Afghanistan: The new national army strives to professionalize

9/21/07

A EurasiaNet photo essay by Sumit Dayal

Six years after the formation of the Afghan National Army, it remains difficult to assess its fighting capabilities. American military advisers believe it may take up to a decade before Afghan units are capable of carrying out independent operations.

Today, the Afghan army (ANA) is grappling with myriad challenges. The revival of the Taliban insurgency and rudimentary conditions at military facilities are believed to be major factors behind a roughly 30 percent desertion rate. Salaries are decent by Afghan standards – about US $90 per month – but, given the hazards, the pay doesn't appear to be enough to entice many soldiers to remain in the army. According to local news reports, less than 50 percent of ANA troops recently choose to re-enlist after finishing their initial three-year tours of duty.

The ANA has to make due with older weaponry, including adapted AK-47s assault rifles, most of them manufactured not in Russia, but in China and other Asian nations. Complaints are rife within the ranks that their weapons are not reliable. The ANA was originally projected to 70,000 troops by 2009, but given the difficulties of training, and then retaining soldiers, it appears that the goal will be difficult to reach.

Despite problems, the ANA has recorded several tangible and important achievements. Most importantly, it has succeeded in incorporating members of Afghanistan's various ethnic groups into its ranks. Overall, the ANA is generally deemed to be the most effective of all of Afghanistan's security forces. Morale within the police force, in contrast, is said to be flagging. Taliban raids in recent months have increasingly targeted the police. For example, Taliban insurgents attacked a police post September 19 in western Badghis Province. Four police officers and 20 militants were killed in the ensuing clash.

Afghan recruits go through basic training at The Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) in Pol-e-charki. The base, established in 2002, operates with financial and logistical assistance provided by US-led coalition forces. When training began at KMTC, France and United States alternated training all soldiers. Then in May 2003 the United States took over basic training for recruits, the UK conducted NCO training and the French conducted officer training.

American military officials say that any Western troop withdrawal cannot begin until the ANA and other Afghan security forces are able to function independently. The United States plans to spend $3.4 billion this fiscal year on army and police units here, according to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, the US-led military unit that supervises the training of Afghan recruits. Plans call for indigenous forces to grow to 132,000 soldiers and police officers, or even as many 152,000, from the present level of 100,000 – at least on paper.

While some experts have expressed concern about the sustainability of such a large number of troops and police over the long term, military officials and outside analysts say such force levels are required today. "Regardless of what happens in Afghanistan, the security forces need to be beefed up," said Steven Ross, a research consultant for the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "It was highly underinvested in the first years after 2001, and almost everyone sees the money coming in from the big supplemental as a positive."

Editor's Note: Sumit Dayal is a freelance photographer and writer who specializes in Afghanistan.