Smita Kiritkumar Brahmbhatt v. Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, Terminal

Publisher	United Kingdom: Court of Appeal (England and Wales)
Author	Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Publication Date	6 December 1984
Citation / Document Symbol	[1984] Imm AR 202
Cite as	Smita Kiritkumar Brahmbhatt v. Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, Terminal, [1984] Imm AR 202, United Kingdom: Court of Appeal (England and Wales), 6 December 1984, available at: https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_CA_CIV,3ae6b6521c.html [accessed 27 May 2023]
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Smita Kiritkumar Brahmbhatt v Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, Terminal

Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

[1984] Imm AR 202

Hearing Date: 6 December 1984

6 December 1984

Index Terms:

Practise and procedure -- Citizenship -- Wife -- Citizen of India -- Married British citizen in India 25.1.1983 -- Arrived without entry clearance -- Refused entry on ground she was without leave -- Whether had right of abode in United Kingdom -- Immigration Act 1971 s 2(1)(a)(b) as substituted by British Nationality Act 1981 s 39(2) -- HC 169 paras 46-48, 76.

Held:

The appellant, born in India 14 March 1957, married a British citizen, Mr Brahmbhatt, in India on 25 January 1983. He had gone there for the purpose of marriage and shortly after it he returned to the United Kingdom because of business and other commitments. The appellant obtained an Indian passport on 17 February 1983 and with that, the marriage certificate, her husband's sponsorship declaration and her air ticket to the United Kingdom she went to the office of the British Deputy High Commissioner on 3 March 1983. There the entry clearance officer gave her a letter saying he was unable to issue her with entry clearance but that she should return on 11 June 1983. She was also given an explanatory leaflet which made it clear that entry clearance would be required before she could enter the United Kingdom. Nevertheless she flew to Heathrow on 8 March 1983 and was refused entry on the ground that she had no entry clearance, at the same time being granted temporary admission, which was later extended. The present appeal was against the refusal, by Woolf J on 12 October 1983, of judicial review of the respondent's decision.

Held: (i) As the appellant was not a British citizen she did not qualify for a statutory right of abode under the new section 2(1)(a) of the Immigration Act 1971 which came into force under the British Nationality Act 1981 on 1 January 1983.

(ii) The appellant did not qualify under the new section 2(1)(b) of the 1971 Act as she did not marry her husband until 25 January 1983, and thus did not have the right of abode in the United Kingdom immediately before the coming into effect of the 1981 Act.

(iii) Accordingly she had never had the right of abode; and the fact that she had no entry clearance justified the Immigration Officer in refusing her leave to enter.

Cases referred to in the Judgment:

R v Home Secretary ex parte Phansopkar [1976] 1 QB 606. R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Alexander [1982] 1 WLR 1076, [1982] Imm AR 50, HL.

R v Entry Clearance Officer, Bombay ex parte Amin [1983] 2 AC 818.

Counsel:

KS Nathan for the appellant.

W Robert Griffiths for the respondent.

PANEL: Slade LJ, Neill J, Sir John Megaw

Judgment One:

SLADE LJ: This is an appeal in an immigration case from an order of Woolf J made on 12 October, 1983 whereby he refused an application for judicial review. It raises points of some importance concerning the rights of wives of British citizens to enter this country. The application in question sought an order of certiorari to quash a refusal of leave to enter the United Kingdom served on the appellant and an order of mandamus directed to the Immigration Officer (who is the respondent to the appeal) to reconsider her claim and to admit her into the United Kingdom. The application had also sought in the alternative an order of mandamus directed to the Secretary of State for the Home Department to consider the apellant's application for registration as a British citizen under the provisions of the British Nationality Act 1981; but that issue has not been pursued on this appeal.

The appellant, Mrs Smita Kiritkumar Brahmbhatt is a citizen of India, where she was born on 14 March 1957. On 25 January 1983 she married in India Mr Kiritkumar Brahmbhatt, who is a British citizen and a businessman and had gone over to India for a short visit for the purposes of the marriage. After the marriage he returned more or less immediately to the United Kingdom because of business and other commitments. Mrs Brahmbhatt immediately took steps to obtain a passport. An Indian passport was issued to her on 17 February valid until 16 February 1988. On 24 February 1983 she was issued a one-way airline ticket from Bombay to London, as a result of arrangements made by her husband.

On 3 March 1983 the appellant called at the Immigration Section of the Office of the British Deputy High Commissioner, Bombay, with her passport, the original of her husband's sponsorship declaration, her airline ticket and her original marriage certificate. The Entry Clearance Officer gave her a letter immediately, saying that he was unable to issue her with an entry clearance, but instead wanted her to call at his office on 13 June 1983. The respondent's unchallenged evidence is that on the same occasion she was also given an explanatory leaflet which made it clear that entry clearance would be required before the appellant could enter the United Kingdom. On this same visit the appellant's passport was stamped with an endorsement "entry clearance applied for, Bombay 3 March 1983", though the appellant's evidence is that she was not aware of this stamping until she came to England.

Since the appellant and her husband did not wish to be parted longer, without waiting to obtain an entry clearance she left Bombay and arrived at Heathrow Airport on 8 March 1983. There the Immigration Officer refused her leave to enter the United Kingdom under section 3(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 ("the 1971 Act"). His refusal of leave to enter stated:

"You have asked for leave to enter the United Kingdom for settlement as the wife of Kiritkumar Chandrakant Brahmbhatt but you have no current entry clearance granted to you for that purpose."

In an affirmation subsequently made on 8 August 1983 the Immigration Officer explained that his opinion that the appellant must hold a current entry clearance was founded on paragraph 46-48 of the Immigration Rules HC 169 and that the Chief Immigration Officer authorised refusal of leave to enter in accordance with paragraph 76 of those rules. At the same time as refusing the appellant leave to enter the United Kingdom, the Immigration Officer granted the appellant temporary admission under paragraph 21 of Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act, subject to certain conditions. This temporary admission has been extended from time to time.

It is common ground that under the law in force between the coming into operation of the 1971 Act and 31 December 1982 the appellant, as a Commonwealth citizen and the wife of a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, would have had the statutory right to enter this country without an entry certificate, subject only to proving her right of abode by a certificate of patriality. The nature of such right was explained in R v Home Secretary, ex parte Phansopkar [1976] 1 Queen's Bench 606. It would have stemmed basically from section 2(2) of the 1971 Act, the requirement for a certificate of patriality being contained in section 3(9).

The relevant statutory provisions

For ease of subsequent reference, I think it will be convenient to set out in extenso the most relevant statutory provisions. They are somewhat complicated but, when their effect is fully understood, the answers to the question raised on this appeal will, in my opinion, become clear.

Section 1(1) of the 1971 Act provided:

"All those who are in this Act expressed to have the right of abode in the United Kingdom shall be free to live in, and to come and go into and from, the United Kingdom without let or hindrance except such as may be required under and in accordance with this Act to enable their right to be established or as may be otherwise lawfully imposed on any person."

The appellant's husband, as a British citizen, has a right of abode in the United Kingdom under section 2(1) of the 1971 Act, as substituted by section 39(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 ("the 1981 Act").

Section 2(2), so far as material, provided in its original form:

"A woman is under this Act also to have the right of abode in the United Kingdom if she is a Commonwealth citizen and either --

(a) is the wife of any such citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies as is mentioned in sub-section (1)(a), (b) or (c) above . . ."

Section 2(6), in its original form, provided that in the following provisions of the Act the word "patrial" is used of persons having the right of abode in the United Kingdom.

Thus, under the pre-1983 law, the appellant, on marrying her husband, would, by virtue of section 2(2) of the 1971 Act, have acquired the equivalent right of abode to that of her husband, subject only to proving it by a certificate of patriality, which have been required by virtue of sections 3(8) and 3(9).

However, on 1 January 1983 the 1981 Act came into force. Section 39 of the Act substituted a new, much briefer, section 2 of the 1971 Act, which reads as follows:

"(1) A person is under this Act to have the right of abode in the United Kingdom if --

(a) he is a British citizen; or

(b) he is a Commonwealth citizen who --

(i) immediately before the commencement of the British Nationality Act 1981 was a Commonwealth citizen having the right of abode in the United Kingdom by virtue of section 2(1)(d) or section 2(2) of this Act as then in force; and

(ii) has not ceased to be a Commonwealth citizen in the meanwhile.

(2) In relation to Commonwealth citizens who have the right of abode in the United Kingdom by virtue of subsection (1)(b) above, this Act, except this section and sections 3(9) and (9A), 5(2) and 13(3), shall apply as if they were British citizens; and in this Act (except as aforesaid) "British citizen" shall be construed accordingly."

This Act has effected a substantial change to the rights of wives in the position of the appellant. She does not qualify for a statutory right of abode under the new section 2(1)(a) of the 1971 Act because she is not a British citizen. Though a Commonwealth citizen immediately before the commencement of the 1981 Act, she does not qualify under the new section 2(1)(b) because she did not marry her husband until 25 January 1983 and therefore did not have the right of abode in the United Kingdom immediately before the commencement of the 1981 Act by virtue of section 2(2) of the 1971 Act, as then in force. It follows that the appellant has never had "the right of abode within the United Kingdom" within the meaning of section 1(1) of the 1971 Act.

Under the 1971 Act the position of persons such as the appellant who do not have the right of abode in the United Kingdom is governed in particular by sections 1(2), 1(4), 3(1) and 3(2). Section 1(2), so far as material, provides:

"Those not having the right may live, work and settle in the United Kingdom by permission and subject to such regulation and control of their entry into, stay in and departure from the United Kingdom as is imposed by this Act; . . ."

Section 1(4) provides:

"The rules laid down by the Secretary of State as to the practice to be followed in the administration of this Act for regulating the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons not having the right of abode shall include provision for admitting (in such cases and subject to such restrictions as may be provided by the rules, and subject or not to conditions as to length of stay or otherwise) persons coming for the purpose of taking employment, or for purposes of study, or as visitors, or as dependants of persons lawfully in or entering the United Kingdom."

Section 3(1) of the 1971 Act, as amended by section 39(6) and Schedule 4, paragraph 2, of the 1981 Act provides:

"Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, where a person is not a British citizen --

(a) he shall not enter the United Kingdom unless given leave to do so in accordance with this Act; . . ."

Section 3(2), so far as material, provides:

"The Secretary of State shall from time to time (and as soon as may be) lay before Parliament statements of rules, or of any changes in the rules, laid down by him as to the practice to be followed in the adminstration of this Act for regulating the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons required by this Act to have leave to enter, including any rules as to the period for which leave is to be given and the conditions to be attached in different circumstances; and section 1(4) above shall not be taken to require uniform provision to be made by the rules as regards admission of persons for a purpose or in a capacity specified in section 1(4) (and in particular, for this as well as other purposes of this Act, account may be taken of citizenship or nationality) . . ."

Before leaving the 1971 Act it will be convenient to refer to the definition of the word "settled", which is to be found in section 33 as amended by section 39(6) and Schedule 4, paragraph 7, of the 1981 Act. Section 33(1) of the 1971 Act as amended provides that "settled" shall be construed in accordance with subsection (2A). Section 33(2) provides:

"It is hereby declared that, except as otherwise provided in this Act, a person is not to be treated for the purposes of any provision of this Act as ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom or in any of the Islands at a time when he is there in breach of the immigration laws."

The new section 33(2A) of the 1971 Act provides:

"Subject to section 8(5) above, references to a person being settled in the United Kingdom are references to his being ordinarily resident there without being subject under the immigration laws to any restriction on the period for which he may remain."

Section 8(5) has no relevance in the present case.

The relevant Immigration Rules

Following the amendment of the 1971 Act by the 1981 Act and the Home Secretary, in exercise or purported exercise of the powers conferred on him by sections 1(4) and 3(2) of the 1971 Act has, with effect from 16 February 1983, issued a Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules (HC 169).

Rule 1 provides (inter alia):

"A person is "settled in the United Kingdom" when he is ordinarily resident here without having entered or remained in breach of the immigration laws, and is free from any restriction on the period for which he may remain. A person is also settled here if, despite having entered or remained in breach of the immigration laws, he has subsequently entered lawfully or has been lawfully granted leave to remain, is ordinarily resident here, and is free from any restriction on the period for which he may remain."

Rule 1 also contains a definition of "passenger" which includes "any Commonwealth citizen . . . who is required by the [1971] Act to have leave to enter."

Rule 4, so far as material provides:

"A British citizen does not require leave to enter . . . A Commonwealth citizen who is not a British citizen but has the right of abode does not require leave to enter. He must, however, prove that he has the right of abode by producing a certificate of entitlement duly issued to him by a British Government representative overseas or by the Home Office. A person who is neither a British citizen nor a Commonwealth citizen having the right of abode requires leave to enter."

Rules 46 to 48 provide:

"46. This paragraph and paragraphs 47-53 cover the admission for settlement of the dependants of a person who is present in the United Kingdom and settled here, or who is on the same occasion given indefinite leave to enter. In all such cases (except those mentioned in the last sentence of this paragraph) that person must be able and willing to maintain and accommodate his dependants without recourse to public funds in accommodation of his own or which he occupies himself and he should give an undertaking in writing to this effect if requested. This requirement does not apply to the admission of the wife, or a child under the age of 18, of a Commonwealth citizen who has the right of abode or was settled in the United Kingdom on the coming into force of the Act.

47. In addition, a passenger seeking admission as a dependant under this Part of the rules must hold a current entry clearance granted to him for that purpose.

48. The wife of a person who is settled in the United Kingdom or is on the same occasion being admitted for settlement is herself to be admitted for settlement if the requirements of paragraphs 46 and 47 are satisfied. A member of HM Forces based in the United Kingdom but serving overseas should be regarded for this purpose as being settled in the United Kingdom."

Rule 76 begins with the following sentence:

"A passenger who does not qualify under the foregoing provisions of these rules is to be refused leave to enter."

The decision of Woolf J

It appears that ultimately, at the hearing before Woolf J, only one point was argued on behalf of the appellant, namely that, because her husband is a British citizen, none of rules 46 to 49 apply to her and that the Immigration Officer erred in considering that these rules or some of them made it obligatory for her to hold a current entry clearance before she could be admitted into the United Kingdom. This point (which I will call "the construction of the rules point") was rejected by the learned judge who accordingly held that the fact that she did not hold such a clearance justified the Immigration Officer in refusing her leave to enter this country.

On this appeal, the issues have ranged rather more widely. Mr Nathan, on behalf of the appellant, has put forward in addition to the construction of the rules point two further or alternative submissions, which can be conveniently referred to as "the ultra vires point" and "the legitimate expectation point". I will deal with these three points in turn.

The construction of the rules point

Mr Nathan has not sought to argue that the appellant has ever had "the right of abode in the United Kingdom" within the meaning of the 1971 Act. The foundation of the construction of the rules point is to be found in section 1(1) of the 1981 Act, which states:

"(1) A person born in the United Kingdom after commencement shall be a British citizen if at the time of the birth his father or mother is --

(a) a British citizen; or

(b) settled in the United Kingdom."

Section 50(2) of the 1981 Act provides that, subject to certain immaterial exceptions, "references in this Act to a person being settled in the United Kingdom . . . are references to his being ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom . . . without being subject under the immigration laws to any restriction on the period for which he may remain."

I think it quite plain that the definition of "settled in the United Kingdom" in rule 1 of HC 169 was intended to reflect the definitions contained in the new section 33(2A) of the 1971 Act and the similar definition in section 50(2) of the 1981 Act.

The appellant's husband has at all times been "settled in the United Kingdom" within the literal wording of all these definitions, since he is ordinarily resident in this country without being subject under the immigration laws to any restriction on the period for which he may remain. However, if I correctly understood Mr Nathan's argument in this context, it essentially ran as follows. Section 1(1) of the 1981 Act draws a clear distinction between a British citizen on the one hand and a "person settled in the United Kingdom" on the other hand. Accordingly, it is said, while the definitions of a person "settled in the United Kingdom" in rule 1 of HC 169 and the preceding statutory definitions are at first sight wide enough to include a person in the position of the appellant's husband, they do not in fact include him, because he is a British citizen. Correspondingly, it is said, the reference in rule 48 of HC 169 to the "wife of a person who is settled in the United Kingdom" does not include the appellant. So it is submitted that there was no obligation on her to satisfy the requirements of rules 46 and 47 relating to entry clearance or other matters, and indeed that there is nothing at all in the rules which deals with the wives of British citizens.

In the face of this alleged lacuna in the rules and the admitted lack of any statutory right of abode in the United Kingdom, Mr Nathan submitted that the appellant, as the wife of a British citizen, still has a right to enter this country conferred on her by the common law. He referred us to the decisions of the House of Lords in Alexander v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1982] 1 Weekly Law Reports 1076 and in R v Entry Clearance Officer, Bombay, ex parte Amin

[1983] 2 Appeal Cases 818 as illustrating that the immigration rules do not have the force of statutes or statutory instruments and should not be construed too strictly. The learned judge, it is submitted, erred in concluding that the effect of the new rules on their true construction was to introduce a new requirement obliging the wife of a British citizen to obtain an entry clearance. It is said that, in so deciding, he also failed sufficiently to take into account that any such requirement would violate Articles 8, 12 and 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms [1953] Cmnd 1969.

With all due respect, these submissions, in my opinion, are not well founded in law. Though Mr Nathan made some reference to the past history of our immigration laws going back beyond 1971, I confess that it never became completely clear to me upon what grounds he asserted that immediately before the passing of the 1981 Act a wife in the position of the appellant would have had a right to enter this country at common law, apart from the statutory rights given her by section 2(2) of the 1971 Act. If I understood him correctly, he submitted (inter alia) that a woman in this position would have possessed such a right at common law as a by-product of the statutory right of her husband under section 1(1) of the 1971 Act to come into the United Kingdom "without let or hindrance". I would, for my part, find great difficulty in accepting any such submission. However, I think it unnecessary to consider further what rights (if any) to enter this country the wife of a person who is now to be termed a British citizen would have enjoyed at common law immediately before the passing of the 1981 Act. For, in my opinion, it is quite clear that such common law right, if indeed it existed, must have been removed by the 1981 Act.

In the context, I need do no more than refer to section 2(1)(a) of the 1971 Act, as amended in 1981 and quoted above, which makes it clear that a person who is not a British citizen has no right to enter the United Kingdom "except as otherwise provided by or under this Act", unless he is given leave to do so. In other words, whatever may have been the position before the passing of the 1981 Act, the rights of entry of any such person now stem from statute and statute alone. A person such as the appellant can gain a right of entry only by qualifying under the Act and the Rules. This, I think, is the combined effect of sections 1(1), 1(2), 1(4), 3(1) and 3(2) of the 1971 Act as amended in 1981.

I do not find any relevant ambiguity either in the 1971 Act, the 1981 Act or the rules. The separate references in section 1(1) of the 1981 Act to a "British citizen" and a person "settled in the United Kingdom" are, in my opinion, required because, on the one hand, not all British citizens are settled in the United Kingdom, within the definition contained in section 50 of the 1981 Act, and on the other hand not all persons so settled are British citizens. The separate references are included so as to extend the classes of persons born in the United Kingdom who can claim British citizenship under the subsection by reference to their parentage. They do not carry with them any implication that the two classes mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) are mutually exclusive.

Thus, I can find no possible justification for saying that the appellant's husband is not a person who is "settled in the United Kingdom" within the meaning of rule 1 or that the appellant herself is not "the wife of a person who is settled in the United Kingdom' within the meaning of rule 48.

Mr Griffiths, on behalf of the respondent, referred us to a number of other rules to illustrate the strange consequences which he submitted would follow if a person "who is settled in the United Kingdom" does not include a British citizen, but I do not think it necessary to refer to these examples. In my opinion, the legal position is clear and can be summarised as follows:

(1) Since the appellant did not marry her husband until after 31 December 1982 she has never possessed a statutory right of abode in the United Kingdom by virtue of section 2(2) of the 1971 Act in its original form. At least since the passing of the 1981 Act there has likewise been no possibility of her possessing any right to enter the United Kingdom at common law apart from statute, even as the wife of a British citizen living in this country.

(2) Being neither a British citizen nor a Commonwealth citizen having the right of abode, she required leave to enter under rule 4.

(3) As the wife of a person who is settled in the United Kingdom, she could have qualified for entry under rule 48, by satisfying the requirements of rules 46 and 47. But she did not satisfy these requirements, since she had not the entry clearance required by rule 47.

(4) Accordingly, rule 76 required that she should be refused leave to enter as being a "passenger" within the meaning of rule 1, who did not qualify under the foregoing provisions of the rules.

The ultra vires point

If, as I have concluded but contrary to Mr Nathan's submission, rule 48 on its true construction is capable of applying to the appellant, he contended that the rule is ultra vires. This contention was based on two grounds.

The first of them is summarised in the amended notice of appeal as follows:

"Under section 1(4) of the Immigration Act 1971, paragraph 48 of HC 169 was laid down without having regard to the practice that was followed until 31st December 1982 of admitting wives of Commonwealth citizens without an entry certificate following the Court of Appeal judgment in Phansopkar."

The essence of this argument, as I understood it, was that ladies in the position of the appellant had a right at common law to enter the United Kingdom without an entry certificate and that this right could not be taken away by rules made by the Secretary of State under section 1(4) of the 1971 Act. The fallacy of the argument, I think, lies in the premise that any relevant right was taken away from persons in the position of the appellant by the rules (HC 169). Any automatic rights of abode in the United Kingdom formerly possessed by persons falling within this category had already been removed from them by the 1981 Act. Rules 47 and 48 were made in consequence of this removal by the Secretary of State, who had express powers under sections 1(4) and 3(2) of the 1971 Act to make rules governing the practice regulating "the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons not having the right of abode", including provision for admitting "subject to such restrictions as may be provided" persons "as dependants of persons lawfully in the United Kingdom" and, furthermore, in so doing to take account of "citizenship or nationality". Once it is accepted that the appellant never had a right of abode in this country by virtue of the 1971 Act as amended, this argument must, in my opinion, fall to the ground.

The appellant's second point relating to ultra vires is summarised in the notice of appeal as follows:

"As her husband had the right of abode on 1.1.73, paragraph 48 of HC 169 if applicable to her is ultra vires section 1(5) of the Immigration Act 1971. Further, her husband on coming into force of the said Act was free to live in and to come and go into and from the United Kingdom without let or hindrance by virtue of section 1(1) of the said Act."

I have not yet quoted section 1(5) of the 1971 Act, which states:

"The rules shall be so framed that Commonwealth citizens settled in the United Kingdom at the coming into force of this Act and their wives and children are not, by virtue of anything in the rules, any less free to come into and go from the United Kingdom than if this Act had not been passed."

Though the appellant's husband was already settled in the United Kingdom when the 1971 Act came into force, the new rules of HC 169 relating to the wives of British citizens do not, in my opinion, infringe the requirements of section 1(5). As Lord Denning MR explained in 111v Chief Immigration Officer, ex parte Bibi [1976] 1 Weekly Law Reports 979 at page 983:

"Before January 1973, the rules were contained in Cmnd 4298. The rule about wives and children is in paragraph 34. That made it clear (as did section 20 of the Immigration Appeals Act 1969) that the wife of a Commonwealth citizen was not free to come into this country unless she was in possession of a current entry certificate granted to her."

In these circumstances I cannot see any grounds for concluding that the relevant new rules contravene section 1(5) in any respect.

The ultra vires point must therefore fail.

The legitimate expectation point

Finally, Mr Nathan drew attention to certain parts of the appellant's evidence which dealt with the belief and expectations of her husband. The following assertions have not been challenged. Before she left Bombay her husband made enquiries and was informed that, following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Phansopkar, wives of all patrials were automatically entitled to enter the United Kingdom without any entry certificate. He was not aware of any alteration in this position following the passing of the 1981 Act. His declaration of sponsorship, dated 2 February 1983, was made before the new Rules HC 169 were laid before Parliament.

In all the circumstances, Mr Nathan submitted, when the husband married her on 25 January 1983, he and she both had a legitimate expectation that she would be permitted to enter this country without entry clearance. If this were not to be the case, it is said, the husband and all other British citizens who were in the United Kingdom on 1 January 1983 ought to have been specifically informed of the change in the legal position by some form of appropriate advance warning.

Though I think the appellant was sadly ill-advised in not pursuing an application for an entry clearance after receiving the information given her on 3 March 1983, I think that both she and her husband deserve some sympathy. If they had married only four weeks earlier, she would have had the statutory right to enter this country, subject only to providing the necessary certificate of patriality.

Nevertheless, as I have attempted to explain, the coming into force of the 1981 Act changed the law. It prevented her from ever enjoying this statutory right. The short answer to the husband's "legitimate expectation" point must be that citizens of this country are expected to know the laws embodied in our statutes. I can see no grounds upon which this point can afford the appellant or her husband any right or remedy in law.

Conclusion

For the reasons which I have given, I respectfully agree with the conclusion of the learned judge that the fact that the appellant had no entry certificate justified the Immigration Officer in coming to the conclusion which he did.

I would accordingly dismiss this appeal.

Judgment Two:

NEILL LJ: I agree

Judgment Three:

SIR JOHN MEGAW: I agree

DISPOSITION:

Appeal dismissed

SOLICITORS:

Messrs Markand-Chimwoon; Treasury Solicitor