Ticking Time Bombs: NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia

I.          SUMMARY ANDRECOMMENDATIONS

Human Rights Watch condemns the use of cluster bombs by NATO in its bombing campaign-Operation Allied Force-against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Because of the high "dud," or failure, rate of the submunitions contained inside cluster bombs, these submunitions in effect become antipersonnel landmines, unable to distinguish between combatants and innocent civilians and ready to detonate on contact.

Both U.S. and British forces have acknowledged using cluster bombs in the bombing campaign, which began on March 24, 1999. The use of these weapons reportedly already has led to civilian casualties, including children. Because of the cluster bomb submunitions' appearance-the CBU-87 and RBL755 bomblets are bright orange/yellow soda-can sized objects, while the ATACMS bomblets are bright baseball-sized spheres-children are particularly drawn to the volatile live remnants. In the short term, live submunitions impede civilian and refugee movement; in the long term, they inhibit agriculture and economic recovery. As the 1991 Gulf war experience indicates, the widespread use of cluster bombs can also pose a severe hazard to friendly ground force operations, including peacekeeping forces.

Cluster bombs have an estimated 5 percent mechanical and fuse failure rate. For Operation Allied Force, the historical record and testing experience would tend to indicate that for every single CBU-87 used, there will be an average of some ten unexploded bomblets, and for every RBL755, there will be an average of five unexploded bomblets. Cluster bomb submunitions, like antipersonnel landmines, therefore have the unique potential to injure and kill civilians both during and after a conflict-cluster bombs despite, and antipersonnel landmines because of their design.

It is possible that, if the bombing campaign continues, the U.S. Air Force may start using the CBU-89 Gator "scatterable" mine system, which holds a mix of antitank and antipersonnel landmines. The use of antipersonnel landmines, an inherently indiscriminate weapon, is banned under the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, which came into force in March 1999. The United States has not signed the treaty, but all other NATO members except Turkey have.

Human Rights Watch calls on NATO to:

ØStop the use of cluster bombs.

ØRefrain from using the CBU-89 Gatormine system.

II.TICKINGTIME BOMBS

The announcement by the U.S. Defense Department at the endof April of a move toward the use of more "area weapons" in Operation AlliedForce, and the reports of a growing shortage of precision-guided weapons, pointto an increased use of unguided ("dumb") weapons by North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) forces in the war against Yugoslavia, including so-calledcluster bombs.[1][1]Human Rights Watch is concerned that the use of cluster bombs raises questionsof humanitarian law, and that the use in particular of the CBU-89 "Gator"scatterable mine would directly violate the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, which bansthe production, use, trade, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines.[2][2]

The extensive use in armed conflict of cluster bombs, whichcontain large numbers of submunitions, uniquely threatens the civilianpopulation. These submunitions-which are expendable because they are designedsimply to make them plentiful and individually less expensive-are dispersedover large areas, creating a grave lingering danger for the noncombatantcivilian population. This is because cluster bomb submunitions have been shownto have a significant "dud," or failure, rate.[3][3]Theduds in effect become antipersonnel landmines, incapable of distinguishingbetween combatants and innocent civilians.

The Gulf war experience verifies the unique dangers involvedin the use of cluster bombs. Hundreds of thousands of weapons were fired fromthe ground and the air at Iraqi forces in 1991, comprising tens of millions ofsubmunitions. One consequence of this massive use of fire power was thepost-war unexploded ordnance challenge represented by hundreds of thousands ofbomblets than had not detonated on contact nor as a result of secondary fusesor "self-destruct" mechanisms. The hazardous after-effect of the war wasparticularly acute because cluster bomb submunitions cannot be "defused": theymust be destroyed in place.

Recognizing the danger to civilians inherent in the use ofcluster bombs, air combat commander Maj. Gen. Michael Ryan (now U.S. Air Forcechief of staff) decided during Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in 1995 toprohibit their use. "The problem was that the fragmentation pattern was toolarge to sufficiently limit collateral damage and there was also the furtherproblem of potential unexploded ordnance," says one Air Force-sponsored study.[4][4]

The mounting toll of civilian casualties caused by NATO'sair war against Yugoslavia is taking place against a backdrop of widespreadabuses against civilians in Kosovo. Human Rights Watch has documented summaryexecutions, including numerous massacres, incidents of rape and other physicalviolence, and the indiscriminate shelling and razing of entire villages by theYugoslav National Army (JNA) and Serbian special police forces, as well as anumber of paramilitary units, since the NATO bombing campaign began on March24, 1999. Attacks on civilians and the systematic destruction of villages haveeffectively "cleansed" large areas of Kosovo of ethnic Albanians. However,civilians have been the targets of war crimes and other violations ofhumanitarian law since the very beginning of the Kosovo conflict in early 1998.[5][5]

Use of Cluster Bombs in Yugoslavia

Despite their acknowledged threat to civilians, clusterbombs have already been used in Operation Allied Force. Both the U.S. andBritain have acknowledged using cluster bombs. U.S. F-15E and F-16 aircrafthave dropped CBU-87 cluster bombs,[6][6]andBritish Royal Air Force (RAF) Harrier GR7s began dropping RBL755 cluster bombson April 6.[7][7](Appendix A contains a description of the main cluster bombs mentioned in thisreport.) The CBU-87 and RBL755 weapons have been used against airfields,communications and early-warning sites, vehicle concentrations on roads,Yugoslav Army command posts, troop compounds and concentrations, artillery, andarmor units.[8][8]There have been reports of cluster bombs being used at Batanica airbase nearBelgrade and Podgorica airfield in Montenegro, as well as in the followingareas in Kosovo: an "agricultural school" on the outskirts of Pristina, nearBelacevac, Djakovica, Doganovic, Lukare, Mt. Cicavica (northwest of Pristina),Mt. Pastrik (near Prizren), and Stari Trg (near Kosovska Mitrovica).[9][9]

Though probably no more than a few hundred air-deliveredcluster bombs have been used to date in Yugoslavia, there reportedly alreadyhave been civilian casualties. A NATO airstrike involving cluster bombs on anairfield in Nis on May 7 went off target, hitting a hospital complex andadjoining civilian areas. On April 24, five boys were reported to have beenkilled and two injured when what was evidently a cluster bomb submunitionexploded near the village of Doganovic, fifteen kilometers from Urosevac in southernKosovo. The munition was described as having a yellow-colored jacket, identicalto that of the CBU-87 or RBL755 bomblets.[10][10]

High Dud Rate

The CBU-87 and RBL755 are both mixed antipersonnel/antiarmor weapons that dispense explosive and incendiary submunitions fused to explode on contact. With 202 individual bomblets, the CBU-87 disperses its submunitions over an area at least the size of a football field. The RBL755 dispenses 147 bomblets. Most cluster bombs are intended for "soft" targets, that is, troops or unarmored vehicles, as well as fixed targets of a dispersed yet unprotected nature, such as communications sites.

The weapons are kept relatively inexpensive (in comparison with guided weapons) through the economical use of fuses and materials.[11][11] The side-effect of keeping the expense of individual bomblets low is a significant dud rate. Estimates of overall dud rates vary from the conservative 2-5 percent claimed by manufacturers, to up to 23 percent observed in acceptance and operational testing, to some 10-30 percent observed on the ground in areas of Iraq after the Gulf War.[12][12] Human Rights Watch has used a conservative estimate of 5 percent mechanical and fuse failures to estimate the humanitarian effect.[13][13] This number seems credible to most experts. In the Gulf war, cluster bomb use left some two million unexploded bomblets behind in Iraq and Kuwait, almost half from air-delivered bombs. It is important to note that these are dud rates associated with some of the newest technologies in the U.S. arsenal.[14][14] Older Vietnam-era cluster bombs such as the Rockeye (not yet used in Operation Allied Force, according to current information) may have much higher dud rates.

Thus for Operation Allied Force, the historical record and testing experience would tend to indicate that for every single CBU-87 used, there will be an average of some ten unexploded bomblets, and for every RBL755, there will be an average of five unexploded bomblets. Bombing in Operation Allied Force to date has been almost exclusively from medium altitudes (circa 15,000 feet), raising important questions regarding the ability to control the collateral damage effects of the use of cluster bombs, and the number of dispersed unexploded bomblets.[15][15] It is also important to note that the experience of cluster bomb use in the Gulf war and other conflicts indicates that the failure to fuse properly does not mean that submunitions on the ground are harmless. Cluster bomb submunitions, however fused, may explode at the slightest touch, even after extended periods of time.[16][16]

Human Rights Watch's Concerns

The current use of CBU-87 and RBL755 cluster bombs in Operation Allied Force raises serious concerns under international humanitarian law (also known as the laws of war). Article 51 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions (1977) prohibits indiscriminate attacks, which include attacks which "employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol."[17][17] The high dud rate of cluster bomb submunitions turns these weapons effectively into antipersonnel landmines that do not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, detonate on contact, and may lie undisturbed for years after a conflict has ended until someone happens upon one. Cluster bomb submunitions, like antipersonnel landmines, therefore have the unique potential to injure and kill civilians both during and after a conflict-cluster bombs despite, and antipersonnel landmines because of their design.

Moreover, because of the cluster bomb submunitions' appearance-the CBU-87 and RBL755 bomblets are bright orange/yellow soda-can sized objects, while the ATACMS bomblets are bright baseball-sized spheres-children are particularly drawn to the volatile live remnants. In the short term, live submunitions impede civilian and refugee movement; in the long term, they inhibit agriculture and economic recovery. As the Gulf war experience indicates, the widespread use of cluster bombs can also pose a severe hazard to friendly ground force operations (see below).

Human Rights Watch is disturbed by the possibility that more cluster bombs, and new types of cluster bombs, will be brought into the mix as NATO's military campaign in Yugoslavia continues to unfold. The U.S. Army is deploying 155mm artillery guns and Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers as part of Task Force Hawk in Albania. Both of these systems are capable of dispensing submunitions-the ATACMS missile fired from the MLRS launcher dispenses as many as 955 bomblets.[18][18] There has also been speculation that the CBU-89 Gator scatterable mine is available for use, and the U.S. government has stated that it reserves the right to use this weapon should the need arise, despite its being banned under the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, which came into force in March 1999.[19][19] The United States has not signed the treaty, but all other NATO members, except Turkey, have.

Human Rights Watch condemns NATO's use of cluster bombs in Yugoslavia, given the proven high dud rate of the submunitions employed, as indiscriminate in effect and the equivalent of using antipersonnel landmines. Human Rights Watch also calls on the United States not to use the CBU-89 Gator scatterable mine system, because this is an inherently indiscriminate weapon. Finally, Human Rights Watch is concerned that cluster bombs may be used in attacks on urban centers. This would present a particularly hazardous condition for the civilian population and should therefore be avoided.

III.        WHAT ARECLUSTER BOMBS?

Modern cluster bombs are of two main types-those delivered by surface artillery or rockets (including155mm and 203mm artillery projectiles and Multiple-Launch Rocket System rockets), and those delivered by air. The bombs are designed to disperse submunitions (often called "grenades" in ground-delivered weapons and "bomblets" in air-delivered weapons) over a large area, thereby increasing the radius of destructive effect over a target. The large number delivered increases the density of explosives in the target area, with submunitions designed to strike every few feet or so. They saturate an area with explosives and tiny flying shards of steel. Depending on the type, bomblets can be dispersed to areas as large as the size of several football fields. An air attack typically disperses thousands of submunitions within a small space; a common target area for a single weapon covers an area of roughly 100 x 50 meters.

Air-delivered cluster bombs are composed of a large dispenser with attached fins (called the tactical munitions dispenser (TMD) in the newest systems); fuses and electronic devices to control, spin, and direct the weapon during fall; and submunitions or bomblets. The bomblets themselves are of a variety of designs. Submunitions for the older CBU-52/B are softball sized, the CBU-58A/B and CBU-71/B have baseball-sized bomblets, and the Mk20 Rockeye carries dart-shaped bomblets with a small fuse in the point end. Once released, cluster bomb units (CBUs) fall for a specified amount of time or distance before the dispenser opens, allowing the submunitions to cover a wide-area target. Depending on the type, the submunitions are activated by an internal fuse, and can detonate above ground, at impact, or in a delayed mode.

Cluster bombs can be set to determine height of burst and the dispersal pattern. As the aircraft drops the TMD, tail fins open and stabilize the bomb body. At the selected time or altitude, the dispenser begins to spin, the spin rate determining the dispersal pattern. As the bomblets fall and disperse, they arm in different ways depending on their design. In the case of the CBU-87 soda-can sized bomblets (individually called BLU-97s), a "spider" cup is stripped off the body, releasing a spring which pushes out a nylon "parachute" (called the decelerator), which inflates and then stabilizes and arms the bomblet. The bomblets orient perpendicular to the ground for optimal top attack, and the descent is slowed to approximately 125 feet per second. On impact the primary firing mechanism detonates the bomblet.[20][20] A secondary firing system is included to detonate if the bomblet impacts other than straight on, or if the bomblet lands in soft terrain or water.[21][21]

The newest BLU-97s on the CBU-87 are made up of the parachute-like decelerator, the firing system and fuse, and the downward-firing shaped charge, all packed in a steel case with a fire-starting (incendiary) zirconium ring. The case is the main part, made of scored steel designed to break into approximately 300 preformed thirty-grain fragments upon detonation of the internal explosive. The fragments then travel at extremely high velocities in all directions. The explosive shaped charge (a formed molten copper jet slug) is the primary antiarmor weapon. If the bomblet has been properly oriented, the downward-firing charge travels at 2,570 feet per second upon detonation. The zirconium ring provides for fuel and other fires by spreading small incendiary fragments.

The impact diameter of individual cluster bomblets can vary from 250 to 500 feet, depending on the altitude of detonation. The shaped charge has the ability to penetrate five inches of armor on contact. The tiny steel case fragments are powerful enough to damage light armor and trucks at fifty feet, and to cause human injury at 500 feet. The incendiary ring can start fires in any combustible environment.

Widespread Cluster Bomb Use in the Gulf War

The 1991 Gulf war saw the most extensive and widespread use of cluster bombs in the history of armed conflict, both air- and ground-delivered. Given the flexibility in delivery modes for the newer bombs, particularly the capacity for delivery at extremely high speeds, and the reliability in comparison with Vietnam-era cluster bombs, CBU-87s became, according to the U.S. Air Force, the "weapon of choice."[22][22] About one quarter of the total number of weapons dropped by aircraft on Iraq and Kuwait were cluster bombs, a total of 62,000 air-delivered cluster bombs. In addition, some 100,000 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) artillery shells and 10,000 MLRS rockets were expended (see Table 2). This translates, overall, into the dispersal of somewhere on the order of 24-30 million submunitions.[23][23] Assuming a dud rate of 5 percent, the number of individual live submunitions left on the battlefield, and in other areas of Iraq and Kuwait, can be reasonably estimated to be, at a minimum, 1.2 to 1.5 million.

Cluster bombs were used in attacks demanding dispersed yet fairly accurate damage against fixed "soft" targets (for example, radar, surface-to-air missile, and communications installations). Air-delivered cluster bombs were also in high demand for attacks intended to destroy Iraq's widely dispersed tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery guns. They were extensively used in attacks on the Iraqi transportation system as part of the effort to find and destroy mobile Scud missiles. Aircraft patrolling from medium and high altitudes randomly delivered cluster bombs on roads and highways, and around culverts and bridges suspected of being missile traveling routes or hide sites.[24][24] From February 19 onwards, in addition, B-52 heavy bombers flying at extremely high altitudes dropped cluster bombs on suspected Scud launch areas and on roads leading to these areas, releasing bombs at timed intervals.[25][25] Towards the end of the war, B-52 bombers, together with many types of tactical fighter aircraft, also delivered cluster bombs on tank and vehicle columns retreating from Kuwait, including along the so-called "highway of death."[26][26] In northern Iraq, in addition, aircraft flying from Turkey dropped cluster bombs on military and dual-purpose civilian installations.

Bombing from medium or high altitudes had a significant impact on both cluster bomb accuracy and reliability. Not only was there a greater dispersal pattern for the submunitions than was intended with low-altitude delivery, but pilots were outside the range needed to make sighting corrections or assess damage.[27][27] Vietnam-era CBU-52/58/71 cluster bombs, intended originally solely for low-altitude delivery, also "performed poorly throughout the war," according to the Gulf War Air Power Survey.[28][28]

One of the unexpected problems involved in medium- and high-altitude delivery of cluster bombs in Operation Desert Storm, even with the newer CBU-87s, was that the weapons began to experience what has been termed "excessively high dud rates."[29][29] Despite contact fuses and secondary firing systems, an enormous number of submunitions failed to detonate, particularly when landing in soft sand, shallow water, or mud.

One of the most immediate problems raised by the large number of unexploded bomblets that was being observed on the ground was the threat to U.S. and coalition forces in ground operations. The situation became so critical that the use of cluster bombs by aircraft was cut back by U.S. Central Command during the ground war for fear of friendly casualties.[30][30] As the ground war began, in some instances, "ground movement came to a halt because units were afraid of encountering unexploded ordnance."[31][31] Troops with the U.S. 1st Armored Division said that the principal threat they faced was "unexploded ordnance believed to have been left over from an earlier American bombardment."[32][32] The Washington Post observed on March 3 that "units of the army's 1st Cavalry Division that had suffered no combat casualties in their unopposed drive through southern Iraq have seen several of their soldiers killed or wounded by bombs or mines in the area they are holding."[33][33]

Post-war injuries to U.S. and U.K. soldiers from submunitions on the battlefield, mostly because of excessively high dud rates of one type of grenades in the 155mm artillery projectile and MLRS rockets, subsequently received much press attention in the United States and Britain, as well as U.S. Congressional interest. The General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that during Operation Desert Storm at least twenty-five U.S. military personnel were killed and others were injured by submunitions fired by their own forces.[34][34] Unexploded submunitions also caused many casualties among disposal specialists.[35][35]

Dangers to the Civilian Population

The use of cluster bombs in Kuwait, on and around roads in southern, northern, and western Iraq, as well as in urban areas in Iraq led to a particularly hazardous situation for the noncombatant civilian populations of both Iraq and Kuwait.[36][36] Almost immediately after the end of the fighting, the civilian impact from the large scale-use of submunitions became evident. Soldiers found large amounts of unexploded submunitions and air-delivered mines in areas outside the immediate battlefield. In the Iraqi town of Safwan, for example, as the refugee population swelled after the cease-fire, "the number of injuries caused by unexploded ordnance rose alarmingly."[37][37] There were widespread and consistent reports of Iraqi and Kuwaiti civilians being killed or injured by unexploded bomblets from coalition cluster bombs. Unexploded submunitions were a hazard to Kurdish refugees and foreign relief operations in the north.[38][38]

The widespread and indiscriminate use of cluster bombs in civilian areas thus generally impeded post-war recovery for the civilian population. Iraqi authorities claim to have cleared over one-half million items of unexploded ordnance in urban areas of the country, and removed tens of thousands of unexploded submunitions from electrical power plants and telephone, television, and radio communications installations, from the approaches to bridges, and from civilian neighborhoods.[39][39] Even if the Iraqi authorities and the experiences of other observers in Iraq were not to be believed, one of the first tasks of the Allied forces in extinguishing the oil fires in Kuwait after the war was clearing unexploded ordnance, particularly coalition submunitions. The Kuwaiti minister for electricity and water stated that delays in restoring services were caused by the discovery of "unexploded cluster bombs and minefields at crucial spots in the electric grid."[40][40]

Cluster bomb submunitions that failed to detonate were also responsible for a considerable portion of the immediate post-war civilian injuries in Iraq.[41][41] It is estimated that more than 1,600 civilians (400 Iraqi and 1,200 Kuwaiti) were killed and over 2,500 injured in the first two years after the end of the Gulf war from accidents involving submunitions.[42][42]

A particular problem for the civilian population, particularly children, was the very design of the submunitions. "Toy-size bombs designed to kill tanks and soldiers [also] appear as white lawn darts, green baseballs, orange-striped soda cans," one report from Kuwait reported almost a year after the war ended. These attractively arrayed and intriguing unexploded submunitions "proved deadly to children."[43][43] Kuwaiti doctors stated that some 60 percent of the victims of unexploded ordnance injuries were children aged fifteen and under.[44][44]

The "lawn darts" referred to are Vietnam-era Rockeye submunitions that were used in huge numbers in 1991. The baseball-like remnants are from older CBU-52/58/71 cluster bombs and the ground artillery- and rocket-delivered bomblets. The orange-striped "soda cans" are the distinct remnants of the BLU-97 bomblets from the CBU-87 and the British BL755.

The distinct shapes and colors of cluster bomb submunitions have posed particular hazards in Iraq and Kuwait, but even so, these live submunitions have been far less detectable than large unexploded bombs, particularly as they were covered by shifting sand or pools of water. In addition, with anti-handling fuses on some submunitions, and a deterioration of inexpensive electronic components caused by the passage of time and widely fluctuating temperatures, there came to exist "perhaps the most dangerous pieces of ordnance in our arsenal, from a dud-fired standpoint...They can only be blown in place or neutralized remotely."[45][45]

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report was written by William M. Arkin, a consultant with the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch, and edited by Joost R. Hiltermann, the executive director of the Arms Division, and Michael McClintock, deputy program director of Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch acknowledges with appreciation the support of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ruth Mott Fund. Human Rights Watch takes sole responsibility for the content of this report.

APPENDIX A:   DESCRIPTIONSOF CLUSTER BOMB TYPES

CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition

The U.S. CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition (CEM) is the newest standard air-delivered cluster bomb unit (CBU) in the U.S. arsenal.[46][46] It has been in the U.S. Air Force inventory since 1986 (and in production since 1984), and has replaced aging and less effective Vietnam-era cluster bomb units and antitank mines. A myriad of delivery settings (high and low altitudes, extremely high speeds, and various toss modes) makes it a significant advance over older bombs. Combining light antiarmor capabilities with antipersonnel and incendiary effects, it is the only weapon in the U.S. inventory to include all three "kill mechanisms."

The 1000-lb. class cluster bomb is compatible with virtually all current tactical fighter aircraft, U.S. and foreign.[47][47] It is manufactured by Alliant Techsystems of Minnesota.

The weapon contains 202 bomblets (designated with the nomenclature BLU-97/B). The bomblets (officially called "combined effects bomblets," CEBs) are seven inches long, with a two-and-a-half inch diameter and a weight of 3.41 pounds.

In contrast with earlier cluster bombs, the ground pattern size and shape of the bomblet dispersal can be determined in the CBU-87 by setting the spin rate of the dispenser and the height of burst. A single CBU-87 set at a low spin rate (e.g., 500 rpm) can disperse bomblets to an area 120 by 200 feet, with bomblets scattered an average of nine feet apart. A range of impact patterns from 70 by 70 feet to 150 by 450 feet can be achieved depending on altitude.[48][48] In general, the bomblets cover an area of 800 by 400 feet, given medium- to high-altitude delivery.[49][49]

In order to even more fully control the accuracy of the weapon, the CBU-87 is being upgraded under the Wind Corrected Munition Dispenser (WCMD) program. This is a retrofitted tail kit manufactured by Lockheed Martin.

BL755

The British BL755 air-delivered cluster bomb is carried by all active Royal Air Force and Royal Navy attack aircraft, most notably the Harrier, Jaguar, and Tornado. A "dual-role" weapon similar to the U.S. CBU-87, it is designed to attack a range of both "hard" and "soft" targets. The TMD weighs 600 lb, and contains 147 "beer-can size" bomblets similar in appearance to the U.S. BLU-97 bomblet delivered by the CBU-87.[50][50] It entered service with the RAF in 1972.

When the BL755 is dropped, the primary fuses arm. After a set interval, the initial cartridge is fired, which produces the gas pressure to blow off the two-part TMD body "skins," and fire the main cartridge. Each bomblet is 5.87 inches (0.15m) when it is fired. This extends to 24.69 inches (0.62m) once the nose probe and retarding parachute extend. The BL755 is manufactured by Hunting Engineering.[51][51]

The BL755 cluster bomb was originally designed for low-altitude delivery only, and in the Gulf war proved ineffective for medium-altitude strikes. During the war, the RAF used U.S. CBU-87s.[52][52]

A modified "R" variant of the BL755, called the RBL755, was developed after the Gulf war to provide medium-altitude operations. This variant of the BL755 has been used by NATO in Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia. It can be dropped from medium altitudes (above 10,000 ft).[53][53]

CBU-89 Gator

The U.S. CBU-89/B is the latest cluster bomb in the Gator family of scatterable mines (which also includes the older CBU-78/79 U.S. Navy weapon). The 1000-lb SUU-64/B TMD of the CBU-89 holds seventy-two antiarmor and twenty-two antipersonnel landmines (or sixty mines in the case of the CBU-78). Gator's mines are the BLU-91/B antitank mine and BLU-92/B antipersonnel mine. The BLU-91/B antitank mine detects targets, distinguishes armored vehicles, and detonates when the target reaches the most vulnerable approach point. The BLU-92/B antipersonnel mine serves to discourage clearing of the antitank mines. The system is built by Aerojet Ordnance Company.

The mines arm immediately upon impact with the ground. Each has an integrated fuse: the antitank mine has a magnetic influence fuse to sense armor, and the antipersonnel mine has a deployed trip wire that activates when personnel walk on or disturb it. The antipersonnel mine has a fragmenting case warhead that is triggered by the trip wires. Upon activation, the mine sends high-velocity steel fragments in a horizontal plane over a wide area. Another feature of the Gator is the random-delay function, allowing for detonations over several days to provide area denial and harassment. Both mines also have a programmable self-destruct feature which can be set just prior to aircraft takeoff using a selector switch on the dispenser.

Gator can be delivered by tactical aircraft or heavy bombers. The minefields are used for area denial, diversion of moving ground forces, or to immobilize targets to supplement other direct attack weapons. During Operation Deliberate Force over Bosnia in 1995, the CBU-89 was slated to be used, according to a U.S. Air Force study: "60 Gator mines were to be used for area denial and funneling of troops and equipment during BSA [Bosnian Serb Army] withdrawals, but the plan was never implemented because of the cease fire and the desire to avoid non-combatant casualties, fratricide, and civilian vehicle damage."[54][54]

Table 1
U.S. Cluster Bomb Types

* Obsolete or no longer in widespread active use by the U.S. military.

The CBU-72/B containing the BLU-73A/B is classified as a fuel-air explosive, and contains three submunitions.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Air Force, Air Land Sea Application Center, UXO: Multiservice Procedures for Operations in an Unexploded Ordnance Environment (FM 100-38, MCRP 4-5.1, NWP TP 3-02.4.1, ACCPAM 10-752, PACAFPAM 10-752, USAFEPAM 10-752), July 1996.

Table 2
Air-Delivered Cluster Bomb Use in the Gulf War

* Does not include a complete count of allied use of cluster bombs, particularly French and Saudi.

Sources: U.S. Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), Volume III, Part I, p. 235; Volume IV, Part I, p. 65, Volume V, Part I, pp. 550-552; House of Commons, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby (July 1991), p. 86. Sources vary on the number of CBU-52/58/71 cluster bombs expended, some stating 17,831. The higher official number was chosen; see GWAPS, Volume III, Part I, pp. 234, 256.

[1][1] To date, over 90 percent of all weapons used have been precision-guided weapons. The remaining 10 percent are a mix of unguided bombs, including some cluster bombs. On April 12, a Department of Defense official stated that the percentage of precision weapons being used was in "the high 90s." Maj. Gen. Chuck Wald, Vice Director J-5, JCS, DOD News Briefing, April 12, 1999.

[2][2] The U.S. military defines a scatterable mine as "a mine laid without regard to classical pattern and which is designed to be delivered by aircraft, artillery, missile, ground dispenser, or by hand." Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), "Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles and Mine Warfare," Joint Pub. 3-15, June 30, 1993, p. GL-8.

[3][3] A dud is defined as a submunition that does not explode upon impact, as is intended.

[4][4] Michael O. Beale, "Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina," thesis presented to the faculty of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, June 1996. See also Air University, "Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, Final Report of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study," June 1998, p. 8-32. According to these sources, one U.S. Air Force A-10 unit dropped two CBU-87s as a result of a miscommunication during the Bosnia campaign, but there was no subsequent use.

[5][5] Human Rights Watch has published a number of reports on human rights conditions in Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1998 and 1999. They include: A Week of Terror in Drenica (New York: Human Right Watch, 1999); "Academic Freedom: Deepening Authoritarianism in Serbia," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 11, no. 2, January 1999; "Detentions and Abuse in Kosovo," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 10, no. 10, December 1998; and Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998). News flashes on the war in the former Yugoslavia can be found at Human Rights Watch's web site at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/kosovo98/.

[6][6] Kenneth Bacon, DOD spokesperson, and Maj. Gen. Chuck Wald, Vice Director J-5, JCS, DOD News Briefing, April 15, 1999; and Maj. Gen. Chuck Wald, Vice Director J-5, JCS, DOD News Briefing, April 12, 1999. On April 15, General Wald said: "We have been dropping cluster bombs. They're well within the confines of international law."

[7][7] John Phillips, "Cluster-bombing ends frustration of Harrier pilots," Times (London), April 7, 1999. The RBL755 is a modified version of the BL755, which the British Royal Air Force used in the Gulf war in 1991 (see below).

[8][8] "War Briefing, Days 31 & 32," Irish Times (Dublin), April 26, 1999; "Harriers Use Cluster Bombs on Enemy HQ," Birmingham Post, April 23, 1999; David A. Fulghum, "Isolated, Serb Army Faces Barrage," Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 19, 1999; and Tim Butcher, "Conflict in the Balkans: Rains restrict the full wrath of NATO air offensive: Rogue bomb has set back allies' propaganda war," Daily Telegraph (London), April 10, 1999.

[9][9] "Five Boys reportedly killed by NATO cluster bomb," Pristina Media Center, as reported in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 26, 1999; "NATO accused of dropping cluster bombs on Kosovo," Pristina Media Center, as reported in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 22, 1999; "NATO planes continue to bomb civilian facilities," ITAR/TASS, April 20, 1999; "Conflict in the Balkans; Balkans Notebook; Cluster Bombs Killed Refugees?," Atlanta Journal and Constitution, April 18, 1999; "NATO reported to have dropped ‘over 10 cluster bombs' on southwest Kosovo," Tanjug News Agency, as reported in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 17, 1999; Paul Watson, "Dispatch from Kosovo: Break in Clouds Can Give Allies Clear Views of Targets; Yugoslavia: If weekend skies brighten as expected, Milosevic's forces won't be able to hide from NATO," Los Angeles Times, April 3, 1999; and "Yugoslav news agency says NATO missiles shot down, repeats cluster bomb charge," Tanjug News Agency, as reported in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 31, 1999.

[10][10] Paul Watson and Elizabeth Shogren, "Dispatch from Kosovo," Los Angeles Times, April 25, 1999; "Children play with NATO bomb, five killed - Serbian media centre," Deutsche Presse Agentur, April 24, 1999; Paul Watson, "Unexploded Weapons Pose Deadly Threat on Ground," Los Angeles Times, April 28, 1999; and "Five boys reportedly killed by NATO cluster bomb," Pristina Media Center, as reported in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 26, 1999.

There was also some press speculation that cluster bombs were used in NATO attacks on roads in Kosovo on April 14. Observers reported seeing two-foot long "fin-shaped bomb remnants" with the name ALCOA stamped on the side. According to the Los Angeles Times, the metal fins of the fragments contained the numbers: ALCOA 2 B24, a serial number 8377401, followed by ALCOA 7075, and the number 961. Paul Watson, "Dispatch from Kosovo: Cluster Bombs May Be What Killed Refugees," Los Angeles Times, April 17, 1999. There are a number of cluster bombs that the general description could correspond with, though the link made by the Times to the U.S. manufacturer ALCOA is likely to be in error, as ALCOA is not known to have been a producer of cluster munitions. It should be noted that the weapons fragments could also be Yugoslav mortar rounds or artillery fragments. See also, "Conflict in the Balkans; Balkans Notebook; Cluster Bombs killed Refugees?," Atlanta Journal and Constitution, April 18, 1999.

[11][11] The materials used in cluster bomb submunitions are of inferior quality compared to the materials used in single bombs, especially laser-guided "smart" weapons, primarily because the bomblets are considered expendable.

[12][12] The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) found that as many as 23 percent of MLRS rocket submunitions failed to explode during acceptance testing. U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, "Operation Desert Storm: Casualties Caused by Improper Handling of Unexploded U.S. Submunitions," GAO/NSIAD-93-212, August 1993, p. 4.

One U.S. army expert estimated 15 percent of submunitions failed to detonate in 1991: "Sometimes you get 50 percent duds." Quoted in James Vincent Brady, "Kuwaitis dying from old menace: unexploded bombs," Fort Worth Star-Telegram, January 12, 1992. Another report on unexploded ordnance states that "around one third of submunitions failed to explode due to landing in soft sand." Trevor Nash, "RO in Kuwait: The Big Clean-Up," Military Technology, July 1991, p. 59. Another U.S. expert said that "at least 600 bombs, rockets and artillery shells dropped or fired every day of the war will have failed to explode and thus constitute a continuing hazard somewhere in the war theater." Quoted in Ken Ringle, "After the Battles, Defusing the Debris," Washington Post, March 1, 1991. See also Chris Hedges, "With a Bang! Bang! Bang! War Cleanup Goes On," New York Times, October 15, 1992; and Rick Atkinson, "Doing a Bang-Up Job: With Cautious Gusto, Troops Explode Iraq's Munitions," Washington Post, March 26, 1991.

[13][13] A submunition has a primary fuse that is designed to ignite on contact. Failing that, a secondary fuse is ignited via a time-delay mechanism. A mechanical failure refers to instances in which the submunition does not detonate either because the parachute fails to deploy (the deploying of the parachute is designed to pull the pin that arms the fuse), or the explosive itself fails to go off, or the spring malfunctions.

[14][14] These numbers have been extensively discussed with U.S. Army and Air Force ordnance experts. Military officials agree that in Desert Storm 3 to 5 percent of the artillery projectiles and bombs failed to explode on average, although soft sand and water likely increased this dud rate to up to 15 percent in some areas. Some weapons types also experienced higher failure rates, such as the air-delivered Rockeye and ground-delivered 155mm artillery submunitions.

[15][15] The higher the altitude at which cluster bombs are dropped, the wider will be the dispersal radius of the submunitions, and the greater, therefore, the potential risk to nonmilitary targets. Moreover, at higher altitudes, pilots have a reduced capability to make sighting corrections. Finally, at greater altitudes, the bomblets do not necessarily have the opportunity to fuse properly, and the dud rate is therefore likely to be higher.

[16][16] The Mennonite Central Committee has done extensive work on the disposal of unexploded bombs left in Laos after the Vietnam War, and continues to find unexploded cluster bomb submunitions to be a significant problem. Experts in Laos have noted, moreover, that submunitions become less stable and therefore more dangerous with each passing year. See Mennonite Central Committee, "Cluster Munitions as Inhumane and Indiscriminate Weapons," December 1997.

[17][17] Moreover, article 35 of Protocol I stipulates that "In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited."

[18][18] There have also been reports that the new CBU-97 Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW) has been used, but this has not been confirmed. See David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, "Weather, Weapons Dearth Slow NATO Strikes: Military officials worry that the limited number of air sorties is undermining the effectiveness of air strikes," Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 5, 1999.

[19][19] Based on Human Rights Watch discussions with U.S. Defense Department officials, April 8 and April 15. See also Tom Curry, "Pentagon Denies Land Mine Report," MSNBC, April 14, 1999, located at http://www.msnbc.com/news/259325.asp and Kenneth Bacon, DOD spokesperson, and Maj. Gen. Chuck Wald, Vice Director J-5, JCS, DOD News Briefing, April 14, 1999. Bacon said: "We have dropped, as General Wald said, cluster bombs, but we have not dropped the ones that he was talking about, which are a combination of anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines. These are the self-destructing ones called Gator."

[20][20] A crushed piezoelectric crystal generates an electrical pulse that is sent through a cable to the Mk 96 detonator, initiating the explosion. Capt. Kelly Leggette, "The Air Force's New Cluster Weapon—The Combined Effects Munition," USAF Fighter Weapons Review, Spring 1986, pp. 24-32.

[21][21] The working of the secondary firing mechanism is described as follows: "At impact, a loose steel ball at the base of the secondary fuse moves outward, regardless of the impact angle, forcing a sleeve upward....This movement releases the secondary firing pin release balls and allows the firing pin spring to force the firing pin into a Mk 55 stab detonator which in turn crushes a second piezoelectric crystal. The resultant burst of electrical current is routed to the Mk 96 detonator and initiates the explosive train in the same manner as the primary fuse. Ibid.

[22][22] U.S. Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), vol. 3, part 1 (1993), p. 246 (hereafter referred to as GWAPS).

[23][23] This is based on the calculation of the number of artillery shells times seventy-two submunitions each, rockets times 644 submunitions each, and bombs times an average of two hundred submunitions each.

[24][24] F-16 aircraft primarily delivered CBU-87s in eastern Iraq as part of these operations, and the F-111F aircraft delivered CBU-89 Gator antitank and antipersonnel mines in western Iraq. GWAPS, vol. 4, part 1, pp. 43, 48.

[25][25] Ibid., p. 290.

[26][26] Ibid., p. 231.

[27][27] Ibid., vol. 2, part 2, pp. 162-163.

[28][28] Ibid., vol. 2, part 1, p. 261. See also Ibid., vol. 4, part 1, p. 222.

[29][29] Ibid., vol. 2, part 1, p. 261. See also GWAPS, vol. 4, part 1, p. 222.

[30][30] "Large quantities of cluster bombs were never used after the start of the ground war because of the rapid advance of allied forces and the fear that they would encounter undetonated bomblets." U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, "Limitations on the Role and Performance of B-52 Bombers in Conventional Conflicts," B-252126, June 22, 1993, p. 61.

[31][31] U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, "Operation Desert Storm: Casualties Caused," p. 9.

[32][32] Douglas Jehl, Los Angeles Times, Pool Report with the 1st Armored Division, February 25, 1991.

[33][33] William Branigan, "Gruesome Examples of Horrors of War Abound in Iraqi Desert," Washington Post, March 3, 1991.

[34][34] U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, "Operation Desert Storm: Casualties Caused." The GAO investigation solely related to the Army's experience with its own M42, M46 and M77 artillery- and rocket-delivered submunitions. According to "EOD Alert," Marine Corps Gazette, January 1994, p. 9, thirty U.S. soldier deaths and 104 injuries were caused by unexploded ordnance overall.

[35][35] "90 Explosive Experts Killed So Far -- Heat May Add to Pollution Problem," Arab Times, July 8, 1992.

[36][36] Frank P. Ragano, "Operation Desert Sweep Ousts Battlefield Waste," National Defense, March 1994, p. 30; Pamela Pohling-Brown, "CMS Goes Clean and Green," International Defense Review, February 1993, p. 132; John Boatman, "Sweep up after the Storm," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 9, 1992; Ron Martz, "Mines Pose Hidden Danger in Kuwait," Atlanta Journal & Constitution, December 15, 1991; John G. Roos, "CMS Encountered Minefield in US Before Winning Kuwait Clean-Up Award," Armed Forces Journal International, November 1991, p. 24; Nash, "RO in Kuwait"; Atkinson, "Doing a Bang-up Job"; and Branigan, "Gruesome Examples."

[37][37] U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (1993), pp. 321, 328.

[38][38] U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Hearings, 1991, p. 35. See also Clyde Haberman, "In Kurdish Havens, the Big Danger is Underfoot," Washington Post, May 27, 1991. According to 39th Tactical Group, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, "Challenges Overcome During Operations Desert Storm and Provide Comfort," n.d. (1993), released under the Freedom of Information Act, explosive ordnance disposal experts cleared 2.7 tons of unexploded ordnance from the runways and operating areas of the northernmost Iraqi airfield bombed in Sirsenk. Of course, the major danger to the Kurdish population was presented by the landmines emplaced by Iraq both during the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war. See Middle East Watch, Hidden Deaths: Land Mines and Civilian Casualties in Iraqi Kurdistan (New York: October 1992).

[39][39] This is based on testimony and observations of the first Harvard Study Team in Iraq in May 1991, and by the International Study Team in Iraq in August-September 1991. See also "Teams Defuse 11 U.S.-Made Bombs in Ninawa," Baghdad INA (Iraqi News Agency), FBIS-NES-93-099, May 25, 1993, p. 35; "Cluster Bombs Kill Boy 16 Apr," Baghdad INA, FBIS-NES-93-073, April 19, 1993, p. 22; "Engineers Clear Saddam Dam Area of Cluster Bombs," Baghdad INA, FBIS-NES-93-071, April 15, 1993, p. 19; "Civil Defense Says 464,599 Bombs Defused Through Feb," Baghdad INA, FBIS-NES-93-040, March 3, 1993, p. 18; "Bombs, Other Ammunition Defused in Dhi Qar," Baghdad INA, FBIS-NES-92-245, December 21, 1992, p. 32; "16 Cluster Bombs Defused in al-Muthanna Province," Baghdad INA, FBIS-NES-92-218, November 10, 1992, p. 34; "Recent Destruction of Munitions in al-Basrah," Baghdad INA, FBIS-NES-92-128, July 2, 1992, p. 21; "Exploding War Bombs Causing Civilian Casualties," Baghdad INA, FBIS-NES-91-243, December 18, 1991, p. 22; "Ordnance Defused in al-Anbar," Baghdad INA, FBIS-NES-91-243, December 18, 1991, p. 22; "‘Text' of Ministry Statement on Defused Bombs," Baghdad INA, FBIS-NES-91-228, November 26, 1991, p. 21; and "U.S.-Kuwaiti Force Reportedly ‘Infiltrated' Farms," Baghdad INA, FBIS-NES-91-204, October 22, 1991, p. 12.

[40][40] Tom Diaz, "Basic needs still unmet in Kuwait," Washington Times, March 18, 1991. See also Eliot Marshall, "To Stop Kuwait's Fires, First Clear the Mines," Science, June 21, 1991, p. 1609. The submunitions were not limited to purely military targets. At one elementary school alone in Fahaheel neighborhood of Kuwait City technicians recovered 1,220 Rockeye submunitions. Brady, "Kuwaitis dying."

[41][41] This was certainly the case in the immediate post-war period (see, for example, Nora Boustany, "Border Town Becomes Wasteland of Refugees," Washington Post, March 20, 1991; and Susan Okie, "30,000 Fleeing War Get Shelter in Iran, U.N. Officials Say," Washington Post, March 20, 1991), and continues even to this day.

[42][42] The Iraqi figures are derived from interviews conducted by the author of this report, William Arkin, with Iraqi civil defense officials in August-September 1991 and February 1993. The Kuwaiti figures were estimated by the Kuwaiti Defense Ministry and from discussions with analysts at the National Ground Intelligence Center. See also Brady, "Kuwaitis dying"; NBC Nightly News, April 29, 1991; Matthew L. Wald, "Mines and Old Bombs Are Still a Threat in Kuwait," New York Times, May 12, 1991; Nora Boustany "Border Town"; and Susan Okie, "30,000 Fleeing War."

[43][43] Cited in Brady, "Kuwaitis dying."

[44][44] Ibid.

[45][45] "Ordnance advice ignored," Letter to the Editor, Army Times, May 18, 1992, p. 30.

[46][46] Much of the detail on CBU-87 and BLU-97 characteristics and operations is derived from Leggette, "The Air Force's New Cluster Weapon"; fact sheets prepared by Alliant Techsystems and Aerojet; and the fact sheet appended to Letter, Department of the Air Force, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, May 18, 1994, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.

[47][47] The dispenser has been approved for use on the A-10, AV-8B, F-15, F-16, F/A-18, B-1, and B-52 aircraft. International aircraft currently certified for the CBU-87 include the British Hawk and Harrier, French Mirage V, German Alpha Jet, Japanese F-1 and FX, and multinational Tornado and Jaguar.

[48][48] The spin rate can be set from 0-2500 rpm. The radar sensor allows selection of heights of burst ranging from 300 to 3,000 feet. See "Combined Effects Munitions (CEM) Safe Separation," USAF Fighter Weapons Review, Summer 1992, p. 33; and Edmond Dantes, "CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition: The Pilot's Weapon of Choice," Asian Defence Journal, March 1991, p. 79.

[49][49] Information provided to Human Rights Watch by the U.S. Air Force in 1999.

[50][50] Phillips, "Cluster-bombing ends frustration."

[51][51] Information provided by the Royal Air Force, located at http://www.raf.mod.uk/front_line/a_sshort.html.

[52][52] U.K., House of Commons, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby (July 1991), p. 86.

[53][53] Nick Cook, "NATO battles against the elements," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 21, 1999.

[54][54] U.S. Air Force, Air University, "Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, Final Report of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study," June 1998, p. 8-33.