

# SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019

EXECUTIVE  
SUMMARY

A FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING SOCIAL  
COHESION WITH SYRIANS IN TURKEY

*Prof. Dr. M. Murat ERDOĞAN*

**SB**  
2019

Photo: Emrah Gürel

Syrians Barometer-2019 is one of the most comprehensive field-studies on the subject of Syrians in Turkey conducted simultaneously with the Turkish society and Syrians. Planned to be repeated every year, the research aims to understand and analyze the social encounters, opinions, attitudes, anxieties, expectations and, most importantly, perceptions through comprehensive surveys and focus group meetings. It also attempts at observing the trends of change and suggesting policy recommendations regarding these.

Included in this Executive Summary are SB-2019's **General Framework - Main Findings - Policy Recommendations - Research Profile.**

The full Syrian Barometer-2019 study, including 23 figures and 130 tables, is available in Turkish, English, and Arabic at:  
[www.tagu.tau.edu.tr](http://www.tagu.tau.edu.tr)  
<https://www.unhcr.org/tr>



# SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019

PROJECT DIRECTOR / REPORTING:

**PROF. DR. M. MURAT ERDOĞAN**

PROJECT COORDINATOR: **DR. ONUR UNUTULMAZ**

PROJECT OFFICER FOR SYRIANS / EXPERT: **TÜLİN HAJİ MOHAMAD**

EXPERT: **DR. YEŞİM YILMAZ**

EXPERT: **DENİZ AYDINLI**

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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayselin YILDIZ, Yaşar Üniversitesi

## UNHCR ANKARA TEAM

### ANAR RESEARCH:

İbrahim USLU

Mithat KAHVECİ \* Funda USLU \* Müzeyyen BUZLU \* Ahmet BABAĞLU \* Oğuz GÜNEŞ

## DESIGN & TRANSLATION

Executive Summary Design & Back Cover Design: Yavuz UZUNAL

Cover Design: Ayla SEZGÜ

Translation from Turkish to English: Dr. Onur UNUTULMAZ

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*This study was commissioned by UNHCR. The study reflects the personal views of the author, which may not necessarily be shared by UNHCR, and UNHCR may not be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.*

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Photo: Nor Prickett

# Justification Framework

**SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019**


**1**

As the anti-administration demonstrations that started in March 2011 spiraled out of control and turned into a civil war encompassing all of Syria, the tragedy surrounding the plight of Syrians who had to escape from their countries to save their lives and sought asylum in neighboring countries has been continuing over 9 years. The number of Syrians who escaped out of the country, which had a national population of 22.5 million in 2011, has surpassed 6.6 million. Additionally, there are around 7 million displaced people within Syria.


Sharing 911 km of land border with Syria, one of the most significantly affected actors from this immense crisis is Turkey. The first mass movement of Syrians into Turkey took place with the arrival of a group of

252 individuals through the Cilvegözü border gate in Hatay, following which the mass movement of Syrian refugees into the country has continued, although in less intensity after 2016, thanks to the “open door policy” implemented by Turkey. According to the official figures provided by the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the number of Syrians “under temporary protection” is 3.576.370 as of 31 December 2019. This figure, which corresponds to 4,36% of Turkey’s national population of 82.003.882, displays a tendency to increase -albeit on a smaller scale compared to previous years. This increasing tendency is due mostly to the natural population growth (by births) of the Syrian community and despite those Syrians who acquired Turkish citizenship or voluntarily returned to Syria over the years.

SB-2019-FIGURE: Syrian Refugees by Country of Residence (6.6 Million / 31 December 2019)



**SB-2019-FIGURE:** Number of Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey, 2011-2019




	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
TOTAL NUMBER OF SYRIANS	14,237	224,655	1,519,286	2,503,549	2,824,441	3,426,786	3,623,192	3,576,370
NET NUMBER OF SYRIANS BY EACH YEAR	14,237	210,418	1,294,631	984,263	330,892	592,345	196,406	-46,822
POPULATION OF TURKEY	73.7	74.7	75.6	76.6	77.7	78.7	80.8	82.0
SYRIANS AS % OF TURKEY'S POPULATION	0,01	0,3	2,00	3,26	3,63	4,35	4,48	4,36

Source: DGMM: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (Access: 05.01.2020)

Although Turkey is no stranger to migration and refugee movements, the recent experience with Syrians is unprecedented in terms of its scale and how quickly it had unfolded. In fact, while the number of individuals under international protection in the country was 58 thousand, by the end of 2014 the figure reached millions making Turkey the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world. With the issue of Syrian refugees perceived to be ever so intimately linked to the political developments in Syria, neither the Turkish public nor the political authorities nor the Syrian refugees themselves had predicted that the process would unfold in this way with millions of refugees ending up staying in Turkey for many years. That's why no settlement policy had been adopted. Until 2013, an effort was made to ensure the settlement of Syrians in the camps set up along the border regions. With the increasing numbers and capacities strained, it had become inevitable to let Syrians move to other parts of Turkey. Thus, started a new sociological phase. Around 90% Syrians have become "urban refugees", settling all across different towns and cities around Turkey and living side by side with the Turkish society largely with their own accord. Currently, 98,3% so Syrians in Turkey live outside of camps.


**SYRIANS IN TURKEY (31 December 2019)**



**SB-2019-FIGURE:** Syrians in Turkey by Status

29 April 2020, marked the 9th anniversary of the arrival of first Syrians in mass groups in Turkey, where the average duration of their stay exceeded 5 years. Because of the continuing war and the environment of violence that is becoming chronic in their country as well as the significant destruction these had brought on the country and other political and security-related problems, Syrians' future prospects of returning to Syria have become uncertain. While their return is becoming more complicated, Syrians' lives in Turkey tend to become normalized in every facet. This is evident by the facts that a vast majority of Syrians are "urban refugees" living side by side with the Turkish society all around the country, at least 535 thousand

**SB-2019-FIGURE: Top 10 Cities in Turkey with Syrian Residents (31.10.2019)**




Source: DGMM: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (Access: 05.01.2020)

Syrian babies were born in Turkey, Syrians are actively involved in the working life with around 1 million Syrians working, up to 680 thousand Syrian children are enrolled to Turkish public schools with 33 thousand Syrian students at Turkish universities, and they are making their livelihood in Turkey largely themselves. While it is difficult to predict what the future will hold for Syrians in Turkey, the observable sociological fact is that the lives that they have established over the years here and the hopelessness regarding the situation in

Syria deeply affected their plans for the future. It is seen that the Turkish society and Syrians ended up having to live together irrespective of either side's expectations or desires. As their possibilities, motivations, and tendencies for returning to Syria has been weakened, there is a significant need for planning as well as developing effective policies in social, political, and security fields.

**SB-2019-FIGURE: Syrian Residents as Percentage of City Population–December 2019**  
(Cities that have either 100 thousand Syrians or more than Turkey's average)





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# Syrians Barometer: A Framework For Achieving Social Cohesion With Syrians In Turkey

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SYRIANS BAROMETER (SB) research is conceived of as a regularly held study to be simultaneously conducted on Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey, whose number has exceeded 3,5 million as of 31 December 2019, and the Turkish society. Structured as a continuation of two previous studies, "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration" published in 2014 and "Syrians Barometer: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey" published in 2017; the study aims to measure and analyze the views, opinions, and attitudes of both Syrians in Turkey and the Turkish society. It is planned to repeat this study, which is the most comprehensive study on social cohesion in this field and the main objective of which is to provide a "a framework for achieving social cohesion with Syrians in Turkey", once every year.

SB research is expected both to provide reliable data on a regular basis to public institutions, researchers, academics, civil society organizations, international organizations, and other interested parties; and to serve as a resource for empirical data-based policies. SB attempts to remain outside of the political discussions as much as possible and to draw attention to the social reality between Syrians and the Turkish society. In addition, it aims to examine the mutual perceptions and, more importantly, to track, measure, and analyze the transformation/development in the perceptions. It is in this context that the experiences, foresights, expectations, anxieties, collaborations, and social cohesion processes are examined and analyzed, within the inevitable limitations of a social science research. Undoubtedly, the findings, which come from the comprehensive surveys and focus group meetings and which are used as the basis of analysis

here, cannot be fully generalized. In other words, what is presented here as the views of the "Turkish society" or "Syrians in Turkey" are obviously the views of the participants of this research and can only be related to the wider populations in a limited manner. In the same way, neither the findings that are based on the empirical data nor the analysis and interpretation that are conducted based on these findings are or can be presented as "the truth".

One of the areas of integration discussions created by mass human mobilizations is related to the "public" sphere, in other words, to the state's preferences, capacity and practices. But more important for the issue of integration is the societal sphere. **Syrians Barometer** study, by mainly focusing on the area of society, aims at investigating a social situation, making empirical observations, and providing a framework on "integration". **This study defines integration as "the way of life in which different communities, whether came together voluntarily or involuntarily, could live in peace and harmony on a common ground of belonging where pluralism is embraced in a framework of mutual acceptance and respect."** The study preferred to engage with the empirical findings of the field study and to underline the essential significance of perceptions and social acceptance for integration, instead of elaborating theoretical discussions on the issue.

The surveys and focus group meetings of SB-2019 research were conducted in April-August 2019. In the face of dynamic nature of the process, during the course of time, there has been very significant developments concerning the subject matter of this study. However, the findings of the study naturally reflect and represent the context of the time that the data was collected.



Photo: M. Murat Erdoğan

# **SB-2019**

## **Main Findings**

**SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019**

**2**


**T**he main findings of SB-2019, which were also evaluated in comparison to SB-2017 and 2014 studies where relevant, can be summarized as follows:

- ▶ Even though the high level of support and solidarity displayed by the Turkish society towards Syrians continues, **there appears to be a considerable decrease in the level of this acceptance and solidarity, with an increase in society's anxieties.** In other words, the acceptance of Turkish society has largely turned into **"toleration"**.
- ▶ The claim of high level of social acceptance depends on the facts that: the past 9 years of living together were largely smooth and peaceful, politicization of the issue had been to a very limited extent, there were no significant reactions in practice against Syrians from the mainstream society, Syrians have managed to open up some space in every facet of life for themselves, and they appear to feel safer and more content with their lives in Turkey every passing day.
- ▶ It can be suggested that Turkish society's support towards Syrians, which remained strong

for a long time, has significantly been eroded. **The growing anxieties** among society concerning Syrians are also causing **an increasing politicization of the process.**

- ▶ The **hopes and determinations of Syrians in Turkey to return is diminishing** partly because of the fact that the war and instability is still going on in Syria. **Equally important**, the normalization of the lives they have established over the years in Turkey is **strengthening the tendency to stay permanently.**
- ▶ Despite prolonged and in many ways naturalizing experience of living together, it is striking to see that Turkish society's **social distance** is growing. According to the social distance measurement scales developed by E. S. Bogardus, there appears to be a significant divergence in the way the Turkish society perceives Syrians and in the way Syrians perceive the Turkish society. While the Turkish society displays a remarkably high level of "social distance" towards Syrians which is measured at a score of **-0,51 ("distant")**, Syrians were found to take a much more positive position towards the Turkish society with a social distance score of **+0,74 ("very close")**. Compared to SB-2017, the social distance has grown among Turkish society and shrank among Syrians in SB-2019.

SB-2019-TABLE: Social Distance Measurements in Comparison



► The **importance of a sense of cultural closeness** or affinity becomes more pronounced during **times of crisis**, especially in the beginning. This has certainly been the case concerning Syrians in Turkey, the notion of “*Ensar-Muhacir*” solidarity was invoked frequently with religious and cultural references. In other words, it may be suggested that the religious and cultural factors have had a significant place in the support that the Turkish society displayed towards Syrians. However, when the context moved past being an emergency through time, the numbers grew beyond being “manageable” and prospects of a permanent cohabitation became more prominent, these cultural referents appear to have started to lose their traction and even be replaced by an attitude of otherization.

**The Turkish society that enthusiastically showed solidarity with people who were in a difficult position, rejects a common future and permanent cohabitation by clearly stating that it is not ready for such an eventuality** through its anxieties and demands.

► The perception of “**cultural closeness**” is very different among the Turkish society than it is among Syrians, just like it was the case with the perception of social distance. Among the Turkish society, the rate of those who disagreed with the statement that there is cultural closeness between Syrians and the Turkish society has grown from 80,2% in SB-2017 to **81,9%** in SB-2019. The same figure was found to be 70,6% in 2014. This shows that there is

**SB-2019-TABLE:** To what extent do you think Syrians in Turkey are culturally similar to us? (SB-2017/SB-2019)

TURKS	SB-2017		SB-2019				
	#	%	#	%			
They are not similar at all	853	40,8	80,2	80,2	1147	50,5	81,9
They are not similar	823	39,4			712	31,4	
They are neither similar, nor not similar	185	8,9	8,9	8,9	196	8,6	8,6
They are similar	152	7,3	7,8	7,8	153	6,7	7,0
They are very similar	10	0,5			7	0,3	
No idea/ No response	66	3,1	3,1	3,1	56	2,5	2,5
<b>Total</b>	<b>2089</b>	<b>100,0</b>			<b>2271</b>	<b>100,0</b>	

**SB-2019-TABLE:** To what extent do you think Syrians are culturally similar to Turks?

SYRIANS	SB-2017		SB-2019				
	#	%	#	%			
Not similar at all	71	8,0	23,9	23,9	51	3,6	21,9
Not similar	141	15,9			259	18,3	
Neither similar, nor not similar	140	15,8	15,8	15,8	281	19,8	19,8
Similar	417	47,0	56,8	56,8	669	47,2	57,1
Very similar	87	9,8			141	9,9	
No idea/ No response	31	3,5	3,5	3,5	17	1,2	1,2
<b>Total</b>	<b>887</b>	<b>100,0</b>			<b>1.418</b>	<b>100,0</b>	

a trend of increase in Turkish society's objection to the existence of a cultural closeness. In contrast, a majority of Syrians (**56,8%**) believe that Syrians are culturally similar to the Turkish society.

- ▶ The large and growing number of Syrians leaves different effects on the Turkish society and Syrians in Turkey. The Turkish society is increasingly concerned in the face of rising numbers in terms of security problems, expenses, disruption in public services, loss of identity, and "uncontrollability". From Syrians' perspective, however, even though there is considerable cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity inside; a growing Syrian community means a stronger Syrian identity in Turkey and growing solidarity networks. These networks provide Syrians with a secure space to establish and sustain their lives within "their own society". These growing networks and solidarity within may exacerbate the anxieties among the local society. It may be suggested that, despite growing and increasingly more vocal anxieties among Turkish society, the main reason why Syrians appear to become more content, happier, and more confident is the increasing numbers and growing networks.
- ▶ **The determination of Syrians to return to Syria is quickly running out.** While the percentage of Syrians who stated that "they do not plan to return to Syria under any circumstances" was 16,7% in SB-2017, the same percentage has risen to 51,8% in SB-2019. In the same way, the share of Syrians who said "I would return to Syria if the war ends and an administration as we desire is established" was %59,6 in SB-2017, while the same group only makes up 30,3% of the Syrian respondents in SB-2019. All the data collected from the field shows that the desire/tendency of Syrians to return has significantly shrunk in the last two years.
- ▶ **The future plans of Syrians are increasingly becoming independent of the developments within Syria.** This appears to mean that, even if a solution is quickly reached in Syria, it will have a limited effect on Syrians' tendency to return.
- ▶ The SB study shows that a part of Turkish society's anxieties and complaints concerning the Syrians stems from **incomplete and incorrect information and partly perceptions.** While underlining the need for a reliable and regular communication strategy towards the Turkish society, this situation appears to constitute a significant handicap for social cohesion.
- ▶ The views of the Turkish society on how the Syrians make their living in Turkey exemplifies the problems with misinformation and managing the perceptions. According to the Turkish society, Syrians are making their livings **through the support of the Turkish state (84,5%) or "begging"**. However, despite minor exceptions and the 1.5 million beneficiaries of the 120 TL SUY assistance and in the absence of any continuous and regular income, Syrians earn their living in Turkey through working.
- ▶ A general societal anxiety usually experienced in response to mass human mobility is native society's **fear of losing work in the face of the incoming cheap labor power.** However, the SB research demonstrates that this anxiety is, strikingly, not considered to be among the top concerns for the Turkish society. The existing 9-year experience has shown that the loss of jobs remained quite limited.
- ▶ **Even though Syrians were given the right to apply for work permits since January 2016, it appears that they mostly work in the informal economy.** One of the most important structural problems of the Turkish economy, **informality**, on the one hand, **caused Syrians to work in an insecure and difficult working environment for very low wages**; on the other hand, it has been important in keeping a **high level of social acceptance and played a crisis-preventing role** in Turkey in the short-term through letting Syrians have access to paid work **while limiting the level of job loss because of Syrians to a minimum.**
- ▶ Among 12 years old or older Syrians, **38,7% in SB-2017 and 37,9% in SB-2019 suggested that they were actively working under difficult conditions** to make a living. Also confirmed by the ILO study, SB findings suggest that there are around 1 million Syrians who are actively working in Turkey. Among these Syrians who mostly find themselves a space in the informal economy, the share of those who have **continuous and regular employment appears to be 50,2%**. While the share of those who work at **casual (day-to-day) work is 33,6%**, those who suggest that they are **self-employed or employers is 13,7%**. These findings, in fact, show that the **economic integration process** has significantly been underway.

**SB-2019-TABLE:** How are the Syrians in Turkey making their living? (Multiple Responses)

		SB-2017		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%
1	Through assistance from the Turkish state	1.801	86,2	1.918	84,5
2	By begging	1.359	65,1	1.231	54,2
3	By working	1.040	49,8	1.155	50,9
4	Through support from charitable people	666	31,9	478	21,0
5	Through NGO (associations/foundations) support	170	8,1	218	9,6
6	Through support from international organizations/ foreign states	101	4,8	181	8,0
7	Other	-	-	22	1,0
	No idea/ No response	19	0,9	31	1,4

**SB-2019-TABLE:** Have you received assistance from any institution or individual in the last 12 months to make your family's living?

	SB-2017		SB-2019	
	#	%	#	%
Yes	195	22,0	515	36,3
No	684	77,1	896	63,2
No idea /No response	8	0,9	7	0,5
<b>Total</b>	<b>887</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>1.418</b>	<b>100,0</b>

**SB-2019-TABLE:** SB-2019 PROFILE OF WORKING STATUS AMONG SYRIANS

Working Status of Interviewed Individuals (18 + year-olds)				Working Status of Individuals in the Households (12+ year-olds)			
		#	%			#	%
1	Working	774	54,6	1	Working	1.648	37,9
2	Housewife	426	30,0	2	Housewife	1.420	32,7
3	Unemployed	121	8,5	3	Student	635	14,6
4	Unable to work/ disabled or old	62	4,4	4	Unemployed	451	10,4
5	Student	32	2,3	5	Unable to work/ disabled or old	182	4,2
6	Retired	3	0,2	6	Retired	7	0,2
<b>Total</b>		<b>1.418</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>Total</b>		<b>4.343</b>	<b>100,0</b>

- ▶ It is observed that the Turkish society identifies Syrians largely using **negative concepts**. While the Turkish society overwhelmingly identified Syrians as “victims who escaped war/persecution” in SB-2014 and SB-2017, this response was pushed down to the fourth place in SB-2019 and the most frequently stated identification became “dangerous people who will cause a lot of trouble for us in the future”.
- ▶ After more than eight years, almost 80% of the Turkish respondents are sure that at least half of the Syrians will remain in Turkey. However, despite the common response of “they will be permanent here”, it can be said that **the will to live together is very weak, meaning that there is a “reluctant acceptance” among the Turkish society regarding Syrians.**
- ▶ There is a **significant divergence between the answers given by the Turkish society and the Syrians to the similarly framed questions concerning “integration”, which has shown how emotional and subjective the issue of integration is.** When asked “To what extent the Syrians have been integrated to the Turkish society/Turkey?”, only 13,2% of the Turkish respondents stated that Syrians were either “completely” or “to a great extent” integrated. In contrast, when the same question was directed at them, a total of **51,6% of the Syrian respondents suggested that integration has taken place either “completely” or “to a large extent”.**
- ▶ In response to the question “Among the top 10 most important problems of Turkey, where would you place the Syrians?”, it appears that **more than 60% of the**

**SB-2019-TABLE:** Do you believe that Syrians in Turkey will return to their country when the war is over?

		SB-2017		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%
1	None of them will return	793	38,0	1.106	48,7
2	Even if some of them return, majority of them will remain in Turkey	679	32,5	674	29,7
3	Half of them will return, half of them will stay	238	11,4	203	8,9
4	Majority of them will return, less than half will stay	189	9,0	145	6,4
5	Almost all of them will return, only few will stay	141	6,7	63	2,8
6	All of them will return	-	-	42	1,8
	No idea/ No response	49	2,4	38	1,7
<b>Total</b>		<b>2.089</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>2.271</b>	<b>100,0</b>

**SB-2019-TABLE:** To what extent would you agree with the following statement? (%)

“We can live together with Syrians in serenity”									
	Completely disagree	Disagree	COMBINED DISAGREE	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	COMBINED AGREE	No idea/ No response	SCORE (out of 5)
<b>SB-2017</b>	70,8	11,8	82,6	7,0	7,7	0,9	8,6	1,8	1,9
<b>SB-2019</b>	46,5	28,5	75,0	11,8	10,3	1,1	11,4	1,8	1,5



respondents consider the issue to be among the top 3 most important problems of the country.

► It is obvious that **there is a strong resistance among the Turkish society against giving political rights**

**out of the 7 proposed problem areas** and that the share of those who suggest that they consider “discrimination” as a problem is 21,1% while the percentage of those who don’t consider it as a problem is 61,8% **can be seen as a cause for optimism.**

**SB-2019-TABLE:** To what extent have Syrians integrated into Turkish society/Turkey?

TURKS	#	%
Completely	52	2,3
To a large extent	248	10,9
Partially	452	19,9
To a little extent	413	18,2
None at all	1050	46,2
No idea/ No response	56	2,5
<b>Total</b>	<b>2271</b>	<b>100,0</b>

**SB-2019-TABLE:** To what extent have the Syrians integrated into Turkey/Turkish society?

SYRIANS	#	%
Completely	119	8,4
To a great extent	613	43,2
Partially	523	36,9
To a very little extent	95	6,7
Not at all	25	1,8
No idea/ No response	43	3,0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1418</b>	<b>100,0</b>

**to Syrians.** The question “How should the issue of granting citizenship to the Syrians be regulated?” was responded with 75,8% in SB-2017 and 76,5% in SB-2019 of the respondents suggesting “None of them should be granted citizenship”.

► The responses received for the question that asked Syrians to what extent they experience problems in the spheres of **working conditions, communication, accommodation, nutrition, discrimination, health, and education** show that there was a decrease in the problems in SB-2019 compared to SB-2017. This suggests that **with their problems getting smaller, Syrians’ satisfaction in Turkey is growing. The fact that Syrians placed “discrimination” at the 5th place**

► The positive outlook given by the Syrians concerning their life in Turkey, despite increasing reactions among the Turkish society, can be associated with the Turkish society not significantly reflecting its anxieties onto the Syrians and/or with the fact Syrians are living in such an inward-looking manner, they are unaware of the criticisms and anxieties voiced by the Turkish society concerning them.

► **The area in which Syrians experience most problems is “working conditions” (36,2%).** Similar to what has been found in SB-2017, the SB-2019 findings also suggest that the area with which **Syrians in Turkey are most satisfied with is “health services”.** It is in-

**SB-2019-TABLE:** To what extent would you agree with the following statements regarding the situation of Syrians in Turkey? (Score)

	SB-2017	SB-2019
Syrians want to obtain citizenship	3,5	3,4
Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	3,0	3,2
Syrians want to stay in Turkey	2,7	3,1
Syrians are happy in Turkey	2,7	3,0
Syrians want to go to another country	2,6	2,8
Syrians are getting what their labor deserves	2,2	2,6
Syrians can get work easily	2,2	2,6
Turks are exploiting Syrians	2,8	2,3
Syrians are excluded in Turkey	2,5	2,3
Syrians don’t like Turks	2,3	2,0

■ 0-2,99    ■ 3,0-5,0

interesting to note that, in all areas the number of those who suggest experiencing problems is smaller than the number of those who suggest otherwise. In addition, there appears to be an improvement in each problem area.

- ▶ SB-2019 included several statements that were developed to give some indications concerning the **future prospects/permanency perspectives of Syrians** in Turkey. While the statement "The Syrians would like to stay in Turkey" brought 54% agreement ("I agree" 48,1%, "I completely agree" 5,9%), the combined share of "I disagree" and "I completely disagree" was only 8%.

It is an obvious finding of both SB-2017 and SB-2019 that there is a very high number of Syrians who have a positive perspective on obtaining **citizenship** in Turkey. When presented with the statement that "Syrians would like to obtain Turkish citizenship", the percentage of respondents who "agreed" and "completely agreed" was 65,6% in 2017 and 63,4% in 2019. The share of those who disagreed with this statement has decreased from 12,4% in 2017 to 5,7% in 2019. 57,7% of Syrians in Turkey would like to be a double citizen, while 22,6% would like to have only Turkish citizenship. In combination, it can be suggested that **the percentage of Syrians who demand Turkish citizenship is 78,3%**.

**SB-2019-TABLE:** In general, which one of the following statements better explains your attitude on returning to Syria?<sup>145</sup>

	SB-2017		SB-2019	
	#	%	#	%
I do not plan to return to Syria under any circumstances	148	16,7	735	51,8
I would return if the war in Syria ends and if an administration we want is formed	529	59,6	429	30,3
I would return if the war ends in Syria, even if an administration we want is not formed	114	12,9	78	5,5
I would return if a safe zone is created in Syria	-	-	83	5,9
I would return even if the war continues in Syria	19	2,1	3	0,2
No idea/ I don't know	46	5,2	64	4,5
No response	31	3,5	26	1,8
<b>Total</b>	<b>887</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>1418</b>	<b>100,0</b>

**SB-2019-TABLE:** Which status would you want to have in Turkey?

		SB-2017*		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%
1	Dual citizenship-both Syrian and Turkish	376	61,8	818	57,7
2	Only Turkish citizenship	51	8,4	320	22,6
3	Refugee status/under temporary protection status	95	15,6	140	9,9
4	Same as my current status	35	5,8	45	3,2
5	Long term/unlimited residence permit	21	3,5	9	0,6
6	Work permit	13	2,1	-	-
	No response	17	2,8	86	6,0
<b>Total</b>		<b>608</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>1418</b>	<b>100,0</b>

- ▶ Some hints were sought after concerning “how happy” the Syrians in Turkey are. In SB-2017, the percentage of those who “agreed” and “completely agreed” with the statement that “**Syrians are happy in Turkey**” was 33,7%. In SB-2019 this figure has increased to 48,1%. In the same way, while the total share of those who “disagreed” and “completely disagreed” with this statement was 21,9% in SB-2017, it has dropped to 16,4% in SB-2019. Both changes indicate that Syrians increasingly believe that their communities are happier in Turkey and there is a trend in the positive direction.
  - ▶ Concerning the support and services provided by the Turkish state in 5 essential fields (health, education, accommodation, nutrition, and financial), the share of those who find them “sufficient” and “very sufficient” was 28,6% in SB-2017, while it has increased to 34,9% in SB-2019. In both studies, the highest degree of satisfaction was mentioned in “health” services with 72% in SB-2017 and 71.8% in SB-2019.
  - ▶ It is important to look at **the reasons why Syrians do not plan to return**. The survey asked the question that “*What are the 3 most important reasons for you to not plan returning to Syria?*” and respondents were given the chance of providing multiple responses. On the top spot was the response “*because it is not a safe place*” (42,9%). A related and similar answer was at the second place which was “*because the war is still continuing*” with a 31,2% share amongst all the answers. In other words, **the strongest reasons people have for not considering return are related to security**. In response to the question “*Under what circumstances would you consider to return?*”, the most frequently provided answer was “*if the war came to an end*” with 31,6%. It was followed by “*When Syria becomes a safe country*” (21,3%), “*If there is a safe zone*” (10,2%), “*If I find a job there*” (5,3%), “*If the current administration is replaced / the regime changes / stability is achieved*” (7,5%), and “*If I own a house*” (4,5%).
  - ▶ The tendency of Syrians to resettle in a third country was also inquired by the question “*Would you like to move to and settle in a country other than Turkey and Syria?*”. Also using multiple answers, the **most frequently given response to this question with 58,6% was “I definitely would not”**. The share of this response was 65,8% in SB-2017. In other words, it can be said that the idea of conditional movement suggested by other options has grown. All findings appear to show that the rate of those who would be willing to go if opportunities, i.e. legal channels, are established has increased.
  - ▶ Syrians were asked the question “*Do you believe that there is a future in Turkey for yourself, your family and other Syrians?*”. The findings suggest that Syrians believe that there is future in Turkey for themselves and for their families with over 60% of the respondents answering affirmatively.
- How the Syrians perceive and evaluate the attitude of Turkish society towards them is also very important. Responded with “multiple answers”, the reactions to the question “*In your opinion, how does the Turkish society treat Syrians?*” indicate a generally positive context. These findings suggest that the reactions, anxieties, and even the rejection of the Turkish society regarding the Syrians “do not reach” them. In other words, even though it is uncomfortable and concerned, the Turkish society doesn’t significantly project these on the Syrians and still provides a space for a peaceful environment. In fact, this finding can be seen as a strong indicator that the Turkish society still retains a significant level of social acceptance towards over 3,5 million Syrians, who constitute nearly 5% of the national population. In addition to this, it can be suggested that the “lack of information” or “apathy” deriving from living within their own community networks and emerging “ghettoes” might have prevented Syrians being aware of the discomfort that the Turkish society discursively expresses.
- Sustainability of social acceptance requires effort both from the social groups (Turkish society and Syrians) and from the public institutions.** It should not be forgotten that the mutual perceptions and positions can be quite fragile, and that the positive picture might instantaneously shatter under the influence of major social, economic, and political developments.

- Dün ne yaptın?

- Bütün gün çalıştım.

- İşveriş yapmadın mı?

- Evet, yapmıştım.

- Annim yoktu.

- Nereye gittin?

- Annem, ama Veli

- Nereye gitti?

- Korkuyor.

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6. Doktor - Niçin önce gel.....?

Atilla - Çünkü tatile git.....?

Doktor - İlaç al.....?

Atilla - Bir ilaç kullan.....?

7. Murat - Kediler nerede?

Leyla - Bahçede.

Murat - Yemek ye.....?

Leyla - Evet, yemek ver.....?

8. Ali - Pardon, gazeteyi

oku.....?

Veli - Oku....., buyurun!

Ali - Ben de oku....., ama

bir habere tekrar bakmak

istiyorum.

Dilek - Alo, Tuncay. Annemler

gel.....?

Tuncay - Yok, hâlâ gel.....?

- Ara.....?

- Telefon et....., iki saat

sonra geliyorlar.

- Ben ne yap.....?

- Ben ne yap.....?

- Ben ne yap.....?

- Ben ne yap.....?

- Ben ne yap.....?

- Ben ne yap.....?

- Ben ne yap.....?

- Ben ne yap.....?

- Ben ne yap.....?

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# **SB-2019**

# **Policy Recommendations**

**SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019**

**3**

**T**he Syrian Barometer study aims to take a scientific snapshot on Syrian refugees, who caused what can be termed “a social shock” for Turkey due to its development, volume and duration. Depending on this snapshot, it aims to provide policy recommendations. Its main objective in this sense is to prevent this “social shock” from turning into a trauma and chronic problem which would lead to social segregation and conflict, and to contribute into drawing a framework for a peaceful and honorable cohabitation. What is recommended here as “integration” is used not in a hierarchical and ideologically-biased way, but is meant to refer to “an honorable life together in peace and serenity” that would be established by a rights and individual oriented approach.

In this context, depending on the findings of SB-2019 research, the main policy recommendations for various policy fields could be presented as follows:

- ▶ **To move beyond the “temporariness-permanence” duality and to focus on the social reality:** What has started in April 2011 with the arrival of first Syrian groups to Turkey, and was seen to be “temporary” by all parties, has undergone a significant sociological transformation through time. More than 3,5 million Syrians are now living all across the country, in mostly urban places, and their presence is felt in every facet of life in Turkey. **Turkey’s policy on Syrians needs to be revised in a way that is independent from the developments in Syria. The current situation shows that the social, political, and economic costs can only be minimized by developing “medium- and long-term policies” and advanced planning, instead of short-term policies built on “temporariness” with a “problem-solving” mentality.**
- ▶ **The social acceptance, which is fragile and in a trend of running out, needs to be strengthened:** It is necessary to intensify the efforts to strengthen the level of social acceptance in the Turkish society and make it sustainable, without disregarding its anxieties. **Policies need to be strengthened and diversified for a peaceful life together,** which should, most importantly, target and encompass not only the Syrians but also the Turkish society
- ▶ **“Cultural closeness” may play a role for solidarity in the beginning but as time passes numerical size becomes the determinant:** Although it is a fact that religious and cultural affinity exists between the Turkish society and Syrians, society’s perception on this can change with increasing numbers. Building integration on cultural closeness may be unrealistic and such emotional statements based on the similarity and closeness of the communities may not be found to be satisfying by either of them. **Integration policies concerning Syrians should be built on rights, norms, and the centrality of individual, while taking into consideration of the capacity of the country and the characteristics of the newcomers.**
- ▶ It is necessary to **develop medium- and long-term, dynamic, and multi optional models, while considering the developments in Syria and in Turkey, for the more than 3,5 million Syrians in Turkey.**
- ▶ **A communication strategy based on comprehensive and accurate information should be developed:** SB studies have shown that a large part of the negative opinions and attitudes concerning Syrians among the Turkish society are based on misleading or incomplete information. It is essential for the Turkish society and the Syrians to be regularly informed about the process using accurate and reliable information. **An effective communication strategy based on accurate data** would fight against misinformation and gossiping, which spread very quickly and often through the social media. Such a communication strategy would also be important in terms of bringing **transparency** to the subject.
- ▶ **Integration policies are risky, they encourage permanency; but if prospects of permanency are already strong, postponing integration policies are risky:** Adopting integration policies for temporary immigrants and especially refugees is not a popular choice for many countries because of the uncertainties surrounding the process and because it is believed that integration policies “encourage permanency”. If the developments, research studies, and analyses, like SB, provide strong indications that Syrians will stay in Turkey, then, integration policies are an essential requirement, not a preference,

for the creation of an honorable and peaceful common life and for preventing many potential problems in social and political realms.

▶ **Which model of integration, which actor(s)?:**

The issue of integration is extremely complex and while there appears to be certain principles, there is no agreed upon model whose effectiveness is proven everywhere. There are three known actors in terms of integration: the state, the host-local society, and the “newcomers”. The state’s role is mostly determining the statuses, making the strategic decisions, and managing the process in the public space. Even if the state determines the course and implement its strategy, integration essentially takes place between communities. Therefore, unless the host society is convinced and it displays a certain level of social acceptance, integration cannot take place solely by the initiative of the state. In this context, Turkey needs to develop integration policies based on rights and peace considering its capacity, experiences, and needs.

▶ **Local integration processes need to be strengthened:**

As the saying goes “If the crisis is local, its solution is also local”. Integration processes should be managed on the basis of local integration. This requires not only opening a legal space for the local governments, especially the municipalities, but also transferring financial and other resources for the foreigners that live within their boundaries. Giving the authority without giving the resources could constitute a serious risk concerning social cohesion.

▶ **It is necessary for Turkey to move from an understanding of short-term “projects” in its process management to a long-term and strategically-driven process management:**

It has taken some time for Turkey to develop a strategy concerning Syrians due to the dynamism of the process, shortcomings in its institutional capacity, and various external factors. If a long-term strategic document will be prepared with the central foresight that a large part of Syrians will stay in Turkey, it needs to embrace a pluralistic and transparent approach. **The strategy that Turkey will develop based on its own priorities and capacity will open**

**the way for coherently using external resources within this strategy. In this way, the chaotic context of disconnected projects can be avoided, more resources can be attracted through coordinated projects that will serve specific aspects of the general strategy, and the funds will be used more efficiently. In other words, instead of projects built on short-term solutions, a period of strategically driven, well-coordinated should start.**

▶ **A “developmental approach” should lead the way: Whether it is desired or not, the very likely prospects of cohabitation**

should be built upon a developmental approach that structures this cohabitation in a way that would contribute to every segment in society. In case immigrants and asylum-seekers become settled in the country, policies developed on the basis of sustainable development goals will be very important. It should not be forgotten that every single individual also brings with him/herself a capacity.

▶ **Re-settlement doesn't appear to be a viable option anymore, major population mobilities should be avoided:**

A central planning for the settlement of Syrians had not been conducted because of the expectation of temporariness and the large numbers. A re-settlement policy doesn't appear to be either socially or politically practical anymore due to the long period of time that passed and various other risks. Its necessity is also questionable. Although it caused unbalanced numbers of Syrian refugees hosted by different cities and districts, the spontaneous settlement of Syrians by their own decisions shaped by their respective priorities also created opportunities for them to find employment, be close to support networks, and feel secure. It can be suggested that this spontaneous settlement had a significant role in the high level of satisfaction that Syrians report.

▶ **The policy of travel restrictions for Syrians should be revisited in terms of its necessity and feasibility:**

A settlement policy was not implemented regarding Syrians in Turkey. Although there is the rule that Syrians cannot leave the city in which they were registered,

their mobility could not be stopped. **Besides the very large numbers and the difficulty of control, the ongoing experience has shown that policy of travel restrictions has been difficult to implement and that it has lost its necessity. It is clear that the regulations concerning travel restrictions of Syrians certainly need to be revised.**

▶ **Social Cohesion Assistance (SUY/ESSN) program needs to be restructured with “development” set as a priority objective:** Funded by the EU, the SUY/ESSN program has costed approximately €1 billion in the last two years and was benefitted by 1.7 million asylum-seekers in Turkey, 1.5 millions of whom being Syrians. Even though this assistance involves a monthly payment of only 120 TL per person, it is still very significant for its beneficiaries. These funds also constitute a significant resource for the local economies. **For the sustainability and efficiency of the SUY program, it is necessary to transform these funds into development/investment works through medium-and long-term policies.**

▶ **External funding programs should be developed for Municipalities (Local Authorities):** It is known that the local authorities, particularly the municipalities, do not have the resources to be used in their activities towards people under international protection in Turkey. In order to facilitate the local integration processes and to protect social peace, there needs to be an additional agreement between Turkey and the EU which should provide project-based funding through municipalities/local authorities to be benefitted not only by Syrians, but also others under international protection. The SUY model can be applied for this new program which could be named Municipality Social Integration Assistance (Belediye Sosyal Uyum Yardımı- BEL-SUY). Through such a program, municipalities could be provided with a monthly funding of, for instance, €10 per refugee to design and implement projects dedicated to refugees. This kind of a program would be essential to eliminate the complaints from the local people who are aggrieved by the perceived use of all funds for the Syrians and to ease the pressure on the politicians because of this.

▶ **The quality of the services provided by the public institutions should be prevented from deterioration; physical and human capacity should be strengthened:** Both in terms of process management and social cohesion, it is essential to increase capacity in public institutions and services, particularly including health, education, and municipal services. Voicing objections and reactions to deteriorating public services is a natural situation that should be expected. Therefore, labeling the voiced concerns or reactions simply as “anti-Syrian discourse”, “racism”, or “hate speech” will make the social integration process more complicated.

▶ **Public institutions should collect healthy data and provide this data to the use of academics and researchers as much as possible:** One of the biggest problems facing the experts on the subject as well as NGOs and local authorities is the difficulty of accessing healthy official data. The production and sharing of healthy data will contribute to all relevant parties in terms of process management and policy-making, particularly concerning local integration processes.

▶ **Syrians should be more actively included in the policy-making and integration processes:** It is of utmost importance that Syrians participate in the policy-making and integration processes in Turkey for effective policies. Syrian academics, university students, NGO representatives that are living in Turkey can potentially play a very significant role in this regard.

▶ **Syrian university students should be utilized as strategic actors in the integration processes:** The special social group of **over 33 thousand university students and alumni of Turkish universities need to be identified as strategic solution partners.** They should be enabled to facilitate the communication and interactions between the Turkish society and Syrians. It should be ensured for the **university students and alumni to assume an active role in integration processes as social bridges and role models.**

▶ **The multi-purpose community centers should be improved:** The number of the multi-purpose **community centers** should be increased and their qualities should be improved. These cen-



ters should be used both to inform and direct individuals concerning activities in education and employment; and to provide support regarding legal rights and social cohesion. These centers would also be important in creating opportunities for the local people and refugees to come together and interact with one another.

▶ **It should be ensured that Syrian women are empowered and that they play an active role in the processes:** 45% of the Syrian population in Turkey are women. Syrian women are the main actors not merely at an individual level, but also at the family level. Therefore, ensuring school-age girls' access to education and empowerment of Syrian adult women through literacy, language, vocational, and entrepreneurial courses, among others, would not only lead to their self-improvement but also create a much wider influence in their respective communities.

▶ **Agriculture and animal husbandry sectors can offer opportunities to create employment for Syrians:** A very large part of the Syrians in Turkey work in the service industry. However, the very large industries of agriculture and animal husbandry in Turkey, which are open to investment, can provide very good opportunities for the employment of the newcomers. Developing projects in this area in close cooperation with the EU can bring along a policy the outcomes of which can be reached in a short while.

▶ **More effort is required in the field of mandatory education to prevent Syrian children from turning into "lost generations":** Despite Turkey's extraordinary efforts and success, more than 35% of school-aged Syrians do not have access to formal education. Without aggravating the native people, there is an urgent need to strengthen the capacity including the number of schools, classrooms, teachers and the other educational equipment as well as taking **a new leap concerning the schooling of Syrian school-aged children.**

▶ **It is necessary to empower Turkish teachers and increase their numbers:** It is plainly obvious that education of Syrians is crucial both for preventing Syrian children from turning into lost generations and for the serenity of the

Turkish society and a harmonious cohabitation. The teachers, who are the bearers of the heaviest burden stemming from this policy of placement of Syrians, need to be supported and strengthened as they work extremely hard in firstly teaching a new language and its alphabet to foreign students, and then trying to give them education.

▶ **Vocational training: It is very valuable and necessary for the young and adult Syrians to be directed towards vocational training. However,** the vocational training courses which do not correspond to the requirements of the economy and which do not lead to employment need to be eliminated.

▶ **It should more frequently shared with the society that fight against informality is a long process and that it involves both Syrians and Turkish citizens:** While informal economic activities are neither sustainable nor ethically defensible, the prospects of developing a sufficient employment capacity for the Syrians in the short and medium term in Turkey do not seem realistic. Even though employment in the informal market seems to provide an opportunity for the Syrians to support themselves economically in the short term, this practice is also known to create risks and losses as well as leading to serious exploitation. New arrangements need to be made in this field considering the economic capacity and the needs of Turkey. However, it should not be forgotten that the informal economy constitutes more than 36% of the Turkish economy and, it should be shared with the society that informality is not a problem that exclusively relates to Syrians.

▶ **In addition to temporary protection, other alternative statuses should be discussed for Syrians who have been in turkey for 9 years:** The **"Temporary Protection Status"** of Syrians needs to be re-evaluated as their average duration of stay in Turkey has exceeded 4.5 years. That is because this status has started to negatively influence the integration processes, primarily through enforcing travel restrictions, of Syrians whose tendency to remain in Turkey has been strengthened. The current practice of transition from

temporary protection to “exceptional citizenship” creates a number of different concerns and complaints among the public. Allowing those Syrians who had stayed a certain amount of time in Turkey and who meet certain criteria to move from having temporary protection to residence permits, and thus, creating new alternatives to granting citizenship, should be opened to discussion

▶ **Transparency in citizenship policy is important for social support:** There is a high degree of reaction and concern among the Turkish society over the issue of granting **citizenship** to Syrians. Even though only “skilled” individuals who are “expected to contribute in Turkey” have been granted naturalization through “exceptional citizenship”, it is necessary **to manage the process more transparently**, to explain the facts more clearly and to share more information with the society.

▶ **Sharing external funding coming from the EU and other sources with the society would help reduce the pressure on social reactions:** The external funds received by Turkey are very limited. Between 2011 and 2019, the total funds to enter Turkey was €5 billion, the largest bit being the €3.2 billion from the EU. Undoubtedly, this is very much below the actual needs and special effort need to be made to expand these resources. In addition, sharing more information regarding the contents/purposes and the amount of such funding with the public is important both for transparency and integration processes. Explaining to the Turkish society the fact that this funding, albeit insufficient, is provided by external resources would help reduce social reactions in many fields. Such explanations would also motivate funder institutions.

▶ **Efforts should be spent to solve general and local coordination problems:** Coordination problems among and within the institutions should be taken seriously and policies solving these problems should be developed. Otherwise, the services are delayed, their efficiency is decreased, and the social anxieties would further be fueled.

▶ **The role and effectiveness of civil society organizations should be enhanced:** The issue of Syrians in Turkey has created an important opportunity to experience how important a role the civil society can play. New NGO formations of Turks and Syrians should be supported, their experiences obtained through local, national, and international collaborations should be reflected into policy-making processes. In addition, it is also necessary to establish mechanisms that would allow conducting impact analysis studies on activities as well as openly displaying cooperation opportunities and possible support resources through a transparent NGO mapping.

**The issue of integration - particularly when concerning a community with a population of over 3,5 million - involves a difficult and long process, which requires significant effort from both the state and the society.** There is no agreed-upon definition of the concept. In the context of this study integration is defined as *“a way of life and emotion enabling peaceful cohabitation in the framework of mutual acceptance and respect, on the basis of a common belonging where plurality is accepted, for communities that come together either spontaneously, voluntarily, or forcibly”*. In the framework of this definition, it is obvious that a lot of different actors, the political and social structure, various priorities, the capacity, and most importantly, social acceptance can/will play a role in the process of integration. Therefore, it shouldn't be forgotten that the process of integration is extremely complex, emotional, costly, and at times conflictual.

**There is a need for a rights-based and individual-oriented, dynamic, and modular approach to integration that prioritizes local integration:** The large numerical size of Syrians in Turkey causes various anxieties among the Turkish society as well as causing the risk of turning inwards/ghettoization or creation of their own society themselves. These risks should be taken seriously and policies should be developed that aim a peaceful and honorable cohabitation of Syrians as a part of and alongside with the Turkish society. The structure of the integration policies should be **dynamic, modular, and prioritizing local integration** and they should be based on rights and centered around individuals so that they can contribute in minimizing current and future problems.

# Research Profil & Technical Background

**SYRIANS BAROMETER 2019**

**4**

**F**ield work of SB-2019 research, through comprehensive surveys and focus group meetings, was conducted to represent both the both the Turkish society (Turkish citizens) and the Syrians (under temporary protection) in Turkey.

## SURVEY

### Survey Numbers and City Distributions:

The survey questionnaires for Turkish citizens were administered with 2,271 individuals in the city centers of 26 cities (Adana, Ankara, Ağrı, Antalya, Aydın, Bursa, Balıkesir, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kastamonu, Kayseri, Kırıkkale, Kocaeli, Konya, Malatya,

Manisa, Mardin, Tekirdağ, Samsun, Şanlıurfa, Trabzon, Van, Zonguldak) with individuals of 18 years of age or older who have the capacity to understand and answer the questions.

**SB-2019-TABLE: SB-2019 City-Based Turkish Society Sample**

Cities							
		#	%			#	%
1	İstanbul	362	15,9	14	Trabzon	74	3,3
2	Ankara	133	5,9	15	Konya	68	3,0
3	Adana	128	5,6	16	Kayseri	67	3,0
4	İzmir	105	4,6	17	Van	65	2,9
5	Kocaeli	102	4,5	18	Mardin	60	2,6
6	Şanlıurfa	100	4,4	19	Tekirdağ	58	2,6
7	Bursa	99	4,4	20	Balıkesir	57	2,5
8	Hatay	91	4,0	21	Kırıkkale	53	2,3
9	Manisa	90	4,0	22	Ağrı	46	2,0
10	Samsun	85	3,7	23	Erzurum	45	2,0
11	Aydın	84	3,7	24	Kastamonu	45	2,0
12	Antalya	83	3,7	25	Malatya	44	1,9
13	Gaziantep	83	3,7	26	Zonguldak	44	1,9
<b>Total</b>						<b>2271</b>	<b>100,0</b>

**SB-2019-TABLE: The Cities in which SB-2019 Surveys were Administered by Category**

Border Cities	Metropolitan Cities	Other Cities		
Adana	İstanbul	Kocaeli	Trabzon	Kırıkkale
Şanlıurfa	Ankara	Bursa	Konya	Ağrı
Hatay	İzmir	Manisa	Kayseri	Erzurum
Gaziantep		Samsun	Van	Kastamonu
Mardin		Aydın	Tekirdağ	Malatya
		Antalya	Balıkesir	Zonguldak

SB-2019-TABLE: SB-2019 Syrians, City-based Sample

Cities				Region		
		#	%		#	%
1	İstanbul	260	18,3	Border cities	861	60,7
2	Gaziantep	189	13,3	Metropolitan cities	368	26,0
3	Hatay	188	13,3	Non-metropolitan cities	189	13,3
4	Şanlıurfa	182	12,8	<b>Total</b>	<b>1.418</b>	<b>100,0</b>
5	Adana	92	6,5			
6	Mersin	88	6,2			
7	Bursa	74	5,2			
8	İzmir	67	4,7			
9	Konya	47	3,3			
10	Kilis	46	3,2			
11	Mardin	41	2,9			
12	Ankara	41	2,9			
13	Kayseri	35	2,5			
14	Kahramanmaraş	35	2,5			
15	Kocaeli	33	2,4			
<b>Total</b>		<b>1.418</b>	<b>100,0</b>			

Border Cities		Other Cities	
		Metropolitan Cities	Non-etropolitan Cities
Adana	Kilis	Ankara	Bursa
Gaziantep	Mardin	İstanbul	Kayseri
Hatay	Mersin	İzmir	Kocaeli
Kahramanmaraş	Şanlıurfa		Konya

In the selection of individual respondents from the Turkish society, simple random sampling was used and the number of surveys to be conducted in each city was determined according to their respective populations, and specific quotas were applied for determining the number of survey participants in the cities.

Surveys with Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey included “household-based surveys” conducted on a sample of 1.418 households in 15 cities (Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Kocaeli, Konya, Mardin, Mersin, Şanlıurfa). The surveys were conducted with an individual authorized to give information on behalf of the household. This study enabled access

to the information of 6.527 Syrians living in these households.

The survey participants were selected from among Syrians living in Turkey outside of camps and those “under temporary protection”.

Syrians living in camps (temporary residence centers) – below 2% of their total population in Turkey – and those Syrians which have other statuses (residence, irregular migrant, citizenship, etc.) in Turkey were left outside of the scope of surveys.

The field implementation of the surveys was conducted by Ankara Centre for Social Research (ANAR), one of the most experienced institutions in this sector.

## CATEGORIES

Maximum effort has been paid to ensure proportional representation of different sex, age, educational attainment, and occupational groups since the study aimed to include these as potentially relevant categories for analysis.

Cities were categorized as “border cities” (5 cities: Adana, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep, Mardin) located very close to Turkey’s Syrian border and host large numbers of Syrian refugees; “metropolitan cities” (3 cities: Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir), while the remaining (18 cities) covered in this study as “other cities”, and the relations between the issue and the categories. For Turkish society participants, 20,3% of the surveys were applied in the border cities; 26,4% in the metropolitan cities;

and 53% in other cities. For Syrian participants, 60,7% of the surveys were applied in the border cities; 26% in the metropolitan cities; and 13,3% in other cities.

**Survey technique:** Surveys were conducted with CAPI- Computer assisted personal interviewing technique.

**Dates of Surveys:** Survey field work for Syrians was conducted on 1-20 May 2019, and 18 April – 1 May 2019 for Turkish Citizens.

**Survey Confidence Level and Interval:** 95% confidence level and  $\pm 2,06$  confidence interval.

**Total Number of Surveys:** In SB-2019, a total of 3.689 surveys (2.271 Turkish citizens and 1.418 Syrians) were conducted. The total number of surveys (Turkish citizens + Syrians) conducted in SB-2017 was 3.324.

**SB-2019-TABLE:** Profile of Syrians in SB-2019 Research (15 cities – 1.418 households – 6.526 individuals)

	Sayı #	%		Sayı #	%
<b>Sex (Household Distribution)</b>			<b>Educational Attainment of Individuals in Households</b>		
Female	3202	49,1	Illiterate	436	8,2
Male	3325	50,9	Literate but not graduate of any school	891	16,7
<b>Total</b>	<b>6527</b>	<b>100,0</b>	Primary school	1690	31,7
<b>Age Groups in Households</b>			Middle school	1170	22,0
0-5	1203	18,4	High-school or equivalent	608	11,4
6-11	981	15,0	2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	141	2,7
12-17	729	11,2	University degree	373	7,0
18-24	1064	16,3	Graduate degree/PhD	15	0,3
25-34	1116	17,1	<b>Total</b>	<b>5324</b>	<b>100,0</b>
35-44	727	11,1	<b>Occupational Status of Individuals in Households</b>		
45-54	406	6,2	Working	1648	37,9
55-64	198	3,0	Housewife	1420	32,7
65 +	103	1,7	Student	635	14,6
<b>Total</b>	<b>6527</b>	<b>100,0</b>	Unemployed	451	10,4
<b>Status in Turkey of Individuals in Households</b>			Unable to work/disabled or old	182	4,2
Temporary protection registration document	4407	67,5	Retired	7	0,2
Temporary protection identification document	1933	29,6	<b>Total</b>	<b>4343</b>	<b>100,0</b>
Residence permit	80	1,2	<b>Type of Jobs of Individuals in Households</b>		
Republic of Turkey citizenship identification	30	0,5	Regularly working employee	828	50,2
No documents/undocumented	77	1,2	Casual (daily) worker	553	33,6
<b>Total</b>	<b>6527</b>	<b>100,0</b>	Self-employed/artisan	184	11,2
<b>Marital Status of Individuals in Households</b>			Employer (Employing 1 or more individuals)	41	2,5
Single/Never married	1493	34,4	Seasonal worker	32	1,9
Married	2647	60,9	Unpaid family employee	10	0,6
Separated	7	0,2	<b>Total</b>	<b>1648</b>	<b>100,0</b>
Widowed	158	3,6			
Divorced	38	0,9			
<b>Total</b>	<b>4343</b>	<b>100,0</b>			


**SB-2019-TABLE:** Profile and Demographic Characteristics of Participants in SB-2019 Survey on Turkish Society

	#	%		#	%
<b>Sex</b>			<b>Geographical Location</b>		
Female	1136	50,0	Border Cities	462	20,3
Male	1135	50,0	Metropolitan Cities	600	26,4
<b>Age Groups</b>			Other Cities	1209	53,3
18-24	426	18,8	<b>Occupations</b>		
25-34	508	22,4	Housewife	546	24,0
35-44	541	23,8	Private sector employee	494	21,8
45-54	428	18,8	Artisans/Tradesmen	438	19,3
55-64	254	11,2	Student	245	10,8
65 and above	114	5,0	Retired	224	9,9
<b>Educational Attainment</b>			Public sector employee	109	4,8
Illiterate	28	1,2	Unemployed	108	4,8
Literate but not graduate of any school	39	1,7	Self-employed	82	3,6
Primary school graduate	578	25,5	Other	25	1,0
Middle-school graduate	382	16,8			
High-school or equivalent school graduate	752	33,1			
University graduate /Holder of graduate degree	492	21,7			

**FOCUS GROUP MEETINGS (FGMs):**

In total, 20 FGMs were conducted: 12 with Turkish citizens and 8 with Syrians in 4 different cities (Ankara,

Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Hatay). Data collected from FGMs was analyzed using the qualitative analysis software MAXQDA.

**SB-2019-FIGURE:** The Number of Individuals Applied for International Protection in Turkey, 2005-2016


Source: DGMM: [http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/uluslararasi-koruma\\_0\\_378\\_4712\\_icerik](http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/uluslararasi-koruma_0_378_4712_icerik) (Access: 25.09.2017)

# SYRIANS BAROMETER - 2019

A FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING SOCIAL COHESION WITH SYRIANS IN TURKEY



Prof. Dr. M. Murat ERDOĞAN



Turkey has been simultaneously known as a transit, origin, and destination country in the context of human mobilities. As a country with an intense internal migration dynamic, Turkey has a social structure that is familiar with human mobility. In the last 10 years, however, Turkey has been having an experience of human mobility that is unique and unprecedented in its history with respect to its scope and qualities. When the first group of 252 Syrian asylum-seekers arrived in

Turkey on 29 April 2011, nobody had expected that millions would have followed them and the crisis would have continued this long. A country with only 58 thousand applicants for international protection back in 2001, Turkey has become the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world since 2014, with Syrians entering their 10th year in the country. The number of Syrians in Turkey has exceeded 3.6 million, accounting for 4,37% of its national population. More importantly, the new sociological reality is very clearly presenting itself. More than 98% of Syrians in Turkey as "urban refugees" are living side by side with the Turkish society, 535 thousand Syrian babies have been born in Turkey, more than 650 thousand Syrian children are currently enrolled to Turkish public schools, more than 33 thousand young Syrians are students at Turkish universities, around 120 thousand Syrians obtained Turkish citizenship, and there are around 1 million Syrians that are actively working. This "compulsory common life" experience is also causing a social shock among the Turkish society. However, the resilience and social acceptance of the Turkish society is making this common life to continue largely without problems. It must be added that this social acceptance is fragile, in a trend of shrinking, and increasingly turning into "toleration".

**"Syrians Barometer: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians"**, designed and has been regularly repeated by Prof. Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan, is an effort related to the social aspects of social cohesion, instead of conceptual or official ones. The present study is based on the same structure used in "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration" in 2014, "Syrians Barometer: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians-2017", and "Şanlıurfa Barometer" in 2018. SB-2019, similar to its predecessors, aims at understanding the developments, integration processes, and tensions related to the "common social life", from the vintage point of both Turkish society and Syrians, and developing policy recommendations related to these. The study includes public opinion surveys conducted on highly-representative samples as well as focus group meetings.

Chaired by Prof. Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan, the research team included Dr. K. Onur Unutulmaz, Tülin Haji Mohamad, Dr. Yeşim Yılmaz, and Deniz Aydın. The reports of the study were penned by Prof. Erdoğan. In addition, comprising the most esteemed academics in the field of migration, refugees, and social research in Turkey, "**Syrians Barometer Academic Advisory Board**" including Prof. Dr. Nermin Abadan-Unat, Prof. Dr. Mustafa Aydın, Prof. Dr. Banu Ergöçmen, Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Ferris, Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kasım Han, Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu, Omar Kadköy, Prof. Dr. Neeraj Kaushal, Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, Prof. Dr. Fuat Keyman, Ümit Kızıltan, Prof. Dr. Kemal Kirişçi, Prof. Dr. Nilüfer Narlı, Dr. Kathleen Newland, Prof. Dr. Barbara Oomen, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Saime Özçürümez, Prof. Dr. Nasser Yassin, and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayselin Yıldız provided invaluable support and contributions.

SB-2019 study was conducted in 26 cities with 2,271 individuals on "individual-basis" from among the citizens of the Republic of Turkey, and with 1,418 Syrians living outside of camps in Turkey on "household-basis". Also, 20 focus group meetings were held both with Turkish people and Syrians in 4 cities. The research findings show that the social acceptance of the Turkish society - albeit still at a high level but also "reluctant" and "fragile" - is in a declining trend, and that the anxieties are becoming evident. Meanwhile, Syrians who have now become "urban refugees" seem to be in a tendency to hold on to life in Turkey and to make their future plans in Turkey. It is understood that Syrians who have to a large extent lost their hopes that peace and tranquility would be established in their country feel much safer, happier and harmonious in Turkey. Despite all uncertainties and anxieties, the process is inevitably evolving towards a common life. Given these, the issue of how to realize a common future compatible with peace and human honor should be prioritized and the process should be managed based on accurate data. Prof. Erdoğan states that through this study, he aims to understand and describe the process that has been experienced since 2011, and also to provide accurate data for researchers and policy makers for the sake of a rights-based and human-oriented, peaceful future. He says this research's effort with an academic outlook in shedding light to the reality should be seen within its own limitations, considering the dynamic nature of the process. Prof. Erdoğan adds that the collected data - albeit with a high level of reliability and representative sample - eventually represents the research participants during the period the study is conducted, rather than showing the "absolute truth". He stresses that most generalizations and descriptions, particularly those of the "Turkish society" and "Syrians", should be considered within this context and limitations.

