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Evaluation of UNHCR's Livelihoods Strategies and Approaches

GLOBAL REPORT
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Photo credit: TANGO International

Note: This report follows the UNHCR Style Companion (2012), which uses the *Concise Oxford English Dictionary* as a reference with the exception of some key spellings such as the use of –ize or –ization.

Evaluation information at a glance	
Title of the evaluation:	Evaluation of UNHCR's Livelihoods Strategies and Approaches
Timeframe covered:	2014-2018
Expected duration:	June-December 2018
Type of evaluation:	Centralized evaluation of Livelihoods strategies and approaches (theory-based)
Countries covered:	Global strategy review with primary data collection in Ghana, Costa Rica, India, Rwanda, and Turkey
Evaluation initiated by:	UNHCR Evaluation Service
Evaluation manager / contact in UNHCR:	Christine Fu, Senior Evaluation Officer

Executive Summary

Background and methods

Purpose. The purpose of this evaluation is to gather strategic and timely evidence on the effectiveness of refugee livelihoods programming from 2014-2018. This evaluation will inform and influence the organizational strategy and practice within UNHCR and external to UNHCR through partners, ultimately, with the aim to improve the economic inclusion of refugees and other people of concern (PoC). The evaluation also serves a dual purpose for learning and accountability within the organization, commissioned by the UNHCR Evaluation Service as a centralized evaluation as per the 2016 Evaluation Policy. To accomplish this objective, Technical Assistance to Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO) International, selected through a competitive bid, conducted an independent, theory-based evaluation of the global livelihoods portfolio.

The intended users of this evaluation are the UNHCR Senior Executive Team, the Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion Unit, the Division of Resilience and Solutions (DRS), Regional Bureaux, Country Offices (COs), and their partners. The secondary audience includes other humanitarian and development actors working in refugee contexts.

This evaluation is timely given the international discourse around the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), with the corresponding Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), and the New Way of Working- Humanitarian-Development nexus. The evaluation has corporate significance with UNHCR undertaking organizational change processes such as the multi-year/multi-partner (MYMP) approach and seeking to better position itself as a strategic partner and advocate on refugee livelihoods. It is of particular importance for UNHCR internally with the forthcoming 2019-2023 Global Strategy and the Livelihoods & Economic Inclusion Concept Note, and with changes and shifts underway related to livelihoods. Some of these changes include the DRS established at UNHCR headquarters (HQ), the shift toward an “economic inclusion” and market-based approach in the livelihoods guidance, and review and revision of the standards in place since 2015 through the Minimum Criteria (MC) for Livelihoods Programming. In 2018, the total global livelihoods budget was US\$ 70.7million with programmes in 75 countries. The most common UNHCR livelihood interventions include: vocational training, agricultural interventions, and artisan livelihood opportunities.

The three key evaluation questions (KEQ) include:

- **KEQ 1:** How effective are UNHCR-funded livelihood interventions in reducing protection risks, strengthening resilience, and improving employment, income and/or savings levels of targeted persons of concern?
- **KEQ 2:** To what extent is there a positive correlation between desired livelihoods programme outcomes and high adherence to UNHCR’s Minimum Criteria for Livelihoods Programming standards?
- **KEQ 3:** What are the different roles UNHCR has played in livelihoods programming? What has worked well in such roles and what are some constraints? What are lessons learned to inform the next iteration of the livelihoods strategy going forward?


Methods. TANGO utilized a mixed-methods approach to integrate primary and secondary data from multiple sources, both internal and external, and across organizational levels. The main methods are comprised of a thorough desk review of secondary data and literature, primary qualitative and quantitative data collection. The secondary data includes over 1,100 background and programme documents received by TANGO. This consists of documents specific to the case study countries as well as background documents to the evaluation, Focus monitoring data, revised livelihood monitoring indicators

where available (baseline for 30 countries), and both internal and external data and reports (shared by UNHCR) relevant to the global livelihoods strategy.

The primary qualitative data collection involved field visits to five case study operations as well as phone interviews with livelihood programme staff of 13 additional countries. The case studies were conducted in The Republic of Turkey (henceforth 'Turkey'), Rwanda, India, Costa Rica, and Ghana, all of which included key informant interviews (KIIs) with UNHCR staff, partners (implementing and operational), government officials at various levels, private sector, and other stakeholders; focus group discussions (FGDs) with livelihood programme beneficiaries; and in-depth interviews (IDIs) with beneficiaries, some of these representing success stories or positive deviants. The primary quantitative data comes from a staff e-survey, representing 74 of the 75 countries across UNHCR's global livelihoods portfolio. The e-survey also included space for respondents to provide qualitative comments. The figure below summarizes the evaluation methods.

Summary of evaluation methods and global sample

The evaluation covered **74 country offices** via a combination of methods: staff in all 74 completed e-surveys (total 102 respondents), **five** of which were the subject of in-depth **country case studies**; and staff in **13 country offices** were interviewed by phone.



In total, the primary qualitative data collection included: 463 FGDs participants, 63 IDIs with beneficiaries, and KIIs with 281 UNHCR staff and stakeholders.

Map source: Awesome Layouts

Resilience approach

The resilience framework incorporated during the inception phase is used as the lens to describe and explain many of the findings and main conclusions. Resilience aligns with the GCR and is used as the framework for this evaluation because it connects UNHCR’s stated aim of economic inclusion with the agency’s two-pronged mandate of protection and finding permanent solutions.

UNHCR DEFINES RESILIENCE AS: THE ABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS, HOUSEHOLDS, COMMUNITIES, NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SYSTEMS TO PREVENT, ABSORB AND RECOVER FROM SHOCKS, WHILE CONTINUING TO FUNCTION AND ADAPT IN A WAY THAT SUPPORTS LONG-TERM PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, PEACE AND SECURITY, AND THE ATTAINMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

Strengthening resilience means building resilience capacities at household, community, and systems levels. Resilience capacities are the potential for proactive actions to be taken or systems to be in place so that households and communities can deal with shocks or stresses. Resilience capacities and the responses that support resilience are contextual. TANGO has worked with international development partners to identify and measure three types of resilience capacities: absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and transformative capacity, along with corresponding components or capacity indicators (shown in the chart below).

- **Absorptive Capacity** is the ability of households and communities to minimize exposure to shocks if possible and to recover quickly after exposure.
- **Adaptive Capacity** is the ability of households and communities to make pro-active and informed choices about their lives and their diversified livelihood strategies based on changing conditions.
- **Transformative Capacity** is the system-level changes that ensure sustained resilience, including formal safety nets, access to markets, infrastructure, and basic services.

Resilience capacities and example components		
Absorptive	Adaptive	Transformative
Bonding social capital	Bridging and linking social capital	Bridging social capital
Informal safety nets	Human capital	Linking social capital
Shock preparedness & mitigation	Access to financial services	Formal safety nets
Hazard insurance (where applicable)	Livelihood diversity	Access to markets
Household savings	Exposure to information	Access to infrastructure
Asset ownership	Asset ownership	Access to basic services
Conflict mitigation	Aspirations & confidence to adapt	Communal natural resources

Findings and conclusions

EFFECTIVENESS (KEQ 1)

KEY FINDINGS:

Effectiveness and impact. The revised livelihood monitoring indicators (results from 15 countries) combined with e-survey results and KII on the topic of impact show beneficiaries experienced at least moderate increases in income, savings, and access to employment and business opportunities. The impact results apply to a small number of PoC in each programme. For the impact areas of access to loans from a financial institution and access to formal and long-term employment, the results are variable.



Across data sources, the livelihood programmes are shown to positively contribute to household well-being and protection outcomes: e.g., food security, education of children, safety, reduced sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and empowerment. Additional impacts noted by e-survey respondents include the strengthening of soft skills, life skills, and overall empowerment, allowing households to be able to make improved decisions about their future.

The e-survey provided anecdotes describing the impacts observed by staff, a few examples include:

- **Savings groups provide finance and social protection in Tanzania:** “Organizing saving groups has been effective in providing not only economic benefit through access to informal finance but also social protection among refugees. Vocational training and agricultural projects that include both refugees and the host communities have promoted peaceful coexistence.”
- **Self-reliance in agricultural livelihoods in Angola:** “Despite limited funds, the Angola operation has encouraged and supported refugees with self-reliance activities...Some farmers are able to earn incomes from the sale of vegetables grown from their farms while others are engaged in trading, thus increasing incomes and nutrition at the household level.”
- **Advocacy enables equal access to financial services in Paraguay:** “Thanks to advocacy by UNHCR, PoC with an entrepreneurial profile can now access business training courses and technical guidance by Fundación Paraguaya at no cost. Recognized refugees may also access micro-credit under the same criteria as nationals.”

All case studies collected primary qualitative data from beneficiaries and stakeholders, which confirmed the above results that some beneficiaries have indeed increased their income, improved the well-being of their household, and created employment for others, though the measurable economic impacts are small overall. The ET finds one of the best ways to promote protection for refugees is through livelihoods.

Strengthening resilience to shocks. This study has found that PoC face high levels of shocks and stressors, inhibiting their livelihood development and progress toward self-reliance. On average, PoC in urban areas have faced 2.9 different types of shocks or stressors (out of five) in the past five years, and camp-based PoC have faced an average of 3.4 (out of five). The most common types of stressors facing PoC are economic/political shocks and protection shocks. The vast majority of livelihood staff (91 per

cent) reported that these shocks and stressors have a significant effect on the outcomes of their livelihood programming. A resilience approach is important to support PoC to not lose gains made from participating in livelihoods programmes when faced with shocks.

Considering the dynamic contexts and high level of shocks UNHCR is operating in, a resilience strategy helps programmes pivot from humanitarian to development approaches in areas with protracted crises and chronic stressors. For example, UNHCR may support livelihood beneficiaries with cash transfers in the midst of a shock to prevent distress sales of their productive assets until regular livelihood programming can resume. E-survey respondents from South Sudan, Mali, Kenya (urban), The Gambia, Chad, among others, commented on the need for this kind of strategic approach and contingency planning in their complex operating environments.

“Livelihood interventions are therefore being delivered in a fragile and conflict-affected setting that is fluid, unpredictable and complex. This has resulted in integrated programming to address some of the gaps.” ~South Sudan UNHCR staff

Through this evaluation, TANGO has seen evidence of how UNHCR livelihood programming strengthens the resilience capacities of PoC households, communities, and national systems, even if not explicitly stated in programme strategies. Some examples of these resilience capacities provided through UNHCR staff interviews and case studies include:

- **Bonding social capital in India (absorptive):** The programme’s group organization process has increased bonding social capital within refugee communities. As a result of this, refugees feel better able to cope with daily challenges as well as significant household shocks (like sickness or death) by accessing support from friends and neighbours.
- **Bridging social capital in Uganda (adaptive capacity):** Some refugees have increased access to land because they negotiated with host community members with whom they’ve formed relations through livelihoods projects.
- **Building human capital and social networks in southern Mexico (adaptive capacity):** The technical and vocational training has provided asylum-seekers and refugees with skills and social networks through which many have found employment opportunities.
- **Community conflict resolution and social cohesion in Ethiopia (absorptive capacity):** The programme has promoted peaceful co-existence among refugees and host communities through formation of farmer cooperatives that comprises both population groups.
- **Livelihood diversification in Malawi (adaptive capacity):** PoC have diversified their livelihoods activities from proceeds earned from the livelihoods programme. For example, a livestock beneficiary diversified to pig production for commercial purposes.
- **Savings and community credit established in Uganda’s South Sudanese operation (absorptive capacity):** The agricultural and non-agricultural micro-enterprise development programme has supported the creation of village savings and loans associations (VSLAs). These community credit structures have provided starter capital to its members who have now established micro-businesses, and many can meet their basic needs.
- **Access to services and markets in Turkey (transformative capacity):** The programme has worked with the national Vocational Qualifications Authority to ensure PoC have access to the certifications and employment that match their skills and experience.

Internal factors affecting results. The main internal factors hindering efficiency and effectiveness are limited programme budgets and the barriers of the one-year project cycle. The predominant internal factors hindering effectiveness as reported by global livelihood staff are limited budget (62 per cent),

barriers related to the one-year budget cycle (41 per cent), and situational analysis not adequately applied to intervention design (19 per cent). The five case studies confirm these results. The programmes inefficiently spend their limited time and resources on repetitive planning and reporting each year, including for the completion of the MC. The livelihood programmes have little assurance of resources from one year to the next, which limits their ability to do multi-year planning; this causes a sense of frustration among operations staff.

The internal factors enabling programme efficiency and effectiveness are livelihood team capacity, intra-office cooperation, and support by the CO management and CO strategy for innovative shifts in the economic inclusion approach. In Turkey, for example, there is a small yet highly capable livelihoods team; they have built a referral pathway with protection teams in order to promote lasting employment with the most vulnerable PoC. UNHCR Costa Rica adjusted their internal structure to integrate protection and durable solutions into one division with two units, allowing for better coordination and integration between the protection and livelihoods teams. The shift to a strategic livelihoods partner approach in Rwanda has been made possible through management support and a CO-wide strategy that envisions refugees as self-reliant contributors to the development of Rwanda.

Many programmes have adapted their livelihood activities to improve livelihood and protection outcomes, such as clearly linking vocational training to job markets, promoting the integration of refugee and host communities, and making adjustments to financial inclusion activities to achieve positive results. Though, the ET finds cash assistance provided through UNHCR could be better leveraged to intentionally build financial inclusion with PoC. The ET recognizes the cash and livelihoods teams have already started working together on this issue.

“We look at these issues [of providing unconditional cash transfers] in a legal mindset. It takes time to see with an economic and empowering lens. We always think of protection, not marketing and empowering an individual to support themselves individually.” ~Malawi UNHCR Staff

The case studies and staff KII show that programme design based on thorough market analyses and participant and stakeholder experience enhances efficiency and effectiveness. These assessments are promoted through the components of the MC, a structure that all case studies found useful overall (see KEQ 2 key findings, below). Yet, the ET finds that even with good standards in place, the implementation of the standards and overall quality and effectiveness of the programmes will continue to be comprised under a one-year project cycle.

External factors affecting results. External factors affecting efficiency and effectiveness are partner capacity (relating also to partner selection, an internal issue) and the legal and economic enabling environments. From KIIs with UNHCR staff, the selection of partners with poor capacity is attributed to rushed selection due to the one-year cycle and the preference for traditional or known partners such as humanitarian NGOs as opposed to those with development expertise. The ET finds CO livelihood teams need guidance to select private sector and development partners and to expand operating partnerships.

PoC mind-set is another factor affecting outcomes. One in five operations report that access to cash interventions or other assistance hinder PoC desire to participate in livelihoods. The ET finds there is a need for UNHCR to assess how dependence on humanitarian assistance (from UNHCR or partners) and its own messaging around vulnerability and durable solutions contribute to PoC willingness to engage in livelihoods.

Strengthening monitoring systems to measure impact and resilience. TANGO acknowledges the ongoing processes and challenges of developing the livelihood programme monitoring system, and UNHCR has made major positive strides in implementing an improved system. The ability to show impact

is hindered by the lack of adequate performance and impact measurement systems in place, as well as the lack of systems-level impact indicators. For the Focus Data, consisting largely of output indicators, the ET finds there are significant issues with data quality and data collection inconsistencies. Recognizing these challenges with the Focus Data, it is important that UNHCR began monitoring livelihoods outside of Focus through the revised monitoring indicators. These indicators provide crucial evidence to the organization on achievements beyond output level indicators. The revised livelihood monitoring system has also improved many of the data quality issues by providing standardized indicator reference sheets and ensuring a cross-sectional sample of 100 across operations. UNHCR has been able to improve its household-level data collection expertise and capacity through partnership with the World Bank Joint Data Centre, and there may be additional opportunities for joint monitoring.

Further, important contributions by UNHCR through its facilitative role with government and private sector are not being captured in reporting that only counts direct beneficiaries. As the livelihoods sector of UNHCR moves more toward operational partners and capacity building and as improved monitoring continues to develop, new outcome and impact indicators are needed to measure systems-level changes.

MINIMUM CRITERIA CONTRIBUTION TO EFFECTIVENESS (KEQ 2)

KEY FINDINGS:

UNHCR first released the Minimum Criteria for Livelihoods Programming in February 2015 to bring greater accountability and quality assurance in livelihoods programming, but has recognized the need to shift and adapt these guidelines since their initiation.

The vast majority of e-survey respondents view every component of the MC as contributing to their desired livelihood and protection outcomes. Many operations appreciated the structure provided by the MC, which improved the design, efficiency, and quality of activities. Market and value chain analyses, livelihoods strategic plans, guidance on livelihoods expertise required for staff, and the targeting components are considered the most helpful. Poor partner capacity (related to UNHCR's partner selection) is the most commonly reported challenge of implementing the MC, as well as insufficient funding such as to cover the costs of conducting ongoing market assessments.

Many operations need technical guidance and support for conducting rigorous assessments, monitoring and impact measurement. Baseline, assessment and monitoring activities were considered useful, where available; though the quality and availability of these monitoring activities are often constrained by partner capacity, resources, and the one-year timing.

“In general, UNHCR is limited in monitoring and evaluation activities, there is a great need to have dedicated staff for this domain.” ~Cameroon UNHCR Staff

Overall, the ET finds the shift to the Minimum Economic Recovery Standards (MERS) for guidance in cases of future livelihoods programme implementation (direct or funded through partners) to be appropriate.


UNHCR'S ROLE IN LIVELIHOODS (KEQ 3)

KEY FINDINGS:

Most UNHCR livelihood operations acknowledge the important role UNHCR has in coordination with government and development actors, including advocacy for policies at the national level. The evaluation finds there is room for improvement in operations' coordination with financial service providers (FSP).

Over half of operations believe UNHCR is best positioned as a facilitator and/or capacity builder in their operational context, partnering and coordinating with other stakeholders to include refugees in their programmes (see figure below). Many operations see this as the long-term vision of UNHCR’s role, but

UNHCR is best positioned in livelihoods as...



Source: Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

there are concerns about how this role would mean less work on the ground.

UNHCR livelihood staff see a clear comparative advantage for their work; UNHCR knows refugees and the legal framework more than any other humanitarian or development actor. Other themes on why UNHCR should be involved in livelihoods include: UNHCR can drive policy on economic inclusion. UNHCR is positioned to be the bridge of the humanitarian-development nexus for refugee livelihoods. UNHCR should be a lead coordinator/convener around refugee livelihoods. Finally, UNHCR should continue to do protection work with an economic inclusion lens, though careful not to over-protect, as building livelihoods involves an empowerment mind-set.

“In as much as we fund operations, it’s about time we (UNHCR) moved from active involvement into a facilitation, coordination and advocacy role. We should rather support existing stakeholder systems to better render services to refugees...and for nationals inclusive in a holistic and comprehensive approach.” ~Senegal UNHCR staff

Sustainability, scalability, and enabling environments. Two-thirds (67 per cent) of e-survey respondents felt the sustainability of their livelihood programme was unlikely (if UNHCR funding ended). Recognizing this, many operations are shifting to development-oriented and systems-level approaches. Joint programming with United Nations agencies and other development, government, and private sector actors appears to be growing among operations. The ET finds there is opportunity for learning from and expanding these partnerships. UNHCR has an important role to play as a convener of the livelihoods sector coordination as it relates to refugees. It is critical that UNHCR is at the table in conversations that involve the humanitarian-development nexus and refugee contexts because UNHCR knows refugees. UNHCR should be part of the conversation not only about refugee protection but also about refugee livelihoods and economic inclusion.

The ET’s analysis of political and economic ‘context typologies’ shows the major constraints and fluidity of the operating environments in which UNHCR is implementing the programmes, which relates closely with the resilience and shocks discussions above. In contexts with the ‘best’ political and economic enabling environments, UNHCR’s role is best as facilitator, linking PoC to government and private sector systems. These are contexts with the most potential for going to scale, working on transformative capacities and institutional level change. In contrast, the operations with poor political and economic enabling environments are contexts where UNHCR’s focus will be primarily in protection and safety nets, i.e., absorptive capacities. In this context, UNHCR still has a role in building the foundation for self-reliance and development through the provision of basic needs (e.g., education), advocating with government, donors, private sector and development actors to make investments in refugee livelihoods.

Overall assessment

The evaluation shows that UNHCR's Global Strategy for Livelihoods (2014-2018), with its focus on economic inclusion and market-based activities, **has initiated a positive shift within the global portfolio of livelihood interventions**. UNHCR's livelihood programmes have increased partnerships with government and development actors, including other United Nations agencies. The programmes are learning and adapting from the new ways of working with private sector, financial service providers, and various government entities. In many COs, the conceptual linkages have been made that connect the mandates of protection and durable solutions with livelihoods; protection and livelihoods teams are working together to promote livelihoods for vulnerable PoC in many cases.

Yet, there are significant challenges limiting the impact and scale of UNHCR's livelihood programmes. The annual budget cycle, small budgets, and poor partner selection/capacity for many of the operations are key factors affecting the effectiveness, sustainability, and reach of interventions. The political, legal, security, environmental, and economic environments have a substantial effect on the ultimate achievement of refugee economic inclusion. Given that most UNHCR programmes are operating in contexts of protracted displacement, shocks will be a mainstay of the operational context, which is why a resilience framework is key.

TANGO recognizes that a fundamental question for the livelihood strategy moving forward is not only *how* to do livelihoods, but *if* UNHCR should do livelihoods. The ET concludes that yes, UNHCR should be involved in livelihoods, but in a strategic role. UNHCR has the comparative advantage of knowing refugees and understanding the legal frameworks that best enable refugee self-reliance. **UNHCR has a key role to play as a facilitator of systems and policies that enable refugee access to economic and financial inclusion, and a key role in continuing to ensure protection throughout the humanitarian-development continuum**. In all, these roles build the foundation of refugee access to basic services and systems on which economic and development activities will depend.

UNHCR must continue in its protection work but with a more intentional livelihoods and resilience lens in building **absorptive** capacity. To build **transformative** capacity, UNHCR should be a key advocate, leader, and coordinator/convener in the refugee livelihoods sector. The evaluation finds that UNHCR is not the best positioned to do the work of building **adaptive** capacity of refugees at the individual or household levels. UNHCR should coordinate with partners operating at scale to fill that role of individual-based livelihood interventions: e.g., vocational trainings, business start-up, financial literacy, language learning, individual work permit applications, etc. UNHCR simply does not have the livelihood budget and expertise to implement these activities at scale; however, UNHCR should be ensuring the protection aspects are included by the partners who take on these activities. UNHCR can build bridges with development organizations and private or financial sector partners, giving them 'access' to refugees and data while continuing with the protection focus. This does not mean UNHCR will never contribute funds to income-generating activities; in some contexts, UNHCR pilots of the Graduation Approach or seed money will be necessary to leverage donor funds or other strategic, large-scale partnerships.

In addition to the evaluation findings on programme effectiveness and impact, this conclusion is based off consistent evidence of how UNHCR staff and partners perceive UNHCR's strategic positioning and capacity in livelihoods. UNHCR's role in building absorptive and transformative capacities of refugees is not only a good fit with the organization's strengths, but also contributes key pieces to the larger 'puzzle' of resilience and durable solutions for refugees. This is a role that should be harnessed by UNHCR as a whole, not just through its livelihoods unit, and it will strengthen its credibility with partners and donors. **From the resilience point of view, UNHCR is a crucial actor in developing the pathway to resilience and lasting solutions for refugees, and in being a bridge in the humanitarian-development nexus for refugees.**

Overview of recommendations

Note: All recommendations are directed to the Livelihoods Unit at HQ with the assumption that the recommendation will be used to inform the revised livelihood strategy in 2019 and its implementation (2019-2023), and that the recommendations will be implemented in coordination with other UNHCR units/sectors as necessary.

I. **By the end of 2019, UNHCR should define its role in relation to self-reliance and resilience—a coherent and mainstreamed resilience strategy is needed.** The concepts of resilience have not yet been incorporated into strategy and design for most programmes. There are many livelihood programmes already contributing to the resilience capacities, but a coherent and mainstreamed resilience strategy by DRS is needed. TANGO also suggests the term self-reliance is better defined in relation to resilience.

II. **By the end of 2019, UNHCR should expand MYMP pilots with livelihood plans to key operations across the portfolio, recruit staff with relevant expertise, and increase cross-programme learning exchange.** The Livelihoods Unit at HQ should consider the findings related to 'context typologies' to identify the enabling environments best suited for the MYMP programming (see also Recs V and VI). For those operations that are not selected for the MYMP livelihood plan, the question for them remains on how to best leverage small budgets in the facilitator/capacity builder role. More guidance is needed in the revised strategy on making that transition from funder/implementer to strategic facilitator. Even within the constraints of a one-year cycle, livelihoods teams should be supported to conduct longer-term planning.

The capacities required of livelihood staff will also be different in this facilitator role, necessitating experience in government capacity building, development, and the private sector; guidance on recruiting staff to fill these capacities/skillsets should be provided by HQ. Additionally, the ET finds there is great potential for intra-organizational learning through cross-programme best practice exchanges on various topics related to partnerships with government, private sector, and FSP.

III. **By the end of 2019, orient protection staff, CBI staff, and CO management to the revised Global Livelihoods Strategy and resilience framework; explore how to better integrate livelihoods within the CO.** There is a need for sensitization and training across the organization on the concepts of refugee economic inclusion and resilience, and how it fits within UNHCR's mandate. The Livelihoods Unit at HQ, in coordination with the directives of senior management and the representative as necessary, should: 1) Work with all sectors/units (protection, CBI, and others) to appropriately disseminate the key concepts and action points of the revised strategy to field offices along with their application across the operation; this also includes providing training on the resilience framework. 2) Explore how the livelihoods teams can be better integrated within the structure of COs using best practices from cases like Costa Rica and others. 3) Provide guidance to CO management on how UNHCR's livelihood approach contributes to the country strategy for self-reliance of PoC. This should ensure continuity in the institutional vision for PoC self-reliance and resilience across country strategies.

IV. **By the end of 2019, the livelihood sector monitoring system and impact indicators should be revised based on the new strategy.** The evaluation finds the direction UNHCR has been heading with increased performance and impact measurement (through the revised livelihood monitoring system) is a good one. With the revised strategy, the ongoing monitoring activities, Results-based Management System and Results Framework will need to capture systems-level change per UNHCR's facilitative role. This means measuring contribution not attribution, revising impact indicators to reflect country-wide PoC access to services and systems, and measuring UNHCR's advocacy achievements. The individual/household level economic indicators should be representative of the larger PoC population.

UNHCR should seek out partners with whom to conduct joint household monitoring. UNHCR can also provide data to development actors or support actors to access data on refugee populations.

V. **By the end of 2019, start planning for the phase out of UNHCR-funded activities focused on small-scale livelihood activities.** The Livelihoods Unit at HQ should support the review of all livelihood activities across the portfolio and work with country livelihood programmes to phase out and/or handover to partners all small-scale and individual-based livelihood interventions (e.g., this includes phasing out non-market oriented vocational training activities, for example, as well as handing over those market-oriented vocational trainings currently supported by UNHCR to an organization or institution able to take the activity to scale). The revised strategy should further outline this phased approach: the ET suggests starting with the operations with the largest budgets and number of PoC that have enabling environments and the possibility of improving operational partnerships. The ET recognizes the sensitivity of this recommendation.

VI. **By the end of 2020, re-orient livelihood programmes to partner at scale and focus on systems change.** In line with the institutional mapping suggested in the recent Livelihoods Global Strategy Concept Note, livelihood programmes should continue to identify key government and development partnerships to pursue, with a focus on those partnerships that create opportunities to reach a larger scale of PoC in the country. Some programmes may need additional guidance on how to work effectively with 'bigger players' drawing on best practices from Turkey, for example. The programmes should also undertake a systems mapping to identify the gaps in systems or policies that are roadblocks to PoC economic inclusion. A joint advocacy strategy to address these gaps should be developed. Finally, the revised strategy should encourage CO management and livelihoods teams to leverage UNHCR's knowledge of refugees to be in the convener role of the livelihoods sector and to be engaged in conversations on the humanitarian-development nexus.

VII. **By the end of 2020, with the support of the representative, develop a plan for incorporating the economic inclusion and resilience concepts into consistent messaging provided to PoC and partners, and into resettlement criteria.** This recommendation is not asking that protection, CBI, or other staff change their core capacities, but that they have an integrated approach to their work. Through Recommendation III, operation staff and management will already be oriented to the concepts of economic inclusion and resilience. Livelihoods teams with the colleagues of their operation must then work together to provide appropriate and consistent messaging to PoC on these concepts, while also working with relevant partners to address issues around aid dependency and eventual graduation from safety nets. This recommendation is intended to help deal with the vulnerabilities and refugee attitudes (especially those pertaining to ideas of resettlement) that have developed in some contexts. In addition, the Livelihoods Unit at HQ should continue to explore with the Division of International Protection (DIP) the pathway of resettlement via labour mobility (i.e. resettlement criteria not only based on vulnerability but also on the potential for skills/labour market inclusion potential).

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List of Abbreviations

AGD	Age, Gender, and Diversity
CBI	Cash-Based Initiatives
CO	Country Office
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DRS	Division of Resilience and Solutions
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
ET	Evaluation Team
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FSP	Financial Service Provider
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HQ	Headquarters
IDI	In-Depth (Individual) Interview
IGA	Income Generating Activities
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization on Migration
IP	Implementing Partners
KEQ	Key Evaluation Question
KII	Key Informant Interview
MC/ MCCA	UNHCR's Minimum Criteria for Livelihoods Programming/ Minimum Criteria Compliance Assessment
MERS	Minimum Economic Recovery Standards
MFI	Micro-Finance Institution
MYMP	Multi-Year and Multi-Partner
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development- Development Assistance Criteria
OL	Operating Level
PoC	Persons/People of Concern
RO	Regional Office
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
TANGO	Technical Assistance to Non-Governmental Organizations International
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme



I. Introduction

1. The intended users of this evaluation are the UNHCR Senior Executive Team, the Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion Unit, the Division of Resilience and Solutions (DRS), Regional Bureaux/ offices (ROs), and Country Offices (COs), and their partners. The secondary audience includes other humanitarian and development actors working in refugee contexts.

I.1. Evaluation background

2. **Purpose, scope, and objectives.** The overarching purpose of this evaluation is to gather strategic and timely evidence on the effectiveness of refugee livelihoods programming during the last strategy period from 2014-2018¹ to inform the forthcoming revised 2019-2023 Global Strategy and the Livelihoods & Economic Inclusion Concept Note. The evaluation will also influence the livelihoods implementation within UNHCR and external to UNHCR through partners, which ultimately seeks to improve the economic inclusion of refugees and other people of concern (PoC).² The evaluation serves a dual purpose for learning and accountability within the organization, commissioned by the UNHCR Evaluation Service as a centralized evaluation as per the 2016 Evaluation Policy.³ To accomplish this objective as outlined in the terms of reference (TOR), Technical Assistance to Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO) International, selected through a competitive bid, conducted a theory-based evaluation. This included review of the global livelihoods portfolio and field visits to five case study

¹ UNHCR (2014). Global Strategy for Livelihoods: A UNHCR Strategy 2014-2018. Division of Programme Support and Management.

² This section is drawn from the TOR for this evaluation, unless noted otherwise.

³ UNHCR (2016). UNHCR Policy on Evaluation. Geneva.

operations: The Republic of Turkey (referred to as ‘Turkey’ for remainder of the report), Rwanda, India, Costa Rica, and Ghana.

3. This evaluation is timely given the international discourse around the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR),⁴ with the corresponding Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework⁵ (CRRF), and the New Way of Working- Humanitarian-Development nexus.⁶ The evaluation has corporate significance, with UNHCR undertaking organizational change processes such as the multi-year/multi-partner (MYMP) approach⁷ and seeking to better position itself as a strategic partner and advocate on refugee livelihoods. In addition to the revised livelihoods strategy and concept note, it is of particular importance for UNHCR internally with changes and shifts underway related to direct funding for livelihoods interventions, with the establishment of the DRS at UNHCR headquarters (HQ), and with the Minimum Criteria (MC) for Livelihoods Programming underway since 2015. **In all, the results of this study will inform the future UNHCR livelihoods strategy and strengthen UNHCR’s strategic positioning with other actors in this area.**

4. As explained in the TOR for this evaluation, income insecurity, labour discrimination, and social marginalization are correlated with increased protection risks for refugees and all people of concern (PoC) seeking to engage in livelihoods activities. This need has led UNHCR and partners to seek a more integrated approach to livelihoods programming, an approach that aims to support PoC towards economic inclusion. This means supporting PoC to be able to make decisions about their lives and how they will engage in the local economies, to build their assets, and strengthen their income-generating skills and capacities. In line with UNHCR’s two-pronged mandate of protection and finding permanent solutions, the Concept Note explains: “Economic inclusion contributes to the self-reliance and resilience of refugees, empowering them to meet their needs in a safe, sustainable and dignified manner; avoids aid-dependency and negative coping mechanisms; contributes to their host economies; and prepares refugees for their future whether they return home, integrate in their country of asylum or resettle in a third country.”⁸ UNHCR seeks to improve the impact of their livelihoods programming utilizing a market-driven and results-oriented approach. This evaluation seeks to assess UNHCR’s livelihood strategy in relation to both its desired approach and its mandate.

5. **Evaluation questions.** There are three key evaluation questions (KEQ) addressing the topics of effectiveness, programme quality standards, and UNHCR’s role of being fit for purpose. The full KEQ and sub-questions include:

KEQ 1: How effective are UNHCR-funded livelihood interventions in reducing protection risks, strengthening resilience, and improving employment, income and/or savings levels of targeted persons of concern?

- 1.1 Under what conditions are UNHCR-funded livelihood operations more or less effective in reducing protection risks, strengthening resilience capacities, and improving employment, income and/or savings of targeted persons of concern?
- 1.2 What salient processes, mechanisms and conditions in UNHCR-funded livelihoods operations create an enabling environment for increased protection, employment and self-reliance, and strengthened resilience among persons of concern?

⁴ United Nations (2018). Global Compact on Refugees, final draft. 26 June.

⁵ CRRF countries include: Panama, Chad, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Mexico, Belize, Kenya, Rwanda, Honduras and Zambia. Source: http://www.globalcrf.org/crrf_country/

⁶ TOR for this evaluation; and UNHCR (2018) Livelihoods brainstorm presentation v.2. PPT used for meeting 12 Feb.

⁷ UNHCR (2017). Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme. 68th Meeting, 21 February. EC/68/SC/CRP.6.

⁸ UNHCR (2018) Refugee Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion: 2019-2023 Global Strategy Concept Note.

- 1.3 What are the typologies of protection risks and vulnerabilities targeted by UNHCR-funded livelihoods programmes? What experience and lessons learned can UNHCR draw from to inform future programming strategies that integrate livelihoods and protection?
- 1.4 How can UNHCR better measure resilience capacities and outcomes? What are the links between UNHCR livelihoods programming and resilience in different contexts? And between protection outcomes and resilience?

KEQ 2: To what extent is there a positive correlation between desired livelihoods programme outcomes (primarily increased employment, income and savings levels of persons of concern) and high adherence to UNHCR's Minimum Criteria for Livelihoods Programming standards?

- 2.1 Do some of the Minimum Criteria contribute more to the desired protection and livelihood outcomes of interest than others? If so, which ones?
- 2.2 What have been some of the benefits/challenges of introducing the Minimum Criteria on UNHCR-funded livelihoods programming, such as the design, implementation and quality of programmes delivered to beneficiaries?
- 2.3 How, if at all, has the Minimum Criteria changed the quality of partners that are funded by UNHCR Livelihoods? How, if at all, has this affected the strategic pivot of Livelihoods teams to engage outside partners, as operational partners (i.e. partners who bring their financing)?
- 2.4 What changes have occurred, if any, in public perception of UNHCR's approach to Livelihoods programming as a result of implementing the Minimum Criteria? Particularly, how have the improved programmes, particularly revisions to measuring outcomes through improved monitoring, increased their understanding of programme outcomes and potential longer-term impacts?
- 2.5 In cases where there is a gap in services working toward economic inclusion of persons of concern and UNHCR has to implement livelihoods programmes, are there further guidelines in addition to the Minimum Criteria that should be followed?

KEQ 3: What are the different roles UNHCR has played in livelihoods programming? What has worked well in such roles and what are some constraints? What are lessons learned to inform the next iteration of the livelihoods strategy going forward?

- 3.1 In cases where UNHCR takes on more of a convening/facilitating role and less of an implementing role, what are some best practices? How can UNHCR add the most value in those situations?
- 3.2 What internal and external factors and conditions should help determine what UNHCR's role in livelihoods should be in an operation? How has UNHCR livelihood programme design taken different operational context typologies into account?

6. In addition to the KEQs outlined above, TANGO applied the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development- Development Assistance Criteria (OECD-DAC) to this evaluation as an overlay with the existing evaluation questions. This includes effectiveness, efficiency, and impact (KEQ 1); relevance/appropriateness, effectiveness, and efficiency as they relate to the MC (KEQ 2); and relevance/coherence and sustainability (KEQ 3). This report is organized around the first and third KEQs, which address the effectiveness of the livelihood programmes and the role of UNHCR. In order to keep this report focused on the strategic aspects of UNHCR's engagement with livelihoods, the detailed findings related to the MC (KEQ 2) are included in Annex 3.

Box 1: Note on report outline

Note to the reader:

TANGO intentionally focused this report on KEQ 1 and KEQ 3. See Annex 3 for findings related to KEQ 2.

1.2. Evaluation framework

1.2.1. Resilience conceptual framework

7. As shown in the KEQs above, concepts of resilience are integrated into KEQ 1, and a draft resilience conceptual framework was developed during the evaluation inception phase to better understand how UNHCR's livelihoods strategy fits with the model. The conceptual framework has been revised by the ET based on the findings of this evaluation and may be found at the end of this section (Figure 1). **The resilience framework is applied to the findings throughout the report.**

8. Resilience is used because it is a concept that connects UNHCR's stated aim of economic inclusion with the agency's two-pronged mandate of protection and finding permanent solutions: i.e., without resilience capacities promoted at household, community, and national levels, PoC will not achieve economic inclusion, nor self-reliance, and will face continued protection risks; this state of vulnerability further limits their options for dignified durable solutions. This logic is included in the GCR/CRRF, and is echoed in the most recent UNHCR Global Strategy Concept Note on livelihoods.⁹ The overarching aim of economic inclusion initiatives is to build resilience by improving the employment, income, and savings levels of PoC, which means also improving the community and systems level enabling environments for resilience.

UNHCR DEFINES RESILIENCE AS: THE ABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS, HOUSEHOLDS, COMMUNITIES, NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SYSTEMS TO PREVENT, ABSORB AND RECOVER FROM SHOCKS, WHILE CONTINUING TO FUNCTION AND ADAPT IN A WAY THAT SUPPORTS LONG-TERM PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, PEACE AND SECURITY, AND THE ATTAINMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.¹⁰

9. According to UNHCR's Theory of Change on "how social protection and resilience enables protection and lasting solutions,"¹¹ the livelihoods and labour-market interventions, alongside household and community contingency planning and risk management efforts, together with protection-sensitive measures across different sectors (health, education, protection-based cash transfers, etc.) all contribute to strengthening resilience. These outputs lead to improved outcomes such as greater economic inclusion and community social cohesion, diversified income sources and livelihood strategies, and positive coping strategies. With these improved outcomes, people of concern have the capacity to face shocks and stressors such as displacement, natural hazards, or economic and social risks without a deterioration in their well-being or livelihood source, thus enabling lasting solutions with protections assured.

10. Strengthening resilience means building resilience capacities at household, community, and systems levels. Resilience capacities are the potential for proactive actions to be taken or systems to be in place so that households and communities can deal with shocks or stresses. Resilience capacities and the responses that support resilience are contextual. TANGO has worked with international development partners to identify and measure three types of resilience capacities: absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and transformative capacity.¹² These are defined below along with a listing of the capacity indicators that TANGO has seen evident in UNHCR livelihoods programming.

11. **Absorptive Capacity is the:** Ability of households and communities to minimize exposure to shocks if possible and to recover quickly after exposure.

⁹ UNHCR (2018) Refugee Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion: 2019-2023 Global Strategy Concept Note.

¹⁰ UNHCR (2017) Applying Social Protection and Resilience Approaches to UNHCR Action. By A. Mitchell. June.

¹¹ UNHCR (2017) Applying Social Protection and Resilience Approaches to UNHCR Action. By A. Mitchell. June.

¹² Vaughan, E. (2018) *Resilience Measurement Practical Guidance Note Series 3: Resilience Capacity Measurement*. Produced by Mercy Corps as part of the Resilience Evaluation, Analysis and Learning (REAL) Associate Award.

- **Informal Safety Nets:** Formation of community-based groups, such as savings groups of refugees and hosts, that can help households in times of need.
- **Bonding Social Capital:** (e.g., connected to informal safety nets, above, it is seen in the bonds between community members) It involves PoC groups or cooperatives based on trust, reciprocity, and cooperation, which is often drawn on during shocks to help each other to cope and recover.
- **Asset Ownership:** Business and productive assets, including livestock, gained through the programme.
- **Household Savings:** Promoting PoC savings so that these resources can be used to cope with a shock in place of negative coping strategies such as distress sale of productive assets, taking children out of school to work, or taking on consumptive debt.
- **Local Shock Preparedness Plan and/or Protection Structures:** Enabling refugee participation in local or municipal disaster preparedness plans (for natural hazards). Shock mitigation also includes raising PoC awareness of how to prevent protection risks such as through sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) prevention trainings, conflict management committees to ease tensions between refugee and host communities, or PoC knowledge of how to report employer abuses.
- **Availability of/access to humanitarian assistance:** Emergency safety nets, access to food assistance, shelter and non-food items (NFI), etc.

12. **Adaptive Capacity is the:** Ability of households and communities to make pro-active and informed choices about their lives and their diversified livelihood strategies based on changing conditions.

- **Livelihood Diversity:** Training PoC in new skills that allow them to diversify their income sources and assets.
- **Human Capital (education/training):** Building PoC language learning, basic literacy, primary or higher education, and trainings received for technical and soft skills.
- **Access to Financial Services:** Programming links PoC to bank accounts, loans, micro-credit.
- **Psychosocial Adaptations:** Promoting PoC confidence, perceived ability to adapt, and to be self-reliant.
- **Social Networks and Bridging Social Capital:** (e.g., social ties with the host community and others in different risk environments their community can draw on when local resources are insufficient or unavailable) Some PoC may heavily depend on remittances, for example. For UNHCR livelihood programming, ties to the host community indicate greater social inclusion.
- **Exposure to Information:** This may include financial literacy and market information.


13. **Transformative Capacity is the:** System-level changes that ensure sustained resilience, including formal safety nets, access to markets, infrastructure, and basic services.

- **Access to Basic Services:** UNHCR enabling PoC access to nearby health centres, primary schools, security services, etc.
- **Access to Employment and Markets:** UNHCR advocating policy changes regarding PoC access to work permits, mobility, land, and formal employment in all sectors.
- **Access to Formal Safety Nets:** UNHCR enabling PoC access to Government, non-governmental organizations (NGO), or UN- provided food or cash assistance for relief or for the most vulnerable.
- **Access to Infrastructure:** UNHCR enabling PoC access to adequate water and sewerage systems, shelter, electricity, telecommunications, paved roads.

- [For pastoral/rural areas] Access to Livestock Services or Natural Resources: UNHCR enabling PoC access to livestock/agricultural extension and veterinary services, communal grazing or farming land.
- Linking Social Capital (e.g., this type of social capital is perceived as a vertical link between a network and some form of authority or power) For example, UNHCR may advocate that a refugee group leader is designated to participate in local government decision making.
- Collective Action and Social Cohesion: PoC and host communities working on building community assets together. Social tensions resolved through community peace building and conflict resolution.
- Gender Equitable Decision Making: Women's empowerment in livelihoods promoting equitable household decision making.
- PoC Participation in Local Decision-Making: PoC involvement in local governance, and local government responsiveness to PoC.

14. Figure 1 shows the theory of change for building resilience capacities within the resilience framework for refugee livelihoods programming. Revisions made to the conceptual framework based on evaluation findings are discussed in the overall assessment of Section 4.1.

Figure 1: Resilience conceptual framework for refugee livelihoods



1.3. Evaluation methods

1.3.1. Overview of methods

15. TANGO utilized a mixed-methods and layered approach to integrate primary and secondary data from multiple sources, both internal and external, and across institutional levels (i.e., UNHCR HQ, RO, and CO levels). TANGO's study design ensured the range of Age, Gender, and Diversity (AGD) perspectives are included and presented in the results. The evaluation team (ET) selected methods to ensure triangulation of information across data sources and to help the team answer the three key questions. The main methods are comprised of a thorough desk review of secondary data and literature, and primary qualitative and quantitative data collection.

16. **Desk review.** The secondary data includes over 1,100 background and programme documents received by TANGO. This includes documents specific to the case study countries as well as background documents to the evaluation, livelihoods monitoring data from Focus and the revised livelihood monitoring indicators where available¹³, and both internal and external data and reports (shared by UNHCR) relevant to the global livelihoods strategy. The ET also reviewed the recent findings of decentralized evaluation in Chad, Guinea, and Benin.¹⁴ Recognizing the limitations in the quality and consistency of the secondary livelihood monitoring data, the ET employed extensive primary qualitative data collection to help the ET explain “what, why and how” results were or were not achieved.¹⁵ See Annex 1 for additional description of the methods.

17. **Five case studies.** The case studies included field visits for “rapid evaluation” and “deep dive” evaluation. The case study countries were selected by the HQ team commissioning the evaluation; discussion of the country selection is provided in Section 2.2. All case studies used the same tools and general approach, the main difference being the number and extent of interviews that could be conducted based on the amount of time in the field. The rapid evaluation case studies (Ghana and Costa Rica) involved 6-7 days of fieldwork with a hybrid TANGO-UNHCR team collecting the data. The deep dive case studies (Turkey, Rwanda, India) involved scoping missions¹⁶ followed by 12 to 14-day evaluation missions. The rapid and deep dive study protocols were jointly agreed by all stakeholders.

18. The tools for the primary qualitative data collection generally remained the same when used across case studies in order to allow for comparison and synthesis across cases, with some minimal tailoring to each context. The tools are provided in Annex 4. Qualitative interviews were conducted with the following target groups:

- Focus group discussions (FGDs) with refugee livelihood programme beneficiaries (separate tools for camp-based and urban)
- Key informant interviews (KIIs) with UNHCR Regional Bureaux, CO, and sub-offices (conducted both in-person during inception meetings and field visits as well as via phone/Skype)
- KIIs with host community members benefiting from the programme: community leaders, community members, and/or market vendors
- KIIs with government at various levels (local and national)

¹³ Secondary monitoring data from Focus, and the revised livelihood monitoring indicators (baseline) are available for 30 countries.

¹⁴ Decentralized evaluation is also underway in Niger but was not completed in time to include in this report.

¹⁵ It should be noted that the proposed study design included primary quantitative data collection in Rwanda and India in order to gather outcome indicator results. The methods were adjusted during the inception phase to omit the quantitative survey component. See 1.3.6 Limitations for more discussion.

¹⁶ The Turkey scoping mission was held in Geneva, to be coordinated with the team leader's inception meetings.

- KILs with partners (implementing and operational partners) and other programme stakeholders
- KILs with private sector/financial service institutions
- In-depth interviews (IDIs) with refugee or host community beneficiaries, some of these IDIs being positive deviants (PDs) (see Annex 1 for further description)

19. **Staff e-survey and interviews:** The staff e-survey and follow-up KILs with a sub-set of operations provided the evaluation with primary data on UNHCR's global livelihoods portfolio. The e-survey, programmed through Survey Monkey, was sent to livelihood operation and sub-operation staff of 75 countries, which represents the entire UNHCR global livelihoods portfolio. More than one survey could be submitted per country operation if there were multiple sub-operations including livelihood activities or if the livelihood activities under the country operation differed significantly by context or target population group. The survey consisted of two main sections: 1) approximately 35 true/false, multiple-choice, and open-ended questions related to the livelihood staff's opinions and experiences related to the operation's livelihood programming, and 2) requested information about the full profile of activities in their operation/sub-operation, including a listing of each livelihood activity, locations implemented, target groups, number of PoC targeted, partner names, and 2018 planned spending (see Annex 5 for the e-survey tool).

20. The UNHCR Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion Unit then proposed a list of 15 countries for follow-up interviews, which were completed with the following 13 countries: Syria, Mauritania, Kenya, Ecuador, Pakistan, Niger, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Mexico, Uganda, Malawi, Chad, Cameroon. The countries were selected to represent the greatest variation across UNHCR's livelihood portfolio based on regions, local contexts, types of activities, and size of the programme.

1.3.2. Evaluation team

21. The TANGO team consisted of three TANGO executive officers and two consultants, together they have many years of experience, complementary skills and technical expertise. The team also received desk-based support by TANGO research associates. The fieldwork for the rapid evaluations was conducted by a joint TANGO-UNHCR team with the aim of building the capacity of UNHCR staff in the area of livelihoods assessments. For the deep dive cases, HQ and CO staff joined the TANGO team for data collection activities as they were able. TANGO largely relied on the UNHCR CO to identify their own staff, partner staff, and/or to identify local translators for hire to assist the teams with the qualitative data collection. In the Rwanda and India cases, two additional national consultants were hired to join the TANGO consultant for the fieldwork.

1.3.3. Sampling strategy

22. The ET used a purposive sampling strategy to draw the qualitative sample from the refugee programming sites to be included in each case study. The sampling strategy included two steps: first to determine the criteria for field sites to visit, and secondly, to determine the eligibility criteria for beneficiary selection within each site visit. The sampling process was done in close consultation with the UNHCR HQ and respective CO stakeholders. The TANGO teams used the following criteria to select field sites to visit:

- Size and characteristics of the refugee camps or urban areas;
- Accessibility related to security or weather conditions; and
- Sites with specific challenges, achievements, and issues of interest relating to current and future livelihoods activities.

23. The second step of sampling was to draw the beneficiary sample. TANGO tailored eligibility and sample selection criteria for each context. In general, the teams aimed for an equal number of male and female FGDs, conducted separately. Within that gender stratification, the FGDs were selected based on age groups and refugee/language groups as necessary. The beneficiary participant selection strove to reflect diversity in terms of success in the programme i.e., being 'better' or 'worse' off, in order to limit the bias that only the most successful programme participants would be selected to participate. This data collection strategy also allowed for comparability across case countries.

1.3.4. Data collection

24. Table 1 shows a summary of the primary data collection, including all interviews conducted during inception/scoping meetings and evaluation field missions, the e-survey responses and follow-up interviews. The primary qualitative data collection included a total of 463 FGDs participants, 63 IDIs with beneficiaries including positive deviants, and KIIs with 281 UNHCR staff and stakeholders. The e-survey collected 102 responses from operations and sub-operations representing 74 countries. The country response rate for the e-survey is 99 per cent. Following the e-survey, follow-up interviews with 27 UNHCR staff were conducted representing 13 countries. See Annex 2 for the interview lists.

Table 1: Summary of primary data collection activities

Data collection from inception/scoping meetings and field missions				
	Dates (2018): (excluding travel)	Beneficiary FGD participants:	Beneficiary and PD IDIs:	KIIs with stakeholders:
Geneva Inception Meeting	24-25 July	N/A	N/A	22
Ghana	13-20 August	127 (56 male/71 female)	15 (8 male/7 female)	63
Costa Rica	11-17 Sept	36 (15 male/21 female)	2 (1 male/1 female)	38
Turkey	Scoping: 25-26 July (in Geneva) Evaluation: 10-19 Sept	50 (31 male/19 female)	3 (2 male/1 female)	52
Rwanda	Scoping: 13-16 Aug Evaluation: 18-28 Sept	130 (63 male/67 female)	15 (7 male/8 female)	49
India	Scoping: 20-24 Aug Evaluation: 10-21 Sept	120 (40 male/80 female)	28 (18 male/10 female)	30
Total:		463 (205 male/258 female)	63 (36 male/27 female)	254
Data collection from staff e-survey and follow-up interviews				
	Dates (2018):	Country survey sample	Countries with min. one response:	Total response/ interviews:
E-survey	12 Oct – 2 Nov	75	74	102
Follow-up interviews	29 Oct – 9 Nov	15	13	27 (15 male/12 female)

1.3.5. Data analysis

25. All FGDs and KIIs were recorded by the designated note-taker, which is in most cases the TANGO team member. For Costa Rica, the notes were recorded in Spanish and translated to English. Qualitative information was transferred into matrices (aligned with the evaluation matrix) and analysed to identify patterns in responses and specific contextual information that helps to address the KEQs and to explain other responses or data. During the analysis, the aggregated notes were useful tools to ensure

that qualitative information could be quickly, concisely, and coherently presented either on its own or integrated with other survey results. During the TANGO quality assurance process, a TANGO staff (who was not involved in the country interviews) confirmed the reliability of the data analysis and interpretations.

26. Triangulation refers to the analysis process of cross-checking the reliability of information in order to draw conclusions across data sources. For this study, responses from participants were triangulated between FGDs, KIIs, and others to cross-check the reliability of information and to identify differences in perception between groups based on gender, age, disability, social or economic status, or ethnic group. Findings from the primary data were also assessed in relation to the secondary data. As a case study approach, the case studies are used to highlight and elaborate the findings drawn from the global portfolio review (including secondary data, decentralized evaluations, the e-survey and e-survey follow-up interviews). Descriptive analysis of the e-survey data was conducted using Survey Monkey and Excel functions. TANGO then integrated the results with the findings of the qualitative data in the main report.

1.3.6. Limitations/Considerations

27. Firstly, the evaluation did not collect quantitative household data. The proposed study design included primary quantitative data collection in Rwanda and India in order to gather household level outcome indicator results. During the inception phase planning meetings, TANGO sought to understand the motive and expectations of UNHCR (HQ and COs) around the household survey in order to develop the sample design and tools. For Rwanda, it became evident that a household-based survey would not be feasible given the evaluation timeline and the necessary approvals required by the government. For India, a survey would need to be stratified across locations and refugee groups, as well as translated into multiple languages in order to collect quality data, which would not be possible with the allotted budget. In addition to feasibility issues (timing and budget), the household survey results would have been limited in their contribution to findings on outcomes and impact attributable to UNHCR interventions due to the lack of baseline data for comparison. TANGO concluded that primary quantitative data from these two case studies would not significantly contribute toward the assessment of the global livelihoods strategy and that the survey resources could be better spent to that end. The ET thus expanded in-depth qualitative fieldwork in India and Rwanda and expanded the review and analysis of the global portfolio in order to better address the KEQs, including sub-questions on resilience.

28. Secondly, at the request of UNHCR, the e-survey was designed not only to solicit respondent opinions about livelihood strategies, but also to replace the annual MCCA survey. The rationale behind a survey of dual objectives was to avoid possible confusion of administering two distinct surveys to the same sample of staff at once. The e-survey contained one thread of questions requesting respondents to express their level of agreement with certain statements or propositions and to share their experiences, and a second thread asking for factual programme profile information. The survey was sent as a link via email directly from UNHCR to maximize the response rate, given UNHCR's good record of attaining close to 100 per cent response rate in past MCCA surveys and the familiarity of COs with this annual information request. UNCHR's role in managing the survey and the data collected via Survey Monkey was limited to the initial and reminder emails to respondents; TANGO maintained sole control of all aspects of survey administration and analysis.

29. While the cover email and the first page of the survey explained that survey input would not be associated with specific respondents in any reports of findings, the limitation with the survey administration process used is that respondents may not have perceived the survey as independent or fully confidential, which may have created response bias. In other words, respondents may not have felt free to express their views fully or honestly. During the e-survey follow-up KIIs, TANGO engaged the survey respondents on this topic and did not find any sentiments of discomfort or hesitancy related to the

survey being sent by UNHCR HQ rather than an independent party. Another possible limitation to the e-survey is that due to time and budget constraints, the survey was only available in English; thus, comprehension of some of the questions was difficult for respondents who are not fluent in the English language.

30. Also related to the e-survey, the analysis was descriptive in nature. This should be noted in the interpretation of the results. While some differences between camp-based and urban operations are discussed in the report, the differences have not been tested for statistical significance.

31. Thirdly, it should be noted that while the case studies were designed as rapid and deep dive, this distinction did not end up being a meaningful one. The rapid evaluations were only a few days less in length than the deep dive evaluations, and the number and types of interviews conducted between the two types of cases were still comparable. For instance, Ghana (as a rapid evaluation) interviewed 63 KIIs, while Turkey (considered a deep dive evaluation) conducted KIIs with 52 stakeholders. The context for arranging and conducting interviews led to more variation in the interviews than the type of case study. This would be a limitation in the design, if it were critical to ensure different case study types, but in actuality, this blurring of case study types did not impact the quality of the case studies conducted for this evaluation.




2. Overview of global portfolio and case studies

2.1. UNHCR’s global livelihoods portfolio

32. At the global level, several factors have contributed to the evolution of UNHCR’s approach to livelihoods. ET interviews at UNHCR HQ explained the organizational shift that occurred to integrate the humanitarian-development nexus approach, and that to do so, the recognition within the organization that multi-year programming is needed. The interviews reported that the majority, an estimated 70 per cent, of UNHCR’s portfolio represents contexts of protracted displacement. Thus, the livelihoods framework must be closely linked to UNHCR’s predominant mandates around protection and durable solutions.

33. According to e-survey responses by operation, half of UNHCR’s livelihoods portfolio is centred in Africa (50 per cent), followed by operations in Latin America (18 per cent), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA, 16 per cent), Asia and the Pacific (9 per cent), and Europe (7 per cent) (Figure 2). The e-survey showed that 77 per cent of livelihood operations included PoC living in urban areas or out-of-camp, and 53 per cent of operations include PoC living in camps, thus, there is overlap with about one-quarter of country operations including both urban and camp populations. This report will refer to the results in shorthand as ‘urban PoC’ and ‘camp PoC’.

Figure 2: UNHCR livelihoods portfolio by region



Source: Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

34. The operating budget level of UNHCR livelihood interventions peaked in 2017 at approximately US\$ 89.5 million operating in 72 countries and reaching an estimated 1.2 million PoC.¹⁷ In 2018, the budget fell to US\$ 70.7million but in a slightly larger number of countries (75 countries). The total UNHCR operating level (OL) livelihood budgets from 2014 to 2018 include:

- **2014:** US\$ 69,181,648
- **2015:** US\$ 62,869,115
- **2016:** US\$ 64,250,100
- **2017:** US\$ 89,511,214
- **2018:** US\$ 70,728,939

35. The UNHCR-supported interventions over the past five years have taken many forms depending on the level of programme resources and capacity, operational context, and target group.¹⁸ The livelihood strategies include: advocacy work for enabling policies on economic inclusion; contributing to the evidence base for inclusion through research and data; building strategic partnerships with governments, other United Nations agencies, humanitarian and development actors, private sector and NGOs; connecting PoC to wage- and self-employment opportunities; providing access to financial services or business assets/start-up; providing apprenticeships and vocational or business trainings; supporting improved agricultural practices; and implementing the Graduation Approach.¹⁹

Box 2: Most common interventions in UNHCR livelihood portfolio 2018

- Vocational training (58%)**
- Agricultural interventions (50%)**
- Artisan livelihood opportunities (43%)**
- Entrepreneurial trainings (36%)**
- Facilitating access to financial services (31%)**

UNHCR (2018) Livelihoods brainstorm presentation v.2. PPT

36. The most common UNHCR interventions include: vocational training, implemented across 58% of country operations, followed by agricultural interventions in half, then artisan livelihood opportunities, entrepreneurial trainings, and facilitating access to financial services; the Graduation approach is implemented in 11% of operations (see Box 2).²⁰ Some country operations have a high number of different types of interventions within a single operation. For instance, Zambia’s livelihood operation implements nine interventions,²¹ while Burkina Faso, Kenya (urban), and Togo implement just one less—eight total interventions. For countries with multiple

livelihood sub-operations, this number of interventions is multiplied for each field operation.

37. Many UNHCR field operations have been shifting away from funding the implementation of livelihoods activities, instead taking on more of an advocacy/convening role to have PoC included into existing programmes with partners such as government line ministries, development actors, private sector and civil society. The shift towards inclusion yields benefits such as greater sustainability and scalability of programmes and services offered to persons of concern, a collaborative, multi-stakeholder approach based on the comparative advantages of each actor, as well as increased efficiency through the elimination of duplicative efforts (this is discussed further in findings related to UNHCR’s role KEQ 3). The

¹⁷ UNHCR (2018) 2015-18 Budgets, Excel spreadsheet and 2014 figure provided by HQ Livelihoods Unit. It should be noted that these figures do not include livelihood-related activities that an operation may include under a different objective.

¹⁸ TOR for this evaluation.

¹⁹ UNHCR (2018) Livelihoods brainstorm presentation v.2. PPT used for meeting 12 Feb.

²⁰ Argentina, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Mozambique, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
Source: UNHCR (2018) Livelihoods interventions taxonomy. PPT.

²¹ Assets/start-up kit, Agriculture, Artisan, Business creation, Entrepreneurial training, Financial services, Graduation, Network facilitation, Vocational training

shift toward an economic inclusion framework also meant the “Livelihoods Unit” became known as the Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion Unit in 2018.

UNHCR Rationale for a strategy of economic inclusion for refugees:²²

Improving livelihoods through economic inclusion is a key component of achieving protection and solutions outcomes for persons of concern. Economic inclusion entails access to labour markets, finance, entrepreneurship and economic opportunities for all, including vulnerable groups.

Economic inclusion contributes to the self-reliance and resilience of persons of concern, empowering them to meet their needs in a safe, sustainable and dignified manner, avoid aid-dependency and negative coping mechanisms, contribute to their host economies, and prepare for their future whether they return home, integrate in their country of asylum or resettle in a third country. Economic inclusion starts from the beginning of the asylum-seeking process, and leveraging the provision of humanitarian assistance at this stage can lead to better outcomes for persons of concern in later phases of displacement.

2.2. Country case studies

38. **Overview of country selection and context.** The evaluation included primary data collection in five case study countries: Ghana, Costa Rica, Turkey, Rwanda, and India. See the separately attached case study reports for more detailed findings. The countries serving as case studies (both rapid and deep dive) for this evaluation represented different operational contexts and some key programming characteristics from which to draw learnings for the evaluation of the global livelihoods strategy. The countries were selected based on evaluability (i.e., refugees are locatable, available data such as baselines, the programme focuses on improving employment and income/savings, etc.), achievements across focus indicators and the MCCA, and the mix of interventions and contexts:²³ They were also selected in view of participation with the CRRF, World Bank International Development Association (IDA)18, and/or MYMP strategies.

39. Table 2 provides a summary of the case countries by total PoC and target beneficiaries, livelihoods budget, number of beneficiaries, and by the camp versus urban context.

Table 2: Case study countries, livelihood programmes at a glance

Country	Total PoC	2018 targeted beneficiaries¹	2018 Planned OL Livelihoods Budget²	Camps or Urban
Ghana	13,178	609 PoC ^{1a}	US\$ 800,000	Both
Costa Rica	17,822 (Aug 2018)*	2,190 PoC	US\$ 413,980	Urban
Turkey	4 million	5,348 PoC ^{1b}	US\$ 5,902,176	Both
Rwanda	150,821	800 PoC	US\$ 546,270	Both
India	39,072	1,257 PoC ^{1c}	US\$ 274,635	Urban

²² UNHCR (2018) Refugee Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion: 2019-2023 Global Strategy Concept Note.

²³ UNHCR (2018) Livelihoods brainstorm presentation v.2. PPT used for meeting 12 February; UNHCR (2018) Livelihoods centralised evaluation, country brief presentation v.2. PPT used for 24 April briefing; UNHCR (2018) Livelihoods centralised evaluation, planning discussion. PPT. 8 Mar; UNHCR (2018) Priority Countries, PPT. 13 Apr.

^aAugust 2018 figure from the Inception Report. Due to the recent political situation and civil unrest in Nicaragua, the influx of people seeking security and better conditions in Costa Rica has considerably increased throughout 2018. Current estimates as of October 2018 include a total of 15,500 PoC from Nicaragua.

¹ Source: Case study reports unless indicated otherwise. ^aGhana figure is for the main partner only, ADRA. ^bTurkey figures are for training beneficiaries only, from Turkey Operation Livelihoods Interventions PowerPoint (12 July 2018).

^cIndia figure is from the India Country Operation Plan 2018 narrative, though the case study interviews indicated that the 2018 targets were unlikely to be achieved.

² Source: UNHCR (2018) 2015-18 Budgets, Excel spreadsheet provided by HQ Livelihoods Unit.

40. **Rwanda**, a context with a large population of camp-based refugees along with urban-based refugees who have chosen to settle outside of the camps, was selected as a 'deep dive' case study because of its high achievement across UNHCR indicators yet low average MCCA scores (68 per cent for FY15-17). As of August 2018, Rwanda was hosting approximately 150,821 refugees, 53 per cent of whom are long-term refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); 47 per cent are more recent arrivals from Burundi. Less than one per cent are from other countries. The Government of Rwanda has provided a good enabling environment for refugee livelihoods. In response to the UNHCR Global Strategy for Livelihoods, UNHCR Rwanda began assessing the potential for livelihood activities in 2014. UNHCR Rwanda is facilitating a private sector approach to livelihoods programming, providing seed money and access to refugees to private sector and social enterprise partners. These partners provide training in business management, access to markets and to financial services.

41. **Ghana** represents a 'rapid evaluation' case study that includes both camp- and urban-PoC and represents the MYMP approach in the West Africa region. The programme has achieved one of the highest average MCCA scores (94 per cent for FY15-17) across the global portfolio. As of July/August 2018, Ghana was hosting about 13,178 refugees, comprised mainly of 6,992 Ivoirians and 3,513 Togolese with the remainder from Liberia, Sudan, Syria, and other countries. About 4,900 refugees, most of whom are Ivorian, live in Ampain and Egyeikrom camps while the remaining refugee population has settled around host communities and in urban areas. Ghana has a favourable legal and policy framework for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers in the country. UNHCR Ghana funds and coordinates with partner organizations that implement activities focused on business skills development, start-up kits, and access to financial services.

42. **Costa Rica** is a unique case study included for 'rapid evaluation' as it represents the CRRF approach in the Latin American region, involves an urban refugee context, and the operation implemented the Graduation Approach from 2014-2017. Costa Rica has a favourable legal and policy framework for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers in the country. It is also an important case study as the number and diversity of PoC have recently increased significantly from about 11,000 PoC in 2017 to over 17,822 by mid-2018, due to the recent political situation and civil unrest in Nicaragua. This has required strategic adaptations by the CO. The programme has included a mix of seven interventions, which is one of the highest numbers of interventions across the global portfolio. Interventions include livelihoods and entrepreneurship trainings, cash grants, legal assistance, job placement services, and guidance on labour market opportunities. Since 2017, the CO has implemented a multi-partner approach in which partners have provided employment services and training and produced employment reports aimed at identifying sectors of the national economy geared for potential employers. The programme is also among the highest average MCCA scores (87 per cent for FY15-17).

43. **Turkey** represents the Syria crisis and the largest refugee response globally. Turkey was selected as a 'deep dive' case study because of the importance of the Syria refugee response. UNHCR Turkey's achievement in the MCCA has been high from 2016-2017, exceeding 90 per cent. An audit in 2016 showed gaps in the livelihood programming approach and monitoring that needed to be addressed, another reason for inclusion in the evaluation. As of October 2018, Turkey was hosting over 3.9 million, mostly urban, PoC: comprised of 3.5 million Syrian refugees as well as 170,000 from Afghanistan, 142,000 from Iraq, and the remainder from Iran, Somalia, and other countries. Since the start of the

Syrian crisis, the Government of Turkey has been working on legislative and institutional reforms to ensure their national asylum system is in compliance with international standards. In April 2013, Turkey's Parliament endorsed its first asylum law, and the Government adopted the Regulation on Work Permits of Refugees under Temporary Protection in January 2016. UNHCR Turkey has the second largest livelihood programme budget in the world, after Syria. Livelihood intervention priorities include: enhancing capacities of national systems and increased cooperation; increasing access to skills, language, and vocational training according to market demands and individual interest; increasing refugee access to information and services leading to employment; and facilitating and strengthening access to enterprise development, and greater market access.

44. **India** is a 'deep dive' case study and involves an urban-refugee context. PoC are mostly dispersed in the informal economy of major urban areas of the country such as Delhi, Jaipur, Mewat, Faridabad, and Hyderabad. As of August 2018, India was hosting approximately 208,381 refugees, of which, the CO has registered 27,441 refugees from 28 countries and 11,631 asylum seekers as the populations of concern. India is not signatory to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, nor does it have a national refugee law. However, it continues to grant asylum to a large number of refugees from neighbouring States and respects UNHCR's mandate for other nationalities. Tibetan and Sri Lankan refugees are protected and assisted by the Government, while UNHCR is directly involved with groups arriving from other countries, notably from Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Somalia, among 40 nationalities of asylum seekers. Based on socio-economic assessments by the programme, the Rohingya in particular have the most households compared to other refugee groups who fall into the extremely poor and poor categories. Many refugees lack the requested documents to find employment and, thus, face problems with being able to work in the formal sector, opening bank accounts, and accessing government schemes implemented for the poor. Overall, it is an operational context that has faced changing levels of government support toward refugees. The programme includes a mix of seven interventions, which is one of the highest numbers of interventions across the global portfolio. The programme has high achievement across UNHCR indicators and the highest average MCCA scores across the portfolio (96 per cent for FY15-17).

45. Please refer to the full case study reports for detailed background and findings for each country. Links to the reports may be found in Annex 2.



3. Evaluation Findings

3.1. Effectiveness (KEQ 1)

Key findings

Effectiveness and impact

- The revised livelihood monitoring indicators (results from 15 countries) combined with e-survey results and KII on the topic of impact show beneficiaries experienced at least moderate increases in income, savings, and access to employment and business opportunities.
 - The impact results apply to a small number of PoC in each programme.
 - For the areas of access to loans from a financial institution, access to formal and long-term employment, the results are variable.
- Across data sources, the livelihood programmes are shown to positively contribute to household well-being and protection outcomes: food security, education of children, safety, reduced SGBV, women's empowerment, etc.

Factors affecting results

- Main internal factors hindering efficiency and effectiveness are limited budgets and the barriers of the one-year project cycle.

- Enabling internal factors are livelihood team capacity, intra-office cooperation, and support by the CO management and CO strategy for innovative shifts in the economic inclusion approach.
- Programmes have adapted activities based on past learning to improve livelihood and protection outcomes, such as clearly linking vocational training to job markets, promoting integration of refugee and host communities, and making adjustments to financial inclusion activities to achieve positive results. Though, cash assistance could be better leveraged to build financial inclusion with PoC.
- External factors affecting efficiency and effectiveness are partner capacity (relating also to partner selection, an internal issue) and the legal and economic enabling environments.
 - The ET finds CO livelihood teams need guidance to select private sector and development partners and to expand operating partnerships.
- PoC mind-set is another factor affecting outcomes. UNHCR should assess how dependence on humanitarian assistance (from UNHCR or partners) and its own messaging around vulnerability and durable solutions contribute to PoC willingness to engage in livelihoods.

Monitoring systems to measure impact and resilience

- Recognizing the challenges with the Focus Data, the revised livelihood monitoring system has made great strides in improving the data quality and ability to show impact from livelihood monitoring. Yet, the small sample size of the revised system limits the ability to draw conclusions across the PoC population.
 - UNHCR has been able to improve its household-level data collection expertise and capacity through partnership with the World Bank Joint Data Centre, and there may be additional opportunities for joint monitoring.
- The ability to show impact is hindered by the lack of systems-level measurement, such as where UNHCR is building transformative capacity.
 - Important contributions by UNHCR through its facilitative role with government and private sector are not captured in reporting that only counts direct beneficiaries.

Contributions to resilience:

- Programme staff report high levels of shocks and stressors faced by PoC, which significantly effects the outcomes of the livelihood programmes.
- Resilience programming is a key factor in the humanitarian-development nexus; the dynamic operational contexts of some programmes require contingency planning and the ability to pivot between humanitarian and development activities.
- Many of the operations are building resilience capacities of PoC, but without awareness of how the programme fits into a resilience framework such as that shown in Figure 1.

3.1.1. Effectiveness and impact

46. **UNHCR livelihood monitoring results.** The revised livelihood monitoring indicators are collected directly through *KoboCollect* and available through an online dashboard currently in the test stage: The Integrated Refugee and Forcibly Displaced Livelihoods Information System. In 2017, 15

countries entered monitoring data into the system.²⁴ The sample size for each country is about 100. The total endline sample of 1,918 has been obtained across the 15 countries. The 2017 global indicator results measuring changes from baseline to endline are shown in Box 3, demonstrating significant programme impacts among this small sample of operations.²⁵ Income reportedly increased at endline for 58 per cent of the livelihood beneficiaries and savings increased at endline for 55 per cent. Access to markets increased by 23 per cent at endline, with 93 per cent of beneficiaries reporting access. Access to financial services improved to 53 per cent of beneficiaries, which is a 14 per cent increase for savings services and 11 per cent for loan services. Additionally, (not shown in the box) employment sustainability at endline shows the need for more long-term livelihood opportunities, particularly in non-agricultural work: 49 per cent of agricultural employment is considered permanent, while only 36 per cent of non-agricultural employment is reported for over 12 months.

Box 3: UNHCR Global livelihoods indicator results 2017

- **Income increased (58% of livelihood beneficiaries)**
- **Savings increased (55%)**
- **Employment rate (81%)**
- **Average number of other employed by a self-employed beneficiary (1.4)**
- **Access to financial services for savings (53%)**
- **Access to financial services for loans (53%)**
- **Access to market (93%)**

UNHCR (2018) Global Indicators 2017. Draft 14 August.

47. The Focus Data are a subset of the revised livelihood monitoring indicators, but the data are collected manually or ad hoc, and thus, the data quality differs than that of the global monitoring indicators collected through Kobocollect. There are limited outcome or impact indicators provided through Focus Data. Noting these limitations, see Box 4 for examples of Focus Data results aggregated across 2015-2018. Comparing the results of these two sets of livelihood indicator data may not be possible, as there are significant differences that cannot be explained until all programmes are using the same methods to report indicators: e.g., the global indicators report access to financial services in 2017 at 53 per cent for livelihood beneficiaries, while the 2017 Focus Data report 14 per cent of PoC using banking services. For that same Focus Data indicator, it is unclear why or how the figure jumped from 14 per cent in 2017 to 76 per cent at mid-year of 2018, which exemplifies the data quality in question.

Box 4: UNHCR Focus data aggregated results 2015-2018

- **% of persons of concern graduated from livelihood trainings employed after three months:** 39% in 2015, 34% in 2016, and 0.5% in 2017
- **% of female persons of concern (18-59 years) with own business/self-employed for more than 12 months:** 8% in 2015, 4% in 2016, 3% in 2017, 1% at mid-year 2018
- **% of persons of concern using banking services (e.g. savings, loans, transfers):** 6% in 2015, 14% in 2016, 14% in 2017, 76% at mid-year 2018

UNHCR (2018) Indicator Aggregation Report (Focus Data). Indicator: employed.

48. Further discussion on strengthening livelihood monitoring may be found in Section 4.1.4.

²⁴ Algeria, Argentina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

²⁵ UNHCR (2018) Global Indicators 2017. Draft 14 August.

49. **Decentralized evaluations.** The independent, decentralized evaluation of Guinea’s livelihood programme found positive impacts related to beneficiary household income and savings in the sustainable agricultural livelihoods and income-generating activities (IGA) projects, but it found no positive impact results for income and savings for the micro-finance intervention.²⁶ Some of these results as reported in the evaluation include: In the agricultural sector, almost 10 per cent of beneficiaries have moved from being seasonal employees/self-employed in the agricultural sector to becoming full-time employees/self-employed in this agricultural sector. Also, the interventions in the field have positively impacted beneficiary households both in terms of increased income (for 57 per cent of households) and increased savings (58 per cent) between the consecutive seasons before and after the interventions. The evaluation also found low levels of access to and use of financial services, overall, despite high levels of awareness among PoC about their right to open bank accounts and access services. The study report does not elaborate further on possible explanations for this finding. Finally, about 83 per cent of the beneficiaries in Guinea believe the livelihood programme has improved their quality of life.

50. The decentralized evaluation results for Benin found that the livelihood interventions had “not translated into a substantial increase in income and most refugees are still struggling to meet their basic needs...Nearly half of households reported that their living conditions deteriorated between 2015 and 2018 and are pessimistic about the future.”²⁷ Taken in context, however, the Benin programme staff explain that the situation for refugees has actually improved beyond that of the host community for various indicators, particularly related to unemployment rates.²⁸ The multi-dimensional poverty rate (including health, education, and living standards) for refugees in Benin has also dropped by 20 per cent among the target refugees over the past three years, according to Benin programme staff, which is substantially lower than the host community.

51. **E-survey impact results (improving adaptive and absorptive capacities).** The livelihood staff throughout UNHCR’s operations are confident in the positive impact they are making in the lives and livelihoods of beneficiaries, even if that impact is not yet quantified and applies to a small number of beneficiaries. Figure 3 shows the staff-reported impacts on PoC household economy and livelihood opportunities. All of the indicators below relate to household adaptive resilience capacity, with the exception of household savings, which is an absorptive capacity.


52. Most staff believe they are making moderate, as opposed to major, positive impacts related to household income, diversification of income sources, and expansion of business/entrepreneurial opportunities. Yet, for the areas of access to loans from a financial institution, access to formal employment, and household savings, staff reported little to no impact for PoC households. These are areas showing room for improvement related to policy as well as partnerships with financial institutions.

²⁶ UNHCR Guinée (2018). Évaluation des interventions de l’UNHCR en matière des moyens de subsistance et d’autosuffisance en République de Guinée de 2012 à 2017.

²⁷ UNHCR Bénin (2018). Évaluation des interventions de moyens de subsistance du HCR au Bénin.

²⁸ Comments on study results from Benin programme staff provided by HQ Livelihoods to the evaluation team on 7 December 2018.


Figure 3: UNHCR staff opinions about livelihood programme impact on PoC household economy and livelihoods



Note: The survey questions also allowed for 'Negative impact' and "Don't know/Refuse" response options.
 Source: Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

53. Staff also reported positive impacts on overall household well-being as a result of the livelihood operations, which relate to household absorptive capacity (Figure 4). Most staff believe there is at least a moderate impact on PoC household ability to keep children in school, access food, live in a safe environment and to be healthy as a result of the programme. Additional impacts noted by e-survey respondents include the strengthening of soft skills, life skills, and overall empowerment, allowing households to be able to make improved decisions about their future.

Figure 4: UNHCR staff opinions about livelihood programme impact on PoC household well-being



Note: The survey questions also allowed for 'Negative impact' and "Don't know/Refuse" response options.
 Source: Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

54. All data sources have shown that the livelihood programme has a positive impact on protection for beneficiaries. Many e-survey comments and KII on programme impacts reported reduced SGBV and other protection risks as a result of reduced stress in providing for household needs because of the

livelihood opportunities, including: increased diet diversity and decreased food insecurity; empowerment of women; improved health and access to education for family members; and improved psychosocial supports and mental well-being.

55. UNHCR's livelihood staff around the global portfolio have anecdotes to share about the achievements of their programme (Box 5).

Box 5: UNHCR livelihood achievements, anecdotes from around the portfolio

Savings groups provide finance and social protection in Tanzania (absorptive capacity):

"Organizing saving groups has been effective in providing not only economic benefit through access to informal finance but also social protection among refugees. Vocational training and agricultural projects that include both refugees and the host communities have promoted peaceful coexistence."

Advocacy enables equal access to financial services in Paraguay (transformative capacity):

"Thanks to advocacy by UNHCR, PoC with an entrepreneurial profile can now access business training courses and technical guidance by Fundación Paraguaya at no cost. Recognized refugees may also access micro-credit under the same criteria as nationals."

Self-reliance in agricultural livelihoods in Angola (adaptive capacity): "Despite limited funds, the Angola operation has encouraged and supported refugees with self-reliance activities... Some farmers are able to earn incomes from the sale of vegetables grown from their farms while others are engaged in trading, thus increasing incomes and nutrition at the household level."

From relief to integration in The Gambia (adaptive capacity): "Prior to 2009, all the refugees were dependent on handouts and relief, but as of today the majority are self-reliant and have integrated themselves into host societies."

Source: Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

56. **Case study impact results.** All case studies collected primary qualitative data from beneficiaries and stakeholders, which confirmed the secondary data presented above that some beneficiaries have indeed increased their income, improved the well-being of their household, and created employment for others, though the measurable economic impacts are small overall. In Ghana and Rwanda, PoC beneficiaries have improved their ability to meet their daily needs and that of their households thereby increasing their resilience to shocks and also enhancing their protection. **Indeed, the ET finds one of the best ways to promote protection for refugees is through livelihoods.**

57. The India case study notes most positive economic outcomes resulting from the programme are not sustainable; yet, the most important achievements have been in building resilience capacities among PoC households and communities, including: social supports and bonding social capital (absorptive capacity), human capital (adaptive capacity) through language training and financial literacy, and women's empowerment through improved joint household decision making (transformative capacity).

58. In Turkey, thousands of refugees have accessed work permits and jobs through UNHCR Turkey's advocacy and capacity building efforts with government and the private sector, which is a focus on transformative resilience capacity. The jobs provide benefits, a minimum wage, and regular income for PoC; some programme participants feel better prepared for various durable solutions. As a result, the refugee employees and their families enjoy regular nutrition and sleep, a benefit reported by a private sector KI. The programme has also worked with the national Vocational Qualifications Authority to ensure PoC have access to the certifications and employment that match their skills and experience (transformative capacity).

59. The Costa Rica programme has ensured PoC beneficiaries have more skills and competencies to compete in the labour market, and the case study (combined with e-survey results) reports that PoC who started working in the partner companies have kept the jobs for more than a year in the majority of the cases, some even receiving promotions. In both Costa Rica and Turkey, the private sector partners/employers have recognized that refugees possess the competencies required to fill their recruitment gaps and they have seen the strengths of a multicultural workforce.

IN COSTA RICA AND TURKEY, THE PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERS/EMPLOYERS HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT REFUGEES POSSESS THE COMPETENCIES REQUIRED TO FILL THEIR RECRUITMENT GAPS AND THEY HAVE SEEN THE STRENGTHS OF A MULTICULTURAL WORKFORCE.


60. In these cases, where UNHCR is mostly in a role that facilitates refugee livelihoods through operational partners with some direct work through IPs, impact cannot only be measured with direct beneficiaries. Otherwise, the most important contributions by UNHCR to refugee livelihoods through its catalytic role with government and private sector are not being captured in regular reporting. Such was a finding by the ET in Turkey: the systems and institutional-level changes need to be captured. Further discussion on strengthening monitoring systems for impact and resilience may be found in Section 3.1.4.

3.1.2. Strengthening resilience to shocks

61. For this evaluation TANGO has integrated concepts of resilience into KEQ 1. To build resilience and to measure resilience in livelihood programmes, the relationship between shocks and responses to shocks, household and community capacities (such as savings, education, or social capital), and their current and future states of well-being must be understood.²⁹ This section begins by describing the exposure to shocks in operating contexts, which shows the importance of using the resilience paradigm to engage in the humanitarian-development nexus, and then evidence is provided of UNHCR programming that contributes to resilience capacities.

62. **Exposure to shocks and impacts.** In all, resilience is the ability of a household, community, and systems to manage or recover from shocks and stresses. This study has found that PoC face high levels of shocks and stressors, inhibiting their livelihoods development and progress toward self-reliance. The reported levels of PoC exposure to various categories of shocks and stressors are high, as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Shocks and stressors faced by urban and camp PoC in past five years



Source: Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

²⁹ TANGO International and Mercy Corps. (2018). Methodological Guide: A Guide for Calculating Resilience Capacity. Produced for the USAID Resilience Evaluation, Analysis and Learning (REAL) Associate Award.

63. Economic or political shocks, including price increases, political instability, widespread unemployment, are the most common faced by 91 per cent of urban PoC and 85 per cent of camp PoC, followed by protection shocks (e.g., widespread SGBV, child marriage, etc.). Conflict shocks (e.g., theft, violence, gangs) also affect over half of both the urban and camp-based PoC. Camp PoC face more climate-related (e.g., drought, flood) and biological (e.g., human, crop or livestock disease) shocks than urban PoC. This makes sense because camp populations are more likely to be located in agricultural and rural areas.

ON AVERAGE, PoC IN URBAN AREAS HAVE FACED 2.9 DIFFERENT TYPES OF SHOCKS OR STRESSORS (OUT OF 5) IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS, AND CAMP-BASED PoC HAVE FACED AN AVERAGE OF 3.4 (OUT OF 5).

64. Some e-survey respondents elaborated exactly what kind of shocks occurred in their contexts. E-survey respondents described common shocks in urban contexts such as changes in government policy toward all/or certain groups of PoC, and declines in the economy thereby increasing unemployment or inflation rates. Prices for basic food items increase in urban areas when climate shocks are drought are felt in agricultural areas. Many urban areas also experience intense climate shocks or natural and biological disasters like the earthquakes of 2015 in Nepal or the Ebola pandemic (2014-2016) affecting many urban areas of Liberia. Urban PoC households may also face violence and extortion due to lack of security and impunity for crime in urban areas. High rates of SGBV and early marriage are also noted, as well as the impacts of generalized xenophobia toward PoC (see quotes below).

*“Above all, poverty pushes many families towards early marriage.”
~Central Africa Republic UNHCR staff*

“In recent years, there is a harmful political language targeting foreigners raising levels of xenophobia in the country. This affects our PoC when accessing public services and labour opportunities.” ~Panama UNHCR staff

65. Many of the same shocks and stressors face PoC living in camps, with some differences. SGBV and child marriage are common scenarios in the refugee camps, which affects the education and livelihoods of PoC, explains an Ethiopia UNHCR staff. Camp-based livelihoods may be more dependent on agriculture and livestock and thus sensitive to climate shocks, with staff particularly noting water scarcity and rainfall variability. Biological shocks, such as disease outbreaks, are reported as widespread in camps with lack of access to adequate health services.

66. **Impacts of shocks.** Not only are the shocks PoC face widespread, but they impact their ability to have successful livelihoods. The vast majority of livelihood staff (91 per cent) reported that these shocks and stressors have a significant effect on the outcomes of their livelihood programming. E-survey staff note that widespread unemployment is a major factor affecting PoC livelihoods and that the economic situation of their context is a major barrier to their programme’s success. These challenges related to context are discussed further in relation to UNHCR’s role in Section 3.2.1.

91% OF LIVELIHOODS STAFF REPORT THAT SHOCKS AND STRESSORS HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE OUTCOMES OF THEIR LIVELIHOOD PROGRAMME

67. **UNHCR and the humanitarian-development nexus.** Considering the dynamic contexts and high level of shocks UNHCR is operating in, a resilience approach is key to the integration of humanitarian-development programming, which is aptly described in the quote below.

“The shocks and stressors combine with other socio-demographic (cultural barriers, low literacy levels, high dependency ratio) and other context-specific factors (poverty) in the refugee hosting area to cause a lag in achieving positive impact. Livelihood interventions are therefore being delivered in a fragile and conflict-affected setting that is fluid, unpredictable and complex. This has resulted in integrated programming to address some of the gaps.” ~South Sudan UNHCR staff

68. A resilience strategy helps programmes pivot from humanitarian to development approaches in areas with protracted crises and chronic stressors. For example, UNHCR supports livelihood beneficiaries with cash transfers in the midst of a shock to prevent distress sales of their productive assets until regular livelihood programming can resume. E-survey respondents commented on the need for this kind of strategic approach in their complex operating environments, paraphrased comments are provided as follows:

- Periods of insecurity in **South Sudan** have led to shifts in financial resources in order to provide critical life-saving activities, but at the expense of livelihood interventions, which often have to be deprioritized. While the life-saving sectors have been argued as key, often they contribute little towards the self-reliance of refugees and tend to undo gains realized as they foster dependency on humanitarian assistance.
- In **Mali**, the insecurity in the north has gradually moved toward the centre of the country. This has made it very difficult for UNHCR Mali to implement programmes and conduct monitoring. The situation remains extremely precarious, and the PoC “unfortunately benefit very little” from the assistance during this time.
- During the elections time, the **Kenya (urban)** operation stopped the provision of livelihood grants because the security situation was not stable, and the refugee businesses were affected; a contingency plan was put in place.
- The operational context is very dynamic in **The Gambia** and keeps changing with circumstances, which can be political, social, economic, or security-related. PoC feel the shocks and stressors of currency exchange rate fluctuations, increased prices for fuel and commodities, climate variations, outbreaks of pests and diseases, population growth, etc. So, implementing livelihoods is challenging and requires a long-term commitment to accompany a refugee through the many shocks to their graduation from UNHCR programmes.

69. **Evidence of UNHCR programming contribution to resilience capacities.** Through this evaluation, TANGO has seen evidence of how UNHCR livelihood programming strengthens the resilience capacities of PoC households, communities, and national systems. Chad is one of the livelihood programmes that explicitly links its programme strategy to resilience, according to the independent, decentralized evaluation of the programme earlier this year.³⁰ The evaluation noted that the operational context in previous years has been marked by a complex emergency with ever increasing numbers of arriving refugees. This influenced UNHCR Chad and its partners to shift their paradigm to one of resilience, which seeks to recognize and strengthen the capacities of individuals and communities to “absorb, adapt and recover from the effects of the risk...through the preservation and restoration of the essential functional structures.”³¹

³⁰ UNHCR Chad (2018). “Assessment External Programs of Livelihoods 2015 - 2017 in the Areas of Refugees in Chad.”

³¹ This is described in the report as (p.8): “In addition to humanitarian assistance, communities of refugees and villages have...developed the micro projects of agricultural activities, income-generating activities and access to micro-finance,

70. Even if not explicitly stated in programme strategies, many operations are building resilience capacities of PoC, but without awareness of how the programme fits into a resilience measurement framework. Some examples are shown in Box 6.

Box 6: Examples of UNHCR strengthening resilience capacities

- **Bridging social capital in Uganda (adaptive capacity):** Some refugees have increased access to land because they negotiated with host community members with whom they've formed relations through livelihoods projects.
- **Building human capital and social capital in southern Mexico (adaptive capacity):** The technical and vocational training has provided asylum-seekers and refugees with skills and social networks through which many have found employment opportunities.
- **Community conflict resolution and social cohesion in Ethiopia (absorptive capacity):** The programme has promoted peaceful co-existence among refugees and host communities through formation of farmer cooperatives that comprises both population groups.
- **Livelihood diversification in Malawi (adaptive capacity):** PoC have diversified their livelihoods activities from proceeds earned from the livelihoods programme. For example, a livestock beneficiary diversified to pig production for commercial purposes.
- **Savings and community credit established in Uganda's South Sudanese operation (absorptive capacity):** The agricultural and non-agricultural micro-enterprise development programme has supported the creation of village savings and loans associations (VSLAs). These community credit structures have provided starter capital to its members who have now established micro-businesses, and many can meet their basic needs.

Source: Case Studies Reports; Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

71. The positive deviant interviews collected during the evaluation case studies demonstrate the resilience and vulnerability pathways of refugees and how UNHCR programmes have contributed to their capacity to face shocks.

72. Table 3 provides an example from Rwanda of Sonia, a restaurant owner in Mahama Camp. Her story shows how the resilience capacities of diversified income sources (e.g., learning to make bricks), savings, asset ownership (her restaurant), access to business training/ information, and aspirations/confidence to adapt have been key to her success. She faces shocks related to floods/heavy rains, and her business is limited by her lack of access to markets outside the camp and by the lack of basic services/infrastructure (i.e., electricity) provided within the camp. She has provided an informal safety net and social support for other vulnerable refugees. Her business in Mahama Camp has given her the confidence to feel that she could have a good life if the durable solution to return home to Burundi were possible in the future.

entrepreneurship and the creation of employment, the operation of alternative and renewable energy as well as the structuring of the living environment.”

Table 3: IDI: Sonia, restaurant owner in Mahama Camp

Age	
0-5	Sonia* was born in Burundi in 1990. When she was three, her father was killed , and she struggled to get school fees. She started school in 1995. She stopped school and restarted or repeated classes depending on when the family could afford it.
24	In 2014 , she completed Grade 12 in Science B. While she was waiting to go to university, the youth in her community were asked to take part in the preparation for national elections. It was not a good experience because she felt forced to participate in the campaigns of the people who had killed her father. There were conflicts during the presidential campaign.
25	She left Rwanda with a childhood friend in 2015 and was among the first refugees in Mahama . Her living situation at first was very hard, living in tents made of plastic sheets and eating corn flour and beans every day. She saw no chance of continuing school. She decided to look for work within and outside the camp. She was lucky as she was among the people making bricks to construct public water taps in the camp; later she worked helping masons at construction sites in the camp. From this, she saved some money and looked for a business to invest in.
28	In 2018, Sonia owns a restaurant that serves 150-200 meals a day and employs four people. She serves plantains, Irish potato, beans, sweet potato, and rice.
	Sonia participated in the Inkomoko Full Programme , which has given her a different way to look at business. As an Inkomoko participant she received business skills training, mentoring, follow-up, and access to loans. Before Inkomoko, her mind-set with the restaurant was that if she could eat and buy a dress, she was satisfied. Before, if she prepared food and people did not come, she did not care, whereas now, she finds out why.
	She estimates her daily profits at Rwf 4000. She knows her recurrent expenses so she knows how much to buy every day as well as what is required for taxes and operating expenses; she puts aside the money to cover these expenses. The rest is profit, which she also uses for personal needs. Even when the price of ingredients increases, she does not raise meal prices because she may lose many clients.
	<u>Challenges:</u> When refugees receive food, people sell food and have money, so business is good, but when refugees run out of food, there is less money and business slows. In the restaurant she only serves food. Sometimes people ask for soda, water, or beer, but she does not have them yet because her capital is still small.
	The restaurant/house often floods in heavy rains. She does not have iron sheets for roofing and cannot afford them. After sunset it is hard to work because the camp has no electricity. Even if she had torches, batteries would cost Rwf 900/day.
	<u>Social networks:</u> Supporting the community is very important. Refugees' main challenge is getting food. Some people beg, and she gives food if she can. She gives some people money, such as mothers who can't feed their children. She does not expect repayment, but these are people who might return and help in the restaurant.
	<u>Aspirations:</u> She hopes to go back home and will use what she earned in Rwanda. By then her partner will have completed his education, and they will have a better life. "My partner and I stayed positive because that was all we had, and we had to survive. With that attitude we were able to work harder and manage what little we had."

*Name was changed. Icon source: Cafe by Made by Made from the Noun Project

3.1.3. Factors affecting effectiveness and efficiency

73. This section discusses factors, both internal and external, affecting effectiveness and efficiency of livelihood programmes. Table 4 shows global livelihood staff views on the top factors hindering their

operation's effectiveness. The table is divided by internal and external factors. The predominant internal factors hindering effectiveness as reported by global staff are limited budget (62 per cent), barriers related to the one-year budget cycle (41 per cent), and situational analysis not adequately applied to intervention design (19 per cent). The main external factor is partner capacity (41 per cent), followed by the lack of interest or engagement with government (27 per cent), and cash or other assistance hindering PoC's desire to participate (20 per cent).

Table 4: Top factors that hinder the operation's effectiveness

Internal factors	
Limited budget and resources	62%
Barriers related to one-year budget cycle	41%
Situational analysis of needs and contextual factors did not adequately inform design	19%
Lack of sufficient monitoring and evaluation of the programme	15%
Targeting criteria and selection of beneficiaries	15%
UNHCR lacking adaptive programme management	9%
UNHCR technical staff capacity	7%
High staff turnover on UNHCR team	5%
External factors	
Partner capacity	41%
Lack of interest/engagement with national and/or local government	27%
Access to cash interventions or other assistance hinder PoC's desire to participate	20%
Lack of engagement with host communities and other community stakeholders	13%
Other (a mix of the internal and external factors above): Lack of government capacity or expertise, government resistance to refugee livelihoods/unfavourable policies, undeveloped economic environment, lack of UNHCR presence on the ground, unplanned/ongoing emergencies in the country, and under-staffed UNHCR livelihood staff, etc.	28%

Source: Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

Internal factors

74. **Main hindering factors: budgets and one-year cycle.** The five case studies confirm the results shown in Table 4: limited budgets and the one-year project cycle hinder programme efficiency and effectiveness. The issue of a small livelihood budget is aggravated by the mandates of a one-year project cycle. The programmes inefficiently spend their limited time and resources on repetitive planning and reporting each year, including the need to complete the MC. One KII noted that raising the issues of the one-year budget cycle is not new, but has, in fact, been discussed as a key challenge within various levels of UNHCR for many years. They have little assurance of resources from one year to the next, which limits their ability to do multi-year planning; this causes a sense of frustration among operations (see quote below).

“Getting a substantial amount of funding for one year and seeing that spent on analysis, but then having no funding the next year creates much frustration. Having external funding opportunities but being told they must be OL is a non-starter for small operations such as Israel. All the reporting on such issues without funding opportunities only serves to deepen the frustration.” ~ Israel UNHCR Staff

75. The ET finds that even with good programme criteria or standards in place, the implementation of the standards and the overall quality and effectiveness of the programmes will continue to be comprised under a one-year project cycle. One KII explained that according to the MC and planning phase guidelines, they are to use wealth criteria for targeting, yet, the use of sufficient targeting criteria is “hardly done.” Instead, they are forced to do a kind of blanket targeting, which leaves many vulnerable households without adequate support: “Because of the timeframe partners are given, they are rushed in the planning and implementing, which comprises the targeting.” This issue was also discussed in the recent decentralized evaluation of the Benin livelihoods programme.³² The evaluation reports that the time pressures of the one-year programme cycle meant the interventions were implemented based on “first come, first served” in order to begin the interventions quickly and did not consider AGD dimensions for targeting. These challenges are further exacerbated through poor partner selection and capacity, which is discussed below under External Factors.

76. **Programme design.** The India case study also reported that programme design quality suffered as a result of the annual cycle. This finding echoes the result shown in Table 4 that programme design is not always informed by adequate context analysis. In the rush to achieve overly ambitious annual targets, insufficient time was taken for comprehensive community and household needs and capacity assessments. For the same reason, insufficient attention was given to early and clear communication to set and manage expectations for refugee roles and responsibilities in engaging with the programme. The programme put more emphasis on market assessments, but without an appropriate understanding of refugees needs, capacities, and expectations, and as a result, the specific economic activities identified based on these assessments received limited uptake.

77. Despite the limitations discussed above, programme design did benefit from adequate formative research in many cases. The case studies and staff KII show that programme design based on thorough market analyses and participant and stakeholder experience enhances efficiency and effectiveness. These assessments are promoted through the components of the Minimum Criteria (MC), a structure that all case studies found useful overall (see Annex 3). The Costa Rica team used the MC along with the guidance of the CRRF, Minimum Economic Recovery Standards (MERS), and previous lessons learnt from the Graduation Model to design the programme, incorporating market analysis to ensure they were building skills of PoC that match demands from private companies.

78. **Main enabling factors: team capacity, commitment, and cooperation.** The case studies show that the capacity and commitment of livelihood teams, other CO teams like protection, and management to support the economic inclusion approach are particularly important to the success of the programme. Intra-office cooperation across programmes and a culture of working together is another significant internal factor. In Turkey, the referral pathway and collaboration between protection and livelihoods teams has been key to promoting safety, dignity, and lasting employment with the most vulnerable PoC. The small, but highly capable, livelihoods team in Turkey has accomplished the most possible through strong relations with operational partners and through strategically managed implementing partners (IPs). The Turkey programme has also benefited from a livelihood team lead with both a private sector and development background. UNHCR Costa Rica adjusted their internal structure to integrate protection and durable solutions into one division with two units, allowing for better coordination and integration between the protection and livelihoods teams.

79. In Rwanda, the small livelihoods team has been effective due to its strong relationship with well-chosen operational partners whose approach fit with the CO’s strategic livelihoods approach. The shift away from traditional NGO partners to more private sector partners in Rwanda has been made possible through management support and a CO-wide strategy that envisions refugees as self-reliant contributors

³² UNHCR Bénin (2018). Évaluation des interventions de moyens de subsistance du HCR au Bénin. Decentralized evaluation conducted by independent consultants: Kotchikpa Gabriel Lawin Ph.D. and N'tcha Judicaël Moutangou, June.

to the development of Rwanda. The CO has demonstrated an interest in innovation and new approaches by partners, in particular by moving from a supply-driven training approach that prepared refugees for jobs with scarce demand to a more market-responsive approach.

80. **Internal learning and adaptive management.** One KI with UNHCR staff stressed the point that UNHCR is a learning organization, with a culture willing to learn, adapt, and improve. E-survey respondents were asked to comment on some of the unintended outcomes (positive or negative) of their livelihood programme and how adaptations were made. See Box 7 for some examples of the lessons that have been learned to improve the quality and effectiveness of programme design and implementation.

81. Recurring themes in the comments involve making ongoing adjustments to targeting and activities based on monitoring and protection concerns, particularly when transitioning from a complex humanitarian response such as Syria. Many of the operations have seen the negative outcomes that arise from vocational or skills trainings that are not directly linked to job markets. The integration of refugee and host communities and markets through the interventions is key, particularly for camp-based refugees as seen in Ghana and Ethiopia. The perceptions that refugees have toward UNHCR must also be considered when connecting refugees to financial service providers (FSP), including micro-finance institutions (MFI). This point was exemplified in South Africa (as shown in the box below), and the Ghana case study found a similar result: PoC were less likely to repay loans if they associated the loan provider with UNHCR. Multiple operations commented on the outcomes, both positive and negative, of new partnerships with FSP, the learning and best practices of which the ET believes could be better collated and shared across operations.

Box 7: UNHCR lessons about unintended outcomes in livelihood programming

In the global e-survey, UNHCR staff wrote the following anecdotes about unintended outcomes they have observed in livelihood programming:

Lesson: the importance of ensuring job/skills training is directly linked to livelihood opportunities

Azerbaijan: “The Refugee Women and Youth Centre regularly organized tailoring courses for women. **Although well intended, the selection was not based on clear targeting criteria nor potential use of the skills obtained.** The instructor was also offering classes in a language which was not common to all. After the course, it was not clear how they would be able to find employment. During evaluations of activities in the Centre, we concluded on one hand that this training has helped women to socialize and learn skills useful as housewives; from a livelihood perspective this activity did not have an impact.”

Nepal (urban): “The office phased out vocational training as a stand-alone activity, unless it is part of concrete business plans and there are **clearly identified niches** in the (job) market.”

Ethiopia: “UNHCR and its partners are simply producing trained unemployed refugee youth in the camps. **Skills training without job opportunities** and market linkages is good for nothing.”

Lesson: the need to monitor unintended consequences of providing livelihood opportunities

Zimbabwe: “The issue of child protection concerns in the irrigation scheme were unintended outcomes in Zimbabwe as some **children skipped school to work in their farming plots.** It was, however, addressed by having a ban of children working in the fields during school learning hours.”

Nepal (urban): “While the office prioritizes job placements, there is a continuous need to actively monitor employment placements in order to **guard against labour exploitation.**”

Lesson: the importance of linking livelihood activities to the local markets and host community

Ghana: “Apprenticeship programmes were implemented on a wholesale basis and also training was done by refugees within the camp. **This was not allowing for refugees to interact with the host**

community/market where they are likely to get most of their customers. This also hindered their ability to communicate or interact in the local language which affects their ability to negotiate for good prices when they sell. The programme therefore was changed from this model to training refugees in host communities.”

Lesson: there is positive potential when PoC are linked with FSPs, but challenges arise when financial services like micro-finance are perceived as offered from UNHCR

South Africa: “The microfinance revolving fund was introduced to disburse micro-loans to PoC. Repayment rates have been low, as beneficiaries have the **misperception that UNHCR-funded initiatives are free to PoC**. The misperception is that PoC assume that the accredited microfinance institution administering the revolving fund is an extension of UNHCR. The unintended outcome is the sense of entitlement of PoC and resultant non-payment. Targeting of beneficiaries will also be refined.”

Panama: “The company that manages our microcredit programme has incorporated beneficiaries of the programme into other types of support such as **access to financing for housing**, for example” (an unintended positive outcome).

Source: Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

82. **Using existing cash transfer systems to promote financial inclusion.** The ET finds that the existing CBI systems could be better used to intentionally promote financial inclusion. This finding was particularly evident in the Turkey case study. The cash transfers to livelihood training beneficiaries delivered by the CBI unit in Turkey are not designed to enable PoC financial or economic inclusion. As to how and when the cash is transferred, the livelihood beneficiaries are treated the same as those PoC receiving a protection stipend i.e., they lose all money not spent from the account at the end of the month, and the account is not building their profile with the financial institution, which could promote their access to other financial products in the future. In all, the ET finds that cash assistance through CBI can be better leveraged for PoC financial inclusion, with the stated aim of promoting PoC access to bank accounts, loans, etc. In addition, if UNHCR Turkey or other COs have a large sum of money in the bank, the bank will be more likely to provide loans to UNHCR beneficiaries.

83. Promoting financial inclusion of refugees, including their future ability to save and access credit, are key indicators of building the economic inclusion as well as the resilience capacities of PoC. This situation is described articulately in the quote below. The ET recognizes the CBI and livelihoods teams at HQ have already started working together on this issue.

“We look at these issues [of providing unconditional cash transfers] in a legal mindset. It takes time to see with an economic and empowering lens. We always think of protection, not marketing and empowering an individual to support themselves individually.” ~Malawi UNHCR Staff

External factors

84. **Partner selection (also an internal factor) and partner capacity.** The e-survey results shown in Table 4 (above) also match with the findings of the case studies and UNHCR staff KIIs. Despite the partner mapping process being a key component of the MC, the capacity of partners selected to implement market-driven activities is a key constraint raised repeatedly in the e-survey and follow-up interviews. While partner capacity is an external factor, the selection of poor partners is an internal issue. One e-survey respondent reported that the partner selection process was “not transparent” and often

resulted in the selection of “weak” partners. From KIIs with UNHCR staff, the selection of partners with poor capacity is attributed to rushed selection due to the one-year cycle and the preference for traditional or known partners such as humanitarian NGOs as opposed to those with development expertise.

85. In the Rwanda case study, selecting the right partners has been key to their success. UNHCR Rwanda works with appropriate partners that are skilled and have been effective during pilot periods. Rwanda is one of eight pilot countries “Delivering as One” (or “One UN”), a framework for coordinating United Nations agencies, The CO’s strategic choice of working with a few IPs is appropriate in this context of camps; according to one camp manager, many organizations, mainly NGOs, have implemented livelihoods programmes in the camps with varying degrees of success but most are not currently functioning due to lack of funding. And as noted above (internal factors), Rwanda and other COs have found that private sector partners have been willing to assume some risk and try new approaches to refugee business, employment, and access to financial services. The ET finds CO livelihood teams need guidance to select private sector and development partners and to expand operating partnerships.

86. **Enabling environment (transformative capacity).** At the systems level, the main external factors either serving to hinder or enable an effective and efficient programme are the political/legal and economic environments conducive to refugee economic inclusion. These context typologies are discussed further in Section 3.2.2. According to the e-survey comments and interviews, the ability to achieve impact is limited by the development context (see quotes below).

“The level of impact that we are aiming for is often limited by the rather small scope of the market.” ~Ecuador UNHCR staff

“Due to current high inflation and an unstable economic environment in the country, even if we had a major positive impact it is no longer valid as all people are suffering, especially refugees.” ~Islamic Republic of Iran UNHCR staff

87. **PoC mind-set and UNHCR’s perceived messaging on durable solutions.** The ET finds that the legal framework for PoC residency in a given context combined with the approach of the humanitarian/safety net assistance impact the PoC mind-set. For example, while the Government of Turkey has acted inclusively toward Syrians, their status is still considered temporary, and this affects the mind-set of refugees with regards to if/where they will work e.g., refugees are unsure what will happen with the one-year work permit or they may be unsure of their future plans in Turkey, so they do not want to lose their current benefits by taking formal employment. ET interviews with various stakeholders in Turkey revealed the perception that refugees do not want to work; this may be due to the future uncertainty felt by refugees already noted, as well as to the differences in the work culture in Turkey (e.g., the longer hours of the average work day as compared to Syria, or gender norms regarding women leaving the home to work) and the mismatch of refugee skills with the labour needs in different geographic regions. Multiple Turkish government agencies told the ET that they see the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), implemented by World Food Programme (WFP) through the national safety net programme, as an impediment to refugees seeking formal employment. WFP recognizes that some beneficiaries originally deemed vulnerable through the criteria may be able to be transitioned into livelihood opportunities, and that the cash transfer is a barrier to those beneficiaries seeking self-reliance. WFP is currently assessing and revising the ESSN.

88. This is one case study example of what one in five operations (20 per cent, see Table 4) see as a hindering factor to refugee self-reliance: access to cash interventions or other assistance hinder PoC participation in livelihoods. For the Greece programme, as well, they have experienced the issue that PoC

benefitting from cash assistance are unwilling to actively seek employment or inclusion into national social welfare systems “for fear that their UNHCR salary” will be discontinued.

1 IN 5 PROGRAMME STAFF REPORT THAT ACCESS TO CASH INTERVENTIONS OR OTHER ASSISTANCE HINDER PoC DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE (IN LIVELIHOODS)

89. The Rwanda and Ghana case studies also found that refugees perceive mixed messages around vulnerability, self-reliance, and durable solutions from UNHCR and partners. Rwanda’s FGDs with long-term Congolese refugees reported that their hope for the future is limited; they grew up in the camp but are not citizens, and even with education they cannot get jobs. The desire to be resettled prevents some PoC from making long-term investments in businesses. Multiple KIIs in Rwanda stated that more sensitization is needed about livelihood trainings as a way of promoting self-reliance, protection and durable solutions. Ghana KII similarly explained that many refugees want to be resettled and are not motivated to succeed, particularly in camps, while refugees in urban areas are more likely to be highly motivated to integrate. A factor constraining UNHCR Ghana’s ability to record programme success is that, according to multiple KIIs, refugees understate positive outcomes derived from current livelihood activities because they assume they need to appear vulnerable in order to resettle. Those who accept Ghana as their home are more likely to successfully apply the livelihood skills learned in UNHCR-funded training. These issues, that refugees believe livelihood projects will hinder their possibilities for resettlement and lead to discontinuation of humanitarian aid, are echoed throughout e-survey comments. In this situation, the Mozambique UNHCR staff note the need for strong communication channels with refugees and for UNHCR to engage the misinformation through direct messaging campaigns.

3.1.4. Strengthening monitoring to capture impact and resilience

90. As the livelihoods sector of UNHCR moves more toward institutional partners and capacity building and as improved monitoring systems continue to develop, new outcome and impact measures are needed in order to build from the existing system. This section discusses some indicators already in use by UNHCR and provides examples of measures to better capture resilience capacities, impact and outcomes. According to the e-survey comments and interviews, the ability to show impact is hindered by the lack of adequate impact measurement systems in place.

91. **Household-level monitoring.** TANGO acknowledges the ongoing processes and challenges of developing the livelihood programme monitoring system, and UNHCR has made major positive strides in implementing an improved system. For the Focus Data, it is difficult to interpret some indicators because what the operation staff reported for the numerator, denominator, or indicator figures differ across operations, and the figures may differ from year to year within the same operation with no description to explain the numbers provided. The design and sample of the Focus Data collection activities also vary across operations. Recognizing these challenges with the Focus Data, it is important that UNHCR began monitoring livelihoods outside of Focus through the revised monitoring indicators. These indicators provide crucial evidence to the organization on achievements beyond output level indicators. The revised livelihood monitoring system has also made great strides in improving the data quality of programme monitoring by providing standardized indicator reference sheets and ensuring a cross-sectional sample of 100 across operations. Yet, the sample size for each programme is too small to draw generalizable conclusions on impact about the target population.

92. UNHCR has been working with the World Bank Joint Data Centre to improve its data collection expertise and capacity, and there may be more opportunities for joint monitoring to support ongoing and larger-scale household monitoring. From a resilience lens, what is key about household economic and well-being outcomes is their stability over time and how they allow the household to recover quickly from shocks and stressors. Well-being outcomes should be tracked over time at the household level to

measure if the outcomes have been sustained in the face of shocks, showing how their resilience capacities may be buffering against the negative impacts of shocks.

93. **Monitoring for institutional engagement and transformative capacity.** With UNHCR in the facilitator role, impact cannot only be measured with direct beneficiaries. Drawing from the figures presently previously in Table 2, for example, if just the direct training beneficiaries of the Turkey programme are counted, 0.1 per cent of the total PoC population is reached (5,348/4 million). Across the other case studies, the reach of the UNHCR livelihood programme to direct beneficiaries is extremely small compared to the total number of PoC in country: ranging from 0.5 per cent in Rwanda to 12 per cent in Costa Rica. Thus, systems-level indicators are needed to capture UNHCR's role in building transformative capacity. This necessitates a shift from direct attribution to contribution in UNHCR's Results-based Management System and Results Framework.

94. **Indicator examples.** The existing Focus Data monitoring indicators do include some good measures to track the extent to which UNHCR is engaging with institutional partners and systems, yet, the data quality limits any interpretation of achievements for many of the indicators. For instance, the data for the indicator "Number of UNHCR supported technical training programmes that are accredited (result in a recognized certificate)" report 143 in 2015, 8,126 in 2016, and 87 in 2017.³³ The significant outlier numbers in 2016 for this indicator may be due to some operations misinterpreting the indicator, reporting the number of beneficiaries in accredited training instead of the number of training programmes. Other good output measures if compared across baseline/endline are: number of PoC enrolled in formal national institutions for certified skills training; number of eligible PoC receiving work permits; among others.

95. Within a resilience impact measurement framework, transformative capacity indicators may include those listed below (also see listing in Section 1.2.1):³⁴

- **Local government responsiveness:** PoC perception of the government's ability to meet their needs.
- **Implementation of policies for refugee livelihoods:** Number of government staff with increased capacity to process work permits. Number of PoC out of total PoC of working age to receive work permits.
- **Participation in local decision-making:** Level of PoC participation in decision making within various community-based groups.
- **Shock preparedness and mitigation:** Includes availability of disaster preparedness and risk management plans at the household and community levels.
- **Availability of/access to infrastructure and services:** Water, sanitation, and energy infrastructure, roads, schools, health centres, agricultural and livestock extension services, and formal safety nets or humanitarian assistance as needed.

96. **Measures for financial inclusion related to adaptive resilience capacity.** UNHCR indicators that have the potential to be good output measures for financial inclusion include: number of PoC who hold bank accounts, per cent of persons of concern using banking services (e.g. savings, loans, transfers); number of PoC clients who have used national microfinance institutions or banks; extent persons of concern have formal access to work opportunities in host country (if this indicator is revised with a clear numerator/denominator); among others.

³³ UNHCR (2018) Indicator Aggregation Report (Focus Data). Indicator: accredited training.

³⁴ TANGO International and Mercy Corps. (2018). Methodological Guide: A Guide for Calculating Resilience Capacity. Produced for the USAID Resilience Evaluation, Analysis and Learning (REAL) Associate Award.

3.2. UNHCR's Role (KEQ 3)

Key findings: UNHCR's role in livelihoods programming

- **Most UNHCR livelihood operations acknowledge the important role UNHCR has in coordination with government and development actors, including advocacy for policies at the national level.**
 - **There is room for improvement in operations' coordination with FSP.**
- **Over half of operations believe UNHCR is *best* positioned as a facilitator and/or capacity builder in their operational context, partnering and coordinating with other stakeholders to include refugees in their programmes.**
 - **Many operations see this as the long-term vision of UNHCR's role, but there are concerns about how this role would mean less work on the ground.**
- **UNHCR livelihood staff see a clear comparative advantage for their work; UNHCR knows refugees more than any other humanitarian or development actor.**
- **Two-thirds of e-survey respondents felt the sustainability of their livelihood programme was unlikely (if UNHCR funding ended).**
- **Scalability will not be achieved in most contexts unless UNHCR is in a facilitator role and there is an enabling political and economic environment.**
 - **Many operations are shifting to development-oriented and systems-level approaches.**

Contributions to resilience:

- **Considering the importance of the enabling environment, including linkages with government and private sector partners:**
 - **UNHCR's role in building transformational resilience capacities is crucial. UNHCR's knowledge and experience with refugees is key to being able to fulfil that role.**
 - **UNHCR's role in building absorptive capacity of PoC through protection work and building/facilitating adequate social protection and safety nets for PoC helps to ensure PoC are protected from shocks, which is crucial in protracted displacement contexts.**
- **UNHCR's comparative advantage in building resilient livelihoods for refugees is the facilitator/capacity building role in transformative capacity.**
- **UNHCR should help position other development partners to sustain household-level livelihood activities (adaptive capacity).**


3.2.1. Relevance of UNHCR's role

97. **Perceptions of UNHCR's role.** Ninety percent of the operations surveyed report that UNHCR's role in livelihoods involves coordination with government and development actors (i.e., NGOs) and advocacy work for policies at the national level for refugee economic inclusion (see Table 6, Annex 6). About three-quarters of the operations surveyed report coordination with other United Nations agencies

and with the private sector to promote economic inclusion of PoC. According to these same results, UNHCR's role is less likely to involve coordination with FSPs, reported by 69 per cent of the operations.

98. While in reality UNHCR serves in multiple roles in a given livelihood programme, the e-survey asked the staff which role UNHCR is 'best' positioned for in their context. Perhaps reflecting UNHCR's shifting role in livelihoods, over half (55 per cent) of staff representing UNHCR livelihood programmes in

Figure 6: UNHCR is best positioned in livelihoods as...



Source: Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

the e-survey believe UNHCR is best positioned as a facilitator and/or capacity builder in their operational context, which includes partnering and coordinating with other stakeholders to include refugees in their programmes (Figure 5). E-survey comments note that the facilitator role is best when there are many other actors in their contexts so as to avoid duplication of efforts and when their coordination role between actors is needed. In some cases, other actors may also have more livelihood technical expertise than UNHCR. The ET notes that this role requires a certain skillset of livelihood programme staff

that will need to be developed, recruited and resourced. While there may be less livelihoods work directly with PoC in the facilitator role, there is more work to be done in advocacy and in building the capacity of government and other operational partners, as well as in communicating with and mobilizing PoC groups to access supports and services.

99. Multiple operations commented that they see the facilitator role as the long-term vision (see quotes below); yet, they are currently implementing activities in order to fill gaps until the policies or capacities exist to handover the implementation of livelihood activities to others. There are also some concerns among staff about this transition such as in the case that refugee needs are not handled adequately when handed over to other actors. At the same time, not all activities should be handed over because of poor quality or design.

100. There are also questions about how UNHCR maintain a strong voice in livelihoods sector coordination and monitoring or advocacy with government if their role is strictly facilitative, i.e., there is no 'skin' in the game. One respondent called this "evidence-based advocacy".

"In some contexts in Mexico we should work as a facilitator and capacity-builder, but for example, the local integration programme that requires relocation fills a gap that no other actor has the capacity to fill currently. We hope to show impact with the programme and then advocate for it to be adapted as a public policy and run by private-public partnerships, but this is a long-term goal." ~Mexico UNHCR staff

"In as much as we fund operations, it's about time we (UNHCR) moved from active involvement into a facilitation, coordination and advocacy role. We should rather support existing stakeholder systems to better render services to refugees...and for nationals inclusive in a holistic and comprehensive approach." ~Senegal UNHCR staff

101. Nearly one-third (31 per cent) of staff see UNHCR's role as a funder of livelihood programmes with IPs, and 12 per cent as a direct implementer of the activities (Figure 5). These roles are seen by staff as appropriate in contexts where they do not have the funding and/or expertise to be in the facilitator and advocacy role such as with government, or where government and market infrastructure/services/policies are very weak. Thus, facilitating refugee livelihood support with existing development or private sector actors or into public programmes is not an option. As a funder, UNHCR is seen as being in a better position to attract donor funding in comparison to local actors in a low-resource setting. Direct implementation is chosen when IP capacity does not exist. Finally, in two per cent of the programmes, UNHCR is not seen as an actor that should be involved in livelihood programmes, and the comments relate this to lack of funding to make a difference and to spend these funds rather on education or providing cash (Figure 5).

102. **Why should UNHCR be involved in livelihoods?** Some within UNHCR are asking the question, "Why should UNHCR be involved in livelihoods?" The ET asked this question in interviews with UNHCR staff and stakeholders during the case study data collection and e-survey follow up interviews. Box 8 provides a summary of the themes that emerged.

Box 8: Why should UNHCR be involved in livelihoods?

Key themes across case study and global staff interviews:

1. UNHCR knows refugees.

"Our comparative advantage is knowing the target population."

UNHCR has the data on refugees.

2. UNHCR can drive policy on economic inclusion.

UNHCR is best positioned to know the refugee legal framework that enables economic inclusion.

UNHCR has credibility and partnerships with government at various levels.

UNHCR has the understanding at the local level that builds the base for national policy.

"We can drive the policy from the grassroots up to the national level."

3. UNHCR is the bridge of the humanitarian-development nexus for refugee livelihoods.

"UNHCR is obliged to do something that lays the ground for the development actors."

UNHCR is preparing refugees to be contributors to another nation or to their home country if they can return, which is how economic inclusion contributes to durable solutions.

"You cannot say that someone stays in a camp for 25 years without dreams. You are killing this person. Everyone has a dream. UNHCR is a catalyst to help refugees still achieve their dreams."

3. UNHCR should be a lead coordinator/convener around refugee livelihoods.

UNHCR promotes the convening around refugees.

UNHCR must sensitize other actors on how to work in refugee contexts without doing harm.

"We are not a development agency. We are not the experts in livelihoods. But still our role is very important, to take the lead on this process."

4. UNHCR should continue to do protection work with an economic inclusion lens.

“We should not be the implementer...but if refugees have an issue they can still come to us.”

Ex: When an MFI is checking the portfolio of a refugee, UNHCR can help the MFI know the constraints and risks refugees are facing and if/why they might lose their business.

UNHCR should be careful not to over-protect; building livelihoods involves an empowerment mindset.

Source: Case Study Reports; Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.


3.2.2. UNHCR’s role in relation to context typologies

103. The revised livelihood monitoring global indicators for 2017 show 58 per cent of livelihood beneficiaries have legal access to land, 53 per cent legal access to employment, and 53 per cent legal access to financial services.³⁵ **These results indicate that in nearly half of the livelihood programme contexts, UNHCR is attempting to promote livelihoods and self-reliance when it is politically/legally very difficult to do so.** The e-survey results that follow similarly show the major constraints and fluidity of the operating environments in which UNHCR is implementing the programmes (see quote below). This relates closely with the resilience and shocks discussions above (3.1.2).

“Even after recovering [from Ebola], the current situation in Liberia can degenerate quickly due to the absence of structural political and economic entities. These shocks can thus significantly affect the implementation and achievement of results.”
~Liberia UNHCR Staff

104. Figure 7 shows the extent to which urban and camp PoC have the rights/legal access to work permits, land, movement within the country, and public services.

Figure 7: Political/legal environment of urban and camp operations



Source: Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

³⁵ UNHCR (2018) Global Indicators 2017. Draft 14 August.


105. UNHCR advocacy is crucial in expanding PoC rights related to livelihoods. Camp populations are more restricted in every area. Access to work permits for formal employment, the right to access land and natural resources for livelihoods, and the right to access formal financial services such as bank accounts are the areas with the largest gaps for PoC.

106. The e-survey asked livelihood staff to rate the economic environment of their operations by selecting one of the statements below. The first statement represents a context with few opportunities for PoC economic inclusion, while the third statement represents the most ideal economic environment for PoC economic inclusion.

- 1) Income-earning opportunities are very few for most PoC; they are isolated from major markets.
- 2) There are livelihood opportunities for PoC, but the vast majority are in the informal sector.
- 3) There are both formal and informal livelihood opportunities for PoC, e.g., jobs are available with large-scale value chains and the formal private sector.

107. Most operations are based in contexts with limited formal sector opportunities for PoC, though urban operations are more likely to have these opportunities (Figure 8). Camp-based operations appear to be more likely to be in contexts with little or no income earning opportunities for PoC. This is not surprising given the often remote and isolated locations of camps.

Figure 8: Economic environment of urban and camp operations





Source: Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

108. The evaluation sought to analyse the context typologies of the UNHCR livelihood operations for two reasons: 1) because of the importance the operating environment (political and economic) in the ability to achieve refugee economic inclusion, and 2) because of the differing role or approach UNHCR may assume based on different contexts. The “best” or most favourable political context includes the legal rights of PoC reported above in Figure 7, and the best economic environment means there are both formal and informal livelihood opportunities for PoC (refer back to Figure 8). Based on perceptions of the e-survey respondents, most of UNHCR’s livelihood operations in urban areas, for example, are based in contexts with moderate/good political and economic environments.

109. Table 5 charts how UNHCR may adapt its livelihood approach based on the context typology, i.e., the best and least favourable enabling environments. This applies to both urban and camp contexts. Please note: the UNHCR role described in each cell is meant to provide an example of the livelihood approach in that context and the examples are not mutually exclusive. For example, advocacy work is necessary in every context, but the table emphasizes advocacy for the bottom row because these are contexts with little political support. Protection monitoring is also expected in every context, but is particularly important in contexts with high informal sector employment and little government support or oversight of labour conditions.

Table 5: Political and economic context typologies of UNHCR livelihood operations

POLITICAL CONTEXT	Best 	Good political support, but difficult for government to justify support for refugees when host population is struggling: Work to bring in development actors and donor investment	Good political support with some economic opportunities: Work with government to link PoC to labour market gaps and basic services; match PoC skills with existing industry in favourable geographic areas while ensuring participation of host communities	Best enabling environment: Facilitate system-level changes and coordination, working with operational partners to build capacity and achieve scale
		Some receptivity by government but limited economic opportunities: Focus on protection with some foundational livelihood activities such as building social capital and informal safety nets (e.g., savings groups)	Moderate enabling environment: Work with government to expand work rights and mobility, and focus on developing operational partners who can expand livelihood activities to PoC and host communities	Some political support with a strong economy: Continue working with partners and private sector to advocate for full rights for PoC, including access to land, financial services, work in all sectors, etc.
		Least favourable enabling environment: Focus on providing adequate protection and safety nets and doing advocacy for PoC rights; little room for livelihood programming going to scale	Poor political support with some economic opportunities: Work with partners to put in place a graduation approach for some assistance; ongoing advocacy is needed along with strong protection monitoring	Poor political support with a strong economy: Advocacy work in coordination with private sector is crucial; protection and monitoring of abuses are still important
				Best 
ECONOMIC CONTEXT				

110. The **top-right cell** represents a context of the best political and economic enabling environments. In reality, very few operations will fall into this category. From the ET’s case study work in two operations that may represent this category, Turkey and Costa Rica, the ET finds that UNHCR’s role in this context typology is best as a facilitator, linking PoC to government and private sector systems. These are contexts with the most potential for going to scale, working on transformative capacities and institutional level change and capacity building. The **mid-range cells** likely reflect most of UNHCR’s livelihood programmes, operating in contexts with some political support and some economic opportunities limited to the informal sector. UNHCR’s focus is building strong operational partnerships and working with government to expand access to livelihoods for PoC. In some contexts, like the **top-left cell**, there is a favourable legal framework for PoC in place, yet, the success of the operation is limited by the economic development of the country. UNHCR can work to bring in development actors and donor investment for the benefit of the host community and refugee livelihoods. Finally, UNHCR is operating in some very limiting political and economic environments for achieving refugee economic inclusion, shown in the **bottom-left cell**. These are contexts where UNHCR’s focus will be primarily in providing adequate protection and safety nets, i.e., absorptive capacities, and conducting strong advocacy. By ensuring basic needs are met, UNHCR still has a role in building the foundation for self-reliance and development: e.g., access to education and trainings linked to potential income-earning opportunities.


111. The operating contexts can shift significantly and necessitate an entirely new approach to livelihoods by UNHCR. This was discussed previously in relation to exposure to shocks and the need to build resilience in Section 3.1.2. An example of this from the case studies is India. A few years ago India may have been categorized with the best level of political environment. The changing context is summarized as the following: The Government of India's Ministry of Home Affairs issued an advisory on illegally residing foreigners in August 2017 specifically referring to Rohingya PoC as illegal immigrants and calling for their identification and deportation. A case is filed at the Supreme Court challenging the deportations, yet, the advisory has resulted in a wave of anti-Rohingya sentiments across locations. Consequently, Rohingya refugees and asylum seekers have been exposed to serious physical protection risks, denial of access to services, evictions, and loss of livelihoods. Due to the fragile security situation, the UNHCR livelihood programme in Jammu has been suspended.

3.2.3. Sustainability and scalability

112. **Survey perceptions on sustainability.** On a scale of likelihood, most e-survey respondents felt the sustainability of their livelihood programme was either unlikely (44 per cent) or very unlikely (23 per cent); see Figure 9.

113. This finding on the limited sustainability of UNHCR-supported activities is largely attributed to local governmental or non-governmental partners (if they exist) not having the capacity, resources, or willingness to continue on their own. The issue that refugees do not have a sense of ownership in the programme to help activities continue was also raised. Some respondents linked the lack of sustainability of their programme to the lack of a clear exit or handover strategy. Even if UNHCR livelihood programme funding were to end, a few respondents still felt the CO should continue with facilitation, capacity building, advocacy, and coordination related to PoC livelihood needs and vulnerabilities, particularly in light of high turnover among partner counterparts and government.

Figure 9: Sustainability of UNHCR livelihood programmes



Source: Evaluation e-survey, October 2018.

114. For those respondents who believe UNHCR livelihood programming would be able to continue if funding ended, the main reason is that IPs could continue on with alternative funding sources. In the Republic of Korea, the programme planned to handover activities to the IP but it was a difficult process after the activities had grown dependent on UNHCR funds (see quote below). Staff from Guinea Bissau, Egypt, and others explained that their activities are designed to be sustainable from the start such as by using a community-based protection model.

“Because of this dependency it was complicated for UNHCR to end its funding relationship with the NGO this year. UNHCR had several meetings with the NGO and notified them well in advance about our intention to terminate this year’s contract early so that alternative funding could be found.” ~Republic of Korea UNHCR Staff

115. **Enhancing sector coordination and joint programming.** Some operations report that government or other operational partners including sister United Nations agencies could absorb the activities into their programmes. Joint programming with WFP, International Labour Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and World Bank appears to be growing among operations. The ET finds there is opportunity for learning from and expanding these partnerships. For instance, UNHCR Uganda reports it is opening “the space” for other specialized agencies like FAO and ILO to play a more active role in livelihoods. The Turkey case study concluded that there were several opportunities for better coordination and joint programming involving the UNHCR livelihoods team and the livelihoods sector, such as engaging with WFP in the transition strategy and next phase of the emergency safety net programme. The Turkey programme is already working closely with FAO, UNDP, and the Big Brands working group.

116. In Chad, UNHCR is working together with two NGO consortia on EU-supported projects, which aim to develop refugee hosting areas. Building on its close collaboration with the World Bank, UNHCR Chad is acting in a role to create synergies between the NGO consortia projects, the World Bank’s initiatives, and other programmes such as with UNDP. The Chad (Goz-Bieda operation), for example, is promoting the alternatives-to-camps approach and focusing on a facilitating role with government to ease access to different government services for refugees and host communities. The decentralized evaluation in Guinea similarly found that the programme’s strong partnership and coordination with other United Nations agencies (FAO, WFP) and the government was a best practice.³⁶

117. As described previously in Box 8, UNHCR has an important role to play as a convener of the livelihoods sector coordination as it relates to refugees. The ET finds that it is critical UNHCR be at the table in conversations that involve the humanitarian-development nexus and refugee contexts because UNHCR knows refugees. UNHCR should be part of the conversation not only about refugee protection but also about refugee livelihoods and economic inclusion.

118. **Seeking partners at scale.** Many operations articulated how they are seeking out new types of partners and shifting to a development-oriented and systems-level approach. This entails a new way of working with NGO partners that is not dependent on UNHCR funding, and in many cases, it means changing partners. For some operations, this shift has been supported by the enabling environment being created by the CRRF. UNHCR Rwanda, for example, is responding to Rwanda as a new CRRF country by adjusting their Livelihoods Strategy to include development with the local host communities, among other changes.

119. In all, the ET finds that scalability relates to the discussions above on UNHCR’s role and the context typologies. The ET recognizes that scale (and ultimately sustainability) will not be fully achieved in many of UNHCR’s operational contexts because of the very poor economic or political environments. However, where there is an enabling political and economic environment, there is potential for reaching scale and sustainability if UNHCR is in the facilitation role.

³⁶ UNHCR Guinea (2018). Évaluation des interventions de l’UNHCR en matière des moyens de subsistance et d’autosuffisance en République de Guinée de 2012 à 2017.



LIVELIHOOD
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MUSHROOM
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CONCLUSIONS &
RECOMMENDATIONS

4. Conclusions and recommendations

4.1. Overall assessment

121. The evaluation shows that UNHCR's Global Strategy for Livelihoods (2014-2018), with its focus on economic inclusion and market-based activities, **has initiated a positive shift within the global portfolio of livelihood interventions**. UNHCR's livelihood programmes have increased partnerships with institutional and development actors, including other United Nations agencies. The programmes are learning and adapting from the new ways of working with private sector, financial service providers, and various government entities. In many country offices, the conceptual linkages have been made that connect the mandates of protection and durable solutions with livelihoods; protection and livelihoods teams are working together to promote livelihoods for vulnerable PoC in many cases.

122. Yet, there are significant challenges limiting the impact and scale of UNHCR's livelihood programmes. The **annual budget cycle, small budgets, and poor partner selection/capacity** for many the operations are key factors affecting the effectiveness, sustainability, and reach of interventions. The political, legal, security, environmental, and economic environments are also substantial factors affecting the ultimate achievement of refugee economic inclusion. Given that most (an estimated 70 per cent) of UNHCR programmes are operating in contexts of protracted displacement, **shocks will be a mainstay of the operational context, which is why a resilience framework is key**.

123. TANGO recognizes that a fundamental question for the livelihood strategy moving forward is not only *how* to do livelihoods, but *if* UNHCR should do livelihoods. This evaluation focuses on that strategic level question and frames the conclusion within a resilience framework (refer to Figure 1). The ET concludes that yes, UNHCR should be involved in livelihoods, but in a strategic role. **UNHCR has a key**

role to play as a facilitator of systems and policies that enable refugee access to economic and financial inclusion, and a key role in continuing to ensure protection throughout the humanitarian-development continuum. These roles build the foundation of refugee access to basic services and systems on which economic and development activities will depend. This is articulated well through the quote by a UNHCR staff below.

“Some UNHCR staff conceive of livelihoods only as a development process. It is not. The underlying factor is the need for clarity on the concept. That’s why we have the humanitarian-development nexus approach. We are the bridge activities... You can’t ask a development actor to come in and start from zero” ~UNHCR Livelihoods Staff

124. UNHCR has the comparative advantage of knowing refugees and understanding the legal frameworks that best enable refugee self-reliance. Thus, the evaluation finds that UNHCR has a key role to continue in its protection work but with a more intentional livelihoods and resilience lens, focusing on building absorptive capacity. This contributes to the **absorptive resilience capacity** of refugees by ensuring their safety and dignity, such as by providing access to social protection systems so their basic needs are met. This also means the messaging provided to PoC from their arrival in country may need to be adjusted, for example, to set expectations around livelihood opportunities and to build their confidence to adapt (also a key resilience capacity) from the start. To build **transformative resilience capacity**, UNHCR should also be a key advocate, leader, and coordinator/convener in the refugee livelihoods sector.

125. **UNHCR is not the best positioned to do the work of building adaptive capacity of refugees at the individual or household levels.** UNHCR should coordinate with partners operating at scale to fill that role of individual-based livelihood interventions: e.g., vocational trainings, business start-up, financial literacy, language learning, individual work permit applications, etc. UNHCR simply does not have the livelihood budget and expertise to implement these activities at scale; however, UNHCR should be ensuring the protection aspects are included by the partners who take on these activities. UNHCR can build bridges with development organizations and private or financial sector partners (not the traditional humanitarian NGOs), giving them ‘access’ to refugees and data while continuing with the protection focus. This does not mean UNHCR will never contribute funds to income-generating activities; in some contexts, UNHCR pilots of the Graduation Approach or seed money will be necessary to leverage donor funds or other strategic, large-scale partnerships.

126. In addition to the evaluation findings on programme effectiveness and impact, this conclusion is based off consistent evidence of how UNHCR staff and partners perceive UNHCR’s strategic positioning and capacity in livelihoods. The organizational identity that focuses on protection and legal frameworks will not change overnight, and perhaps it shouldn’t. UNHCR’s role in building absorptive and transformative capacities of refugees is not only a good fit with the organization’s strengths, but also contributes key pieces to the larger ‘puzzle’ of resilience and durable solutions for refugees. In all, UNHCR does not have to be directly engaged in economic activities with refugees to be contributing to refugee economic inclusion and resilient livelihoods.

127. **From the resilience point of view, UNHCR is a crucial actor in developing the pathway to resilience and lasting solutions for refugees, and in being a bridge in the humanitarian-development nexus for refugees.** This is a role that should be harnessed by UNHCR as a whole, not just through its livelihoods unit, and it will strengthen its credibility with partners and donors.

128. In conclusion, **UNHCR’s focus for refugee economic inclusion should be on the absorptive and transformative capacities, and doing these well**; UNHCR should bring in other partners who are able to work at scale on the adaptive capacity component, giving them access to refugees and supporting them through UNHCR’s expertise on refugees. The resilience conceptual framework in Section 1.2.1 (Figure 1) shows UNHCR’s role in yellow boxes based on these evaluation conclusions, showing the bigger picture of how UNHCR’s role contributes to PoC livelihood, protection, well-being, and shock recovery outcomes and to the ultimate goals of lasting solutions and protections assured for PoC. A smaller section of the conceptual framework is also shown below (Figure 10).

Figure 10: UNHCR’s role (shown in yellow boxes) in building livelihood resilience capacities- section of conceptual framework




Figure developed by TANGO International for this report (2018).

4.2. Recommendations

Note: All recommendations are directed to the Livelihoods Unit at HQ with the assumption that the recommendation will be used to inform the revised livelihood strategy in 2019 and its implementation (2019-2023), and that the recommendations will be implemented in coordination with other UNHCR units/sectors as necessary. The recommendations are intentionally high-level in order to allow UNHCR stakeholders to decide the specifics of how the recommendation can best be integrated into the draft of the revised livelihoods strategy. It should be noted that specific recommendations were also provided for each case study, which may be found in the separate case study reports.

I. **By the end of 2019, UNHCR should define its role in relation to self-reliance and resilience—a coherent and mainstreamed resilience strategy is needed.** UNHCR recently established the Division of Resilience and Solutions (DRS), yet, the concepts of resilience have not yet been incorporated into strategy and design for most programmes. DRS is at a crucial juncture for

deciding how resilience and self-reliance are part of the organization (or not). There are many livelihood programmes already contributing to the resilience capacities of PoC, host communities, and host governments/systems, but a coherent and mainstreamed resilience strategy is needed. TANGO also suggests the term self-reliance is better defined in relation to resilience, considering the term's alternative definition used by a major donor (USAID).

II. By the end of 2019, UNHCR should expand multi-year/multi-partner (MYMP) pilots with livelihood plans to key operations across the portfolio, recruit staff with relevant expertise, and increase cross-programme learning exchange. UNHCR's effective contribution to refugee resilience and the humanitarian-development nexus requires a multi-year approach focused on building strong operational partnerships, along with adequate team competencies. The Livelihoods Unit at HQ should consider the findings related to 'context typologies' to identify the enabling environments best suited for the MYMP programming (see also Recs V and VI). For instance, in some contexts facing recurrent shocks and crises, there is also a need for multi-year integrated (humanitarian/development) contingency planning in order to not lose the livelihoods gains while pivoting to/from crisis mode.

For those operations that are not selected for the MYMP livelihood plan, the question for them remains on how to best leverage small budgets in the facilitator/capacity builder role. The recent Livelihoods Global Strategy Concept Note begins to address how/when programmes should decide on their role in livelihoods vis-à-vis other actors and the context, but the evaluation finds that more guidance is needed on making that transition from funder/implementer to strategic facilitator.

Even within the constraints of a one-year budget cycle, livelihoods teams should be supported to conduct longer-term and multi-year planning. The capacities required of livelihood staff will also be different in this facilitator role, necessitating experience in government capacity building, development, and the private sector (e.g., those who have a good understanding of labour market demands, the technical skills necessary for mass production, etc.); guidance on recruiting staff to fill these capacities/skillsets should be provided by HQ. (Partner selection is addressed in Rec. V). Additionally, the ET finds there is great potential for intra-organizational learning by promoting opportunities for cross-programme/cross-country best practice exchanges, such as on municipality and government partnerships, how to manage various private sector partnerships, and how to increase the success of services offered by financial service providers.

III. By the end of 2019, orient protection staff, CBI staff, and country office (CO) management to the revised Global Livelihoods Strategy and resilience framework; explore how to better integrate livelihoods within the country operation. There is a need for sensitization and training across the organization on the concepts of refugee economic inclusion and resilience, and how it fits within UNHCR's mandate. Many livelihoods teams across the portfolio feel isolated with their work because other teams may not fully 'understand' what they do, and some feel outright resistance toward livelihood activities from management and other colleagues.

The Livelihoods Unit at HQ, in coordination with the directives of senior management and the representative as necessary, should: 1) Work with all sectors/units (protection, CBI, and others) to appropriately disseminate the key concepts and action points of the revised Global Livelihoods Strategy to field offices along with their application across the operation, which means, for instance, better leveraging of cash for financial inclusion and developing exit strategies for cash assistance that promote self-reliance; this dissemination work also includes providing training on the resilience framework. 2) Explore how the livelihoods teams can be better integrated within the structure of country operations using best practices from cases like Costa Rica and others. 3) Provide guidance to CO management on how UNHCR's livelihood approach contributes to the country strategy for self-reliance and greater economic and financial inclusion of PoC through advocacy, capacity building, and partnerships with

various stakeholders. This should ensure continuity in the institutional vision for PoC self-reliance and resilience across country strategies.

IV. **By the end of 2019, the livelihood sector monitoring system and impact indicators should be revised based on the new strategy.** The evaluation finds the direction UNHCR has been heading with increased performance and impact measurement is a good one. With the revised livelihood strategy, the monitoring activities, Results-based Management System and Results Framework will need to reflect the bigger picture of capturing systems-level change per UNHCR's facilitative role. This means measuring contribution not attribution, revising impact indicators to reflect country-wide PoC access to services and systems, and measuring UNHCR's advocacy achievements. The individual/household level economic indicators should be representative of the larger PoC population. UNHCR should seek out partners with whom to conduct joint household monitoring (e.g., with the appropriate government ministry, World Bank, United Nations agencies, etc.) UNHCR can also provide data to development actors or support actors to access data on refugee populations.

V. **By the end of 2019, start planning for the phase out of UNHCR-funded activities focused on small-scale livelihood activities.** The Livelihoods Unit at HQ should support the review of all livelihood activities across the portfolio and work with country livelihood programmes to phase out and/or handover to partners all small-scale and individual-based livelihood interventions (e.g., this includes phasing out non-market oriented vocational training activities, for example, as well as handing over those market-oriented vocational trainings currently supported by UNHCR to an organization or institution able to take the activity to scale). The revised strategy should further outline this phased approach: the ET suggests starting with the operations with the largest budgets and number of PoC that have enabling environments and the possibility of improving operational partnerships. The ET recognizes the sensitivity of this recommendation and that it represents a shift away from the case-by-case approach of working with a small number of refugees directly (through funded partners) on livelihoods. These operations should have in place a partnership strategy such that they will no longer spend budget on direct livelihood activities but focus on partnerships, and providing access to refugees and data. UNHCR will continue to be connected to refugees through its regular protection activities.

VI. **By the end of 2020, re-orient livelihood programmes to partner at scale and focus on systems change.** In line with the institutional mapping suggested in the recent Livelihoods Global Strategy Concept Note, livelihood programmes should continue to identify key government and development partnerships to pursue, with a focus on those partnerships that create opportunities to reach a larger scale of PoC in the country. Some programmes may need additional guidance on how to work effectively with 'bigger players' i.e., large-scale private sector or government actors. There are many best practices across the portfolio to draw upon such as collaboration with governmental offices for vocational qualifications/certifications as seen in Turkey, or demonstrated through joint programming with other United Nations agencies. In addition to institutional mapping, the programmes should also undertake a systems mapping to identify the gaps in systems or policies that are roadblocks to PoC economic inclusion. A joint advocacy strategy to address these gaps should be developed with key government, private sector, development, and United Nations partners. The revised strategy should encourage CO management and livelihoods teams to leverage UNHCR's knowledge and understanding of refugees to be in the convener role of the livelihoods sector and to be engaged in conversations on the humanitarian-development nexus.

VII. **By the end of 2020, with the support of the representative, develop a plan for incorporating the economic inclusion and resilience concepts into consistent messaging provided to PoC and partners, and into resettlement criteria.** This recommendation is not asking that protection, CBI, or other staff change their core capacities, but that they have an integrated approach to their work. Through Recommendation III, operation staff and management will already be oriented to the concepts of economic inclusion and resilience. Livelihoods teams with the colleagues of their operation must then

work together to provide appropriate and consistent messaging to PoC on these concepts, while also working with relevant partners to address issues around aid dependency and eventual graduation from safety nets. This recommendation is intended to help deal with the vulnerabilities and refugee attitudes (especially those pertaining to ideas of resettlement) that have developed in some contexts. In addition, the Livelihoods Unit at HQ should continue to explore with the Division of International Protection (DIP) the pathway of resettlement via labour mobility (i.e. resettlement criteria not only based on vulnerability but also on the potential for skills/labour market inclusion potential).

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