Nagorno-Karabakh; a decade of frustration in search of a negotiated peace

Haroutiun Khachatrian 5/12/04

On May 12, 1994, a ceasefire brought a halt to fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh, a conflict that embroiled Armenia and Azerbaijan and Karabakh Armenians. In the decade since then, the two countries, along with representatives of the unrecognized Karabakh Republic, have been unable to agree on a political settlement. Despite an increased international interest in promoting lasting peace, the near-term prospects for a Karabakh deal appear bleak.

In early 2004, international mediators, operating under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group, took action to reinvigorate the peace process, facilitating several top-level meetings of Armenian and Azerbaijani officials. In late April, for instance Armenian President Robert Kocharian met with his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev in Warsaw. And on May 12-13, the foreign ministers of the two countries were scheduled to meet on the sidelines of a Council of Europe gathering. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Amid the flurry of recent diplomatic activity, both Armenian and Azerbaijani officials have used terms such as "productive" to characterize the discussions. The Russian news agency Itar-Tass on April 30 quoted Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov as saying the presidential meeting in Warsaw featured "a useful exchange of opinion." No one, however, sounds optimistic that the existing deadlock will be broken any time soon.

Indeed, Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities in recent days have stressed that while they remain open to talks, their respective negotiating positions are unchanged: Yerevan will not accept any settlement that leaves Karabakh a constituent part of Azerbaijan; Baku will not consent to a deal in which Karabakh operates beyond the control of Azerbaijani authorities. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Baku also is pushing for Armenian forces to withdraw from occupied Azerbaijani lands before addressing a Karabakh settlement.

Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Markarian said on May 11 that Yerevan is seeking a "comprehensive" Karabakh solution that attaches no pre-conditions to peace talks. "We want this issue to be dealt with comprehensively, instead of having to vacate the [occupied Azerbaijani] lands and then discussing Nagorno-Karabakh's status," the Russian Itar-Tass news agency quoted Markarian as saying while on a visit to Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has grown increasingly frustrated with international mediation efforts. Aliyev said that the Minsk Group co-chairs "have to stop just observing" peace talks and do more to promote a settlement, the publication Baku Today reported on May 8. In recent months, Aliyev has repeatedly suggested that if the negotiating stalemate was not broken soon, then Azerbaijan would consider resorting again to force to resolve the Karabakh issue. Few political observers believe Aliyev would follow through on his threat, however, given that such action would likely prompt international sanctions. Military analysts also believe that Armenia's armed forces retain the ability to repulse a potential Azerbaijani offensive.

The Karabakh conundrum has its roots in the late Soviet era, a time when former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to restructure the Communist system unleashed pent-up nationalist feelings among ethnic minorities. Under the Communists, Karabakh existed as an administrative entity within Azerbaijan that was inhabited mainly by ethnic Armenians. In February 1988, the regional legislature debated the issue of Karabakh's transfer from Azerbaijani to Armenian jurisdiction. The transfer question sparked a chain reaction in which popular demonstrations in both Karabakh and Armenia were followed by anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan. In a flash, two peoples – Armenians and Azerbaijanis – who had co-existed in peace for decades, if not centuries, developed into mortal enemies.

In 1992, military operations engulfed Karabakh. At first, Azerbaijani forces held the upper hand. But in 1993 Karabakh Armenian forces, with considerable support from Yerevan, broke an Azerbaijani siege, and went on to occupy about 15 percent of Azerbaijani territory before the cease-fire brought military operations to a halt.

In trying to negotiate a permanent political solution, both Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders have found that they have less room for maneuver than expected. Attempts to forge Karabakh compromises have more often than not proved politically dangerous. The first such instance came in late 1997, when then-Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosian indicated that he might accept a political formula that would allow Karabakh to remain a part of Azerbaijan with strong security guarantees for the region's Armenian population. Ter-Petrosian immediately faced stiff opposition from hardliners within his administration, and, ultimately, was forced to resign. His successor, Robert Kocharian, was the political leader of Karabakh who led regional forces in defeating the Azerbaijani army in the early 1990s. Since assuming the Armenian presidency, Kocharian has been unswerving in his efforts to secure a settlement that leaves Karabakh outside of Azerbaijan.

So far, the closest the two countries have come to agreeing to a deal appears to have occurred in April 2001 during a round peace talks at the Florida resort island of Key West. Although nothing was ever formally announced, Azerbaijan's leader at the time, Heidar Aliyev, the now deceased father of Azerbaijan's incumbent president, reportedly agreed in Key West to a deal that would have severed Baku's administrative ties to Karabakh. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. When the elder Aliyev returned to Baku, however, he faced broad opposition to the proposed settlement terms. Accordingly, Baku backed away from the supposed Key West settlement parameters.

The question of whether or not Heidar Aliyev tentatively agreed to a deal in Key West remains politically sensitive for Baku. Azerbaijani officials claim the former president never made any actual commitments at Key West, while Armenian leaders insist that he did. Whatever the case, little progress on Karabakh peace talks has occurred since the Key West meeting, as the sides have been unable to set aside mutual suspicion to restart a substantive dialogue.

Editor's Note: Haroutiun Khachatrian is a Yerevan-based writer specializing in economic and political affairs.

Posted May 12, 2004 © Eurasianet