

Danish Immigration Service

Report on the Nordic Fact-finding Mission to Kosovo

19 to 25 October 1997

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PREFACE

The Nordic countries' immigration authorities had been planning since the autumn of 1996 to carry out a joint fact-finding mission to Kosovo. Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark were to take part in the mission.

A joint mission was scheduled for the first week of February 1997. The trip had to be called off at the last minute as the Danish member of the team was not issued a visa for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Work then went ahead on planning a new mission. It was timed for 19 to 25 October 1997, so that the trip could be made immediately after the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia.

By the time of departure, the Danish and Finnish members had been issued visas for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whereas the Norwegian member had not. In accordance with the usual procedure, the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade had been notified of the mission. No reply had, however, been received by the time of departure, nor was any forthcoming during the visit. As part of the programme for its trip, the mission had asked to meet representatives of the Serbian authorities, but it was unable to arrange this. Under the circumstances as they stood at the outset of the mission, the Swedish member of the team opted not to take part in the trip to Kosovo.

The mission to Kosovo was thus carried out by representatives of the Finnish and Danish Immigration Services only. This report of the visit to Belgrade and Kosovo is given in the name of the Finnish and Danish members.

The return journey was by way of the FYROM (Macedonia), where a few meetings were held to explore any connection between conditions for ethnic Albanians there and the situation in Kosovo. No detailed account of conditions in Macedonia is given here.

The terms of reference for the mission are set out in Annex 1 to this report. Annex 2 contains the schedule of visits. As shown by the schedule, the mission held meetings in particular with politicians and others involved in the political scene in Kosovo, with human rights organizations, with the UNHCR and other international humanitarian agencies, with representatives of a number of western embassies and lastly with individuals acquainted with conditions in the area. As can be seen from the above, the mission had no opportunity for any meetings with the Yugoslav authorities.

Almost invariably, the sources questioned had no objection to being quoted. This also goes for sources consulted among the ethnic Albanian majority of Kosovo's population. Two sources asked for quotes not to be attributed to them by name. They are referred to by arrangement as, in the one case, a source from an international humanitarian agency and, in the other, a source wishing to remain anonymous.

The report looks in turn at the questions raised in the terms of reference for the mission. For convenience in reading the report as a whole, it has been provided with two introductory sections. The first briefly gives some general background information, mainly on social institutions in Kosovo, including a description of the "parallel" institutions. In response to the relevant assignment in the terms of reference, a full account is given of the information gleaned during the mission, in particular on the scale of the parallel society. The second introductory section gives a number of details obtained during the mission regarding the economic situation and living conditions. After addressing the questions in the terms of reference, the report concludes with a section giving the information received by the mission on the Albanian parallel Priština University and the special significance of students in the current political scene.

INTRODUCTION

Social institutions in Kosovo

There are currently some seven million ethnic Albanians living in the Balkans. Around half of them live in Albania, while for instance about 800 000 live in Macedonia and about 60 000 in Montenegro. There are some two million ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo, where they make up about 90% of the population.

With the introduction in 1974 of a new constitution in Yugoslavia as it then was, the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Kosovo gained autonomous status within the Republic of Serbia. Kosovo had a kind of "in-between" status, not being a republic in its own right, which meant that, as the constitution was framed, it was not able to secede from Yugoslavia, but it did enjoy extensive home rule and, on a par with the six constituent republics and Vojvodina, had a seat in the collective presidency, the state's highest authority.

Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power in Serbia saw the first moves, in March 1989, to do away with Kosovo's autonomy. In the immediately ensuing years a large number of institutions in Kosovo were brought under the Serbian government in Belgrade. Employees of state institutions, such as teachers and health care staff, or of state-run businesses had to sign declarations of allegiance to Serbia. Many refused to do so and therefore had to leave their jobs. Dismissals, strikes and other confrontations between the majority population group and the Serbian authorities resulted during those years in tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians losing their jobs.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Albanian majority population group have been building up "parallel" institutions as an alternative to using the ordinary, Serb-controlled state institutions. As described later in this report, there are separate Albanian institutions in education, health care, politics and the media.

In September 1991 an overwhelming majority voted in a referendum, regarded by the Serbs as illegal, for Kosovo to be given the status of an independent republic within a future Yugoslavia.

In May 1992 the Albanian community held presidential and parliamentary elections, contested by many parties. The party leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), Ibrahim Rugova, was elected president. The Serbian authorities considered the elections illegal. Just one attempt was made for the elected parliament to assemble, but it was prevented by Serbian police. As stated later in this report, the mission was told that the parliament operates by way of subcommittees.

Five major parties won representation in the "shadow parliament". The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) is the largest party, the others being the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK), the Peasants' Party of Kosovo (PFK), the Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDSHK) and the Social Democratic Party of Kosovo (PSDK). As stated later in this report, the mission was told that these and a number of other parties operate openly in Kosovo.

The LDK was founded in December 1989. In the May 1992 election it won 76% of the seats in the "shadow parliament" and is thus the "governing party" within the Albanian parallel political system. As described later in this report, the party supplied the mission with information on matters including the scale of its local sections in Kosovo. As also stated later in the report, the party emphasized that it keeps to its line of non-violent resistance to the Serbian authorities and that confrontations which might cause an escalation of the conflict are to be avoided.

There are also separate Albanian press media in Kosovo, including the newspaper *Koha Ditore*, given special mention later in this report. Only Serbian radio and television are broadcast. There are thus no separate Albanian institutions in that field. Dish aerials for the reception of foreign channels by satellite are very common in Kosovo.

Living conditions

Unemployment in Kosovo is very high. The LDK told the mission that it put the true unemployment rate at about 70%.

According to a source from an international humanitarian agency, about 50% of the population are under the age of 25. The LDK told the mission that the average family size is about six.

A source wishing to remain anonymous said that about a quarter of the population are to be classed as very poor. In the view of the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) in Priština, unemployment and poverty prompt many ethnic Albanians to emigrate, which is just what the Serbian authorities want.

The above sources estimated the number of Kosovo Albanians living abroad to be in the order of 350 000 to 500 000. In their view, virtually every family has one or more members abroad. Family ties are traditionally very strong and it is common for funds to be remitted from abroad to support relatives in Kosovo.

In the view of the source wishing to remain anonymous, 60% to 70% of all economic activity in Kosovo is based on funds remitted from abroad.

According to that source and the Helsinki Committee for Serbia, there is an extensive underground economy. The anonymous source added that there are also mafia-style operations afoot, both on the Serbian side and among ethnic Albanians. The editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Koha Ditore* told the mission that Serbian government employees are involved in underground economic activities. The Humanitarian Law Centre in Belgrade said that Serbs and Albanians work together where business affairs are concerned.

TERMS OF REFERENCE: ASSIGNMENTS 1 TO 5

Assignment 1: Investigate the scale and nature of harassment or maltreatment and of discrimination

(a) What kinds of abuses occur?

The Helsinki Committee for Serbia, the UNHCR in Belgrade, the Humanitarian Law Centre in Belgrade and the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) in Priština all concurred that abuses by the Serbian authorities in Kosovo take the form of random harassment and violence by the police, searches of premises without a warrant, including searches for arms, summoning to report for "informative talks" not, as required, in writing with the purpose stated, detention of individuals at random, threats and violence in police detention and lack of access for detainees to the assistance of a lawyer. In the CDHRF's view, a list of abuses should also include actual police use of torture and killings in police custody. The other sources pointed to the difficulty of producing evidence of such abuses.

The Humanitarian Law Centre explained that summoning to report for "informative talks" is so widespread that it is regarded by Kosovo Albanians as part of normal police behaviour. People are usually summoned by a phone call and, even though notice in writing, stating the purpose of the interview, can be demanded, the vast majority do report. The explanation for this, according to the Humanitarian Law Centre, is that people are afraid of the authorities, especially in the countryside and among uneducated people. At the same time, however, it is quite common for people to tell the police openly at such interviews that they are in favour of an independent Kosovo. According to the source, they expect to be beaten up by the police anyway. Further information obtained by the mission on the content of "informative talks" will be found in section (b) below. The Humanitarian Law Centre knew of two or three cases in which people had refused to report for interviews unless they were given notice in writing, stating the purpose. In those cases the people concerned had not subsequently come to any harm.

At its meeting with the CDHRF in Pristina, the mission was handed extensive written material looking into discriminatory legislation enacted for Kosovo by the Serbian parliament since the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy. The material describes in particular the amendments made in areas covered by the parallel Albanian social institutions subsequently established, i.e. political institutions, education and health services and news media. It also includes a description of legislation providing economic incentives for Serbs and Montenegrins wishing to move to Kosovo and legislation restricting sales of real estate.

(b) Are abuses arbitrary or are they related to the extent of political, organizational or professional prominence or activity?

The mission heard from its sources some not entirely consistent versions of the scale of arbitrary police violence and the groups particularly at risk.

The CDHRF in Pristina described the situation generally as having deteriorated of late. Its records of human rights violations show 32 killings in 1997 as compared with 14 in 1996. In the first three weeks of October 1997, 567 people were beaten up by the police, 72 detained and two killed. The mission was given an overall picture of the organization's records of human rights violations for 1994, 1995, 1996 and the first half of 1997, showing a total of 41 919 such violations, including 4 405 cases of summoning for "informative talks".

According to a human rights lawyer, Ivan D. Jankovic, those statistics cannot be wholly relied upon. Different methods of calculation are used, some cases are counted twice and in some cases, for instance, deaths from other causes are recorded as human rights violations.

The Humanitarian Law Centre told the mission that there has generally been less police repression in Kosovo since the conclusion in September 1996 of an agreement between President Milosevic and the Kosovo Albanian "shadow president", Ibrahim Rugova, to normalize the situation in education. The point was made, however, that the present state of affairs could not be classed as satisfactory.

The mission learned from the German embassy in Belgrade that it had carried out an assessment, using CDHRF figures, of the scale of human rights violations. This showed that on an annual basis less than 1% of Kosovo's population faced abuses in practice.

The German embassy added that the outcome of systematic authentication checks on documents produced by Kosovo Albanians in asylum cases in Germany showed about 90% of them to be false. The documents in question were summonses, judgments etc.

Sources generally considered there to be an arbitrary side to the Serbian authorities' treatment of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The following further information was supplied as to whether some people can be regarded as more at risk than others.

The CDHRF in Pristina cited as people who may be particularly at risk certain party activists (the Unikomb party was mentioned), teachers, human rights campaigners and journalists. It also said, as did the Humanitarian Law Centre, that members of the general public present in areas in which acts of violence have been carried out, possibly by terrorist groups, risk being detained. This has recently happened in remote villages.

The CDHRF reported that its own office in Pristina had been raided by the police in July 1993, with material confiscated and members of staff beaten up. No such abuses have taken place since.

The Humanitarian Law Centre said that, since the second half of 1996, the police have not been actively harassing the "official" Albanian political parties, i.e. those operating openly in Kosovo, including the LDK. Nor are people questioned in "informative talks" about working in Kosovo for, say, the LDK.

The UNHCR in Belgrade considered ethnic Albanian ex-policemen to be a group at greater risk of ill-treatment, but did not see that group generally as facing persecution. A similar view was taken in the case of former career members of the armed forces. People working on a day-to-day basis in the parallel Albanian social institutions are not, in the UNHCR's view, in any greater risk of ill-treatment solely on that account. This applies, for instance, to teachers and health care staff. Political activists in the Albanian parties may be summoned for "informative talks" if the authorities want information on particular occurrences in a local area or on activities abroad. They will not be subjected to detailed questioning about their own political activities for parties operating openly. Such activities will normally be known to the authorities. "Middle-ranking" activists are likely to be at greater risk here. In the UNHCR's appraisal, such "informative talks" with party activists involve less risk of police use of violence than those with other people, the risk being even lower where more prominent figures are summoned to appear before the police. It was explained here that members of the Kosovo government in exile could expect to be summoned to appear, should they return home. None of them had, however, up to now come back to Kosovo.

As reported in greater detail in section 1(f) below, in 1997 trials were held of people accused of being involved in terrorist operations carried out in Kosovo. In some cases they were accused of belonging to the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (NMLK).

At the mission's meeting with miners' representatives in Mitrovica, it was told that they are actively targeted by police ill-treatment, e.g. having been beaten up on the streets after meeting to commemorate the anniversaries of major strikes in the early 1990s.

At the mission's meeting with the editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Koha Ditore*, it was told that over the previous ten days its offices had been visited four times by the police. Editors and journalists have been summoned for "informative talks", including questioning about their political line. No-one was beaten up by the police on such occasions.

For the mission's information on police treatment of students and teaching staff at the parallel Albanian university, see the final section of this report, concerning Pristina University.

(c) What relationship, if any, is there between level of activity and abuses, i.e. are they in proportion and in what way?

Section (b) above reports the information obtained by the mission as regards people particularly at risk of harassment or maltreatment.

As stated, sources generally considered there to be an arbitrary side to the Serbian authorities' treatment of ethnic Albanians. Sources also took the view that there cannot be said to be any proportional relationship between level of activity and risk of abuses. Nor did sources consider that there could be said to be an "inverse" relationship, with those active at a lower level generally more vulnerable than higher-profile figures.

According to the Helsinki Committee for Serbia, the human rights lawyer Ivan D. Jankovic and the German embassy, "middle-ranking" activists are in greater danger of attracting the Serbian authorities' attention. The Helsinki Committee for Serbia pointed out here that this is probably true wherever in the world harassment or maltreatment is practised in any country.

According to the Humanitarian Law Centre, those at risk of detention in police operations in areas where terrorist attacks have been carried out are generally residents of the area in question, there being no discernible relationship with individual prominence and activities.

The Humanitarian Law Centre had no hesitation in describing the above question as irrelevant in the present situation in Kosovo.

(d) For what length of time are people usually detained and do abuses occur in detention?

The human rights lawyer Ivan D. Jankovic explained, as did the Helsinki Committee for Serbia and the Humanitarian Law Centre, that people may be detained for 24 hours to establish their identity. After that, the police are able to hold them for a further three days, where they are suspected of any crime. During that period it is not in practice possible to obtain the assistance of a lawyer.

Charges have to be brought within six months of a person's arrest. A considerable proportion of those charged are released when proceedings in their case begin before a lower court. Anyone sentenced to less than five years' imprisonment who appeals against the conviction may also be released during the appeal proceedings. These factors are conducive to many people disappearing during proceedings and therefore being judged *in absentia*.

The above sources made the point that the rules in question are normally observed by the Serbian authorities.

According to the above sources, ill-treatment of detainees usually occurs during the first few days in police custody. Where an accused person has been ill-treated by the police, it is not uncommon for the fact to be pleaded in a subsequent trial. According to the lawyer Ivan D. Jankovic, it is well-nigh impossible to succeed in getting the precise circumstances looked into in the course of court proceedings.

(e) To what extent are searches for arms used as part of general harassment?

According to the Helsinki Committee for Serbia, the Humanitarian Law Centre and the human rights lawyer Ivan D. Jankovic, searches of houses to look for arms have been going on for years. The reason behind them is to find arms, it being customary in the area to keep arms at home, but searches are also a form of harassment by the authorities. In the present situation, the Serbian authorities can find grounds for them in the terrorist attacks carried out since early 1996.

According to the UNHCR in Belgrade, searches for arms are conducted in villages in particular.

The Humanitarian Law Centre considered the frequency of arms searches to be declining. Arms are rarely discovered in such searches. In its view, people are probably now more afraid of having arms found at their homes, on account of the terrorist attacks.

(f) To what extent are criminal penalties used as a means of political repression and how are they to be seen in terms of legal safeguards?

One criticism levelled at the legal system by the Helsinki Committee for Serbia, the Humanitarian Law Centre, the human rights lawyer Ivan D. Jankovic and the CDHRF in Pristina was that convictions are obtained on the basis of confessions extracted, in their view, following maltreatment in police custody. It was pointed out here that this criticism of the legal system does not only apply to cases against Kosovo Albanians but is true of Serbia generally.

In the early 1990s trade union activists from the miners' union were put on trial in connection with major strikes in response to the loss of Kosovo's autonomy. Also in the early 1990s there were a number of trials of Albanian ex-policemen. Those trials in particular can be regarded as political, according to the Helsinki Committee for Serbia and the Humanitarian Law Centre. The above sources were also critical of the courts' handling of the trials held during 1997, in connection with the terrorist attacks carried out in Kosovo, both of people alleged to have taken part in the attacks and of people alleged to have been involved in plotting them.

In May 1997 the trials were held of 20 ethnic Albanians accused of plotting and attempting to carry out acts endangering state security and of intent to use violence for the purpose. According to the case against them,

they belonged to the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (NMLK). That organization has stated that it is unrelated to the Kosovo Liberation Army, in whose name claims of responsibility for the terrorist attacks were issued after them. All of those accused were convicted, one being sentenced to 10 years in prison and the rest to from 2 to 9 years.

In June and July 1997 the trials were held of 15 ethnic Albanians accused of both plotting and carrying out terrorist attacks, including the murder of four people and attempted murder of another 16. According to the case against them, they belonged to the Kosovo Liberation Army. Eleven of the 15 were each sentenced to 20 years in prison, two to 15 years, one to 10 years and one to 4 years.

In the view of the above sources, those trials failed to produce sufficient evidence, including eye-witness reports. One of the accused died in custody. The authorities said it was suicide.

(g) To what extent are Kosovo Albanians discriminated against in the labour market?

As mentioned in the introductory section on living conditions, a very large proportion of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are out of work. On doing away with Kosovo's autonomous status, the Serbian authorities required public-sector employees to sign declarations of allegiance to Serbia. Those who refused to do so, like many Albanians, being opposed to the removal of autonomy, lost their jobs. As stated in the introductory section of this report, the LDK told the mission that it put the true unemployment rate at about 70%.

As mentioned in the introductory section too, however, according to some sources, another factor to be borne in mind in the employment situation is an extensive underground economy; the mission was also told that Serbians and ethnic Albanians work together in business affairs.

The independent trade unions formed around 1989 are now, according to the editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Koha Ditore*, made up largely of people excluded from the labour market. The source said that there are also what he called official trade unions, described as being an extension of the Serbian Socialist Party.

(h) Who is behind abuses and at what administrative and political level are they sanctioned?

As regards who is behind harassment or maltreatment and discrimination, the Helsinki Committee for Serbia and the Humanitarian Law Centre considered that, generally speaking, the population of Kosovo is kept on a tight leash by the Serbian authorities, i.e. the police, army and intelligence agencies. According to those sources, the Belgrade government is in charge of the exercise of authority in Kosovo. The collection of discriminatory legislation, mentioned earlier, which the mission received from the CDHRF in Pristina, consists of rules enacted by the Serbian parliament.

Sources consulted by the mission concurred in the view that police use of violence and other abuses can be seen to be rife in Serbia and ethnic Albanians are thus not the only ones affected. The Humanitarian Law Centre made the point that it is not that there are any ethnic clashes between the Albanian community and the Serbian minority in Kosovo, but rather that ethnic Albanians face problems with the Serbian police in particular.

According to the Helsinki Committee for Serbia and the Humanitarian Law Centre, however, another factor to be taken into account is the importance of the attitude of individual policemen working in Kosovo. Many Serbian police officers are afraid of the Albanian majority of the population. In those sources' view, many of the abuses taking place are attributable to individual policemen's fear, coupled with scope for more or less uncurbed wielding of power.

Assignment 2: Investigate the situation for returning Kosovo Albanian asylum seekers

(a) What problems face returning asylum seekers upon entry?

At the time of the mission, agreements making provision for enforced repatriation of rejected asylum seekers had only been concluded by the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the authorities in Germany and Switzerland. Sources had no reports of any repatriations from Switzerland, but the mission was supplied with various information concerning those repatriated from Germany.

The German embassy in Belgrade told the mission that, under the agreement concluded, applicable from 1 December 1996, about 3,000 people were forcibly repatriated to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia up to the end of September 1997, the vast majority of them being from Kosovo. A further 1 000 or so are estimated to have returned voluntarily. It was added that the number of asylum seekers entering Germany over the same period was about 1 000 a month.

The German embassy explained that the agreement with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not contain any reference to opportunities for the embassy to monitor the situation of those repatriated. As part of its ordinary human rights reporting, however, the embassy does keep an eye on the situation of those repatriated. It is harder to watch over what becomes of voluntary returnees than it is for those forcibly repatriated by the German authorities.

The embassy explained that the agreement entitles the Yugoslav side to refuse to admit particular individuals. Germany is not able to challenge any such decision. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has so far refused to allow in quite a sizeable number of those whose readmission Germany sought. There does not appear to be any pattern to this as regards ethnic background etc.

According to the embassy, those forcibly repatriated have to be in possession of a special document, or *putni list*, without which they are not allowed to enter the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav embassy or consulates-general in Germany issue those documents, which may be described as a special laissez-passer for readmission purposes. The document also as a rule serves as evidence of nationality. If those concerned hold passports or other identity papers, these are handed over to the Yugoslav representative offices in Germany. Airports etc. in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are notified by means of lists of people to be repatriated. The actual expulsion is normally carried out in practice by charter flight direct to Pristina.

The German embassy in Belgrade told the mission that it is common for those repatriated to report having been questioned upon arrival at the airport. As the Serbian authorities believe there to be terrorist groups operating from abroad, this may be the reason behind the questioning. According to the embassy, it is possible in such situations to obtain assistance from the Serbian Helsinki Committee. In the embassy's view, there are very few cases in which people have any problems with the police at that stage.

The Helsinki Committee for Serbia confirmed that those repatriated are able to contact it at the airport. However, there is no procedure under which it is notified of arrivals by the Yugoslav authorities, but NGO contacts in Germany usually give advance warning of particular individuals' arrival, whereupon its representatives see to it that they are on hand at the airport.

The human rights lawyer Ivan D. Jankovic confirmed to the mission that returnees may be questioned upon arrival. He pointed out that this may be entirely justified on account of their criminal activities abroad.

The German embassy said that, in its belief, those returning voluntarily would normally be refused entry if they had not prior to their return obtained the special document, or *putni list*, referred to above. The embassy had no further details of people having returned illegally, e.g. by crossing land borders.

(b) Do returning asylum seekers face harassment and is it systematic?

The German embassy in Belgrade told the mission that, according to its information, a new passport may be issued after people return, but in some cases issue of a passport has been refused.

In the embassy's assessment, the Serbian authorities want to keep an eye on young male returnees in particular. After returning home, people are commonly summoned for from one to three sessions of "informative talks". Questions about their nationality, passport status etc. may serve as a pretext for attention. The embassy thought it should be pointed out that there is generally in Kosovo an arbitrary aspect to the Serbian authorities' treatment of ethnic Albanians and so the risk for returnees has also to be seen against that background.

The embassy considered that intimidation is practised in the course of "informative talks" with returnees. Psychological methods are used to instil fear but, in its view, crude physical violence is not used, except in very few cases.

The embassy said that enquiries were subsequently carried out in cases in which abuses vis-à-vis those repatriated from Germany had been alleged. There turned out to have been serious abuses in just under ten cases. Apart from those cases, in the embassy's view, other instances involved misunderstandings or exaggerations.

The German embassy said that in those serious cases the Yugoslav authorities had been approached and asked to look into what had happened. At the time of the mission, the embassy had received replies from the authorities in two cases. In the embassy's view, the fact that the authorities had replied in those cases was in itself significant. The embassy considered it very important for local authorities to be open to questioning from Belgrade in such cases.

The CDHRF in Priština told the mission that it tries to keep watch on the situation of returnees but this is difficult, particularly as it does not have a chance to contact them on arrival at the airport, as well as for reasons of resources. It considered there to be some fear of reporting to it. Seven returnees whom it knew to have been subjected to violence were unwilling to sign statements to it to that effect. At its meeting with the CDHRF, the mission was given a report containing a compilation of the organization's information on people returning from Germany under the country's agreement with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Humanitarian Law Centre told the mission of its impression that returnees tend to keep a low profile. The explanation for this in many cases, in its view, is that they are working towards a chance to leave again. In other cases, crime committed abroad may be the explanation. When those concerned are questioned by the police, it is in particular about their knowledge of organizations abroad, about funding from abroad for Albanian parallel institutions and activities and about internal power structures within the LDK, of which they may conceivably have learned something abroad.

The UNHCR in Belgrade told the mission that its Priština office's main work is with Serbian refugees from Krajina. The UNHCR takes the attitude that those repatriated from other countries in Europe are "of concern" as regards returning in safety and dignity, but are not in themselves part of its remit. The UNHCR cannot engage in active monitoring of those repatriated but can, as far as it is able, watch over repatriations. The UNHCR pointed out that it holds the repatriating countries responsible for adequate monitoring. It had no detailed knowledge of specific cases in which those repatriated had experienced problems with the authorities, but it had seen reports of this from Kosovo. As regards the possibility of returnees being summoned for "informative talks", the UNHCR took the view that this is common in Kosovo generally and may therefore also happen to returnees. The UNHCR advised against large-scale repatriations at present, as this would have a destabilizing effect on the fragile political and economic situation in Kosovo.

Assignment 3: Investigate implementation of the amnesty law

(a) Is the law actually being implemented?

The Helsinki Committee for Serbia, the UNHCR in Belgrade and the human rights lawyer Ivan D. Jankovic all agreed that the Yugoslav federal law on amnesty for draft evaders and deserters, covering acts committed before 14 December 1995, is being complied with. As Ivan D. Jankovic put it to the mission, the law is being observed "to the letter"; he added that he had now reported this countless times to representatives of various countries. At the same time it was pointed out that the law does not apply to commissioned officers.

Ivan D. Jankovic had published an article surveying judgments concerning draft evaders and deserters in 1994 and 1995, i.e. before the amnesty law was introduced. Convictions had been handed down in about 97% of cases. Around 60% were given suspended sentences. About 23% had received firm prison sentences of from one month to a year. The average sentence was six months. The lawyer explained that longer than average sentences were imposed in the case of deserters or where those concerned had made off with arms.

(b) Do returnees of conscription age etc. experience any problems with the authorities?

Section 2 above on the situation for returning asylum seekers reports the information obtained by the mission on this. Returning young males of conscription age will find the situation as depicted there with regard to the risk of attracting the authorities' attention.

Even though the amnesty law is, according to the above sources, being observed, this does not waive the basic need for returnees to perform military service which they avoided.

The UNHCR in Belgrade and a source from an international humanitarian agency considered that the Serbian authorities do not make any great effort to get young ethnic Albanian males in Kosovo to perform their compulsory military service. In approaching them about conscription, the authorities are often playing some kind of "game", according to those sources, for the Serbian authorities are not really interested in having Kosovo Albanians perform military service, as this would provide them with military training. The conscription issue may, moreover, in some cases serve as an excuse for the authorities if they want to focus attention on someone.

Assignment 4: Investigate the scale of the parallel society, including political institutions and parties, the press and education and health care systems, and its relationship with the official society

(a) To what extent are the "shadow government" and unregistered parties tolerated and do individual members face persecution, including prosecution?

As stated above in the introductory section on social institutions in Kosovo, following the removal of Kosovo's autonomy, a "parallel" system has been built up since the early 1990s. The system has been established by ethnic Albanians as an alternative to using the Serbian state system. It is a parallel system in that Albanians use their own institutions, while Serbs in Kosovo use the official institutions.

According to the picture painted by all of the mission's sources, the parallel system covers education, health, politics and the media.

There are no separate Albanian security arrangements, e.g. for policing-type tasks. Section 1(b) above reports the information obtained by the mission from the UNHCR in Belgrade that ethnic Albanians who used to work for the police or as career soldiers are a category at greater risk of abuses by the Serbian authorities.

As regards the parallel Priština University, its situation and the special significance of students in Kosovo's current political scene are described in section 6 below.

The information obtained by the mission on the more specific role of the parallel social institutions is set out below.

According to the Helsinki Committee for Serbia, the Humanitarian Law Centre and the CDHRF in Priština, within the parallel education system it is only in primary schools that Albanian pupils are taught in the same buildings as Serbian pupils. Pupils are segregated, however, with walls put up for the purpose. Otherwise tuition is given in private homes, basements, garages etc. Even where parts of school buildings are allowed

to be used, Albanian pupils were said by the sources to have far less opportunity for use of teaching materials, technical equipment etc. than Serbian pupils.

At the mission's meeting with the "shadow president", Ibrahim Rugova, he stated that negotiations with the Serbian authorities on implementation of the agreement to normalize the situation in education, concluded between him and President Milosevic in September 1996, had reached stalemate.

According to a source from an international humanitarian agency, the parallel health system can only treat illness treatable at a medical practitioner's surgery. Albanians use the ordinary, Serb-run hospital system but, according to the source, prefer to attend clinics forming part of the parallel system rather than go into hospital. According to that source, about 70% of hospital staff are ethnic Albanians. The same source added that the hospital system had been hard hit by international sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and by the poor economic situation generally.

As stated in the introduction, five major parties won representation in the "shadow parliament" elected in May 1992. They are the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK), the Peasants' Party of Kosovo (PFK), the Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDSHK) and the Social Democratic Party of Kosovo (PSDK). As the mission was told by the Humanitarian Law Centre, the UNHCR in Belgrade and the CDHRF in Priština, those parties, like a number of other Albanian parties, now operate openly in Kosovo.

The "shadow president", Ibrahim Rugova, said that, even though parliament cannot assemble, an earlier attempt to do so having been prevented by Serbian police, work is going on in subcommittees. The holding of fresh elections was previously postponed. According to Ibrahim Rugova, a decision on any new elections would be taken by the end of December 1997.

At its meeting with the LDK, the mission was given some information on the party's organization. According to the party, after it was founded in 1989 it soon gained a very large membership. It now has a membership of 600 000. The party explained that there are in Kosovo 1 340 party cells, 433 local sections, each of which may cover a village or part of a larger town, and 36 main branches, of which those local sections form part. In May 1992 the party won 76% of the seats in the "shadow parliament", making it the governing party within the Albanian political system. Apart from the "shadow president", LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova, the actual "shadow government" is living abroad. The party advocates pluralism and has, as confirmed to the mission by Ibrahim Rugova, placed great emphasis on non-violent resistance to the Serbian authorities and on the need to avoid confrontations which might cause an escalation of the conflict.

As regards registration of parties, the CDHRF in Priština said that the LDK and the Peasants' Party were registered with the federal authorities in the old Yugoslavia, the SFRY. According to the source, the Parliamentary Party has applied for registration with the federal authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but has not received any response to its application. The general attitude among Albanian parties otherwise, according to that source, is not to seek registration, since that could be construed as acceptance of the present Yugoslavia. As stated above, sources said that many parties operate openly in Kosovo, regardless of differences between parties over registration.

Section 1(b) above reports the information obtained by the mission on the risk of harassment or maltreatment for those active in Albanian political parties.

The mission was told by the "shadow president", Ibrahim Rugova, and by the Helsinki Committee for Serbia that, apart from the negotiations on implementation of the education agreement, there are no other talks going on between Serbian government representatives and Albanian political leaders in Kosovo.

There are separate Albanian press media in Kosovo. Mention may be made here of the newspapers *Bujku* and *Koha Ditore* and the weekly magazine *Zeri*. The Humanitarian Law Centre said that up until recently

the media had been dominated by the LDK but this was now changing. Special reference should be made here to the newspaper *Koha Ditore*, which has been appearing as a daily since the spring of 1997. Its editor-in-chief told the mission that the newspaper takes a politically independent line in relation to the Albanian parties and also reports the Serbian authorities' views. The newspaper voices criticism of politicians in Kosovo, including Ibrahim Rugova, without this having given rise to any problems, according to the editor.

Serbian radio and television are broadcast in Kosovo. There are no separate Albanian institutions in that field. According to the editor of *Koha Ditore*, no licences have been issued to private television or radio stations for seven years. It was pointed out here that Slobodan Milosevic regards control of television as vitally important. The editor said that, as the mission could see for itself, satellite receivers are extremely common, giving access in particular to foreign news media.

According to the LDK, the parallel Albanian system is funded partly by contributions from Kosovo Albanians abroad and partly by payments made by the Albanian population of Kosovo. Payment of the special "tax" of 3% for those living abroad and 5% in Kosovo is voluntary, according to the LDK. The government in exile is in charge of collection abroad and in Kosovo this is arranged via a special committee, on which the LDK and the other main parties are represented.

(b) What kind of harassment is faced by doctors and teachers working or having worked in the parallel system and by journalists and pressmen from the Kosovo Albanian media and on what scale?

Section 1(b) above reports the information obtained by the mission on the risk of harassment or maltreatment for those working in the Albanian parallel system. Reference should be made to that section, which sets out in detail the information supplied to the mission by individual sources.

Assignment 5: Investigate the general security situation

(a) What impact have the parliamentary and presidential elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had on the general situation?

The second round of the presidential election in Serbia was held on 5 October 1997. However, it failed to produce a result because the turnout was too low and so the presidential election had to be re-held.

The Helsinki Committee for Serbia, the Humanitarian Law Centre, the editor-in-chief of *Koha Ditore*, the former Communist Party leader, Mahmut Bakalli, and a source wishing to remain anonymous told the mission that real power in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia lay solely with the federal President, Slobodan Milosevic. The present state of relations between the Belgrade regime and Albanian politicians in Kosovo was described by those sources, moreover, as one of complete deadlock.

According to the above sources, neither within the Serbian parties in government nor among the Serbian opposition parties were there any forces which might conceivably support Kosovo Albanians' calls for independence or in any way enter into a constructive dialogue to resolve the conflict. Several sources saw Serb nationalism as the main obstacle standing in the way of a solution to the conflict. The Helsinki Committee for Serbia, for instance, considered that there was no "normal" opposition in Serbia, with opposition rather being reflected merely in differing degrees of nationalism. The editor-in-chief of *Koha Ditore* took the view that Serbian opposition only involved opposition to the figure of Milosevic and not to the policy followed. A source wishing to remain anonymous explained that in Serbia's highly charged nationalist politics it would be suicidal for any political party publicly to put forward an electoral platform that could be construed as taking an accommodating line towards the demands of Albanian political leaders in Kosovo.

The Humanitarian Law Centre, the "shadow president", Ibrahim Rugova, the Helsinki Committee for Serbia

and Mahmut Bakalli were pessimistic as to the possibility of the conflict being resolved bilaterally by means of negotiations between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. The conflict could be settled only by involving the international community.

While the mission was in Serbia, the second round of the presidential election in Montenegro was held on 19 October 1997. It was won by the Prime Minister, Milo Djukanovic, of the governing Democratic Party of Montenegrin Socialists (DPMS). He was running against Slobodan Milosevic's political ally, the sitting President, Momir Bulatovic, also of the DPMS.

As to whether that election might hold any significance for the situation in Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova said that it would not be of any direct relevance. In his view, Djukanovic would have little influence over Serbian policy. However, he feared that a new policy calling for Montenegro to be given greater independence from Serbia might lead to war, adding that the Serbs have been engaged in a military build-up in Montenegro and adjoining areas since 1992. A similar view was taken by the editor-in-chief of *Koha Ditore*.

(b) Has the situation deteriorated or improved since the new government took office in Albania and is there any connection to be seen between the situation in Kosovo and the growing unrest between the authorities and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia?

It should first be noted that the editor-in-chief of *Koha Ditore* and the former Communist Party leader, Mahmut Bakalli, told the mission that in their view no serious political forces in Kosovo were calling for union with Albania.

In its programme for its term of office, the new government in Albania declared its willingness to seek consensus with its neighbours and its wish to engage in constructive dialogue with the Serbian government over the Kosovo conflict. The editor-in-chief of *Koha Ditore* said that the search for consensus was merely superficial and there was not really any change in Albanian policy on Kosovo.

The OSCE Mission in Macedonia considered that the new Albanian government brought scope for a significant improvement in bilateral relations. The same source added that ideas of a "greater Albania" are now being broached more commonly among radical ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, where the Albanian minority makes up 23% of the population.

There has traditionally been close contact between Albanians in Macedonia and in Kosovo but, while Albanians in Kosovo are calling for independence, Albanians in Macedonia, as the mission was told by the OSCE and the mayors of Tetovo and Gostivar in Macedonia, are only calling for improvements in their minority status and implementation of the minority rights legislation passed by the Macedonian parliament. That is the backdrop to clashes between the authorities and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia.

The editor-in-chief of *Koha Ditore* did not regard the unrest between the authorities and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia as having any impact on the situation in Kosovo. The OSCE in Macedonia took the view that, if anything, the reverse was the case. For instance, some of the Albanian teaching staff dismissed from Pri tina University are now working for the unofficial university established by Albanians in Tetovo, in Macedonia, and thereby playing an active part in the conflict between Macedonians and Albanians. According to that source, people in Macedonia feared a hardening of positions in Kosovo, the worst conceivable scenario in that event being for Albanians to flee across the border into Macedonia in their hundreds of thousands.

(c) Of what significance for the general situation is enforced settlement of Serbian refugees?

According to the UNHCR in Belgrade, some 16 000 Serbian refugees from the Krajina area were moved into Kosovo in 1995. Together with some 4 000 mainly Muslim refugees already housed there, this brought Kosovo's refugee population for 1995 to about 20 000. Some 5 000 of these have since left, mainly Serbs making their way to Vojvodina on account of family ties. There are thus at present about 15 000 refugees in

Kosovo, most of whom are ethnic Serbs.

According to a source wishing to remain anonymous, many of those refugees were brought to Kosovo without their consent and often without their knowledge. There were cases in which refugees protested by refusing to get off the train when it stopped at Kosovo Polje near Priština. According to the UNHCR in Belgrade, there were about 11 000 refugees put up at refugee centres, some 2 000 of them being housed in twenty of the former Albanian schools.

The above source wishing to remain anonymous described the refugees from Krajina as mainly elderly, poorly educated people from a small-scale farming background and added that, given the already high unemployment, it was hard to see any future for them in Kosovo. According to the same source and the UNHCR in Belgrade, there was no integration programme established for them and only very few had found work. No-one knew what was to become of them.

The same source wishing to remain anonymous did not consider the refugees in themselves, in their small numbers, to be of any significance for the general situation. Their significance was entirely political and symbolic, the refugees' presence being seen by Kosovo Albanians as a Serbian attempt to impose colonization of Kosovo by Serbs. The source did not believe that to be the motive for sending the Serbian refugees to Kosovo, but saw it as a political signal to Serbs in Kosovo that Belgrade had not forgotten them. According to the source, even given the refugees' poor future prospects, Belgrade will for the same reason be unable to move them back out of Kosovo without sending the wrong message to Kosovo Serbs. The source pointed out that no further refugees have been sent to Kosovo since 1995.

According to the UNHCR in Belgrade, the placing of the refugees in Kosovo has not met with any protest from the international community. Nor does the UNHCR regard the placing of refugees in Kosovo as any problem, since the number of refugees there is very small in comparison with the total number of refugees in Serbia.

(d) Who is behind the recent armed attacks and provocative acts?

The sources consulted by the mission took widely differing views as to whether there was any question of terrorism at all, whether recent attacks on police stations, refugee centres and individuals were genuine or fictitious and who was behind them and hence also as to the existence of the terrorist organization UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army), to which the attacks and killings carried out have been attributed by the Serbs.

The "shadow president", Ibrahim Rugova, rejected any talk of Albanian terrorism, saying that in all probability these were Serb-organized operations designed to discredit the Albanian policy of non-violence. He emphasized that no kind of evidence had been produced in the trials of alleged Albanian terrorists.

The former Communist Party leader, Mahmut Bakalli, took the view that terrorist operations could not be run from Kosovo. There might be people abroad behind them. Having said that, he did not think individual terror as a political means served the Kosovo Albanians' cause.

The human rights lawyer Ivan D. Jankovic believed that terrorism was genuine but the culprits unknown. He too pointed out that in the trials of alleged terrorists no evidence had as yet been produced to show that the accused were involved in terrorism.

The Helsinki Committee for Serbia and the Humanitarian Law Centre were convinced that terrorism was real but unable to say who was behind it. The latter source said that the UCK had not come out in public with statements of its political programme or anything else to substantiate its existence.

A source wishing to remain anonymous could neither confirm nor deny that there was any terrorist

organization such as the UCK. The source pointed out that the attacks on police stations had not caused any deaths or physical damage. The source knew that two murdered policemen had been killed in mafia infighting, which might also be the case with the murder victims regarded as collaborators. They might also be killings in connection with a fresh outbreak of traditional Albanian blood feuds. The source had no detailed knowledge of the scale of these.

The above sources concurred in the view that Kosovo Albanians do not support terrorism. On the contrary, there was widespread fear of it among the population in the realization that such acts could provide grounds for the Serbian authorities to take a tougher line in Kosovo.

Section 6: Pristina University

During the mission's visit to the area, it was given some information about the university in Pristina and the role of ethnic Albanian students in Kosovo's current political scene.

According to the background material supplied to the mission, Pristina University was founded in 1970. It was the only university in the old Yugoslavia at which it was possible to study in Albanian. Students came to Pristina from Albanian minorities in other parts of the country, including what is now Macedonia.

In 1991 a university for Albanian students was set up as part of the parallel Albanian social institutions in Kosovo. According to information obtained at the mission's meeting with Albanian students' representatives, this was because some 27 000 Albanian students and some 1 000 teaching staff were at that time excluded from tuition at the university up to then in operation. In the course of other changes made in Kosovo in removing the province's autonomy, Belgrade had amended the university's previous system of government and taken charge of curricula, student admissions etc. Like the other parallel institutions, the parallel university is not recognized by the Serbian authorities.

A number of students are taught at the present official, Serb-run university. Representatives of Albanian students at the parallel university said that the figure is about 5,000, of whom some 4 000 come from the Serbian community in Kosovo. As a result of low student numbers at the official university in comparison with the pre-1991 period, the university buildings are half-empty.

According to the Albanian students' representatives, it was thought in 1991 that the parallel university would be in operation for quite a short while. Conditions were, as they still are, very Spartan, with tuition given in garages etc. Considerable difficulties have been faced in medical training in particular, one of them being the unavailability of internships in Kosovo's Serb-run hospital system. According to the students, internships have been arranged in countries such as Turkey and Albania.

According to Albanian students' representatives, the parallel Pristina University currently has about 23 000 studying at it. Some 7 000 have sat examinations since 1991. There are 14 faculties. The university has cooperation agreements with universities in other European countries on matters including recognition of qualifications. The students explained, however, that degrees could not be used in the rest of Serbia since, as mentioned above, the university is not recognized by the Serbian authorities.

Albanian students' representatives said that individual students have to pay an annual fee of DEM 140 into a fund out of which teaching staff are paid. Money is also received from abroad and from students' families to buy books, equipment etc.

Albanian students' representatives said that students have not experienced any problems in travelling abroad, e.g. to attend conferences etc. On the other hand, students and teaching staff have faced various kinds of maltreatment and harassment in everyday life, e.g. being beaten up by the police when they arranged "night walks" in which sizeable numbers of students walked the streets of Pristina.

On 1 October 1997 Albanian students, with teaching staff also taking part, organized demonstrations in

Priština and other towns in Kosovo. According to the Humanitarian Law Centre, those demonstrations are to be seen as bringing pressure to bear on the "shadow president", Ibrahim Rugova, as regards his cautious political line. The students' initiative may be regarded as reflecting a wish for a more active non-violent line than the policy followed up to now by the LDK.

Albanian students' representatives described their demands as non-political to the mission and did not want to let political capital be made out of them by any particular forces. Students were calling for renewed access to university buildings, residences etc. Their call was more specifically for the parallel university as an institution to have access to buildings. They did not want to see an integrated Serbian and Albanian curriculum, once Albanian students returned, as they feared that an integrated curriculum would be controlled by the Serbian authorities. Serbian students currently taught in the university buildings should, according to Albanian students' representatives, be able to retain their own particular curriculum if they so wished. The Albanian students' demands were put as one university, two curricula.

A journalist from the newspaper *Koha Ditore* told the mission that on 1 October 1997 there were about 30 000 people in the part of Priština in which the demonstration took place. Students had requested, through channels such as political parties, that other sections of the population should not take part in the actual demonstration, but some were present in the area as spectators or to lend moral support.

The "shadow president", Ibrahim Rugova, told the mission that the demonstration was soon forcibly broken up by Serbian police in a very brutal manner. Students were surrounded by police and both demonstrators and supporters were subjected to a violent crackdown using tear gas and batons. According to students' representatives and the CDHRF in Pristina, about 500 people were injured. Students' representatives added that many people were detained or summoned for "informative talks" in the lead-up to the demonstration. The students' union committee from the parallel university were detained for two hours following the break-up of the demonstration.

Albanian students' representatives told the mission that they were planning to hold another such demonstration on 29 October 1997. They were quite prepared to run the risk of Serbian police again carrying out a very heavy-handed crackdown on demonstrators.

A source wishing to remain anonymous pointed out to the mission that, even though the students' demands might appear non-political, as they themselves claimed, any arrangements for resolving the issue of the return of Albanian students to the state university system could be seen as establishing general principles for an overall solution in Kosovo. The same source described the present state of political relations between Belgrade and Albanian politicians in Kosovo as one of complete deadlock, with no sign of either side being prepared to budge. The source therefore thought it unlikely at present that any solution would be found regarding the university.

ANNEX 1

Terms of reference for the fact-finding mission to Kosovo

Assignment 1: Investigate the scale and nature of harassment or maltreatment and of discrimination

- (a) What kinds of abuses occur?
- (b) Are abuses arbitrary or are they related to the extent of political, organizational or professional prominence or activity?
- (c) What relationship, if any, is there between level of activity and abuses, i.e. are they in proportion and in what way?
- (d) For what length of time are people usually detained and do abuses occur in detention?
- (e) To what extent are searches for arms used as part of general harassment?
- (f) To what extent are criminal penalties used as a means of political repression and how are they to be seen in terms of legal safeguards?
- (g) To what extent are Kosovo Albanians discriminated against in the labour market?
- (h) Who is behind abuses and at what administrative and political level are they sanctioned?

Assignment 2: Investigate the situation for returning Kosovo Albanian asylum seekers

- (a) What problems face returning asylum seekers upon entry?
- (b) Do returning asylum seekers face harassment and is it systematic?

Assignment 3: Investigate implementation of the amnesty law

- (a) Is the law actually being implemented?
- (b) Do returnees of conscription age etc. experience any problems with the authorities?

Assignment 4: Investigate the scale of the parallel society, including political institutions and parties, the press and education and health care systems, and its relationship with the official society

- (a) To what extent are the "shadow government" and unregistered parties tolerated and do individual members face persecution, including prosecution?
- (b) What kind of harassment is faced by doctors and teachers working or having worked in the parallel system and by journalists and pressmen from the Kosovo Albanian media and on what scale?

Assignment 5: Investigate the general security situation

- (a) What impact have the parliamentary and presidential elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had on the general situation?
- (b) Has the situation deteriorated or improved since the new government took office in Albania and is there any connection to be seen between the situation in Kosovo and the growing unrest between the authorities and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia?
- (c) Of what significance for the general situation is enforced settlement of Serbian refugees?
- (d) Who is behind the recent armed attacks and provocative acts?

ANNEX 2

Meeting schedule for the fact-finding mission to Kosovo, from 19 to 25 October 1997

Belgrade, Sunday 19 October 1997:

19.00 Meeting with Sonja Biserko, of the Helsinki Committee for Serbia, the lawyer Ivan D. Jankovic and representatives of the Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish embassies.

Belgrade, Monday 20 October 1997:

09.00 Meeting at the Swedish embassy. Briefing with Jonas Weiss, Secretary.

12.00 Meeting with the Helsinki Committee for Serbia, represented by Sonja Biserko.

15.00 Meeting with the UNHCR in Belgrade, represented by Margaret O'Keefe, Chief of Mission, Johanna Langenkamp, Assistant Chief of Mission, and Adelmo Risi Valdettaro, Assistant Chief of Mission.

16.30 Meeting with the German embassy, represented by Volker Pellet, First Secretary and Consul (meeting held at the Norwegian embassy and attended by representatives of the Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish embassies).

19.00 Meeting with Kaj Sønnerup, from the Danish embassy in Belgrade.

Belgrade, Tuesday 21 October 1997:

09.00 Meeting with the Humanitarian Law Centre, represented by its Director, Natasa Kandic, et al.

12.00 Meeting with the British embassy, represented by Julian Braithwaite, Second Secretary (Political/Information).

15.00 Departure for Pristina, Kosovo.

Pristina, Tuesday 21 October 1997:

21.00 Meeting with Veton Surroi, editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Koha Ditore*.

Pristina, Wednesday 22 October 1997:

09.00 Meeting with an international humanitarian agency.

10.30 Visit to the newspaper *Koha Ditore*.

12.00 Meeting with the "shadow president", Ibrahim Rugova. Also attended by Edita Tahiri, head of foreign affairs for the LDK.

15.00 Meeting with the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF), represented by its Chairman, Pajazit Nushi, and Executive Secretary, Behxhet Sh. Shala, et al.

19.00 Meeting with the independent students' union at Pri tina University (the parallel university), represented by Bujar Dugolli, President, Driton Lajci, Vice-President, Albin Kurti, Member of the Presidency, and Muhamult Movraj, Member of the Presidency.

20.00 Meeting with Shkelzen Maliqi, editor at the weekly magazine *Zeri*, and Gazmend Pula, of the Helsinki Committee for Kosovo.

Pristina, Thursday 23 October 1997:

10.00 Meeting with the Social Democratic Party of Kosovo, represented by its President, Luljeta Pula-Beqiri.

11.00 Meeting with Mahmut Bakalli, leader of the Communist Party in Kosovo from 1971 to 1981.

13.30 Visit to the industrial town of Mitrovica and meeting with the miners' union, represented by Xhafer Nuli, Chairman, Selami Helshani, Secretary, Sheshivar Begu, Secretary, and Faruk Spahijx, Secretary (LDK).

15.15 Visit to Kosovo Polje, the scene of the famous battle on 28 June 1389 between the armies of the Serbian kingdom and the Ottoman empire.

16.00 Meeting with an international humanitarian agency.

17.30 Departure for Prizren, Kosovo.

Prizren, Thursday 23 October 1997:

20.00 Scheduled meeting with Besnik Dauti, who has worked at the Red Cross on joint grass-roots projects for Albanians and Serbs, but who failed to turn up.

Prizren, Friday 24 October 1997:

11.00 Departure for Skopje, Macedonia.

Skopje, Friday 24 October 1997:

16.00 Meeting with the OSCE Mission in Skopje, represented by its Head, Christian Faber-Rod, Ambassador.

Macedonia, Saturday 25 October 1997:

10.30 Visit to FINCOY/UNPREDEP in Tetovo, Macedonia. Briefing with a number of officers, policemen and advisers.

12.30 Meeting with Rufi Osmani, mayor of Gostivar, Macedonia.

14.00 Meeting with Alajdin Demiri, mayor of Tetovo, Macedonia.