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Yemen: Whether al-Jihad or any other terrorist organization had a presence in Yemen between August 1994 and August 1995, and whether al-Jihad was active in the country any time before or after this period

Publisher Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
Author Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada
Publication Date 12 February 2003
Citation / Document Symbol YEM41089.E
Reference 2
Cite as Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Yemen: Whether al-Jihad or any other terrorist organization had a presence in Yemen between August 1994 and August 1995, and whether al-Jihad was active in the country any time before or after this period, 12 February 2003, YEM41089.E, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f7d4e3ce.html [accessed 29 May 2023]
DisclaimerThis is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.

Terrorism in Yemen in the Early 1990s

The Research Directorate was able to find one article, which was written by Brian Whitaker, the Middle East editor for the British newspaper, The Guardian, that made reference to Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) - controlled southern Yemen supporting terrorism when, between 1977 and 1979, "members of the Red Army Fraction ... took refuge in southern Yemen to escape the German authorities and underwent weapons training there at a Palestinian camp" (Yemen Gateway 3 Dec. 2000).

Between 1992 and 1994 there was "a wave of bombings and political killings" in Yemen directed for the most part against the "Yemen Socialist Party which, along with the General People's Congress, was a partner in Yemen's post-unification government" (ibid.). According to Whitaker, it was thought that Muslim veterans of the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, "almost certainly funded by [Osama] bin Laden," were behind the attacks (ibid.). These Arab Afghans, as they came to be known, formed "a loose alliance with various southern Yemenis who harboured grievances against the YSP" under the name "Jihad" (ibid.).

While initially "Jihad" was thought to be responsible for, most notably, the Aden hotel bombings in 1992, Whitaker points out that, since 1994, opinion had changed and "some government sources go so far as to blame Jihad for most of the terrorist incidents during 1992-94" (ibid.).

In addition to the bin Laden-funded Jihad, a key figure in Yemeni terrorism in the early 1990s was Tariq Bin Nasir Bin Abdullah al-Fadli, "a sheikh from a prominent southern Yemeni family," which, prior to the "Marxist take-over [of the YSP regime], controlled one of the big cotton plantations outside Aden" (ibid.). Following the unification of North and South Yemen and his return to Yemen "to claim his inheritance,"

Sheikh Tariq gathered around himself a number of Afghan war veterans, members of his own tribe and religious opponents of the YSP. He was said ... to be seeking ... [to] wage war on the authorities and bring down the regime which he considered outside Islam ... [i]t seems that Fadli had given his campaign a religious tinge merely to win support in pursuit of a far more personal and mundane goal: to take revenge on those who had dispossessed his family and to obtain restitution of their property (ibid.).

Please refer to the attachments for the full text of Brian Whitaker's article entitled "Yemen and Osama Bin Laden."

Terrorism in Yemen in the Late 1990s

According to the London-based newspaper, Al-Majallah, in mid-1998 the "Islamic Jihad group declared itself and established a camp in Abyan province" (3-9 Nov. 2002). The camp was attacked and dispersed by Yemeni security forces in May 1998 after it was discovered that the returning Afghanistan veterans were gathering there "to train and resume their halted activities" (Al-Majallah 3-9 Nov. 2002).

A few weeks after the attack on the camp, the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, identified by Al-Majallah as "a splinter group of Jihad," set up a camp in the Maraqishah Mountains (ibid.). According to one report, "when the Yemeni government tried to close the Islamic Army's training camp, a bin Laden representative attempted to mediate" (Yemen Gateway 12 Dec. 2001).

The Islamic Army was unheard of until 29 May 1998 "when it issued the first in a series of political/religious statements on Yemeni and world affairs" (ibid. 29 Apr. 2001). Then, also in 1998, it carried out an operation to kidnap Western tourists, "the first operation to end with a bloodbath as six tourists, the majority of whom were British, were killed" (Al-Majallah 9 Nov. 2002). The leader of the Islamic Army, Abu-al-Hasan al-Mihdar, was arrested and executed following "a trial in which he admitted his links to Usama Bin Ladin and his reliance on Bin Ladin's fatwa to kill US and British nationals" (ibid.).

Despite al-Mihdar's death, in 2000 and 2001, 30 Apr. 2001; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 May 2002).

Vulnerability of Yemen to Terrorism

According to Whitaker, Yemen is vulnerable to terrorists because

[i]ts land and sea borders are virtually impossible to guard; government presence in many parts of the country is minimal; the rugged, often sparsely-populated terrain makes it easy to train guerrillas or construct well-defended hideouts; and the country's religious diversity means that most varieties of Islamic militant can find someone, somewhere, to shelter them (Yemen Gateway 3 Dec. 2000).

Similar sentiments have been stated in Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000: "The Government of Yemen did not provide direct or indirect support to terrorists, but its inability to control fully its borders, territory, or its own travel documents did little to discourage the terrorist presence in Yemen" (30 Apr. 2001).

Al-Qaeda in Yemen

United States intelligence organizations have stated that "the inability of the Yemeni Government to tighten its control over the regions of Yemen makes the tribal and remote areas a secure haven for the al-Qa'ida members" (Al-Majallah 9 Nov. 2002).

In the mid-1980s, Osama bin Laden co-founded the Maktab al Khidamat lil Mujahidin al-Arab (MAK) or Afghan Service Bureau (Gunaratna May 2002, 3-4) "to help funnel fighters and money to the Afghan resistance [against the Soviets] in Peshawar with the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood leader Abdallah Azzam" (FAS 31 Oct. 2002). Some time during the 1980's, MAK's resources "were diverted by Al Qaeda away from Afghanistan into regional conflicts where Islamist guerrillas were involved," including in Yemen (Gunaratna May 2002, 5).

In his book entitled Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, Rohan Gunaratna writes that, upon his return to Saudi Arabia following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, Osama bin Laden "helped Saudi intelligence to create the first jihad group in South Yemen under the leadership of Tariq al-Fadli, which was seeking to oust the Communist regime" (May 2002, 27).

According to Middle East International, "[v]eterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union took refuge [in Yemen] and training camps flourished for much of the 1990s" (26 Oct. 2001, 17). Al-Majallah reported that "a number of this large group of Yemenis, who fought under the flag of Bin Laden and then returned to Yemen, are still in contact with the al-Qa'ida organization, and the rest sympathize with it" (9 Nov. 2002).

Jane's Intelligence Review reported that while many of these returning mujahideen from Afghanistan were placed in the Yemeni army to help reintegrate them back into Yemeni society, many went "directly to 'Islamic learning centres' in the north or to a camp financed by Osama bin Laden in Mudiyah, Abyan province" (July 1999, 26). The same report noted that "[a]n estimated third of Bin Laden's recruits are Yemeni" (July 1999, 27), information that is corroborated by Gunaratna, who says that "Al Qaeda's Yemeni membership is the third largest after the Egyptians and Algerians" (May 2002, 139).

Following the relocation of al-Qaeda "from Sudan to Afghanistan in May 1996, its European and North American bureau moved to Turkey and Yemen" (Gunaratna May 2002, 95). According to Gunaratna, al-Qaeda's "African operations are run from Yemen and Somalia" (May 2002, 10).

Claiming that bin Laden "directly coordinated" the attacks of 11 September 2001 and "provided the strategic leadership" for the attacks on the East African embassy and the USS Cole, Gunaratna adds that it was "Al-Qaeda's experienced Egyptian, Algerian and Yemeni terrorists [who] were always involved in planning and conducting such attacks" (May 2002, 77).

Al-Qaeda's guerrilla organization - the 055 Brigade - "was integrated into the Army of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from 1997 to 2001 to fight the Northern Alliance" (Gunaratna May 2002, 58). According to Gunaratna, the 055 Brigade "functioned as an integral part of the [Taliban's] military apparatus" and "formed the strategic reserve of Al Qaeda's terrorist network" (ibid., 58-59). Again, Yemen's membership in the 055 Brigade made up the third largest group, following the Egyptians and Saudis (ibid., 59).

American Statesman reported that the bin Laden network's "first terrorist act was in 1992, when a bomb exploded in a Yemen hotel" (13 Sept. 2001).

Then, on 12 October 2000, a boat full of explosives was detonated as it impacted the USS Cole as it was being refuelled in Aden Harbour (Knight Ridder 29 Oct. 2000; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 30 Apr. 2001). The explosion killed 17 United States sailors (ibid.; Richmond Times - Dispatch 29 Aug. 2002). While, according to Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, the Islamic Army of Aden, Muhammad's Army and the Islamic Deterrence Force all claimed responsibility for the attack (30 Apr. 2001), al-Qaeda is also believed to be linked to it (The Houston Chronicle 7 July 2002; Richmond Times - Dispatch 29 Aug. 2002; Middle East International 26 Oct. 2001, 18).

In 2000 and 2001, al-Qaeda continued to operate illegally in Yemen (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 30 Apr. 2001; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 May 2002).

Al-Majallah reported in November 2002 that,

al-Qa'ida's sleeper cells in Yemen have already started their activities, but with extreme caution. These cells have addressed a number of warnings to the Yemeni Government in the name of "sympathizers to al-Qa'ida organization" and carried out a series of explosions, which were described as warnings and which targeted command and security centers, in order to force the government to release the detainees suspected of having links to Usama Bin Laden (9 Nov. 2002).

Al-Qaeda also functions through other terrorist organizations such as al-Jihad, al-Gamma al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and a number of jihad groups in other countries that include Yemen (US 18 Dec. 2001; The Gold Coast Bulletin 17 Oct. 2002; The Journal 13 Nov. 1998).

Please see the attached excerpt from Gunaratna's book entitled Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror for additional information on al-Qaeda in Yemen.

Osama bin Laden's Yemen Connection

Although Osama bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia, his father was from Yemen (Gutaratna May 2002, 16). Bin Laden's fourth wife was also a Yemeni (ibid., 48). According to Gunaratna, "[b]y marrying a Yemeni from the northern tribes, Osama established close relations with the al-Islah Party," since he "already had close relations with the Islamic Army of Aden Abyan, an Islamist group in the south of Yemen" (ibid.).

In addition, bin Laden was known to have had "business interests in Aden" and he made "several" trips into Yemen after "becoming known for his sponsorship of international terrorism" (Jane's Intelligence Review July 1999).

Please refer to the attached article from Jane's Intelligence Review entitled, "Yemen: Unlikely Key to Western Security," for additional information on Osama bin Laden and his links to Yemen.

Al-Jihad al-Islami in Yemen

Al-Jihad al-Islami is also known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Jihad, Islamic Jihad and Jihad Group (Monterey Institute of International Studies 2002). Active since the late 1970s, it is a large militant group that seeks "to establish Islamic rule in Egypt by force and targets any secular establishment … believe[d] to be heretical, especially secular Arab governments" (ibid.). Although al-Jihad al-Islami is headquartered in Afghanistan, it has branches in various other countries, including Yemen (ibid.).

According to Al-Sharq al-Awsat, a London-based Arabic-language newspaper, "Yemen was one of the most important posts for the Egyptian Jihad Organization from where its members travelled to other Arab and foreign countries" (3 Apr. 2002). And, between 1999 and 2001, Egyptian Islamic Jihad continued to operate illegally in Yemen (Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 12 May 2000; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 30 Apr. 2001; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 May 2002).

Other Groups

In 1999, 2000 and 2001, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad were recognized as legal organizations, and they maintained offices in Yemen (Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 12 May 2000; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 30 Apr. 2001; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 May 2002).

"[I]nternational terrorist groups" that maintained an illegal presence in Yemen between 1999 and 2001 included al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Libyan opposition groups and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 12 May 2000; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 30 Apr. 2001; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 May 2002).

The Dar al-Hadith School in Yemen

The Dar al-Hadith School consists of five institutions located "in the heart of the Arabian desert just south of the Saudi border" (Christian Science Monitor 6 Feb. 2001). The schools, which are owned by Sheik Muqbel bin Hadi al-Wadie, are believed by "Western diplomats and experts in Yemen [to] ... serve as ideological wings of a Middle East terror network controlled by Osama bin Laden" (ibid.). The students include Americans, Egyptians, Somalians and Libyans, many of whom "are fresh from an Islamic 'holy war,' or jihad, in places like Chechnya and Afghanistan, or they are on their way to another" (ibid.). The students and teachers of these schools insist that "they are carrying out [their own concepts of jihad] strictly within the bounds of Islamic principles which, they say, specifically ban terrorism" (ibid.).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please find below the list of additional sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

References

Al-Majallah [London, in Arabic]. 3-9 November 2002. "Yemen: Al-Majallah Reviews Al-Qa'ida Activities, Government Measures, US Reactions." (FBIS-NES-2002-1113 9 Nov. 2002/ WNC)

Al-Sharq al-Awsat [London, in Arabic]. 3 April 2002. "Report Says Pakistan Extradited to Egypt Jihad Leader 'Abu-Mus'ab Reuters.'" (FBIS-NES-2002-0403 3 Apr. 2002/WNC)

American Statesman [Austin]. 13 September 2001. "Experts: Signs Point to Bin Laden, Once Again, Islamic Extremist Is Main Suspect in a Terrorist Attack Against the U.S." (NEXIS)

Christian Science Monitor. 6 February 2001. Philip Smucker. "Where Holy Warriors Learn the Fundamentals." [Accessed 31 Jan. 2003]

Federation of American Scientists (FAS). 31 October 2002. "al-Qa'ida (The Base)." [Accessed 10 Feb. 2003]

The Gold Coast Bulletin [Gold Coast, Australia]. 17 October 2002. Ken Vernon. "Many-Headed Monster." (NEXIS)

Gunaratna, Rohan. May 2002. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press.

The Houston Chronicle. 7 July 2002. Joyce M. Davis. "Palestinian Terror Goals Are Not the Same as Al-Qaida's; Difference Could Be Important for U.S., Analysts Say." (NEXIS)

Jane's Intelligence Review. July 1999. Vol. 11, No. 7. Susan Lackey. "Yemen: Unlikely Key to Western Security."

The Journal. 13 November 1998. "US Offer 5 Million for Capture of Bin Laden." (Ethnic NewsWatch/NEXIS)

Knight Ridder [Washington]. 29 October 2000. Sudarsan Raghavan. "Process of Moving USS Cole Set to Begin Sunday." (Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service/NEXIS)

Middle East International. 26 October 2001. No. 661. Brian Whitaker. "Yemen: Honey and Jihad."

Monterey Institute of International Studies. 2002. Centre for Nonproliferation Studies. "Special Section: Terrorist Attacks on America." [Accessed 5 Feb. 2003]

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001. May 2002. United States Department of State. Washington, DC. [Accessed 15 Jan. 2003]

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000. 30 April 2001. United States Department of State. Washington, DC. [Accessed 15 Jan. 2003]

Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999. 12 May 2000. United States Department of State. Washington, DC. [Accessed 15 Jan. 2003]

Richmond Times - Dispatch. 29 August 2002. "Terror Probes Gather Steam; Six in U.S. Accused of Backing Al-Qaida." (NEXIS)

Yemen Gateway. 12 December 2001. "Attack on the USS Cole." [Accessed 10 Feb. 2003]

_____. 29 April 2001. "The Islamic Army." [Accessed 11 Feb. 2003]

_____. 3 December 2000. Brian Whitaker. "Yemen and Osama Bin Laden." [Accessed 10 Feb. 2003]

United States. 18 December 2001. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Congressional Testimony. "Global Reach of Al-Qaeda." Testimony by J.T. Caruso, Acting Assistant Director, Counter Terrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation. (Federal Document Clearing House/NEXIS)

Attachments

Gunaratna, Rohan. May 2002. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press. (pages 138 -141).

Jane's Intelligence Review. July 1999. Vol. 11, No. 7. Susan Lackey. "Yemen: Unlikely Key to Western Security."

Yemen Gateway. 3 December 2000. Brian Whitaker. "Yemen and Osama Bin Laden." [Accessed 10 Feb. 2003]

Additional Sources Consulted

Journal of South Asian & Middle Eastern Studies (Spring 1999, Vol. XXII, No. 3, to Winter 2002, Vol. XXV, No. 2)

The Middle East (Jan. 1999 to Jan. 2003)

Middle East International (Jan. 1999, No. 591, to Dec. 2002, No. 689)

Middle East Report (Spring 1999 to Winter 2002)

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Copyright notice: This document is published with the permission of the copyright holder and producer Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB). The original version of this document may be found on the offical website of the IRB at http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/. Documents earlier than 2003 may be found only on Refworld.

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