Countries at the Crossroads 2004 - Kazakhstan

(Scores are based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing weakest and 7 representing strongest performance.)

Executive Summary

Author

Carolyn Kissane is currently a visiting assistant professor in the Department of Educational Studies at Colgate University, teaching courses in the areas of comparative and international education and Central Eurasia. Her scholarly research interests include post-Soviet political and educational reform and the societal impact of transition.

Kazakhstan remains on an uncertain trajectory 12 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In many regards Kazakhstan has made the greatest strides of the five Central Asian republics in terms of market reforms and infrastructural development. According to the United Nations (UN) bureau in Kazakhstan, the proportion of people living below the poverty line fell from 42 percent in 2000 to 28 percent in 2003, an impressive and commendable accomplishment for a newly independent republic. However, in other areas, such as those analyzed for this survey, Kazakhstan has not exhibited the same levels of success and remains stuck in a high degree of authoritarianism, political cronyism, and suppression of legitimate opposition. President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the former first secretary of the Communist Party in Kazakhstan and part of the former Soviet-era nomenklatura, has held power since he was first elected in December 1991. He retains virtually total control through a variety of means, many of which are categorically undemocratic and violate many of the reforms he in theory claims to uphold. To retain control over his power base, Nazarbayev has continued to tighten his grip on areas he views as a direct threat to his power and authority. He and the elite circle of advisers and officials who surround him have revealed little in the way of initiative to support the implementation of democratic reforms. Governance is highly centralized and opaque, which results in weak institutional and legal systems. Suppression of the media through threats against journalists and closure of editorial offices, maintenance of strict controls over the registration of political opposition parties, involvement in large-scale corruption, and lack of adequate protection and promotion of human rights remain acute issues in Kazakhstan. Many of the strides the country made in the early years of independence have been pushed aside in favor of more authoritarian measures used to suppress civil society and protect elite interests within the state.

In terms of political and civil reform, Kazakhstan has moved backward in its reform efforts, and recent evidence indicates deterioration in the areas of human rights and press freedom and an increase in corruption. Three important laws are due for review – the laws on elections, the media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) – and observers note that the draft legislations are more restrictive than the laws the drafts are meant to replace, signaling a possible worsening of conditions in the political, civil, and human rights realms. At the same time, increasing attention by the state and political elite to gender and minority rights is evident, and modest positive legislative changes have resulted from the work of advocacy networks within Kazakhstan and from international pressure on Kazakhstan to align its laws in accordance with international norms.

Civil Liberties – 3.53

Kazakhstan has succeeded in promulgating a range of high-minded and progressive-sounding laws regarding civil liberties. But de facto these are selectively applied or entirely ignored at the top levels of an insular government. Kazakhstan's constitution protects citizens' civil liberties, but government measures to suppress these rights diminish the efficacy of the laws. As a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Kazakhstan has undertaken commitments to uphold OSCE standards but has been criticized for failing to meet those in the area of civil liberties. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has publicly announced that Kazakhstan's basic rights protection has "deteriorated dramatically during the past year."¹ Domestic NGOs have also expressed outrage over the clear deterioration of civil liberties, but due to increasing suppression of dissent their views are silenced in the domestic sphere.

Cruel or humiliating punishment is unlawful according to law. Article 17 of Kazakhstan's constitution protects citizens from torture, and Article 15 of the criminal procedure code provides further legal protection against physical mistreatment. In December 2002, Nazarbayev signed into law amendments to the criminal procedure and criminal executive codes that expanded the definition of torture and criminalized the deliberate infliction of physical or psychological suffering by investigators or other officials to solicit confessions. However, according to the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (KIBHR), the use of torture is widespread throughout the country, not only by police but also by the Committee of Security, which under law also has the right to conduct investigations.

In 2001, the daughter of a prominent journalist writing for an opposition paper died after being detained by the police for possession of drugs. Also in 2001, Dilbirim Samsakovaya, director of a foundation focused on the rights of the Uighur minority, was murdered; no one was brought up on charges for the murder. Both of these deaths are thought to have been politically motivated. However, there were no killings of members of the political opposition or activists in 2002-03. Nevertheless, political opposition members were threatened, arrested, and silenced by government officials according to reports by the OSCE, RFE, and HRW.

After the United States and Russia, Kazakhstan has the world's third-largest per-capita incarceration rate, with 528 inmates per 100,000 people.² While the constitution provides that every person detained, arrested, or accused of committing a crime has the right to the assistance of a lawyer from the moment of detention, arrest, or accusation, instances of police not informing the accused of their rights have been cited. The police have the right to detain a person for up to 72 hours without bringing official charges against the detainee; however, with the approval of the prosecutor general it is possible to detain people for much longer periods of time without repercussions. Still, according to the KIBHR this is happening less frequently, although the bureau did cite incidents in which detainees were held for weeks or even months without being charged for a crime. Judicial backlogs leading to long delays in bringing those jailed to trial remain a persistent problem and one the government has claimed to address but with little direct effect on the actual pace of detainees being brought to trial. Citizens of Kazakhstan can petition the government and seek redress when their rights are violated, although the instances of this happening are few due to repercussions such as threat to the family, removal from employment, and the acknowledgment that the government can and does exert more power over citizens than citizens do over their government. The government in theory protects citizens from abuse by private actors, but because of strong elite ties with the government, adequate citizen protection is often jeopardized.

Article 14 of Kazakhstan's constitution guarantees citizens against discrimination. Kazakhstan signed and ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the government is currently reviewing a Law on Domestic Violence and Gender Equality that is meant to protect better against gender discrimination. The National Commission on Family and Women's Affairs is responsible for the government's gender strategy, and a department within the ministry of the interior has been set up to address domestic violence.

While the situation has improved for women, further steps are still necessary, especially in the areas of domestic violence and trafficking of females. According to a report by the ministry of the interior, between January and March 2002, 13,000 crimes were committed against women, 2000 more than in the same period the previous year. Between January and May 2003, 11,000 crimes of violence were committed in Kazakhstan against women by their spouses or partners. Protection in Kazakhstan has deteriorated in the areas of professional women's rights within the labor code, social protection, and maternity benefits. There is no formal legal provision for bringing charges of sexual harassment. While equal education opportunity exists for males and females according to the constitution, in rural areas the quality of education is decreasing, and education researchers are concerned that girls suffer the most from decreases in quality and access. Further declines in female enrollment can be expected if the government does not address the situation in rural areas, where many schools are classified as not providing the full educational provisions guaranteed by the constitution.

Trafficking in women and children is another serious issue for Kazakhstan. According to Sergei Dospolov, head of the foreign relations department of the prosecutor general's office, human trafficking is the third most profitable crime in Kazakhstan. Prior to this year, the government was very slow to take action against human trafficking. However, in early 2003 the U.S. State Department and other international parties criticized Kazakhstan for not adequately addressing human trafficking within its borders. As a result, in July the government amended articles in the criminal codes, making it easier to prosecute human traffickers. In addition, a deputy prime minister was appointed to oversee the government's more stringent counter-trafficking efforts. Still, as of September 2003 only five cases of human trafficking had been investigated and prosecuted since the beginning of the year. This is in part due to the difficulty local law-enforcement agencies have in eliminating human trafficking because it involves highly organized and well-connected criminal syndicates capable of bribing border police and other officials.³

Despite these deficiencies, the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) notes that Kazakhstan is ahead of other countries in the region in terms of gender rights, and some women feel optimistic about the prospects for further positive developments. According to the Confederation of NGOs in Kazakhstan, women's organizations represent the highest proportion of activity within the republic.⁴ However, others fear the government does not consider women's rights to be an important issue and that they therefore will not be adequately addressed in future legislation.⁵ The dynamics of the political and social situation prevent gender provisions from being implemented. As the senior project coordinator for the Central Asia office of UNIFEM in Almaty says, "The political will is stronger than in the past but implementation lags behind will."⁶

More than 100 different nationalities are represented in Kazakhstan. The north has historically been predominantly populated by non-Kazakhs – mainly Russians and Ukrainians – while the south is predominantly ethnic Kazakh. According to the last census, held in 1999, Kazakhs currently represent a majority in all oblasts, but these figures are in question due to underreporting of non-Kazakhs and an effort on the part of authorities to show a marked increase in the Kazakh population. The constitution guarantees the equality of all citizens, but since independence ethnic Kazakhs have been receiving economic and political privileges relative to non-Kazakhs. Kazakh authorities treat Kazakh ethnicity as an integral component of a state patronage system, granting advantage to the titular national group over non-titular nationalities. Kazakh is the state language, but Russian remains widely spoken, especially in urban areas. Nevertheless, the constitution requires a fluent command of the Kazakh language as a prerequisite for holding the positions of president and speakers of the senate and mazhilis, or lower house of parliament. In addition, under new administrative codes, 50 percent of all broadcasting time must be in the Kazakh language.

In schools, the language of instruction is either Kazakh or Russian, although the ministry of education does allow for education in other non-titular languages with the approval of the ministry. Article 7(3) of the constitution requires that the government provide adequate instruction in the state language. However, most teachers of Kazakh are not qualified to teach the language, and therefore students in schools where Kazakh is not the medium of instruction are not given a reasonable opportunity to learn the language. Education in Kazakhstan today is becoming increasingly stratified and ethnically divided, with Russian schools catering to Russians and non-Kazakhs, and Kazakh schools serving Kazakhs. Education officials interviewed by the author asserted that Kazakhs are given preference over non-Kazakhs for university admission.

The constitution recognizes the right of citizens to freedom of association. However, organizations are required to have special registration permits to hold meetings, participate in conferences, and set up bank accounts. Because the government can decide which associations it chooses to recognize and give organizational approval to, freedom of association is limited in practice. Dr. Cassandra Cavanaugh, scholar of Central Asia and former HRW officer, maintains that the government's manipulation of power over associational freedom affirms its use of "politicized justice" as a means of suppressing political opposition and silencing any dissent to the current regime.⁷ Section 318 of the criminal code makes it illegal to insult the honor and dignity of the president, silencing most public protest by construing any opposition as unconstitutional. In 2003 there were no reports of the government using force to put down a demonstration or protest; instead, general requirements for organizing a protest prove to be a powerful nonviolent way for the government to deter dissent.

The Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan comprises an association of sector trade unions from 30 different organizations. In theory, organizations can mobilize and advocate their cases, but they do so infrequently due to fear of reprisal or suppression, especially with regard to political opposition to the government. In addition, they are required by law to register any public meeting or protest, and therefore they cannot freely mobilize without the consent of governmental authorities.

Recent government figures indicate that approximately 4,300 NGOs operate in Kazakhstan, all of which are required by law to register with the ministry of justice. According to the Confederation of NGOS in Kazakhstan, NGOs currently employ 35,000 full-time staff, 50,000 part-time staff and consultants, and more than 100,000 volunteers. The state, the ruling party, and oligarchic economic interests associated with the Nazarbayev family have been active in recent years in shaping quasi-official NGOs. There are efforts to impede the activity of some NGOs, especially those organizations aligned with an opposition party or critical of the government, such as human rights groups and those promoting media freedoms. Citizens are not required by law to belong to an association.

A new law on NGOs has been proposed by the government, and many within the NGO community believe that, if it is ratified, new NGOs will have more difficulty registering. The proposed law requires previously registered NGOs to reregister for official status as well, thus giving government authorities the power to rescind official registration of organizations that they determine undermine their authority or that are not within the accepted NGO operational parameters. Beyond this, NGOs are concerned that the government will use the law's new requirement that organizations be "socially useful" to exclude some NGOs from registration.⁸ Excessive registration, licensing, and control procedures also hamper the development of new NGOs, especially in rural regions where the time and cost of travel to urban areas required for registration serves as an obstacle to their creation.

Kazakhstan provides for the free practice of religion, but in 2002-03 government officials increased surveillance of some religious groups that are thought to be potentially destabilizing. Human rights organizations have criticized the government for its ambiguous and restrictive rhetoric concerning religious freedom. In 2003 the government revised its law on religion, bringing it more in line with international standards. Still, the government fears Islam much more than other religions. Hizb-ut-Tahrir, an extreme Islamist group that opposes democracy and advocates the reestablishment of a transnational Islamic state, has been the subject of government repression for its distribution of leaflets and recruitment of new members.

Kazakhstan does not allow for religious education in the early primary grades, and religion is not taught in state schools. A private school seeking to teach religion must meet ministry of education registration requirements to do so. Through government registration requirements and restrictions on association, the government is able to wield control over the internal organization and activities of faith-related organizations. The constitution provides for freedom of religion and citizens can observe religious holidays and attend religious ceremonies without government interference. In research conducted by Martha Olcott of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, "90% of the country's self-proclaimed religious believers profess Islam, and 1,150 of the country's 2,299 religious institutions are in some way associated with Kazakhstan's Muslim Ecclesiastic Administration. However, recent government emphasis has meant strong discouragement of nontraditional religious groups from religious practice."⁹

Recommendations

The government needs to continue its progress in improving gender equality within the republic. A more progressive law on NGOs than the one proposed is necessary; the restrictive language in the present version must be altered to demonstrate Kazakhstan's willingness to sustain and support civil society. Torture in any form must be criminalized, and laws pertaining to torture must be upheld by authorities. Officials who engage in torture must be prosecuted criminally. However, preventing torture will be the best way to eliminate it from practice, and it is therefore important to support and facilitate training of police officers, prison officials, and others associated with law enforcement in understanding what torture is and how to end its use. Kazakhstan's application to be chair of the OSCE should be used by the international community as leverage to encourage reform and to force the government to address civil liberties infringements.

Rule of Law – 1.90

Judges are chosen to sit at the local, oblast (provincial), and supreme court levels. The president appoints oblast and local-level judges based on lists provided to him from the ministry of justice. Supreme Court judges are selected by the president based on recommendations from the High Judicial Council. The majority of the High Judicial Council is appointed by the president. The constitution effectively grants the president control of the judiciary, thereby stripping it of its autonomy, and the absence of separation of powers within the government makes it impossible for the judiciary to be impartial. Laws that came into effect in 2002 grant the prosecutor general's office the right to suspend court decisions, adding yet another curb on judicial independence. Salaries of judges are low, although they are high in comparison to other government salaries in Kazakhstan. Judges supplement their income and raise their standard of living by accepting bribes. According to university administrators, bribery is also widely used by students to enter into the law departments of universities. The perception of the judiciary as non-independent and corrupt is a serious problem; citizens do not trust the judiciary or feel that it is there to serve them. Rule of law in Kazakhstan is inconsistently implemented because of a very arbitrary interpretation of the actual law.

Under Article 16 of Kazakhstan's constitution, due process and the right to legal defense are guaranteed to all citizens. Article 77, section 3 (1), states clearly that a person is considered innocent until guilt has been established. However, in practice the constitution is not upheld in these areas. Trials are often not fair. There is no system of public defenders, thereby making it virtually impossible to uphold the law of right to counsel for those who cannot afford an attorney. Courts do not function in an effective and timely manner, and there are often delays in bringing cases to trial, leading to infringements on due process. Judiciary observers note the system is highly corrupt, and bribes are used both to speed up and to slow down the judicial process. Prosecutors are not independent of political control and are often directed in their work in a non-objective way. There are cases of public officials being tried and prosecuted for illegal activity; however, the majority of these cases are believed to be politically motivated and used against the opposition. Given the evidence of cases against public officials, it is fair to surmise that public officials who pose a political threat to the president or the ruling elite are targeted for investigation for tax evasion, illegal registration, and misappropriation of funds. In 2000, President Nazarbayev signed a law granting himself lifetime powers, including immunity from prosecution.

The police, military, and internal security services are controlled by the president and the executive branch. By exerting control over security forces, the ruling elite has the power to close and suppress opposition newspapers, harass and imprison journalists who threaten to expose government corruption and wrongdoing, and unevenly apply anticorruption measures to the benefit of those in power. By serving elite interests, security forces are in effect interfering in political processes, and that ultimately restricts pluralism.

The constitution protects state and private property, but this is a heavily contentious issue given problems surrounding privatization and closure of previously state-run enterprises. In June 2003, the Kazakh land code was passed, providing for private ownership of farmland. In November 2003, provisions regulating the privatization of farmland, plot size, and access to privatization for legal entities and private individuals were scheduled to be reviewed, with official implementation targeted for early 2004. Kazakhstan's economy is dependent on commodities, making it vulnerable to downward world price fluctuations. According to current economic data, Kazakhstan's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was estimated at $1,914 for 2003. In 2003 the government decided to renationalize Air Kazakhstan, possibly signaling a move toward renationalization of formerly privatized industries and greater state intervention in the economy. The privatization program has slowed, and a number of key initiatives such as the sale of a 30 percent government stake in Kazakhtelecom remain incomplete.¹⁰ Financial indicators put unemployment at 9 percent for 2003, down from 14 percent in 1999.

Recommendations

Strengthening the judiciary to ensure that it is in fact independent of the executive branch remains one of the most important directions for policy to ensure law enforcement and protection against abuses of the system. Constitutional amendments are necessary to make the judiciary free from undue influence by the executive branch and not subject to pressures from the justice ministry. The government needs to take substantial steps toward compliance with its own laws and agreements. An intense review of the judicial system as it functions today is imperative in order to address the many areas in which it is ineffective and is operating unlawfully by not upholding the laws as they are designed to be implemented and practiced.

Anticorruption and Transparency – 1.58

Through highly bureaucratic registration procedures and complex regulations, Kazakhstan creates an environment where corruption is widely accepted and is viewed as necessary for success in both business and government. Reviews of multiple reports conducted by international organizations and the recent investigations into corruption illustrate that bribery, theft, misappropriation, and nepotism are common practices in Kazakhstan, and the government and businesses help to support and sustain corrupt practices.

Kazakhstan's highly centralized government and weak institutional and legal system provide fertile ground for corruption. On Transparency International's 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index Kazakhstan scored a 2.3, where 10 indicates highly clean and 0 indicates highly corrupt. In 2003 Transparency International ranked Kazakhstan 101 out of 133 countries on corruption and government transparency.

Kazakhstan has laws criminalizing the acceptance and payment of bribes, but they are not observed. Nazarbayev has effectively shielded himself from scrutiny through legislation safeguarding him from arrest. Attempts by journalists, such as Sergei Duvanov, to reveal overseas bank accounts held by the president were met with threats and imprisonment. The assets of public officials are fairly well protected; only in the event of a falling-out with the ruling elite will a public official's assets be subject to investigation and judicial review.

The tax system of Kazakhstan is highly bureaucratic, and although internal audit systems are in place they do not always function effectively. Still, in the last two years Kazakhstan has dramatically improved its system of tax collection, and there are initiatives under way to standardize and computerize the process further, which is unique for the region. Abuses of the tax police appear to be decreasing.

Prosecutions of corruption are not free from governmental influence; which cases are tried is very much at the discretion of the executive. In 2002-03, the government brought charges of corruption and tax fraud in a crackdown on the political opposition. The largest corruption case of 2003 was the product of investigation and legal action outside Kazakhstan. It centered on the United States's case against James Giffen, a U.S. businessman with close ties to the Kazakh government. On March 31, 2002, a federal grand jury in New York indicted Giffen on two counts of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which forbids U.S. citizens and companies from paying bribes to obtain contracts. The jury asserts that Giffen took more than $78 million in fees and commissions from Mobil during 1995-96 and illegally channeled the funds into the bank accounts of senior Kazakh officials, widely assumed to be President Nazarbayev and a select group of his elite circle. Nazarbayev is under investigation for receiving substantial bribes and attempting to obstruct the investigation, although he is immune from prosecution.

In early 2002, media outlets close to opposition party Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan's (DVK's) leader and former energy minister, Mukhtar Ablyazov, accused President Nazarbayev of illegally siphoning off billions of dollars of public money. In March 2002 Ablyazov was arrested. He was subsequently sentenced to six years in prison on what are believed by rights groups to be politically motivated and trumped-up corruption and abuse-of-power charges.¹¹ However, on May 13, 2003, Nazarbayev granted Ablyazov a presidential pardon and released him, despite reported protests from some of his own supporters.

When the Kazakhstan government does act to counter corruption, it does so only intermittently and frequently to eliminate political opponents. To display to outside observers its commitment to anticorruption measures, the government arrested the minister of transport for stealing $40 million in 2002, as well as the governor of Pavlodar oblast. However, the latter arrest is viewed as being instigated by Nazarbayev because the governor was a co-founder of a political opposition group. In 2002-03 at least three public officials were brought up on charges of corruption while in office. They were imprisoned and two remain in jail today.

Corruption within education is an acute and growing problem. Students view bribery as a way to get into, pass exams in, and eventually graduate from universities. To address complaints of corruption in university admittance, Education Minister Zhaksybek Kulekeyev plans to introduce a unified system of computer-based testing in 2004-05.

An auditing body outside the executive branch does exist, but it is not free from political influence. Corruption laws are selectively enforced, and the state has not created an environment of protection for reporting corruption within the public and private sectors. Journalists are inclined toward self-censorship because of government crackdowns on media outlets that have reported crimes committed within the government.

On more positive fronts, the economic and fiscal conditions of Kazakhstan have improved substantially in the last five years. There is government involvement in the economy, but the Council of Foreign Investors and the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK), the two key governmental financial institutions, function well and relatively independently. Foreign companies working in Kazakhstan complain of excessive tax audits and complicated customs procedures but also acknowledge a government effort to bring down bureaucratic barriers. Although the government has allowed for little in the way of political liberalization, it has exhibited a strong commitment to market-oriented reforms.

Public access to government information is limited to the printing of proposed amendments and new legislation in the newspaper; otherwise there is little government transparency. The legislature reviews the budget-making process in Kazakhstan, but because the executive has veto power over the legislature, investigations of questionable processes are initiated only by the executive. The government does publish budget expenditures, and the process is considered effective, but as a result of the entrenched corruption within the system it is not an accurate and complete view of expenditures nor does it account for unofficial salary supplements among those who solicit bribes. Citizens have a legal right to information on the conduct of government, but they are not likely to obtain it due to bureaucratic obstacles and fear of reprisal.

Kazakhstan has received substantial funds through grants and aid programs designed to support political reforms and help sustain and promote civil society. To handle this inflow of money, the government set up an administrative procedure for dispersing the funds, and there has been little criticism from international organizations of the government's handling of foreign assistance.

Recommendations

A viable legal framework that enforces anticorruption laws without political favoritism or arbitrariness is a required first step for Kazakhstan to take toward controlling corruption. All sectors of the government must be held accountable for corruption, including the executive branch; if Nazarbayev is not held accountable for enforcing policies he himself claims to support, it is highly unlikely the rest of society will take them seriously. The government also needs to direct more attention to educational funding and support for transparent practices within education in order to prevent young people from growing up using bribery and other forms of corruption to get through school, which leads them to transfer these practices into their professional lives. Kazakhstan's desire to join the WTO may offer a way for the international community to establish incentives for the government to enforce and uphold anticorruption measures and increase governmental transparency.

Accountability and Public Voice – 1.94

Kazakhstan's political system is best categorized as top-down, with most power resting in the executive branch. President Nazarbayev maintains an unassailable hold on power and has protected himself from oversight by decree. The executive branch enjoys substantial de jure and de facto power over all other areas of the government, thereby barring opportunities for political opposition and criticism of the government. Only Nazarbayev can initiate constitutional amendments, appoint and dismiss the government, dissolve parliament, call referendums, and appoint administrative heads of regions and cities. In short, the country has none of the usual governmental and nongovernmental checks and balances that are characteristic of democratic rule.

Kazakhstan violates most requirements for free elections and eliminates political competition through harassment, intimidation, and eventual shutdown of political party offices. The absence of a clear mechanism for tracking tabulation of votes makes it impossible to hold fair elections. The 1999 election was declared to be in default by the OSCE due to heavily rigged voting and an unfair preelection environment. The next parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2004. According to the OSCE and reports from RFE, in elections held on September 20, 2003, observers from NGOs and other election monitors reported massive electoral violations. The draft law on elections currently under review by parliament contains restrictive funding provisions that could severely curtail the activities of independent election monitors. Citizens are free to vote as they choose, but government control of the media restricts the possibility of informed choice, political repression eliminates the possibility of significant political options, and election rigging means that all votes may not be counted. Increasingly tight restrictions on opposition parties allow the government to control who can run and who is elected. The majority of positions in the civil service are filled through family/clan ties, political favors, and corruption, ensuring a political patronage system that inhibits the emergence of viable political competition.

The largest political party in Kazakhstan is Otan, "Fatherland" in Kazakh. Otan is a strong supporter of President Nazarbayev and, in fact, nominated Nazarbayev to be party head at its founding congress. Nazarbayev turned down the post, pointing out that it was unconstitutional to be a party head and head of state simultaneously. There are currently concerns among the opposition concerning 40-year-old Dariga Nazarbayeva, daughter of President Nazarbayev. She occasionally comments on political matters in the Kazakh media and has a long history as a public figure and head of Kazakhstan's largest news agency, Khabar. In 2003, she announced her leadership over the new social movement Asar (altogether).¹² Then in September of 2003 she declared that Asar would not only be a public movement but also a political party. Political commentators see Nazarbayeva's political leanings as an indication of a possible ascent to political power, first through gaining a seat in parliament and eventually by replacing her father after he steps down from office. Kazakhstan's most powerful political party, Otan, supports Nazarbayev. The possibility is great that Asar and Otan may join forces to further shut out any political opposition to the Nazarbayev reign.

In 2003, parliament adopted a new law requiring political parties to submit at least 50,000 signatures in order to be officially registered. Of the 19 political parties defined as "active" in politics prior to the reregistration, 11 filed within the new law. With the exception of the Communist Party, all seven parties whose registration was accepted are considered pro-government. DVK, an opposition party under constant attack by the government since it was formed in November 2001, was charged with tax fraud and other violations and closed down in late September 2003. On September 11, 2003, the Almaty city procuracy filed charges of tax evasion and document forgery against Amirzhan Qosanov, the executive committee chairman of the Republican People's Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK). Qosanov is also the director of the NGO Reform, devoted to conducting research and providing training on political and civil society-related issues. These are two examples of how the government severely undermines any political party deemed in opposition to it. In the first half of 2003, HRW documented more than 15 cases of arbitrary civil and criminal charges against opposition political party members.¹³

Women's organizations represent an important part of Kazakhstan's civil society, and Kazakhstan set up a House of Culture that accommodates the different organizations representing minority interests in Kazakhstan. However, most funding for activities must be raised through the individual minority organizations and not from the government, thereby limiting the degree to which they can engage in and organize events and activities. Minorities and women are inadequately represented within government.

Although Kazakhstan protects some rights of the independent civil sector, these rights are ignored when they threaten the ruling government. NGOs and other organizations in Kazakhstan can and do comment on and sometimes influence government policy and regulation; for example, women's organizations were responsible for amending the civil code in its legislation concerning rape. However, in the case of the media, NGO, and electoral legislation that was before parliament in September 2003, there was little optimism that the comments and suggestions of representatives from NGOs and other advocacy networks would be integrated into the new legislation.

Donors and funders of policy-oriented civic organizations are subject to state pressure. Bureaucratic procedures are set up so that the government must be involved in the receipt and disbursement of funds. Public policy institutes that depend on state funding to cover salary and operational costs are subject to state directives and are heavily influenced by governmental agendas.

The state newspaper, Kazakhstantsya Pravda, publishes information about pending legislation and government policy and is available throughout Kazakhstan. Another resource for citizens with access to the Internet is www.zakon.kz, a government-run Web site devoted to publishing laws, policies, and new regulations in Kazakhstan.

In 2002, the government embarked on its harshest crackdown on independent media since independence. Conditions of press freedom continued to deteriorate in 2002-03. Article 20 of Kazakhstan's constitution does guarantee the right to freedom of expression, but it is not upheld in practice. The government inhibits free expression through internal controls and heavy bureaucratic regulation, and the general consensus is that strangulation is stifling possibilities for the development of a free and independent media.¹⁴ Reporters without Borders ranked Kazakhstan 116 out of 139 countries in their 2003 index of press freedom.

In 2002-03, the state breached numerous agreements, squelching media freedom by bringing defamation suits against media opposition outlets and physically intimidating and legally harassing journalists critical of the government. For example, independent journalist Nuri Muftakh was run over in the parking lot of a bus station in November 2002 and died from the injuries suffered. At the time of his death, Muftakh was pursuing allegations that Kazakhstan's president had secretly transferred large amounts of money to foreign banks. On October 28, 2002, Sergei Duvanov, editor of the opposition magazine Bulletin and a journalist who wrote extensively on human rights and corruption in Kazakhstan, was arrested on charges of statutory rape and sentenced in January 2003 to five years in prison. The OSCE determined the evidence used against Duvanov was "wholly inconclusive," according to an OSCE representative in Almaty.¹⁵ Media outlets that have reported on an investigation of payments made when oil contracts were given to foreign oil companies have faced lawsuits and tax inspections, which are suspected to be motivated by their reporting of the story. The increasing levels of intimidation and threats have resulted in both private and state-owned media being inclined toward self-censorship with respect to sensitive news items. Additionally, fears of reprisal for objective reporting in Kazakhstan lead many journalists to use pseudonyms rather than their real names in articles they publish. A review of online journals such as Transitions Online, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, and Eurasianet reveal that the majority of journalists use pseudonyms to protect themselves from arrest and punishment.

According to Information Minister Sautbek Abdrakhmanov, 80 percent of Kazakhstan's media outlets are privately owned. However, most analysts note that these outlets are owned by persons associated with the president or government.¹⁶ Many media outlets considered to be independent are controlled by holding companies that do not make public the names of their investors. According to a recent study conducted by IREX, there are 1,237 newspapers, 503 magazines, 162 television and radio-broadcasting companies, and 13 news agencies operating in Kazakhstan today. Members of the president's family own large chunks of the media and wield significant control over media content, both television and print. Thus, the media are effectively completely controlled by the presidential structure. It is difficult to ascertain an accurate picture of the extent of free and independent media due to the ambiguous ownership configurations currently in place. Opposition newspapers can be bought at kiosks but they are usually not available together with the regular government-sanctioned papers.

In February 2002, the government cancelled broadcasting licenses for six television companies. In September 2002, Kazakhstan's leading Internet provider blocked access to zhakiyanov.info, the official Web site of DVK. In March and April 2003, local Internet servers blocked access to Web sites covering the corruption case against Nazarbayev.

According to IREX's 2002 Media Sustainability Index, the 18 university journalism programs in Kazakhstan are of poor quality and are taught by teachers who themselves have had little practical training as journalists.¹⁷

The government is currently reviewing a new law on the media and elections, which has received strong criticism from opponents because it gives too much power over the media to government authorities. [editor's note: The media draft law passed through the lower house of parliament on December 21, 2003, and is expected to pass through the upper house before being approved by Nazarbayev. The version passed does not address the criticisms of Kazakhstan's media and human rights groups or those of international organizations such as the Open Society Institute and the OSCE, which have both come out in opposition to the law due to the limitations it places on freedom of speech and association. In response, on December 23, 2003, Nazarbayev strongly condemned the role of international organizations in opposing the proposed the media and election draft laws.¹⁸] There is concern on the part of the media and political observers that the law as it is being proposed will further diminish media freedoms and will prevent opposition parties from operating officially due to increasingly difficult registration procedures.

Recommendations

In order for free and fair elections and free media to flourish, the government must cease using both legal and extralegal means to control and suffocate scrutiny and dissent. It must end its crackdown on political opposition groups and discard the proposed law on elections. It is vital that the new law on media and elections does not reverse the direction of media and electoral reform in Kazakhstan. The government needs to address the criticisms by opponents about the changes to the proposed laws and allow for a more open and democratic debate. The government must cease instigating lawsuits and using threats and coercion in its efforts to stifle the media and opposition. Registration thresholds for political parties should be lowered, and banned parties should be allowed to resume their activity. Lawyers, judges, and journalists must be better trained to understand press freedoms and the enforcement of constitutional protections with respect to elections and the media. Kazakhstan must also be held accountable by the international community to uphold recognized standards of free speech and fair elections.

Notes

1 "Central Asia: EU Should Require Human Rights Progress" (New York: Human Rights Watch [HRW], 21 July 2003).

2 "Kazakhstan: Authorities Discuss Possible Media-Law Changes" (Prague and Washington, DC: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [RFE/RL], 4 September 2002).

3 Frangis Najibulla, "Central Asia: Governments Slowly Changing Approach to Human Trafficking" (RFE/RL, 3 July 2003).

4 "NGOs in Kazakhstan" (Almaty: Development Gateway, 2003), http://www.kazakhstan-gateway.kz/society/ngos.htm.

5 Interviews with two representatives of women's organizations in Kazakhstan. They concurred that the government offers a degree of space for women's organizations to advocate for change, but their concerns are not adequately addressed in actual legislation (25 July 2003).

6 Interview with UNIFEM Senior Project Coordinator, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 24 July 2003.

7 Cassandra Cavanaugh, "Silencing Central Asia: The Voices of Dissidents," Testimony from Hearings on Central Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, 27 July 2001), http://www.Eurasianet.org.

8 Interview with NGO director, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 21 July 2003.

9 Martha Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise (Washingon, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 207-08; Kazakhstan, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2002 (U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 31 March 2003).

10 "Research: Republic of Kazakhstan – Financial and Economic Indicators" (New York: Standard & Poor's, 30 May 2003.

11 "Kazakhstan: Focus on Civil Liberties," Almaty Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (KIBHR), 28 June 2002.

12 "Central Asia: Presidents' Daughters Emerging as Unlikely Political Forces in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan" (RFE/RL, 24 September 2003).

13 "Letter to President Nazarbaev" (HRW, 3 October 2003), http://hrw.org/europe/kazakhstan.php.

14 Kazakhstan Annual Report 2003 (Paris: Reporters without Borders [RSF], 2003), http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=6522.

15 Interview at OSCE headquarters, Almaty, 23 July 2003.

16 Kazakhstan, Media Sustainability Index 2002 (Washington, DC: International Research & Exchanges Board IREX], June 2003), http://www.irex.org/msi.

17 Kazakhstan, Media Sustainability Index 2002 (IREX).

18 Roman Ivanov, "Kazakstan: Nazarbaev Rounds on 'Foreign Meddlers'" (London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 9 January 2004), http://www.iwpr.net.