

UNHCR
Centre for Documentation and Research



WRITENET Paper No. 06/2000

**SUDAN: The Internal and External Contexts
of Conflict and Conflict Resolution**

By Korwa G. Adar

**Department of Political Studies/International Studies Unit
Rhodes University, South Africa**

July 2000

**WriteNet is a Network of Researchers and Writers on
Human Rights, Forced Migration, Ethnic and Political Conflict**

WriteNet is a Subsidiary of Practical Management (UK)

E-mail: writenet@gn.apc.org

THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION, ANALYSIS AND COMMENT. ALL SOURCES ARE CITED. THE PAPER IS NOT, AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO BE, EITHER EXHAUSTIVE WITH REGARD TO CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY SURVEYED, OR CONCLUSIVE AS TO THE MERITS OF ANY PARTICULAR CLAIM TO REFUGEE STATUS OR ASYLUM. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND ARE NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF WRITENET OR UNHCR.

ISSN 1020-8429

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. ECONOMIC SCENARIO	1
3. SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM-CUM-ARABISM	2
3.1. ACTORS IN THE CIVIL WAR	3
4. ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY PROCUREMENT	7
4.1. THE REBEL MOVEMENTS: THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH AND SOURCE OF ARMS	10
5. THE INTERFACE BETWEEN OIL PRODUCTION AND THE SUDANESE CIVIL WAR	13
6. REFUGEES SCENARIO	18
7. CONFLICT RESOLUTION TRENDS	20
7.1. INTERNAL DIMENSION	21
7.2. EXTERNAL DIMENSION	22
7.3. REGIONAL DIMENSION: THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS	22
8. CONCLUSION	26
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY	27
10. ACRONYMS	31

1. Introduction

From 1955, one year before its independence, but more so since 1983, Sudan has been engulfed in perpetual internal civil war, which has claimed more than 2 million lives and displaced 4 million as refugees. Yet, the situation in Sudan remains one of the most forgotten human tragedies in the world today. Whereas the civil war has pitted mainly the Government of Sudan against rebel movements in the South and, among other areas, the Nuba Mountains, territorial and personality rivalries and differences among the rebels have also led to periodical intra- and inter-rebel military conflicts. Since its independence, Sudan has been governed by civilian parliamentary democracies (1956-1958; 1964-1969; 1986-1989) and totalitarian military regimes (1958-1964; 1969-1985; 1989-present), with limited participation by the southern Sudanese.

Whereas the islamization and arabization policies instituted amidst dissension by all the governments in Sudan constitute part of the determinants of the civil war, the central causal factors are the competing claims for socio-economic and political rights.¹ The rebels resent their marginalization by the Government of Sudan. Over the years the Sudanese ruling elite have used the state and Islamic laws, *shari'a*, as instruments for control and domination. The southern Sudanese people are of the view that the policies of national identity and unity pursued by the Sudanese governments can only take root if the ruling elite accept and adopt the policy of the separation of religion and state. Adherence to the policy of the separation of religion and state would derogate the prevailing internal core-periphery relations inherent in *shari'a* laws and instead lay the foundation for a society based on equal rights under the constitution. As in other conflict prone areas in Africa, the situation in Sudan has acquired interlocking regional, continental and global dimensions, with complex implications for conflict resolution.² This study puts into perspective the internal, regional, continental and global dimensions of conflict and conflict resolution in Sudan.

2. Economic Scenario

For most of the 1980s and 1990s Sudan ranked third after Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire as the most heavily indebted country in Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa. However, in 1997 Sudan's total external debt reached more than US\$ 16 billion, second only to Nigeria's over US\$ 28 billion.³

¹ For a detailed analysis of islamization and arabization policies see K.G. Adar, "Islamisation in Sudan Revisited: the Fallacy of the Sudanese Administrations' Policy of National Identity" in P. Toggia, P. Lauderdale and A.A. Zegeye (eds), *Terror and Crisis in the Horn of Africa: Autopsy of Democracy, Human Rights and Freedom* (Aldershot: Ashgate, fc.)

² K.G. Adar, "A State Under Siege: The Internationalisation of the Sudanese Civil War", *African Security Review*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1998), pp. 44-53

³ World Bank, *African Development Indicators 2000* (Washington DC, 2000), p. 176

FIGURE 1⁴
SUDAN: TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT
 (Million US \$ - current prices)




Figure 1 shows the steady increase in the Sudanese indebtedness over the years, a situation, which prompted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to threaten to expel Sudan in 1997.⁵ Sudan's indebtedness is not only compounded by its high inflation rates which averaged 83% between 1985 and 1996 and 133% during 1996,⁶ but also by its monthly interest payments on loans, estimated at US\$ 4.5 million in 1999.⁷ The financial difficulties are made more complex by the endemic internal civil war, which costs the government more than US\$ 1 million per day.⁸ Under these circumstances, Sudan's current account deficit has continued to grow, rising from US\$ 500 million in 1995 to US\$ 827 million, US\$ 828 million and US\$ 957 million in 1996, 1997 and 1998 respectively.⁹ Saudi Arabia, China, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Egypt and Japan are the main trading partners of Sudan.

3. Secularism and Islamism-cum-Arabism

The central locus of the civil war in Sudan is on the issue of equal rights inherent in the age-old concept of *jus naturale* (natural law). At the time of independence most Sudanese envisaged a society within which equal access to socio-cultural and economic-political rights would be established and embedded in a constitution. However, over the years, the policies, which have been incorporated in the constitution and implemented in various degrees by the governments in power have negated these expectations. For the political survival of the ruling Islamic elite in Sudan, *shari'a* and its corollaries islamization and arabization have been adopted officially and unofficially as rallying points. As we have explained, the policies have created a wedge mainly between Muslims and non-Muslims, with the latter advocating a secular state.

⁴ World Bank, *African Development Indicators 2000* (Washington DC, 2000), p. 176

⁵ S. Field, *The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry*, Occasional Paper No. 23 (Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, February 2000), p. 4

⁶ J.A. Allan, "Sudan" in *Africa south of the Sahara 2000* (London: Europa Publications, 2000), p. 1051

⁷ Field, p. 4

⁸ Associated Press, "Sudan President Says Civil War Cost Half of State Budget - Report", 3 February 1999

⁹ Allan, p. 1054

The state, therefore, constitutes the centre of contestation with divergent dichotomous implications.

Whereas the Sudanese Islamic ruling elite use the state as an instrument for control and promotion of their socio-economic and political interests, the non-Muslims led by rebel movements perceive the state as an apparatus used by the governments to oppress and suppress them. In this case the southern Sudanese associate their security and protection not with the state but with the rebel movements. However, it needs to be pointed out that not all southern Sudanese are non-Muslims. Similarly, not every Sudanese in the North is a Muslim. Of the 35 million people in Sudan 70%, 25% and 5% are Sunni Muslims, animists (indigenous beliefs) and Christians (mainly in the South and Khartoum) respectively, whereas the Blacks in Sudan account for 52% of the total population, and the Arabs and the Beja account for 39% and 6% respectively. The Sunni Muslims include mainly the Baggara Arabs, the Fur, Masalit, Zaghana, the Beja and the Arab Sudanese (in the northern part of Sudan).

To bolster their war efforts against the rebel movements the governments in Khartoum appeal for support mainly from the Arab-speaking Sudanese and Muslims in general. Indeed, various Sudanese administrations, President Bashir's Government included, have used the tactic of *jihad* (Islamic holy war) to mobilize support against the rebel movements.¹⁰ Given their marginalization and oppression in the name of promoting *shari'a*, the southern Sudanese and others have argued for the incorporation of secularism in the constitution. What continues to prevail in Sudan is a clash between what could be called "Muslim Sudanese nationalism" and "secular nationalism". This is not to argue that all Muslims in Sudan subscribe to the form of nationalism advocated by the ruling elite. However, what is important to reiterate is that the governments have successfully used the state to further their interests in the civil war. Religion, Islam, is used as a source of strength and unity at home and a means for securing support abroad, particularly among the Muslim countries. Sudan is a member of the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Since the 1998 adoption of a constitution which incorporates *shari'a* customary law (*al-urf*) and national consensus (*ijma al-ummah*) as the cornerstones of legislation,¹¹ the Government of Sudan has increased the implementation of customary law against offenders.¹²

3.1 Actors in the Civil War

Apart from the regular Sudanese Popular Defence Force (SPDF) deployed by the successive governments in Sudan against the rebel movements, in 1989 President Bashir promulgated the Popular Defence Act and established an Islamic militia, the People's Defence Forces (PDF) to bolster the SPDF war efforts.¹³

¹⁰ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Sudan: Government Says 655,000 to Join Army", Vol. 10, No. 2 (March-April 1998), p. 27

¹¹ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Sudan Endorses Draft Constitution", Vol. 10, No. 2 (March-April 1998), p. 25

¹² *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Sudan Resumes Amputation as Punishment", Vol. 12, No. 2 (March-April 2000), p. 29

¹³ United States, Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practice, 1995: Sudan* (Washington DC, March 1996), p.1

The dominant and consistent liberation movement in the South since 1983 is the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) led by John Garang. Personality differences and a contest for the control of the SPLM/SPLA, which occurred between Garang (a Dinka) and Riek Machar (a Nuer) in 1991, led to a split within the SPLM/SPLA. The split led to the formation of the SPLA-United (Nasir Group - under Machar) and SPLA-Mainstream (Torit Group - under Garang). Thousands of people were killed and more than 300,000 displaced between 1991 and 1993. The Nasir Group renamed SPLA-United the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and its military arm, Southern Sudan Independence Army (SSIA), which in 1997 amalgamated six other factions into the United Salvation Democratic Front (USDF). Machar's USDF established a military wing, the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) and joined Khartoum to fight against the other rebel movements, particularly the SPLA. President Bashir's government, dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), rewarded Machar by appointing him Vice-President and head of the Coordinating Council for the Southern States (CCSS). Kerubino Kuonyin Bol (a Dinka), former deputy commander-in-chief of the SPLA and deputy chairman of the SPLM, also formed a splinter group, SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal, and joined the ranks of Machar's forces in Khartoum. President Bashir appointed him deputy to Machar in the CCSS administrative hierarchy.¹⁴

After Kerubino Bol rejoined Garang in 1998, Lawrence Lual Lual took over the leadership of the Bahr al-Ghazal group. However, differences between Machar and Lual also led to a split between USDF and SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal in 1998.¹⁵ These persistent internal factional differences culminated in further disagreements between Machar and other SSDF commanders in 1999, namely Gordon Kong (Upper Nile forces), Gatwick Gatkout (Nasir on the Ethiopian border) and Gatwick Dhel (Jonglei state forces).¹⁶ Machar has since February 2000 resigned as Vice-President, as head of the CCSS, and as the commander-in-chief of the USDF, accusing the NIF government of President Bashir of reluctance to implement the USDF-NIF peace agreement.¹⁷

The 1997 peace accord was signed by Major General Al Zubeir Mohammed Salih, First Vice-President of Sudan, Dr Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon of SSIM/SSIA and Kerubino Kuonyin Bol of SSIM/SSIA and witnessed by government officials Ahmed I. Eltahir, State Minister and Legal Advisor in the Presidency, and Musa Sayed Ahmed, Director-General Supreme Council, and by Dr Thomas Abwal Chidi, Secretary General of the SSIM/SSIA, and Arok Thon Arok of the SSIM/SSIA. The agreement provided for, *inter alia*, resolution of conflict through peaceful means, the maintenance of the unity of Sudan, a referendum in the South, the establishment of a federal system and incorporation of *shari'a* and custom as the sources of legislation.¹⁸ Under the provisions stipulated in the agreement it would be fair to argue that Machar and his Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and its military wing, Southern Sudan Independence Army (SSIA) sold their movement to the government given the incorporation of *shari'a* in the document.

¹⁴ Sudan, *The Sudan Peace Agreement* (Khartoum: Government Printing Office, 21 April 1997)

¹⁵ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Pro-government Ally Splits from Coalition", Vol. 10, No. 5 (September-October 1998), p. 28

¹⁶ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Machar Faces Ouster Attempt", Vol. 11, No. 3 (May-June), p.24

¹⁷ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Machar Quits All Government Posts", Vol. 12, No. 1 (January-February 2000), p. 28

¹⁸ Sudan, *The Sudan Peace Agreement*, pp. 1-14

Further contenders in the liberation struggle, who have been fighting either against or alongside the governments in Khartoum include, among others, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a conglomeration of the SPLM/SPLA, the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Sudanese Communist Party, and the Legitimate Command of General Faithi Ahmed Ali; the Patriotic Resistance Movement of Southern Sudan; Nuba Mountains Solidarity; SPLM/SPLA Nuba Mountains; Equatoria Defence Force; Anya Nya 2; the Union of Sudanese African Parties; and the *murahelin* militia (Baggara Arabs - mainly the Rizeiqat, Rufaa al Huj and Misiriya). Like the Anya Nya 2, which received military aid from Khartoum, the *murahelin* militia and the SPLM/Nuba Mountains (led by Muhammad Harun Kafi) continued to get logistical and military support from the NIF Government. A number of rebel movements have, therefore, supported the Government of Sudan's policy of islamization and by extension legitimized the marginalization of the southern Sudanese. Even President Numeiri who in 1972 signed the Addis Ababa Accords with the rebel movements, quickly reverted to *shari'a* laws because of internal dissension and pressure.¹⁹ Former Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi (now the leader of the NDA) maintained the policy of an Islamic state during his tenure.

The internal policy perspectives pursued by the belligerent parties are made more complex by the involvement of other external actors. For example, Uganda provides logistical and military support to the SPLA. As a *quid pro quo*, Sudan provides military aid to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA - led by J. Kony) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), both operating from southern Sudan and fighting against President Yoweri Museveni's Government. Uganda was among the few members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that came out openly in support of the 1998 United States bombing of a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum suspected of manufacturing dangerous chemical weapons.²⁰ Whereas the WNBF (of Colonel Juma Oria) was decimated in 1997, the LRA, with its 6,000 fighters, continues to operate in the NIF-controlled areas of southern Sudan, particularly in Jebelin Nimule, Kit II and Musito. Uganda severed diplomatic relations with Sudan in 1995 because of what it considered to be Khartoum's interference in its internal affairs. As a result of mediation by the former US President, Jimmy Carter, President Museveni and President Bashir signed a peace agreement in Nairobi in December 1999, which paved the way for the release of 72 Sudanese and 20 Ugandan prisoners of war.²¹ Indeed, it is because of the Sudanese-Ugandan differences and the involvement of Ugandan military in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) civil war that Sudan gives the DRC military support. The Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) is fighting alongside the rebels in the DRC because of what Museveni's leadership considers to be its national interest. The UPDF has not only been engaged in military actions against the LRA and WNBF in the North, but also in Western Uganda against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) based in the DRC-Uganda border. The ADF consists of groups such as the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda and the Islamic group, the Salaf Tabliq. President Laurent Kabila of the DRC has visited Sudan on a number of occasions to enlist President Bashir's moral, logistical and military support.

¹⁹ Adar, "Islamisation in Sudan Revisited"

²⁰ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Uganda Supports US Attack", Vol. 10, No. 4 (July-August 1998), p. 25

²¹ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Sudan and Uganda Reach Agreement", Vol. 11, No. 5 (October-December 1999), p. 30 and "Uganda to Continue Moral Support of SLPA", Vol. 12, No. 1 (January-February 2000), p. 31

This interlocking *Realpolitik* military equation is not confined to the Sudan-Uganda-DRC nexus only.

Prior to the 1993 Eritrean secession, Sudan provided bases as well as material and logistical support for the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) during their liberation struggle against the Government of Ethiopia. The EPRDF was composed mainly of the Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Front. While Sudan supported the EPLF and the EPRDF, the Governments in Ethiopia provided the SPLA with logistical and military support.²² However, the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war changed the *Realpolitik* dimensions of the Sudanese civil war. For example, Ethiopia has not only sought rapprochement with Sudan (after Ethio-Sudanese diplomatic relations had been cut in 1995, because of the alleged Sudanese involvement in the assassination attempt on the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during the OAU meeting in Addis Ababa), but has also closed the SPLA's base in Gambela on its western border with Sudan.

Eritrea, on the other hand, has implemented two far-reaching diplomatic decisions vis-à-vis Sudan. Firstly, Eritrea severed diplomatic relations with Sudan in 1994 because of the Sudanese logistical and military support for the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ).²³ Secondly, in a show of displeasure with Sudan's support for the EIJ, Eritrea not only closed the Sudanese embassy in its capital, Asmara,²⁴ but also handed over the facilities to the NDA in June 1995. It was because of the Sudanese-Ethiopian mediation efforts that ten Eritrean opposition movements amalgamated in 1999 and formed the Eritrean National Forces Alliance. Indeed, it can correctly be argued that the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war worked in favour of Sudan because it weakened the Eritrea-Ethiopia-Uganda *troika* against Khartoum. However, Eritrea has continued to provide the logistical and military support needed by the SPLA and the NDA. The SPLA has since 1996 based its New Sudan Brigade in western Eritrea. The other Sudanese liberation movements based in Eritrea include the Beja Congress, the Umma Party (of the former Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi, now leader of the NDA), Sudan National Party (Nuba Mountains people), and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance and others.

Even though Sudanese-Egyptian relations have remained at a low ebb because of the two countries' outstanding dispute over the Halaib territory near the Red Sea, Egypt generally supports the policy of a united Sudan as advocated by its leaders. However, Egypt does not condone the growing Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan. The Egyptian leadership also takes into account the country's dependence on the Nile River water, which flows through Sudan. The Government of Egypt emphasize that a disintegrated Sudan - either through secession or self-determination - may have long-term negative implications for their own country. In order to maintain official contacts with Sudan, Egypt re-opened its embassy in Khartoum in early 2000. The embassy was closed in

²² Adar, "A State Under Siege". See also M. Bradbury, "Sudan: International Responses to War in the Nuba Mountains", *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 77, No. 25 (September 1998), pp. 463-74

²³ F.M. Deng, "Mediating the Sudanese Conflict: A Challenge for the IGADD", *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 169 (February 1995), pp. 1-7

²⁴ *The Guardian* [London], Peter Biles, "Sudan: The Frontline States, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda", 11 May 1996

1995 following the alleged assassination attempt on President Mubarak.²⁵ These external entanglements in the Sudanese civil war have hardened the positions of the belligerent parties, with the internal and external actors explicitly and implicitly supporting the policies based either on secularism or on Islamism-cum-Arabism.

4. Armed Forces and Military Procurement

The official figures indicate that Sudan's armed forces are the fourth largest in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), after Nigeria, Ethiopia and Angola. Of its estimated population of 35 million in 1999, more than 5 million (aged 15 to 49) are fit for military service. The PDF militia consists mainly of the younger generation. The PDF *murahelin* militia are part of what the government call *quwwat as-sadiqa* (friendly forces) to fight against the *khawarij* (rebels or outlaws). The successive governments in Sudan have used these so-called "friendly forces", some of whom split from the ranks of the SPLA, to fight against the rebel movements. To ensure their survival, the governments in Sudan have continued to increase steadily the armed forces and military spending.

TABLE I: SUDAN: ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE: 1985-1998²⁶

YEAR	ARMED FORCES (thousands)	MILITARY EXPENDITURE (US \$ millions)
1985	65	146
1986	59	128
1987	59	197
1988	65	245
1989	65	280
1990	65	204
1991	65	531
1992	82	766
1993	82	304
1994	89	426
1995	90	389
1996	90	405
1997	93	413
1998	94	550
1999	110	610

As Table I indicates, while the total number in the Armed Forces remained relatively steady at 65,000 between 1988 and 1991, the figure increased from 82,000 in 1992 to 90,000 and 110,000 in 1995 and 1999, respectively. After the 1989 military coup the military spending increased from US\$ 204 million in 1990 to over US\$ 530 million in 1991 and US\$ 760 million in 1992. The increase in military spending coincided with the intensified military operations in southern Sudan by the NIF government. The

²⁵ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Egypt Sends First Envoy Since 1995", Vol. 12, No. 2 (March-April 2000), p. 34

²⁶ Sources: United States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990-1994* (Washington DC, 1995) and *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996-1999* (Washington DC, 2000)

increase of military spending also coincided with the promulgation of the PDF and the increased involvement of the state and privately owned companies in the production of oil in southern Sudan. As discussed in the next section, the major oilfields, namely Adar, Heglig and Unity, are all located in the disputed areas of southern Sudan. The issue of the maintenance of security, particularly around the oilfields, therefore, becomes a *sine quo non* for the NIF government.

The total size of the Sudanese Armed Forces does not include the PDF and the reserves estimated to be more than 170,000 and 85,000 in 1996, respectively.²⁷ The PDF paramilitary groups undergo forced military training and Islamist re-education to prepare them for *jihad* (holy war) against the liberation movements.²⁸ Thousands of young people, some of whom are under age, are conscripted to serve in the PDF. The introduction of the PDF in 1989 constitutes a clear manifestation of the militarization of the state by the NIF government under President Bashir. The state has largely abdicated its traditional legitimate responsibility of protecting its own citizens. The PDF cadres are trained by over 2,000 Iranian military advisers in Sudan.²⁹ Iran is one of the suppliers of military hardware to Sudan, delivering some 60 main battle tanks in 1997/1998. Iran's military industry and exports have grown over the years, with the Middle East and Africa constituting the major recipients of arms equipment from Teheran. However, China has become the principal supplier of arms to Sudan since 1994. Sudan also imports arms from, among others, Iraq, Russia, other former Soviet Republics, and the former Warsaw Pact countries, France, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Chile, Ethiopia, Yemen and Qatar.

Even though China began supplying arms to Sudan in the 1980s, the Chinese dominance of the Sudanese military imports coincided with oil concessions Khartoum has offered Beijing since the early 1990s. For example, between 1991 and 1997, China supplied to Sudan, among other military equipment, two transport aircraft (Y-8), six fighter aircraft (F-7M Airguard), 60 battle tanks, 12 fighter ground-attack of different categories, 120 mortars, and 50 helicopters, most of which are financed by Iran.³⁰ In 1996 it was reported that China sold SCUD missiles at a cost of US\$ 200 million to Sudan. The US\$ 200 million was provided by Malaysia in exchange for oil concessions for the government owned Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas). Petronas together with the Chinese state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) have the largest shares in the Sudanese Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) consortium.

The Russian military exports to Sudan followed the 1993 agreement between the two countries, which incorporated Russian participation in the Sudanese oil industry. Since then Sudan has imported military equipment from Russia which includes,

²⁷ Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, "Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arabic Peninsula: Sudan" in *The world Geopolitics of Drugs 1995/96: Annual Report* ([Paris], September 1997) (<http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP01_RAP.htm> accessed 17 July 2000)

²⁸ M. Mahmoud, "Sufism and Islamism in Sudan" in E.E. Rosander and D. Westerlund (eds.), *African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters Between Sufis and Islamists* (Athens OH: Ohio University Press, 1997), p. 188

²⁹ See *Jane's Defence Weekly*, R. Lowry, "Sudan Strengthens Forces as Fighting is Stepped Up", 9 May 1992

³⁰ *Ploughshares*, "Military Profiles: Horn of Africa Countries", 1999 (<<http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/BUID%20PEACE/militaryProfile.htm>> accessed 23 June 2000)

among other items, Sukhoi bombers, Mi-24 helicopter gunships, MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighter aircraft and T-55 tanks.³¹

Contrary to denials by the South African ANC-led government, Sudan continued to receive some weapons from South Africa, with some of the military equipment received during the apartheid era frequently serviced by experts from Pretoria. Some of the military equipment continued to be supplied to Sudan by private companies based in South Africa.³²

Apart from the other military hardware, both the Government and the SPLM/A also use landmines to bolster its war effort against the liberation movements. It is estimated that Sudan has between 500,000 and 2 million landmines scattered mainly in the war-torn areas of the South and the Nuba Mountains in contravention of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.³³ The landmines used by Sudan are of different varieties such as Iranian YM-III; Belgian PRB M-3; Russian TM-57 and TM-46; U.S. M-15; Chinese T-69; Belgian VS-3.6; U.S. M-14; Israeli No. 4; Russian PMD-6M and POMZ-2 and Egyptian T/79, among others.³⁴

In order to strengthen its war efforts against the South, the NIF government of President Bashir - as in the case of the other previous governments - has supported other militias against the SPLA. Indeed, conflicts within and between the rebel movements are on many occasions also engineered by the governments in Khartoum.³⁵ Some of the militias supported by the NIF government are the Baggara Arabs, particularly the Rizeiqat, Rufaa al Huj, and Misiriya. These *murahelin* militias operate around Darfur and Kordofan, the oil rich regions. They have either fought independently against the SPLA and other rebel movements or alongside the PDF. The *murahelin* militias also frequently carry out sporadic raids against villages, burning homes and taking women and children as slaves. In 1997, for example, the Arab militias destroyed villages in Gadier, Ajibani, Andiring, Mirianta, Timbili, Haraza, Buyuut, Umm Kharaba, Ashaba, Sabirna, Kasay, Shoshta, Kalkuti and Kasia. The other groups that the government has supported against the rebel movements include the Nuer militias supporting Anya Nya 2, the Murle, Toposa, and Mandari militias.³⁶

³¹ United Nations, *United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/52/312, 28 August 1997, pp. 10-14

³² *Daily Mail & Guardian* [Johannesburg], M. Edmunds, "SA in the Sudan Conflict", 4 September 1998. See also South African Press Association-Agence France Presse, "Sudan Envoy Clears SA Government of Linkage to Arms Deals", 31 July 1998 and South African Press Association, "Arms Supplies to Sudan Illegal: Asmal", 28 July 1998

³³ Associated Press, C. Mbitiru, "Mines-Sudan", 14 July 1999

³⁴ United Nations, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Mine Clearance Unit, *The HAC Report: Sudan Mine Action Programme, July 1997: Assessment Mission Report* (Geneva, August 1997). Annex 1, pp. 10-11.

³⁵ D. Petterson, *Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999) and J. Prendergast, *Crisis response: Humanitarian Band-aids in Sudan and Somalia* (London: Pluto Press, 1997)

³⁶ A.Y. Atem, "The Current Status of the Civil-Military Relations: the Case of the SPLA", paper presented at the Conference on Civil-Military Relations, Nairobi, April 1999

4.1. The Rebel Movements: Their Military Strength and Source of Arms

Over the years since its inception in 1983, the SPLM/SPLA has remained the dominant and consistent player among the rebel movements. The moral, political, material and military support the SPLA receives internally and internationally provides the movement with the ability and capacity to challenge the successive theocratic governments in Sudan. The SPLA draws its military cadres mainly from, among other ethnic groups, the Nuer, Dinka, Lotuho, Shiluk, Nuba, Anuak, Beja, Fertit, Latuka and Acholi. Since its foundation, the SPLM/SPLA has undergone some administrative and structural changes to strengthen its war efforts against the governments in Khartoum and to rally support for its aims and objectives. The Provisional High Command, later renamed Politico-Military High Command (PMHC) of the SPLM/SPLA, was manned by the top SPLA commanders, thus subordinating the functions of the SPLM (the political wing) to the SPLA. The Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, John Garang, became the main personality behind the conduct of the war and administration of the movement. The leadership of the PMHC was assisted by the zonal commanders responsible for specific provinces (regions). Below the zonal commanders are the district administrators, district commanders, and a judiciary.

In 1984, the SPLM put into practice its own penal and disciplinary laws which established general court-martial, district court-martial, and summary court-martial for the administration of justice in the liberated areas.³⁷ What is important to note here is the existence of a state within a state. The wind of change sweeping the African continent in the name of democratization has not spared the SPLM/SPLA. There is an internal movement within the ranks of the SPLM/SPLA since 1991 in favour of the need to separate the political activities and objectives of the SPLM from its military wing. The first major breakthrough came in April 1994 at the National Convention at Chukudum, southern Sudan. The Chukudum Accords replaced the General Field and Staff Council, the successor of the PMHC, with the National Executive Council. The Chukudum Accords established the New Sudan People's Liberation Act (1994) which provided for, *inter alia*, the separation of the army from the civil administration, with the army officers incorporated in security committees at all levels.

Whereas initially most of the SPLA soldiers were drawn from the Nuer, the second largest ethnic groups, the largest number of soldiers over the years have been Dinka. The actual figures of soldiers under the command of the SPLA are not known, with some insiders insisting only that the SPLA has one of the largest armies in Africa.³⁸ The SPLA has more than 60,000 soldiers, with a quarter of the military contingent drawn from the Nuba.³⁹ The SPLA operates not only in the southern regions but also in Nuba Mountains and along the Ethio-Eritrean borders. Apart from the SPLA's New Sudan Brigade, which operates around the Ethio-Eritrean borders, the other liberation

³⁷ A.Y. Atem, "The Current Status of the Civil-Military Relations: the Case of the SPLA", paper presented at the Conference on Civil-Military Relations, Nairobi, April 1999

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ K.G. Adar, "Human Security, Conflict Resolution, Prevention and Management in a Turbulent Region: The Case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the Horn of Africa", paper presented at the Conference on Human Security, Global Governance, Sustainable Development Challenges in Central and Southern Africa, organized by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, and the United Nations University, Tokyo, 18-22 August 1999

movements that frequently engage the SPDF and the PDF include the Beja Congress Armed Forces (BCAF), the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF), the Umma Liberation Forces and the Legitimate Command all of which form part of the NDA. John Garang heads the Joint Military Committee of the NDA. As in the case of the SPLM/SPLA in southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, the NDA also has its own military and civilian administrative structures that oversee its operations and functions.

The SPLM/SPLA and other rebel movements in Sudan receive moral, political, material and military support from many sources including those captured from the SPDF and the PDF. Over the years, particularly since 1984 and until his death, the British multimillionaire and LONHRO chief, a close confidant of Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi, Roland "Tiny" Rowland, was one of the main financial supporters of the SPLA. Rowland was admitted as a member of the SPLA in 1993.⁴⁰ As we have indicated, the countries that have supported the southern liberation movements include Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Israel and since the 1990s, Eritrea and the U.S. Apart from the frequent UPDF-SPLA joint military exercises, Uganda, like Eritrea, has granted radio facilities to the SPLA. The SPLA is also reported to be one of the beneficiaries of Kenya's secret arms industry located in Eldoret, Rift Valley Province.⁴¹ The BCAF draws its force from the Beja ethnic group, around the Eritrean borders. Sudan's strategic ports, Port Sudan and Suakin, are located in the areas considered by the Beja people as their homeland. With its over 10,000 soldiers and the Eritrean support, the BCAF provides a real threat for the NIF government. Eritrea also gives the SAF military support, with reports indicating that U.S. arms are transported to the rebels through Asmara.⁴²

In addition to Rowland's LONHRO, there are other known businesses and non-governmental organizations and individuals known to be either overtly or covertly supporting the SPLA. The Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), a relief organization operating in southern Sudan, provides financial aid to the SPLA. Even though the Norwegian Government stopped providing funds to the NPA because of its support for the SPLA, the NPA continued to receive more than US\$ 20 million annually from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).⁴³ The other Norwegian relief organization involved in the support of the SPLA is the Church Emergency Aid (Kirkens Noedhjelp). The NPA, founded by the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions in 1939, has been operating in southern Sudan since 1986. It also receives financial support from Christian Solidarity International (CSI) of Britain. What is interesting to note is that the SPLA's spokesman, Monsour Khalid. Khalid served as the Vice-Chairman of the Brundtland Commission, instituted by Gro Harlem Brundtland (now a high ranking official in the UN), former Norwegian Prime Minister in 1987.⁴⁴

It is through these sources, among others, that the SPLA and the other rebel movements have managed to withstand military incursions waged by Khartoum. The

⁴⁰ See J.M. Burr, "SPLA Background and Biodata" (n.d.) (<<http://www.yasin.dircon.co.uk/sudan/whois/spla.htm>> accessed 17 July 2000)

⁴¹ L. Lata, "Armed Rebellion in the Horn of Africa", *Ploughshares*, September 1998 (<<http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/BUILD%20PEACE/Lata98.html>> accessed 17 July 2000)

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Executive Intelligence Review*, "Rice Caught in Iran-Contra-style Capers in Africa", 20 November 1998

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Florida based security company, Airscan, is also involved in arms trafficking from Uganda to the SPLA. The other well-known security companies that operate in Sudan include the British Sandline International, an affiliate of the South African security company Executive Outcomes (EO) and the U.S. firm Military Professional Resources Incorporated.⁴⁵ These security firms provide the needed military training on both sides of the conflict. In its attempts to restrict the activities of security firms, the Government of South Africa in April 1997 introduced a bill in Parliament, called the Foreign Military Bill, to curb the operations of such firms abroad. The Bill incorporated the 1977 Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, which prohibits mercenary activities. Apart from the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, the OAU's Charter and specifically its Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa as well as the United Nations' 1989 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (though not in force) prohibit the use of mercenaries.

The U.S. is increasingly becoming more overtly and covertly involved in support for the SPLA and other rebel movements in Sudan, particularly since the NIF government came to power in 1989. One of the main reasons for the U.S.'s actions is its unhappiness with the radical Islamist fundamentalism of the government in Khartoum rather than necessarily any desire to support the cause of the rebel movements *per se*. The presence of U.S. military officers during the 1996 joint Ugandan-Eritrean-SPLA military exercises can be understood in this context, that is, intimidation of the NIF government.⁴⁶ Indeed, the bombing on 20 August 1998 of the al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Factory in Khartoum was in response to what the U.S. believes is the NIF support for radical Islamic groups such as Abu Nidal, Hamas, Hezbollah, Gamaat Islamiya, and the Islamic Jihad.⁴⁷ The U.S. claimed that the bombing was in response to the simultaneous terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam on 7 August 1998, which claimed more than 300 lives and injured over 5,000 people in Nairobi alone. The U.S. insisted that the al-Shifa factory was being used by Osama bin Laden to produce chemical weapons, particularly the O-ethyl methylphosphonothioic acid (or EMPTA), an ingredient in the VX nerve agent.⁴⁸ The objective of the simultaneous bombing of al-Shifa and Afghanistan by Tomahawk cruise missiles in Operation Infinite Reach was to eliminate Osama bin Laden and his group residing in Afghanistan at the time. The central point to stress here is the U.S. concern over the growing Islamic fundamentalism in the region, which explains its support for the SPLA.

Apart from military support, the U.S. has also provided humanitarian assistance to both sides to the conflict since 1988. The Clinton administration, through the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative launched in 1994, as well as USAID Horn of Africa Support Assistance, USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR), USAID's Bureau for Africa and the State

⁴⁵ See generally K. O'Brien, "Military-Advisory Groups and African Security: Privatised Peacekeeping?", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 78-105

⁴⁶ *Africa Confidential*, "Sudan: Arms Against a Sea of Troubles", 15 November 1996

⁴⁷ Petterson, p. 69.

⁴⁸ See *The New York Times*, T. Weiner, "Pentagon and C.I.A. Defend Sudan Missile Attack", 2 September 1998; *International Herald Tribune*, V. Loeb and B. Graham, "Sudan Plant Was Probed Months Before Attack", 1 September 1998; *Washington Post*, K. Vick, "US, Sudan Trade Claims on Factory", 25 August 1998, p.1, and *Wall Street Journal*, R.S. Greenberger and N. Deogun, "Officials Say Soil Sample Buttressed US Suspicions about Sudan Plant", 25 August 1998

Department's Bureau for Population, Refugee, and Migration, among other agencies, maintains the U.S. interests in Sudan. In the 1999 Fiscal Year, for example, the Clinton administration provided US\$ 95 million in humanitarian emergency funds to Sudan, including US\$ 2.5 million disbursed by the USAID/OFDA. Apart from US\$ 1 million provided by STAR in rebel held areas, the NPA also received nearly US\$ 2 million for disbursements in the SPLA held areas.⁴⁹ Together with food and refugee assistance the Clinton administration provided more than US\$ 203 million to Sudan. Between 1989 and 1998 the U.S. gave over US\$ 800 million in humanitarian aid to Sudan. What needs to be stressed here is that the U.S. Government provides Sudan mainly with humanitarian aid as opposed to military aid. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, stated publicly after her meeting with John Garang and NDA leaders in Uganda in 1998 that the U.S. was working to isolate Sudan, that is, the government of the NIF.⁵⁰

5. The Interface Between Oil Production and the Sudanese Civil War

As in the case of Angola and other conflict prone countries in Africa, mineral and oil productions provide needed foreign revenue incentives for the belligerents in civil wars. In Sudan, where the debt burden accounts for 250% of GDP, the production of minerals and oil by foreign private and state owned companies provides consumption needs and revenue earnings for the country's war efforts against the rebel movements. Whereas Sudan consumes about 30,000 barrels per day,⁵¹ its production is estimated to have increased from about 12,000 in 1999 to 200,000 barrels per day in early 2000.⁵² Sudan completed its 1,610 km oil pipeline, financed mainly by Talisman, connecting Heglig oilfields (southern Darfur and southern Kordofan) and President Bashir, south of Port Sudan, as well as al-Jayli oil refinery (70 km north of Khartoum) in 1999 at the cost of US\$ 1 billion and US\$ 600 million, respectively.⁵³ The companies that are involved in funding, building and maintaining the pipelines include, among others, Denim Pipeline Construction (Canada), Roll 'n Oil Field Industries (Canada), Mannesmann (Germany), the Europipe Consortium, Weir Pumps (United Kingdom), Techint (Argentina), Allen Power Engineering (United Kingdom), and the Chinese Government.⁵⁴ The other major oil fields include Adar (western Upper Nile) and Unity (in Bentiu area in Unity State).⁵⁵

The oil exploration and exploitation companies operate under the auspices of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), a consortium of, among others, Chinese, Malaysian, Canadian, and Sudanese companies. These companies have concessions in the Adar, Heglig and Unity oilfields, all of which are located in southern Sudan.⁵⁶ Chevron, one of the first companies to engage in extensive

⁴⁹ United States Agency for International Development, *Sudan: Complex Emergency Situation Report no. 1 (FY 2000)* Washington DC, 5 January 2000

⁵⁰ Petterson, p. 186

⁵¹ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Tug of War", Vol. 11, No. 2 (March-April 1999), p. 26

⁵² *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Oil Exports Rise", Vol. 12, No. 2 (March-April 2000), p. 35

⁵³ Field, p. 6

⁵⁴ *Company News Africa*, "Sudan Signs Pipeline Contract with British, Chinese and Argentinean Firms", 3 April 1998

⁵⁵ Field, p. 6

⁵⁶ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Sudan starts pumping oil", Vol. 11, No. 3 (May-June 1999), p. 34

petroleum production in Sudan in the 1960s, abandoned its US\$ 800 million investments due to the attacks by the SPLA. The other oil companies involved in the exploration of oil in Sudan in the 1960s and 1970s included Agip, Texas Eastern, Sun Oil and Union Texas. After the withdrawal of Chevron from its Suakin Basin oilfields, 40 km from the Red Sea, the Government of Sudan signed an agreement with the Saudi Arabian businessman, Adnan Khashoggi, to establish the National Oil Company of Sudan to resume the production of oil in exchange for a 50% interest in the venture and related assets. Chevron sold its assets at the Abu Jarra oilfields to Concorp of Sudan, which by 1992 began the production of petroleum.⁵⁷ Sudan's oil and gas reserves are estimated at 700 million barrels and 86 billion cubic metres (or 0.06% of the world's reserves) respectively.⁵⁸ The oil revenue received by the Government of Sudan totals US\$ 1 million per day, equal to the amount spent on arms per day.

TABLE II OIL PROSPECTORS IN SUDAN⁵⁹

COUNTRY	STATE/PRIVATELY OWNED COMPANIES	CONCESSION
Austria	OMV-GmbH	Heglig
Canada	Arakis Energy	Heglig
Canada	State Petroleum Corporation	Heglig
Canada	Talisman	Heglig
China	China National Petroleum Company	Heglig
China	Petrochina	Heglig
France	ELF-Aquitane	Heglig
France	Totalfina	Unity
Iran	National Iranian Gas Company	Unity
Italy	AGIP	Heglig
Italy	ENI	Heglig
Malaysia	Petroliam Nasional Berhad	Heglig
Mauritius	GAPCO	Heglig
Netherlands	Royal Dutch Shell	Heglig
Nigeria	Amni International Petroleum	Suakin
Qatar	Gulf Petroleum Corporation	Adar
Qatar	Gulf International	Adar
Russia	YUKOS	Adar
Russia	Zarubezh-Neftegasstroj	Adar
Saudi Arabia	Arab Group International	Heglig
Sudan	Al-Ghanawa	Melut
Sudan	CONCORP	Adar
Sudan	National Oil Company of Sudan	Heglig
Sudan	SUDAPET	Heglig
Sweden	International Petroleum Corporation	Heglig
United States	Chevron ^a	Unity
United States	Occidental Petroleum Corporation ^a	Unity
United States	Texas Eastern ^a	Unity

⁵⁷ *New Africa*, "Sudan Mining Sector" (<<http://www.newafrica.com/mining/sudan.htm>> accessed 17 July 2000)

⁵⁸ *Mbendi Information for Africa, 1995-2000*, "Oil Industry Profile - Upstream Sudan" (<<http://www.mbendi.co.za/indu/oilg/oilgsuus.stm>> accessed 24 June 2000)

⁵⁹ Compiled from numerous sources including, S. Field, *The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry*, Occasional Paper, No. 23 (Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, February 2000). Some of the state and privately owned companies are engaged in the production of oil in more than one concession, that is, in the Adar, Heglig, and Unity oilfields.

United States	Union Eastern ^a	Unity
---------------	----------------------------	-------

NOTE: ^a These companies have withdrawn from oil production in Sudan.

As Table II indicates, a number of state and privately owned companies are involved in the production of oil in Sudan, which directly and indirectly influences the behavior of the belligerents in the civil war. For example, as we saw from Table I, there has been a dramatic increase of military procurement by the Government of Sudan since the beginning of its oil exports in the 1990s. The Sudanese military procurement increased from US\$ 204 million in 1990 to more than US\$ 766 million in 1992. Within the GNPOC in Heglig the Chinese state controlled company, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), owns over 40% of the shares. The CNPC, under the name of Petrochina, is also privately owned by other companies worldwide, with BP Amoco's investments alone reaching more than US\$ 576 million. Whereas the Malaysian state owned company Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas) has 30% of the shares, Talisman Energy, a Canadian private company and Sudan's state owned company, Sudapet, have 25% and 5% of the shares respectively.⁶⁰

There are many other states and privately owned companies that are involved in the exploitation of petroleum. In Block 5A concession, for example, the International Petroleum Corporation, which is owned by Lundin Oil AB, a private Swedish company, has over 40% of the shares. Petronas, OMV-GmbH of Austria, and Sudapet have over 29%, 26% and 5% of the shares, respectively. What is important to note is that apart from the use of oil revenues for military procurement by Sudan, the oil exploration and exploitation companies are also concerned about security. Indeed, apart from the Sudanese soldiers and the pro-government militia deployed to protect oilfields, Chinese soldiers, mercenaries from Malaysia and Branch Heritage of the South African Executive Outcomes (EO) are also reported to be operating in these areas. Executive Outcomes have links in countries in Africa, South America and the Far East, with 70% of its operations based in Africa. Whereas in Kenya the EO is reported to have established security consulting companies with Raymond Moi (President Moi's son), in Sudan the EO also provides security to the Canadian oil firm, Talisman.⁶¹ As in the case of other interlocking conflict entanglements in Africa, the involvement of the oil producing companies not only perpetuates the civil war but is directly implicated in that many people have been killed or forcibly displaced from the areas surrounding the oilfields.⁶²

With an estimated 12.5 billion barrels of undiscovered oil, Sudan is likely to be one of the world's largest oil producers.⁶³ Sudan, therefore, continues to attract oil prospectors who are willing to invest in the oil industry irrespective of the security risks involved. The marketing of Sudanese oil has recently attracted a number of competitors, with Trafigura Beheer BV of the Netherlands winning the contracts against Vitol SA (Switzerland), Arcadia Group PLC (United Kingdom), and Glencore

⁶⁰ South Sudanese Friends International, *Oil in Sudan* (Bloomington IN, 14 June 2000) (Internet: <<http://www.geocities.com/ssfi/issues/oil000614>> accessed 17 July 2000)

⁶¹ O'Brien

⁶² Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Human security in Sudan: the report of a Canadian assessment mission prepared for the Minister for Foreign Affairs* (Ottawa, January 2000) (Internet: <<http://www-dfaii-maeci.ac.ca/foreignp/menu-e.asp>> accessed 23 June 2000)

⁶³ *Financial Times* [London], E. Alden, "Canada in \$196m purchase of Arakis", 18 August 1998

International AC (Switzerland).⁶⁴ As we have explained, the National Islamic Front (NIF) dominated government of President Omar al-Bashir or any other future government in Khartoum for that matter, is likely to harden its position on the question of southern Sudan because of the concentration there of the oil fields. An increase in the production and export of oil will also continue to provide Sudan with badly needed revenues for military procurement. It is, therefore, fair to argue that the countries involved in the oil exploration and exploitation either directly or indirectly through their privately owned companies are perpetuating the civil war in Sudan. Except for the United States whose companies have withdrawn because of the sanctions imposed by Congress, most of the countries in Europe as well as Canada, China, Russia and some Third World countries are involved in promoting and perpetuating the forgotten tragedy in Sudan.

The state and privately owned companies from China and Canada enjoy the largest share of oil production in Sudan, with the Canadian companies providing the needed technology. Some of the top executives of the oil companies have close relations with the NIF leadership. For example, the chairperson of the Board of Arakis Energy, Lutfer Khan, had close links with the Sudanese Minister for External Security, Qutbi Mahdi. The Khan-Mahdi personal relations paved the way for better understanding between Arakis Energy and the Government of Sudan. Lutfer Khan also played an important role in encouraging Petronas to be involved in oil production in Sudan.⁶⁵ Prior to its oil prospecting and production being taken over by Talisman, Arakis was also engaged in servicing the broken SPDF trucks as well as providing electricity and water to the army camps close to the oilfields.⁶⁶

It is also important to note that the good relations between Sudan and Saudi Arabia are cemented by widespread investments in the Sudanese oil industry by the Arab Group International, a company chaired by Prince Sultan bin Saud.⁶⁷ Saudi Arabia's investments in Sudan became more prominent, particularly since the 1970s, following the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil price increases. The oil price increases provided OPEC, and particularly Saudi Arabia, with huge financial surpluses. The Faisal Islamic Bank (FIB), established in Sudan in 1977 under the Faisal Islamic Bank Act, and whose patron was Prince Muhammad ibn Faisal Al Saud, became an important investor in the Sudanese oil industry and other sectors. A number of prominent members of NIF served on the board of FIB, which prompted the other political parties such as the Umma Party and DUP to form their own Islamic banks. Indeed, the influence of Saudi Arabia on Sudan, particularly with respect to the Saudi investments in Sudan's oil industry and the financial support provided must be understood in these contexts.

The Chinese strategic interest in Sudan is based largely on the immediate and long-term needs for oil. China has, therefore, become one of the major trading partners of Sudan. Even though it has oil deposits of 17 billion tons and produces over 150 million tons of crude oil annually, China still imports substantial amounts of oil for its

⁶⁴ Dow Jones Business News, "Dutch-based Trafigura reportedly wins Sudan oil-marketing deal", 2 August 1999

⁶⁵ Field, p. 12

⁶⁶ Inter Press Service, R. Chatterjee, "Canada-Sudan: Activists Condemn Oil Company's Operations in Sudan", 26 August 1997

⁶⁷ *New Africa*

domestic consumption.⁶⁸ China has not only used more than 7,000 Chinese laborers in its oil project in Sudan, but over 20,000 Chinese with military training are reported to be deployed in Sudan to protect CNPC and Petrochina concessions.⁶⁹ The Chinese persistent support for Sudan within the United Nations Security Council is a clear testimony to the importance China attaches to the two countries' relations. Indeed, it is because of this Sino-Sudanese cooperation that China blocked the Security Council's initiatives to impose sanctions against Sudan.⁷⁰ Oil, therefore, constitutes an important intervening variable in Sino-Sudanese foreign relations. Like China, Malaysia is an important trading partner of Sudan. When the IMF threatened to expel Sudan, it was Malaysia, which paid US\$ 500 million to cover some of Sudan's debts.⁷¹ This was the second time that Sudan was threatened with suspension. In 1993, the IMF voted to suspend Sudan's membership for its failure to pay US\$ 1.6 billion in arrears, the largest debt in the IMF.⁷²

As we have indicated, the investment by Western and Third World countries in the oil industry in Sudan has undermined the peace process in Sudan. It is only the United States, which has imposed modest sanctions against the Government of Sudan. Together with Cuba, Iran, Libya, Syria, Iraq and North Korea, the U.S. included Sudan under its 1996 Anti-terrorism Act which prohibits corporations and individuals from engaging in financial transactions with such countries. Specifically, doing business with Sudan or with the GNPOC and Sudapet carries criminal penalties of up to US\$ 500,000 and US\$ 250,000 for corporations and individuals, respectively, as well as ten years imprisonment. The Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department is given the administrative prerogative under the Act to impose civil penalties of up to US\$ 11,000 per violation. However, what is interesting to note is that the Treasury Department gave special exemptions to CNPC, Petronas, and Talisman which together own 95% of the GNPOC concessions.⁷³ Indeed, it can correctly be argued that the U.S. own econo-political interests are more fundamental than imposing stiff sanctions against Sudan. As in the case of other countries and private companies involved in the oil exploration and exploitation in Sudan, the Clinton administration continues to sanction human rights violations in Sudan.

The untold human suffering arising as a result of deliberate displacements and killings mainly by the SPDF and the PDF to clear the oil rich areas for exploration and exploitation continues unabated. In Western Upper Nile, tens of thousands of people were killed and forcibly removed by the government forces through the use of ground attacks, helicopter gunships and bombardments to clear the oil rich areas, with some of the gunships piloted by Iraqi soldiers.⁷⁴ The most affected areas where over 30,000 people were reported missing included, among others, Bentiu, Guk, Rik, Gumriak,

⁶⁸ Asia Intelligence Wire, "China Actively Explores International Oil Market", 4 November 1998

⁶⁹ *Financial Times* [London], "Sudan Looks to Oil for New Lifeblood", 11 June 1998

⁷⁰ *Alwan Daily* [Khartoum], "China Rejects Intervention in Sudan Internal Affairs", 20 July 1999

⁷¹ Field, p. 18

⁷² *Sudan Newsletter*, "Money and Politics: IMF Suspends Sudan", Vol. 111, No. 4, (Winter 1993/1994), p.1

⁷³ Casey Institute, "Classic Clinton: Like Canada, US Refuses to Sanction Sudan's Foreign Oil Partners - But Pretends to Do So", Security Forum, No. 00-F10 (Washington: Center for Security Policy, 16 February 2000) (<<http://www.security-policy.org/papers/2000/00-F10.html>> accessed 17 July 2000)

⁷⁴ *Africanews*, John Deng, "Sudan: Streams of Oil and Blood", Issue 50 (May 2000) (<http://metro.peacelink.it/afrinews/50_issue/p1.html> accessed 17 July 2000)

Pariang, Mankien, Langkien, Neny, Duar, Koch, Toic, Yirol, Pagarau, Twic, Ruweng, Makuac, and Wuncuie.⁷⁵ The attacks by the government forces code named Oil Brigade intensified in 1999 and coincided with oil exports and more oil discoveries around Bor, south of Adar, Unity and Heglig concessions. Apart from a consortium of Gulf Oil Company, al-Ghanawa, three unnamed Canadian and European companies and Sudapet contracted to extract oil from the Bor area; other contenders include companies from Britain, India, Italy, New Zealand and Pakistan. The Bor area covers about 70,000 square kilometers, that is, from Upper Nile to the eastern Sudanese-Ethiopian border.⁷⁶

As expected, the oilfields continue to be prime targets for liberation movements. For example, the Beja Congress under the command of the SPLA attacked the oil pipelines around Atbara and Erkowit in 1999 and early 2000. The Government of Sudan recruits children under 18 years of age to join the PDF *Murahelin* to protect the oilfields. The Sudanese policy contravenes the International Labour Organization's Convention No. 138 on Minimum Age (1973), adopted by the 174 member states in June 1999, which provides for, *inter alia*, 18 years as the minimum employment age.⁷⁷ Whereas Talisman Energy uses the PDF *Murahelin* fighters to protect its oilfields, the Swedish company, the International Petroleum Corporation, employed trained Nuer militia. The production of oil in Sudan has not only complicated the civil war scenario but has also created a vicious circle where both the NIF government and the liberation movements are involved in human rights violations.

6. Refugees Scenario

Over 80% of the southern Sudanese are either internally displaced or are refugees in other countries, particularly in the neighboring countries. At least one out of every five southern Sudanese has died because of the civil war, with the massive loss of life surpassing the civilian death toll in any war since World War II and more than all war related deaths suffered by Americans in the country's 200-year history.⁷⁸ The civil war in Sudan remains the longest lasting civil war in the world.

TABLE III: SUDANESE REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES⁷⁹

YEAR	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	ETHIOPIA	KENYA	UGANDA
1996	30,000	100,000	70,000	30,000	200,000
1997	32,000	60,000	60,000	40,000	160,000
1998	35,000	30,000	60,000	45,000	170,000

⁷⁵ Amnesty International, *Sudan: The Human Price of Oil* (London, May 2000), p. 4

⁷⁶ Amnesty International, *Sudan: The Human Price of Oil* (London, May 2000), p. 6

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p.10

⁷⁸ United States, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs, *Sudan's Humanitarian Crisis and the US Response: Testimony of Roger Winter, US Committee for Refugees* (Washington DC, March 1999)

⁷⁹ Source: United States Committee for Refugees, *Worldwide Refugees Information: Country Report: Sudan [1998], [1999], [2000]* (Washington DC, 1998, 1999, 2000)

(<<http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/sudan.htm>> accessed 17 July 2000)

Whereas the total number of the Sudanese refugees in the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda remained relatively the same, the number of refugees in the DRC dropped markedly in 1997 and 1998. It is likely that most of the refugees fled because of the civil war in the DRC, with most of them probably crossing into Uganda during the same period. What needs to be noted is that these figures vary with sources.

In the same period, that is, 1996 to 1998, Sudan also received refugees from the neighboring countries. For example, Sudan accommodated more than 395,000, 365,000 and 360,000 refugees from the neighboring countries in 1996, 1997 and 1998, respectively. Eritreans accounted for most of these refugees, that is, 340,000, 320,000 and 320,000 in 1996, 1997 and 1998, respectively.⁸⁰ More than 30 international and local NGOs provided aid in southern Sudan alone. Although these NGOs work independently, their activities are also coordinated by the United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). From its base in Nairobi, Kenya, the OLS, created in 1989, distributes humanitarian food aid at the cost of US\$ 1 million per day, equivalent to what the Government of Sudan spends per day in maintaining its war efforts in the south. On average more than 60,000 people have died in southern Sudan each year, with 250,000 and 200,000 reported to have died in 1988 and 1998, respectively.⁸¹ For the greater part of the 1990s, the government prohibited flights by the OLS, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other organizations into southern Sudan from Khartoum, El Obeid and Lokichokio (Kenya).⁸² These restrictions exacerbated the human suffering in southern Sudan. Apart from the refugees in the neighboring countries, a number of Sudanese also applied for asylum in Europe and North America. Between 1990 and 1995, for example, more than 10,000 Sudanese applied for asylum in Europe, with Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom receiving 43%, 22% and 13% of the asylum seekers respectively in 1995.⁸³ The number of Sudanese asylum applications in North America has remained steady at about 600 a year since 1991, with Canada receiving the majority of the applications. Between 1990 and 1995, European countries, Canada and the United States granted convention status asylum to 1,560, 1,500 and 650 Sudanese respectively.⁸⁴

The extent of human suffering and human rights violations by all the parties to the conflict, with women and children being the main victims, has been extensively documented. What needs to be stressed here is that slave trade similar to that of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries has openly resurfaced in Sudan in this era of civilization, with the UN, the OAU and the powerful nations watching without taking a concerted and coordinated effort to eradicate the problem. During his testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Roger Winter, the then Executive Director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, recommended that the UN and the U.S. should be prepared to declare southern Sudan a “humanitarian autonomous zone” to allow humanitarian emergency

⁸⁰ Source: United States Committee for Refugees [2000]

⁸¹ United States, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

⁸² United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, *Situation of Human Rights in Sudan: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Gaspar Biro*, E/CN.4/1996/62, 20 February 1996

⁸³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from the Sudan* (Geneva, February 1997), p.3

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 3-4

deliveries with or without express consent of the NIF leadership.⁸⁵ Whereas such a view may be contrary to the UN Charter and would violate international norms, the situation in southern Sudan requires such a decisive action and more UN attention.

Sudan is a signatory to both the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery. In 1996 the government established a Special Committee to Investigate Slavery and Disappearance in response to the 1995 UN General Assembly resolution.⁸⁶ Irrespective of the government's denial of the existence of slavery, a number of reports have confirmed that slavery thrives in Sudan. The Switzerland based Christian Solidarity International (CSI), for example, has since 1995 spent more than US\$ 1 million to redeem over 20,000 slaves captured by the pro-NIF *murahelin* militias. The CSI pays about US\$ 50 for each redeemed slave, with the prices varying according to sex and area.⁸⁷ It is because of the support the CSI gives to the SPLA as well as the CSI's report on slavery in Sudan that the NIF government, with the help of China, managed to successfully lobby for the withdrawal of the CSI's observer status with the UN.

The area most affected by slave abductions by the Baggara Arabs is the Bahr El Ghazal Province, inhabited mainly by the Dinka. These reports have been confirmed by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Sudan, Leonardo Franco.⁸⁸ It was because of the pressure by, among others, UNICEF and Save the Children that in May 1999 the NIF government established a Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children within the Ministry of Justice to deal with the issue of slavery. However, both sides of the conflict divide are still implicated on the issue of slavery. All these conflict related humanitarian problems as well as state and interlocking personality interests, among other reasons, continue to complicate progress towards conflict resolution.

7. Conflict Resolution Trends

Irrespective of the human tragedy that prevails in Sudan, all the Sudanese still regard Sudan as their primary locus of identity. Indeed, because Sudan is at war with itself and more so because parts of the territory are under the control of the rebel movements, Sudan may best be characterized as a "quasi-state" or a "weak state" that is on the verge of collapse.⁸⁹ As we have explained, the southern Sudanese and the Nuba, among others, consider the state as a threat to their survival. For this reason, the rebel movements constitute the centre of security for the people who are constantly subjected to state terrorism. On the other hand, the state also constitutes the centre of

⁸⁵ United States, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

⁸⁶ United States, Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 1997: Sudan* (Washington DC: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 30 January 1998)

⁸⁷ *Daily Mail and Guardian* [Johannesburg], C. Duodo, "Slave Trade Thrives in Sudan", 28 January 2000

⁸⁸ Washington Office on Africa, *Slavery, War and Peace in Sudan* (Washington, March 2000) (<<http://www.woafrica.org/Sudan.html>> accessed 17 July 2000). See also *Sudan Update*, "Slavery Revived", Vol. 6, No. 7 (15 May 1995), pp. 4-5

⁸⁹ See B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991) and R. Jackson, *Quasi-states, Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

contestation among the parties to the conflict, with all of them advocating different versions of conflict resolution. Over the years, particularly since the 1980s, a number of conflict resolution initiatives put in place by individual bilateral and multilateral actors have so far failed to resolve the civil war.

7.1 Internal Dimension

As already explained, the 1991 split within the ranks of the SPLM/SPLA involving John Garang and Riek Machar led to frequent serious conflicts involving Garang's SPLA and Machar's SSIM/SSIA. The most serious confrontation between the two movements, which occurred in 1992-1993, claimed over 20,000 lives and displaced more than 300,000 Nuers and Dinkas, particularly around Ayod, Kongor and Waat (Jonglei Province) dubbed the "Jonglei Starvation Triangle".⁹⁰ Traditional chiefs along the borders of the Nuers and Dinkas have played important roles in resolving conflicts between the two communities, the most notable one being the 1986-1987 SPLA/Anyanya 2 union. This "People-to-People" initiative involving chiefs, women and religious bodies, particularly the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) has brought together the warring factions in the 1990s. Some of the incentives of the "People-to-People" conflict resolution initiative are that it has increased access to fishing sites, farmland, grazing areas and trade as well as facilitated the establishment of border courts and the return of captured women and children.

The January 1999 Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant brokered by the NSCC and funded by the STAR programme, is one of the best examples of a "People-to-People" conflict resolution initiative. The Wunlit Covenant was signed by over 300 chiefs from the Dinkas and Nuers in the presence of the SPLA commander Salva Kiir (a Dinka from Gogrial region) and Bishop Monsignor Caesar Mazzolari of the Catholic Diocese of Rumbek.⁹¹ The NSCC has since then embarked on the mission of expanding the "People-to-People" peace process to other areas, culminating in the Waat-Lou Nuer Covenant signed in November 1999 by Nuer leaders in Upper Nile region.

The June 1999 rapprochement between the African Masalit farmers and their counterparts, the nomadic Arab cattle traders in Western Darfur State was also a result of similar initiatives by the NSCC and chiefs. The NSCC success in bringing the Dinkas and Nuers together was as a result of a series of meetings and workshops held between 1994 and 1998 which brought together grassroots leaders from both sides. The NSCC, for example, with the help of the Peace Facilitator, Telar Deng, managed to bring together at the 1998 Lokichokio (Kenya-Sudan border) workshop, chiefs, elders, women and church leaders from the two communities. It was because of the Nuer-Dinka Loki Accord, as it was called, that the Wunlit Covenant was then signed in 1999, laying the foundation for what has been described by Telar Deng as a "peace movement by the people for the people with a firm foundation at the grassroots".⁹²

Yet, the churches have also had their own problems. The NSCC as well as the Church Ecumenical Action in Sudan (CEAS) have accused the South African fundamentalist

⁹⁰ K. G. Adar, "Conflict Resolution in a Turbulent Region: The Case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Sudan", *Africa Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *fc*.

⁹¹ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Sudan: Tribes Give Peace a Chance", Vol. 11, No. 2 (March-April 1999), p. 23

⁹² *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Sudan: Church Succeeds Where Politicians Fail", Vol. 12, No. 1 (January-February 2000), p. 27

Christian NGOs, particularly the Frontline Fellowship (FF) chaired by Rev. Peter Hammond of favoring southern Christians vis-à-vis southern Muslims. Specifically, the NSCC and the CEAS accuse the FF and other South African Christian fundamentalists (made up of South African military and Zimbabwean whites) of understanding the southern problems solely in religious terms, a dichotomy which the Sudanese churches have consistently tried to avoid. The CEAS is not supportive of the mercenaries within the ranks of the FF as well as the military equipment, which the South African religious NGOs supply to the southern rebels through Uganda.⁹³ The CEAS has also registered its reservations against CARE International and World Vision because the two NGOs are perceived to be promoting American foreign policy interests in Sudan. CEAS, with an annual budget of US\$ 20 million, is linked to Caritas International and Action by Churches Together both of which are based in Switzerland.⁹⁴

7.2 External Dimension

Whereas the extra-Sudanese peace process has since the early 1990s been centred within the framework of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), there are other initiatives which require examination. One of the first initiatives that brought John Garang and Riek Machar together after their split in 1991 was the 1993 symposium organized jointly by the African Sub-Committee of the U.S. Congress and the Institute of Peace. However, the resulting Washington Declaration, as it was known, did not end conflict among the warring factions.⁹⁵ One of the central setbacks to the Washington Declaration was lack of tangible follow-up to ensure compliance by the parties to the conflict. The 1995 diplomatic initiative by the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, which temporarily led to the cease-fire between the rebel movements and the government, was mainly to allow his team to eradicate guinea worm and river blindness and to provide vaccination to the southern Sudanese children.⁹⁶ Neither the Egypto-Libyan efforts designed to broker a peace process in Sudan, nor the 1992-1993 Abuja Rounds in the Nigerian capital succeeded in convincing President Bashir to end the war.

7.3 Regional Dimension: The IGAD Peace Process

Created in 1986, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), later renamed Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been the dominant player in the Sudanese peace process. The initial objective of IGADD was to deal with issues pertaining to the endemic ecological (drought and desertification) and humanitarian problems in the region. However, in the 1990s, IGAD transformed its role to that of conflict resolution, prevention and management. IGAD's role in conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa received official recognition from the government, when in 1990 Sudan requested IGAD to take a more proactive role in the peace process in southern Sudan. The acceptance by Sudan that IGAD's conflict resolution mechanism constitutes the best option for bringing the belligerents

⁹³ *Ibid*, p. 32

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 33

⁹⁵ *Sudan Newsletter*, pp. 6-7

⁹⁶ Petterson, pp. 167-9 and *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, "Jimmy Carter's Latest Peace Initiative: Where Can It Lead Sudan?", Vol. 7, No. 3 (May-June 1995), p. 26

together enhanced the role of the regional body vis-à-vis other possible contenders. Indeed, it provided IGAD with an opportunity to promote “African sub-regional solutions” to “African sub-regional problems”, a post Cold War phenomenon which is emerging in the continent.

A comprehensive conflict resolution proposal was negotiated by IGAD and adopted in its 1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP). IGAD’s DOP incorporated most of the policy options, which have been pursued by Sudan and the rebel movements. Central to the war of attrition in Sudan are the issues of unity of Sudan, self-determination for southern Sudanese and the separation of religion and state. The 1994 Nairobi IGAD DOP meeting, attended by, among others, representatives from the Government of Sudan, the SPLM/SPLA-Mainstream (Garang’s group) and the SPLM/SPLA-United (Machar’s group), was a follow-up to the previous meetings held in August 1989 in Addis Ababa, December 1989 in Nairobi, May and June 1992 and April and May 1993 in Abuja, and January 1992 in Frankfurt.⁹⁷ The DOP provided for, *inter alia*, the right of self-determination for the southern Sudanese, maintenance of the unity of Sudan, federalism, and a secular and democratic state.⁹⁸ The DOP can be interpreted as a triumph for the southern liberation movements given its endorsement of the separation of religion and state.

The endorsement of the DOP by the National Democratic Alliance following its 1994 Chukudum Accord and the 1995 Asmara Declaration, expanded IGAD’s peace process vis-à-vis other interested parties to the conflict in Sudan. Apart from the rebel movements, there are numerous NGOs and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) which have endorsed the IGAD’s DOP. They include, among others, the NSCC, the World Council of Churches (WCC), CARE International, Doctors without Borders, USAID, ICRC, IGAD Partners Forum (comprising the U.S., Canada, Norway, Italy, Britain and Netherlands), Coalition for Peace in the Horn-US, Working Group on the Horn-Canada, the OAU, and the UN. What is important to emphasize is not only that IGAD’s role has been broadened and legitimized internationally but that for the first time a consensus has emerged around the principle of self-determination for the southern Sudanese. However, it is important to note that even though Khartoum signed the DOP in 1997, the NIF still insists that the document is not legally binding on the government.⁹⁹ The incorporation of *shari’a* laws in the 1998 Sudanese constitution is a setback for the IGAD peace process.

CARE International, Doctors without Borders, Oxfam, and Save the Children in a meeting with United Nations Security Council members stressed the importance for the UN to reinforce and complement the IGAD peace process.¹⁰⁰ During its 1998 Eighth Assembly in Harare the WCC endorsed the role of IGAD in the Sudanese civil war, with the southern Sudanese stressing that the WCC should not be party to what it called an “international conspiracy of silence on the genocide in southern Sudan”.¹⁰¹ In their 1998 Nairobi meeting, church leaders from the Great Lakes and the Horn of

⁹⁷ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, “Declaration of Principles”, Vol. 6, No. 5 (September-October 1994), p. 27

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ F.M. Deng, *Sudan peace prospects at a cross-road: an overview* (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1999), pp 1-12


¹⁰⁰ *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, “Sudan: NGOs appeal for peace”, Vol. 10, No. 6 (November-December 1998), pp. 25-9

¹⁰¹ World Council of Churches, “WCC must not be party to conspiracy of silence on genocide” (press release), 5 December 1998

Africa regions representing, among others, the All African Conference of Churches (AACC), the National Council of Churches of Kenya, and the NSCC, as well as the SPLM/SPLA and representatives of the Government of Sudan, called on all the parties to recognize IGAD as the locus for conflict resolution in Sudan.

Figure 2 summarizes the policy options, which have been pursued by the parties to the conflict, as well as other regional and global NGOs and IGOs.

FIGURE 2: ACTORS' OPINIONS ON THE CONFLICT IN SUDAN (1956-PRESENT)



Whereas the successive governments in Sudan have pursued a policy of islamization since the second phase of the civil war in 1983, the NIF leadership has accepted the IGAD DOP. As Figure 2 indicates, the rebel movements have also endorsed the DOP as well as the establishment of a secular and democratic state incorporated in the IGAD DOP. Even though the Umma Party and the DUP accept the IGAD's DOP, it is important to note that the two movements as well as other northern Sudanese rebel movements are sensitive to the idea of self-determination for the southern Sudanese.

8. Conclusion

The Sudanese civil war is a complex one, with many state and non-state actors' interlocking interests. This study has demonstrated that the central cause of conflict in Sudan is the marginalization of the southern Sudanese and the politicization of Islamic laws as the centres for the control of the state. This has led to competition between the policies of secularism pursued by the liberation movements and Islamism and Arabism advocated by the Sudanese governments. Indeed, a lasting peace in Sudan cannot be realized unless the leadership institutes a secular state.¹⁰² Moreover, there is a clear correlation between increased military spending and the production and export of oil. It is fair to argue that the state and privately owned oil companies operating in Sudan are perpetuating the conflict. Specifically, the *Realpolitik* and national interests of other nation-states prevent the realization of peace in Sudan, with far reaching loss of lives, internal displacements, flight of refugees, and other related human rights consequences. For the IGAD peace process to succeed, a number of recommendations need to be taken into consideration.

Firstly, the UN, the OAU and other IGOs need to impose stiff sanctions on Sudan at a similar level to the econo-military sanctions imposed on the South African apartheid governments. Secondly, there is a need for divestment against companies that are engaged in the exploration and exploitation of minerals and oil in Sudan. It does not serve any useful purpose for the Clinton administration to institute penalties on some companies, corporations and individuals doing business in Sudan while at the same time exempting others. Thirdly, it is important for the IGAD partners to develop coherent, consistent and coordinated policies vis-à-vis Sudan in the same way that the IMF, the World Bank, and the other donors are doing in the name of "political conditionalities". Finally, for the IGAD peace process to succeed, a nascent and vibrant civil society needs to be supported by all the parties within and outside Sudan. A proactive involvement of the UN would provide an incentive for the peace process in Sudan.

¹⁰² K.G. Adar, "Conflict Resolution in Sudan", *Conflict Trends*, Issue 3 (September 1999), pp. 30-2

Bibliography

Adar, K.G. "Islamisation in Sudan revisited: the fallacy of the Sudanese administrations' policy of national identity" in P. Toggia, P. Lauderdale and A.A. Zegeye (eds.). *Terror and crisis in the Horn of Africa: autopsy of democracy, human rights and freedom*. Aldershot: Ashgate, fc.

_____. "Conflict resolution in a turbulent region: the case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Sudan". *Africa Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Fc.

_____. "Human security, conflict resolution, prevention and management in a turbulent region: the case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the Horn of Africa". Paper presented at the Conference on Human Security, Global Governance, Sustainable Development Challenges in Central and Southern Africa, organized by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, and the United Nations University, Tokyo, 18-22 August 1999.

_____. "Conflict resolution in Sudan". *Conflict Trends*. Issue 3 (1999). Pp. 30-2.

_____. "A state under siege: the internationalisation of the Sudanese civil war". *African Security Review*. Vol. 7, No. 1 (1998). Pp. 44-53.

Africa Confidential. "Sudan: arms against a sea of troubles". 15 November 1996.

Africanews. John Deng. "Sudan: streams of oil and blood". Issue 50 (May 2000) (Internet: <http://metro.peacelink.it/afrinews/50_issue/p1.html> accessed 17 July 2000).

Allan, J.A. "Sudan" in *Africa South of the Sahara 2000*. London: Europa Publications, 2000. Pp. 1037-68.

Alwan Daily [Khartoum]. "China rejects intervention in Sudan internal affairs. 20 July 1999.

Amnesty International. *Sudan: the human price of oil*. London, May 2000.

Asia Intelligence Wire. "China actively explores international oil market". 4 November 1998.

Associated Press. C. Mbitiru. "Mines-Sudan". 14 July 1999.

_____. "Sudan President says civil war cost half of state budget - report". 3 February 1999.

Atem, A.Y. "The current status of the civil-military relations: the case of the SPLA". Paper presented at the Conference on Civil-Military Relations, Nairobi, April 1999.

Bradbury, M. "Sudan: international responses to war in the Nuba Mountains". *Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 77, No. 25 (September 1998). Pp. 463-74.

Burr, J.M. "SPLA background and biodata". n.d. (Internet: <<http://www.yasin.dircon.co.uk/sudan/whois/spla.htm>> accessed 17 July 2000).

Buzan, B. *People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post Cold War era*. 2nd ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991.

Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Human security in Sudan: the report of a Canadian assessment mission prepared for the Minister for Foreign Affairs*. Ottawa, January 2000 (Internet: <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign/menu-e.asp>> accessed 23 June 2000).

Casey Institute. "Classic Clinton: like Canada, US refuses to sanction Sudan's foreign oil partners - but pretends to do so". Security Forum, No. 00-F10. Washington: Center for Security Policy, 16 February 2000 (Internet: <<http://www.security-policy.org/papers/2000/00-F10.html>> accessed 17 July 2000).

Company News Africa. "Sudan signs pipeline contract with British, Chinese and Argentinian firms". 3 April 1998.

Deng, F.M. *Sudan peace prospects at a cross-road: an overview*. Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1999.

_____. "Mediating the Sudanese conflict: a challenge for the IGADD". *CSIS Africa Notes*. No. 169 (February 1995). Pp. 1-7.

Daily Mail & Guardian [Johannesburg]. C. Duodo. "Slave trade thrives in Sudan". 28 January 2000.

_____. M. Edmunds. "SA in the Sudan conflict". 4 September 1998.

Dow Jones Business News. "Dutch-based Trafigura reportedly wins Sudan oil-marketing deal". 2 August, 1999.

Executive Intelligence Review. "Rice caught in Iran-Contra-style capers in Africa". 20 November 1998.

Field, S. *The civil war in Sudan: The role of the oil industry*. Occasional Paper, No. 23. Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, February 2000.

Financial Times [London]. E. Alden. "Canada in \$196m purchase of Arakis". 18 August 1998.

_____. "Sudan looks to oil for new lifeblood". 11 June 1998.

The Guardian [London]. Peter Biles. "Sudan: the frontline states, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda". 11 May 1996.

Horn of Africa Bulletin. "Egypt sends first envoy since 1995". Vol. 12, No. 2 (March-April 2000).

_____. "Sudan resumes amputation as punishment". Vol. 12, No. 2 (March- April 2000).

_____. "Machar quits all government posts". Vol. 12, No. 1 (January-February 2000).

_____. "Uganda to continue moral support of SPLA". Vol. 12, No. 1 (January-February 2000).

_____. "Sudan: Church succeeds where politicians fail". Vol. 12, No. 1 (January-February 2000).

_____. "Sudan and Uganda reach agreement". Vol. 11, No. 5 (October- December 1999).

_____. "Machar faces ouster attempt". Vol. 11, No. 3 (May-June 1999).

_____. "Sudan starts pumping oil". Vol. 11, No. 3 (May-June 1999).

_____. "Oil exports rise". Vol. 11, No. 2 (March-April 1999).

_____. "Tug of war". Vol. 11, No. 2 (March-April 1999).

_____. "Sudan: tribes give peace a chance". Vol. 11, No. 2 (March-April 1999).

_____. "Sudan: NGOs appeal for peace". Vol. 10, No. 6 (November-December 1998).

_____. "Pro-government ally splits from coalition". Vol. 10, No. 5 (September-October 1998).

_____. "Uganda supports US attack". Vol. 10, No. 4 (July-August 1998).

_____. "Sudan: Government says 655,000 to join Army". Vol. 10, No. 2 (March-April 1998).

_____. "Sudan endorses draft constitution". Vol. 10, No. 2 (March-April 1998).

_____. "Jimmy Carter's latest peace initiative: where can it lead Sudan?". Vol. 7, No. 3 (May-June 1995).

_____. "Declaration of principles". Vol. 6, No. 5 (September-October 1994).

International Herald Tribune. V. Loeb and B. Graham. "Sudan plant was probed months before attack". 1 September 1998.

Inter Press Service. R. Chatterjee. "Canada-Sudan: activists condemn oil company's operations in Sudan". 26 August 1997.

Jackson, R. *Quasi-states, sovereignty, international relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Jane's Defence Weekly. R. Lowry. "Sudan strengthens forces as fighting is stepped up". 9 May 1992.

Lata, L. "Armed rebellion in the Horn of Africa". *Ploughshares*. September 1998 (Internet: <<http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/BUILD%PEACE/Lata98.html>> accessed 17 July 2000).

Mahmoud, M. "Sufism and Islamism in Sudan" in E.E. Rosander and D. Westerlund (eds.). *African Islam and Islam in Africa: encounter between Sufis and Islamists*. Athens OH: Ohio University Press, 1997. Pp. 162-92.

Mbendi Information for Africa, 1995-2000. "Oil industry profile - upstream Sudan" (Internet: <<http://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/oilgsuss.stm>> accessed 24 June 2000).

New Africa. "Sudan mining sector". (Internet: <<http://www.newafrica.com/mining/sudan.htm>> accessed 17 July 2000).

The New York Times. T. Weiner. "Pentagon and C.I.A. defend Sudan missile attack". 2 September 1998.

Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues. "Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arabic Peninsula: Sudan" in *The world geopolitics of drugs 1995/96: annual report*. [Paris], September 1997 (Internet: <http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP01_RAP.htm> accessed 17 July 2000).

O'Brien, K.A.. "Military-advisory groups and African security: privatised peacekeeping?". *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 1998). Pp. 78-105.

Petterson, D. *Inside Sudan: political Islam, conflict and catastrophe*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1999.

Ploughshares. "Military profiles: Horn of Africa countries". 1999 (Internet: <<http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/BUILD%PEACE/militaryProfile.htm>> accessed 23 June 2000).

Prendergast, J. *Crisis response: humanitarian band-aids in Sudan and Somalia*. London: Pluto Press, 1997.

South African Press Association-Agence France Presse. "Sudan envoy clears SA Government of linkage to arms deals". 31 July 1998.

South African Press Association. "Arms supplies to Sudan illegal: Asmal". 28 July 1998.

South Sudanese Friends International. *Oil in Sudan*. Bloomington IN, 14 June 2000 (Internet: <<http://www.geocities.com/ssfi/issues/oil000614.html>> accessed 17 July 2000).

Sudan. *The Sudan Peace Agreement*. Khartoum, Government Printing Office, 21 April 1997.

Sudan Newsletter. "Money and politics: IMF suspends Sudan". Vol. 3, No.4 (Winter 1993/1994).

Sudan Update "Slavery revived". Vol. 6, No. 7 (15 May 1995).

United Nations. *United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: report of the Secretary-General*. A/52/312. 28 August 1997.

United Nations. Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Mine Clearance Unit. *The HAC report: Sudan Mine Action Programme, July 1997: assessment mission report*. Geneva, August 1997.

United Nations Economic and Social Council. Commission on Human Rights. *Situation of human rights in Sudan: report of the Special Rapporteur, Gaspar Biro*. E/CN.4/1996/62. 20 February 1996.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Background paper on refugees and asylum seekers from the Sudan*. Geneva, February 1997.

United States Agency for International Development. *Sudan: complex emergency situation report no. 1 (FY 2000)*. Washington DC, 5 January 2000.

United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *World military expenditures and arms transfers, 1990-1994*. Washington DC, 1995.

_____. *World military expenditures and arms transfers, 1996-1999*. Washington DC, 2000.

United States Committee for Refugees. *Worldwide refugees information: country report: Sudan [1998], [1999], [2000]*. Washington DC, [1998], [1999],[2000] (Internet: <<http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/sudan.htm>> accessed 17 July 2000).

United States. Department of State. *Country reports on human rights practice for 1997: Sudan*. Washington DC: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 30 January 1998.

_____. *Country reports on human rights practice, 1995: Sudan*. Washington DC, March 1996.

United States. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs. *Sudan's humanitarian crisis and the US response: testimony of Roger Winter, US Committee for Refugees*. Washington DC, March 1999.

Wall Street Journal. R.S. Greenberger and N. Deogun. "Officials say soil sample buttressed US suspicions about Sudan plant". 25 August 1998.

Washington Office on Africa. *Slavery, war and peace in Sudan*. Washington, March 2000 (Internet: <<http://www.woafrica.org/sudan/html>> accessed 17 July 2000).

Washington Post. K. Vick. "US-Sudan trade claims on factory". 25 August 1998.

World Bank. *African development indicators 2000*. Washington DC, 2000.

World Council of Churches. "WCC must not be party to conspiracy of silence on genocide" (press release). 5 December 1998.

Acronyms

AACC	All African Conference of Churches
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
BCAF	Beja Congress Armed Forces
CCSS	Coordinating Council for the Southern States
CEAS	Church Ecumenical Action in Sudan
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
CSI	Christian Solidarity International
DOP	Declaration of Principles
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
EIJ	Eritrean Islamic Jihad
EO	Executive Outcomes
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
FF	Frontline Fellowship
FIB	Faisal Islamic Bank
GNPOC	Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NIF	National Islamic Front
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDF	People's Defence Forces
PMHC	Politico-Military High Command
SAF	Sudan Alliance Forces
SPDF	Sudanese Popular Defence Force
SPLA	Sudan Peoples Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Force
SSIA	Southern Sudan Independence Army
SSIM	Southern Sudan Independence Movement
STAR	Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USDF	United Salvation Democratic Front
WCC	World Council of Churches
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front