaged in humanitarian activities.

Military Actor: Military actors refer to official military forces, i.e., military forces of a state or regional-/inter-governmental organisation that are subject to a hierarchical chain of command, be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental. This may include a wide spectrum of actors such as the local or national military, multi-national forces, UN peacekeeping troops, international military observers, foreign occupying forces, regional troops or other officially organized troops.

⁹ The definition of ‘Civil-Military Coordination’ is identical to that used in the “*Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*” of March 2003. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) uses a different definition of Civil-Military Coordination; see DPKO’s paper on ‘*Civil-Military Coordination Policy*’ dated 9 September 2002.

D. Background

11. The humanitarian and military actors have fundamentally different institutional thinking and cultures, characterised by the distinct chain-of-command and clear organisational structures of the military vis-à-vis the diversity of the humanitarian community. The two groups have different mandates, objectives, working methods, and even vocabularies. It is important for military actors to understand the complex network of humanitarian assistance, which includes international organizations and local, national and international NGOs that work with national staff and local partners. Humanitarian action is also largely dependent on acceptance by the parties to the conflict. Most of the local actors engaged in humanitarian work are present on the ground long before the arrival of international personnel and will continue their functions after their departure. Susceptibility towards local sensitivities and adherence to the actuality and perception of impartiality and independence are therefore pivotal assets of any humanitarian operation, and this should be made known to the military. For humanitarian actors, on the other hand, it is important to be aware of the varied reasons and motivations why the military may undertake actions that can encroach on humanitarian space.

12. Within the context of civil-military relations, there are a number of situations where some level of coordination between the humanitarian and military actors may become necessary. As defined in paragraph 10, **civil-military coordination** is a **shared responsibility** of the humanitarian and military actors, and it may take place in various levels of intensity and form. Where cooperation between the humanitarian and military actors is not appropriate, opportune or possible, or if there are no common goals to pursue, then these actors merely operate side-by-side. Such a relationship may be best described as one of **co-existence**, in which case civil-military coordination should focus on minimizing competition and conflict in order to enable the different actors to work in the same geographical area with minimum disruption to each other’s activities. When there is a


common goal and agreed strategy, and all parties accept to work together, **cooperation** may become possible, and coordination should focus on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts to serve humanitarian objectives.

13. In any circumstances, however, it is important to maintain a **clear separation** between the roles of the military and humanitarian actors, by **distinguishing their respective spheres of competence and responsibility**. This approach is implicit in and builds on the principles of international humanitarian law, and is crucial to maintaining the **independence** of humanitarian action. The need for the humanitarians to maintain an actual and perceived distance from the military is especially important with regard to belligerent forces or representatives of an occupying power¹⁰. Any coordination with a party to an armed conflict must proceed with extreme caution, care and sensitivity, given that the actual or perceived affiliation with a belligerent might lead to the loss of neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian organization, which might in turn affect the security of beneficiaries as well as humanitarian staff, and jeopardize the whole humanitarian operation in a conflict zone. **Thus, cooperation – the closer form of coordination - with belligerent forces should in principle not take place, unless in extreme and exceptional circumstances and as a last resort.**

14. However, the emphasis on **distinction** should not be interpreted as a suggestion of *non-coordination* between humanitarian and military actors. The particular situation on the ground and the nature of the military operation in a given situation will play a determining factor on the type of coordination that may take place. Possible features of civil-military coordination include the sharing of certain information, a careful division of tasks, and when feasible and appropriate, collaborative planning.

¹⁰ As an example of principles and practical considerations including specifics on permissible and impermissible action when interacting with an Occupying Power, see the “*General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq*” of 8 May 2003.

FIGURE 1-1: The Range of Civil-Military Relationship and UN CMCoord Strategy



15. The military often have the capability to help secure an enabling environment on the ground in which humanitarian activities can take place in relative safety. The military may also have practical means to offer in the delivery of assistance, such as rapid deployment of large numbers of personnel, equipment, logistics and supplies. However, humanitarian expertise – including beneficiary identification, needs and vulnerability assessment, impartial and neutral distribution of relief aid, and monitoring and evaluation - will remain essential to an effective and successful humanitarian operation.

16. The nature of the relation between one or a group of humanitarian organization(s) and the military as well as the conduct of these actors in this relationship may also have an **effect on other humanitarian agencies** working in the same area and even beyond, possibly affecting the perception of humanitarian action in general. For example, the use of armed escorts by one humanitarian organisation may negatively influence the perception of neutrality and impartiality of other humanitarian organisations in the same area. Coordination amongst humanitarian actors, preferably leading to a common approach to civil-military relations in a given complex emergency, is therefore desirable.

PART 2: PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS

17. All humanitarian action, including civil-military coordination for humanitarian purposes in complex emergencies, must be in accordance with the overriding core principles of *humanity*, *neutrality* and *impartiality*. This section outlines these cardinal humanitarian principles as well as other important principles and concepts that must be respected when planning or undertaking civil-military coordination.

A. Humanity, Neutrality and Impartiality¹¹

18. Any civil-military coordination must serve the prime humanitarian principle of *humanity* – i.e. human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. In determining whether and to what extent humanitarian agencies should coordinate with military forces, one must be mindful of the potential consequences of too close an affiliation with the military or even the perception of such affiliation, especially as these could jeopardize the humanitarian principles of *neutrality* and *impartiality*. The concept of non-allegiance is central to the principle of neutrality in humanitarian action; likewise, the idea of non-discrimination is crucial to the principle of impartiality. However, the key humanitarian objective of providing protection and assistance to populations in need may at times necessitate a pragmatic approach, which might include civil-military coordination. Even so, **ample consideration must be given to finding the right balance between a pragmatic and a principled response, so that coordination with the military would not compromise humanitarian imperatives.**

¹¹ For example, the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality are stipulated as guiding principles for humanitarian assistance in *UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182* of 19 December 1991.

B. Humanitarian Access to Vulnerable Populations

19. Humanitarian agencies must maintain their ability to obtain *access* to all vulnerable populations in all areas of the complex emergency in question and to negotiate such access with all parties to the conflict. Particular care must also be taken to ensure the sustainability of access. **Coordination with the military should be considered to the extent that it facilitates, secures and sustains, not hinders, humanitarian access.**



C. Perception of Humanitarian Action

20. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to all populations in need must be *neutral* and *impartial* – it must come without political or military conditions and humanitarian staff must not take sides in disputes or political positions. This will have a bearing on the *credibility* and *independence* of humanitarian efforts in general. Any civil-military coordination must also be mindful not to jeopardize the longstanding local network and trust that humanitarian agencies have created and maintained.

D. Needs-Based Assistance Free of Discrimination¹²

21. Humanitarian assistance must be provided on the *basis of needs* of those affected by the particular complex emergency, taking into account the local capacity already in place to meet those needs. The assessment of such needs must be independent and **humanitarian assistance must be given without adverse discrimination of any kind**, regardless of race, ethnicity, sex/gender, religion, social status, nationality or political affiliation of the recipients. It must be provided in an equitable manner to all populations in need.

E. Civilian-Military Distinction in Humanitarian Action



22. At all times, a clear *distinction* must be maintained between combatants and non-combatants – i.e., between those actively

engaged in hostilities, and civilians and others who do not or no longer directly participate in the armed conflict (including the sick, wounded, prisoners of war and ex-combatants who are demobilised). International humanitarian law protects non-combatants by providing immunity from attack. Thus, **humanitarian workers must never present themselves or their work as part of a military operation, and military personnel must refrain from presenting themselves as civilian humanitarian workers.**

¹² A similar provision on needs-based assistance is articulated as Principle 2 in “*The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief*”. The principle of non-discrimination is expressed in a multitude of human rights instruments, including the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* of 1948; *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* of 1966; *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* of 1966, etc.

F. Operational Independence of Humanitarian Action

23. In any civil-military coordination **humanitarian actors must retain the lead role in undertaking and directing humanitarian activities.** The *independence* of humanitarian action and decision-making must be preserved both at the operational and policy levels at all times. **Humanitarian organisations must not implement tasks on behalf of the military nor represent or implement their policies.** Basic requisites such as freedom of movement for humanitarian staff, freedom to conduct independent assessments, freedom of selection of staff, freedom to identify beneficiaries of assistance based on their needs, or free flow of communications between humanitarian agencies as well as with the media, must not be impeded.



G. Security of Humanitarian Personnel

24. Any perception that humanitarian actors may have become affiliated with the military forces within a specific situation could impact negatively on the security of humanitarian staff and their ability to access vulnerable populations. However, humanitarian actors operating within an emergency situation must identify the most expeditious, effective and secure approach to ensure the delivery of vital assistance to vulnerable target populations. This approach must be balanced against the primary concern for ensuring staff safety, and therein a consideration of any real or perceived affiliation with the military. The decision to seek military-based security for humanitarian workers should be viewed as a *last resort* option when other staff security mechanisms are unavailable, inadequate or inappropriate.

H. Do No Harm

25. Considerations on civil-military coordination must be guided by a commitment to **‘do no harm’**. Humanitarian agencies must ensure at the policy and operational levels that any potential civil-military coordination will not contribute to further the conflict, nor harm or endanger the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.

I. Respect for International Legal Instruments

26. Both humanitarian and military actors must respect international humanitarian law as well as other international norms and regulations, including human rights instruments.



J. Respect for Culture and Custom¹³

27. Respect and sensitivities must be maintained for the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries where humanitarian activities are carried out. Where possible and to the extent feasible, ways shall be found to involve the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and/or local personnel in the design, management and implementation of assistance, including in civil-military coordination.



¹³ For example, see Principles 5 and 7 of “*The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief*”.



K. Consent of Parties to the Conflict¹⁴

28. The risk of compromising humanitarian operations by cooperating with the military might be reduced if all parties to the conflict recognize, agree or acknowledge in advance that humanitarian activities might necessitate civil-military coordination in certain exceptional circumstances. Negotiating such acceptance entails contacts with all levels in the chain of command.

L. Option of Last Resort¹⁵

29. Use of military assets, armed escorts, joint humanitarian-military operations and any other actions involving visible interaction with the military must be the option of **last resort**. Such actions may take place only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military support can meet a critical humanitarian need.

M. Avoid Reliance on the Military¹⁶

30. **Humanitarian agencies must avoid becoming dependent on resources or support provided by the military.** Any resources or support provided by the military should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel/means. Resources provided by the military are often only temporarily available and when higher priority military missions emerge, such support may be recalled at short notice and without any substitute support.

¹⁴ For example, see *UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182* of 19 December 1991.

¹⁵ For example, see Paragraphs 7, 26, 30, 33 and 38 of “*Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*” of March 2003.

¹⁶ For example, see Paragraph 29 of “*Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*” of March 2003.

PART 3:

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

31. This section outlines the main practical considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.

A. Establishment of Liaison Arrangements

32. Liaison arrangements and clear lines of communication should be established at the **earliest** possible stage and at **all relevant levels**, between the military forces and the humanitarian community, to guarantee the timely and regular exchange of certain information, before and during military operations. However, these activities should be conducted with caution. Either mentioning or concealing to the public the existence of direct communication between the humanitarian and military actors could result in suspicion and/or incorrect conclusions regarding the nature of the communication. Due to its possible impact on the perception of humanitarian operations, at times, it may be reasonable not to disseminate or publicize the liaison arrangements between the humanitarian community and the military. Obviously, such a decision has to be balanced with the need to ensure accountability, transparency and openness towards the local population and beneficiaries.

33. There are a number of initiatives within the UN system that focus on preparing humanitarian personnel on civil-military issues and practical liaison arrangements in complex emergencies. This includes the **UN CMCoord induction courses**, organised by OCHA's Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU)*. This unit also conducts pre-deployment training and workshops tailored to a particular content and mission.

[* Editor's Note (2008): The Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) was renamed as the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) on 3 October 2005.]



34. In addition to **UN CMCoord Officers** deployed by OCHA, UN agencies may deploy **Military Liaison Officers (MLOs)** to focus on specific sectoral and operational civil-military issues and DPKO may deploy **Civil-Military Liaison Officers (CMLOs)**. Where established, the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), an inter-agency facility, also provides a civil-military coordination function on an operational logistics level.

Issues arising¹⁷:

- How should the liaison arrangements between the humanitarian community and the military be conducted: in confidence or in transparency?
- What would the implications be of public knowledge of such liaison arrangements on the perception of the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian activities?
- How can transparency of the civil-military liaison arrangements be ensured while maintaining the understanding of a clear distinction between the military and humanitarian actors?
- How can incorrect perceptions and conclusions be prevented regarding the nature and purpose of civil-military liaison arrangements?
- Which circumstances call for formal liaison arrangements? When is it better to maintain liaison on an *ad-hoc* basis?
- What is the appropriate size and structure of the civil-military liaison component?
- When, if ever, should the liaison officers of the humanitarian and military communities be co-located in the same facility?

¹⁷ These are questions to be addressed when drafting guidelines for civil-military relations in particular complex emergencies.

B. Information Sharing


35. As a matter of principle, any information gathered by humanitarian organisations in fulfilment of their mandate that might endanger human lives or compromise the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian organizations should not be shared.

36. However, to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to populations in need, information sharing with the military forces may at times become necessary. In particular, information that might affect the security of civilians and/or humanitarian workers should be shared with appropriate entities. Information sharing between humanitarian and appropriate military actors may include:

- **Security information:** information relevant to the security of civilians and to the security situation in the area of operation;
- **Humanitarian locations:** the coordinates of humanitarian staff and facilities inside military operating theatre;
- **Humanitarian activities:** the humanitarian plans and intentions, including routes and timing of humanitarian convoys and airlifts in order to coordinate planned operations, to avoid accidental strikes on humanitarian operations or to warn of any conflicting activities;
- **Mine-action activities:** information relevant to mine-action activities;
- **Population movements:** information on major movements of civilians;
- **Relief activities of the military:** information on relief efforts undertaken by the military;
- **Post-strike information:** information on strike locations and explosive munitions used during military campaigns to assist the prioritisation and planning of humanitarian relief and mine-action/UXO activities.

FIGURE 1-2:

CMCoord Strategy, Methods, and Structures



(Source: UN-CMCoord Concept, Annex C)

Issues arising:

- What kind of information should/could be shared, with whom and when?
- How can information that may be important for humanitarian purposes be differentiated from information that is politically, militarily or economically sensitive?
- How do we determine which information might serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian? For example, how do we ensure that information on population movements or aid beneficiaries will not be misused for military purposes?
- Should information that is shared with one military group be shared with all other military and/or political groups as well? How should we ensure that no side is favoured over another while being mindful of sensitivities involved in information?
- When and how should we verify information provided by the military?



C. Use of Military Assets for Humanitarian Operations

37. The use of military assets in support of humanitarian operations should be **exceptional** and only on a **last resort**. It is recognized, however, that where civilian/humanitarian capacities are not adequate or cannot be obtained in a timely manner to meet urgent humanitarian needs, military and civil defence assets, including military aircraft, may be deployed in accordance with the **“Guidelines on the Use Of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” (“MCDA Guidelines”)** of March 2003.¹⁸ In addition to the principle of ‘last resort’¹⁹, key criteria in the MCDA Guidelines include: (1) **unique capability** – no appropriate alternative civilian resources exist; (2) **timeliness** – the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action; (3) **clear humanitarian direction** – civilian control over the use of military assets; (4) **time-limited** – the use of military assets to support humanitarian activities is clearly limited in time and scale.

38. **As a matter of principle, the military and civil defence assets of belligerent forces or of units that find themselves actively engaged in combat shall not be used to support humanitarian activities**²⁰. While there are ongoing hostilities, it will be necessary to distinguish between operations in theatre and those outside. In theatre, the use of military assets for humanitarian purposes should generally not be undertaken. Only under extreme and exceptional circumstances would it be appropriate to consider the use, in theatre, of military assets of the parties engaged in combat operations. Specifically, this situation may occur

¹⁸ For the full text of the MCDA Guidelines, see internet address in the Annex at the end of this paper. [Editor’s note (2008): MCDA Guidelines are also included in Section 2 of this booklet.]

¹⁹ Last resort is defined as follows: ‘Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability.’ (See paragraph 7 of the MCDA Guidelines.)

²⁰ See Paragraph 25 of the MCDA Guidelines.

when a highly vulnerable population cannot be assisted or accessed by any other means. Outside the theatre of operations, military assets of the parties engaged in combat operations may be used in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and guidelines. However, preference should first be given to military assets of parties not engaged in combat operations.



39. Any humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its **civilian nature and character**. **While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organisation**. Military and civil defence assets that have been placed under the control of the humanitarian agencies and deployed on a full-time basis purely for humanitarian purposes must be visibly identified in a manner that clearly differentiates them from military assets being used for military purposes.

Issues arising:

- Who defines last resort and what are the exact criteria for last resort?
- How can we ensure the credibility and security for a humanitarian operation that uses military assets and how can we maintain the confidence of the local population for such operations?
- How can we make sure that humanitarian actors retain the lead role and direction of humanitarian efforts even when military assets are used as the only means available?



D. Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys



40. The use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys or operations is an **extreme precautionary measure that should be taken only in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis**. The decision to request or accept the use of military or armed escorts must be made by **humanitarian organizations**, not political or military authorities, based solely on humanitarian criteria. In case the situation on the ground calls for the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, any such action should be guided by the principles endorsed by the IASC in September 2001.²¹

Issues arising:

- Who should provide the escort (UN forces, other international forces, government forces, forces of non-state actors, armed guards provided by security services companies)?
- How can we ensure that humanitarian operations will not become dependent on military escort - to the extent that it becomes impossible to operate without them?
- How can the capability, credibility and deterrence of an escort be determined?
- How do we determine if the escorts themselves are a potential source of insecurity? How do we ensure that short-term gain in access by using armed escorts would not result in long-term loss of losing actual or perceived neutrality, impartiality, independence and even credibility of the humanitarian operation?

²¹ See IASC Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines on the “Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys” of September 2001. This paper was approved by the IASC and reviewed by the UN Office of Legal Affairs.

E. Joint Civil-Military Relief Operations

41. Any operations undertaken jointly by humanitarian agencies and military forces may have a negative impact on the perception of the humanitarian agencies’ impartiality and neutrality and hence affect their ability to operate effectively throughout a complex emergency. Therefore, any joint civil-military cooperation should be determined by a **thorough assessment** of the actual needs on the ground and a review of civilian humanitarian capacities to respond to them in a timely manner. To the extent that joint operations with the military cannot be avoided, they may be employed only as a means of **last resort**, and must adhere to the principles provided in the above-mentioned **“MCDA Guidelines”**.



42. One must be aware that the military have different objectives, interests, schedules and priorities from the humanitarian community. Relief operations rendered by military forces

could be conditional and could cease when the mission of the military forces changes, the unit moves or if the assisted population becomes uncooperative. Such action by the military can also be conducted primarily based on the needs and goals of the force and its mission, rather than the needs of the local population.

Issues arising:

- How can the impartiality and neutrality of a humanitarian action be preserved when it is carried out as a joint civil-military operation?
- What are the implications of a joint civil-military operation regarding access to all civilians in need and the safety of humanitarian staff?
- What happens if the military is suddenly redeployed to another mission or location, after the start of the joint operation?

F. Separate Military Operations for Relief Purposes

43. Relief operations carried out by military forces, even when the intention is purely ‘humanitarian,’ may jeopardize or seriously undermine the overall humanitarian efforts by non-military actors. The other parties to the conflict and the beneficiaries may neither be willing nor able to differentiate between assistance provided by the military and assistance provided by humanitarian agencies. This could have serious consequences for the ability to access certain areas and the safety of humanitarian staff, not to mention the long-term damage to the standing of humanitarian agencies in the region and in other crisis areas if humanitarian assistance is perceived as being selective and/or partial. Assistance provided by the military is susceptible to political influence and/or objectives and the criteria used in selecting the beneficiaries and determining their needs may differ from those held by humanitarian organizations.

44. For these reasons, military forces should be **strongly discouraged** from playing the role of the humanitarian aid providers. Their role in relation to humanitarian actors should be limited to **help create a secure operating environment that enables humanitarian action**. If need be, diplomatic efforts should be used to explain and reiterate to political and military authorities the concern of the humanitarian community in this regard.

45. However, there may be extreme and exceptional circumstances that require relief operations to be undertaken by the military as a



last resort.

This might be the case when the military are the only actors on the ground or the humanitarians lack the capacity and/or resources to respond to critical needs of civilians.

Issues arising:

- What are the means and possibilities of humanitarian agencies to discourage separate military operations for relief purposes?
- In what circumstances should exceptions be recognized? For example, if belligerent forces were the only ones who could reach vulnerable populations and therefore alleviate extreme human suffering? Should the humanitarian community advocate for the involvement of military forces in such cases?
- If the military engages in relief activities, what kind of coordination arrangement should be established with the humanitarian community?

G. General Conduct of Humanitarian Staff

46. The *independence* and *civilian nature* of humanitarian assistance should be emphasized at all times. A clear *distinction* must be retained between the identities, functions and roles of humanitarian personnel and those of military forces – i.e., travel in clearly marked vehicles, clearly mark offices and relief supplies, etc. Weapons should not be allowed on the premises or transportation facilities of humanitarian organizations. Humanitarian personnel should not travel in military vehicles, aircraft, etc., except as a last resort or for security reasons. Humanitarian workers should not wear any military-uniform-like clothing. Failure to observe this distinction could compromise the perception of neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian activities and thereby negatively affect the safety and security of humanitarian staff.

Issues arising:

- How should differences of opinion regarding civil-military coordination be settled between humanitarian and military actors? Who decides?
- How should public appearances (TV, radio, ceremonies, events, social functions, events sponsored by the military, etc.) be handled, in view of the sensitivity required in fostering the appropriate public images and perceptions?


ANNEX: RELATED DOCUMENTS AND WEB-PAGE ADDRESS

Related Documents

- Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (March 2003)
- Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys - Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines (14 September 2001)
- General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq (8 May 2003)
- Relationships with Military Forces in Afghanistan – Guidelines for UNAMA Area Coordinators and other UN Personnel (2002)
- Guidance On Use of Military Aircraft for UN Humanitarian Operations During the Current Conflict in Afghanistan IMTF (7 November 2001)
- Civil-Military Coordination Policy by Department of Peacekeeping Operation (9 September 2002)

All the above documents as well as this reference paper, *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*, can be found at the following website address: <http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines>

Figure 1-3: Applicable Civil-Military Guidelines, Concepts, Standards and Law



Based on: UN CMCoord Course Module

2

Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies

March 2003
(Revision 1 - January 2006)



Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA GUIDELINES) was endorsed by the members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in March 2003.

International Process and Development of the Document (2000-2003)

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UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Figures inserted in the text of this Booklet are not an official part of the original IASC-endorsed Guidelines.

PREFACE

When and how should one decide to request the use of military and/or civil defence assets in support of United Nations humanitarian activities in complex emergencies? Why are military assets considered a *last resort* in these circumstances? What are the existing mechanisms to enable swift mobilisation of these assets when necessary? What is exactly meant by direct assistance, indirect assistance and infrastructure support by the military? Why is direct assistance by the military mostly discouraged? If military and civil defence assets are to be requested, on which criteria should such decisions be made?

All of these are valid questions faced in the field of humanitarian operations in complex emergency situations. A simple mistake could lead to unintended consequences that might harm the operations of not only the humanitarian agency concerned, but the wider humanitarian and local community as well. It is therefore vital that a shared knowledge and understanding is developed amongst a wide range of relevant professionals who may have a role in facilitating the decision-making and its execution.

It is in this spirit that this booklet has been produced – to provide a user-friendly tool to contribute to increased understanding of the humanitarian approaches to the use of military and/or civil defence assets in support of United Nations humanitarian activities. I highly recommend it to all professionals who may become involved in this subject.

'The Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies' is one of several guidelines and references endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. I encourage the readers to also take a look at the other sections in this booklet as well as the additional civil-military material available through:

<http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines>.

This booklet is available in all official languages of the United Nations.



John Holmes
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and
Emergency Relief Coordinator

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This document has been developed with the collaboration of a broad representation of the international humanitarian community, through a *Drafting Committee* consisting of representatives of Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Sudan, Switzerland, UK, USA, DPKO, SCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, as well as a *Review Committee* consisting of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, India, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey, Yugoslavia, COE, ECHO, EC, EUMS, ICDO, ICRC, ICVA, INTERACTION, IOM, NATO, OCHA, THW and WHO.



Changes in this Revision I concern the renaming of the Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) of OCHA, to the *Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS)*, on 3 October 2005. It also corrects the official IASC definition of a complex emergency (para 1), to read: “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme.”



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INTRODUCTION

Key Terms and Definitions:

The following terms are essential for establishing a common understanding of the terminology used by the guidelines as set out in this document.

1. **Complex Emergency:**

A complex emergency, as defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme.”

2. **Humanitarian Assistance:**

Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to **save lives** and **alleviate suffering** of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of *humanity, impartiality* and *neutrality*.

For the purposes of these guidelines, assistance can be divided into three categories based on the **degree of contact** with the affected population. These categories are important because they help define which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with international military resources under different conditions, given that ample consultation has been conducted with all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the assistance.

Direct Assistance is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services.

Indirect Assistance is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel.

Infrastructure Support involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

Figure 2-1: Military Missions, Political Situations and Advisability of Military Support

Impartiality of Forces & their Availability to Support Humanitarian Operations Decrease

Visibility of Tasks Decreases

Assistance Tasks	Military Mission	Peace time	Peace-keeping	Peace-enforcement	Combat
Direct		Maybe	Maybe	NO	NO
Indirect		YES	Maybe	Maybe	NO
Infrastructure		YES	YES	Maybe	Maybe

Based on: UN CMCoord Course Module and UN CMCoord Officer Field Handbook



3. The Humanitarian Operating Environment:

A key element for humanitarian agencies and organizations when they deploy, consists of establishing and maintaining a conducive humanitarian operating environment (this is sometimes referred to as "*humanitarian space*"). The perception of adherence to the key operating principles of neutrality and impartiality in humanitarian operations represents the critical means by which the prime objective of ensuring that suffering must be met wherever it is found, can be achieved. Consequently, maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of the military is the determining factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely. Sustained humanitarian access to the affected population is ensured when the receipt of humanitarian assistance is **not conditional** upon the allegiance to or support to parties involved in a conflict but is a right independent of military and political action.

4. Military and Civil Defence Assets:

MCDA, as defined in the 1994 "Oslo Guidelines", "comprises relief personnel, equipment, supplies and services provided by foreign military and civil defence organizations for international humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, civil defence* organization means any organization that, under the control of a Government, performs the functions enumerated in Article 61, paragraph (1), of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949". When these assets are under UN control they are referred to as UN MCDA.

[* Editor's Note (2008): For a more recent discussion on civil defence and civil protection, see proceedings of the "Extraordinary Session of the Consultative Group on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets" held on 28 November 2007.]

5. Other Deployed Forces:

These are all military and civil defence forces deployed in the region other than UN MCDA. For the purposes of these guidelines these forces are divided into four categories based on their missions. These missions are peacetime, UN commanded peacekeeping operations, other peace operation/peace support, and combat. The **mission of a force** is the primary factor that determines a military unit's availability and appropriateness to humanitarian tasks, as it impacts on whether or not it will be perceived by others as neutral and impartial.

Peacetime missions include training and exercises in the region with no hostile intent.


UN commanded peacekeeping operations include missions under the auspices of Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter.

Other peace operation / peace support missions include a range of tasks undertaken by military forces that are not under UN command, including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building and other so-called peace support operations where forces are deployed under operational parameters that dictate a minimum necessary use of force.

Combat missions are those where the primary purpose of the operation is the defeat of a designated enemy.

Figure 2-2:

Military Missions, Political Situations, Force Impartiality, and Need for Assistance and Security




6. Civilian Control:

A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization. This does not infer any civilian command and control status over military assets.

7. Last Resort:

Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability.

Figure 2-3: Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets as a Last Resort



Based on: UN CMCoord Course Module.

8. Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator:

The Resident Coordinator (RC) is the head of the UN Country Team. In a complex emergency, the Resident Coordinator or another competent UN official may be designated as the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). In large-scale complex emergencies, a separate Humanitarian Coordinator is often appointed. If the emergency affects more than one country, a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator may be appointed. In countries where large multi-disciplinary UN field operations are in place the Secretary-General might appoint a Special Representative (SRSG). The relationship between the SRSG and the

RC/HC is defined in a note issued by the Secretary-General on 11 December 2000 (Note of Guidance on Relations Between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, dated 30 October 2000).

9. Emergency Relief Coordinator and Inter-Agency Standing Committee:

The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and coordinates the international response to humanitarian emergencies and disasters. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is chaired by the ERC and has the membership of all UN operational humanitarian agencies, with standing invitation to ICRC, IFRC, IOM, UNHCHR, the Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs, the World Bank and the three NGO consortia (ICVA, InterAction and SCHR). It is important to note that the decision whether to and who to appoint as Humanitarian Coordinator is made by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

10. UN Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination (CMCoord):

The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.



Aim:

11. This document provides guidelines for the use of international military and civil defence personnel, equipment, supplies and services in support of the United Nations (UN) in pursuit of humanitarian objectives in complex emergencies. **It provides guidance on when these resources can be used, how they should be employed, and how UN agencies should interface, organize, and coordinate with international military forces with regard to the use of military and civil defence assets.** The document may also be of value in other large-scale emergencies.



Scope:

12. These guidelines cover the use of United Nations Military and Civil Defence Assets (UN MCDA) – military and civil defence resources requested by the UN humanitarian agencies and deployed under UN control specifically to support humanitarian activities - and military and civil defence resources that might be available. These other forces on other missions are referred to as other deployed forces.

13. **Principles, concepts, and procedures** are provided for requesting and coordinating military and civil defence resources when these resources are deemed necessary and appropriate, and for interfacing with international military forces who are conducting activities which impact on UN humanitarian activities.

14. These guidelines are primarily intended for use by UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators, UN MCDA commanders and commanders of other deployed forces performing missions in support of the UN humanitarian agencies and liaison officers coordinating UN humanitarian activities with international military forces. All humanitarian actors should also be familiar with the principles, concepts and procedures set out herein and encouraged to adhere to them, as appropriate.

15. They could also be used by decision-makers in Member States and regional organizations when considering the use of military and civil defence resources to provide assistance to civilian populations. They may also be of value to international military or civil defence commanders, including peacekeeping forces, in the pursuit of their missions.

16. This document focuses on the use of military and civil defence assets in **complex emergencies**. The foundation for effective coordination of military and civilian assistance during reconstruction and rehabilitation of a disaster or post-conflict society is often established during relief operations, however reconstruction and rehabilitation activities are beyond the scope of this document.

17. Guidelines for the use of international military resources in **natural disasters and peacetime technological or environmental emergencies** are provided in a separate document entitled: ***“Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief” (May 1994), also known as the “Oslo Guidelines”.***



Status:

18. The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the UN humanitarian agencies have agreed to these guidelines. Implementing and operational partners are encouraged to follow this guidance. Member States and regional organizations engaged in relief or military operations in complex emergencies are also encouraged to use the principles and procedures provided herein. While a significant number of Member States have participated in the development of the guidelines and endorsed their use, they are not binding on Member States. The guidelines are considered a living document and may be reviewed as appropriate in the future.

19. These guidelines will not, in any way, affect the rights, obligations or responsibilities of States and individuals under international humanitarian law. This includes, but is not limited to, the obligation to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded delivery of relief consignments, equipment and personnel, protect such consignments, and facilitate their rapid distribution. Nor will these guidelines affect the obligations of States that are parties to the United Nations Conventions on the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, or the United Nations Charter.

**Organization:**

20. The remainder of the document is divided into **two parts**. The first contains **principles** that guide the use of international military and civil defence resources by UN humanitarian agencies in complex emergencies and their coordination with international military forces. The second section describes the **tasks and responsibilities** of key actors in situations where UN MCDA are used and in situations when other deployed forces are requested by the United Nations to support humanitarian activities.

**Comments, Recommendations and Future Changes:**

21. This document was prepared under the auspices of the UN MCDA Project. It complements the existing “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief” (May 1994) also known as the “Oslo Guidelines”. The Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) provides the Secretariat for the UN MCDA Project and is responsible for maintaining these guidelines. Comments should be directed to the **Chief, CMCS, Emergency Services Branch, OCHA (Geneva), Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland, or cmcs@un.org**. Proposed changes will be incorporated annually in the Consultative Group On The Use Of MCDA in consultation with the Advisory Panel to CMCS, and when necessary referred to the ERC and IASC.

PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS

Core Principles:

22. As per UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of *humanity*, *neutrality* and *impartiality*.

Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

Neutrality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.

Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

23. In addition to these three humanitarian principles, the United Nations seeks to provide humanitarian assistance with full respect for the *sovereignty* of States. As also stated in General Assembly Resolution 46/182:

“The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country.”

24. The United Nations humanitarian agencies involved in humanitarian activities subscribe to these principles and have incorporated these concepts in their respective mandates and operational guidelines.

25. As a matter of principle, **the military and civil defence assets of belligerent forces or of units that find themselves actively engaged in combat shall not be used to support humanitarian activities.**

Key Concepts for Use of Military/Civil Defence Resources:

26. In addition and in the framework of the above-mentioned principles, the use of MCDA shall be guided by the six following standards:

- Requests for military assets must be made by the **Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator** on the ground, not political authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria.
- MCDA should be employed by humanitarian agencies as a **last resort**, i.e. only in the absence of any other available civilian alternative to support urgent humanitarian needs in the time required.
- A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its **civilian nature** and **character**. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization. This does not infer any civilian command and control status over military assets.
- Humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organizations. Insofar as military organizations have a role to play in supporting humanitarian work, it should, to the extent possible, **not encompass direct assistance**, in order to retain a clear distinction between the normal functions and roles of humanitarian and military stakeholders.
- Any use of MCDA should be, at its onset, clearly **limited in time** and **scale** and present an exit strategy element that defines clearly

how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel.

- Countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the **UN Codes of Conduct** and the **humanitarian principles**.

27. Implementing and operational partners and members of international civil society, are expected to adhere to these core principles and have been encouraged to adopt the "Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief".

Avoiding Reliance on Military Resources:

28. The UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners rely upon States to guarantee their security and to respect the principle of full and unimpeded access to the affected population. When security cannot be assured by the host government (e.g. when areas are controlled by non state actors), and/or when there are difficulties accessing the affected people, the UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners must rely upon their neutrality for security and use negotiation as the primary means of gaining access to the affected population. Therefore, the use of military and civil defence resources should under no circumstances undermine the perceived neutrality or impartiality of the humanitarian actors, nor jeopardize current or future access to affected populations.

29. Furthermore, most military forces provided by Member States explicitly for UN MCDA or resources diverted from other missions by international military forces to support humanitarian assistance, are **only temporarily available**. When higher priority military missions emerge these forces are often recalled by the Member States or regional organizations. Therefore, as a general principle, **UN humanitarian agencies must avoid becoming dependent on military resources and Member States are encouraged to invest in increased**

civilian capacity instead of the *ad hoc* use of military forces to support humanitarian actors.

30. However, there are circumstances when most requirements or security conditions are such that military resources provide the means of last resort for addressing the needs in a timely, effective way. In such cases, military resources, when available, may be appropriate for use. In general these resources can be divided into **two categories**: United Nations Military and Civil Defence Assets (UN MCDA) and resources from other deployed forces.

31. The principal distinctions between these two types of resources are that UN MCDA have been placed under the control of the UN humanitarian agencies and deployed on a full-time basis specifically to support UN humanitarian activities. Only a limited number of these resources are normally available for most emergencies. Other deployed forces are under the direction, and/or support of other entities, normally have security related missions, and may or may not be readily available. However, there may be occasions when support to humanitarian activities forms a specific part of the mandate.

When to Use Military and Civil Defence Resources to Support Humanitarian Activities:

32. The decision of whether or not to use military and civil defence resources in a complex emergency is one that must be taken **with extreme care**. The expedient and inappropriate use of military and civil defence resources can compromise neutrality, impartiality and other humanitarian principles of all humanitarian actors responding to the emergency. This loss of neutrality can result in relief workers becoming direct targets of the belligerents and being denied access to the affected population, not only in the current emergency, but also in future humanitarian crises. In addition, the loss of neutrality can result in the affected population becoming direct targets of the belligerents. Ultimately, **decision-makers must weigh the risk to relief workers and their ability to operate**

effectively at the moment, and in the future, against the immediacy of the needs of the affected population and the need for the use of military and civil defence assets.

33. The **Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)**, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, provides the **overall guidance** for a particular complex emergency including parameters for the use of UN MCDA and other military and civil defence resources to support UN humanitarian activities. The UN Resident Coordinator or Humanitarian Coordinator or the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will initiate the request for the use of military and civil defence resources in the field, within these parameters. Within the framework of the key principles listed in Paragraph 25 above, the following questions are provided to help guide these decisions:

- Are they the option of last resort, indispensable and appropriate?
- Are the countries offering MCDA also parties to the conflict?
- Based on the need, is a military or civil defence unit capable of the task?
- How long will they be needed?
- Can they be deployed without weapons or additional security forces?
- How will this association impact the security of UN personnel and other humanitarian workers?
- How will this impact the perceptions of UN neutrality and/or impartiality?
- What control and coordination arrangements are necessary?
- How and when will transition back to civilian responsibility be achieved?
- What are the consequences for the beneficiaries, other humanitarian actors, and humanitarian operations in the mid to long term?

34. The **start** and **duration** of any support to UN humanitarian activities by UN MCDA should be determined by the **Humanitarian Coordinator** upon the request or consent by the affected sovereign State. Where such a request or consent can not be obtained, subject to the exceptional circumstances caused by the emergency situation, the decision to that effect must be taken

by the Humanitarian Coordinator in strict conformity with the UN Charter and corresponding decisions by the UN Security Council.



35. The use of other deployed forces to support UN humanitarian activities is more problematic. Many international military forces provide assistance to the civilian population in their areas of responsibility. While motivation for this can be purely humanitarian and needs based, assistance can also be motivated by a desire to legitimize missions, gain intelligence, and/or enhance protection of forces. Unilateral support of this nature can be inappropriate, lack longevity, and can disrupt assistance that forms part of a coherent immediate and long term programme. While there is a need for humanitarian activities to be divorced from political and military agendas, this must be balanced with a clear need for a level of consultation and coordination that ensures assistance provided by international military forces does not undermine the legitimacy and credibility of humanitarian efforts.

36. Nonetheless, other deployed forces often have resources that might be extremely useful in an emergency and, bearing in mind paragraph 24 above, should not be ignored. The primary considerations, which should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, will be the immediacy of the need, ability to fulfill needs with civilian assets, and the impact on the perceived neutrality and impartiality of the assistance effort. It must be also recognized that the availability of these resources is often depending on the mission, capability and discretion of the commander.

Operational Standards for the Use of UN MCDA:

37. The following operational standards, in addition to the Guidelines Key Principles, are provided to ensure that when UN MCDA are used they are in concert with the core humanitarian and UN principles as well as international humanitarian law.

Civilian Control: Safety of UN MCDA is the responsibility of the designated military or civil defence commander. However, to be effective, direction and coordination of an overall humanitarian effort is a function requiring professional humanitarian staff. As such, **UN MCDA should always remain under civilian control.** Nevertheless, the degree of UN control of UN MCDA will be different than the UN direction of other deployed forces performing *ad hoc* support tasks. In the case of UN MCDA they will normally be in “direct support” of a UN humanitarian agency. The missions within the agreed Terms of Reference will be assigned by the Humanitarian Coordinator in consultation with the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).

At No Cost: UN MCDA, like all UN humanitarian assistance, is to be provided at **no cost** to the affected State or receiving agency. This should not result in assisting States’ cutting or reducing other planned and programmed assistance, such as development aid resources, to recover the cost of UN MCDA or other relief support.

38. In principle, unarmed UN MCDA, accepted as neutral and impartial, and clearly distinguished from other military units, can be used to support the full range of humanitarian activities. However, their involvement in **direct assistance** should be weighed on a case-by-case basis and only if it satisfies the criteria of **last resort**. Their activities should focus on **indirect assistance** and **infrastructure support** missions.

39. Military and civil defence personnel employed exclusively in the support of UN humanitarian activities should be clearly

distinguished from those forces engaged in other military missions, including the military component of peacekeeping missions, peace operations and peace support, and accorded the appropriate protection by the affected State and any combatants.

40. Acceptable means for distinguishing UN MCDA from security and forces engaged in military operations are the markings of the supported UN humanitarian agency or the use of civil defence markings accorded protection under the Geneva Conventions. When UN MCDA are from military organizations the appropriate **white markings** and **UN symbols** may be used. When civil defence assets are employed they should be marked in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Military forces cannot be marked as civil defence forces. In all cases, movement of UN MCDA, including entry to the UN peacekeeping mission area, must be cleared by the UN peacekeeping mission headquarters.

41. Military personnel providing direct assistance should not be armed and should rely on the security measures of the supported humanitarian agency. Guidelines for the security of UN personnel are set by the UN Security Coordinator. However, if military forces providing indirect assistance or infrastructure support missions must be armed, for their security and/or the safeguarding of their equipment, they will operate under strict rules of engagement based on the Law of Armed Conflict and should take account of advice and guidance by the Humanitarian Coordinator, Special Representative, or other appropriate UN official, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

42. Under no circumstance will the request for UN MCDA be construed as an endorsement of any military operations or be used as a justification for undertaking combat operations, resorting to the use of force, or the violation of State sovereignty.

43. Under no circumstance will UN MCDA be used to provide security for UN humanitarian activities. A **separate security force** may, however, be used to ensure security in areas

where humanitarian personnel may be attacked while delivering humanitarian assistance. Such assistance, however, is not addressed in this document. Further reference can be found in the *Non-Binding Guidelines on The Use of Military and Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys* (text of 14 September 2001 approved by the IASC Working Group).

Operational Standards for the Use of Other Deployed Forces:

44. Bearing in mind paragraph 25, as well as paragraph 37 with regard to civilian control, in the case of other deployed forces, the *Humanitarian Coordinator* will determine what humanitarian tasks need to be done, what modalities must be respected, and request appropriate support. The supporting military or civil defence commander will determine whether he/she can complete the task within his/her means and capabilities given his/her primary mission requirements. Provided that the means indicated by the military or civil defence commander respect the principles of these guidelines, the Humanitarian Coordinator will then, or not, authorise the tasks to be undertaken by the designated unit.

45. Under the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, States have obligations under International Humanitarian Law. These include an obligation not to impede humanitarian activities as well as responsibilities to grant access to the affected populations and the safeguarding of relief personnel.

46. Military forces deployed by Member States or regional organizations whose primary missions are other than humanitarian support may also provide support to UN humanitarian agencies when requested by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator or other designated officials. When these forces undertake activities in support of UN humanitarian agencies or their implementing and operational partners, this support will be on a **case-by-case basis, subject to a request**. The military resources will remain

under the control of the military force commander.

47. Military or civil defence forces undertaking missions to support UN humanitarian activities should reconcile their *modus operandi* with the circumstances of the operating environment. Under these conditions only, and provided the *modus operandi* in question respects all appropriate humanitarian principles, should the Humanitarian Coordinator, or other responsible UN authority, authorise the mission.

48. Military forces, other than UN MCDA, performing assistance missions are in principle **not granted any special protection nor are they authorized to display the emblems of the supported UN humanitarian agencies**.



49. When other deployed forces are UN peacekeeping forces operating under the auspices of a UN Security Council mandate, the degree to which these forces can be used to support humanitarian activity will be determined by the **head of the UN mission**, based on the mandate and capabilities of the peacekeeping force. The mechanisms for coordination between the UN humanitarian agencies and the peacekeeping force will also be established by this authority, with careful attention to the coherence of the mission. In all cases, movement of military and civil defence resources supporting humanitarian activities, including entry to the UN peacekeeping mission area, must be cleared by the UN peacekeeping mission headquarters. Further details are to be found in the *DPKO Policy on Civil-Military Coordination of 9 September 2002*, as well as the *Note of Guidance on Relations Between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, issued by the Secretary-General on 11 December 2000*.

United Nations Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination (CMCoord) in Complex Emergencies:

50. International civilian organizations providing humanitarian assistance to the affected population and international military forces, regardless of their missions, should maintain some level of interface to ensure that the civilian population does not suffer unnecessarily, that those in need receive the necessary assistance, and that relief personnel are safeguarded to the maximum extent possible.

51. **Liaison** in the midst of perceived or actual offensive military activity should nonetheless take place even when a cooperative arrangement cannot be reached with military forces. Even in the worst of situations a **minimum amount of liaison is required** in order to protect personnel and assets from unintended harm, limit competition for resources and avoid conflict.

52. In all cases, regardless of the mission or status of the military force, there will be a requirement for the **sharing of information**. Considerable humanitarian information can be gleaned by military forces going about their military business (e.g. state of the affected population, availability of key services and critical infrastructure). Operational security notwithstanding, military forces should endeavour not to classify this type of information and should make it readily available to appropriate UN humanitarian agencies through the civil-military coordination structure. Conversely, UN humanitarian agencies should provide necessary information regarding their activities in order that any military operations can be reconciled with those of humanitarian actors. Even this basic level of information exchange will help to avoid inadvertent damage, disruption and destruction of relief assets and preclude unnecessary risks to humanitarian personnel and the civilian population.

53. Military forces providing assistance to the affected population, for whatever reason, should

in normal circumstances coordinate such action with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator. Military forces deployed as part of a UN commanded peace operation should coordinate all humanitarian assistance with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator through the missions' civil-military coordination structure. Timely coordination of such actions will avert inappropriate action, allow, where necessary, appropriate military-humanitarian delineation and promote an increased impact for the affected population.



54. Critical areas for coordination include **security, logistics, medical, transportation, and communications**. In these areas the steady flow of timely information is essential for the success of humanitarian missions. Within these areas there will often be opportunities for task division and planning at both senior levels of the UN and the military and at the field level.

55. One of the effective ways to share information, and when appropriate share tasks and participate in planning, is through the exchange of liaison personnel from the appropriate UN humanitarian agencies and the military at the necessary levels. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, **Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS)**, offers **training** to military and civilian actors in civil military coordination and liaison in a complex emergency. Several UN humanitarian agencies have built up cadres of personnel experienced in liaising with military personnel. Trained liaison personnel are also available through the CMCS to UN humanitarian agencies and other actors responding to complex emergencies.

TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Affected State and Transit States:

56. The *affected State* has **primary responsibility** for providing humanitarian assistance to persons within its borders. Even though UN humanitarian agencies have been requested by the affected State or the UN Secretary General to provide additional assistance, the affected State has the right to decline the use of UN MCDA or the use of other military and civil defence resources by UN humanitarian agencies on a case-by-case basis.

57. States adopting a specific policy on the use of foreign UN MCDA within its borders may consider making this position known to the UN Resident Coordinator and/or UN Humanitarian Coordinator (if present), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

58. States that permit UN humanitarian agencies to call on external forces or forces already deployed by other nations within their borders should make any restrictions on the use of these forces known to OCHA and should include these restrictions in the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) established between their governments and the governments or responsible alliance/coalition which have forces stationed in their country. This does not preclude States from imposing restrictions on the use of military forces deployed within its borders on a case-by-case basis.

59. Affected States should provide security for UN MCDA operating in support of UN humanitarian activities in the same manner that they would provide security for other UN humanitarian personnel and resources. UN MCDA shall have at least the same freedom of movement, immunities, privileges, and exemptions afforded the UN humanitarian agencies when working in support of these

activities, including when en route and returning to their units or stations.

60. *Transit States* are those States whose national borders, territorial waters, and airspace are crossed by UN MCDA moving to and from and conducting operations in the affected State. Transit States, especially those bordering the affected State, will facilitate the movement of requested UN MCDA in the same manner that they facilitate the movement of UN relief goods and personnel.

Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator:

61. When a *Humanitarian Coordinator* has been designated, he or she is responsible for initiating requests for UN MCDA or approving the use of other military and civil defence resources. If a Humanitarian Coordinator has not been appointed, the decision to request UN MCDA or use other military and civil defence resources rests with the *Resident Coordinator*, after consultation with the *UN Country Team*. The individual charged with coordinating the UN effort will ensure that affected State clearance is obtained prior to processing the request at the country level.

62. Before requesting these assets the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will consult with the appropriate authorities of the affected State, the ERC, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Resident Representative, as appropriate. If the affected State is capable of and willing to provide the coordination structure for a complex emergency, this arrangement should be used.

63. In the absence of a Humanitarian Coordinator, Resident Coordinator, or SRSG the decision on whether or not to use UN MCDA to support UN humanitarian activities, will be made

by the *Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)*, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

64. The HC, RC or SRSG will ensure that the coordination mechanisms and specific guidelines are in place to effectively employ these by the UN humanitarian agencies responding to the complex emergency, to include means for the sharing of information and, where appropriate, the exchange of liaison personnel.

65. The Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will plan for the earliest possible release of UN MCDA and ensure that UN humanitarian activities do not become dependent on these or any other military and civil defence resources, once the complex emergency has passed.

66. In circumstances where there is likely to be a protracted complex emergency, or complex emergency conditions are likely to re-emerge, the supported UN humanitarian agencies will make arrangements for these needs to be met with resources available from the affected State or other civilian sources.

67. When MCDA are made available to UN humanitarian agencies or their implementing and operational partners, following a request from the cognizant decision-making authority, the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will ensure that an appropriate system, consistent with these Guidelines and UN policies and regulations, is put in place to control the use of UN MCDA.

68. When other deployed forces are providing support on a case-by-case basis to UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners, the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will ensure that the provision of humanitarian assistance by military forces does not compromise the humanitarian actors and that the military forces performing these missions understand the importance and humanitarian purpose of such missions. The Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will also seek to ensure that assistance activities carried out by

other deployed forces on their own behalf do not compromise UN humanitarian efforts.

69. The Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator or the designated UN authority requesting the military and civil defence resources, should review regularly, with MCDA and military or civil defence commanders, the *modus operandi* of supporting forces and offer appropriate advice and guidance. This review should include such considerations as: the types of task that can be performed, how the unit is armed and its rules of engagement, types of uniforms and equipment, the chain of command, use of liaison officers, exit criteria for the mission or task, status of the forces to include privileges or immunities, claims and insurance matters such as damage compensation.

UN Humanitarian Agencies:

70. *UN humanitarian agencies* will request the use of UN MCDA through the Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator that has coordination responsibilities for the complex emergency.

71. Except in situations where there is imminent loss of life or acute suffering, UN humanitarian agencies will avoid *ad hoc* local requests for UN MCDA and the uncoordinated use of other military and civil defence resources. If in exceptional situations UN MCDA or other military and civil defence resources are used, UN humanitarian agencies will report this use to the responsible coordinator, including when they expect the assets to be released and how they intend to minimize their use in the future.

72. UN humanitarian agencies supported by UN MCDA will respect the integrity and chains of command of the supporting units. They will clearly state what they want the unit to accomplish and leave the unit commander as much latitude as possible in determining how he or she will accomplish the desired outcome, provided that core humanitarian principles are fully respected.

73. UN MCDA supporting UN humanitarian activities will normally not be used in the direct

delivery of assistance. When possible the supported UN humanitarian agencies will try to use UN MCDA in a manner that limits their visibility and focus on tasks that do not call into question the neutrality or impartiality of the agency, implementing and operational partners or other humanitarian actors.

74. UN humanitarian agencies should acknowledge the UN MCDA support being provided, but avoid making any public statements on behalf of the UN MCDA units.

75. UN humanitarian agencies making use of UN MCDA will report the arrival, departure and status of these assets to the Civil-Military Coordination Section of OCHA, through the Humanitarian Coordinator / Resident Coordinator, to ensure that the resources are properly tracked and the contribution is recorded and acknowledged by the United Nations.

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA):

76. Within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva, the *Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS)* has the primary responsibility for the mobilization of UN MCDA and civil-military coordination in a complex emergency.

77. CMCS will process the request for UN MCDA, make the necessary arrangements with the Member States, and track the use of these resources by the UN humanitarian agencies.

78. CMCS, with donor support, will maintain a training programme for those involved in the use of military and civil defence resources to support UN humanitarian activities, with special attention to the training of liaison personnel and the procedures and methods for Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) in complex emergencies.

79. On behalf of the Member States, and in accordance with the UN MCDA Project, CMCS will maintain a roster of UN CMCoord trained

liaison personnel and assist in mobilizing these personnel to support the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator and the UN humanitarian agencies.

80. If a *UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC)* is established, CMCS will coordinate the UN MCDA used to support logistics with the UNJLC. Likewise, CMCS will assist OCHA *Humanitarian Information Centres (HIC)* in obtaining relevant information from the military where a HIC or similar information-sharing activity has been established.

81. CMCS will maintain the necessary tools to facilitate and support civil-military coordination and the mobilization of UN MCDA in complex emergencies, to include database and communications capacity.

Assisting State and International Military or Civil Defence Commanders:

82. States or regional organizations and peacekeeping forces involved in complex emergencies or other military operations beyond their borders should include in the guidance or orders issued to force or contingent commanders the parameters for the use of their resources to support UN humanitarian activities in a complex emergency. *Commanders* should establish their force *modus operandi* taking into account the operational circumstances, International Humanitarian Law, and core Humanitarian Principles and consult with the host nation, ERC and Humanitarian Coordinator or cognizant humanitarian authority, including the OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) for further technical advice, before deploying into the crisis area.

83. In a complex emergency, prospective assisting States with military resources deployed in the affected area, or in reasonable proximity, should facilitate coordination. This could include information on any assets available to support essential humanitarian functions including the transport of relief goods, the movement of

persons at risk, and the reestablishment of basic human services, including medical care.


84. The commanders of UN MCDA assigned specifically to support UN humanitarian activities, and other deployed forces performing humanitarian support missions at the request of the UN, will avoid compromising the neutrality and impartiality of these agencies, their implementing and operational partners and other humanitarian actors responding to complex emergencies. Likewise, all supporting activities will be conducted in a manner that respects the dignity, culture, religions, and laws of the affected population.

85. Military or civil defence organizations dispatched to support complex emergency activities should be self-supporting for the duration of their mission in terms of transport, fuel, food rations, water and sanitation, maintenance and communications, in order to avoid placing additional stress on overburdened local authorities or the supported humanitarian actors.

86. Unless specifically exempted, UN MCDA will abide by the security and movements procedures set by the UN Security Coordinator to ensure the safety of UN personnel and be prepared to provide non-security related assistance in the relocation or evacuation of UN personnel should the need arise.

87. The States providing UN MCDA will not exploit these missions for the purpose of intelligence collection, propaganda, or psychological operations.

88. When military forces have assumed responsibility for vital civilian functions, such as delivery of water, provision of power, or the safe operation of an airfield, regardless of how this responsibility was acquired, they will facilitate a smooth transfer of these functions to the appropriate civilian authority, in coordination with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator as soon as possible. This will be done in a timely manner, well prior to terminating this support, to ensure that any disruption of services will not have an adverse impact on relief and recovery activities.



3

Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys

Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines

14 September 2001



The Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys: Discussion Paper and Non-binding Guidelines (ARMED ESCORTS GUIDELINES) was endorsed by the members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on 14 September 2001.

Document Development and Inter-Agency Process (2001)

Drafting and Process Facilitation:

David Harland

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in 2001

Figures inserted in the text of this Booklet are not an official part of the original IASC-endorsed Guidelines.

PREFACE

When should humanitarian actors use military or other forms of armed escorts and who should decide this? Who decides whether or not the security situation warrants their use? What are some of the key factors that would be essential to consider when employing these escorts? On which criteria should these decisions be made? Moreover, once the decision is made to use military or armed escorts, exactly how should these escorts be undertaken and under whose overall direction and operational control?

All of these are very real and important questions faced almost daily in humanitarian operations in acute situations. A simple mistake could lead to unintended consequences that might harm not only the operations of the humanitarian agency concerned, but the wider humanitarian and local community as well. It is therefore vital that a shared knowledge and understanding is developed amongst a wide range of relevant personnel that may have a role in facilitating the decision-making and its execution.

It is in this spirit that this booklet has been produced – to provide a user-friendly tool to contribute to increased understanding of the humanitarian approaches to the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys. I highly recommend it to all professionals who may become involved in this subject.

The *‘Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys – Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines’* is one of several guidelines and references endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. I encourage the readers to also take a look at the other sections in this booklet as well as the additional civil-military material available through:

<http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines>.

This booklet is available in all official languages of the United Nations.



John Holmes
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and
Emergency Relief Coordinator

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

OCHA was requested by the Deputy Secretary-General's Task Force on security policy to prepare draft guidelines on the use of military and armed escorts for humanitarian convoys. The following text was elaborated in collaboration with IASC member bodies, UNSECOORD, DPKO, academic reviewers and field colleagues in a number of organizations. They were approved for implementation by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group meeting of May 2001. The text as approved by the IASC Working Group was then submitted to the Office of Legal Affairs for review, after which a number of additional modifications were made.

Part I reviews the broader policy context. It concludes that, due to changes in the nature of conflict and in the nature of humanitarian assistance, military or armed escorts are, in a limited number of cases, necessary. In these cases, they should be used sparingly, and only in accordance with clear guidelines. **Part II** consists of two sets of non-binding guidelines: one on when escorts might be used, the other on how they might be used.



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- Exceptions (Criteria)
- Exceptions (Procedures)
- Relations with forces operating under a United Nations mandate

Non-binding guidelines on how to use military or armed escorts

- Guiding principles for humanitarian-military relations
- Collective action by the humanitarian community – Negotiation process
- Collective action by the humanitarian community – Negotiation substance
- Collective action by the humanitarian community – Codes of Conduct

PART I

Introduction: Efforts to sustain humanitarian operations in an environment characterized by the erosion of humanitarian space

One important assumption of humanitarian operations in war has been that military forces have more to gain by focussing their efforts on military targets than they do by focussing on non-military ones.¹ Parties to many conflicts have been willing to accept humanitarian operations in the belief that such operations do not represent a significant obstacle to the achievement of their own military goals and that humanitarian organizations are not a party to the conflict. International humanitarian law has sought to build on this distinction between the military domain and the non-military domain, seeking to create what is now sometimes referred to as ‘humanitarian space’.² In seeking to consolidate this humanitarian space, the use of armed or military escorts for humanitarian convoys has generally not been appropriate.

The distinction between military targets and non-military targets, however, has often been problematic. Military and political leaders have frequently seen the entire population of the adverse party as the enemy, and as an appropriate object of military operations. The suffering of ‘enemy’ populations is not, in these cases, an incidental consequence of military operations, it is often the object of those operations.³

¹ Claude Bruderlein, *Towards a New Strategic Approach to Humanitarian Protection and the Use of Protected Areas*, 2. New York and Geneva: United Nations (OCHA), 2000.

² Ibid, citing Jean Pictet, *Development and principles of international humanitarian law*. Geneva, Henry Dunant Institute, 1985.

³ See, for example, Brooks D. Simpson and Jean V. Berlin, eds, *Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William T. Sherman, 1860-1865* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

Even when there has not been a deliberate attempt to target civilians, civilians have increasingly been the victims of ‘area weapons’, including the aerial bombardment of populated areas. By the time of World War II, the distinction between combatants and civilians was seriously strained.⁴ Thus, despite the expansion and further codification of international humanitarian law and the laws of war, the number of civilians killed as a percentage of total mortality has risen during the past century.⁵

Within the humanitarian community there is an ongoing debate as to how to deal with this process. One viewpoint stresses that the appropriate response to this blurring of the military and non-military domains is to reassert the impartiality, neutrality and independent identity of the humanitarian community, and to take all reasonable steps to reinforce the distinction between military actors and humanitarian ones.⁶ The emphasis here is on strengthening negotiated access to beneficiaries. A somewhat different view asserts that, with the erosion of consensual premises on which international humanitarian action is based, a new emphasis must be placed on the *enforcement*, including the enforcement by military means, of certain minimum standards.⁷ In this context, the use of military or armed escorts is seen as a response to changed circumstances – as a new means to achieve a long-standing humanitarian goal.

⁴ See, for example, Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard, *Total War*, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 1989), 512.

⁵ Estimates of the civilian percentage of total mortality are unreliable. Estimates in the following conflicts have been advanced within the United Nations (A/C/3 SR 1780), cited in Esbjorn Rosenblad, *International humanitarian law of armed conflict*, (Geneva: Henri Dunant Institute, 1979), 55-6. World War I, 5 %; World War II, 48 %; Korean War 84 %; Vietnam War 85+%.

⁶ See, for example, Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop in ‘Civil-Military Cooperation in the Wake of Kosovo: A Humanitarian Perspective’, Conference on Civil-Military Cooperation, Copenhagen, 1-2 September 2000.

⁷ See, for example, the Brahimi report (A/55/305), paras. 50, 63.

This debate is made more urgent by two other processes. First, humanitarian workers are increasingly the victims of harassment and armed attack. Sometimes, this is part of a deliberate effort to thwart the delivery of humanitarian aid and services to ‘enemy’ populations, or a function of the extent to which ‘humanitarian’ organizations are no longer seen as impartial, neutral and independent. Sometimes, it is merely a function of the gangsterism, criminality and general fragmentation of authority that are associated with many modern conflicts, particularly in ‘failed states’.⁸

The second process driving the debate on the relationship between the military and humanitarian communities is the evolution of military thinking in regard to the provision of humanitarian aid and services. In NATO and elsewhere there has been an evolution of the doctrine of military-civilian operations, with an increasing tendency for military forces being used to support the delivery of humanitarian aid, and sometimes even to provide this aid directly.⁹

Preparation of guidelines – five preliminary questions:

In an effort to address some of these issues, the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations convened a Task Force on policy issues associated with staff security. This Task Force met in New York on 17-18 November 1999, and made recommendations in a number of areas.¹⁰ One of those recommendations was that guidelines should be developed regarding the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian

convoys. OCHA was asked to draft the guidelines.

The number of missions in which this issue arises is relatively small. United Nations humanitarian convoys move without military or armed escorts in 15 of the 22 complex emergencies with which OCHA is closely involved at the present. Nevertheless, the issue speaks to wider issues of humanitarian-military relations.

In seeking to prepare guidelines on the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, **five sets of questions** can be asked:

- i. Does the nature of modern conflict present risks to humanitarian workers that were not present in the past?
- ii. If so, is military or armed protection for humanitarian convoys an appropriate response, or would association with military actors compromise the impartiality of humanitarian organizations?
- iii. If humanitarian convoys are at greater risk, and if association with the military would not compromise their principles or operations, would the provision of military or armed escorts actually be of use? Would it increase security or diminish it? Would it pass the threshold of the United Nations Minimum Operating Security Guidelines or fall below it? Would it increase the amount of assistance that could be delivered, or reduce it? Would it increase the security of beneficiary populations or compromise it?
- iv. What would be the consequences of not using armed or military escorts for humanitarian convoys?
- v. What policies and practices have already been put in place with respect to the use of armed or military escorts and how effective have these been?

⁸ General Assembly resolution 54/192 (17 December 1999) deplors the increasing loss of life to United Nations humanitarian personnel in the field and the “continuous erosion of respect for the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.” The Report of the Secretary-General on Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel (A55/494, 18 October 2000) provides a more detailed account of the rising level of insecurity.

⁹ See, for example, Jean-Daniel Tauxe, ‘The ICRC and civil-military cooperation in situations of armed conflict’, 45th Rose-Roth Seminar, Montreux, 2 March 2000.

¹⁰ ‘Report of the Task Forces on Policy and Legal and Operational Issues’, circulated by a note of the Deputy Secretary-General dated 28 March 2000.



I. GROWING THREAT TO HUMANITARIAN WORKERS

Modern warfare tends to offer increased risk to humanitarian workers. Three principal reasons can be identified for this.

(a) The increasingly irregular nature of warfare

During the period 1900-1950 the overwhelming bulk of military activity was conducted by regular forces. The forces were characterized by strong command, control and communication, strong internal discipline and a clear distinction between the use of force for military purposes and the use of force for private or criminal purposes. During this period, humanitarian workers – principally from Red Cross Movement – operated with the consent of the belligerents, and were rarely under any significant degree of physical threat. The Red Cross symbol provided a protective value that was almost universally recognized.¹¹



During the period 1950-2000 the bulk of military activity was conducted by irregular forces. Inter-state warfare, which had accounted for most military activity in the previous half-century, was largely replaced by wars of national liberation, wars of insurgency, wars of secession and, in the last years of the century, a sort of gangster warfare that was part-ethnic, part-political and part-criminal. Command, control and communication was often weaker than in the preceding period, as was internal discipline. The increasing use of child soldiers, and of soldiers operating under the use of drugs, may have exacerbated this trend, as may have the criminalization and ‘privatization’ of conflict.¹²

¹¹ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Principles and response in international humanitarian assistance and protection (C. The use of armed escorts)”, Presented at the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 15 September 1995.

¹² A/55/494, Annex II.

(b) Erosion of perception of impartiality of humanitarians: The increasing number of humanitarian organizations

Prior to 1950, the Red Cross Movement was overwhelmingly dominant in the provision of humanitarian services in armed conflict. Its impartiality and neutrality were generally accepted. By the end of the 20th century hundreds of non-governmental organizations were active in major conflict areas.¹³ Many of these had religious, ethnic or national affiliations which made them the objects of suspicion in conflicts which themselves had a religious or ethnic character. In some cases, the suspicions were well founded, and other organizations – genuinely committed to humanitarian principles – suffered by association.¹⁴

(c) Erosion of perception of impartiality of humanitarians: The changing role of humanitarian organizations

During the major conflicts of the period 1900-1950, humanitarian organizations tended not to undertake activities that might have affected the outcome of the conflict. No humanitarian organization, for example, provided food to the general population of Leningrad during the 1941-1944 siege of that city. Indeed, there seemed to be a general acceptance that the German policy of starving Leningrad into submission was a legitimate war aim.¹⁵ There was, therefore, no conflict in that case between the actions of the besiegers and those of the humanitarian community.

¹³ In Bosnia and Herzegovina, over 3,000 people from over 250 humanitarian organizations carrying valid UNHCR ID cards in 1995. Mark Cutts, ‘The Humanitarian operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-95: Dilemmas in negotiating humanitarian access,’ (Geneva: UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research – Working Paper No. 8, 1999), 7. In Kosovo, at least 180 NGOs were operating in 1999. Suhrke, Barutciski, Garlock and Sandison, ‘The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: And independent evaluation of UNHCR’s emergency preparedness and response,’ (Geneva: UNHCR, February 2000), 65.

¹⁴ See, for example, Cutts above, 7, 23-4. See also, ICRC, above, “Principles and response.”

¹⁵ Just as the Lieber Code (Art. 17) states that, “It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy,” so the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg stated that, in respect of the siege of Leningrad, “the cutting off of every source of sustenance from without is deemed legitimate.” War Crimes Reports Vol. 12, 84.

Fifty years later, there is increasingly a clash of purposes. The use of hunger as a weapon of war is one example. The resurgence of this practice in recent conflicts has been met by a growing insistence by the humanitarian community that food aid must be brought to those in need. When one or more belligerents has made active use of hunger for military purposes in conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Somalia, southern Sudan, northern Uganda and elsewhere, humanitarian organizations have put themselves in harm's way by attempting to provide food.¹⁶ The humanitarian community has sometimes responded, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by associating itself with military actors which are (or are seen to be) party to the conflict.¹⁷

II. IMPARTIALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE INCLUDING ARMED ESCORTS

There are many cases in which the use of force, including armed escorts, would compromise the impartiality of humanitarian organizations.

There are also circumstances, however, in which the use of armed or military escorts for humanitarian convoys would *increase* the capacity of such organizations to provide assistance in an impartial manner, that is, “regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients ... and on the basis of need alone.”¹⁸ The example of siege situations has already been given, and could be expanded to cover other situations in which one belligerent, controlling access to areas controlled by another belligerent, might seek to reduce the amount of aid flowing to what they see as an enemy population. During the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

¹⁶ See, for instance, Action Against Hunger (ACF), *Geopolitics of Hunger: 2000-2001 – Hunger and Power*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000. See also, Catherine Bertini, “Statement to the United Nations Security Council Debate on Security of UN Humanitarian Personnel, New York, 9 February 2000,” (Rome: World Food Programme, 2000).

¹⁷ Larry Minear et al, ‘Humanitarian Action in the Former Yugoslavia: The U.N.’s Role, 1991-1993’, Watson Institute Occasional Paper Series #18, 1994, 83-103.

¹⁸ This formulation of the humanitarian imperative is that of Article 2 of the ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief’, 1994.

humanitarian organizations were unable to deliver aid on the basis of need due to the lack of cooperation of those military factions controlling access to the most needy populations. Only when military escorts were provided – and when a credible use of force projected by those providing the escorts – was the imbalance somewhat corrected.¹⁹

III. UTILITY OF ARMED OR MILITARY ESCORTS

There are many cases – the great majority – in which the use of armed or military escorts would be counter-productive. The use of such escorts can compromise the security of humanitarian personnel and can reduce their capacity to provide assistance effectively on the basis of need and regardless of race, creed or nationality. For example:

- Cooperation with an outside military force – including cooperation with a UN-mandated force – can lead local actors to associate humanitarian organizations with the political and military objectives of that force.
- Cooperation with armed or military escorts which do not have the capacity to prevail if attacked – and to keep routes open for further convoys – can make a convoy or convoy route more vulnerable than it would be without an escort.
- Dependence on support from a military or armed force – whether foreign or local – often makes it impossible to operate without such force.
- Cooperation with one belligerent can make it impossible or unsafe to operate in territory controlled by another belligerent, unless there is an agreement on hand-over at the boundary.

These problems are exacerbated when, as is usually the case, humanitarian actors remain in a conflict zone after the departure of external military forces.

¹⁹ Cutts, 14-16.

IV. CONSEQUENCE OF NON-USE OF MILITARY OR ARMED ESCORTS

Regardless of their utility, there are some humanitarian organizations which – for reasons of broader principle – will not use military or armed escorts to protect their convoys. This position may contribute to a general trend towards direct provision of humanitarian services by foreign military forces.

When humanitarian organizations are unwilling or unable to provide humanitarian services, foreign military forces are increasingly likely to fill the gap. This is true whether the reasons are military (e.g. when they are part of an effort to secure the good will of the population within which a force is operating), or narrowly institutional (e.g. when there is a need for military forces to be seen to be active during periods of low threat) or immediately political (e.g. as a part of a public relations effort directed towards constituencies in the sending state).

The experience in Kosovo appears to be a further example of the extent to which bilateral and military actors can and will assume functions normally carried out by independent humanitarian organizations.¹ Even if the Kosovo case is not repeated, however, “certain Western states, the EU and NATO are rethinking military doctrine, particularly in the field of security, and are seeking way of using some of their military capabilities and assets, which are presently under-utilized, for civilian purposes.”²



¹ For more, see Larry Minear et al, ‘NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis’ in Watson Institute Occasional Papers Series #36, 2000.

² Tauxe, *ibid.*

V. POLICIES AND PRACTICES ALREADY IN PLACE

Within the United Nations, the development of policies with respect to the use of armed and military escorts for humanitarian convoys, and with respect to related issues such as the use of armed or military security for fixed installations, has been fragmented. Broadly, however, members of the United Nations system have adopted policies which recognize the need for armed or military escorts in exceptional circumstances.³

The use of armed guards provided by security service companies to escort convoys would be governed by the Security Directive disseminated on 9 January 1996 on the use of armed guards by organizations of the United Nations system. Such use would be subject to the authorization of the United Nations Security Coordinator.

With respect to the protection by United Nations forces, the authorization for the dispatch of such a force, whether in the case of peacekeeping or peace enforcement, falls within the competence of the Security Council, which shall also determine the mandate of such a force. Any protection expected from a military component of a UN peace operation to humanitarian convoys must be consistent with the mandate of the UN peace operation as established by the Council.

Within the community of humanitarian organizations outside the United Nations there is a spectrum of policy. The Red Cross Movement holds that, “as a general principle, any armed protection for any component of the Movement is in conflict with the following Fundamental Principles: humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality.”⁴ Some other organizations,

³ Compare, for example, UNHCR, *The Security and Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Refugee Camps and Settlements*, EC/49/SC/INF.2, 1999 with UNSECOORD, *United Nations Security Operations Manual*, 1995.

⁴ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘Report on the use of armed protection for humanitarian assistance’, extracted from ‘Working Paper, Council of delegates, 1995’, presented at the ICRC and International Federation, Council of delegates, Geneva, 1-2 December 1995.

including especially implementing partners of United Nations agencies, have no such policy objections.⁵

Some efforts have been made to establish a common policy for all humanitarian organizations, including both those members of the United Nations system with humanitarian mandates as well as humanitarian non-governmental organizations. In 1995, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group adopted the *Report of the Task Force on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations*.⁶ The Report did not refer to the use of armed or military escorts in particular, but did establish six general ‘operating principles’ with respect to the use of all military assets in support of humanitarian operations. These stated that:

- i. Decisions to accept military assets must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria.
- ii. Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in nature or timeliness of deployment, and its use should be a last resort.
- iii. A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. The operation must remain under the overall authority and control of the humanitarian organization responsible for that operation, whatever the specific command arrangements for the military asset itself. To the extent possible, the military asset should operate unarmed and be civilian in appearance.
- iv. Countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the code of conduct and principles of the humanitarian organization responsible for that deployment.

⁵ Cutts, 6-10.

⁶ United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group, XIXth Meeting, 27 September 1995, Geneva: Summary Record’.

iv. The large-scale involvement of military personnel in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance should be avoided.

v. Any use of military assets should ensure that the humanitarian operation retains its international and multilateral character.⁷

The broadest of these principles – points i and ii above – can clearly be applied to the specific case of armed and military escorts. Points iii-vi may be less applicable. Point iii, for example, might undermine the capacity of an armed or military escort to offer a credible deterrent to would-be attackers.

In practice, the positions of the various humanitarian organizations are not far apart, though different criteria may be applied in the decision-making process.



Conclusion:

The generally restrictive practice of all major humanitarian organizations is appropriate. Whatever policy guidelines are put in place should reflect the broad aim of limiting the circumstances in which organizations will have to resort to the use of armed or military escorts.

The convergence of practice among humanitarian organizations in the field is to be applauded, and should be reinforced, with a view, where possible, to having a common position among all humanitarian organizations in any given operation.

Whatever guidelines are approved should reflect two levels of decision-making: first, *when* to use armed or military escorts and, second, having taken the decision to use such an escort, *how* to do so.

⁷ United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations: Report of the Task Force’, 27 September 1995.

PART II

Non-binding guidelines on when to use military or armed escorts

GENERAL RULE

As a general rule, **humanitarian convoys will not use armed or military escorts.**

EXCEPTIONS (CRITERIA)

Exceptions to the general rule will be considered, as a **last resort**, and only when all of the following criteria have been met:

- i. **Sovereignty.** The sovereign power or local controlling authority ('the local authorities') is unwilling or unable to provide a secure environment without the use of military or armed escorts.
- ii. **Need.** The level of humanitarian need is such that the lack of humanitarian assistance would lead to unacceptable human suffering, yet assistance cannot be delivered without the use of military or armed escorts.
- iii. **Safety.** Armed or military escorts can be provided in a way which would provide the credible deterrent needed to enhance the safety of humanitarian personnel and the capacity to provide assistance to intended beneficiaries without compromising the security of beneficiaries and other local populations.
- iv. **Sustainability.** The use of an armed or military escort would not compromise the longer-term capacity of the organization safely and effectively to fulfil its mandate.

EXCEPTIONS (PROCEDURES)

Within the United Nations system, the determination as to whether or not the criteria have been met will normally be made by the **Designated Official**. The Designated Official is accountable for matters concerning the security of United Nations personnel and property to the Secretary-General, through the United Nations Security Coordinator.

Note: In most cases, but not all, a single individual serves as Humanitarian Coordinator, Resident Coordinator and Designated Official. The authority of the Resident Coordinator with respect to UN staff and property is stated in full in section V paragraph 20 of the UN Field Security Handbook.

Recognizing that a common position among humanitarian actors will increase the security of all, the Designated Official (or Humanitarian Coordinator, as appropriate) will consult widely within the humanitarian community before making a determination. The Designated Official will invite representatives of the non-UN humanitarian community to participate, either as members or as observers, in the work of the Security Management Team.

With respect to the **sovereignty** criterion, the Designated Official will formally engage the local authorities to determine whether or not they are willing or able to provide the necessary secure environment and to fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian law. The Designated Official will formally advise members of the humanitarian community as to the role of forces operating under a Security Council mandate with respect to support to that community, and to the provisions of status-of-forces agreement that may be in force.



Note: There has been confusion in some cases as to whether or not a country agreement/SOFA/SOMA is in force, who is covered by it, and what it means in practice. The Designated Official will endeavour to clarify this issue for representatives of the wider humanitarian community as a basis for security planning.

With respect to the **safety** criterion, the factors to be considered by the Designated Official will include the following:

- i. **Who is providing the escort?** (E.g. UN forces conducting peace operations, whose actions shall be governed by decisions of the Security Council; other international forces; government forces; forces of non-state actors; armed guards provided by security service companies, whose use, for the UN community, is subject to the approval of the UN Security Coordinator.)
- ii. **What are their capacities?** (E.g. Can they provide intelligence on the security situation? Will they represent an effective deterrent to attack? Will they be credible in the event of such an attack? What are their rules of engagement? What are the command and control arrangements? Do they have a capacity for extraction? Can they keep a route open and secure for future convoys once force has been used to move one convoy through?)
- iii. How high is the protection of humanitarian convoys on the **priorities** of those providing the escorts? Are the escorts themselves a **potential source of insecurity**?
- iv. **Is there a choice?** (E.g. Are those who are providing the escorts insisting – for political, military, economic or criminal reasons – on their use? If so, what are the possible consequences of resisting?)
- v. **Would the use of escorts in one area have a deleterious effect on the capacity of the organization to fulfil its mandate in other areas?** (E.g. If escorts are to be provided by a belligerent, would that affect the ability to operate in areas not controlled by that belligerent?)



With respect to the **sustainability** criterion, the Designated Official will consider whether the use of armed or military escorts might make it more difficult to provide aid later. (E.g. If escorts are being provided by an external military force, what will happen when, as is usually the case, that military force leaves, but humanitarian operations have to continue?)

Note: There are occasions when the safety or sustainability criteria will not be met, as determined by the DO. In these cases it may be appropriate to **suspend** operations or to **withdraw**. Persisting with operations in the face of unacceptably high risk is rarely an effective means of meeting humanitarian needs. On more than one occasion, political authorities have encouraged humanitarian actors to continue operations – under military and armed escort, and in the face of unacceptably high risk – as an excuse for not addressing the root causes of a humanitarian crisis.





RELATIONS WITH FORCES OPERATING UNDER A UNITED NATIONS MANDATE

The role and mandate of forces operating under a United Nations mandate is defined by the United Nations Security Council, and is binding. The Secretary-General’s Note of 30 October 2000 will guide the relationship between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators in the execution of this mandate. The relationship between the political/military elements of the United Nations presence and the humanitarian presence – including on the use of military escorts for humanitarian convoys – will be determined by agreement between the SRSG/RSG and HC/RC, and will be congruent with the Security Council mandate. In accordance with paragraph 8 of the Secretary-General’s Note, the SRSG/RSG and the HC/RC should resolve policy differences at the field level. Where this is not possible, the issue will be brought to the Headquarters task force for resolution.

[Editor’s Note (2008): See ANNEX of this Booklet for the latest version issued in 2006 for integrated missions.]*

Note 1: *The number of situations in which there is the possibility of escorts by U.N.-mandated forces is very few. At present, only East Timor, Eritrea/Ethiopia and Sierra Leone are possible examples, and in none of those are escorts actually used.**

[Editor’s Note (2008): Possible examples in this category have increased since the time of adoption of this paper by the IASC in 2001.]*

Note 2: *The Brahimi report (Section II/E) proposes a notion of impartiality which would, in some circumstances, be quite distinct from the humanitarian principles that would govern the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In such circumstances, there would not be automatic identity of interest between United Nations elements reporting to the RSG/SRSG and those coordinated by the HC/RC.*

Non-binding guidelines on how to use military or armed escorts

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR HUMANITARIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS

In situations in which an external military actor is present, the relationship between the humanitarian community and the external military forces should be based on a number of guiding principles, including:

- i. **The primacy of the humanitarian organizations in humanitarian work.** In the first instance, humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organizations. Insofar as military organizations have an immediate role to play in supporting humanitarian work, it should be in the provision of a secure environment and/or in the provision of logistics support when requested by humanitarian organizations.
- ii. **Primacy of humanitarian criteria.** Decision to request or accept the use of military or armed escorts must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political or military authorities, based solely on humanitarian criteria.
- iii. **Humanitarian identity.** Humanitarian convoys must retain their civilian nature and character. Other than the vehicles, weapons and personnel providing the escorts, the convoys must remain exclusively humanitarian and armed personnel should remain in separate vehicles. In order to give visibility to the civilian character of humanitarian convoys, vehicles other than the ones used to transport armed escorts may be fitted with “No Weapons” stickers.

Note: *Where external military actors are involved, the above guiding principles should be agreed in advance. Representatives of the humanitarian community may wish to consider the preparation of agreements with major military establishments confirming these principles as a basis for cooperation and division of labour in the area of escorts for humanitarian convoys.*

COLLECTIVE ACTION BY THE HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY – NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Where possible, a **single team** – representing all humanitarian organizations seeking armed or military escorts for their convoys – should negotiate the escort arrangements. Prior to these negotiations, the team should have a **common approach** to the procedural elements to be negotiated.

Note: For example:

- Whether the humanitarian organizations will make a consolidated agreement on behalf of all interested organizations, or whether separate agreements with each organization will be necessary.
- With which parties the escort agreement will be negotiated.
- At what level the escort agreement will be negotiated.
- Whether the agreement will be a formal and written one, or whether it will be an informal understanding.
- What terms and conditions will be accepted; whether or not the escort provider will be paid, and costs involved.
- What the political ramifications of the agreement are; what issues of legal liability arise, and whether or not the privileges and immunities of the United Nations can be invoked, and who will be covered by them.
- Whether or not the existence and contents of the agreement will be made generally available.



COLLECTIVE ACTION BY THE HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY – NEGOTIATION SUBSTANCE

Where possible, the humanitarian negotiating team should have a common position on the substantive elements to be negotiated.

Note: For example:

- Procedures with respect to **pre-movement security assessment** (e.g. the role of the DO and SMT in assessing the threat level and making appropriate arrangements; whether or not there will be a formal determination of ‘phases’, each requiring an appropriate configuration).
- Procedures with respect to the **composition of convoys** (e.g. whether UN and NGO vehicles be mixed; whether or not a consolidated manifest will be available, and to whom; whether passengers will be allowed and, if so, what categories of passengers.)
- Procedures with respect to **convoy command and control** (e.g. who will have authority over the configuration of the convoy and over whether or not to abort a convoy, or to reroute it; whether or not escorted vehicles will have the authority to leave the convoy unilaterally).
- Procedures with respect to the **carriage and use of weapons** (e.g. humanitarian convoys must retain their civilian nature and character. Other than the vehicles, weapons and personnel providing the escorts, the convoys must remain exclusively humanitarian. Armed personnel should remain in separate vehicles).
- Procedures with respect to **communication and liaison** (e.g. how will the escorts communicate with those escorted, en route and at headquarters)
- Procedures with respect to demands for **pre-approved movement, checkpoints, stops, searches, payment, etc.**
- Procedures with respect to interacting with persons encountered en route.
- Procedures with respect to security incidents.

**COLLECTIVE ACTION BY THE HUMANITARIAN
COMMUNITY -- CODES OF CONDUCT**

The humanitarian community will encourage the development of situation-specific codes of conduct, based on a common framework, to be elaborated by representatives of the UN and non-UN humanitarian community. Such codes of conduct should be consistent with the United Nations Minimum Operating Security Standards for that location.

4

ANNEXES & REFERENCE



ANNEXES

- A. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NOTE OF GUIDANCE ON INTEGRATED MISSIONS**
- B. OBSERVANCE BY UNITED NATIONS FORCES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
(SECRETARY-GENERAL'S BULLETIN)**
- C. WE ARE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPERS
(UNITED NATIONS STANDARD OF CONDUCT)**
- D. TEN RULES: CODE OF PERSONAL CONDUCT FOR BLUE HELMETS**
- E. SPECIAL MEASURES FOR PROTECTION FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND SEXUAL ABUSE
(SECRETARY-GENERAL'S BULLETIN)**
- F. UN CMCOORD OFFICER – GENERIC TERMS OF REFERENCE**

Most of the material in the ANNEXES were developed outside the framework of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), but within the United Nations System at large. The respective sources are indicated in the material.

NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

GUIDANCE ON INTEGRATED MISSIONS

In my directive of 11 December 2000, I provided specific guidance on the relations among Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators. Since that time, integration has evolved significantly and integrated missions now routinely provide for the combined function of DSRSG/RC/HC. While this has greatly facilitated coordination and collaboration between the mission and the UN Country Team, it has also underlined the need for further clarification of the roles and responsibilities of senior mission leadership and their relationship with the UN Country Team.

Following a discussion at the Policy Committee, I tasked the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in consultation with other key partners, to draft a revised Note of Guidance. This document has now been finalized and I am pleased to note that it is based on broad consensus among the agencies, funds and programmes that were involved in this consultative process. As such, it takes due account of specific concerns with respect to **humanitarian space** and the role of human rights, while affirming the overall authority of my Special Representative in relation to the activities of the United Nations in a given country.

I fully endorse the Note of Guidance and am confident that it will improve the coherence of the UN system in supporting countries emerging from conflict. I count on you to ensure that its provisions are adhered to in your respective areas of responsibility. I would also request that you circulate the Note of Guidance to your staff, including in the field.

Thank you.



Kofi A. Annan

9 February 2006

NOTE OF GUIDANCE ON INTEGRATED MISSIONS: CLARIFYING THE ROLE, RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL/RESIDENT COORDINATOR/HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR

1. The December 2000 Note of Guidance provided directions on the relations between Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Resident Coordinators (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinators (HC) and, specifically, called for the RC/HC to serve as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) in multidimensional peacekeeping missions. As peacekeeping operations have further increased in complexity and scale since that time, a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the different actors is required in order to ensure effective coordination between the mission, UN agencies¹ and other external partners.
2. Successful recovery from conflict requires the engagement of a broad range of actors, including the national authorities and the local population, in a long-term peacebuilding effort. The rationale for the integration of activities undertaken by the United Nations is to assist countries to make this transition from conflict to sustainable peace. The UN's presence must therefore be based on a clear and shared understanding of priorities and a willingness by

¹ In this Note, the term "agencies" includes all UN Departments, Programmes, Funds and Specialized Agencies.

all actors to contribute toward the achievement of common objectives.

3. This updated Note of Guidance applies to all integrated missions in which the SRSG is supported by a RC and HC serving as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG/RC/HC). Provisions relating to the presence of a non-resident SRSG or RSG, as stipulated in the 2000 Note of Guidance, remain in force. It is acknowledged that 'integrated missions' is an evolving concept and that further guidance will be required. This Note of Guidance will, therefore, be updated at regular intervals to reflect these and other emerging considerations.

4. Integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy. An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner. This Note of Guidance is primarily intended to clarify institutional relations and to facilitate communication and coordination between the mission and the UN system already present in the country.

ROLE, RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE SRSG

5. The SRSG is the senior UN Representative in the country and has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations. He/She represents the Secretary-General and speaks on behalf of the United Nations in a given country.

The SRSG establishes the overall framework that guides the activities of the mission and the UN Country Team and ensures that all the UN components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach. The SRSG reports to the Secretary-General, through the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

6. The SRSG is supported by two Deputies, one of whom performs the function of DSRSG/RC/HC. The SRSG will devise effective coordination mechanisms among the security, political, human rights, rule of law, humanitarian and development components of the mission.
7. In devising effective coordination arrangements, the SRSG will make use of existing humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms and the expertise of the UN Country Team. The SRSG will also establish appropriate coordination mechanisms between mission-run support services and humanitarian common services.
8. In order to ensure effective coordination of respective planning processes, as well as regular reviews of the implementation of the mission's mandate, the SRSG should establish a planning cell in the mission to engage the UN Country Team, the international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other relevant actors.
9. Those parts of the UN that need to retain a public advocacy role should ensure that such advocacy is conducted in full coordination with the SRSG and in a manner that does not undermine the mandate of the mission.
10. The SRSG will uphold humanitarian principles (as outlined in GA resolution 46/182) in the implementation of the mission's mandate and support the creation of an effective humanitarian operating environment.
11. The SRSG will engage with the UN Country Team, through the DSRSG/RC/HC, to ensure that mission planning and operations management are compatible with long-term

national development goals and that mission exit strategies clearly articulate the hand-over of ongoing activities to the UN Country Team and other relevant actors.

12. Where mission activities have a close bearing on the humanitarian or development response, such as 'hearts and minds' campaigns, quick impact projects or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, the SRSG, through the DSRSG/RC/HC, will establish effective approval and coordination mechanisms to ensure maximum coherence and prevent any adverse impact on humanitarian and development operations.

13. When appointed as Designated Official, the SRSG is accountable to the Secretary-General, through the Under Secretary-General of the Department of Safety and Security, for the security of all personnel employed by the organizations of the UN system and their recognized dependants throughout the country or designated area. The SRSG will also ensure that the goals of the United Nations security management system are met, that a Security Management Team has been constituted and that the DSRSG/RC/HC is appointed as the Deputy Designated Official.

14. While recognizing that UN agencies are responsible for the implementation of their mandated activities, the SRSG may request a given agency to re-orient its planned interventions in line with the broad strategic objectives of the mission, subject to the agency's mandate and available resources.

15. The SRSG will ensure that optimal use is made of existing capacities in the implementation of the different elements of the mission's mandate. Where such elements are best implemented through the combined capacities of the UNCT and the mission, the SRSG will provide overall guidance and encourage the design and implementation of joint programmes and operational partnerships between UN agencies and the mission. Where several agencies could conceivably implement a given programming

component, the selection of the appropriate agencies will be made through existing coordination mechanisms, on the basis of their comparative advantage.



16. Human Rights are a cross-cutting concern for both the mission and the UN Country Team and they need to be fully integrated into peace operations². The SRSG will uphold human rights law in the implementation of the mission's mandate. All human rights functions should be co-coordinated by one component of the mission and the head of the human rights component should report to the SRSG, either directly or through one of the two DSRSGs, as appropriate. A secondary reporting line to provide guidance and functional support is retained between the head of the human rights component and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. As representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the head of the human rights component should be a full member of the expanded UN Country Team. Separate public reporting by the mission and/or the High Commissioner on issues of human rights should be routine.

ROLE, RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE DSRSG/RC/HC

17. The principal reporting line of the DSRSG/RC/HC is to the SRSG who provides direct supervision and overall strategic direction.

² Given its overriding importance as a cross-cutting concern, the role of human rights in integrated missions was reviewed at a special session of the Secretary-General's Policy Committee (see decision 2005/24).

18. In his/her capacity as RC, the DSRSG/RC/HC is responsible for the coordination of the UN Country Team and the planning and coordination of UN development operations. He/She is also responsible for donor coordination in the areas of recovery and development and will maintain links with governments, donors and other development partners for this purpose. The DSRSG/RC/HC retains a secondary reporting line to the UNDP Administrator, as the Chair of the UNDG. UNDP will continue to provide support for the RC function.

19. Similarly, in his/her capacity as HC, the DSRSG/RC/HC is responsible for the planning and coordination of humanitarian operations and will maintain links with governments (and other parties), donors and the broader humanitarian community for this purpose. The DSRSG/RC/HC retains a secondary reporting line to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). Where the HC is supported by an OCHA office, it will serve as the humanitarian coordination office. Where appropriate, the OCHA office may be located separately from the mission to facilitate access by the broader humanitarian community.

20. These two secondary reporting lines are essential to provide guidance and functional support to the DSRSG/RC/HC but do not constitute a day-to-day supervisory relationship. In fulfilling the respective roles of RC and HC, the DSRSG/RC/HC retains existing accountabilities in accordance with prevailing Terms of Reference for these roles.

21. The DSRSG/RC/HC will inform the SRSG of all policy communications with the UNDP Administrator and the ERC respectively. The SRSG will, in turn, keep the DSRSG/RC/HC informed of all relevant substantive communications with Headquarters.

22. Whereas the SRSG has the overall authority for the coordination of UN activities, the DSRSG/RC/HC is expected to serve as the principal interface between the mission and the

UN Country Team, to lead the coordination effort for humanitarian, development and recovery activities and to bring concerns raised by the UN Country Team to the attention of the SRSG. The DSRSG/RC/HC also engages with non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES

23. The SRSG will resolve any issues related to the co-ordination of different mission components represented by the two DSRSGs, in his/her capacity as their immediate supervisor. Where differences related to the role of RC and HC have not been resolved effectively, the UNDP Administrator (as Chair of UNDG) or the ERC may raise the issue with the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, in an effort to assist with the resolution.

24. All policy differences related to the interpretation of mandates should be resolved in a timely manner at field level. Should the issue involve a UN agency represented on the Country Team, the *DSRSG/RC/HC* is expected to assume a leading role in the mediation effort. Where disputes cannot be resolved in-country, the SRSG is required to jointly review the matter with the executive head of the agency in order to seek a formal agreement, while keeping the USG for Peacekeeping informed. In the event that good faith efforts to resolve disagreements do not produce results, the SRSG and/or the executive head of the agency concerned may approach the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

25. Where agreement cannot be reached, the matter may be referred to the Secretary-General or his Policy Committee, as appropriate.



OBSERVANCE BY UNITED NATIONS FORCES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

SECRETARY-GENERAL’S BULLETIN ST/SGB/1999/13 (6 AUGUST 1999)



The Secretary-General, for the purpose of setting out fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations forces conducting operations under United Nations command and control, promulgates the following:

SECTION I - FIELD OF APPLICATION

1.1 The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.

1.2 The promulgation of this bulletin does not affect the protected status of members of peacekeeping operations under the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel or their status as non-combatants, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians under the international law of armed conflict.

SECTION 2 - APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAW

The present provisions do not constitute an exhaustive list of principles and rules of international humanitarian law binding upon military personnel, and do not prejudice the application thereof, nor do they replace the national laws by which military personnel remain bound throughout the operation.

SECTION 3 - STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENT

In the status-of-forces agreement concluded between the United Nations and a State in whose territory a United Nations force is deployed, the United Nations undertakes to ensure that the force shall conduct its operations with full respect for the principles and rules of the general conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel. The United Nations also undertakes to ensure that members of the military personnel of the force are fully acquainted with the principles and rules

of those international instruments. The obligation to respect the said principles and rules is applicable to United Nations forces even in the absence of a status-of-forces agreement.

SECTION 4 - VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

In case of violations of international humanitarian law, members of the military personnel of a United Nations force are subject to prosecution in their national courts.

SECTION 5 - PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

5.1 The United Nations force shall make a clear distinction at all times between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. Military operations shall be directed only against combatants and military objectives. Attacks on civilians or civilian objects are prohibited.

5.2 Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

5.3 The United Nations force shall take all feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian property.



5.4 In its area of operation, the United Nations force shall avoid, to the extent feasible, locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas, and take all necessary

precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects against the dangers resulting from military operations. Military installations and equipment of peacekeeping operations, as such, shall not be considered military objectives.

5.5 The United Nations force is prohibited from launching operations of a nature likely to strike military objectives and civilians in an indiscriminate manner, as well as operations that may be expected to cause incidental loss of life among the civilian population or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

5.6 The United Nations force shall not engage in reprisals against civilians or civilian objects.

SECTION 6 - MEANS AND METHODS OF COMBAT



6.1 The right of the United Nations force to choose methods and means of combat is not unlimited.

6.2 The United Nations force shall respect the rules prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons and methods of combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law. These include, in particular, the prohibition on the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and biological methods of warfare; bullets which explode, expand or flatten easily in the human body; and certain explosive projectiles. The use of certain conventional weapons, such as non-detectable fragments, anti-personnel mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons, is prohibited.

6.3 The United Nations force is prohibited from employing methods of warfare which may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or which are intended, or may be expected to cause, widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.

6.4 The United Nations force is prohibited from using weapons or methods of combat of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering.

6.5 It is forbidden to order that there shall be no survivors.

6.6 The United Nations force is prohibited from attacking monuments of art, architecture or history, archaeological sites, works of art, places of worship and museums and libraries which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. In its area of operation, the

United Nations force shall not use such cultural property or their immediate surroundings for purposes which might expose them to destruction or damage. Theft, pillage, misappropriation and any act of vandalism directed against cultural property is strictly prohibited.

6.7 The United Nations force is prohibited from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuff, crops, livestock and drinking-water installations and supplies.

6.8 The United Nations force shall not make installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating stations, the object of military operations if such operations may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

6.9 The United Nations force shall not engage in reprisals against objects and installations protected under this section.

SECTION 7 – TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS AND PERSONS HORS DE COMBAT

7.1 Persons not, or no longer, taking part in military operations, including civilians, members of armed forces who have laid down their weapons and persons placed *hors de combat* by reason of sickness, wounds or detention, shall, in all circumstances, be treated humanely and without any adverse distinction based on race, sex, religious convictions or any other ground. They shall be accorded full respect for their person, honour and religious and other convictions.

7.2 The following acts against any of the persons mentioned in section 7.1 are prohibited at any time and in any place: violence to life or physical integrity; murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; collective punishment; reprisals; the taking of hostages; rape; enforced prostitution; any form of sexual assault and humiliation and degrading treatment; enslavement; and pillage.

7.3 Women shall be especially protected against any attack, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution or any other form of indecent assault.



7.4 Children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault.

SECTION 8 - TREATMENT OF DETAINED PERSONS

The United Nations force shall treat with humanity and respect for their dignity detained members of the armed forces and other persons who no longer take part in military operations by reason of detention. Without prejudice to their legal status, they shall be treated in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, as may be applicable to them *mutatis mutandis*. In particular:

- (a) Their capture and detention shall be notified without delay to the party on which they depend and to the Central Tracing Agency of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in particular in order to inform their families;
- (b) They shall be held in secure and safe premises which provide all possible safeguards of hygiene and health, and shall not be detained in areas exposed to the dangers of the combat zone;
- (c) They shall be entitled to receive food and clothing, hygiene and medical attention;
- (d) They shall under no circumstances be subjected to any form of torture or ill-treatment;
- (e) Women whose liberty has been restricted shall be held in quarters separated from men’s quarters, and shall be under the immediate supervision of women;
- (f) In cases where children who have not attained the age of sixteen years take a direct part in hostilities and are arrested, detained or interned by the United Nations force, they shall continue to benefit from special protection. In particular, they shall be held in quarters separate from the quarters of adults, except when accommodated with their families;
- (g) ICRC’s right to visit prisoners and detained persons shall be respected and guaranteed.

SECTION 9 - PROTECTION OF THE WOUNDED, THE SICK, AND MEDICAL AND RELIEF PERSONNEL

9.1 Members of the armed forces and other persons in the power of the United Nations force who are wounded or sick shall be respected and protected in all circumstances. They shall be treated humanely and receive the medical care and attention required by their condition, without adverse distinction. Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be administered.

9.2 Whenever circumstances permit, a suspension of fire shall be arranged, or other local arrangements made, to permit the search for and identification of the wounded, the sick and the dead left on the battlefield and allow for their collection, removal, exchange and transport.

9.3 The United Nations force shall not attack medical establishments or mobile medical units. These shall at all times be respected and protected, unless they are used, outside their humanitarian functions, to attack or otherwise commit harmful acts against the United Nations force.

9.4 The United Nations force shall in all circumstances respect and protect medical personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, transport or treatment of the wounded or sick, as well as religious personnel.

9.5 The United Nations force shall respect and protect transports of wounded and sick or medical equipment in the same way as mobile medical units.

9.6 The United Nations force shall not engage in reprisals against the wounded, the sick or the personnel, establishments and equipment protected under this section.

9.7 The United Nations force shall in all circumstances respect the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems. These emblems may not be employed except to indicate or to protect medical units and medical establishments, personnel and material. Any misuse of the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblems is prohibited.

9.8 The United Nations force shall respect the right of the families to know about the fate of their sick, wounded and deceased relatives. To this end, the force shall facilitate the work of the ICRC Central Tracing Agency.

9.9 The United Nations force shall facilitate the work of relief operations which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, and shall respect personnel, vehicles and premises involved in such operations.



SECTION 10 - ENTRY INTO FORCE

The present bulletin shall enter into force on 12 August 1999.

(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General

WE ARE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL

UNITED NATIONS STANDARD OF CONDUCT:

The United Nations Organization embodies the aspirations of all the people of the world for peace. In this context the United Nations Charter requires that **all personnel must maintain the highest standards of integrity and conduct.**



We will comply with the **Guidelines on International Humanitarian Law for Forces Undertaking United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*** and the applicable portions of the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights** as the fundamental basis of our standards.

We, as peacekeeping personnel, represent the United Nations and are present in the country to help it recover from the trauma of a conflict. As a result we must consciously be prepared to accept special constraints in our public and private lives in order to do the work and to pursue the ideals of the United Nations Organization.

We will be accorded certain privileges and immunities arranged through agreements negotiated between the United Nations and the host country solely for the purpose of discharging our peacekeeping duties. Expectations of the world community and the local population will be high and our actions, behaviour and speech will be closely monitored.

(Editor's Note: This is the Secretary-General's Bulletin on "Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian Law - ST/SGB/1999/13 of 6 August 1999)*

WE WILL ALWAYS:

- ◆ Conduct ourselves in a professional and disciplined manner, at all times;
- ◆ Dedicate ourselves to achieving the goals of the United Nations;
- ◆ Understand the mandate and mission and comply with their provisions;
- ◆ Respect the environment of the host country;
- ◆ Respect local laws, customs and practices and be aware of and respect culture, religion, traditions and gender issues;
- ◆ Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration;
- ◆ Act with impartiality, integrity and tact;
- ◆ Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak;
- ◆ Obey our United Nations superiors/supervisors and respect the chain of command;
- ◆ Respect all other peacekeeping members of the mission regardless of status, rank, ethnic or national origin, race, gender, or creed;
- ◆ Support and encourage proper conduct among our fellow peacekeeping personnel;
- ◆ Report all acts involving sexual exploitation and abuse;
- ◆ Maintain proper dress and personal deportment at all times;
- ◆ Properly account for all money and property assigned to us as members of the mission; and
- ◆ Care for all United Nations equipment placed in our charge.

WE WILL NEVER:

- ◆ Bring discredit upon the United Nations, or our nations through improper personal conduct, failure to perform our duties or abuse of our positions as peacekeeping personnel;
- ◆ Take any action that might jeopardize the mission;
- ◆ Abuse alcohol, use or traffic in drugs;
- ◆ Make unauthorized communications to external agencies, including unauthorized press statements;
- ◆ properly disclose or use information gained through our employment;
- ◆ Use unnecessary violence or threaten anyone in custody;
- ◆ Commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially women and children;
- ◆ Commit any act involving sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual activity with children under 18, or exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex;
- ◆ Become involved in sexual liaisons which could affect our impartiality, or the well-being of others;
- ◆ Be abusive or uncivil to any member of the public;
- ◆ Willfully damage or misuse any United Nations property or equipment;
- ◆ Use a vehicle improperly or without authorization;
- ◆ Collect unauthorized souvenirs;
- ◆ Participate in any illegal activities, corrupt or improper practices; or
- ◆ Attempt to use our positions for personal advantage, to make false claims or accept benefits to which we are not entitled.

WE REALIZE THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO ACT WITHIN THESE GUIDELINES MAY:

- ◆ Erode confidence and trust in the United Nations;
- ◆ Jeopardize the achievement of the mission;
- ◆ Jeopardize our status and security as peacekeeping personnel; and
- ◆ Result in administrative, disciplinary or criminal action.

*These Standards appear as **Annex H** in the “Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and [participating State] contributing resources to the [United Nations Peacekeeping Operation]”- the so-called “Model MoU” between UN and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). The original version of the MoU is contained in the “Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual) annexed to General Assembly (GA) document A/C.5/60/26.*



*In June 2007, a Working Group of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations recommended to the GA that it request the Secretary-General to incorporate in the Model MoU a number of proposed amendments, including these Standards as **Annex H**, as reflected in its Report A/61/19 (Part III) of 12 June 2007. Subsequently, the GA adopted the recommendation through its Resolution A/RES/61/267 B of 24 August 2007. These Rules are also available as Annex III to the Note by the Secretary-General to the GA on “Making the Standards Contained in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin Binding on Contingent Members and Standardizing the Norms of Conduct so that they are Applicable to All Categories of Peacekeeping Personnel” – A/61/645 of 18 December 2006.*

TEN RULES:

CODE OF PERSONAL CONDUCT FOR BLUE HELMETS



1. Dress, think, talk, act and behave in a manner befitting the dignity of a disciplined, caring, considerate, mature, respected and trusted soldier, displaying the highest integrity and impartiality. Have pride in your position as a peace-keeper and do not abuse or misuse your authority.
2. Respect the law of the land of the host country, their local culture, traditions, customs and practices.
3. Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration. You are there as a guest to help them and in so doing will be welcomed with admiration. Neither solicit or accept any material reward, honor or gift.
4. Do not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation of the local population or United Nations staff, especially women and children.
5. Respect and regard the human rights of all. Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak. Do not act in revenge or with malice, in particular when dealing with prisoners, detainees or people in your custody.
6. Properly care for and account for all United Nations money, vehicles, equipment and property assigned to you and do not trade or barter with them to seek personal benefits. Show military courtesy and pay appropriate compliments to all members of the mission, including other United Nations contingents regardless of their creed, gender, rank or origin.
7. Show respect for and promote the environment, including the flora and fauna, of the host country.
8. Exercise the utmost discretion in handling confidential information and matters of official business which can put lives into danger or soil the image of the United Nations.
9. Do not engage in excessive consumption of alcohol or any consumption or trafficking of drugs.
10. Exercise the utmost discretion in handling confidential information and matters of official business which can put lives into danger or soil the image of the United Nations.

These Rules are also available as Annex IV to the Note by the Secretary-General To the General Assembly on “Making the Standards Contained in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin Binding on Contingent Members and Standardizing the Norms of Conduct so that they are Applicable to All Categories of Peacekeeping Personnel” – A/61/645 of 18 December 2006.

SPECIAL MEASURES FOR PROTECTION FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND SEXUAL ABUSE

SECRETARY-GENERAL’S BULLETIN ST/SGB/2003/13 (9 OCTOBER 2003)

The Secretary-General, for the purpose of preventing and addressing cases of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, and taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 57/306 of 15 April 2003, “Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa”, promulgates the following in consultation with Executive Heads of separately administered organs and programmes of the United Nations:

SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of the present bulletin, the term “**sexual exploitation**” means any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. Similarly, the term “**sexual abuse**” means the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.

SECTION 2: SCOPE OF APPLICATION

2.1 The present bulletin shall **apply to all staff** of the United Nations, including staff of separately administered organs and programmes of the United Nations.

2.2 **United Nations forces** conducting operations under United Nations command and control are prohibited from committing acts of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, and have a particular duty of care towards women and children, pursuant to section 7 of Secretary-General’s bulletin ST/SGB/1999/13, entitled “Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law”.

2.3 Secretary-General’s bulletin ST/SGB/253, entitled “Promotion of equal treatment of men and women in the Secretariat and prevention of sexual harassment”, and the related administrative instruction¹ set forth policies and procedures for handling cases of sexual harassment in the Secretariat of the United Nations.

¹ Currently ST/AI/379, entitled “Procedures for dealing with sexual harassment”.

Separately administered organs and programmes of the United Nations have promulgated similar policies and procedures.

SECTION 3: PROHIBITION OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND SEXUAL ABUSE

3.1 Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse violate universally recognized international legal norms and standards and have always been unacceptable behaviour and prohibited conduct for United Nations staff. Such conduct is prohibited by the United Nations Staff Regulations and Rules.

3.2 In order to further protect the most vulnerable populations, especially women and children, the following specific standards which reiterate existing general obligations under the United Nations Staff Regulations and Rules, are promulgated:

- (a) Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse constitute acts of serious misconduct and are therefore grounds for disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal;
- (b) Sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18) is prohibited regardless of the age of majority or age of consent locally. Mistaken belief in the age of a child is not a defence;
- (c) Exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex, including sexual favours or other forms of humiliating, degrading or exploitative behaviour, is prohibited. This includes any exchange of assistance that is due to beneficiaries of assistance;
- (d) Sexual relationships between United Nations staff and beneficiaries of assistance, since they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics, undermine the credibility and integrity of the work of the United Nations and are strongly discouraged;
- (e) Where a United Nations staff member develops concerns or suspicions regarding sexual

exploitation or sexual abuse by a fellow worker, whether in the same agency or not and whether or not within the United Nations system, he or she must report such concerns via established reporting mechanisms;

- (f) United Nations staff are obliged to create and maintain an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. Managers at all levels have a particular responsibility to support and develop systems that maintain this environment.

3.3 The standards set out above are not intended to be an exhaustive list. Other types of sexually exploitive or sexually abusive behaviour may be grounds for administrative action or disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal, pursuant to the United Nations Staff Regulations and Rules.

SECTION 4: DUTIES OF HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, OFFICES AND MISSIONS

4.1 The Head of Department, Office or Mission, as appropriate, shall be responsible for creating and maintaining an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, and shall take appropriate measures for this purpose. In particular, the Head of Department, Office or Mission shall inform his or her staff of the contents of the present bulletin and ascertain that each staff member receives a copy thereof.

4.2 The Head of Department, Office or Mission shall be responsible for taking appropriate action in cases where there is reason to believe that any of the standards listed in section 3.2 above have been violated or any behaviour referred to in section 3.3 above has occurred. This action shall be taken in accordance with established rules and procedures for dealing with cases of staff misconduct.

4.3 The Head of Department, Office or Mission shall appoint an official, at a sufficiently high level, to serve as a focal point for receiving reports on cases of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. With respect to Missions, the staff of the Mission and the local population shall be properly informed of the existence and role of the focal point and of how to contact him or her. All reports of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse shall be handled in a confidential manner in order to protect the rights of all involved. However, such reports may be used, where necessary, for action taken pursuant to section 4.2 above.

4.4 The Head of Department, Office or Mission shall not apply the standard prescribed in section 3.2 (b), where a staff member is legally married to someone under the age of 18 but over the age of majority or consent in their country of citizenship.

4.5 The Head of Department, Office or Mission may use his or her discretion in applying the standard prescribed in section 3.2 (d), where beneficiaries of assistance are over the age of 18 and the circumstances of the case justify an exception.

4.6 The Head of Department, Office or Mission shall promptly inform the Department of Management of its investigations into cases of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, and the actions it has taken as a result of such investigations.

SECTION 5: REFERRAL TO NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

If, after proper investigation, there is evidence to support allegations of sexual exploitation or sexual abuse, these cases may, upon consultation with the Office of Legal Affairs, be referred to national authorities for criminal prosecution.

SECTION 6: COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH NON-UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES OR INDIVIDUALS

6.1 When entering into cooperative arrangements with non-United Nations entities or individuals, relevant United Nations officials shall inform those entities or individuals of the standards of conduct listed in section 3, and shall receive a written undertaking from those entities or individuals that they accept these standards.

6.2 The failure of those entities or individuals to take preventive measures against sexual exploitation or sexual abuse, to investigate allegations thereof, or to take corrective action when sexual exploitation or sexual abuse has occurred, shall constitute grounds for termination of any cooperative arrangement with the United Nations.

SECTION 7: ENTRY INTO FORCE

The present bulletin shall enter into force on 15 October 2003.

(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General

UN-CMCOORD OFFICER

GENERIC TERMS OF REFERENCE

ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING AND REPORTING

RELATIONSHIPS: This position is located in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The Civil – Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Officer will be deployed to [town, country]. The UN-CMCoord Officer will report to the Humanitarian / Resident Coordinator through the Head of the OCHA Office in [country].

ACCOUNTABILITIES: Within limits of delegated authority, the UN-CMCoord Officer will be responsible for the following duties:

1. Serve as an adviser to the HC/RC for humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) matters; advise on overall policy direction on specific issues; and, more generally, review and provide advice on a diverse range of policy issues related to UN-CMCoord and the safeguarding of humanitarian principles.
2. Serve as primary focal point for all matters, including policy, related to civil-military coordination, in close consultation with the HC/RC.
3. Assist and advise in the development of country-specific guidelines on civil-military relations and use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), based on the current 'IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies', 'Guidelines on the Use of MCDA to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies' and the 'Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys,' applicable Security Council resolutions and other relevant instruments.
4. Ensure that the country-specific guidelines and, if necessary, the generic guidelines mentioned above are properly disseminated and understood by both the humanitarian actors and the military forces present, as well as by local actors, as appropriate. Promote and ensure adherence to the above Guidelines within the entire humanitarian community and advise on potential consequences if these principles are compromised.
5. Establish and maintain dialogue and coordination with the military forces in the area of responsibility. Identify, establish and maintain contact with the appropriate military counterparts and ensure mutual exchange of information about ongoing humanitarian assistance issues. Advise the military forces in the area of responsibility on international humanitarian coordination mechanisms. These mechanisms may include the UN Country Team, UN Security or Disaster Management Teams, UN Joint Logistics Centre, Humanitarian Information Centre, Humanitarian Clusters, etc.

6. In parallel, establish and maintain contact with civilian humanitarian actors in the area of responsibility and serve as an information channel and advocate for their issues with relevant military systems.

7. Work in close cooperation with UN OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) in Geneva to support the UN-CMCoord training programme as appropriate. Identify and coordinate with OCHA/CMCS regarding potential candidates for inclusion in the UN-CMCoord Training Programme.

8. In coordination with UN OCHA/CMCS, establish and maintain contact with actors involved in military exercises in area of operation and advise on which events should be monitored and/or supported. Support planning for and execution of exercises, lessons learned workshops, seminars, and training events with military participation, as appropriate.

9. Monitor, analyze and report on any major accomplishments and progress as well as identify any difficulties in relations between the humanitarian and military communities.

10. Participate in work groups, meetings and consultations with other UN agencies and humanitarian partners; organize meetings with Heads of Agencies on UN-CMCoord matters.

11. Support logistics and operations personnel in the area of responsibility on all issues connected to civil-military relations.

12. Establish, if appropriate, an information exchange forum for stakeholders and interested parties in civil-military relations and participate in relevant meetings.

13. Prepare or provide input to requests for MCDA assets.

14. Provide situation reports on ongoing civil-military activities and the overall civil-military relations situation in [country] in agreed formats and timeframes. Upon concurrence with the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator, these reports should be disseminated to the UNCT, UN OCHA Office in [country], UN OCHA/CMCS, relevant CRD Desks, PDSB/PHA. Reports may also be disseminated to other agencies if relevant and appropriate.

15. Any other duties as may be requested by the Humanitarian / Resident Coordinator.

Note: The above is an excerpt from the 'Draft Generic Terms of Reference: Civil-Military Coordination Officer (P/LA)' of February 2008 - developed based on 'Annex A' of the 'United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Concept' endorsed by the IASC in March 2005.

REFERENCES

- A. ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS**
- B. RELEVANT MATERIAL**

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

(A) Abbreviations

Armed Escorts Guidelines	Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys: Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines (14 September 2001)
IASC Reference Paper	Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper (28 June 2004)
MCDA Guidelines	Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (March 2003)
OSLO Guidelines	Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (November 2006, Revision 1.1 – November 2007)
UN-CMCoord Concept	United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Concept (22 March 2005)
UN-CMCoord Handbook	United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook (29 November 2007)

(B) Acronyms

NOTE: This list highlights some of the commonly used acronyms in the civil-military context, mostly in United Nations operations. In practice, slight differences exist across missions. This is not an official version, nor is it exhaustive.

3Ds	Diplomacy, Development and Defense	AOC	Air Operations Centre
3BW	Three Block Wars	AO	Area of Operations
AA	Agency Agreements	AOI	Area of Interest
A/A	Air to Air	AOR	Area of Responsibility
AAM	Air to Air Missile	AOS	Area of Separation
AASLT	Air Assault	AP	Advisory Panel
ABN	Airborne	AP	Ammunition Point
AC	Aircraft Commander	AP	Anti-Personnel
ACA	Airspace Coordination Area	APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
ACA	Airspace Control Authority	APM	Anti-Personnel Landmines
ACC	Administrative Committee on Coordination	ARMD	Armoured
ACFT	Aircraft	ARTY	Artillery
ACM	Airspace Control Measures	ATC	Air Traffic Control
ACQ	Acquisition	ATM	Anti-Tank Mines
ACR	Armoured Cavalry Regiment	AS	Area Security
ACT	Analysis Control Team	ASG	Assistant Secretary-General (UN)
AD	Air Defence	ASLT	Assault
AD	Armoured Division	ASOC	Air Support Operations Centre
ADA	Air Defence Artillery	ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ADM	Admiral	ASR	Alternative Supply Route
AdPro or AP I, II	1977 Geneva Protocol (I, II) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949	ASR	Ammunition Supply Rate
AG	Advisory Group	ATA	Actual Time of Arrival
AG	Adjunct General	ATC	Air Traffic Control
A/G	Air to Ground	ATD	Actual Time of Departure
AGL	Above Ground Level	ATF	Amphibious Task Force
AGM	Air to Ground Missile	ATK	Attack
AI	Air Interdiction	ATS	Air Traffic Services
AIREVAC	Air Evacuation	ATO	Air Tasking Order
ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions	AU	African Union
ALITE	Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies (WFP)	AVN	Aviation
ALO	Air Liaison Officer	AXP	Ambulance Exchange Point
ALT	Altitude, Alternate	BAT or BN	Battalion
AMB	Area Mission Brief	BC	Battle Command
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia	BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
AMMO	Ammunition	BDE	Brigade, Brigadier
		BDU	Battle Dress Uniform
		BDZ	Battle Defence Zone
		BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

REFERENCE A ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BOI	Board of Inquiry	COIN	Counter-insurgency
BONUCA	United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic	COL	Colonel
BP	Battlefield Positions	COMD or CMD	Command
B/P	Be Prepared Mission	COMM	Communication
BRIG GEN or BG	Brigadier General	COMMZ	Communication Zone
BSA	Brigade Support Area	CONOPS	Concept of Operations
BTRY	Battery	CONPLAN	Concept Plan
BZ	Buffer Zone	CONST	Construction
C	Chemical	COS	Chief of Staff
C2	Command and Control	CP	Check Point
C2W	Command and Control Warfare	CP	Command Post
C3	Command, Control and Communications	CPL	Corporal
CA	Civil Affairs	CPO	Chief Procurement Officer
CA	Combat Assessment	CPX	Command Post Exercise
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority	CRD	Coordination and Response Division (OCHA)
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer	CS	Combat Support
CAO	Civil Affairs Officer	CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CAP	Combat Air Patrol	CSE	Contingent Support Element
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process	CSS	Combat Service Support
CAP	Crisis Action Planning	CT	Counter-Terrorism
CAS	Casualty	CW	Chemical Warfare
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy	CZ	Combat Zone
CAS	Chief Administrative Services (DPKO)	DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
CATK	Counter-attack	DCO	Deputy Commanding Officer
CAV	Cavalry	DCOS	Deputy Chief of Staff
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological	D-DAY	Day on which a Particular Operation Starts
CBT	Combat	DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements	DFC	Deputy Force Commander
CCPOQ	Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions	DFS	Department of Field Services (UN)
CCW	1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons	DGZ	Desired Ground Zero
CDR	Commander	DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (changed to OCHA in 1998)
CE	Command Element	DIV	Division
CERF	Central Emergency Revolving Fund	DMT	Disaster Management Team
CFL	Coordinated Fire Line	DO	Designated Official
CG	Consultative Group	DO	Director of Operations
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan	DO	Duty Officer
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO)	DOA	Director of Administration
CIVPOL	Civilian Police	DOA	Direction of Attack
CJTf	Combined Joint Task Force	DOS	Date of Supply
CJTf	Commander of Joint Task Force	DOW	Died of Wounds
CMA	Civil-Military Affairs	DP	Decision Point
CMCO	EU Civil-Military Coordination	DPA	Department of Political Affairs (UN)
CMDR	Commander	DPI	Department of Public Information (UN)
CMO	Chief Military Officer	DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
CMO	Civil-Military Operations	DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centre	DSG	Deputy Secretary-General (UN)
CMCoord	Civil-Military Coordination	DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN)
CMCS	Civil-Military Coordination Section (OCHA)	DSS	Department of Safety and Security (UN)
CMLO	Civil-Military Liaison Officer (DPKO)	DZ	Drop Zone
CMLO	Chief Military Liaison Officer (DPKO)	EA	Engagement Area
CMO	Civil-Military Operations (US)	EASBRIG	Eastern African Standby Brigade
CMO	Chief Military Observer	ECHA	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
CMO	Chief Military Officer	ECPS	Executive Committee on Peace and Security
CMSEC or COMSEC	Communication Security	ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
CO or COY	Company	ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
CO	Commanding Officer	ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
COA	Course of Action	ELSEC or ESEC	Electronic Security
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment (DPKO)	EMOP	Emergency Operations

REFERENCE A ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

EN, ENG or ENGR	Engineer	IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	IASC-WG	Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group
EOM	Experts on Mission	IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EOSG	Executive Office of the Secretary-General	ICC	International Criminal Court
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator	ICDO	International Civil Defence Organisation
ERDC	Enhanced Rapid Deployable Capacity	ICJ	International Court of Justice
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War	ICL	International Criminal Law
ETA	Expected Time of Arrival	ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ETD	Expected Time of Departure	ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
EU	European Union	IDP	Initial Delay Position
EW	Electronic Warfare	IDP(s)	Internally Displaced Person(s)
EZ	Extraction Zone	IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
FAA	Forward Assembly Area	IFV	Infantry Fighting Vehicle
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation	IG	Inspector-General
FB	Fire Base	IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation
FC	Force Commander	IHL	International Humanitarian Law
FCL	Final Coordination Line	IMPP	Integrated Missions Planning Process (UN)
FH	Field Hospital	IMTF	Integrated Missions Task Force (UN)
FIR	Force Information Requirements	INF	Infantry
FITTEST	Fast Information Technology & Telecommunications Emergency Support Team (WFP)	INSARAG	International Search & Rescue Advisory Group
FLB	Forward Logistics Base	INT	Intelligence
FLOT	Forward Line of Own Troops	INTREP	Intelligence Report
FLT	Fork Lift Truck	InterAction	American Council for Voluntary International Action
FM	Field Manual	IO	International Organisation
FOB	Forward Operations Base	IOM	International Organisation for Migration
FPU	Formed Police Units	IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
FSCO	Field Security Coordination Officer	JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
FSO	Field Security Office	JEZ	Joint Engagement Zone
FWD	Forward	JLOC	Joint Logistics Operation Centre (DPKO)
G1, J1, or U1	Personnel	JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre (DPKO)
G2, J2 or U2	Intelligence, Information, or Security Operations	JMC	Joint Military Commission
G3, J3 or U3	Operations	JMC	Joint Movement Centre
G4, J4 or U4	Logistics, Field Support	JMCC	Joint Movement Control Centre (DPKO)
G5, J5 or U5	Planning or Civil Affairs	JOA	Joint Operations Area
G6, J6 or U6	Communications	JOC	Joint Operations Centre (DPKO)
G7, J7 or U7	Training	JTF	Joint Task Force
G8, J8 or U8	Finance	KIA	Killed in Action
G9, J9 or U9	Cooperation, Capabilities or Doctrine	LAV	Light Armoured Vehicle
GA	General Assembly	LC	Line of Contact
GC I, II, III, IV	1949 Geneva Conventions I, II, III, IV	LEMA	Local Emergency Management Authority
GEN	General	LF	Landing Force
GIS	Geographic Information Systems	LNO or LO	Liaison Officer
GPS	Global Positioning System	LO	Law and Order
GW	Guerrilla Warfare	LOA	Letter of Assist
HA	Holding Area	LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
HA	Humanitarian Assistance	LOC	Line of Communication
HACC	Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centre	LOC	Logistics Operations Centre
HAO	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	LOD	Line of Demarcation
HC	1907 Hague Conventions	LOG	Logistics
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator (UN)	LRS	Long-Range Surveillance
HE	High Explosive	LT COL or LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
HELO	Helicopter	LZ	Landing Zone
HET	Heavy Equipment Transporter	MACC	Mine Action Coordination Centre
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre	MAG	Mine Advisory Group
HN	Host Nation	MAIN	Primary Command Post
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Centre	MAPEX	Map Exercise
HOM	Head of Mission	MBA	Main Battle Area
HOS	Hostile	MCDA	Military and Civil Defence Assets
HOSP	Hospital		
HVT	High Value Target		

REFERENCE A ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

MCDU	Military and Civil Defence Unit (changed to CMCS in 2005) (OCHA)	OPCON	Operational Control
M-DAY	Mobilisation Day	OPLAN	Operational Plan
MECH	Mechanised	OPO	Operation Order
MED	Medical	OPS	Operations
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation	OPSEC	Operations Security
METL	Mission Essential Task List	ORLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (DPKO)
MG	Machine Gun	OSOCC	On-site Operations Coordination Centre
MILAD	Military Adviser	OT	Observer Target
MILOB	Military Observer	PA	Public Affairs, Political Affairs
MINOPUH	UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	PAO	Political Affairs Officer
MINUGUA	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala	PAX	Passenger
MINURCA	UN Mission in the Central African Republic	PDSB	Policy Development & Studies Branch (OCHA)
MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	PETD	Policy, Evaluation & Training Division (DPKO)
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	PHA	Promotion of the Humanitarian Agenda Unit (OCHA)
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti	PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
MLO	Military Liaison Officer (UNHCR, WFP)	PL	Platoon
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System	PM	Provost Marshal
MOB	Main Operations Base	POC	Point of Contact
MONUA	UN Observer Mission in Angola	POC	Protection of Civilians
MONUC	UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	POD	Point of Debarkation
MOOTW	Military Operations Other than War	POE	Point of Embarkation
MOTAPM	Mines Other than Anti-Personnel Landmines	POW	Prisoner of War
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement	PSN	Position
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding	PSO	Peace Support Operations
MP	Military Police	PSYOP	Psychological Operations
MPS	Military Planning Service (DPKO)	PVO	Private Voluntary Organisation
MPV	Multi-Purpose Vehicle	PZ	Pick-up Zone
MSA	Mission Subsistence Allowance	QIP	Quick Impact Project
MSD	Minimum Safety Distance	R2P	Responsibility to Protect
MSR	Main Supply Route	R3P	Rearm, Refuel, Resupply Point
MTF	Medical Treatment Facility	RAA	Rear Assembly Area
MU	Medical Unit	RAS	Rear Area Security
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	RC	Resident Coordinator (UN)
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical	RDRA	Regional Disaster Response Advisor (OCHA)
NCA	National Command Authorities	RFA	Request for Assistance
NCC	National Contingent Commander	RFA	Restrictive Fire Area
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operation	RFI	Request for Information
NFA	No Fire Area	RFP	Request for Proposal
NFL	No Fire Line	RECCE or RECON	Reconnaissance
NFI	Non-Food Item	REGT	Regiment
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation	ROE	Rules of Engagement
NVD	Night Vision Device	ROI	Rules of Interaction
OAS	Offensive Air Support	ROZ	Restricted Operations Zone
OAS	Organisation of American States	RPV	Remotely Piloted Vehicle
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	RSGIDP	Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs
OHCHR	UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights	S/A	Surface to Air
OIOS	UN Office of Internal Oversight Services	SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
OLA	UN Office of Legal Affairs	SAM	Surface to Air Missile
OMA	Office of Military Affairs (DPKO)	SAR	Search and Rescue
ONUB	UN Operation in Burundi	SAT	Security Assistance Team
ONUC	UN Operations in the Congo	SATCOM	Satellite Communication
ONUCA	UN Observer Group in Central America	SC	Security Council
ONUSAL	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador	SCR	Security Council Resolution
OO	Office of Operations (DPKO)	SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
OP	Observation Post	SECT	Section / Sector
OPCOM	Operational Command	SF	Special Forces
		SG	Secretary-General
		SGB	Secretary-General's Bulletin

REFERENCE A ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

SGT	Sergeant		
SGTM	Standard Generic Training Module	UNIC	UN Information Centre
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe	UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
SHIRBRIG	Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations	UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
SITMAP	Situation Map	UNIMOG	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
SITREP	Situation Report	UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
SMILAD	Senior Military Advisor	UNIOSIL	UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
SMO	Senior Military Officer	UNJLC	UN Joint Logistics Centre
SMT	Security Management Team	UNMO	UN Military Observer
SMT	Senior Management Team	UNMOGIP	UN Observer Group in India and Pakistan
SO	Special Operations	UNOE	UN Owned Equipment
SOF	Special Operations Forces	UNPOL	UN Police
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement	UNIPOM	UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement	UN MCDA	UN Military and Civil Defence Assets
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures	UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
SPEC	Specification	UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SQN	Squadron	UNMIH	UN Mission in Haiti
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN)	UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
SSM	Surface to Surface Missile	UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
STM	Standard Training Module	UNMIN	UN Mission in Nepal
TA	Technical Agreement	UNMIS	UN Mission in the Sudan
TA	Travel Authorisation	UNMISSET	UN Mission of Support in East Timor
TACC	Tactical Air Control Centre	UNMIT	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
TACOM	Tactical Command	UNMOP	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
TACON, TACCON	Tactical Control	UNMOT	UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
TAM	Technical Assessment Mission	UNOCI	UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries	UNOGBIS	UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
TCF	Tactical Combat Force	UNOGIL	UN Observer Group in Lebanon
TF	Task Force	UNOSOM	UN Operation in Somalia
TGT	Target	UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia
TOC	Tactical Operations Centre	UNOMIL	UN Observer Mission in Liberia
TOR	Terms of Reference	UNOMSIL	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle	UNOMUR	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UHF	Ultra High Frequency	UNOWA	UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa
UN	United Nations	UNPOS	UN Political Office for Somalia
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Force
UNAMI	UN Assistance Mission for Iraq	UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
UNAMIC	UN Advance Mission in Cambodia	UNSCO	Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East
UNAMID	African Union / United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	UNSF	UN Security Force in West New Guinea
UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda	UNSMIH	UN Support Mission in Haiti
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone	UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNASOG	UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group	UNTAES	UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and W. Sirmium
UNAVEM	UN Angola Verification Mission	UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UN CMCoord	UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination	UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group
UNCRO	UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	UNTMIH	UN Transition Mission in Haiti
UNCT	UN Country Team	UNTOP	UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding
UNDAC Team	UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (OCHA)	UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organisation
UNDG	UN Development Group	UNV	UN Volunteers
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Force	UNYOM	UN Yemen Observation Mission
UNDP	UN Development Programme	USG	Under-Secretary-General (UN)
UNEF	UN Emergency Force	UW	Unconventional Warfare
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
UNFPA	UN Population Fund	WFP	World Food Programme
UNGOMAP	UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	WHO	World Health Organisation
UNHAS	UN Humanitarian Air Service (WFP)	WIA	Wounded in Action
UNHCR	UN Office for the High Commissioner for Refugees	WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
		ZOS	Zone of Separation
		ZULU	Universal Time

RELEVANT MATERIAL

[A] Humanitarian Guidance on Civil-Military Issues and Armed Groups

GENERIC

- ◆ Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies (OCHA, 2008)
- ◆ United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook (OCHA, 29 November 2007)
- ◆ UN CMCoord IMPACT (Integrated Missions Practical Approach to Coordination Tools) Electronic Study Tool (OCHA, February 2007)
- ◆ CMCS's structure, functions and the role within the humanitarian community (OCHA, December 2006)
- ◆ United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Concept (IASC, March 2005)
- ◆ The Use of Military and Civil Defence (M/CD) Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations: Report of the Task Force (IASC, 27 September 1995)
- ◆ IASC Principles on Military-Civilian Relations (IASC, January 1995)
- ◆ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (GA, December 1991)
- ◆ The Charter of the United Nations (1945)

COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

- ◆ Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper (IASC, 28 June 2004)
- ◆ Civil-Military Relations in Armed Conflict: A Humanitarian Perspective (Bessler & Seki OCHA, November 2004, published 2006)

- ◆ Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (IASC, March 2003 / January 2006 – Revision 1)
- ◆ Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys: Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines (IASC, 14 September 2001)

NATURAL DISASTERS

- ◆ Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief November 2006 (IASC, Rev 1.1, November 2007)

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC

- ◆ UNMIL Guidance for Civil-Military Coordination in Liberia – CIMIC Guidance (UNMIL, December 2006)
- ◆ Guidelines for Interaction Between MONUC Military and Civil Organizations (MONUC DSRSG/HC, June 2006)
- ◆ Guidelines for Humanitarian Organizations on Interacting with Military and other Security Actors in Iraq (UNAMI DSRSG/HC, October 2004)
- ◆ Principles Guiding the Civil-Military Interface in Afghanistan (UNAMA, 2004)
- ◆ Relations With the Military Forces in Haiti - Guidelines For UN Personnel (MINUSTAH, April 2004)
- ◆ General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq (SG, 8 May 2003)
- ◆ Relationships with Military Forces in Afghanistan - Guidelines for UNAMA Area Coordinators and other UN Personnel (UNAMA DSRSG/HC, 2002)

- ◆ Guidance On Use of Military Aircraft for UN Humanitarian Operations during the Current Conflict in Afghanistan (UNAMA DSRSG/HC, November 2001)

HUMANITARIAN SPACE

- ◆ Respect for Humanitarian Mandates in Conflict Situations (IASC, 1994)

AGENCY-FOCUSED

- ◆ UNHCR and the Military: A Field Guide (UNHCR, September 2006)
- ◆ UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations (UNHCR, January 1995)
- ◆ The ICRC and Civil-Military Relations in Armed Conflict (ICRC, 2001)
- ◆ The ICRC and Civil-Military Cooperation in Situations of Armed Conflict (ICRC, 2000)

NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

- ◆ Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners (Bessler & McHugh, OCHA, 2006)
- ◆ Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups (Bessler & Mc Hugh, OCHA, 2006)

[B] UN Peace Operations and Civil-Military Issues

Some items listed in this section are restricted to the UN

OVERVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

- ◆ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines: Capstone Doctrine (DPKO Draft, 2007)
- ◆ Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, December 2003)

CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION AND LIAISON

- ◆ DPKO Policy Directive on Civil-Military Coordination and Liaison (DPKO Draft, 2008)

- ◆ Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Review of Military Involvement in Civil Assistance in Peacekeeping Operations - A/60/588 (OIOS, December 2005)

- ◆ Civil-Military Coordination Policy, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, September 2002)

- ◆ United Nations Military Symbols Handbook (DPKO, 2000)

SYSTEM-WIDE COORDINATION AND INTEGRATED MISSIONS

- ◆ United Nations Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General (SG, June 2006)
- ◆ Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions (SG, February 2006)
- ◆ Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Relations Between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators (SG, 11 December 2000)
- ◆ Standard Directives for the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SG, 1999)
- ◆ ACC Guidelines on the Functioning of the Resident Coordinator System (CCPOQ, September 1999)

USE OF FORCE

- ◆ Guidelines for the Development of Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, November 2000)
- ◆ Secretary-General's Bulletin: Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian Law - ST/SGB/1999/13 (SGB, August 1999)
- ◆ Policy Governing the Use of Force and the Use of Firearms by United Nations Security Officers (UN, January 2001)

- ◆ Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (UN, September 1990)

COMMAND AND CONTROL

- ◆ Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, 15 February 2008)
- ◆ Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNITAR, 2004)

TRAINING FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION AND LIAISON IN PKOs

- ◆ Standard Training Module (STM) 2-6 on Civil-Military Coordination (DPKO, April 2005)
- ◆ Standardized Generic Training Module (SGTM) 10 on United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (DPKO, February 2005)

MILITARY GUIDELINES AND DIRECTIVES

- ◆ Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and Troop Contributing Countries (GA, August 2007)
- ◆ Guidelines for the Development of Command Directives for the Force Commander and the Chief Military Observer in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, October 2001)
- ◆ Generic Standard Operating Procedures for United Nations Force Headquarters (SOP/UNHFHQ) deployed in Peace Operations (DPKO, April 2001)
- ◆ Sample Directive for the Force Commander (DPKO, November 2000)
- ◆ Sample Directive for the Chief Military Liaison Officer (DPKO, November 2000)
- ◆ Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations – A/45/594 (GA, 9 October 1990)

MISCELLANEOUS

- ◆ Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), DPKO Policy Directive (DPKO, February 2007)
- ◆ Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres, DPKO Policy Directive (DPKO, July 2006)

[C] Field Security

- ◆ Saving Lives Together: A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements Among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field (IASC Amended Version, November 2006)
- ◆ Policy on Cooperation and Coordination between the Department of Safety and Security and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DSS and DPKO, October 2006)
- ◆ Be Safe, Be Secure: Security Guidelines for Women (DSS, September 2006)
- ◆ Recommendations to the IASC-WG from the IASC-WG Staff Security Task Force (IASC, 18 January 2002)
- ◆ Security in the Field: Information for Staff Members of the United Nations System (former UNSECOORD, 1998)
- ◆ 1994 UN Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel; and its 2005 Optional Protocol

[D] Code of Conduct and Standards

- ◆ UN Standard of Conduct: “We are the United Nations Peacekeepers” in A/61/19 (GA, June 2007)
- ◆ Ten Rules Code of Conduct for Blue Helmets in A/61/645 (GA, December 2006)
- ◆ The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (SPHERE Revised Edition, 2004)
- ◆ Directive for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers (DPKO, 2003)

[E] Gender / Abuse / Violence**GENDER EQUALITY**

- ◆ IASC Policy Statement on Gender Equality (IASC, March 2008)
- ◆ Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Peacekeeping Contexts: A Strategy Workshop with Women's Constituencies from Troop and Police Contributing Countries: Final Report (DPKO, February 2007)
- ◆ Women, Girls, Boys and Men: Different Needs – Equal Opportunities, Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action (IASC, December 2006)
- ◆ DPKO Policy Directive on Gender Equality in UN Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, 3 November 2006)
- ◆ Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, July 2004)
- ◆ Security Council Resolution 1325 (SC, 31 October 2000)

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE

- ◆ United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel – A/62/595 Annex, adopted by A/RES/62/214 (GA, 21 December 2007)
- ◆ DPKO Directive on Sexual Harassment in United Nations Peacekeeping and Other Field Missions – For Military Members of National Contingents, Military Observers and Civilian Police Officers (DPKO, 2003)
- ◆ Secretary-General's Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse – ST/SGB/2003/13 (SGB, October 2003)

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

- ◆ Guidelines for Gender-based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings (IASC, September 2005)

- ◆ Action to address Gender-based Violence in Emergencies: IASC Statement of Commitment (IASC, 22 Dec 2004)

[F] International Humanitarian Law**GENERAL**

- ◆ 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
- ◆ 1977 Geneva Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions – AP I Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; and AP II Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
- ◆ 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
- ◆ 1949 Geneva Convention - GC I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
- ◆ 1907 Hague Conventions and Declaration - in particular, HC IV on Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land; V on Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land; VII Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships; VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines; IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War; XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War; and XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War

CULTURAL PROPERTY

- ◆ 1999 Second Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict

REFERENCE B RELEVANT MATERIAL

- ◆ 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
- ◆ 1954 First Hague Protocol of the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict

ENVIRONMENT

- ◆ 1994 ICRC/UNGA Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict
- ◆ 1976 UN Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

WEAPONS

- ◆ 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
- ◆ 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
- ◆ 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
- ◆ 1980 UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; 1980 Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments; 1980 Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices and its Amended Protocol of 1996; 1980 Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons; 1995 Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons; and 2003 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War

- ◆ 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
- ◆ 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

[G] Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts

- ◆ OCHA's Role in Supporting Protection: International and Field Level Responsibilities (OCHA, September 2006)
- ◆ Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians (OCHA, 2004)
- ◆ Frequently Asked Questions on International Humanitarian, Human Rights and Refugee Law in the Context of Armed Conflict (IASC Task Force on Humanitarian Action and Human Rights, 2004)
- ◆ Glossary of Humanitarian Terms in Relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (OCHA, 2003)

[H] Information and Communication

- ◆ Secretary-General's Bulletin on Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling – ST/SGB/2007/6 (SGB, 12 February 2007)
- ◆ Policy and Guidance for Public Information in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (DPI and DPKO, July 2006)
- ◆ Standard Operating Procedure on Press Statements (DPKO, 3 April 2006)

NOTE: The list is not exhaustive and country/mission-specific guidelines have not been included. Readers are encouraged to check the following websites for further material on civil-military relationship.

OCHA: <http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines>

DPKO: <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/Pages/Public/Home.aspx>

IASC: <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc>

RELIEFWEB: <http://www.reliefweb.int>

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Electronic version available at: <http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines>

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