

**IHF FOCUS: good governance; elections; freedom of the media; peaceful assembly; freedom of association; right to privacy; right to life (death penalty); freedom of religion and religious tolerance; asylum seekers.**

Compared to other Central Asian countries, and even to the whole former Soviet Union, the Republic of Kazakhstan is relatively wealthy, thanks to its natural resources and a functioning industry. Therefore, Kazakhstan has been pursuing a policy of relative economic openness and wanted to show its capability to be a reliable partner for investors.

Kazakhstan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in January 2006 and aspires to assume the OSCE presidency in 2009.

In 2005, one of the Kazakh government's main priorities was to ensure the country's security, yet in its determination to implement its security policy it clamped down on basic human rights. The events in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan resulted in increased mistrust among the Kazakh government officials against local NGOs - and particularly toward foreign NGOs active in the country. Under the pretext of ensuring national security, authorities amended relevant legislation to restrict NGO activities.

Corruption remained widespread despite formal as well as legal measures taken against it. Kazakh election legislation was reformed and the conduct of the December 2005 presidential elections demonstrated improvements but nevertheless failed to comply with international standards for democratic elections. For example, the opposition campaigning was obstructed, the electronic voting still caused confusion, and pressure was exerted on individuals by the supporters of the incumbent to support him.

In the run-up to the presidential election, pressure on independent and opposition media was also increased. Furthermore, a series of new legislation adopted

in 2005 aimed at increasing national security weakened the position of the independent media and provided restrictions on the activities of religious organizations. It also appeared to give the KNB secret police more powers in determining Kazakhstan's policy on religions and practices. Fortunately, the new laws were not implemented fully in the course of the year. Nevertheless, as in previous years, religious minority groups faced discrimination and harassment.

A moratorium on the death penalty continued but authorities took no serious measures for its total abolition.

At the end of the year, Uzbek Muslim refugees regarded as "extremists" by Uzbek authorities were reportedly extradited to Uzbekistan after having been brutally beaten. Kazakh authorities denied any knowledge of the incident.

### **Good Governance**

The 2005 "Transparency International Global Corruption Perception Index" ranked the Republic of Kazakhstan at 107 out of 140, with the lowest ranked country deemed to be the most corrupt one.<sup>1</sup> Corruption remained ubiquitous in all sectors of public life. In April, President Nazarbaev signed a decree aiming to step up measures against corruption, providing for a reorganization of disciplinary councils, as well as for enhanced transparency of government business with the private sector. Yet at year's end, the decree had not yet been enforced.<sup>2</sup>

The huge corruption scandal in which the Kazakh state railway company was involved was illustrative of the necessity of taking rigorous measures against corruption. As of writing, the perpetrators were still not brought to justice.

◆ The Kazakh state railway company (*Kazakh Temir Zholy*) bought equipment from a Russian enterprise at a price three times higher than the adequate price. The Kazakh state paid the high price by charging it against Russia's payments for the rent of the Baikonur space complex. By inflating the purchase price, Kazakhstan lost US\$46 million (EUR 37.7 million) of Russia's rent payments for Baikonur, while the Russian Federation lost US\$13 million (EUR 10.6 million) in taxes. The newspaper *Respublica*, which was closed down in May 2005, had investigated this scandal extensively and revealed the involvement of high-ranking decision-makers who profited from the purchase (see Freedom of the Media, below).

### Elections<sup>3</sup>

As in previous years, there were improvements both in Kazakh election legislation and the manner in which elections were carried out was improved but still failed to comply with international standards for democratic elections.

Due to constitutional ambiguities on the holding of the election, the issue was referred to the Constitutional Council, which decided on 19 August that the election was to be held in December 2005, one year before the anticipated date. The opposition criticized that moving the date forward left them too little time to properly prepare their election campaign.

With the main opposition party, the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK), being closed down in January 2005 (see Freedom of Association), the opposition had difficulties to organize a real campaign. Its candidates, however, were able to register without major difficulties. Five candidates ran for the post of president of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Yerassyl Abylkasymov (Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan), Alikhan Baimenov (*Ak Zhol* Party), Mels Yeleussizov (independent),

Nursultan Nazarbayev (*Otan* Party), and Zharmakhan Tuyakbay ("For a Fair Kazakhstan" movement, ZSK). Among the five candidates, only Tuyakbay of the ZSK could garner significant support, but its campaigning was exposed to severe harassment.

The presidential election was held on 4 December. The incumbent president, Nursultan Nazarbaev who has held office since 1989, officially received 91.01% of the votes.<sup>4</sup> The election was widely criticized by foreign and domestic observers alike for falling short of internationally recognized standards, even though, compared to previous elections, some progress was made.

### Election Legislation

The legislative framework regulating elections underwent thorough reform prior to the 2004 parliamentary elections.<sup>5</sup> The new legislation was assessed by the OSCE/ODIHR, which recommended several changes in order to bring it in line with the country's OSCE commitments. Yet, by the end of 2005, many of the recommendations had not been adopted or implemented.

The joint election observation mission of the OSCE/ODIHR, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe criticized that authorities continued making use of administrative resources and that the media was overwhelmingly biased in favor of the incumbent president.

### Organizational Aspects

As in other republics of the former Soviet Union, the Central Election Commission (CEC) plays a pivotal role in administering the ballot such as organization, preparation, vote count, declaration of results, etc. For this reason, the CEC is particularly vulnerable to the authorities' pressure - which was reaffirmed by the 2005 election in Kazakhstan. While during the

2004 parliamentary elections the CEC seemed to aim at furthering the interests of the authorities,<sup>6</sup> its performance in 2005 was improved: it had a new composition, and its activities and decisions were more transparent than previously. Nevertheless, problems persisted in the operation of the lower level election committees.

Electronic voting devices were first introduced in Kazakhstan at the 2004 parliamentary elections, where they were a major cause of confusion and concern. Relying on the 2004 experience, some problems could be solved prior to the December presidential elections. Fifteen percent of the polling stations were equipped with e-voting devices, compared to ten percent in the previous year. Local election commissions carried out information campaigns in order to make voters and observers familiar with the new process, the voters were free to choose between e-voting and paper ballot, and, in a welcome development, a single paper voter list was established instead of many, as during the previous elections.

However, the many problems the e-voting process bore continued to affect its credibility, especially the fact that the electronic voting devices still lacked printing facilities, a problem already deplored in 2004.<sup>7</sup> As paper records of votes could not be obtained, there was no opportunity for recounting votes or recovering them in case of machine failure. Furthermore, an optional four-digit personal code was introduced, meant to enable voters to control whether their vote was recorded correctly. Yet this method potentially opened the way to abuse and intimidation in case the codes and the respective votes were to become public, as pointed out by the joint OSCE, European Parliament and Council of Europe report. Because of this uncertainty of e-voting, several presidential candidates urged their voters to choose paper voting. As a result, in polling stations equipped

with e-voting devices, more than two-thirds of the votes were cast by paper.

### *Electoral Campaign<sup>8</sup>*

The incumbent president Nazarbaev remained predominant in the media and other public fora during the election campaign. Opposition parties repeatedly deplored lacking billboard space and meeting venues. They were also frequently harassed by authorities when disseminating information in public places or conducting rallies. Furthermore, law enforcement officials reportedly video- or audio-taped opposition meetings.

◆ In April, the ZSK leader and main opposition candidate Zharmakhan Tuyakbay was nearly hit by a brick thrown at a party meeting in eastern Kazakhstan. In May, a mob disturbed a party meeting, shouting to kill Tuyakbay “for Nazarbaev.”<sup>9</sup> In addition, members of Tuyakbay’s election campaign were reportedly beaten by unknown assailants and they found their offices under video surveillance, as confirmed by OSCE/ODIHR.

◆ Students reported being put under pressure by professors and the university administration, urging them to go voting and, particularly, to vote for Nazarbaev – otherwise they would be suspended from the faculty or would no longer be granted scholarships.

### **Freedom of the Media**

The year 2005 did not see any significant amelioration of freedom of expression and the media. To the contrary, the presidential election in December led to increased pressure on independent and opposition media. Furthermore, the amendments to legislation adopted in 2005 to increase national security, weakened the position of the independent media.

On 6 May, Kazakhstan’s main independent newspaper *Respublika* was clo-

sed down following a government lawsuit. The closure followed a series of threats against and harassment of the newspaper.<sup>10</sup> Its successor, *Set' KZ* was also exposed to pressure by the authorities.<sup>11</sup>

On several occasions, journalists were beaten up.

◆ Kazhymurat Abilkaliev, the deputy editor-in-chief of the *Altyn Gasyr* newspaper and Azamat Dospanov, a volunteer of the same newspaper, were beaten up by unidentified assailants on 27 August and 13 September, respectively. The latter suffered severe head and vertebral injuries. It was believed that the attacks were linked to the political activity of the newspaper's editor-in-chief, Zhumabay Dospanov, a prominent opposition figure.<sup>12</sup>

◆ On the night of 1 October, an unidentified person visited Mikhail Mysikov, the owner and editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Region Plus* of Kapchagay (near Almaty), on the pretext of having important and confidential information to convey. When Mysikov opened the door, the assailant tried to hit him into the eye with a sharp object, yet only managed to wound him on the eyebrow. Then he disappeared. The following night, unknown persons broke through the balcony door of a journalist of the same newspaper. The policemen in charge urged the journalist not to file a formal complaint. *Region Plus* is known for its critical coverage of the local authorities' activities.<sup>13</sup>

Libel and defamation charges were still widely used in order to silence critical journalists, as well as accusations that journalists had caused harm to the honor and dignity of the president of Kazakhstan.

### **Media in the Electoral Process**

In September 2005, some months prior to the presidential election, the state general prosecutor's office issued a statement, in which it expressed its willingness

to tighten up the observation of the legality of journalists' activities related to the election. The prosecutor's office argued that the elections would "impose an increased civic and judicial responsibility on mass media and journalists."<sup>14</sup> This statement led many journalists to be particularly cautious when covering election-related events, if not to self-censorship.

When covering the 2005 presidential election campaigns, most TV and print media showed bias in favor of the incumbent president Nursultan Nazarbaev. All main TV channels dedicated half to three-thirds of the coverage time to Nazarbaev. Furthermore, he received overwhelmingly positive coverage, while the main opposition candidate Zharmakhan Tuyakbay was typically depicted in negative terms.<sup>15</sup>

### **Peaceful Assembly**

Kazakh authorities generally tolerated the right to freedom of assembly, within certain limits.

◆ On 1 May, an approved public rally and a concert took place in Astana. Law enforcement agents alongside with OMON special forces beat and detained some 80 persons, most of them young people wearing orange scarves and balloons. The students were threatened with expulsion from university.<sup>16</sup>

An amendment to the election law, adopted shortly before the 2005 presidential poll, prohibits bigger demonstrations in the period between the day before voting and the official publication of results by the CEC.

### **Freedom of Association**

On 6 January 2005, the Almaty Special Economic Court shut down Kazakhstan's main opposition party – the DVK. The court ruled that a party's statement calling for civil disobedience posed a threat to national security. Party supporters were

intimidated by authorities throughout the proceedings.<sup>17</sup> As of the end of 2005, the party's co-founder Galymzhan Zhakianov continued to serve a seven-year sentence handed down in 2002 in proceedings largely regarded as unfair and politically motivated.<sup>18</sup>

### **Law on Non-Commercial Organizations**

On 29 June, the *Majlis* (parliament) adopted amendments to the law on non-commercial organizations, severely tightening the regulations for NGO activity. When discussing the draft law, several *Majilis* deputies accused NGOs of posing a threat to Kazakhstan's security and of undermining its political and social system. One deputy even accused NGOs of "human rights totalitarianism."

The new law prescribed that NGOs would be obliged to inform the local administration about any planned activities ten days prior to carrying them out and to invite state representatives to all their meetings and conferences. Furthermore, they would need to obtain *à priori* approval from authorities to receive foreign grants. Branches of foreign NGOs would be subject to compulsory registration with the Ministry of Justice. Henceforth, foreign citizens would not have the right to head Kazakh NGOs. Moreover, according to the new law, NGOs should publish their budgets in the mass media.

The Almaty Helsinki Committee argued that the new law was at variance both with Kazakhstan's human rights commitments and the constitution.<sup>19</sup>

Subsequently, on 23 August 2005, the country's Constitutional Council ruled that the amendments were incompatible with the constitution, which prevented their entering into force.

In March 2005, the state general prosecutor's office began with a thorough audit of 33 NGOs that operated based on considerable foreign grants,<sup>20</sup> a step that sig-

nalled a new attempt to increase state control over NGO activity.

### **Right to Privacy**

A set of laws drafted to enhance the country's security provided for changes to the law "On Operational and Investigative Action." Prior to the amendments, the law allowed for control of "postal and telegraph communication." The draft amendments allowed control over "communication networks," vesting the security officers to control e-mail and mobile phone communications.<sup>21</sup> These amendments were, however, not adopted.

### **Right to Life**

#### **The Death Penalty**

A moratorium on the death penalty was introduced by presidential decree in December 2003, which states that it will remain in force until the issue of the abolition of the death penalty has been finally resolved. All executions were suspended for the time of the moratorium and life imprisonment was established as an alternative to the death penalty as of January 2004.<sup>22</sup>

In April 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the Kazakh parliament signed a co-operation agreement aimed at promoting parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights in Kazakhstan. Under this agreement, the Kazakh parliament undertook to "act for and encourage the competent authorities to [...] abolish the death penalty."<sup>23</sup>

Full abolition had not taken place as of writing this report.

The standing of Kazakh authorities on the death penalty issue was further undermined as they continued to extradite persons to countries where the death penalty was in force. In March 2004, Rahmutulla Islyil and Arken Yakuf, two Uighurs who were extradited from Kazakhstan to China

in 2002, were executed on murder charges. Persons, who sought refuge in Kazakhstan after the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan<sup>24</sup> were likewise facing illegal extradition (see section on Asylum Seekers, below) to Uzbekistan, where the death penalty was in force and implemented.

### **Freedom of Religion and Religious Tolerance**

There were no significant changes in the practical situation of religious communities in 2005 in comparison with previous years: authorities continued to exert pressure on religious groups in the same worrisome manner. Harsh new laws on extremism and national security were introduced in 2005, providing for additional formal restrictions on the activities of religious organizations, though not yet altering the authorities' practices with regard to religious activity.

#### ***Legislative Framework***

In 2002, the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan had declared unconstitutional an article of the draft law "On the Freedom of Belief and Religious Communities" that stipulated that refusal by religious communities to register was punishable with fines or banning of their activities. This ruling was generally regarded as a positive sign for freedom of belief in Kazakhstan.

Nevertheless, new laws "On Combating Extremism" and "Introducing Changes and Amendments to Several Legislative Documents in the Republic of Kazakhstan on Issues Relating to Combating Extremist Activity" were signed into law by President Nazarbaev in February 2005, in spite of concerns raised among others by the country's human rights groups, the ombudsman and the OSCE. The laws failed to clearly define the term "extremism," thus providing the state with the possibility to "combat religious organizations it does not

like," as pointed out by the Almaty Helsinki Committee in the wake of the adoption of the documents.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, the new laws expanded the powers of the State Agency for Relations with Religious Associations to control their activities, particularly observing their compliance with the law on extremism.

The legal framework became even tighter when President Nazarbaev signed into law on 8 July several amendments to the existing laws under the pretext of improving "national security." The amendments introduced, among others, a provision banning the activity of non-registered religious organizations, in spite of the Constitutional Council's ruling in 2002. A deputy backed this initiative, arguing it would enhance "ethno-cultural security."<sup>26</sup>

Furthermore, in order to conduct missionary activity, registration with authorities was prescribed. All non-registered missionary activity was explicitly banned.

The amendments were rushed through parliament, providing no time for thorough parliamentary work and leaving deputies unable to prepare alternative drafts. This resulted in the adoption of legal provisions that remained contradictory and ambiguous.

Although the new legislation provides a vast leeway to the authorities, it appears that in the course of 2005 authorities did not fully make use of the powers given to them: according to the Almaty Helsinki Committee, no significant changes occurred in the state practice toward religious groups.<sup>27</sup> It noted, however, that the new legislation appeared to show that the "KNB secret police lays down religious policy in the country."<sup>28</sup> This assumption was underscored by the statement of the first deputy chairman of the KNB, Vladimir Bozhko, who confirmed the need to "defend society from the penetration of ideas that are alien to our mentality, alien to our traditional forms of religious expression."<sup>29</sup>

Kazakhstan's two major religious groups, though, welcomed the new legislation. Representatives of the government-backed Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan (the Muftiate) as well as of the Russian Orthodox Diocese of Astana and Almaty voiced their contentment that the new framework would "limit the opportunities for members of sects."<sup>30</sup>

### *State Policies Toward Religious Groups*

The Spiritual Administration of Muslims pursued its ambition to gain control over all Muslim communities in the country. No legal provisions existed to force mosques to join it but the administration reacted harshly against possible opponents, arguing that a unification of all mosques within its framework would help overcome regional "inconsistencies" in Muslim rites.<sup>31</sup>

◆ In August, the head of the independent Union of Muslims in Kazakhstan (UMK), Murat Telibekov, was sued by the Nur-Mubarak Islamic Cultural University for having caused moral damage after he had published an article disclosing corruption in that university, which is jointly run by the Kazakh and the Egyptian state.<sup>32</sup> Telibekov stood trial once again in October, this time accused by the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan for having given a critical interview to the *Metropolis* newspaper. According to Forum 18, this was the fourth legal case brought against the UMK in 2005 trying to close it down, in which the Muftiate has been either directly or indirectly involved.<sup>33</sup>

◆ The Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan continued its policy of a "Kazakhification" of Uzbek Muslims communities in Southern Kazakhstan.<sup>34</sup> Forum18 reported that, allegedly, the Muftiate in several cases did not recognize theological degrees obtained at Uzbek institutions and ordered Uzbek theologians to undergo "retraining." Furthermore, the

Muftiate attempted to replace Uzbek *imams* by ethnic Kazakhs.<sup>35</sup>

◆ In northern Kazakhstan, the district education department particularly targeted children attending Protestant activities. In the village of Krasnoyarka, teachers were reported to have told eight-year-old children that praying "might even cause death." Schools were ordered to conduct "educational work" with children and to offer more extra-curricular activities in order to dissuade them from attending religious activities.<sup>36</sup>

The new legislation particularly affects some Baptist groups, which reject registration on principle. But even before new amendments making registration obligatory were signed into law, local authorities had exerted pressure on unregistered Baptist groups.

What is more, Protestant communities that were willing to register with the authorities were repeatedly rejected, thus criminalizing their activities. These communities included the Resurrection Church in Atytau (northwestern Kazakhstan). It had applied four times for registration but was rejected. The local Sonbakym Protestant Church had been rejected six times.<sup>37</sup>

In addition, the Hare Krishna community near Almaty continued to experience severe pressure from authorities. The community was accused of having used forged documents in order to acquire its farming premises in 1992.<sup>38</sup>

### **Asylum Seekers**

Following the bloodshed of 13 May in Andijan in neighbouring Uzbekistan,<sup>39</sup> many Uzbeks fled to Kazakhstan to avoid persecution but were not always provided refuge.

In December, nine Uzbek Muslim refugees "disappeared" in Shymkent in southern Kazakhstan and were reportedly extradited to Uzbekistan. According to wit-



nesses' statements, the arrests were conducted very brutally and with the use of guns. Kazakh authorities denied any knowledge of the incident, yet Human Rights Watch reported that ten persons, who had been arrested in Kazakhstan were being detained in a Tashkent prison on suspicion of being "Wahhabists" or members of "Akramiya." According to the detainees' lawyer, they had been transferred from Kazakhstan to Uzbek authorities without any extradition procedures. A representative of an Uzbek refugees association in Kazakhstan reported that persons who had applied for asylum at the

UNHCR office in Almaty were being observed and that only strong international pressure on Kazakh authorities might prevent further abductions.<sup>40</sup>

◆ Lutfullo Shamsuddinov, a prominent human rights activist involved in the investigation of the Andijan events fled to Kazakhstan and applied for asylum at the UNHCR office. The Uzbek authorities, though, requested his extradition, accusing him of terrorism. After being held six days in detention by Kazakh authorities he was released in response to strong international pressure and left the country.<sup>41</sup>

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Transparency International Global Corruption Perception Index 2006, at [www.transparency.org/policy\\_and\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2005](http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005).

<sup>2</sup> Transparency International 2006 Annual Report, chapter on Kazakhstan, at [www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download\\_gcr#download](http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr#download).

<sup>3</sup> Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on OSCE/ODIHR/OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, European Parliament and the Council of Europe, *Presidential Election, Republic of Kazakhstan, International Election Observation Mission, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions*, 4 December 2005, at [www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2005/12/17232\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2005/12/17232_en.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, "Nazarbaev re-elected President in a Landslide," 4 December 2005, at [www.kazakhembus.com/ELECTION-2005.html](http://www.kazakhembus.com/ELECTION-2005.html).

<sup>5</sup> See IHF, *Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Europe, Central Asia and North America, Report 2005 (Events of 2004)*, at [www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc\\_summary.php?sec\\_id=3&d\\_id=4057](http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=3&d_id=4057).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> See also Freedom of the Media, below.

<sup>9</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Human Rights Overview: Kazakhstan," January 2006, at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/kazakh12287.htm>.

<sup>10</sup> For details, see IHF, *Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Europe, Central Asia and North America, Report 2005 (Events of 2004)*, at [www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc\\_summary.php?sec\\_id=3&d\\_id=4057](http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=3&d_id=4057).

<sup>11</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Human Rights Overview: Kazakhstan," January 2006, at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/kazakh12287.htm>.

<sup>12</sup> Adil Soz, "Ситуация со свободой слова в Казахстане в 2005 году. Аналитический доклад" (The situation of the freedom of expression in Kazakhstan in 2005, an analysis) 2006, at [www.adilsoz.kz/site.php?lan=russian&id=492](http://www.adilsoz.kz/site.php?lan=russian&id=492).



- <sup>13</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup> OSCE ODIHR Kazakhstan 2005 News Programs Analysis at [www.osce.org/LLLLKKK](http://www.osce.org/LLLLKKK).
- <sup>16</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Human Rights Overview: Kazakhstan," January 2006, at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/kazakh12287.htm>.
- <sup>17</sup> For further information, see IHF, *Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Europe, Central Asia and North America, Report 2005 (Events of 2004)*, at [www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc\\_summary.php?sec\\_id=3&d\\_id=4057](http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=3&d_id=4057).
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup> *Panorama*, "Представители НПО утверждают, что законопроекты о международных и иностранных некоммерческих организациях не соответствуют Конституции" (NGO representatives declare that the law projects of international and foreign non-commercial organizations do not respect Constitution), 22 July 2005, at [www.humanrights.kz/appeal\\_67.php](http://www.humanrights.kz/appeal_67.php).
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- <sup>22</sup> OSCE/ODIHR, *The Death Penalty in the OSCE Area – Background Paper*, October 2004, p. 22-23, [www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/09/3656\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/09/3656_en.pdf).
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- <sup>24</sup> See the chapter on Uzbekistan.
- <sup>25</sup> Forum 18, "KAZAKHSTAN: Religious Freedom Survey, December 2005," 8 December 2005, at [www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article\\_id=701](http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=701).
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- <sup>29</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup> Forum 18, "Kazakhstan: New 'national security' law contradicts itself," and Forum 18, "Kazakhstan: Fears over planned sweeping new restrictions on religion," 4 August and 12 April 2005, at [www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article\\_id=625](http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=625) and [www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article\\_id=542](http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=542).
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- <sup>38</sup> Forum 18, "Kazakhstan: Continued state hostility to independent Muslims and Hare Krishna devotees," 14 October 2005, at [www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article\\_id=671](http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=671).
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- <sup>40</sup> Memorial, "СПЕЦСЛУЖБЫ КАЗАХСТАНА ПЫТАЮТСЯ СКРЫТЬ СВОЮ ПРИЧАСТНОСТЬ К ПОХИЩЕНИЮ УЗБЕКСКИХ МУСУЛЬМАН," (Kazakh Secret Services try to cover up their involvement into the abduction of Uzbek Muslims), press release, 8 September 2005, at [www.memo.ru/hr/politpr/asia/2005/pres-uz/uz20051205.htm](http://www.memo.ru/hr/politpr/asia/2005/pres-uz/uz20051205.htm).
- <sup>41</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Human Rights Overview: Kazakhstan," at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/kazakh12287.htm>.