Russia: Follow up to RUS32172.E of 2 July 1999 regarding forcible recruitment by the Federal Security Bureau (FSB)
| Publisher | Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada |
| Author | Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada |
| Publication Date | 1 July 1999 |
| Citation / Document Symbol | RUS32358.E |
| Cite as | Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Russia: Follow up to RUS32172.E of 2 July 1999 regarding forcible recruitment by the Federal Security Bureau (FSB), 1 July 1999, RUS32358.E, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab9b70.html [accessed 1 June 2023] |
| Disclaimer | This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States. |
The following information was received in a 5 July 1999 letter sent to Research Directorate by the Director of the Organized Russian and Eurasian Crime Research Unit at Keele University, who has published extensively on the topic of Russian security forces:
I am aware of cases of pressure being put on individuals for recruitment by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) - and the other arms of Russian intelligence and state security, especially the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the armed forces' Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).
To a large extent, this reflects the decision made in 1995 to allow the FSB's predecessor, the FSK, to reactivate the old KGB's 5th (Political Security) Chief Directorate's network of informants. Most of the cases of which I am aware relate to individuals who had once been KGB informants (willingly or not) being required to resume that work, or else new 'entrants.' The sanctions used tend to be threats to the livelihood of the individual or his/her family, their access to accommodation, etc. Although they are usually initially required only to report on people and organisations with which they already have contact (eg, academic lecturers on students, journalists on colleagues), over time they may be required to take a more active role, such as joining an organisation in which the FSB is interested. This may even begin to shade over into activities more properly the field of the agent provocateur.
SVR and GRU pressure is more likely to be to recruit individuals with access to foreigners or working abroad to act as intelligence agents. I have less direct knowledge of such operations.
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.
Reference
Organized Russian and Eurasian Crime Unit, Keele University, Staffordshire, UK. 5 July 1999. E-mail from Executive Director.
