



## SHADOW PLAYS: The Crisis of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Indonesia

In the region that is now Indonesia, puppet theater has been a widely popular art form for centuries. It is particularly enjoyed on the island of Java, known for its intricately made puppets of leather and wood. In the shadow puppet performances, figures are manipulated behind an illuminated cotton screen, telling stories that reflect the region's Hindu-Buddhist heritage as well as its more recent Muslim history. As with wooden marionettes, shadow puppets are often controlled by a single puppeteer.

Puppet theater, particularly the shadow play, is often used as an analogy for the current unrest in Indonesia, which has displaced nearly one million people. The displaced speak of an unseen hand controlling them from behind the scenes, a “master manipulator” who stirs up trouble, casts false blame, and causes the innocent to flee their homes. They sometimes surmise the identity of the manipulator—often former president Suharto or, collectively, “the army”—but mostly they speak only of “elites” or “provocateurs.” While the causes of displacement are complex, many Indonesians feel strongly that they are being used to further the goals of one or more “puppeteers” pulling the strings and casting shadows.

Jana Mason  
Policy Analyst



## I. INTRODUCTION

Nearly one million people are internally displaced within Indonesia, putting it high on the list—numerically—of countries experiencing a displacement crisis. The displaced are in virtually every province of the sprawling island nation, from Aceh in the far west to Irian Jaya (also known as West Papua) in the east. In addition, an estimated 125,000 East Timorese refugees are in the Indonesian territory of West Timor, while an unknown number of East Timorese are elsewhere in Indonesia.

Much of the recent displacement is the result of clashes between Muslims and Christians in the Malukus, a group of about 1,000 islands comprising the provinces of Maluku and North Maluku (formerly known as the Moluccas and, in colonial times, the Spice Islands). Close to 90 percent of Indonesians are Muslim, but the population of the Malukus—about two million people prior to the fighting—is almost evenly divided between Christians and Muslims. Persons from the Malukus have fled to various areas of Indonesia.

Central Sulawesi Province has also experienced religious violence and displacement similar to that in the Malukus. In Aceh, on the northwest tip of Sumatra, fighting between the Indonesian military and separatist rebels—despite a formal “humanitarian pause”—continues to produce tens of thousands of displaced persons. In West Kalimantan, on the island of Borneo, brutal fighting between ethnic groups has caused displacement since 1996. West Papua is hosting displaced persons from the Malukus and has begun to produce its own displaced persons as a result of its longstanding independence movement. Displacement has also affected the politically dominant Indonesian island of Java and the tropical resort of Bali.

In many areas of Indonesia, a significant percentage of the displaced were originally “transmigrants” who are now finding themselves uprooted once more. Transmigration is a longstanding governmental program through which Indonesians from the island of Java (and some other areas) are given land and economic incentives to relocate to less populated areas. (See box, page 8.) As a result of the current conflicts in Indonesia, some transmigrants are now returning to their areas of ethnic origin (or those of their parents), while others have gone to new destinations.

USCR Policy Analyst Jana Mason visited Indonesia twice in 2000 to assess the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons in several areas of the country. In January, she visited the territory of Aceh (including Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, and Pidie), the island of Bali (to which displaced persons from the nearby island of Lombok had recently fled), and the territory of West Timor (Kupang and Atambua) in the province of East Nusa Tenggara (NTT). In July and August, she visited the city of Pontianak (and surrounding area) in the province of West Kalimantan on the island of Borneo; the city of Ujung Pandang (also known as Makassar) in the province of South Sulawesi; the towns of Palu, Poso, and Tentena in the province of Central Sulawesi; and the islands of Ternate and Bacan in the province of North Maluku. She also met with Indonesian government officials and international nongovernmental organizations in Jakarta.

This paper includes general findings regarding internal displacement in Indonesia as well as region-specific findings. The latter concern only a portion of the internal displacement in the country, as certain major areas of displacement (such as Ambon and Southeast Sulawesi) were not visited. However, much of the data from the areas visited is indicative of displacement throughout the archipelago.

Most information on East Timorese refugees in West Timor is found in that section (See p. 36).

## II. GENERAL FINDINGS

### Numbers and Locations

Estimates of the numbers of internally displaced persons in Indonesia—both the total and in the various regions—vary by source, although not significantly. Most sources put the total at between 750,000 and 850,000. These estimates do not include the 125,000 East Timorese refugees in West Timor. In early November 2000, an Indonesian government agency put the total figure at more than one million people, spread over 18 provinces.

The largest numbers of internally displaced persons are currently in the provinces of Maluku (215,000), North Maluku (207,000), and Southeast Sulawesi (110,000 to 130,000). An estimated 73,000 are displaced in Central Sulawesi, and in West Kalimantan the figure is 60,000 to 70,000 persons. The latest reports indicate more than 36,000 displaced



in North Sulawesi, 30,000 in North Sumatra, 20,000 throughout Java, 17,000 in West Papua, 15,000 in South Sulawesi, and at least 8,000 in Aceh (although the figure there fluctuates often.) Thousands are also displaced elsewhere in Sumatra and on the islands of Nusa Tenggara.

Most of these numbers are fast changing, particularly in areas of ongoing violence.

### Causes of Displacement

Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous nation, is a vast archipelago with more than 3,000 inhabited islands. With 360 tribal and ethno-linguistic groups and more than 250 different languages and dialects, the country is far from homogenous. Although it has the largest Muslim population in any country, it is not an Islamic state. Islam in Indonesia is infused with other beliefs and is characterized by regional variations. Thirty percent of Indonesians practice a different religion altogether.

Partly because of its size and disunity, Indonesia experienced great political turmoil following independence in 1949, culminating in the military coup of 1965 that toppled Sukarno and brought Suharto to

power. (Sukarno and Suharto, like many Indonesians, use only one name). Since then, rebellion has been sporadic and, until recently, unsuccessful. In May 1998, after ruling the country for more than 30 years, President Suharto was forced to step aside. His immediate successor, B.J. Habibie, was a close Suharto associate. In October 1999, Indonesia's parliament elected Abdurrahman Wahid, a Muslim cleric widely known as "Gus Dur," as Indonesia's fourth president.

Given Indonesia's complex demographics and its current political turmoil, the causes of displacement defy easy analysis. There are both profound similarities and significant differences among the conflicts that have led to displacement around the country. In Aceh, displacement results from the conflict between separatist rebels and the military, along with the human rights abuses accompanying that conflict. In Maluku, North Maluku, and Sulawesi, what appears to be a religious conflict between Muslims and Christians is at its root most likely a conflict among powerful civil, military, and economic forces both within and outside the region. These forces have used religion to sow distrust and fear between the two groups, creating a conflict that quickly spread to other regions. In



*A burned mosque outside of Poso, in Central Sulawesi, reflects the religious violence that has wracked the area. Photo credit: USCR/J. Mason*



## THE INDOONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO



Kalimantan, tribal clashes between Madurese on one side and Dayaks and Malays on the other resulted largely from Indonesia's transmigration policy—a factor in the other conflicts as well. In Papua, as in Aceh, transmigration and the control of natural resources fuel a separatist movement based on a view of the Javanese as neo-colonialists. In Java and elsewhere, transmigrants who for decades have lived on other islands are returning to a home that is no longer a home, adding to the ranks of the displaced.

When asked why Indonesia is experiencing such turmoil, Indonesians and others offer myriad theories to explain the root causes. The following are the most popular theories, followed by a discussion of other, more localized, sources of conflict. Of these broad theories, the first three are—in USCR's opinion—likely to be the most valid, although they do not explain all, or even most, of the violence throughout Indonesia. Of the others, each likely has a small element of truth but, especially in the case of the theories about “Islamicizing” or “Christianizing” Indonesia, that small element is what makes them so dangerous. Observers say:

1) that poor implementation of the transmigration policy—regardless of its purposes—is causing longstanding resentments to explode. One aid worker told USCR that transmigration has been the “downfall of the country.” Because transmigration often involves a particular religious or ethnic group (usually Javanese Muslims but also Madurese Muslims, Balinese Hindus, and others), economic disparities created by transmigration often cause what appear to be religious or ethnic clashes that are in fact economic at root. Muslims from Makian Island (which was evacuated when a volcano erupted) received land and other privileges in the mostly Christian town of Malifut. In West Kalimantan, Muslim transmigrants from Madura were seen as economically favored over native Dayaks, who are Christian.

2) that members of the Indonesian military (particularly the army) are fomenting unrest throughout the country to demonstrate that a strong military is needed to restore order, and therefore to hinder Wahid's stated goal of reforming the military and reducing its role in civilian life. (See box, page 28.)

3) that “political elites” opposed to the Wahid

government may be attempting to destabilize his regime in order to regain influence.

4) that individuals with strong business interests in Indonesia—including the children of former president Suharto, all of whom own logging concessions and other ventures throughout the country—may provoke the troubles to prevent political and economic reforms that are counter to their interests.

5) that Suharto and his allies could be attempting to destabilize the current government and forestall corruption prosecutions. In September 2000, a Jakarta court dismissed the case against Suharto after a panel of physicians determined that he was too ill to stand trial for allegedly embezzling more than \$500 million in a charity scheme. In November 2000, an appeals court decided the trial could resume without him.

6) that current or former military leaders responsible for past atrocities—in East Timor and elsewhere—are causing the troubles to create distractions for the government and therefore delay investigations and prosecutions for human rights abuses (or perhaps to prevent them entirely, in the hope that if they demonstrate the continued usefulness of a strong military, there will be little incentive to investigate its leaders).

7) that political and/or military actors are attempting to quash separatism throughout Indonesia by provoking distrust among allies in the separatist struggle (such as Muslims and Christians who together proclaimed the Republic of the South Moluccas in the 1950s).

8) that certain leaders of Muslim-based political parties and/or other Muslim leaders are trying to achieve their longstanding goal of “Islamicizing” Indonesia. While most Christians and Muslims emphasize that they have lived in harmony for decades and that the current unrest is not the result of deep-seated religious animosity, some Christians believe there is an organized effort to drive out Indonesia's Christians, particularly from eastern Indonesia where they are largely concentrated, or at least to prevent them from becoming too strong politically or economically.

9) that Christian leaders and those in the interna-



tional community sympathetic to them are attempting to “Christianize” parts of Indonesia. As evidence, they point to the multinational involvement in the independence of predominantly Catholic East Timor.

10) that religious and ethnic tensions that existed all along but were kept in check by Suharto’s authoritarian rule are now rising to the surface as Indonesia struggles with a transition to democracy.

### Local Sources of Conflict

In addition to offering these broad theories, displaced persons and others point to local power struggles and other explanations for the violence. In most areas that have experienced religious violence, the conflict is traced to one or more incidents between communities or individuals. In Central Sulawesi, for example, Christian and Muslim communities supported different candidates for a local political office. In North Maluku, natives and transmigrants competed for jobs with a gold mining company.

In certain areas of Indonesia, groups calling themselves “Jihad” warriors (or Muslim holy warriors) are the most direct cause of much of the violence and displacement. The most well-known of these groups is the Laskar Jihad (Jihad Force), based in central Java. The Laskar Jihad has deployed an estimated 3,000 fighters to Maluku since April 2000, and the Indonesian government has been largely powerless to prevent their actions.

The Laskar Jihad members are armed with sophisticated weapons and are well-trained. Because of this, many observers suspect that one or more members of Indonesia’s “political elite” are funding the warriors. In addition, some Indonesian soldiers are reportedly directly assisting the Jihad. In July 2000, Wahid ordered the Laskar Jihad to be forcibly removed from Ambon. When Jihad leaders threatened reprisals against “Christian posts” on Java (interpreted as churches), the government reportedly backed off. The next month, former defense minister Juwono Suharsono said the ranks of the Laskar Jihad and related forces had reached 10,000 people and were the “main reason for the ongoing ground conflict.”

In the Malukus, Central Sulawesi, and elsewhere, Christians have formed gangs and paramilitaries to fight Muslims. In these areas, Muslims are known as the “white” group and Christians as the “red” group (terms reportedly coined by the military to prevent

direct reference to the religions). The sectarian fighting has caused death, injury, and displacement among both communities. In Central Sulawesi, the Muslim community has reportedly suffered disproportionately.

Some observers have speculated that developments in East Timor, which achieved independence from Indonesia in late 1999, have inspired the separatism and violence now occurring throughout the archipelago. While it is true that East Timor’s independence gave new hope to the longstanding separatist movements in Aceh and West Papua, it does not explain most of the violence in Indonesia. In West Kalimantan, the tribal conflict between Madurese and other ethnic groups—which initially began in the 1960s—was renewed in late 1996, nearly three years before the East Timorese independence vote. In Central Sulawesi, the Muslim-Christian violence started in December 1998, a month before then-president Habibie announced that he would allow a referendum in East Timor. In Ambon, the triggering incident was seven months before the referendum, and in North Maluku the violence began the very month of the East Timor vote. In fact, with international attention focused on East Timor, the killings and devastation in North Maluku went virtually unnoticed.



*These children are among the more than 70,000 persons, both Muslim and Christian, who have fled the religious violence in Central Sulawesi. Photo credit: USCR/J. Mason*



## Indonesia's Response to the Displaced

The Indonesian government acknowledges the scope of the displacement and its responsibility for assisting the displaced. In most areas of the country, the government is providing at least some assistance to displaced persons, and it cooperates with UN agencies, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and others offering such assistance. However, several factors—including Indonesia's current political crises and ongoing economic problems—have prevented the government from effectively responding to the needs of the displaced persons.

The government has emphasized that the current unrest, particularly the religious violence in Maluku, is an internal matter and that international “interference” will not be permitted. In July 2000, when the European Union expressed concern over the situation in the Malukus, Wahid ruled out any possibility of foreign peacekeepers to quell the violence. He said only humanitarian assistance, and possibly logistical support, would be welcomed. Some observers have speculated that if the violence continues, Wahid may eventually relent to some form of international peacekeeping (as he did in East Timor), particularly in the wake of the September 2000 killing of three UN aid workers in West Timor at the hands of pro-Indonesia militias.

The governmental system for responding to displacement is complex and confusing, with a wide array of ministries and departments playing a role. Complicating matters is the government's national-level reorganization and a decentralization of power to the local level. According to one NGO, the roles of the various agencies and bodies have been “fuzzy and confused.”

Many decisions regarding assistance to displaced persons and other victims of natural or man-made disasters are made by the National Disaster Management Coordination Board (Bakornas PB), a “nonstructural” agency answering directly to Wahid. The agency is comprised of various cabinet-level officials and the chair of the National Social Welfare Agency (BKSJ). BKSJ and the other agencies jointly decide the type and amount of assistance to be given to refugees and displaced persons.

Normally, the government gives emergency assistance—usually 400 grams of rice and about 1,500 rupiah (about \$2) per person—for the first two weeks after a disaster. After that, the assistance varies. BKSJ reportedly decided that displaced persons in

North Sumatra, East Java, West Kalimantan, and Southeast Sulawesi would receive assistance for 70 days, while those in Aceh would have 75 days of assistance and those in Maluku 90 days. According to the Indonesia Child Welfare Foundation, however, these guidelines do not always stand. Assistance in Maluku and West Kalimantan, for example, was extended for at least a year. Likewise, the government announced and then retracted a decision to cut off aid to the refugees in West Timor.

At the time of the USCR site visit in July 2000, much of the government's response to refugees and internally displaced persons fell under the purview of the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare and Poverty Alleviation, a position that has since been restructured and renamed. The Coordinating Minister told USCR that the government “welcomes the sympathy and help of foreign countries” in helping internally displaced persons.

He added that the government's priority is to “repatriate” displaced persons to their homes. Because such return is difficult to achieve (often because of the security situation) and because it is also difficult to find settlement areas in a short period of time, he added that there is an urgent need for food and temporary settlements, as well as for temporary schools and other assistance in the camps. Transmigration, he said, is the “last choice” solution for internally displaced persons, although he noted that some displaced persons have been officially transmigrated.

The Indonesian Red Cross (known as PMI), often in partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), provides emergency relief to displaced persons in various areas of Indonesia. Although PMI receives no direct funding from the Indonesian government, the government has asked it to play a coordination role on behalf of the internally displaced. In addition, many Indonesian NGOs are providing varying degrees of assistance—some as implementing partners of governments or international agencies, others purely through local sources of funding.

## International Assistance

A large number of UN agencies are working in Indonesia to assess and, in some cases, to respond to the needs of internally displaced persons. The resident representative of the UN Development Program (UNDP) serves as the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Indonesia, and UNDP itself conducts some limited activities on behalf of displaced persons. The UN



## TRANSMIGRATION: WISE POLICY OR THE “DOWNFALL OF THE COUNTRY”?

The term *transmigrasi* (transmigration) is used in Indonesia to refer to the movement of people from the most densely populated islands—primarily Java, Bali, Lombok, and Madura—to underdeveloped and sparsely populated islands in other parts of the archipelago. Historically, leaders in Jakarta have believed that a lack of internal migration has led to unemployment or underemployment and significant disparities between the country’s lesser and more developed areas. This belief prompted the government to establish transmigration projects to curb population and land pressures.

In recent years, however, the policy has come under criticism for several reasons, including the little economic benefit the new settlements provide to the transmigrants; the environmental impact of deforestation and other land clearing activities; and land disputes between transmigrants and indigenous peoples whose needs and rights were often pushed to the wayside. Some Indonesians view transmigration as an attempt to spread the influence of Javanese culture. Whether or not that view is accurate, transmigration has undisputedly fueled tensions between religious and ethnic groups, some of which have led to large-scale conflict and displacement. One humanitarian aid worker told USCR that transmigration is the “downfall of the country.”

The idea of moving people to underdeveloped areas of the Indonesian archipelago began in the 1930s under the Dutch colonialists, with the aim of alleviating population pressures in Java. After independence, the program was more or less continued by the Indonesian government, which sought to foster a more balanced population distribution. The government made numerous efforts in the 1950s and 1960s to establish successful agricultural settlements and to coordinate the public and private agencies responsible for their oversight. This entailed extensive government propaganda to arouse community interest in transmigration. As a result, significant numbers of people chose to move to other areas. However, the government was concerned primarily with numbers and failed to consider the economic impact of the new settlements, both on the migrant farmers and

the receiving communities. Moreover, political and economic problems in the 1960s drained government resources and diverted attention from correcting the flaws of the transmigration policy.

In the late 1960s, transmigration became part of Suharto’s first five-year development plan. In an attempt to revitalize the failing economy, the government shifted the focus of transmigration toward agricultural expansion and regional development. From 1969 to 1974, the government opened up new agricultural lands with greater diversification and intensification of farming methods. The practice of moving indigenous people into transmigration areas, in an effort to improve their economic position, also came into practice at this time. The practice was also motivated, however, by a desire to make more land available for cultivation and settlement. The government hoped the practice would facilitate assimilation between the indigenous population and the Javanese or Balinese enclaves settling in the area.

In 1983, Indonesia established a cabinet-level transmigration agency, which focused on the agricultural potential of Indonesia’s less densely populated areas. The primary destination for transmigrants had traditionally been the western island of Sumatra but began shifting to areas in Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Irian Jaya (West Papua). The basic tenets of the program, however, have remained the same. The government attempts to recruit voluntary transmigrants and provides them with land and other economic incentives. Since the 1980s, the government has enlisted the help of civil engineers, regional planners, and environmental consultants to address concerns over poor implementation of transmigration projects. Many of these consultants are funded by international development agencies (e.g., the World Bank) and through foreign aid programs.

The policy, however, continues to be wrought with administrative and structural problems. In particular, the human and environmental impact on Indonesia’s outer islands has prompted criticism and mistrust within the country, questioning the future viability of transmigration as a development tool. It is also not clear that the policy always benefits the transmigrants. In some areas,





such as West Papua, the government has been accused of placing people into swampland, flood plains, and other areas with little chance of agricultural success.

Many Indonesians and outsiders also view transmigration as a cause of much of the turmoil wracking the country. If—as many believe—larger political forces are creating unrest, those forces have built on communal tensions created by decades of transmigration. While those tensions appear grounded in ethnic or religious hatred, they are at root economic. Because Indonesia is overwhelmingly Muslim, most transmigrants—such as the Javanese and Madurese—are Muslim. However, they have often been placed in heavily Christian areas such as West Papua and Maluku. If the transmigrants become more economically successful than the local population, resentments can appear to be religiously based. When transmigrants share religion with the indigenous population, hostilities can appear directed at the transmigrants' ethnicity, especially given the widely held belief that Jakarta wishes to "Javanize" the other islands.

In many cases, low-level but longstanding transmigration tensions have risen to the surface as

Indonesia struggles with a transition to democracy. Many observers believe forces seeking to destabilize the country have exploited these tensions. In many conflict areas, large numbers of transmigrants have fled the region, some returning to their native island (or that of their parents), others fleeing to the nearest safe port. Yet, as an aid worker noted, "the government not only doesn't see transmigration as a problem but it sees it as a solution" (by relocating certain groups of displaced persons). Yet, the solutions are not always clear. As a transmigrant who fled his home in West Papua noted, "We are victims of bad government policy. The government must send us home or transfer us to better locations."

In December 2000, Indonesia's transmigration minister, Alhilal Hamdi, said the government had terminated the regular inter-island transmigration program four months earlier, when he was appointed minister. Hamdi said the government was instead focusing on local transmigration programs, particularly in West Java. "We will only work to resettle refugees and local people in new settlements in the same province, at the most in neighboring districts," he added. He noted, however, that some "spontaneous transmigration" would still occur.

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has also sent staff to coordinate efforts in certain regions of the country. The World Food Program (WFP) provides most of the food distributed to displaced persons, primarily through NGOs. The World Health Organization (WHO) has conducted detailed assessments of the health conditions of displaced persons and has made recommendations for a response. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), through its office in Jakarta, has participated in UN missions to assess the situation of displaced persons in various regions and has provided advice. It has not, however, as yet had a significant role in assisting or ensuring the protection of internally displaced persons in Indonesia. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has also participated in assessment missions.

In July 2000, five UN agencies established a formal presence in Ambon. Representatives of UNDP, WFP, WHO, UNICEF, and OCHA are providing assistance (in cooperation with international and local NGOs), monitoring ongoing needs, and disseminating

information. The UN suspended operations in Ambon and in North Maluku in September 2000 because of violence but had re-opened the offices by December. OCHA has said the UN will also establish a monitoring presence in Manado (North Sulawesi), Palu (Central Sulawesi), and Sorong (West Papua).

International NGOs assisting displaced persons in Indonesia include Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Action Contre la Faim (ACF), World Vision International (WVI), Oxfam, Mercy Corps, CARE, the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). ICRC is active in many regions of Indonesia, above and beyond its funding of PMI.

### Conditions for the Internally Displaced

In certain areas, particularly Ambon and other areas of Maluku and North Maluku, the security situation has hindered assistance to the displaced and has caused some international agencies to suspend operations.



Also in these areas, the logistical challenges posed by Indonesia's geography (including the distances between islands) has prevented an adequate response. It is in these areas, however, that the needs of the displaced are believed to be the most critical, with reports of serious malnutrition and disease. In one camp in North Maluku visited by USCR, the displaced were living under plastic sheeting on a dock owned by a fish processing plant. The camp residents have since been moved to a new location, but the new site also has problems that limit its long-term viability.

In most other areas, including nearly all areas visited by USCR in July and August 2000, the displaced are in conditions that, while not adequate for the long term, are not desperate. The basic needs of the displaced—shelter, food, sanitation, and health—are usually being met. Throughout Indonesia, many displaced persons are in “collective centers” such as sports stadiums, warehouses, or other buildings. Others are in more traditional “camps” comprised of newly built structures of wood or other materials. In the worst camps, they are under plastic sheeting. Still other displaced persons are in private homes, often those of family members or friends but also those of community members willing to help.

In Aceh, the numbers of displaced persons have increased sharply since the USCR site visit in January 2000, and conditions for the displaced have deteriorated. Many of the displaced are gathered around mosques or other buildings, often living under plastic sheeting. Because of the security situation and widely publicized attacks on humanitarian workers, including three local staff of Oxfam, few agencies are now providing assistance to the displaced in Aceh.

In areas of Indonesia that have experienced religious violence, displaced persons are generally separated by religion. Camps or collective centers usually contain one or more villages that fled together. While many of those villages were religiously mixed prior to the violence, generally only one religious community chose to flee, often after—or in anticipation of—an attack by the other group. In some locations, displaced Christians are in camps just miles away from displaced Muslims. In other cases, one group, usually the Christians, has entirely evacuated the region or the island. Thus, some areas of Indonesia are gradually reconstituting themselves along religious lines.

Some displaced persons have already been relocated by the Indonesian government, either for

temporary or long-term purposes. USCR visited two relocation sites. In North Maluku, the military was supervising construction of a site intended as short-term shelter for 3,000 residents of a camp where conditions were harsh. At the time of the USCR visit, the old camp was about to close and all residents were to be moved to the new site where conditions were better. In West Kalimantan, the government had relocated 500 displaced families to a site intended as a long-term solution. The families had volunteered for the move but, after living there for nearly a year and being unable to cultivate the land, many doubted they would be able to stay there much longer.

In late August 2000, the National Commission for the Protection of Children, an Indonesian NGO, estimated that 60 percent of the refugees and displaced persons in Indonesia were under 14 years of age. The Commission also said many displaced children age five and under were suffering from malnutrition, a lack of proper medical treatment, and insufficient sanitation. As an example, they said more than 1,000 children had died in Sambas, in West Kalimantan, because of a shortage of potable water.

The Commission also reported that children in many camps were being sexually exploited. Similarly, a University of Indonesia medical team known as MER-C (Medical Emergency Rescue Committee), which has assisted displaced persons in various parts of the country, reported that some displaced girls have resorted to prostitution. During the July 2000 site visit, several local NGOs told USCR that some displaced persons were selling their children because they were unable to care for them. USCR was unable to confirm these reports.

## Prospects for the Future

The vast majority of displaced persons interviewed by USCR said they wish to return to their homes. In most cases, however, they said they had no immediate prospects for return, and many said they believed they would be killed if they returned at this time. Most said they would not return unless the Indonesian government could ensure their safety, although many said the military had done nothing to prevent the attacks that had led to their displacement.

Displaced persons told USCR they will accept relocation by the government—or even formal transmigration—if the government tells them it is the best solution. Many said they would go “wherever the government tells us.”



Numerous organizations concerned with the violence and displacement in Indonesia—including the Indonesian government, many international and local NGOs, and the U.S. Agency for International Development—are urging reconciliation among parties to the various conflicts, and in some cases are developing projects to achieve this. Some observers have urged caution in this undertaking. One NGO worker said, “It won’t be enough to get the leaders together; reconciliation needs to come from the ground up.” Both Muslim and Christian leaders are forming investigation teams to assess the causes of the conflicts and to propose solutions. But another NGO worker noted that “These teams won’t be seen as credible by the other side or by the public in general” and suggested that such investigations be conducted by either nonsectarian organizations or by representatives of both religions (or all sides to an ethnic conflict) appointed by a neutral body.

NGOs have noted that, as they flee, the displaced bring their stories—and evidence of atrocities—with them, often expanding the conflict area. For example, many of the clashes that have occurred in Central Sulawesi, Lombok, and even Java have been related to the conflict in Ambon. Some clashes even began through demonstrations or prayer meetings for the people of Ambon. Many NGOs are now worried about North Sulawesi, particularly Manado, which is receiving displaced Christians from both Central Sulawesi and North Maluku. A Manado-based Christian “brotherhood” organization reportedly announced that if the religious conflicts continued in Ambon, they would begin burning mosques and taking other action against Muslims in Manado.

Since the September 2000 murders of the UNHCR workers in West Timor, the international community has become increasingly aware of the Indonesian government’s inability to curb the violence. Until it is brought under


control, however, the number of displaced persons will likely increase.

As well as the immediate concerns over safety and material assistance, the long-term impact of the bloodshed has become a major concern. In October 2000, a prominent Indonesian psychologist said the Suharto regime was so “repressive and firm in its denial” of conflicts that even journalists were reluctant to report on communal violence. As a result, he said, Indonesia’s mental health professionals are not trained to deal with traumatized people.



*This man and hundreds of others reside in small huts built as part of a cultural exhibition center in Tentena, Central Sulawesi. Many said they hid in the forest after “the other side” in the religious conflict attacked their village and burned their houses. Photo credit: USCR/J. Mason*





### III. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN ACEH

#### Numbers and Locations

In December 2000, the World Food Program reported that more than 8,000 persons were internally displaced within Aceh—a decrease of some 7,000 from the previous month and nearly 25,000 less than in October. The level of displacement in Aceh fluctuated widely in 2000, from approximately 4,000 in January to some 80,000 in August.

In October, local NGOs reported that some 16,000 of the displaced persons in Aceh (roughly half at the time) were Javanese transmigrants, with the rest being ethnic Acehnese. The ethnic Acehnese are located throughout the region, while most Javanese are in Central Aceh.

In addition to displacement in Aceh itself, an unknown number of persons have fled Aceh for Medan, a city just south of Aceh in the province of North Sumatra. The displaced in Medan include both native Acehnese and Javanese transmigrants.

#### Causes of Displacement

Aceh, located on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra, represents Indonesia's most longstanding separatist movement. For more than 120 years, the Acehnese have sought independence, first from Dutch colonizers and later from Indonesia, which obtained

the territory in 1949 in what the Acehnese regard as an illegal transaction.

Three times since then, the Indonesian government has pledged to give Aceh some form of autonomy, most notably in 1959 when Aceh became a “special territory” with an ostensibly high degree of freedom in religious, educational, and cultural matters. The Acehnese, however, say the status has been virtually meaningless.

In addition to believing Indonesia illegally occupies their territory, Acehnese resent what they view as Indonesia's exploitation of Aceh's natural resources—a complaint shared by other provinces but particularly acute in Aceh, which is rich in oil and natural gas. Aceh is viewed as crucial to the economic survival of Indonesia, as its resources account for 20 percent of the national budget. The Acehnese also view Indonesia's transmigration policy as an attempt to favor the Javanese economically and to spread the influence of Javanese culture.

Like the rest of Indonesia, Aceh is overwhelmingly Muslim. However, the Acehnese—while taking pains to note that they are not “fundamentalist”—claim to practice a purer form of Islam than most other Indonesians. Many Acehnese advocate an independent Aceh based on Islamic law.

In 1976, the goal of independence was advanced through the founding of “Gerakan Aceh Merdeka” (Free Aceh Movement), an armed resistance group generally known by its acronym, GAM. In the late 1970s, Indonesian authorities conducted mass arrests of GAM members and shut down their activities until 1989, when the movement was resurrected. In response, in 1990 the government declared Aceh a military operations zone (known as DOM) and launched a counter-insurgency campaign that led to the deaths and disappearances of many civilians. Torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings are among the reported human rights abuses. In 1994, Amnesty International estimated that at least 2,000 people had been killed in Aceh between 1989 and 1991 alone.

The May 1998 downfall of Suharto sparked new hope for the Acehnese. In August 1998, following the discovery of mass graves in Aceh, Indonesia's then-defense minister and armed forces commander, General Wiranto, announced the lifting of the DOM status and apologized to the Acehnese people for human rights abuses committed by the Indonesian military. However, the withdrawal of troops and other promised reforms were short-lived. Before long, the DOM-era violence was surpassed, and the Acehnese calls for independence grew louder.



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## In Memoriam: Jafar Siddiq Hamzah



*On September 2, 2000, the body of Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, a U.S. permanent resident and prominent activist for human rights in Aceh and throughout Indonesia, was found outside the North Sumatra city of Medan, near Aceh. Hamzah's death sparked sadness and outrage on the part of his many friends and colleagues, including those of us at the U.S. Committee for Refugees.*

*Born in the village of Pulo near Lhokseumawe, Aceh, Hamzah left his home to work to unify Acehnese freedom movements and help bring an end to the violence that has caused the deaths of more than five thousand people in Aceh in the 1990s alone. Hamzah was a human rights activist and lawyer who, under persistent threats and intimidation from the Indonesian military, left Aceh in 1996 to move to New York City. In 1999, he enrolled as a graduate student in political science at the New School for Social Research. At the same time, he established and chaired the International Forum for Aceh. He made numerous trips to Indonesia to help improve the human rights situation, while working tirelessly to achieve a referendum on Aceh's independence. Hamzah was instrumental in the founding of "Su Aceh," the first newspaper published in the Acehnese language.*

*Hamzah returned to Aceh in July 2000 to help set up a local office of the Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh (SCHRA)—an umbrella group with dozens of institutional members worldwide—and to explore legal remedies for alleged corporate involvement in human rights abuses in Aceh. On August 5, he disappeared after leaving a meeting in Medan. Numerous organizations soon joined an international campaign urging Indonesia to locate Hamzah. Nevertheless, on September 2, Hamzah's body and those of four other unidentified persons were found outside Medan. Hamzah was 35 years old. Although his body revealed signs of torture, the cause of death has not yet been determined.*

*Individuals and agencies around the world, including the U.S. State Department, have called on the Indonesian government to investigate Hamzah's death and to prosecute those responsible. Thus far, the government has provided little information. Although Jafar's family and many observers suspect the involvement of the Indonesian army, no evidence has yet indicated those responsible.*

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In 1999, large numbers of Acehnese began fleeing their homes in response to brutality by the military and police, or out of fear of being caught up in clashes between the security forces and GAM. Although some Acehnese—particularly those with financial means—fled outside of Aceh (often to Medan), most remained inside, usually in camps that formed around mosques and school compounds. The months preceding Indonesia's general election in October 1999 saw a dramatic increase in the number of internally displaced persons, not only because of the violence but because some GAM members reportedly ordered Acehnese to leave their homes and set up camps to avoid being forced by the military to vote. The Acehnese may therefore have feared both the military and GAM. Some villagers sought to avoid both by fleeing to the forests and mountains.

January 2000 saw mounting pressure on

Indonesia's new president, Wahid, to end the violence and human rights abuses in Aceh and to hold trials for those accused of atrocities. Although prior to his election he had publicly supported an East Timor-like referendum in Aceh (allowing a choice between autonomy within Indonesia or independence), once in office he asserted that the referendum should only address whether Aceh should be governed by Sharia (Islamic law).

In February 2000, GAM's military commander in Aceh, Tenguku Abdullah Syafi'ie, publicly announced the rebels' willingness to negotiate a cease-fire if the army and police discontinued "sweeping" operations in Aceh (operations that include roadblocks, door-to-door searches, and other techniques ostensibly to locate GAM members but also reportedly used to intimidate civilians and extort money). Many displaced Acehnese have said that such operations, or



even rumors that such would begin in their villages, led them to flee their homes.

That same month, the military and police launched the latest in a series of post-DOM operations in Aceh. As the deaths and disappearances of human rights activists began to increase (and as the bodies of the dead showed signs of torture), international NGOs increased their calls for impartial investigations. In mid-February, General Wiranto was removed from his new post as security minister for his alleged role in military-sponsored human rights abuses in East Timor.

April 17, 2000 marked the beginning of long-anticipated human rights trials of 24 soldiers and one civilian for their roles in a July 1999 massacre in Aceh. The trials were conducted by a joint civil-military court (to the dismay of many Acehnese and some international human rights groups). More than 1,000 soldiers were sent to safeguard the proceedings because of an increase in arson attacks and bombings in the area. The eventual outcome was a guilty verdict for all 25 suspects and a sentence of eight to ten years in prison—a sentence regarded as too light by much of Aceh’s population.

Wahid announced in early May 2000 that his government and GAM’s leadership (based in Sweden) had reached an agreement on a “humanitarian pause” to the violence in Aceh. Agreement was reached during talks in Geneva facilitated by the Henri Dunant Foundation. The pause, strongly opposed by the Indonesian military, was to commence on June 2 for an initial period of three months and be regularly reviewed for renewal.

The day before the pause was to take effect, more than 6,000 Acehnese reportedly fled their homes in North Aceh because of continued fighting. The next day, the leader of a splinter GAM faction was shot at point blank range in a restaurant in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur. GAM accused military intelligence agents of the murder, and the military cast blame on GAM. In the second week of June, as prospects of a genuine cease-fire seemed grim, Wahid dismissed the governor of Aceh and replaced him with a senior minister viewed by many Acehnese as condoning human rights abuses in the region.

The following months saw continuing sweeping operations in Aceh as well as ongoing clashes causing displacement and general unrest. The new governor said authorities had been unable to implement the truce since they had not received the funds earmarked for humanitarian assistance. Both Wahid and GAM leaders proposed an extension of the pause

to allow assistance to reach the internally displaced persons.

Despite charges by Indonesia’s defense minister that the humanitarian pause is “too advantageous” to GAM, in late September the two sides signed an extension of the agreement through January 15, 2001 (the pause formally lapsed from September 3 to October 15; however, the lapse made little difference because violence had continued and even intensified during the pause).

November 2000 proved especially violent in Aceh, as military and police clashed with hundreds of thousands of Acehnese demonstrating at a two-day pro-referendum rally in the provincial capital. Outside the capital, as many as a million more were stranded on roadsides or in camps as soldiers blocked their efforts to attend the rally. Although the official death toll was in the 30s, several human rights groups said more than 200 Acehnese had been killed within a one-week period. Another 500 were reported missing.

As of December 2000, the situation in Aceh remained at a violent stalemate, with both sides saying the humanitarian pause would not be extended past January 2001. A referendum on independence appears unlikely, and most Acehnese say promises of greater autonomy are meaningless. While many Acehnese do not support all of GAM’s tactics, and may even have reason to fear some elements of GAM, most appear to support the insurgency in general, given their common enemy—the Indonesian military. GAM has also engendered support by re-building homes burned by the military and providing some level of security. Often, however, civilians are targeted for their real or perceived support for GAM, or they simply become victims of the cross-fire. As the violence continues, Acehnese continue to flee their homes.

The fluctuating level of displacement since January 2000 is similar to that of 1999, when displacement ranged from a few hundred to more than 130,000. This fluctuation does not necessarily correspond with the level of military activity and human rights abuse, which have been high at times when displacement was minimal. Rather, displacement appears to be a function of several factors, possibly including some manipulation by GAM in an effort to draw international attention to Aceh’s political and humanitarian problems. Several sources told USCR that the high level of displacement in the summer of 1999 was due in part to such efforts; however, USCR was not able to independently verify this claim. In addition, despite burning people out of their homes, the military has alternately told Acehnese that they will be killed if they leave their



villages or if they do not return to them. The displaced persons interviewed by USCR in January 2000, all of whom were ethnic Acehnese, said they would return home when the military left their villages.

Many displaced Javanese in Aceh have said they fled because of intimidation from “unknown people,” according to local NGOs. The Indonesian military has blamed GAM for this intimidation, while GAM has denied the allegations and accused “military provocateurs.”

### Conditions for the Displaced

The internally displaced are living in and around mosques, schools, and other buildings in Aceh, in conditions ranging from fair to inadequate. Acehnese student groups are providing logistical support for many of the camps, including small amounts of material assistance. Most assistance, however, comes from local businesses and occasionally from the public. The local government occasionally distributes food, but very irregularly. To some extent, the lack of significant government assistance to the Acehnese may result from the Acehnese people’s stated refusal of such assistance. A small number of international NGOs have been operational in Aceh during the past year.

Most of the displaced Javanese transmigrants are in a mosque compound in Central Aceh, not far from the capital, Banda Aceh. As the camp is near a military base, the student groups have provided little assistance there for fear of the soldiers.

In September 2000, Acehnese refugees in the Pidie area (where fighting has been fierce) were reportedly short of food and suffering from numerous health problems. Student groups had requested assistance from the local community, but widespread poverty hindered such efforts.

As a result of increased violence, including attacks on their local staff, international NGOs have increasingly had to scale down or suspend their work in Aceh.

In late August 2000, three local staff of Oxfam were seriously injured in an attack that also took the lives of two displaced persons. A police and military patrol had chased suspected GAM rebels into a displaced persons camp in West Aceh, where the conflict escalated. Police officers reportedly beat the Oxfam workers after they failed to show identification documents. As of late October 2000, Oxfam was reportedly




*A displaced Acehnese girl waits with her family and others at a government compound before being relocated to a camp in Banda Aceh. The displaced said they fled after the mobile police brigade (BRIMOB) terrorized their village.*

*Photo credit: J. Koch/Jacqueline Koch Photography*

still in Aceh but was not providing assistance. MSF was in a similar situation.

Detailed reports of violence, intimidation, torture, and disappearances indicate that humanitarian workers are in constant danger. While most reports cite abuse by Indonesian military and police, humanitarian workers also say many GAM rebels do not respect their work and sometimes harass or obstruct them.





#### IV. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN BALI

##### Numbers and Locations

As of early December 2000, as many as 3,000 internally displaced persons were believed to be on the island of Bali (the local government knew the exact location of only 37). Most of the 3,000—if not all—were ethnic Balinese who had transmigrated to East Timor years earlier and fled there following the August 1999 referendum and ensuing violence.

An international NGO, however, said at least some of the displaced were from the nearby island of Lombok. Nearly a year earlier, at the time of the January 2000 USCR site visit, Bali was hosting more than 7,500 internally displaced persons from Lombok. Six months later, an Indonesian government official told USCR that the displaced from Lombok in Bali had all returned home.

In July 2000, about 1,000 persons from Ambon fled to Bali. Most were believed to be either native Moluccan or ethnic Chinese. It is unknown whether any are still in Bali.

##### Displacement from Lombok

During the January site visit, USCR assessed the situation of displaced persons from Lombok on Bali. Nearly all of the displaced were Christian, and a large percentage were ethnic Chinese. Most were from the Lombok capital of Mataram. They arrived in Bali soon

after January 17, 2000, when large-scale riots between Muslims and Christians began in Lombok.

The displaced were living in or around Bali's capital, Denpasar. The others were scattered around Bali. Although some lived with relatives or friends, most were sheltered in churches, seminaries, retreat houses, and other buildings.

The riot on Lombok began during a Muslim prayer meeting of about 5,000 people in support of the Muslims in Ambon. According to displaced persons and church workers, a few days prior to the gathering, a Muslim leader had sent a threatening letter to a Christian leader, indicating that violence might follow. The letter was reportedly provided to the military before the gathering. At some point during the meeting, unidentified persons joined the gathering and incited anti-Christian sentiment, leading to a riot in which nine churches and more than 70 houses were reportedly set on fire. In the following days, thousands of Lombok Christians fled the island. Many said they were assisted by the Indonesian police and military, who provided temporary protection in police stations and military headquarters, transported the displaced persons to the ferry dock, and escorted them to Bali. Displaced persons said they believe the military and police were genuinely trying to protect them, rather than forcing them to leave.

All displaced persons interviewed by USCR said that, although they are Christian, they had lived peacefully with the Muslims in Lombok until the recent events. Most emphasized, often sorrowfully, that they had Muslim friends and that there had been no problems until now. Many observers speculated that rogue members of the military, "political elites," and other "provocateurs" incited the sectarian violence to undermine Wahid's government and demonstrate the necessity of a strong military. Others said the violence was simply "revenge" for similar occurrences in Ambon.

Local Catholic and Protestant churches provided most of the assistance to the displaced. The Indonesian government gave rice and provided security for the displaced persons, while university students and other volunteers performed various tasks. The conditions observed by USCR appeared good.

During the site visit to Jakarta in July 2000, Indonesia's minister for housing and settlements told USCR that the displaced persons from Lombok had all returned home. She stated, "Muslim leaders went to Bali to fetch them back. It was beautiful." According to an international NGO, it was likely that some persons from Lombok—perhaps even hundreds—had remained on Bali.







*A Muslim woman and a Catholic nun break into tears during a peaceful demonstration in Jakarta in September 1999. Scores of women activists demanded an end to violence throughout Indonesia. Photo credit: AFP*

### **East Timorese on Bali**

Beginning in early August 1999 (prior to the August 30 East Timorese independence referendum), approximately 1,500 East Timorese refugees fled to Bali. Most were ethnic Timorese Christians, and they were assisted by the same church network that would later assist the displaced from Lombok. Most of these East Timorese were repatriated in October and November of 1999.

At some point following the violence in East Timor, a second group of East Timorese also arrived on Bali. This group of nearly 3,000 were ethnic

Balinese Hindus who had transmigrated to East Timor years earlier. UNHCR considered them internally displaced persons rather than refugees, as there was no doubt of their Indonesian citizenship and they had continued to avail themselves of Indonesia's protection. The local government on Bali offered each transmigrant a small piece of land on Burung Island, off Sumatra, although many were displeased with the offer. As of December 2000, 37 of the transmigrants remained at a government-run transit camp on Bali. The rest had returned to their villages of origin within Bali or were in some stage of transmigration to Burung or elsewhere.





## V. INTERNALLY DISPLACED MADURESE IN WEST KALIMANTAN

### Numbers and Locations

As of early December 2000, approximately 63,000 persons were internally displaced in the province of West Kalimantan on the Indonesian part of the island of Borneo, according to the World Food Program.

The vast majority of the displaced are ethnic Madurese from the coastal district of Sambas, which has experienced sporadic ethnic clashes since late 1996. Most are in camps and collective centers in and around the provincial capital of Pontianak. Others have returned to their native Madura (an island off the coast of East Java) or have been relocated to other areas of the country.

The WFP figure is some 30,000 less than that provided by a local NGO in West Kalimantan, which told USCR that some 79,000 people were displaced in and around Pontianak as of mid-October, not including a large camp outside the city that holds some 14,000 people.

Regardless of the total, both sources agree that the number of displaced persons in West Kalimantan has increased by at least 20,000 since the time of USCR's site visit in July 2000, because of the return to Pontianak of displaced Madurese who had briefly returned to Madura. Finding conditions on Madura unsuitable and enticed by the government's offer of relocation at a new site, they have re-entered the camps and are awaiting such relocation.

The displaced in Pontianak city are housed in several "collective centers," including a football stadium (holding more than 10,000 persons as of mid-October 2000), a Muslim pilgrimage center, a university stadium, a warehouse, and other large structures. Some are in hastily made huts outside of the main buildings. Others, as many as 20,000, have sought shelter with family or friends in Pontianak. About two hours from Pontianak by road is the oldest camp, Singkawang, which now contains some of the newest arrivals. The camp was built near a military compound to help ensure safety. A local Madurese man voluntarily provided the land on which the camp was built.

USCR visited two collective centers in Pontianak as well as the camp at Singkawang and a government-initiated relocation area.

### Causes of Displacement

The displaced in West Kalimantan are overwhelmingly ethnic Madurese. The Madurese, who are predominantly Muslim, come from the Indonesian island of Madura, off the coast of East Java. In the 1960s, Suharto began moving many Madurese to West Kalimantan to alleviate overpopulation on Madura. Since then, at least eight conflicts have broken out between Madurese transmigrants and indigenous Dayaks, and at least one between Madurese and ethnic Chinese. In March 1999, ethnic Malays (who are predominantly Muslim, like the Madurese) clashed with the Madurese and enlisted the help of Dayaks (who are predominantly Christian). Together, the attackers burned homes and decapitated people.

As a result of the March 1999 violence, which reportedly began with a drunken brawl between a Malay and a Madurese, at least 200 Madurese were killed and some 35,000 others (35 percent of the Madurese population in West Kalimantan) became displaced. The military originally sheltered many of the displaced in barracks in Sambas town, in the northern part of Sambas District. A few weeks later, when tension spread to Sambas town, the military brought the displaced to Pontianak. Other Madurese arrived there on their own. Still others fled to Java or elsewhere. A small group attempted to enter Malaysia, but Malaysia refused entry and cooperated with Indonesian authorities in bringing the asylum seekers to Pontianak.

Some observers say that the transmigration program gave the Madurese an economic advantage and, therefore, led the Dayaks and other ethnic groups to blame the Madurese for the loss of jobs and tribal land. Many Madurese say their cultural emphasis on



hard work led them to advance economically and has resulted in “social jealousy” on the part of other groups. Although the clashes reportedly began with arguments between individual Madurese and Dayaks, some say the military had provoked the clashes, using religion as the apparent motive. Others say that since most political power rests with the Malays, their involvement in the recent violence may signal a political issue.

The Madurese told USCR that, during the attacks, the Dayaks reverted to their ancestral practice of eating the organs of those they killed. A Dayak scholar told USCR that this had happened but not to the extent believed. He said there were complex reasons for this, including the fact that the Madurese are known throughout Indonesia as fierce fighters and that some Madurese had carried out particularly brutal killings, prompting a commensurate response by the Dayaks.

Several displaced persons told USCR that while a military company is posted in Sambas, no soldiers were present during the two-day clash in March 1999. Some said the commander of the unit pulled his troops out two days before the incident, returning to help evacuate the Madurese but not to defend them. USCR could not verify this.

Three months after the site visit, in late October 2000, a traffic accident in Pontianak involving a Madurese and a Malay reignited violence between the two groups. Ethnic Malays armed with machetes, daggers, and homemade rifles reportedly killed at least two Madurese in three days of violence. Reports said the violence left seven people dead, but they were not all believed to be Madurese. Attackers also torched shops, buses, and property belonging to Madurese, and commercial activity in the city came to a virtual standstill. The displaced persons camps were put under police protection, and Indonesia sent reinforcements of the police mobile brigade to Pontianak to halt the violence.

### Conditions for the Displaced

Overall conditions for displaced persons in and around Pontianak are fair to good, with no reports of serious malnutrition or disease. However, the deputy governor of the province told USCR that resources are beginning to be strained and that the local community will not accept the displaced persons indefinitely. He urged international assistance to decrease the burden,



*These children are among more than 10,000 displaced ethnic Madurese living in a sports stadium in Pontianak, West Kalimantan. Madurese transmigrants have been targeted by ethnic Malays and Dayaks. Photo credit: USCR/J. Mason*



## U.S. AID TO INDONESIA'S MILITARY

**F**or decades, the United States was Indonesia's chief weapons supplier and trained countless Indonesian soldiers. The close military relationship existed throughout the 32 years of Suharto's authoritarian rule, despite the fact that his regime routinely jailed, tortured, and killed its opponents. When Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975, it did so with tacit U.S. approval. According to State Department sources, ninety percent of the weapons used in the invasion came from the United States.

After President Clinton took office in 1992, the climate both internationally and domestically supported a reduction of arms sales to Jakarta because of reported human rights violations by the Indonesian military. In response to the 1992 "Dili Massacre" in East Timor, the United States imposed a ban on small arms, riot gear, and other technologies that could be implicated in human rights abuses. Congress also cut funds for training programs that benefitted Indonesia. The arms ban was expanded in 1995 to include helicopter-mounted armaments and in 1996 to include armored personnel carriers. Despite these concessions, Clinton's first term saw military aid to Indonesia average around \$35 million per year.

The United States also provided training to Indonesia under the Military Education and Training (IMET) program between 1950 and 1992. Undertaken as a joint project of the Defense Department, the State Department, and various military divisions, the program trained more than 7,300 Indonesian military personnel. Although Congress discontinued the program in 1992 along with the ban on certain weapons, the Pentagon worked around the restrictions. U.S. special forces continued training their Indonesian counterparts, including the elite and savage Kopassus—the unit believed responsible for the most egregious human rights violations.

In 1996 and 1997, human rights groups criticized the Clinton Administration for permitting the sale to Indonesia of larger weapons such as F-16 fighters/bombers on the grounds that they would not be used to commit human rights abuses. It was not, however, until the spring of 1998 that Congress learned that the Pentagon had continued to secretly train Indonesian military forces. Outraged members of Congress and some members of the international community attacked the program. Consequently, in May 1998, following the riots in Jakarta that led to Suharto's ouster from power, the Defense Depart-

ment announced the suspension of the training exercises for the Indonesian military.

U.S. advisors were hopeful when Suharto's immediate successor, B.J. Habibie, promised widespread reforms and agreed to a referendum on East Timor's future. However, immediately following the referendum, Indonesian military-backed militias went on a rampage in the territory, committing gross human rights violations. In September 1999, Clinton suspended all military-to-military ties (including training), military transfers, and commercial weapons sales to Indonesia.

Even with Indonesia's acceptance of a multilateral peacekeeping force in East Timor and its October 1999 ratification of the independence vote, mounting evidence of military complicity in the violence prevented the United States from renewing military ties. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) secured passage of an amendment to the fiscal year 2000 foreign aid bill that codified restrictions on U.S. military aid until Indonesia takes positive steps to bring to justice those responsible for the violence and to secure the safe return of refugees from neighboring West Timor.

Early in 2000, the Pentagon quietly began renewing military ties that it deemed not banned by the legislation.

In May 2000, the United States invited Indonesian military officers to observe a U.S.-sponsored "Cobra Gold" exercise in Thailand. That was followed in July by a joint U.S.-Indonesian naval exercise in East Java—known as Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training or CARAT/2000—which included humanitarian operations. In August, U.S. officials approved the sale to Indonesia of spare parts for C-130 planes. Indonesia says the lack of such parts hinders its ability to curtail violence within its borders and may even prevent the delivery of humanitarian aid. Human rights groups dispute that contention and say no form of aid to Indonesia's military is warranted at this time.

The United States abruptly halted phased re-engagement with the Indonesian military following the September 2000 deaths of three UN aid workers in West Timor at the hands of pro-Indonesia militias. Given Indonesia's continued inability to quell violence in West Timor and elsewhere, Congress renewed the "Leahy provisions" in the fiscal year 2001 foreign aid bill enacted in November 2000.



particularly in order to find relocation areas for the displaced, in the absence of an ability to return them to their homes. He noted that, despite efforts at reconciliation, clashes continue.

A variety of international NGOs are providing assistance to the displaced (including food and sanitation), as are PMI and ICRC. The local government provides no assistance.

Displaced persons told USCR that, while the assistance is generally sufficient, the distribution is sporadic, which makes rationing difficult. “We’re never told how long the money or the rice is supposed to last,” said one man. They said that only about five percent of the children are attending school.

## Relocation

About 500 displaced Madurese families have been relocated to a settlement area some three hours from Pontianak by boat. The relocation project began in mid-1999. The area was selected because the majority of the local population is Madurese. The government built small houses for the families who were previously in camps in Pontianak and volunteered for the relocation.

Although the houses at the relocation site are all officially occupied, in many cases the adult men have returned to Pontianak to find work. The major complaint of the displaced persons, and a concern of NGOs, is that the land is not suitable for farming, even for growing rice. Recent droughts have intensified the problem. The government reportedly said it would install a water system, but the population is relying on rainwater until it does. According to one of the leaders of the new settlement, representatives from the agriculture department of a local university conducted an assessment and said the land can be rectified for agricultural purposes within two to three years if the government provides adequate funds. Residents of the site said corruption is the main reason the land has not been made productive. According to the residents, no UN agencies or international NGOs have yet provided assistance in the relocation area, although some have conducted assessments.

In October 2000, a Pontianak-based NGO said the site had yielded successful crops but was still in need of longer-term agricultural assistance. Health conditions, said the NGO, were also a problem.

The government also reportedly built resettlement communities for the Madurese on nearby islands. Some Indonesian officials had objected to the plan, saying that separating the ethnic groups would flout Indonesia’s motto of “unity in diversity.” Most of the displaced refused the resettlement offer, not wanting to risk losing their land and belongings at home in Sambas.

## Return to Sambas or Madura

Displaced Madurese interviewed by USCR said they want to return to Sambas, where they still have land, but would do so only if the government ensured their safety and compensated them for the loss of their houses and other property.

Thousands of Madurese also attempted to return to their native Madura, although most of the younger generation was not born there, but were unable to remain because of a lack of jobs and land. Most have reportedly returned to the camps. The minister of housing and settlements told USCR that the government had built 1,000 houses on Madura for returning displaced persons, although it was unclear how many returning Madurese occupied those homes.



*Government-built houses at a relocation site for displaced Madurese in West Kalimantan. Photo credit: USCR/J. Mason*



# An Indonesia Timeline

## August 17, 1945

Indonesian nationalist leader Sukarno proclaims the independent Republic of Indonesia. Dutch colonists, however, resist.

## November 1949

Indonesia and the Netherlands sign the Round Table Conference Agreements, brokered by the United Nations. The Dutch recognize the Republic of Indonesia as having de facto authority over the islands of Java, Madura, and Sumatra. The two governments will cooperate to form the “United States of Indonesia,” composed of the Republic, Borneo, and East Indonesia (including the Moluccas). Irian Jaya (West Papua) remains under Dutch control.

The Kingdom of Aceh (in Sumatra) is included in the agreements despite not having been formally incorporated into the Dutch colonial possession. Subsequently, Indonesia uses armed troops to quell Acehnese opposition.

## December 27, 1949

Power is officially handed over to a fully sovereign United States of Indonesia (later called once again the Republic of Indonesia).

The establishment of the secular Indonesian state incites Islamic militant groups to initiate a fundamentalist Islamic rebellion, known as Darul Islam (“House of Islam”).

## April 1950

The Moluccan Islands declare their independence by forming the “Republik Maluku Selatan” (Republic of South Moluccas) or RMS, consisting of Ambon and other islands. Three months later, Indonesian forces invade the Moluccas and eventually gain control of Ambon city. RMS forces retreat. Later, RMS leaders establish a government-in-exile in the Netherlands.

## March 1960

The elected parliament is dissolved and replaced by a parliament appointed by the president. The military and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) are each given a significant portion of the seats. The concept of *Dwifungsi* (Dual Function) incorporates the military into socio-political decision-making.

## 1962

The Dutch hand control of Irian Jaya over to the United Nations on October 1, 1962.

Also in 1962, the Darul Islam rebellion is finally subdued.

## 1963

Indonesia takes administrative control over Irian Jaya. The Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or OPM) is formed and becomes the nexus of the Papuan resistance.

## September 30, 1965

Six of Indonesia’s top generals are taken from their homes and executed in an attempted coup, possibly—but not certainly—organized by the PKI. The coup is soon thwarted by military loyalists headed by General Suharto. Soon after, Suharto launches a counter coup and an anti-communist purge of Indonesia. An estimated 300,000 to 400,000 people are killed during the purge.

## 1967

Suharto now firmly in power, the parliament relieves Sukarno from his duties and elects Suharto acting president. It elects him president in March 1968. Under Suharto’s “New Order,” the military further expands into affairs of the state.

## 1969

Indonesia officially annexes Irian Jaya. At the height of the “insurrection movement” in Irian Jaya (1967 to 1972), there are 30,000 to 100,000 Papuan deaths.

## December 1975

Indonesia invades East Timor, ostensibly to “liberate” it from communist control.

## July 17, 1976

Despite armed resistance to its occupation by the three political parties in East Timor, Indonesia formally annexes East Timor as its 27th province.

## 1976

Acehnese separatists establish the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) as an armed resistance group.

## 1990

The Indonesian government declares Aceh a military operations zone (known as DOM) and launches a counter-insurgency campaign that leads to the deaths and disappearances of many civilians.

## November 12, 1991

In what becomes known as the Santa Cruz massacre, Indonesian troops fire on pro-democracy demonstrators in the Santa Cruz cemetery in the East Timor capital of Dili, killing at least 100 people.

## May 1998

Amid riots in the capital and elsewhere, protesters call



on Suharto to step down. Organized groups (security forces or militia) open fire on students at Jakarta University, killing six and wounding countless others. On May 21, Suharto steps down from his 32-year presidency. Vice President B.J. Habibie is sworn in as the new president. Habibie agrees to lift restrictions on political parties and hold open elections in 1999.

### August 1998

Mass graves are discovered in Aceh. Indonesia's armed forces commander and defense chief, General Wiranto, apologizes to the people of Aceh for human rights abuses perpetrated by the military.

### December 1998

Violence erupts between Christians and Muslims in the town of Poso in Central Sulawesi.

### January 1999

Habibie stuns even his own political and military advisors by announcing that he will allow East Timor to decide between autonomy within Indonesia and complete independence.

Also in January, violence between Christians and Muslims erupts on Ambon Island in the province of Maluku.

### March 1999

Violence erupts in West Kalimantan (on the island of Borneo) as Malays and Dayaks attack Madurese transmigrants. At least 200 Madurese are killed and some 35,000 others become displaced.

### June 1999

Indonesia holds its first free parliamentary elections in 44 years. The ruling Golkar party loses seats, as the party led by Megawati Sukarnoputri (Sukarno's daughter) captures nearly 40 percent of the votes.

### August 30, 1999

East Timorese overwhelmingly vote for independence from Indonesia. Leading up to and following the vote, Indonesian-backed militias go on a rampage, killing civilians and destroying infrastructure. Some 400,000 persons become displaced within East Timor, while 260,000 become refugees in West Timor.

The same month as the East Timor vote, violence erupts on the island of Halmahera, in North Maluku, between natives of the island and transmigrants from the island of Makian. The violence soon spreads to areas of North Maluku.

### September 1999

Habibie relents to an international peacekeeping force in East Timor, known as INTERFET.

### October 19, 1999

Indonesia's national assembly votes to confirm the results of the East Timorese referendum.

### October 20, 1999

Indonesia's parliament elects Abdurrahman Wahid, a Muslim cleric, as Indonesia's president. Megawati is elected vice-president.

By the end of the month, Indonesia withdraws all military personnel from East Timor. The UN Security Council approves the mandate of the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), which will replace INTERFET in March 2000, as East Timor begins the slow process toward full independence.

### December 1999

Continuing riots between Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas leaves 100 dead.

### January 2000

Large-scale riots between Muslims and Christians occur in the town of Mataram on the island of Lombok, near Bali, apparently in response to the sectarian clashes in Ambon.

### May 2000

The Indonesian government and Acehnese rebels sign an agreement for a "humanitarian pause."

A third sectarian clash, the most serious to date, occurs in Central Sulawesi. The violence leaves 98 people dead and about 4,000 homes burned or destroyed.

### June-July 2000

More than 114 people die in violence in North Maluku. Twenty people are killed in Ambon despite a state of emergency. Broadcast video shows men in government-issue uniforms fighting alongside Muslim sectarian fighters.

At a June 2000 congress in Jayapura, the West Papuan capital, more than 500 tribal leaders declare independence, name their homeland West Papua, and call for international recognition of their sovereignty. Wahid attempts a negotiation, but the talks break down and violence soon erupts again.

### August 2000

Suharto is officially charged with corruption.

### September 6, 2000

Pro-Indonesia militias kill three UN relief workers in Atambua, West Timor. The next day, Indonesia allows UN peacekeepers in East Timor to cross into West Timor to evacuate UN and NGO aid staff.

### December 2000

While more than 100,000 East Timorese refugees remain in a precarious situation in West Timor, as many as 900,000 Indonesians are displaced in other parts of the country.





## VI. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN UJUNG PANDANG (MAKASSAR)

### Numbers and Locations

Nearly 15,000 persons were displaced in the province of South Sulawesi as of December 2000, according to WFP figures. An unknown number were in and around Ujung Pandang, the capital, also known by its historical name, Makassar. The majority of the displaced were from East Timor. Most others were from Central Sulawesi (primarily fleeing the conflicts in Poso), while some were from Ambon.

### East Timorese

USCR visited a camp for East Timorese Muslims in Makassar. The camp held 130 people (33 families). (About 10 percent of East Timor's population prior to the referendum was Muslim). The camp spokespersons said they were pro-Indonesia and did not support the independence of East Timor. They said they and other East Timorese currently in Makassar had been there since March and were the "sixth wave" to go there from West Timor, where they went following the independence referendum and ensuing violence. They said the previous groups had been transmigrated by the government to Luwuk, in Central Sulawesi, and that they expected to be transmigrated as well.

The East Timorese said they have received some money from the government but that it has been very irregular. Most food assistance, they said, is contributed by businesses or local NGOs. Medical care is available at the local hospital. The displaced said that no UN agencies or international NGOs have provided assistance.

The East Timorese said they left West Timor because the camp conditions there were bad and no land was available. Most of those interviewed by USCR said they want to stay in Indonesia rather than return to an independent East Timor and are willing to go anywhere the government sends them. Some, however, said they may consider returning to East Timor in a few years if it is stable and if their safety can be guaranteed.

Because they have retained Indonesian citizenship and are availing themselves of Indonesia's protection by voluntarily participating in the transmigration program, the East Timorese in Makassar—like those in Bali—are generally considered internally displaced persons rather than refugees.

In late October 2000, police in Makassar conducted a firearms sweep of a camp for displaced East Timorese on the campus of the Indonesian Muslim University. The police, who arrested one East Timorese in the process, said they conducted the operation in response to the United Nations' urging of Indonesia to disarm all East Timorese militias and civilians living in refugee camps. In response, the displaced East Timorese went to the city's police headquarters, where they set up a new camp and protested the police actions. A camp leader said they had left the old camp for their safety and to allow police to "check for themselves" allegations that camp residents were keeping automatic weapons there.

### Ambonese

USCR interviewed two displaced persons from Ambon in Makassar, both Muslim and both students who were studying at the local university. Originally students in Ambon, they fled to Makassar with their families in 1999. They told USCR that most students, both Christian and Muslim, were unable to continue their studies in Ambon because of the violence. At the students' prompting, the education minister in Jakarta directed all Indonesian universities to accept any student leaving Pattimura University in Ambon. However, the students said no funds were made available to facilitate this.







They said that about 400 students and their families had gone to Makassar. About 300 are Muslim, the rest Christian. Most are living with other relatives or, in many cases, the relatives of friends. The situation, they said, puts a great strain on the host families, especially because no assistance is provided by the government.


The incident that triggered the initial violence in Ambon occurred in January 1999. A Muslim bus driver (reportedly an ethnic Bugis) and an Ambonese Christian passenger had a disagreement over money. Each apparently went to his community to enlist support, which led to large-scale religious violence. The students said the true motives for the

conflict were likely political, especially since earlier incidents on Java had reportedly sparked the conflict. They added, however, that local power struggles might play a role, along with tensions created by transmigration.



*Photos above: These displaced pro-Indonesia East Timorese left a camp in West Timor for better conditions at a Muslim center in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi. They await relocation elsewhere. Photo credit: USCR/J. Mason*





## VII. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN CENTRAL SULAWESI

### Numbers and Locations

Nearly 73,000 persons were displaced in the province of Central Sulawesi as of December 2000. Most fled Muslim-Christian clashes in Poso (also in Central Sulawesi). Many of the displaced are in camps around Poso and the nearby town of Tentena. Others are in Palu, Donggala, and other Central Sulawesi towns.

Most of the displaced in Poso and Palu are Muslim. In Tentena, about an hour from Poso, most of the displaced are Christian. In both areas, however, a few camps house both Muslims and Christians, often members of the same family.

Because displaced persons from the Poso area have also fled to North Sulawesi (primarily Manado), South Sulawesi, or other areas, it is likely that the total number of displaced persons from Central Sulawesi is much larger.

### Causes of Displacement

Central Sulawesi, like elsewhere in Indonesia, is home to significant numbers of Javanese transmigrants.

An NGO worker told USCR that transmigration has caused conflicts over land ownership.

Transmigrants in the region, he said, each receive two hectares (about five acres) of land from the government but receive no certificates of land ownership; they are often later evicted and then move to coastal areas looking for jobs, which creates more tensions with the local population.

In addition to these longstanding problems, a 1998 conflict over the selection of a local official in Poso reportedly caused tensions between Christians and Muslims. In December 1998, the term of the Poso district head, a Muslim, was ending. The majority of the local population was Christian and wanted a Christian district head, which sparked disagreements between the religious communities.

Another possible factor is business. Members of the Suharto family and other allies of the Suharto government own numerous businesses, including logging concessions and palm oil plantations, throughout Sulawesi. Some observers believe those owners are causing unrest to safeguard their properties from the economic and land reform efforts of the current government.

The violence in Poso began in December 1998, with other significant events occurring in April and May 2000. The first incident reportedly involved a drunken brawl between two youths, one Christian and one Muslim. Each party to the fight enlisted the support of his friends. Large-scale violence, including the burning of homes, ensued. The authorities were reportedly slow to respond.

On May 23, 2000, a group of 12 “ninjas” from the Christian community entered a Muslim neighborhood looking for the people they held responsible for the April riots, in which a disproportionate number of Christian homes were burned. Three persons were killed in the May attack, and two of the perpetrators were caught. Several other attacks followed.

According to a report on the Poso crisis by InterNews Indonesia and the Alliance of Independent Journalists, “The attacks were so well organized that it has led to speculation that members of the armed forces were involved, and the local military commander has stated that he suspects that the group was trained by retired officers.” The May events left 98 people dead and about 4,000 homes burned or destroyed.

Most displaced persons interviewed by USCR in Palu, Poso, and Tentena, both Christian and Muslim, said they fled their homes because they heard that their villages were about to be attacked by the “red” or “white” group. In a few cases, they saw evidence of the attacks before they fled. One family said they and others were captured by “the other side” while hiding in the woods. The captors held the group for two days



in a high school building, and then delivered them to a military post. The military then took them to a displaced persons camp. Such stories of the military assisting with evacuations, but doing little to stop the violence, were common.

NGOs told USCR that a few weeks before the December 1998 incident, a senior military officer was quoted in the press as saying that Poso should be administered by the military because there were already signs of ethnic tensions and the local civilian authorities were incapable of handling such problems. Soon after the first clash, the same officer reportedly said that the violence proved his argument.



*This ethnic Javanese woman fled Muslim-Christian violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi. She and hundreds of other transmigrants are sheltered in a sports stadium in Palu.  
Photo credit: USCR/J. Mason*

## Conditions for the Displaced

The “camps” throughout Central Sulawesi include various structures—sports facilities, religious centers, a cultural center comprised of small houses. Conditions were good in the five camps visited by USCR. In Tentena, where most displaced persons are Christian, church organizations are largely responsible for the assistance. According to church leaders, there are nearly 35 camps for displaced persons in the Tentena area, two of which have both Christian and Muslim residents. Those camps—also referred to as “collective centers”—consist of schools, a community center, and a cultural center. In addition, some private homes are hosting displaced families. In some camps in the town of Poso, including the local parliament house as well as military and police facilities, the Indonesian government provides most or all of the assistance.

According to local NGOs, as of late July 2000, more than 16,000 displaced persons in the Palu area (about 80 percent of whom were Muslim) were receiving government assistance. Those in camps receive food directly while others receive coupons for rice. The government gives the assistance to the “Posko” (command post), while university students organize the poskos to care for the displaced.

Local NGOs said the government gives some cash to the displaced, but not regularly. At least two international NGOs (Oxfam and CARE) are providing assistance, along with ICRC. Others have reportedly done assessments. Medical care is available at local hospitals, with assistance from the Posko, and MERC also provides care to some displaced persons. According to one NGO, the local representatives of a national political party, the Justice Party, have provided assistance to displaced Muslims.

Staff of both international and local NGOs have reportedly been harassed while attempting to assist the displaced. One NGO worker said a local group threatened to burn down a warehouse where food was to be stored.

In October 2000, press reports said 10,000 displaced persons in Palu were “on the verge of starvation.” According to a local relief coordinator, rice stocks for the area were at a critical level and would last only another few days.



## DWIFUNGSI: THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN CIVIL SOCIETY

Understanding the role of Indonesia's military (TNI) as a powerful force in the country's internal strife requires a brief historical context.

The Indonesian military has been implicated, if not instrumental, in aggravating security concerns in many regions of the country. In Aceh, TNI activities in the name of counterinsurgency have caused large numbers of Acehnese to flee their homes in fear. In West Papua, TNI has been linked with pro-Jakarta militia groups, inciting distrust and fear among the indigenous population. Military ties with militia groups in East Timor led to massive bloodshed following East Timor's independence vote, and those ties have caused the harassment and intimidation of refugees and aid workers in West Timor, including the deaths of three UN workers in September 2000.

During Indonesia's post-independence period of 1945 to 1957, the new country, with its system of parliamentary democracy, was ill-equipped to run a sophisticated and truly democratic government. The country lacked necessary civil institutions, and the paternalistic traditions and legal structure Indonesia inherited from its Dutch and Japanese rulers—coupled with a poor, illiterate, and politically uninformed population—undermined the efficacy of the government. Nonetheless, despite numerous political troubles, this period was arguably the freest and most open in Indonesian history. It would be followed by two authoritarian regimes: Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" (1957-1965) and Suharto's "New Order" (1966-1998).

From the time of independence, the Indonesian armed forces (known as ABRI and now as TNI) had formally accepted the sovereignty of the civil government. However, this formality belied a continuing belief within the army—the most powerful military branch—that it was the guardian of the state. Army commanders believed that their role in the struggle for independence, and their vested interests in the success of the burgeoning republic, gave the military special rights to influence the socio-political matters of the country. The result was the formalization of the concept of

*Dwifungsi*, or "dual function," of the military.

The doctrine of *Dwifungsi* was first articulated by army chief of staff General Abdul Haris Nasution and later adopted by President Sukarno. Together, they advanced the idea that the military should not just be an "instrument of the government" as it is in Western countries but, rather, a legitimate force within the political decision-making process.

In 1959, Sukarno dissolved the elected parliament and reinstalled the 1945 constitution (which provided for a powerful president and weak legislature), setting into motion his concept of "guided democracy." In doing so, he allowed the concept of *Dwifungsi* to manifest itself within the new government. This move represented a convergence of interests between Sukarno and the military leadership.

The 1958-1965 government under Sukarno, however, saw tremendous political, administrative, and economic troubles. The economy faltered and, with little infrastructure, the "guided democracy" experiment was on the verge of collapse. On September 30, 1965, at the height of this chaos, unknown forces (possibly communist) staged a coup and killed six senior generals. The attempt was soon thwarted, however, by forces under the command of General Suharto. This ushered in the "New Order" government of Suharto in 1967 (formally proclaimed in 1968) following Sukarno's ousting from power. The transition was also a turning point in the military's dual-function role, which was given a constitutional basis under the Suharto regime. The attempted coup, in effect, entrenched the military as a socio-political force in Indonesia. By preventing a potential communist usurpation of power, the military earned esteem and legitimacy within the Indonesian populace.

The early years of the Suharto regime saw the expansion of military control over instruments of the state and the economy, along with the gradual replacement of civilian personnel with members of the military. By the late 1970s, 78 percent of directors general and 84 percent of ministerial secretaries were military appointees, along with half the cabinet and two-thirds of the governors. The



military's dominance filtered down even to the district levels, and its reach extended into business through seizure of former Dutch companies and their transformation into state-owned enterprises run by military boards. Suharto awarded state contract to the military, allowing it to exercise control over profitable sectors of the economy and ultimately bringing it into the inner circles of power.

The dual function system gave the armed forces considerable influence over political matters and gave Suharto the electoral majority to stay in power during the four elections he held. The strengthening of the military role in lieu of civilian institutions drew numerous proponents to the Suharto regime.

Although the Indonesian public generally accepted the authoritarian nature of the regime for most of Suharto's 32 years in power (in light of significant economic growth and improvements in living standards), by the 1990s people became increasingly disillusioned by the state's oppressive tactics. Ironically, the development of Indonesia's economy under the New Order created a larger educated professional class that called for more "openness" within society and government. In 1997, when the Asian financial crisis crippled the marketplaces of the region, Indonesia was hardest hit. President Suharto was forced to resign in May 1998.

The new president, B.J. Habibie, made a number of political changes during his short tenure. Among those, he decreed that all parties meeting the legal requirements would be able to participate in parliamentary elections, with the gradual reduction of military representation in the legislative bodies. In addition, the military was to be confined to a neutral stance between political parties and would

no longer be elected or appointed to positions within the civilian government.

In October 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president and began consolidating civilian control over the government. He dismissed General Wiranto, the former defense minister and armed forces chief, after Wiranto was cited for human rights infractions in East Timor. Wahid also spoke of abandoning the *Dwifungsi* doctrine.

Wahid's talk, however, has not resulted in any real change in the role of the military. In August 2000, the national assembly adopted a decree allowing the armed forces to retain their 38 seats in the legislative assembly until 2009. Indonesia's provinces, districts, and sub-districts still have considerable military units. The mili-

tary continues to be involved in the nation's intelligence agencies and to exercise control over many lucrative business enterprises, which provides significant space for political maneuvering. Perhaps even more significantly, nearly all of Wahid's early attempts to put reformist-minded military personnel into positions of power have been reversed.

The military's future role depends on a number of factors, including the amount of transparency and accountability TNI demonstrates in the country's unfolding political climate and whether civilian forces continue to tolerate the military's socio-political role. The latter may depend on the extent to which civilian and military actors can forge an alliance that serves to mute public and international dissatisfaction.



*A protester grimaces in pain as an Indonesian soldier kicks him during clashes between soldiers and students in Jakarta, September 1999. The students protested legislation giving the military expanded emergency powers. Photo credit: AP/B. Marquez*





## VIII. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN NORTH MALUKU

### Numbers and Locations

As of December 2000, there were more than 207,000 internally displaced persons in the province of North Maluku, according to the World Food Program. Nearly all are from the various islands of North Maluku, primarily Halmahera, the largest island. Some are transmigrants from other areas, including Java, and others are from Maluku Province, including Ambon. The displaced are both Muslims and Christians who have fled religious violence similar to that in Maluku Province and in Central Sulawesi. Many persons from North Maluku have also fled to other areas of Indonesia, with many Christians fleeing to Manado in North Sulawesi.

The figure of displaced persons in North Maluku is distinct from the figure for Maluku Province, where more than 215,000 were displaced as of December 2000. Displaced persons from Maluku (primarily Ambon) have likewise fled to various regions of Indonesia, including North Maluku and Sulawesi. Many Muslims have fled to Buton Island off the Southeast Sulawesi coast. Smaller numbers have fled to Sorong in West Papua and to East Timor. Some Javanese transmigrants have returned to Java.

On the island of Ternate in North Maluku, there were 80,000 to 90,000 internally displaced persons at the time of USCR's visit. All of them are

Muslims from nearby islands, primarily Halmahera. Almost all of the Christians from Ternate—who formerly comprised 15 percent of the population—have left the island, the exceptions being Chinese Christians. Thus, the number of displaced persons on Ternate now surpasses that of the local population.

### Causes of Displacement

The violence in North Maluku began in the town of Malifut, on Halmahera, in August 1999. From there it spread to other areas of Halmahera and to nearby islands, including Ternate. According to NGOs, the violence was carried out through “strategic, planned attacks.”

NGOs told USCR that transmigration tensions are a primary factor in the displacement. In 1975, following the eruption of the Kie Besi volcano on Makian Island (south of Ternate), the Indonesian government transmigrated many of the local people to north Halmahera, primarily Malifut. The Makians are Muslims, whereas Malifut was generally a Christian area. The transmigrants received land and other privileges, which led to resentment by the local population. After nearly 25 years of tension, in 1999, gold was discovered in Malifut. An Australian gold mining company went to Malifut, and the transmigrants from Makian obtained most of the mining jobs, which further fueled the tensions. Soon thereafter, the Indonesian government divided the Malukus into two provinces—North Maluku and Maluku—which sparked various battles for local political control. The Makians and others in Halmahera were on opposite sides of these struggles, which led to attacks on the Makians, who fled to Ternate. Soon after their arrival in October 1999, the Makians reportedly incited attacks on Christians. The Christians fled to Manado and other largely Christian areas of Indonesia.

The political and economic tensions in North Maluku also reignited centuries-old disputes stemming from when Ternate and a neighboring island, Tidore, were bitter rival sultanates. This aspect of the conflict was purely intra-religious, as both groups are Muslim.

According to the local government, another triggering cause of the violence was a pamphlet written by a Christian leader that included threats against the Muslim community. Some displaced Muslims told USCR the conflict was “planned from the beginning by the red group [the Christians] to chase the Muslims from this area.” NGOs say there was provocation on both sides, although—as is the case throughout Indo-



nesia—many observers believe that political interests are driving the religious conflict.

In addition to the local ethnic and political tensions, the problems in North Maluku cannot be separated from the problems in Ambon. Many displaced persons told USCR that the Muslims and Christians in North Maluku lived in peace until people from Ambon came and “stirred up trouble” or at least garnered sympathy that led to new violence. Others say the story is not quite so simple but concede that displaced Ambonese contributed to the tensions.

According to an international NGO worker, “in parts of Halmahera, everything was burned to the ground.” He added, “The destruction was unbelievable. Yet, no one knew what was going on because of the publicity in East Timor.”

Several NGOs said the Indonesian military is deeply involved in the conflict in North Maluku, so much as to be “one of the root causes.” One NGO worker, however, added that the recent increased military presence in the area has “calmed things down quite a bit” and has allowed some displaced persons to return home. As he explained, “They’ve moved new troops in here because no one trusted the old ones. The new troops do sweepings [searches] of boats, go to houses collecting weapons, etc. The difference from before is like night and day. But it could change any minute.”

### Conditions for the Displaced

Most displaced persons on Ternate are in private homes, usually those of family or friends. Some are in the abandoned homes of Christians who fled the island when the problems between the Muslim and Christian communities began. A Muslim woman from Halmahera who is now occupying a Christian home on Ternate told USCR, “They [the Christians] left in a peaceful way, not like us. We fled because our village was being attacked.”

Other displaced persons are in “collective centers” around Ternate—a warehouse, a university auditorium, a disco, and other buildings. Conditions there are fair to good. Displaced persons said the amount of food is generally sufficient and basic health care is available. They are concerned about the lack of certain medicines, the inability to afford medical treatment for serious illnesses, and the lack of schooling for many children.

The Indonesian government has sporadically provided some cash and non-food items. Some NGOs

are exploring the possibility of teaming displaced persons with local residents and providing seeds and tools to help the teams cultivate land (including land that currently belongs to the military).

The Indonesian government has given PMI the authority to coordinate all international NGOs working on Ternate. According to one NGO, this coordination system has “worked very well so far.” The NGOs meet with PMI regularly and involve PMI in all of their activities. PMI receives significant funding from ICRC for these efforts.

According to ACF and World Vision, providing assistance to the displaced has created some tensions with the local community, as is often the case in relief efforts. Some members of the local population—who are struggling financially—have tried to register for food distribution. WFP, which provides all of the food, will only permit the food to be distributed to displaced persons.

On the island of Bacan, five hours from Ternate by speedboat, USCR visited a camp where the conditions were bad. More than 3,500 displaced persons (all Christian) were living under plastic sheeting on the dock of a pier owned by a fishing company (the area is called Panambuan). The displaced had been at the site since January 2000, when fighting began on Bacan. NGOs and the U.S. embassy pressured the Indonesian government to relocate the camp, and the relocation occurred soon after the USCR visit. Some NGOs believe the relocation occurred primarily for economic reasons, as the fishing company was anxious to re-open.

ACF, which provides food at two locations on Bacan, is concerned with conditions at the site where the displaced persons from Panambuan were relocated. Known as Babang, the new site is near the foot of a mountain, on what ACF believes to be a flood plain. The military counters that the area has never flooded. The displaced are living in wooden barracks of untreated plywood (“a real fire trap,” said one NGO worker), with an estimated space of about ten square feet (one square meter) per person. About half of the barracks had been built at the time USCR visited the site. The military, which was overseeing Panambuan and the move to Babang, said there were no plans to build latrines because the displaced would “use their traditional method” of using the sea. Showers, however, were being constructed.

Several UN offices and agencies have recently sent assessment teams to Maluku and North Maluku to analyze the assistance needs, monitor existing programs, and plan longer-term efforts.



## Prospects for the Future

The tensions in North Maluku, like elsewhere in Indonesia, have tended to spread through word-of-mouth, including by displaced persons who have relocated. For this reason, some NGOs are particularly worried about Manado, in North Sulawesi, where many Christians from Ternate have fled, including 200 people who were severely injured in the fighting in Halmahera.

NGOs are also concerned by government plans to return displaced persons to Halmahera, particularly Malifut, without adequate consideration of the conditions needed to ensure successful reintegration. As one NGO worker explained, “The military is planning to bring people home—and is building barracks for that purpose—even though the people there don’t want them back. The military says they’ll provide security, and I guess they just hope that someday there will be peace.” Under this scenario, he added “Malifut could become the next hot spot.”

Displaced persons on Ternate told USCR they would like to go home as soon as possible but would do so only with adequate security. One said the military would need to be a “buffer zone” between Christians and Muslims. A few said they would also need assurances that schools, mosques, and other institutions had been re-built, and one man told USCR he would return only if all Christians from the two nearby Christian villages were removed. Several displaced persons noted that if they remain on Ternate, they will have to continue receiving assistance because no jobs are available. Most said they are willing to relocate and will go “wherever the government tells us to go.”

When asked about reconciliation, displaced persons said it will be needed in the future but is “almost impossible” now. As one woman said, “It’s still very painful. Our family members were killed. There are lots of stories of people being burned alive. It’s hard to forgive and forget right now.” One NGO representative told USCR that “reconciliation will probably take five or six years, but it needs to happen.”



*More than 3,500 displaced persons lived under plastic sheeting on the dock of a fish processing plant, on the island of Bacan in North Maluku, for more than seven months. The camp was relocated soon after USCR’s visit, but conditions at the new site are also troubling. Photo credit: J. Mason/USCR*





## SEPARATISM IN INDONESIA

As Indonesia struggles with violence and displacement throughout the archipelago—some of it related to separatism—observers have noted the potential “Balkanization” of the country, especially in light of East Timor’s 1999 independence from Indonesia. Although separatist sentiment plays little or no role in some regions experiencing turmoil (such as West Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi), it is a significant component in others (particularly Aceh and West Papua). In still other areas, such as the Malukus, the strength of the separatist movement is sharply debated.

While most, if not all, of the separatist movements in Indonesia predated the 1999 referendum in East Timor, the referendum did give hope to those with similar aims in other regions. Such regions share many characteristics, such as hostility toward transmigration and a view that Jakarta unfairly drains resources from the provinces. In some cases—such as Aceh, West Papua, and Maluku—they share with East Timor a history in which Indonesia’s right to sovereignty over their region is at least questionable. In many cases, they share an enemy, real or perceived—the Indonesian military.

The history of East Timor is discussed in the section on East Timorese refugees in West Timor. Following is a brief overview of the other major separatist movements in Indonesia’s history.

### Aceh

Islam first entered the Indonesian archipelago, and possibly all of Southeast Asia, through Aceh sometime around the year 700. Much later, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the port of Aceh became entangled, along with the rest of what is now Indonesia, in the European colonial powers’ competition for worldwide political and economic dominance.

The profitable spice trade led the Dutch to establish the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1602. In nationalizing the VOC in 1799, the Dutch government began to assert firm control over various Indonesian territories, ushering in the region’s Dutch colonial era.

Through the 1824 signing of the London Treaty, the Dutch gained control of all British

possessions on the island of Sumatra, including Aceh at the island’s northern tip. In the same treaty, however, the Dutch agreed to allow independence for Aceh. Nevertheless, in 1871, the British authorized the Dutch to invade Aceh, possibly to prevent French annexation.

Thus, in 1873, the Netherlands invaded Aceh. They found gaining control of the territory more difficult than expected. The Aceh War lasted intermittently until 1942, shortly before the Japanese invaded Indonesia. In August 1945, just days after the Japanese surrender, the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed its independence. The Dutch, however, still claimed control of the area.

The 1949 Round Table Conference Agreements provided for a transfer of sovereignty between the territory of the Dutch East Indies and a fully independent Indonesia. The Kingdom of Aceh was included in the agreements despite not having been formally incorporated into the Dutch colonial possession. Subsequently, the Java-based Indonesian government used armed troops to quell Acehnese opposition. Since then, the Acehnese have continued to resent what they consider foreign occupation.

The precursor to Aceh’s modern independence movement began in the 1950s when Indonesia experienced the Darul Islam rebellion (see below). The Acehnese lent support to this rebellion, which took years to crush.

In 1976, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was founded as an armed resistance group. In the late 1970s, Indonesian authorities effectively shut down GAM’s activities until 1989. That year, GAM (also known abroad as the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front) vigorously renewed its quest for independence.

In response, in 1990, the government launched a counter-insurgency campaign that led to the deaths and disappearances of many civilians. A cease-fire agreement in 2000 did virtually nothing to quell Aceh’s violence.

### South Moluccas

Islam came to Ambon and the neighboring islands of the Moluccan group in the 15th century. By the early 16th century, the Portuguese had moved into the area and established a trading network as well



as Christian missions. The Dutch slowly gained a stronger foothold in the region, ousting the Portuguese and consolidating their power in the islands by the mid-17th century. The Dutch also established a monopoly on the exports from the so-called “spice islands,” and the Moluccas became a vital link to the Dutch trading chain along the East Indian archipelago.

Between the 15th and 17th centuries, the Dutch developed a close relationship with the Christians from Ambon Island, in the southern Moluccas. The Ambonese played an important role in the Royal Dutch Indian Army (KNIL), and Christian Ambonese were particularly crucial to the “Marechaussee Corps,” a special military unit involved in the prolonged effort to conquer Aceh. (In later years, however, the Acehnese and Ambonese would find common ground in their separatist efforts).

The 18th and 19th centuries saw a marked decline in the value of spices, and Dutch interests shifted to the plantation economies of Java and Sumatra. As a result, the Dutch used the Christian Ambonese as proxy administrators, further straining relations between the local Christian and Muslim communities.

By the beginning of the First World War, a sense of national identity was rapidly emerging in the region that is now Indonesia. Although none of the separate regions under Dutch colonial rule shared a unifying historical identity (and indeed the Dutch had never attempted to unite them), these regions were concerned with protecting local customs and the rights of individuals. The Moluccas were no exception. The Dutch grew increasingly wary of this political agenda and looked to the Christian Ambonese to help contain anti-colonial activity. At the same time, however, the Ambonese elite—both Christian and Muslim—were forming their own anti-colonial association.

In August 1945, after Japan's three-year occupation of the region, one of the nationalist leaders, Sukarno, proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. The new republic was to include eight provinces, including Maluku. The Dutch, however, attempted to resume control.

In the Linggarjati Agreement of 1947, the Dutch recognized Indonesia as having *de facto* authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra (the Republic of Indonesia). The two governments

were to cooperate in forming the United States of Indonesia (USI), composed of the Republic, Borneo, and East Indonesia (including the Moluccas).

The Netherlands unilaterally abrogated the Linggarjati Agreement in July 1947 and launched a new military campaign.

In December 1949, under the Round Table Conference Agreements, the Dutch East Indies ceased to exist and the Republic of the United States of Indonesia was formed (the Dutch, however, retained control of Irian Jaya). The Agreements allowed the various geographic components to be a part of the new Indonesian state, by ratifying its constitution, or to opt out by negotiating a “special relationship” with the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands. Political leaders in the South Moluccas indicated their intent not to be part of the new state.

In 1950, however, Sukarno established Indonesia as a unitary state (once again named the Republic of Indonesia), which included eastern Indonesia. In April 1950, the South Moluccas declared their independence by forming the Republic of South Moluccas or RMS. Three months later, Indonesian forces invaded the Moluccan Islands and eventually gained control of Ambon city. RMS leaders retreated.

In 1951, the Dutch government brought some 12,000 Moluccans—former KNIL army members and their families—to the Netherlands. The new Indonesian government had refused to allow the Moluccan KNIL members to return to East Indonesia. In 1963, RMS members established a government-in-exile in the Netherlands.

Virtually ignored for years, RMS supporters have reasserted their claims for an independent south Moluccas since Suharto's ouster and particularly since the independence of East Timor. Christian Ambonese have felt threatened by the loss of power, and many Ambonese—both Christians and Muslims—maintain that newcomers (predominantly Javanese) have disrupted centuries of peaceful coexistence between the two groups.

### West Papua (Irian Jaya)

The Indonesian province of West Papua (also known as Irian Jaya) comprises the western half of the island of New Guinea, with the other half being the



country of Papua New Guinea. Papuans are a Melanesian people, like many Moluccans and unlike the Javanese who are predominantly of the Malay ethnicity. Papuans are also predominantly Christian. Having had less contact with the Western world than most other regions of Indonesia, the Papuans also have a markedly distinct culture.

During the twelve years of Dutch colonial rule of West Papua following Indonesia's independence (1950 to 1962), the Dutch established policies to prepare the region for self-governance. However, in 1962 the Dutch handed over control of the territory to the United Nations. The next year, Indonesia took administrative control of Irian Jaya.

The same year, the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM) became the nexus of the Papuan resistance. In 1969, Indonesia officially annexed Irian Jaya. The action caused widespread violence and unrest, with independence leaders and other observers saying the vote was flawed and unrepresentative. The separatist movement continued. Indonesia deployed approximately 60,000 soldiers to Irian Jaya at the height of the "insurrection movement" from 1967 to 1972, resulting in 30,000 to 100,000 Papuan deaths.

In the 1970s, violence in the territory significantly waned as the Indonesian army began to establish stronger control. The OPM, however, still conducted an insurrection from bases in the peripheral areas of the province. The armed resistance continued through the 1980s and has become a significant issue in Indonesian-Papua New Guinea relations, as Papua New Guinea has hosted many refugees from Irian Jaya. Indonesian soldiers have crossed the Papua New Guinea border in pursuit of OPM rebels.

The 1980s saw the expansion of Indonesia's transmigration policies, which led to even wider unrest between the newly settled Javanese migrants and the more than one million Papuans. In addition to an underdeveloped infrastructure and inhospitable environment for the transmigrants—along with the ongoing insurgency—the policy suffered from a neglect of the indigenous peoples' concerns. Native Papuans believe Indonesia has focused too much on integrating the territory's oil and mineral resources into the state economy, resulting in communal tensions over land. Of particular controversy is the role of the U.S.-based company Freeport McMoRan.

Freeport's massive gold and copper mine in West Papua, one of the world's largest, is responsible for approximately one-third of Jakarta's income. West Papua reportedly receives less than one percent of the taxes paid by the multinational giant.

By the late 1990s, the mood in Irian Jaya became more open, with a willingness in Jakarta to discuss local grievances and consider wide-ranging autonomy for the region. However, the lack of concrete actions, ongoing claims of human rights abuses by the military, and the East Timorese independence referendum reignited the separatist movement.

At a June 2000 Congress in Jayapura, the provincial capital, more than 500 tribal leaders declared independence, named their homeland West Papua (a name that Indonesian president Wahid had earlier said he would use), and called for international recognition of their sovereignty. National political leaders increased their pressure on Wahid to crush the movement. Wahid instead attempted a peaceful negotiation, but the talks broke down and violence again erupted in the fall of 2000.

### The Darul Islam Rebellion

In 1950, the establishment of the secular Indonesian state (then the United States of Indonesia) incited Islamic militant groups to initiate a fundamentalist Islamic rebellion, dubbed Darul Islam ("House of Islam"). These militant groups had been functional since the Japanese occupation and the later Dutch re-consolidation of power. The Darul Islam movement became the longest sustained rebellion in Indonesian history. Lasting for nearly 13 years, from the late 1940s to early 1960s, it was most active from 1957 to 1962 in West Java. The insurgency gained followers in Aceh, South Sulawesi and elsewhere, who believed that the secular government had inflicted a wrong against Muslims by rejecting Islam as the sole foundation of the state.

While Darul Islam was never a significant threat to the central government, it tied up army units for much of the 1950s. In addition, its influence was never fully subdued. Muslim aspirations to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia still exist, and sporadic riots under the banner of Darul Islam surfaced throughout the 1990s and into 2000.





## IX. EAST TIMORESE REFUGEES IN WEST TIMOR

### Numbers and Locations

As of December 2000, most sources estimated that 95,000 to 125,000 East Timorese refugees remained in the Indonesian territory of West Timor (UNHCR uses the 125,000 figure). Jose Ramos Horta, the Nobel peace laureate who is now foreign minister in East Timor's transitional government, said in November 2000 that he believed the number of East Timorese refugees still in West Timor was only 60,000. It is unclear whether Horta's estimate included ethnic Javanese and others who were originally transmigrants to East Timor. Because of ongoing difficulties in gaining access to the camps, the actual number has been difficult to determine since the majority of refugees first entered West Timor in September 1999. The suspension of nearly all humanitarian assistance a year later, following the September 2000 killing of three UNHCR workers, has done nothing to clarify either the numbers or the characteristics of the refugees.

The refugees are concentrated in three main areas: Kupang (the capital of West Timor, near the western tip of the island), Kefamananu (in the central part, outside of the East Timorese enclave of Oecussi), and Belu District, particularly Atambua (near the border with East Timor). An unknown number of East Timorese refugees are in other areas of Indonesia.

In addition to the East Timorese, West Timor

has hosted other groups of displaced persons, including those from Maluku. In July 2000, some 1,500 Ambonese arrived in Kupang via ferry. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) provided transportation to hastily established shelters on the grounds of the Christian University of Kupang and a Christian community center, where the displaced received assistance from NGOs.

### Background to the Refugee Crisis

For more than 450 years—from 1524 to 1975—East Timor was, with minor interruptions, a Portuguese colony. Located on the western half of the island of Timor, across the Timor Sea from Australia, the territory is roughly the size of New Jersey.

The East Timorese waged sporadic insurrections against the Portuguese colonists until the early 1900s. The Portuguese government that came to power in a 1974 coup supported the right of self-determination for its colonies, and Lisbon sent a new governor to East Timor to oversee its decolonization. As a result, rival political groups emerged in the colony. The group known as Fretilin favored immediate recognition of East Timor's right to independence, with implementation in three to ten years. The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) favored a gradual transition to independence and rejected integration with any foreign country. The third group, Apodeti, represented a small minority of the population favoring integration with Indonesia.

Indonesia had broken from its colonists, the Dutch, in 1945. At that time, West Timor became part of the Republic of Indonesia, leaving Jakarta with a natural interest in the eastern half of the island.

In August 1975, UDT staged a coup against the Portuguese administration in the East Timor capital of Dili. The goal was to expel all communist elements from East Timor, including the leftist elements of Fretilin and the colonial establishment. In the process, UDT arrested Fretilin supporters, thus prompting a civil war that lasted several weeks and claimed 23,000 to 30,000 lives. In the melee, Portugal withdrew from the territory. In doing so, they left East Timor without a working infrastructure and little investment in health facilities, schools, roads, and the like.

Fretilin, which gained control of the territory, declared independence and established a de facto administration. UDT forces withdrew into West Timor. Indonesia, which by now had begun incursions into East Timor, allowed the border crossing on condition



that UDT sign a request for integration with Indonesia. Soon after, in early December 1975, Indonesian radio announced that UDT and Apodeti leaders had asked Indonesia to liberate East Timor from Fretilin's control. Several days later, Indonesian troops invaded Dili, beginning a bloody period that included mass executions. Tens of thousands of people were killed in a two-month period that Indonesia claimed was the continuation of the civil war.

The invasion was accomplished with the tacit support of the United States and other Western nations that feared establishment of a communist state in the middle of the archipelago. On July 17, 1976, despite armed resistance to its occupation by all three political groups, Indonesia formally annexed East Timor, declaring it the nation's twenty-seventh province. In doing so, President Suharto relied on the "free choice" of a puppet assembly that requested integration.

Following the annexation, Indonesia began pursuing its national policy of transmigration in East Timor. Because of transmigration, East Timor became home to more than 2,500 Indonesian families from other regions.

East Timor, because of its Portuguese colonial history, is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, unlike primarily Muslim Indonesia. Religion, however, is only one element in the troubles.

Human rights organizations say that up to 200,000 people may have been killed by Indonesian forces or died of hunger in the two decades following the annexation. During that time, pro-independence guerrillas, known as Falintil, continued to fight the Indonesian armed forces. Falintil was the armed wing of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT).

In 1991, in what became known as the Santa Cruz massacre, Indonesian troops fired on pro-democracy demonstrators in Dili's Santa Cruz cemetery, killing at least 100 people. The next year, Indonesia arrested CNRT president Xanana Gusmao and gave him a life sentence that was later commuted to 20 years. In 1996, two East Timorese human rights activists, Jose Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Drawing from international law, particularly the UN Charter, the United Nations never recognized Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor. The UN instead considered East Timor a non-self-governing territory under the continued administration of Portugal. Successive UN resolutions denounced the invasion and called for self-determination of the East Timorese people. Individually, virtually all countries

took a similar stance, although many—including the United States—acknowledged Indonesia's de facto control over the territory of East Timor. Australia, influenced by growing economic ties to Indonesia, came closer than any other country to recognizing East Timor's integration into Indonesia.

In August 1998, representatives from Portugal, Indonesia, and the United Nations sat down for a round of talks during which Indonesia proposed granting "wide-ranging autonomy" to East Timor. Although the agreement fell short of the referendum on independence sought by some East Timorese, some pro-independence activists said it was a good first step. Further talks were scheduled for 1999.

### Events of 1999

In January 1999, President Habibie stunned his own military and political advisors, as well as the international community, by announcing he would consider granting independence to East Timor. He said the territory would first be given the option of having autonomy within Indonesia. If East Timor rejected autonomy, the province would become independent.

A referendum on autonomy was subsequently scheduled for August 8, 1999. It soon became clear, however, that independence would not come easily.

The prospect of an independent East Timor did not set well with the Indonesian military, who regarded East Timor as having cost them many lives and much money. In addition, given recent events in Aceh and other regions, the fear of setting a precedent for other separatist movements was strong.

In early April 1999, violence began to engulf East Timor. Anti-independence militia, backed by the Indonesian army, used violence and intimidation as part of a campaign to influence the outcome of the referendum. Militia members attempted to force people to join them or be killed.

On May 5, Portugal and Indonesia signed an agreement entrusting the United Nations with the organization and conduct of the referendum. Habibie announced that he had agreed to a UN "civilian police force" supervising the vote.

The spread of violence eventually led the UN to delay the referendum until August 30. Among the many concerns was the need to allow displaced East Timorese to register to vote.

In mid-August, political campaigning for the ballot formally began. By then, however, the violence had forced an estimated 40,000 to 85,000 East Timorese from their homes. Many of the territory's educated



elite—primarily Javanese transmigrants—had already left. Hunger and disease were reportedly prevalent among the displaced, some of whom had fled to West Timor, where they came under direct control of the paramilitary forces. UN and humanitarian officials were also militia targets. Human rights groups and others urged the Indonesian government to disband and disarm the militia and to establish a secure environment for the displaced.

Defying the intimidation, nearly 99 percent of East Timorese turned out for the August 30 vote. More than 78 percent voted to reject autonomy, thus favoring independence. Immediately following the announcement of the ballot results, the militia began a rampage throughout East Timor, destroying entire villages and decimating city centers, including that of

Dili. Although Indonesia pledged that its troops would restore order, Indonesian soldiers began openly joining a violent campaign to force thousands of East Timorese from the territory. They rounded up East Timorese, loaded them on trucks, and took them to West Timor—most likely to maintain control over the population. They placed the refugees in “camps”—often schools, sports stadiums, or other structures. Unlike refugee camps run by UNHCR or aid agencies, these camps were controlled by the militia and Indonesian military or police. The refugees, while fearing return to East Timor, were also in effect hostages. Other refugees who crossed into West Timor on their own were also terrorized by the militia.

On September 7, Indonesia placed East Timor under martial law and, for reasons that remain clouded, freed Gusmao. The next day, the UN announced a total pullout from East Timor. The evacuation from the UN headquarters in Dili, however, was delayed by the presence of more than 1,500 displaced East Timorese taking shelter at the compound. Refusing to leave the displaced in the hands of the militia, the UN staff finally left in the early hours of September 14, taking the 1,500 persons with them to Darwin, Australia.

On September 9, the United States suspended military cooperation with Indonesia. Three days later, after nearly two weeks of deadly violence, Habibie agreed to allow an Australian-led international peacekeeping force (INTERFET) to restore order. On September 14, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution authorizing the multinational force.

Without naming Indonesia, the UN resolution condemned all acts of violence in East Timor and demanded that those responsible be brought to justice. Habibie agreed to begin withdrawing Indonesian troops from East Timor, although a few thousand would be left to work with the foreign peacekeepers.

The first of the multinational troops arrived in East Timor on September 20. They began a slow, methodical operation to reclaim the area taken by the militia. Even as INTERFET attempted to restore order, widespread displacement continued inside East Timor, and more than 250,000 refugees remained in West Timor.

Evidence soon began to emerge that



*A displaced East Timorese man and his daughter in one of the numerous small camps in Atambua, West Timor, near the East Timor border. Photo credit: USCR/J. Mason*



militia were actively recruiting from refugee camps in West Timor as well as orchestrating revenge killings not only in Timor but in Java, Bali, Sumatra, and other islands where known independence supporters had taken refuge.

Another concern regarding the refugees was the possibility that Indonesia would forcibly translocate them. In October 1999, Indonesia's then-transmigration minister said all refugees in West Timor would be moved to other areas of Indonesia within two months. To facilitate this plan, the Indonesian government began registering the refugees in West Timor to identify their "preferences." UNHCR issued a press statement expressing deep concern about the registration, noting that it was occurring without international involvement and could expose pro-independence refugees to further threat from the militia. Indonesia eventually halted the registration.

Beginning on October 19, thousands of refugees—at the rate of about 500 an hour—began streaming over the border from West Timor back into East Timor. An estimated 17,000 returned that first day. IOM—which coordinated the effort with UNHCR—had already repatriated nearly 3,000 persons by air and was planning boat returns. INTERFET forces screened returnees to prevent the re-entry of militia members.

Also on October 19—the day before Indonesia's national assembly elected Wahid as the country's new president—the assembly voted to confirm the results of the East Timorese referendum. By the end of the month, Indonesia had withdrawn all military personnel from East Timor. The UN Security Council approved the mandate of the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), which would replace INTERFET in March 2000, and East Timor began the slow process toward full independence. However, the refugees remaining in West Timor were in a tenuous situation.

### Conditions for the Refugees

As of December 2000, the East Timorese refugees in West Timor remain extremely vulnerable. Militia members continue to terrorize them, and most international aid agencies have suspended their operations following the deaths on September 6, 2000 of three UNHCR workers at the hands of militia members. This situation was not unforeseen in the early stage of the refugee crisis.

In its first weeks of operation in West Timor, UNHCR had great difficulty obtaining access to the refugee camps. When the Indonesian government

began to help UNHCR gain access, it occurred slowly, camp by camp. Militia leaders, who openly roamed the camps, were hostile to UNHCR's efforts to educate the refugees about conditions in East Timor and to help them return. In some cases, militia members violently attacked UNHCR staff. UNHCR was forced to conduct what it called "snatch and run" operations to get refugees out of the camps before the militia members could act.

At the time of the USCR site visit to West Timor in January 2000, the climate in the camps was tense. Some international aid agencies said the militia members' power was diminishing, but there were still reports of intimidation and violence against the refugees and aid workers.

The refugees are comprised of several groups. Approximately 14,000 Indonesian civil servants and their families (a total of about 70,000 persons) were among the East Timorese who entered West Timor following the referendum, along with 24,000 members and families of the Indonesian armed forces (TNI). Of the 14,000 civil servants, about 6,000 soon chose to relocate to other parts of Indonesia, leaving about 8,000 in West Timor. While some of those remaining may wish to return home, their decision is complicated by the fact that they can only remain Indonesian civil servants and continue drawing their salaries or pensions if they remain in West Timor. For those who choose to stay, the Indonesian government is exploring ways to integrate them into the local civil service.

Of the 24,000 TNI members and families, about 14,000 are expected to be kept on active duty, either in West Timor or other areas of Indonesia. The Indonesian government has discussed vocational training for others (particularly those within a few years of retiring) who will likely stay in West Timor. Still others are expected to resign and repatriate to East Timor if they believe it is safe to do so.

The remaining East Timorese in West Timor include at least three groups whose numbers remain uncertain: anti-independence militia members (or former militia members); East Timorese who supported autonomy over independence; and pro-independence East Timorese—the group essentially "held hostage" by the militia.

The refugee camps in West Timor vary by size and conditions. Although the three major Kupang-area camps are large (holding as many as 9,000 in one camp), many others are small, village-like settlements of only a few families. In Belu District, refugees are in more than 200 sites. While



some camps are converted buildings, others consist of straw huts or tents with plastic sheeting. An unknown number of refugees live in the homes of family members or friends.

At the time of the USCR visit in January 2000, several international agencies and NGOs were helping the refugees. Sources told USCR that assistance was disorganized. Agencies, they said, often ventured into other areas of assistance, with differing standards and little coordination. As one observer noted, “Almost every NGO is doing everything.” Duplication of services in some camps, and gaps elsewhere, were also mentioned. Although OCHA was nominally responsible for some coordination and UNHCR was the *de facto* lead agency, there was a general feeling that no one was in charge.

Several sources said that, despite the large numbers of agencies operating in West Timor, their staff often lacked the necessary experience and expertise—unlike those sent to East Timor. Agencies also reported insufficient funds, equipment, and support from their central offices. More than one source said the international community is pouring assistance and personnel into East Timor while treating West Timor as a “side show.”

Perhaps due in part to that disparity, conditions in West Timor have continued to deteriorate. In February 2000, UNHCR and IOM workers were held at gunpoint by Indonesian police while escorting refugees back to East Timor. Border skirmishes also erupted as militia members crossed into East Timor.

In May, in a move praised by the UN, the Indonesian government announced that it would reassign West Timor-based soldiers in an attempt to reduce the militia violence. However, the efforts proved to have little effect. Likewise, the announcement by militia leader Eurico Guterres that the refugees were “free to go home” was viewed skeptically by the international community and had no visible effect.

In June and July 2000, UNHCR twice suspended (and later resumed) operations in Kupang camps because of increased violence. In late July, a UN peacekeeper from New Zealand was killed in East Timor by armed militiamen who had reportedly crossed the border from West Timor. He was the first UN peacekeeper to be killed in the territory. Indonesia once again announced plans to disarm the militia and close the camps by repatriating or locally settling all refugees.

UNHCR suspended operations in West Timor in late August 2000, after a violent attack against three staff who were distributing plastic sheeting to refu-

gees. It resumed activities six days later after Indonesian authorities arrested two of the alleged assailants and agreed to increase security for humanitarian workers.

The resumption was short lived. On September 6, thousands of rioters led by pro-Indonesian militia members stormed the UNHCR office in Atambua and killed three UNHCR staff. Within the next two days, after obtaining permission from the Indonesian government, UN peacekeepers based in East Timor entered West Timor and evacuated all foreign and most local aid workers. At the time of the killings, more than 120 incidents of harassment and violence against aid worker and refugees had been recorded since UNHCR established a presence in West Timor a year earlier.

On September 15, 2000, Indonesia and the UN signed an agreement to work together to resolve the fate of the remaining refugees in West Timor. Among other things, Indonesia proposed moving refugees to Wetar, an island north of East Timor. The United States and other countries continued to press Indonesia to disarm the militia. In response, Indonesia called for a four-day operation from September 22 to 26 to seize firearms and other weapons from the militia. The operation was a complete failure.

The following month, Indonesia took several steps toward pacifying the international community, including arresting Eurico Guterres (for the second time) and approving a visit to West Timor by a delegation of the UN Security Council.

Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, said in mid-October 2000 that the situation in West Timor was still too dangerous and unstable for the refugee agency to return. She said she was not satisfied with the Indonesian government’s efforts to crack down on the militia. In early November, one international NGO, Church World Service, reopened its program in West Timor, noting that no aid had reached the camps for nearly a month and that conditions were likely desperate. The agency said the reopening was largely possible because its staff were Indonesian and Timorese. On November 21, the UN Security Council mission that visited West Timor recommended that UN security experts be sent there to determine whether it is safe for UN staff to return.

The vast majority of the refugees remain in a precarious situation in West Timor. They have begun to run out of food, as the food distribution system was halted by the withdrawal of the aid agencies. The Indonesian government is reportedly doing some food





distribution, but it is sporadic. In many camps, particularly those with the worst conditions, the rainy season (which began in November) has exacerbated the difficulties and increased illness. Hundreds of refugees have died from malaria, respiratory problems, and natural disasters, including flooding.

In late November 2000, Indonesian government sources said they were still prepared to resettle East Timorese refugees—along with domestic transmigrants—at two sites on the island of Wetar. An official was quoted as saying, “It is true that some of the local people have rejected the idea, but if we promote the program properly, in time they will be able to accept it.”



## X. DISPLACEMENT ELSEWHERE IN INDONESIA

In numerous areas of Indonesia not visited by USCR during its January and July 2000 site visits, displaced persons are a part of the landscape. Like those in Aceh, North Maluku, and elsewhere, they are crowding into stadiums, huddling under tents, or living out of sight in private homes. The most desperate among them are hiding in the mountains and jungles.

In Java, there are no camps. Most of the estimated 20,000 displaced persons there (primarily in East Java) are Javanese transmigrants returning from other islands, and most are living with family and friends. (The number for Java had been 30,000 higher in previous months, before ethnic Madurese began returning from Madura to West Kalimantan). Others, such as East Timorese and Ambonese, are being housed through the local Catholic diocese.


In North Sumatra, an estimated 24,000 persons are displaced, primarily from Aceh. The displaced, most of whom are in and around the city of Medan, include both native Acehnese and Javanese transmigrants. Many of the native Acehnese are living with family or friends, while others are in shelters established by long-time Acehnese residents of Medan. The Javanese transmigrants say they have fled threats and abuse from native Acehnese, based on economic competition or suspicion about political sympathies. Some are living in collective centers, while others are in private homes.

Other areas of Sumatra are also hosting displaced persons from Aceh (primarily transmigrants).

In late September 2000, more than 120 Javanese families from Aceh were reportedly facing uncertainty in West Sumatra, as the provincial government had insufficient funds to implement a planned relocation. A local official said the displaced were in temporary shelters or with relatives, awaiting the availability of houses and land. Many were reportedly working for a tea plantation.

In Southeast Sulawesi, including the island of Buton, as many as 130,000 persons are displaced. According to NGOs, conditions there range from fair to poor. Some displaced persons have reportedly purchased land, while the government has relocated others to areas not suitable for long-term settlement (including Mauna, a coral island).

West Papua (also known as Irian Jaya) is both hosting and producing internally displaced persons, in addition to adapting to the return of some Papuan refugees from Papua New Guinea. Nearly 4,000 of the displaced are from Maluku (primarily Ambon) and North Maluku. Most are on a relatively inaccessible island off Sorong, on the western tip of Papua. According to ICMC, which is providing services to the displaced, a large number of Moluccan families have been in Sorong for generations, making it a logical destination for persons fleeing the strife in the Malukus. However, much of the Sorong community has been unhappy with the influx. An initial group arrived in Sorong in January 2000 and were there for more than two months. In the absence of sufficient services, they fled onward to Tual in Southeast Maluku. A few months later, a new group arrived, having fled the latest violence.



In early October 2000, violence between police and pro-independence Papuans in the town of Wamena caused the death of 26 people and led more than 10,000 civilians to seek shelter. Many were in military and police posts, while others were in mosques or churches. Wamena was virtually emptied of its inhabitants. Most or all of the displaced were believed to be transmigrants. Weeks after the incident, international NGOs still did not have access to the displaced, although a central government official said the displaced were in squalid conditions and faced hunger if rice did not reach them soon.

The largest group of displaced persons in Indonesia is in the province of Maluku, including Southeast Maluku. As of early September 2000, according to a report by ICMC, an estimated 135,000 displaced persons were on Ambon Island (including Ambon city), about half of whom were in camps and the other half in collective centers or private homes. Another 150,000 were elsewhere in Maluku (including the islands of Buru, Seram, Karuku, Saparua, and Tanimbar, as well as in the Tual area), for a total of 285,000 displaced persons in Maluku Province. (WFP put that figure at 215,000 for the same period and showed no change as of December 2000).


Although the level of violence in December 2000 was much lower than earlier in the year, the situation in Maluku remained tense, with sniper activity and other outbursts still taking lives and causing people to flee. In many areas, physical barriers remained between Christian and Muslim communities. Members of the Laskar Jihad reportedly still had posts and checkpoints in all inner-city Muslim neighborhoods and had a “very visible presence.”

In addition to ICMC and its local partners, the displaced in Maluku are receiving services primarily from ACF, MSF, and Mercy Corps. Throughout 2000, these agencies have struggled to maintain operations in the midst of difficult security conditions, with ACF and Mercy Corps suspending operations for a period.

Many camps in Maluku are comprised solely of Muslims or Christians, although others are mixed. The camps range from concrete buildings to mountainous jungles.

As of September 2000, the newest displaced persons camp in Maluku, with 7,000 persons, was at Rimba Raya. As ICMC explains:

*Waaï, a Christian community on the north-east side of Ambon Island, [was] attacked in early August this year, and the entire population fled to the mountains and*



*walked to Ambon (120 kilometers) over a 5-day period. A number of elderly persons died en route. Several local NGOs and church groups went into the mountains to accompany them to Ambon. It was a very difficult evacuation with heavy rains and flooding occurring at the time, and many people remain very traumatized. They are being housed in an aluminum copra warehouse and have been provided with... food, bedding and clothing.*

Looking at the long term, ICMC has initiated the “Safe Passages” program. Its goals are to provide protection and safe relocation for displaced persons evacuating from Maluku and to facilitate durable solutions such as return or local integration. The program is to operate in Papua, West Timor, Java, and Maluku. However, ICMC has noted that the current environment in Maluku is not yet conducive for safe returns. “Along with demilitarizing the city and inserting some form of civil policing, a disarmament program for the civilian population will also be important,” says the agency. “It appears that a possible scenario is the return of [displaced persons] to their places of origin but not necessarily to their former neighborhoods/villages... None of this seems very likely in the next year.”



## XI. RECOMMENDATIONS

### To the government of Indonesia:

1. Take further steps to arrest and disarm the militia in West Timor and the members of the Laskar Jihad and other groups or individuals responsible for violence (including members of the military and police).
2. Take immediate steps, through the Attorney General's office and the Human Rights Commission, to identify and prosecute those individuals or entities that have funded or otherwise supported the Jihad groups, particularly the Java-based Laskar Jihad.
3. Fully investigate the death of Jafar Siddiq Hamzah—a New-York based human rights activist who went missing in Medan, North Sumatra in August 2000 and whose tortured body was discovered September 2000—and the deaths and disappearances of other human rights activists and humanitarian workers in Aceh and elsewhere. Those responsible for these actions must be brought to justice.
4. Treat internally displaced persons in full accordance with the UN's Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, with particular regard to their needs for adequate shelter, health care, and safety. Observe the Guiding Principles with regard to the prevention of arbitrary displacement.
5. Carefully monitor displacement throughout the country and rectify any gaps in assistance.
6. Carefully consider the implications of premature or inappropriate relocation of displaced persons, whether through the transmigration program or other relocation efforts. In conducting any such relocations, considerations should include the long-term viability of the new settlements—in terms of location, land, infrastructure, and other aspects—as well as the desires of the displaced persons, the receptivity of the local community, and the potential for the displaced to return to their homes.
7. Given the role of transmigration in creating many of the tensions that have contributed to communal violence in Indonesia, maintain the current moratorium on inter-island transmigration. Limit local transmigration to situations

where no other viable solution can be found and steps are taken to minimize any negative impact. Do not resume significant levels of transmigration without serious reforms.

8. Fully cooperate with the UN Special Representative to the Secretary-General for Internally Displaced Persons and the UN Special Coordinator on Internal Displacement when they conduct missions to Indonesia in 2001. Such cooperation should include facilitating their access to displaced persons throughout the country.

### To the U.S. government:

1. Do not reengage with the Indonesian military until civilian control of the military is clearly established and the military is held accountable for human rights violations. A continued moratorium on such engagement is warranted by recent developments in Indonesia, including: an upsurge in violence (by the military and militia) in West Timor and Aceh; the removal of certain reform-minded leaders in the Indonesian military; a constitutional amendment preventing any new human rights laws from applying to military abuses committed in the past; and the national assembly's adoption of a decree allowing the armed forces to retain their 38 seats in the legislative assembly until 2009.
2. If military reengagement is contemplated, it should occur only after Indonesia meets certain conditions, including: (1) reforms to reduce the military's presence and influence over local and provincial government structures with the long-term goal of the full termination of the "dual function" structure; (2) the cessation of military-sponsored militia violence against East Timorese in West Timor and against the peoples of Aceh, West Papua, and other regions; (3) full cooperation by the military with domestic and international investigations of human rights abuses; and (4) the disbanding of Kopassus, the special military unit responsible for the most egregious human rights violations.



3. If U.S. training of the Indonesian police is re-initiated (as is currently being planned), ensure that Indonesian NGOs and other groups familiar with the police are consulted on the goals, curriculum, and techniques of the training. NGOs should also have input in the selection of training participants.

Although Indonesia has initiated a formal separation of the police from the military, in most areas of the country this separation has not yet taken hold. While in some regions the police are viewed as neutral and are not implicated in human rights abuses, in other areas they are viewed no differently than the army and have been accused of facilitating the violence—or at least failing to prevent it. In Aceh, for example, members of BRIMOB have been accused of particular brutality.

For these reasons, any U.S. training of the Indonesian police should be focused on helping achieve the demilitarization of Indonesian society. Demilitarization should include the complete separation of the military and police, the deployment of police rather than the military in situations of internal conflict, and use of appropriate police tactics in quelling violence.

#### To the UN and the international community:

1. Use all political and economic leverage to pressure and assist the Indonesian government to disarm, arrest, and prosecute all persons who incite or perpetuate communal violence, including implicated members of the armed forces, police, “Jihad” groups, militia, or other “provocateurs.”
2. If the Indonesian government remains unwilling to disarm the militia and to significantly reduce the level of communal violence throughout the country, the international community should consider ways to reduce the bloodshed and provide humanitarian assistance, with or without Indonesia’s cooperation.
3. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights should send a team of human right observers to Indonesia and should appoint a special rapporteur to investigate human rights abuses and make recommendations to the Commission on Human Rights. Such observations and investigations should take place immediately in West Timor, Aceh, and the Malukus as a potential curb on current violence, but it should ultimately include Central Sulawesi, West Papua, and other areas.
4. International relief and development agencies, including UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations, should monitor the situation of displaced persons throughout Indonesia to ensure the adequate provision of humanitarian assistance. Given Indonesia’s ongoing economic difficulties, humanitarian agencies should take steps to ensure sufficient funding to meet the most urgent needs of the displaced. Funding appeals should stress the logistical challenges imposed by Indonesia’s geography.
5. To the extent possible under security conditions, UN relief and development agencies, international agencies, and NGOs should establish or expand their presence in Aceh, Maluku, and elsewhere, both to provide assistance to persons in need and to serve as an international presence with the goal of monitoring and preventing further violence.
6. Agencies experienced in assisting displaced persons should provide technical assistance to the Indonesian government at both the national and local levels to help ensure a coordinated and adequate response to displacement by the government, including the effective implementation of long-term solutions such as relocation or return.
7. UNDP, national governments, and NGOs should assess the burdens that displacement has put on local communities and consider the assistance and development needs of these areas.
8. While it may be too soon to conduct reconciliation programs in areas where violence is still occurring, the international community should begin exploring ways to encourage reconciliation between religious and ethnic communities. In particular, training of local NGOs should be a focus. To further the eventual reconciliation, the Indonesian government and the international community should help ethnic and religious leaders to jointly investigate human rights abuses, possibly with the assistance of a representative collection of local NGOs or other neutral bodies.

