Constructing a modern military in Kazakhstan

Roger N McDermott 8/21/02

In July, Kazakhstan fulfilled a preexisting offer by opening an airport near Almaty to the United States Air Force for use in emergencies. The opening prompted speculation that Kazakhstan will become the fourth Central Asian state to serve as a base for American and allied forces in the war on terrorism. But this arrangement may signal that Kazakhstan means to revitalize its own military.

For the time being at least, Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev has denied that his country is deepening its commitments to the United States. Like all Central Asian officials, Tokayev knows that his native armed forces suffer from low standards, inadequate training and small budgets. Despite Kazakhstan's participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program since 1994, and the recent high profile training of its Special Forces by its US counterparts, the military remains undistinguished. So Kazakhstan seeks to build a modern military, in part through contact with the world's sole military superpower.

Kazakhstan has restructured its armed forces without improving their standards, according to former military commissar General Asker Kusmanovich. The country hopes to have professional soldiers comprising half its force by 2010. It has deepened its links with NATO, signing onto an alliance planning and analysis process program on June 9. Kazakh Defense Minister Colonel General Mukhtar Altynbayev has described the American presence in his country as part of an overall push toward a sounder military. Kazakhstan is keen to acquire modern weaponry as cheaply as possible. Although it has traditionally looked to Russia for military equipment, the United States has offered to supply arms and military training to consolidate the ‘material and technical basis' for the development of mobile forces. This aid will come through established American programs, and some Kazakh officers expect to study in American schools beginning in 2003. None of this will supplant Russian aid, particularly since the Kazakhs lack experience in using western equipment, but it may encourage Russia to more aggressively engage Kazakhstan in military planning.

Already, Russia looks more solicitous. On June 11, Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that 150 Kazakh servicemen will get free training at Russian schools this year, followed by 250 countrymen in 2003. Russia has also promised to sell Kazakhstan arms at preferential prices and help the Kazakhs cost-effectively avail themselves of Russian spare and aged supplies. Altynbayev said that $12 million would be available in the 2002 defense budget for purchasing spares and repairing hardware, and officials had expected to spend up to $26 million on such supplies in 2003. Now, Astana will pay between 10-15 times less for these hardware supplies from Russia. Kazakh armed forces have used Russian military hardware for decades, making the repair and maintenance process meaningfully easier.

As he leverages American attention and Russian concern, President Nursultan Nazarbayev has continued to espouse the Collective Security Treaty. Indeed, stronger bilateral relations with Russia can help reform Kazakhstan's military, making it a more legitimate player within the CIS. Russia cannot leave the region, which makes it a more secure partner in some ways than the United States. At the same time, the US alliance with Russia in the war on terrorism eliminates any rational argument for Nazarbayev's choosing between a strong CIS and an independent relationship with the Americans.

As he seeks that balance, Nazarbayev will rely on the preferences of a few elite advisors. Altynbayev is a graduate of the Soviet Armavir Supreme Military Aviation School of the Antiaircraft Forces and later ran an antiaircraft regiment. As an Air Force veteran, Altynbayev may lend special gravitas to the task of reforming the military. Around 70 percent of the Kazakh Air Force are professional servicemen whilst the comparable figure in the army is 17 percent. Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Malik Saparov, has commanded a motor infantry regiment and favors the creation of mobile forces. While Altynbayev seeks bigger budget allocations, Saparov worries about protecting the country's southern borders. These men have quite differing leanings on the direction military reform should take in Kazakhstan, and both men are politically astute. So any decision that emerges from Nazarbayev about the armed forces may be subject to change, even as the country tries to please both American and Russian interests.

Kazakhstan will continue to rely militarily upon Russia for aid and training facilities at reduced rates. It will also seek to participate more closely in NATO programs and will appeal to Washington for general fiscal support. The country has no choice but to serve both allies. Americans' high-tech equipment will do little for Kazakh security, since soldiers need training in the use and management of such equipment. Yet American financial assistance could outpace Russian aid, and Nazarbayev has seen how Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan drew big contributions from the United States after offering their bases to American soldiers. Though the Kazakh military desperately needs a sustained reform program, it may instead put on a show to woo American and Russian allies. If such showmanship stalls or undermines real structural improvements, Kazakhstan's new and refreshed military alliances may end up weakening security in the region.

Editor's Note: Roger N. McDermott is a Political Consultant at the Scottish Center for International Security of the University of Aberdeen.

Posted August 21, 2002 © Eurasianet