

Indonesia: Hope and Hard Reality in Papua

I. OVERVIEW

The conflict in Indonesian Papua continues to defy solution, but some new ideas are on the table. A spike in violence in July and August 2011 underscores the urgency of exploring them. The government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono should move quickly to set up a long-delayed new Papua unit with a mandate that includes political issues. That unit should look at a set of political, social, economic, legal and security indicators produced in July by a Papua Peace Conference that could become a framework for more enlightened policies. Taken together, they represent a vision of what a peaceful Papua would look like. The conference participants who drafted them, however, were almost all from Papuan civil society. For any real change to take place, there needs to be buy-in not just from Jakarta but from the increasingly large constituency of Papuan elected officials who have influence and resources at a local level.

The aspirations voiced during the conference contrast sharply with the reality of escalating conflict in the highland district of Puncak Jaya, a remote region wracked by insurgency, corruption and some of the worst poverty in Indonesia. It is home to one of the most active units of the pro-independence National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, TPN) of the Free Papua Organisation (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM). A complex set of factors feeds the insurgency, including a sense of historical injustice, harsh actions by security forces, and competition and factionalism, sometimes clan-based, among the fighters themselves. Violence there helps fuel local political activism and an international solidarity movement, which in turn fuels antipathy in Jakarta to any steps toward conflict resolution that involve discussion of political grievances. It also leads to restrictions on access by foreign humanitarian and development organisations.

The conference on 5-7 July was meant to break that pattern. The fruit of two years of behind-the-scenes labour by a group called the Papua Peace Network, it was to be an exercise in formulating issues that could then be discussed with the government in Jakarta in a way that some thought might keep the “M” word – *merdeka* (independence) – at bay. It did not work out quite as the organisers had planned. Top government officials offered informal “constructive communication”, without specifying what they had in mind; activists responded with a demand for a

much more formal dialogue, with the Indonesian government sitting across the table from Papuan pro-independence negotiators, mediated by a neutral international third party. Instead of building bridges, the conference underscored the depth of the gulf in perceptions between Jakarta-based officials and Papuan civil society about the nature of the conflict.

The government of President Yudhoyono, on Papua as on everything else, has been glacially slow to develop a policy that would be different from the default response of throwing cash at the problem and hoping it will go away. In mid-2010 the idea emerged of a special unit on Papua to be based in the vice-president’s office called the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (Unit Percepatan Pembangunan di Papua dan Papua Barat, UP4B). Initially conceived as an agency to implement “quick win” development projects, it seemed by early 2011 to be gaining a wider mandate that could also allow it to address more sensitive issues related to land, conflict and human rights. A draft decree setting up UP4B has been on the Cabinet Secretary’s desk, however, since May and there is no indication when it will be sent to the president for signing. Without the new unit, the chance of any positive change in policy is much diminished, allowing developments in Puncak Jaya to stand as a symbol for activists inside and outside Indonesia of everything that is wrong in Papua.

II. THE PEACE CONFERENCE

All involved in the Papua Peace Conference, held from 5-7 July 2011 in Abepura, the university town outside Jayapura, agree that in many ways, it was a success.¹ It was a feat of organisation, with some 800 participants from across Papua

¹ For related Crisis Group reporting, see Asia Briefings N°108, *Indonesia: The Deepening Impasse in Papua*, 3 August 2010; N°66, *Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict*, 19 July 2007; N°53, *Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions*, 5 September 2006; N°47, *Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue*, 23 March 2006; and N°24, *Dividing Papua: How Not To Do It*, 9 April 2003; and Asia Reports N°188, *Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua*, 11 March 2010; N°154, *Indonesia: Communal Tension in Papua*, 16 June 2008; N°39, *Indonesia: Resources and Conflict in Papua*, 13 September 2002; and N°23, *Ending Repression in Irian Jaya*, 20 September 2001.

transported, housed and fed for three days with only minor glitches. There were no major disruptions or protests that forced its early closure. Everyone had a chance to speak, and no topic was off limits. Senior officials from Jakarta, led by Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Air Marshall (retired) Djoko Suyanto, attended the opening, signalling a commitment to the stated goal of finding a path to peace. With a set of political, social, economic and human rights “indicators”, participants produced a vision of what a peaceful Papua should look like that can serve as a blueprint for policymakers as well as for UP4B, if it ever comes into being. (See Appendix D for a list of the indicators.)

It also produced a controversial final declaration that suggested the conference was not about securing policy change but setting up formal negotiations between the government and pro-independence political fronts. Among other things, it listed seventeen criteria for future negotiators, including a commitment to an independent Papua and suggested five individuals for the role, all of them members of the pro-independence Papuan diaspora. The declaration produced a range of reactions from dismay to delight to shrugs of “What did you expect?”

To Dr Neles Tebay or Pater Neles as he is known, chair of the conference and a senior figure in the Papua Peace Network (Jaringan Damai Papua, JDP) that facilitated it, the enthusiastic reception of the declaration was a sign that almost all Papuan political groups are willing to give dialogue a chance over other alternatives – for example, a referendum on independence. To some others in the JDP, the declaration, about which they were not consulted and had no hand in drafting, was short-sighted and tactically unwise. To senior Papuans in Jakarta, including the Papuan caucus in the Indonesian parliament, it was not a setback but simply underscored the problems and the need to address them. Others pointed out that it was naïve to assume that so many Papuans could assemble in one place without a pro-independence message emerging at the end.

The declaration may have made the bridge-building task of the JDP somewhat harder and complicated the quest of proponents of the UP4B for a more political mandate.

A. ORIGINS OF THE CONFERENCE

The conference was the outgrowth of an effort underway since 2009 to unite Papua civil society and activist groups in the interest of resolving the multi-dimensional conflict. Inspired by the 2005 peace process in Aceh, at the other end of the Indonesian archipelago, the founders of what became the JDP wanted to challenge two of the frequently-cited obstacles to conflict resolution in Papua: that Papuans could never agree among themselves and there was not a single group to talk to. Among the key individuals in this process were Pater Neles, a Catholic priest from Papua’s

central highlands who has long been an advocate of peaceful dialogue, and Dr Muridan Widjojo, a Javanese scholar who grew up in Papua and led the efforts of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, LIPI) from 2007 onwards to develop a “road-map” for peace in Papua.²

Beginning in early 2010, they began a series of public consultations across Papua, led by Pater Neles, and a series of conversations in Jakarta, led by Muridan, aimed among other things at convincing each side that talks with the other were worthwhile. To parliamentarians and government officials Muridan’s message was, “Don’t expect people to give up the idea of independence unless there’s something else tangible on offer”.³ In Papua, Pater Neles led nineteen consultations with Papuan civil society groups across the provinces of Papua and West Papua and two with “civilian resistance” groups.⁴ Six other consultations with non-Papuan migrants were led by JDP member Anum Siregar, herself from a migrant family. In early 2011 Pater Neles and others in the JDP decided it was time to take the process one step further by consolidating the results of the consultations and working out an agenda for talks.

Plans went ahead accordingly. JDP was to be the facilitator. International and local donors would provide support, including a contribution from the Papuan provincial government. Five people from each consultation would come but the wider Papuan civil society would be invited, as would senior government officials from Jakarta and Jayapura. Participants would be asked to sign up for one of six “commissions” for focused discussions on politics; economics and the environment; socio-cultural issues; security; law and human rights; and dialogue. Each commission would have a facilitator, either from JDP or brought in from outside, and would be asked to come up with a description of the problems in each area and craft indicators of their resolution. For example, if one problem was exploitation of natural resources by various non-Papuan parties, one indicator of a peaceful Papua would be a thorough mapping of indigenous Papuan land, with customary rights legally recognised. The result was to be forward-looking, a vision of the future that all Papuans could share.

² Other key members of the LIPI team were Adriana Elisabeth who led it from 2004-2006; Amiruddin al Rahab; Cahyo Pamungkas; and Rosita Dewi.

³ Crisis Group Report, *Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua*, op. cit., p. 24.

⁴ These were the Papuan National Consensus and the West Papuan National Council for Liberation. The first was set up in Jayapura in May 2009 by Edison Waromi and Terianus Joku of the West Papua National Authority; Thaha Alhamid, Herman Awom and Tom Beanal of the Dewan Papua; and former political prisoner Eliaser Awom. See www.etan.org/etanpdf/2009/Papuan%20Consensus.pdf. The second is led by Rex Rumakiek and John Otto Ondawame, based in Vanuatu.

B. THE CONFERENCE DYNAMICS

Participation vastly exceeded expectations. More than double the number of Papuans registered showed up. From the Jakarta side, Coordinating Minister Djoko Suyanto made a special trip to Papua for the conference, bringing with him a delegation of some twenty top officials from the ministries he coordinates: defence, home affairs and law and human rights. It was a way of showing that he took the conference seriously and so should they. Lt. Gen (retired) Bambang Darmono, tapped to be the head of UP4B whenever it gets set up, attended as did senior provincial officials.

The provincial army chief of staff, filling in for the commander, made the mistake of inviting the participants to chant “Papua damai” (peaceful Papua). They responded as one “Papua merdeka!” (independent Papua). As one participant said, “He must have been new, otherwise he would have known better”.⁵

Once the opening ceremonies were over and participants got down to work, they divided themselves among the various commissions. Each group was asked to choose a chair and a secretary. Commission VI, on dialogue, chose as chair Rev. Herman Awom, a member of the once-influential Papua Presidium Council; Pater Neles himself was the facilitator.⁶ Unlike the other commissions, Commission VI did not produce “indicators”; it produced instead criteria for negotiators who would lead a formal dialogue.

The discussion in other commissions was passionate and lively, though more focused on problems than solutions, to the point that the facilitators often had a difficult time steering the discussion toward concrete recommendations. In Commission IV, on environment, for example, the participants suggested closing all mines as a solution to natural resource exploitation or simply independence as an all-encompassing indicator of peace.

The second and third days were devoted to reporting back from the commissions to the plenary for more discussion, after which the organisers were to refine the results into a final declaration, or so they thought. One of the liveliest discussions followed the reporting from Commission VI on the last morning. When it reported back on the criteria for negotiators, one woman stood up and started to suggest the names of prominent Papuans. Herman Awom cut her

off, saying their security could be endangered, dramatically drawing a finger across his throat.

Behind the scenes, two different drafts of a final declaration were being prepared, each without the knowledge of the other drafters. One was based on the results of the first five commission reports, the other almost entirely on the results of Commission VI. Pater Neles had to decide between them, and with no time for further discussion, he chose the second (see Appendix B for the full text).⁷

He also read out the names of five recommended negotiators, all heads of pro-independence fronts based abroad, including a Dutch-Papuan woman who has never set foot in Papua. He said later that he had been handed a paper as he was about to read the declaration, and when he saw that they were all overseas and therefore would face no security risks, he saw no problem reading them out.⁸

For several members of the JDP, the issue was not so much the five names. It was that the role of the JDP as honest broker was undermined; the idea of using the conference to suggest an agenda for, rather than the mechanics of a dialogue was subverted; and key non-Papuan members of the organising committee were sidelined.⁹ Pater Neles was unperturbed. This was a Papuan conference, with a Papuan perspective, he said. For Papuans, the whole conflict was between the security forces of the Indonesian state and fighters for independence. This was what had to be mediated through dialogue, and it was the signal achievement of the conference, he said, that everyone supported this form of conflict resolution.¹⁰

C. THE IMPACT

It is too soon to know the full impact of the conference but there are a few possibilities. One is that the conference will be simply overtaken by events. With several major outbreaks of violence since it concluded – an election dispute cum clan feud in Puncak district that left nineteen dead on 30-31 July; an attack in Nafri, Jayapura on 1 August that left four dead, including one soldier; two TPN/OPM attacks in Puncak Jaya on 3-4 August that killed one soldier; and other shooting incidents in Abepantai, not far from Jayapura, and Paniai in the central highlands – the focus

⁵ Crisis Group interview, conference participant, 18 July 2011.

⁶ The council, known in Indonesian as the Presidium Dewan Papua or PDP, was set up by the Second Papua Congress in June 2000 to work for independence. It has been moribund for the last several years, although several members have found other institutional platforms. Another member of the PDP, Don Flassy, also took part in Commission VI.

⁷ Crisis Group email communication with Neles Tebay, 3 August 2011.

⁸ Crisis Group interview, Neles Tebay, 18 July 2011.

⁹ “Jaringan Damai Papua (JDP), Benarkah posisinya di ‘tengah-tengah’?”, 9 July 2011, at www.aldepe.com/2011/07/jaringan-damai-papuajdp-benarkah.html.

¹⁰ Crisis Group interview, Neles Tebay, 18 July 2011.

may well revert to dealing with the present rather than thinking about the future or addressing the past.¹¹

In addition, election politics at the provincial and district level are consuming time and attention in several areas of Papua and West Papua, diverting attention from the conference or its results. The 20 July election for governor in West Papua was deeply flawed and boycotted by three of the four candidates. In Papua province, on 25 July, a caretaker appointed by the Home Affairs Ministry replaced Governor Suebu, whose term expired before new elections could be held because of a legal dispute over candidate registration. With all of this going on, the problem may be simply keeping the achievements of the conference in view.

Also, on 2 August the National Committee for West Papua (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB), the only organisation to overtly reject the Papua Peace Conference on the grounds that the goal should be a referendum, not dialogue, brought thousands on to the streets in Jayapura, Wamena and other Papua cities in support of independence, far outstripping the number that attended the peace conference. The demonstrations were designed to coincide with a seminar in Oxford, England, organised by International Lawyers for West Papua, on the 1969 Act of Free Choice which led to Papua's integration into Indonesia. One of the prominent participants in the seminar was Benny Wenda, who was listed as one of the five possible "negotiators" in the final declaration of the Papua Peace Conference, but he was not consulted beforehand and continues to reject any talk of dialogue. Many in Papua believe larger pro-independence demonstrations will take place on 1 December 2011, the fiftieth anniversary of the original declaration of Papuan independence. The JDP may have to struggle to be heard.

A second possibility is that the final declaration of the conference will have an overall negative effect in two ways: raising alarms in Jakarta that Pater Neles and the peace network are more interested in independence than in bridge-building, and raising expectations among Papuans that a formal negotiating process is somehow imminent. One of the declaration's drafters said that conference participants were now enthusiastically talking up dialogue with their

constituents at home.¹² It is a form of dialogue, however, that has little chance of happening.

A third possibility is business as usual. Regardless of the differences over the declaration, the JDP intends to continue its work trying to formulate a workable strategy for peace. The declaration is now past; the point is to move on. Some of the Jakarta-based Papuan elite who have been supporting the network's efforts were unconcerned by the declaration – if the conference did not succeed as a trust-building exercise between Jakarta and Papua, they said, maybe a different kind of gesture was called for – such as the release of political prisoners, maybe to coincide with the formation of UP4B.¹³ And some in Jakarta seemed to have such low expectations that the conference would produce anything meaningful that they hardly looked at the declaration.

Overall, however, the most important result of the conference may be what it says about how vast the political differences are between Jakarta and Jayapura and how much work remains to be done. The best way to ensure a positive outcome may be to focus on the indicators, not the declaration, and try to use them as guidelines for concrete change.

III. PUNCAK JAYA

As discussions were taking place in Papua, violence was escalating in Puncak Jaya, an area that for many Papuans symbolises what is wrong with Jakarta's policies, even though it is not necessarily representative: the OPM is more active there and the conflict more sustained than in many other parts of the region. Many of the most vocal political activists in Papua are highlanders and identify strongly with the struggle in Puncak Jaya, as do most of the Papuan solidarity groups abroad. It would thus be a useful exercise to apply some of the JDP's indicators to Puncak Jaya and see where the path to peace might lie for this one district alone. To do so, however, it is worth examining how Puncak Jaya has turned into such a cauldron.

A. FAILED DECENTRALISATION

Puncak Jaya, one of the poorer districts in the poorest province of Indonesia, is one of six in Papua and West Papua the Home Affairs Ministry deems to have failed. In an

¹¹ The attack in Nafri and shooting in Abepantai raised questions, because a similar attack took place in the same area in November 2010. Several men loyal to a man named Dani Kogoya, also known as Dani Tabuni, were arrested at the time but quickly released by local police, much to the frustration of the then provincial police chief, Bekto Suprpto. Little effort was made to track down Dani, leading to speculation of collusion between him and elements of the security forces. Human rights groups are calling for a full investigation into the most recent Nafri attack. See "Menanti Ujung Tabir Teror Jayapura", www.kompas.com, 19 August 2011.

¹² Crisis Group telephone interview, 20 July 2011.

¹³ The release of political prisoners – or at least those imprisoned only for non-violent activities such as raising of the Papuan flag – came up repeatedly in discussions as a measure the president could take that would be indicative of a genuine change in policy. In July 2010 the president granted an amnesty to Yusak Pakage after he had served five years of a ten-year term for raising the flag, so there is a precedent.

evaluation of the 205 new districts, cities and provinces created since 1999, the ministry created a scale of 1 to 100, with the top-ranking new district, a city in South Kalimantan, getting a score of 64.6. Puncak Jaya, created in 1999, got a score of 1.9. Only one district – Paniai, next door – scored lower.¹⁴

Remote and rugged, it boasts Indonesia's highest peak, over 5,000m high. There is no overland link to the provincial capital, Jayapura, an hour away by small plane. About half the population of just over 100,000 is concentrated in the district capital Mulia and the neighbouring subdistrict of Tingginambut; the population density in the mountainous subdistrict of Fawi is one person per square kilometre. The main road linking Mulia to Wamena, the nearest city of any size, is mostly dirt beyond the Mulia town limits. The stretch that runs from Mulia through the subdistricts of Tingginambut and Ilu is known locally as the "Gaza Strip" because of the frequency of shootings along it.

Governance is not just poor, it is almost non-existent. The capable district head, Lukas Enembe, head of the Papua branch of Partai Demokrat, President Yudhoyono's party, is running for governor and is frequently away – one of his staff estimated that he spends two months of the year in Puncak Jaya, the rest in Jakarta or Jayapura.¹⁵ The number of local government employees jumped from 600 in 2010 to over 2,000 in 2011, but a visitor saw only about 30 to 50 workers in the main government building, most of them in the departments of finance and employment and in the district planning office.¹⁶ Other offices were largely deserted. One man said most people worked from 8am to 12pm on a good day, more often people were gone by 11am, with a workweek from Monday to Thursday.¹⁷ He said, "The *bupati* (district head) never comes to the office, we can do as he does".

Corruption is endemic as everywhere else in Indonesia, but it has also been linked to violence. In late 2009, police were investigating construction projects for two bridges over the Kalome river that they suspected were largely fictive. The companies building the bridges received payment in full from the provincial government (Rp.8.8 billion [just over \$1 million] for the first bridge, Rp.7.3 billion [about \$850,000] for the second) after reporting that they were fully completed. When the police went to inspect

them, it was clear the work had barely begun and they summoned the company principals for investigation. The companies promised to complete the work, but just as they began, an alleged OPM/TPN attack took place on 15 October 2009, killing a worker named Thamrin. Citing security risks, the companies stopped work and the projects were written off because of *force majeure*, factors beyond their control.¹⁸ The linkage between the shootings and the bridge inspection was never proved, but suspicions remain.

In addition to absenteeism and corruption, another impediment to development is the high cost of basic goods because of the transport fees to bring them in. A sack of cement in Jayapura is Rp.56,000-Rp.60,000 (about \$7). In Mulia it can cost as much as Rp.1.2 million (\$140). The high cost of imported goods also means that funds allocated in Jakarta for security operations do not go very far, especially given the usual skimming. This puts more of a burden on the local government and populace.¹⁹

B. THE INSURGENCY

Puncak Jaya would be a governance challenge even without the insurgency, but since 2004, it has had some of the most active OPM/TPN units in Papua. Initially led by Goliat Tabuni, the OPM in Puncak Jaya today has splintered into several factions. Collectively they have more arms than other rebel units in Papua, about 30 as of early 2011, including Mausers (called the "old widows"), SS1s, M16s and newer AKs from China.²⁰

To understand how Puncak Jaya has become a key node of the insurgency, it is important to understand the background of Goliat Tabuni. This is not to suggest that one man is responsible for the conflict, but rather that his experience exemplifies the factors driving escalation of violence and helps explain some of the dynamics within the OPM.

¹⁴ "Pemekaran Gagal Total", *Suara Karya*, 11 April 2011. Puncak Jaya was further divided in 2008 with the creation of Puncak district. In 2008, Puncak Jaya was cited as the poorest district in Papua, but with the creation of more and more new districts, including Puncak, there are now eight that are in even worse shape.

¹⁵ Crisis Group interview, Mulia, February 2011.

¹⁶ "Pegawai di Kabupaten Puncak Jaya sampai 2000", <http://enembe.com>, 30 March 2011.

¹⁷ Crisis Group observation and conversations, visit to Mulia, February 2011.

¹⁸ Crisis Group interview, police in Jayapura, February 2011; Police Criminal Investigation, "Paparasi Hasil Lidik Dugaan Kasus Tindak Pidana Korupsi Dana APBD TA.2008 Kabupaten Puncak Jaya Sebesar Rp.8,892,500.00 – Proyek Pembangunan Jembatan Rangka Type C Kali Kalome (Kawinikime)", powerpoint presentation, 12 October 2009.

¹⁹ Crisis Group Report, *Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua*, op. cit., p. 14.

²⁰ An Indonesian military document released by the *Sydney Morning Herald* on 13 August 2011, titled "Anatomy of Papuan Separatists", <http://images.smh.com.au/file/2011/08/12/2553999/Kopassus2011.pdf>, suggests that Goliat Tabuni has only twelve arms for some 60 insurgents, but the document seems to date from 2008 and the information on Tabuni from 2007. After a January 2009 raid in which Goliat's son and others seized four police guns, police estimated that he had eleven guns and 40 fighters. See "Anggota TPN/OPM jadi tersangka", pemuda-baptis.blogspot.com, 20 January 2009.

Goliat, an ethnic Dani from Gurage in what is now Puncak Jaya, joined the OPM in the 1980s when he was about seventeen, reportedly after he and two friends were wrongly accused of rape in Mulia and beaten to a pulp by soldiers. He went to Timika after the incident, settled in the area known as Kali Kopi and became a fighter under Kelly Kwalik, the legendary OPM commander.²¹ In 1996 he joined Kelly Kwalik and two other OPM leaders, Daniel Kogoya and Titus Murib, in the abduction of 26 foreign and Indonesian wildlife researchers in Mapnduma, in what is now Jayawijaya district of the central highlands.²²

For years afterwards, little was heard of Goliat until mid-2004 when he returned to Gurage.²³ Shortly before national day celebrations on 17 August 2004, a rival clan member reported his presence to a unit of the army special forces, Kopassus.²⁴ Many Kopassus troops had been moved from Jayapura into the interior following the 2001 murder of tribal leader Theys Eluay in which their members were implicated; these men may have seen the capture of Goliat as a way of regaining prestige. When they drew near Goliat's hiding place, however, the OPM opened fire and a Kopassus soldier was wounded. The OPM members, knowing that there would be military retaliation, decided to join forces. Three other commanders based in and around Mulia, Anton Tabuni, Marunggen Wonda and Militer Murib, thus joined Goliat.²⁵

The joining of these three men and their followers with Goliat's forces gave the Puncak Jaya OPM important new strength. For almost a month, the situation was quiet. On 14 September 2004, however, Kopassus troops returned to Gurage with reinforcements from Wamena. They failed to arrest Goliat, because he and his forces escaped into the jungle. Instead, in Gurage they arrested his uncle, Rev. Elisa Tabuni, the youngest brother of his father, who in the process was shot and killed. Elisa's son, Melkias, managed to flee. The killing outraged Goliat and became an important part of the Puncak Jaya narrative of injustice.

Several weeks later, Goliat's men burned the building housing the Ilu subdistrict offices and tried to burn the camp of a construction company, PT Modern, that was reportedly contracted by the government to clear land belonging to Goliat's family. Three incidents of shooting at PT Modern vehicles followed, culminating in an attack on 12 October 2004 in Munia, Ilu, in which six PT Modern workers building the Trans Wamena-Mulia road were killed.²⁶ On 12 November, Goliat's men ambushed a vehicle carrying aid and medicines that were to be distributed by the local government to displaced people in the subdistricts of Mulia and Ilu. Yance Kirimay, a policeman, died; two government employees were seriously wounded, and eight others sustained minor injuries.

Since 2004, the cycle of violence in Puncak Jaya has continued with peaks and troughs, with the current wave dating back to an OPM raid on a police post in early 2009.²⁷ Solidarity groups tend to portray the conflict in Puncak as one-sided military or police repression, ignoring the frequent ambushes of security forces by guerrillas.

On 28 May 2011, TNI Sgt. Kamaru Jaman was shot in the back of the head at Ilu district market while an army "community aid" project was underway to clean up the market. On 24 June, Sgt. Muhamad Yasin from the Puncak Jaya

²¹ Kelly Kwalik was killed by Indonesian police in December 2009.

²² The hostage rescue was organised by then Kopassus commander Prabowo Subianto in the course of which two hostages and eight OPM members were killed. For a full account of the incident, see "Mengapa Navy dan Yosias Dibantai?", *Tempo*, 18 May 1996, at www.tempo.co.id/ang/min/01/12/utama3.htm.

²³ One version says he returned to visit his father's grave and take care of customary land (*tanah adat*) that was about to be cleared for a new airport. Another says he heard that there was to be a meeting of three churches that would then issue a call for independence; he planned to attend and take the opportunity to visit Gurage which he had not been back to in many years.

²⁴ The report allegedly came from Terry Telenggen, a former member of the PIB (Partai Indonesia Baru). He lost his bid to become a legislator, after a conflict in the PIB Puncak Jaya over the allocation of the two seats that the party received in the 2004 election. Terry Telenggen wanted the seats to be divided in two, one for the Tabuni clan, one for the Telenggen. But it turned out that both seats were taken by two members of the Tabuni clan, Elvis and Iskandar. Terry was angry at the Tabuni family and reported Goliat to Kopassus. Crisis Group interview, Mulia, February 2011. Elvis is currently the head of the Puncak district council and his men were involved in the violence in Ilaga on 30-31 July 2011.

²⁵ Anton Tabuni was a former elementary school teacher in Tumpanggi who had been a member of the team of 100 that met President Habibie in February 1999. From 2000-2003, he was head for Puncak Jaya of Satgas Papua, the pro-independence militia created around the time of the 2nd Papua Congress, and

almost all of his followers were also in the militia, including one man later to take on a more important role, Dinus Wakerkwa alias Rambo. Their base was in Ilu. Marunggen Wonda was an OPM fighter who had been based in Vanimo, Papua New Guinea. He returned to Puncak Jaya with his men in 2004, sometime before Goliat. Militer Murib was a former follower of an OPM leader, Yustinus Murib, who was based around Kuyawage in what is now Jayawijaya district. Yustinus Murib's men were among the best armed in Papua, following spectacular raids in Ilaga (now a part of Puncak district) in October 2001 in which they set fire to the police station and market and occupied the airport for five days, in Ilu, Puncak Jaya in 2002; and Wamena, Jayawijaya in 2003 in which they broke into the weapons depot of the district military command.

²⁶ "OPM Tembaki Kendaraan Sipil, Enam Orang Dikabarkan Tewas", *Media Indonesia*, 14 October 2004.

²⁷ Crisis Group Report, *Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua*, op. cit., pp. 13-15.

police command was shot in the side of the head at Mulia airfield. On 5 July, three soldiers from Infantry Battalion 751 were shot, one while on patrol, two others after unidentified gunmen shot at their post in Kalome, Tingginambut. On 12 July two soldiers from Battalion 753 and a civilian were wounded in another attack in Kalome; several civilians were wounded in military operations to search for the perpetrators. On 2 August, another soldier from Battalion 753 was shot in the chest and as he was being airlifted for medical treatment the next day, a group of OPM/TPN attacked the TNI helicopter; the soldier died as a result.²⁸ The last attack led to bellicose statements from the newly appointed army chief of staff, Gen. Pramono Edhie Wibowo, who is the president's brother-in-law. It also produced a statement of responsibility read out to journalists on 5 August in Tingginambut by Anton Tabuni, secretary-general of OPM for the Central Highlands region, who said the attacks were a way of showing to the world that the struggle for independence would not end.²⁹

The frequency of the attacks attests to the ability of the Puncak Jaya fighters to keep the security forces off guard, despite factionalism in their own ranks.

C. FACTIONALISM IN THE TPN/OPM

Even though the TPN/OPM in Puncak Jaya formally acknowledged Goliat Tabuni as Supreme Commander in 2009, it did not mean everyone was loyal to him. Internal disputes eventually produced three large factions.

One is the group around Goliat himself, operating in the area of Tinggineri, Tingginambut, Pagagor, and a part of Gurage. Included in this group are Anton Tabuni, Dinus Wakarkwa, Tendiles Murib, Ogolek Wonda, Sari Tabuni, Mus Wanimo and others. Dekiles (Decky) Tabuni, Goliat's adopted son, was a member of this group until his death on 11 January 2009.³⁰

Second is the group around Marunggen Wonda, one of the commanders who joined Goliat in 2004, whose area of operation encompasses Gurage, Puncak Senyum and Kota Baru. Eburnakim Tabuni and Linus Enembe are members.

The third faction, and the most active in undertaking attacks in 2010 and 2011, consists of followers of Werius Telenggen, an OPM leader shot and killed in a joint police-military operation on 17 May 2010. They operate in the area of Yambi, Kulirik and Wuyuneri. No leader emerged to replace Werius, but two men who stand out in the group are Gobanik Telenggen and Militer Murib. Militer himself was initially part of Marunggen's group but left after Werius was killed. Others in the group include Leka Tabuni, Yandiron Tabunim, Tugui alias Tukwi alias Bindo Rugwe Kogoya, and Tenga Mati Telenggen. On 4 December 2010, this unit attacked Kafe Coklat in Mulia, shooting a member of Kopassus and another soldier. A motorcycle taxi driver, Muhammad Amas, was killed in the attack.

Outside these three large factions are several smaller groups, one around Eki Wonda, who operates in Yamo subdistrict, and another around Uranus Telenggen in Mewoluk subdistrict. The two groups are not prominent because their numbers are small, and they have no firearms, only traditional weapons.

Sources in Mulia say the fragmentation within TPN/OPM Puncak Jaya cannot be separated from Dani traditions. One intra-OPM clash started with an armed encounter between the TPN/OPM forces under Gobanik Telenggen and Militer Murib against members of TNI Infantry Battalion 753 on 2 August 2010 in Yambi subdistrict, in which an OPM fighter named Nombangge Gire from Tingginambut was killed. The victim was the son of Kikuk Gire, a paramedic who lived in the same hamlet as Goliat Tabuni. He was very angry at the death of his son and said, "Just as we're getting independence, my son dies". He asked Gobanik Telenggen for blood money (*bayar kepala*), then went to Goliat and demanded that he ask the TPN/OPM in Yambi for payment. Goliat ordered five of his troops to Gobanik Telenggen to make the traditional payment.

Gobanik could not pay, and Kikuk Gire and his fellow villagers, including some of Goliat's men, were angry. The hamlet performed the traditional pre-war ceremony (*mandi becek*) as preparation for an attack on Gobanik. In the Dani tradition, a warrior leader who takes a foster child from another hamlet must pay blood money if that child is killed by the enemy. If he cannot pay, a war between hamlets takes place. In this case, negotiations prevented a war against Gobanik, but this was not the first time such tensions had arisen.³¹ A similar case took place in 2009,

²⁸ "Pangdam: Pelaku Penembakan di Puncak Jaya Pakai 6 Senjata", www.kbr68h.com, 4 August 2011.

²⁹ "OPM Klaim Bertanggung Jawab", <http://infotpnopm.com>, 8 August 2011.

³⁰ Decky's newly dug grave is pictured in a video of a Brimob operation on 16 January 2009 in Tinggineri, Tingginambut. The video shows Brimob troops shooting indiscriminately into houses, almost all of which appear to have been evacuated, then setting fire to them. One of the houses burned belonged to Goliat. The operation took place after a raid on a police post by Decky's men on 8 January 2009 in which they seized four guns and stabbed the wife of a policeman. The video also shows a wounded man, Yendenak Wonda, being dragged from the bushes and roughly interrogated by police. Police later said he admitted to being a captain in the TPN/OPM; he was charged with robbery and illegal possession of a weapon.

³¹ This account comes from a source close to the Tabuni clan. Crisis Group interview, February 2011.

after the death of a child from the Wonda clan who had joined Marunggen's group. Villagers from Gurage demanded blood money from Marunggen Wonda. Even though no fight erupted, the incident created friction among the OPM forces in Puncak Jaya.³²

Another divisive factor has been a leadership struggle, with candidates vying to raise their prestige through attacks. The activity of Werius Telenggen's men in 2010 can be explained in part by the fact that Werius reportedly had ambitions to become the TPN/OPM commander for Puncak Jaya, replacing Goliat. When Goliat undertook a raid, Werius had his forces step up attacks on the security forces to raise his reputation at the expense of Goliat's. This also created ill-will between the two groups.³³

Militer Murib also had ambitions. At first he joined the Marunggen group, but after Werius Telenggen died, he moved to Yambi to join Werius's followers because he saw an opening to move into the leadership. Together with Gobanik Telenggen, Militer Murib led his men to attack security forces, not only in Yambi but also in Mulia, not in retaliation for anything the military had done but as a way of increasing his own influence.

These power struggles are rooted in clan tradition, one Dani said. He noted that in fact, the Dani have no leadership system per se. Someone becomes leader who has gravitas and power, both of which can be built up through acquisition of wealth and war. A change is not based on heredity but on a decision of the people themselves, when

³² Ibid. Demands for blood money apparently are increasingly being used as a fund-raising tactic by the TPN/OPM. Since 2008, TPN/OPM leaders in Puncak Jaya have tried to tap into Respek, a program started by Governor Suebu to get \$10,000 for development projects to every village in Papua. Initially they were unsuccessful since village heads were not interested in turning over any of the money received. In May 2010, the flow of funds stopped anyway, on the grounds that security in Puncak Jaya was such that distribution of Respek funds was not possible. In early 2011, after funding resumed, the OPM tried a new tactic of trying to revive old blood payment demands. In February 2011, for example, the group around Marunggen Wonda demanded customary payment for the death of Wagwe Gire, a woman from Kilolome, in Mewoluk subdistrict who had been killed by her husband's family. They accused her of causing her husband's death through witchcraft and shot her with an arrow. Wagwe Gire was a distant relative of Yandiron Tabuni, one of Marunggen Wonda's men, so Yandiron and Marunggen demanded that the village head of Dondo pay Rp.55 million to Kilolome village. The money was paid when Respek funds were distributed. A similar case took place in Yamo where a woman close to Gobanik Telenggen was killed after she was accused of murdering her husband. Gobanik demanded blood money, and some of the money went to fund his unit's activities. Crisis Group interview with Respek official, Puncak Jaya, February 2011.

³³ Crisis Group interview, Jayapura, February 2011.

they think their leader has become weak and others are more capable.³⁴

D. RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE TWO SIDES

The numbers both sides are deploying in Puncak Jaya are difficult to assess. On the OPM side, Dominic Brown's film *Forgotten Bird of Paradise*, made in 2009, seems to show thousands of fighters under Goliat Tabuni's command.³⁵ Most, however, are not combat forces but sympathisers who can provide logistical support to the much smaller number of combatants – and that support base is large. It is also the primary source of recruitment for the fighters, who across the different factions may number about 200, according to an independent observer.³⁶

One means of assessing strength is through weaponry. Police estimate the factions collectively have about 30 guns. Some have been seized in raids on the police or army, but they do not account for the whole arsenal.³⁷ Some were acquired long ago. Marunggen Wonda, for example, brought two Dabolov and one revolver when he came to Puncak Jaya from Vanimo in 2004.³⁸ Militer Murib's group carries several guns that the OPM in Kuyawage seized from the raid on the Wamena district military command in 2003. A few are believed to come in from Papua New Guinea, and in February 2011, police in Nabire arrested a man named Tommy Murib as two men from Ternate were delivering a Mauser to him. Tommy had been involved in the 2003 Wamena raid, but the weapon he had just acquired was left over from the conflict in Maluku.³⁹ The army believes that six guns were used in the 3 August attack on the TNI helicopter in Puncak Jaya.⁴⁰

On the government side, the number of "organic" – that is, locally based – troops in Puncak Jaya is small. The total number of soldiers in the military command in Puncak Jaya is only six, but they are reinforced by troops from Infantry Battalion 753 based in Nabire of about 150 men on four-month rotations. In early 2011 there was also a task force sent from Jakarta of 125 men, 30 of whom were a platoon from a combat unit (*batalyon intai dan tempur, yontaipur*). A Kopassus detachment of 30 was stationed

³⁴ See Koentjaraningrat, *Irian Jaya Membangun Masyarakat Majemuk*, Penerbit Djambatan, Jakarta, 1994.

³⁵ The full video is on YouTube, at www.youtube.com/watch?v=CaGou3vB3A0.

³⁶ Crisis Group interview, Puncak Jaya, February 2011. This is much higher than security force estimates two years earlier.

³⁷ For more on how illegal arms are acquired, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°109, *Illicit Arms in Indonesia*, 6 September 2010.

³⁸ Crisis Group interviews, Jayapura and Mulia, February 2011.

³⁹ Crisis Group interview, Mulia, February 2011.

⁴⁰ "Pangdam: Pelaku Penembakan di Puncak Jaya Pakai 6 Senjata", www.kbr68h.com, 4 August 2011.

there together with a six-person military intelligence squad, a squad of six from the State Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN), and three members from the intelligence unit of the provincial military command. The total was about 300 personnel. In May, some 200 more troops arrived to take part in a controversial “community service” program, discussed below.

The district had about 300 “organic” police, less than the 350 minimum for a district-level command. In addition there was a platoon of about 35 personnel from the paramilitary mobile brigade (Brimob), based in Kotaraja, Jayapura, and another company of about 155 troops sent in from Brimob headquarters in Jakarta.

The financial and logistical burden that the presence of “non-organic” troops places on the provincial government was discussed in an earlier report.⁴¹ Basic living expenses are a real issue. A policeman stationed in Puncak Jaya gets the same salary as his or her counterpart in Jakarta, with a hardship allowance of Rp.100,000 (about \$11.50) a month and a food allowance of Rp.35,000 a day (about \$4). But the cost differential is huge. A kilo of rice in Jayapura is double or triple the price in Puncak Jaya, increasing the incentive for rent-seeking. “Here the first battle is our stomach, the second is Goliath Tabuni”, one officer said. “Here there’s a saying that to be sent to Puncak Jaya is to put down your life as a deposit. Better to pay Rp.50 million so you don’t have to go”.⁴²

E. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

The pattern of OPM ambushes followed by counter-insurgency operations by police, military or joint forces has taken its toll on the population, in the form of frequent “sweepings” (searches for perpetrators) and serious human rights violations, deepening local resentment. Gratuitous abuse is more common than the security forces will admit and it goes largely unpunished.

A video of two Tingginambut men being tortured by three Indonesian soldiers on 27 May 2010 was shown round the world on YouTube; the men were interrogated with knives to their throats as lighted cigarettes were applied to their genitals – and that was only what the soldiers themselves filmed.⁴³ The perpetrators were tried by a military court in Jayapura and in February 2011 they were given sentences of between eight and ten months minus time served for violations of military discipline. The slap-on-

the-wrist sentences reinforced the conviction of many Papuans that Jakarta would never take demands for justice and accountability of the security forces seriously – particularly when non-violent raisers of the Papuan independence flag invariably receive harsh sentences on rebellion charges.

A trial just concluded at a military court in Jayapura offered more of the same. First Sergeant Tong Sihombing and two subordinates, Privates Hery Purwanto and Hasirun from the 753rd infantry battalion went on trial in July 2011 for the March 2010 killing of Genderman (also seen as Kinderman) Gire, a local pastor in Tingginambut. The court charged them with assault as well as disciplinary violations. On 11 August, Hery received a fifteen-month sentence for assault and disobeying orders; Sgt Sihombing received seven months for negligence resulting in death and disciplinary infractions; Hasirun received six months for only the latter.⁴⁴

The soldiers did not dispute their role in the killing.⁴⁵ According to the version heard in court, the three were on patrol in Kampung Kalome, Tingginambut, when a truck driver told the soldiers that Genderman and two others had been asking him for fuel. The soldiers, apparently considering this suspicious behaviour, confronted Genderman but did not get what they considered a satisfactory response. Sihombing told the court, “I was forced to hit Genderman Gire because he didn’t speak Indonesian. I hit him three times with my hand”.⁴⁶

Sihombing said Genderman then told them he was not afraid of the TNI because he had “30 friends in the hills with guns”.⁴⁷ Sihombing then arrested the pastor and his friends and turned them over to his subordinates for interrogation. During the questioning, the three Papuans were beaten further – Hasirun justified this by saying they were trying to grab their weapons. After some time, Genderman’s two friends broke free and ran into the forest, despite shots fired by the soldiers as they fled. Genderman, the soldiers said, tried once more to grab Hery’s weapon, so Hery shot him in the chest, killing him instantly. The three then loaded Genderman’s body into one of their vehicles and while Hasirun stood guard, Sihombing and

⁴¹ Crisis Group Report, *Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua*, op. cit.

⁴² Crisis Group discussion at provincial police command, Jayapura, February 2011.

⁴³ For details, see “Laporan Tim Pemantauan dan Penyelidikan Kekerasan di Puncak Jaya”, KOMNAS HAM, 2011.

⁴⁴ “Tiga oknum anggota TNI telah divonis”, *Cenderawasih Pos*, 12 August 2011. All three were convicted of disobeying orders on Article 103 of the Military Criminal Code. In addition, Hery Purwanto and Sihombing were convicted under Criminal Code Articles 351 and 359 respectively.

⁴⁵ “3 Anggota TNI Disidang Karena Menganiaya Warga Papua”, *Suara Pembaruan*, 20 July 2011.

⁴⁶ “Tiga Oknum TNI Penyiksa Warga Langgar Perintah”, www.aldepe.com, 22 July 2011.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

Hery dumped it in the river. Sihombing reported the incident to his post commander, and the three were detained.⁴⁸

A report prepared by the national human rights commission, Komnas HAM, presents a different account.⁴⁹ Genderman was waiting by the road for fuel to be delivered from Wamena. Questioned by soldiers from a passing convoy, he grew frightened as one of them withdrew the cartridge from his weapon and asked whether Genderman knew what it was and whether he was hiding weapons. A fellow pastor, Pitinius Kogoya, happened to be awaiting a delivery of cooking oil nearby, and both were arrested for questioning about where local OPM members might be hiding and storing weapons. The two were then beaten until their faces were swollen and bruised.⁵⁰

Pitinius said he managed to flee into the bushes but heard two shots fired as he ran away. Local villagers knew only that Genderman never returned home, but a few weeks later his head was found by the edge of the Tinggin river in Yamo, Gurage. Locals also allege that Genderman's church was burned down by the TNI.⁵¹

That the killing came to trial at all is progress, but the lenient sentences underscore how far there is to go before Papuans will feel they are treated fairly by the courts. It was no surprise that one of the indicators of a peaceful Papua proposed by the Commission on Law and Human Rights at the July peace conference was "Perpetrators of state violence to be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the Papuan people's sense of justice".⁵²

F. THE MILITARY'S "COMMUNITY SERVICE" PROGRAM

In early May 2011, in part as a way to improve its image after a rash of human rights incidents, the provincial military command, Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih, began a four-month program of community service (*bakti sosial*), due to end on 30 August.⁵³ Activities have included building roads and bridges, repairing landslide-affected areas, rehabilitating housing, renovating schools and churches, providing health services, initiating reforestation, and developing farming and fishing activities in the area. The central government has provided Rp.5 billion (\$585,000) in funds, while the provincial government has provided

some supporting services.⁵⁴ As a public relations exercise, it has not worked. Most Papuans do not want security forces in their villages no matter what they are doing. At the peace conference, participants urged that the entire *bakti sosial* program be turned over to the civilian government.

In Puncak Jaya activities include construction of clinics, markets, houses and churches, as well as a variety of training programs in farming, carpentry, mechanics, water purification and food preparation and sports.⁵⁵ In June, the TNI began offering a literacy program in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Culture. But the funds also covered the construction of ten military barracks and the establishment of civilian security groups (*pamswakarsa*), according to a military document.⁵⁶ These activities have been focused in Mulia, Ilu and Tingginambut districts, including in the Gurage area. The 3 August shooting of a soldier reportedly took place during a community service program.

While the military justifies the program in terms of efforts to ensure security for the governor's elections, scheduled for September 2011, many Papuans see it as a way of placing new troops in Puncak Jaya without inciting controversy. Some 400 members of the TNI and the police have been involved since the beginning of the program, half of them drawn from a new contingent sent to Puncak Jaya in April.⁵⁷

Major General (Ret.) TB Hasanuddin, deputy head of the Indonesian parliament's Commission I that handles security affairs, said in a public forum on Papua on 9 August that, by law, any military operation "other than war", including to counter separatist activity, needs the approval of parliament based on proposals that outline the objectives, duration and budget needed. He said that since he was elected in 2009, not a single such proposal has come to the commission, so if operations to hunt down OPM leaders are taking place, they are illegal.⁵⁸

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ "Laporan Tim Pemantauan dan Penyelidikan Kekerasan di Puncak Jaya", op. cit., pp. 44-46.

⁵⁰ Ibid, pp. 45-46.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 15.

⁵² "Indicators on Papua Land of Peace", (handout of powerpoint slides), Papua Peace Conference, July 2011.

⁵³ Its official name is TNI Manunggal Masyarakat Desa (TMMD), literally "the military and villagers become one".

⁵⁴ "TNI Berupaya Perbaiki Citra dan Rangkul PTN/OPM", *Bintang Papua*, 1 May 2011.

⁵⁵ More specifically, the program in Puncak Jaya involved the construction of 30 health posts, six security posts to protect forests (*pos kamling*), three sports facilities, two traditional markets (and rehabilitation of five others to include bathroom facilities), sixteen houses and three churches. Soldiers have also built pigpens, chicken cages and fish farms, bus stop and motorcycle taxi shelters as well as a range of facilities for literacy programs, post-natal healthcare, and community centres.

⁵⁶ Daftar Kegiatan Bakti Sosial TNI di Puncak Jaya, obtained in Mulia, February 2011.

⁵⁷ "Kodam Kirim 200 Personil ke Puncak Jaya", *Bintang Papua*, 8 April 2011.

⁵⁸ Comment in seminar on "Securitisation of Papua", hosted by Imparsial, Aryaduta Hotel, Jakarta, 9 August 2011. The law he was referring to was No.34/2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces.

IV. PUNCAK JAYA, THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE NEW UNIT IN JAKARTA

The situation in Puncak Jaya puts some of the indicators developed by the July conference in perspective. For example, among the political indicators are that indigenous Papuans feel safe, are able to live freely without intimidation, discrimination and marginalisation and no longer face stigmatisation as separatists or subversives.⁵⁹ The case of Genderman Gire, immediately assumed to be the “enemy”, is a case in point. He may well have had friends in the OPM, but around Tingginambut it would be difficult to find someone who did not. Quite apart from the clear human rights issues involved, the treatment that he and his companions received is counterproductive, from the Indonesian point of view, as it inevitably strengthens support for independence. Better training of security forces is needed but so is a better system of deterrents and incentives: punishments for abuse and rewards for good community relations.

Another political indicator is rectification of history. This usually refers to the need to acknowledge the shortcomings and manipulation of the 1969 Act of Free Choice. But Papua would benefit from detailed local histories as well so that both Papuans and non-Papuans understand the troubled background of areas such as Puncak Jaya.

Many of the economic indicators focused on legal recognition of customary land rights. If it is true that one factor that brought Goliat Tabuni back to Puncak Jaya in 2004 was the clearing of his family’s land for a new airport without consultation with the customary owners, this would be the kind of act that would no longer take place in peaceful Papua.

The security indicators included that the armed forces carry out their duties in a professional manner, respectful of human rights, and that there be a reduction of non-organic military and police forces across Papua and West Papua. As long as ambushes of patrols and attacks on military posts continue, it might be difficult to argue for a reduction in Puncak Jaya, but it is also true that fewer forces might provoke fewer attacks. In 2009, Lukas Enembe argued that the more troops sent to Puncak Jaya, the less secure the community became.⁶⁰

Among the sociocultural indicators are an end to labelling Papuans as ignorant, drunken, lazy and primitive, and rec-

ognition and appreciation of their customs and norms. Governments at the national, provincial and district levels might consider drafting a short guide to the culture of the Dani and other ethnic groups in the Puncak Jaya area that would be required reading for any soldier or civilian assigned there.

In short, there are various ways in which the indicators from the conference can be translated into concrete programs that would acknowledge the value of the process without endorsing the final declaration.

For this to happen, two other steps need to take place: the Yudhoyono government needs to move ahead quickly with the formation of UP4B and Papuan elected officials need to become more actively involved in discussions of Papua’s future.

A. THE NEW UNIT: UP4B

One interesting facet of Indonesian politics is how developments in Aceh and Papua play off each other. What happens in one often becomes the basis of ideas for the other. The whole idea of a Papua roadmap was very much inspired by the 2005 peace process in Aceh.⁶¹ UP4B had its origins in the desire of then Papuan Governor Suebu to replicate the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi, BRR) set up in Aceh after the December 2004 tsunami: an agency directly under the president that could undertake a mammoth task reasonably efficiently and cleanly. In Aceh it was cleaning up after a natural disaster. In Papua it was to speed up development in a way that would make up for years of neglect and corruption and get “special autonomy” back on track.

A new entity focused on Papua was therefore initially seen largely in economic terms, as a body that was to implement Presidential Instruction No. 5 from 2007 on accelerated development in Papua and West Papua. That instruction promised a “new deal” for Papua and was to focus on food security, raising the quality of education and delivery of health services, basic infrastructure to improve access to isolated areas and affirmative action.⁶² Very little happened, in part because implementation was left to vari-

⁵⁹ “Indicators on Papua Land of Peace”, Papua Peace Conference, Political Indicators Nos. 1, 2 and 7.

⁶⁰ Crisis Group Report. *Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua*, op. cit. p. 14.

⁶¹ Other examples include the RESPEK program of Papuan governor Bas Suebu (cash grants to villages) which was adopted and adapted by Aceh governor Irwandi Yusuf and the authority to apply Islamic law in Aceh which in 2007 became a basis for a draft regulation in Manokwari, West Papua that would have applied “Christian law”, including complete work stoppages on Sundays, to the city (it was never adopted). When local parties were allowed in Aceh under the 2005 peace agreement, Papuan activists demanded the same. See also Sidney Jones, “Democracy, Autonomy and the Constitutional Court”, *Tempo* (English edition), 26 July 2011.

⁶² Instruksi Presiden Nomor 5 Tahun 2007, www.itjen.kkp.go.id/pustaka/images/stories/pdf/Nomor-5-Tahun-2.pdf.

ous ministries in Jakarta. In 2008, Governor Suebu visited Aceh and was struck by what the BRR had accomplished. A plan was floated to establish the Papua equivalent, to be called Papua Accelerated Development Unit or PADU; it was to be directly under Suebu, instead of having everything pass through the ministries. This plan ran into opposition in Jakarta – among other things, some saw it as giving too much power to the governor.⁶³ The idea of a unit to coordinate Papua development was reformulated, and the result was UP4B.⁶⁴

As more than twenty drafts of a presidential regulation creating the new body were discussed and discarded, a small group of Jakarta political elite emerged in late 2010 as proponents of a more creative approach to Papua. Most had been involved in earlier discussions of the Papua “roadmap”. They included Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, deputy chair for social sciences and humanities of LIPI and one of Indonesia’s top political scholar-practitioners, who in October 2010 became deputy for political affairs to Vice-President Boediono; Djohermansyah Djohan, Dewi’s predecessor in that role, who became director-general in the Home Affairs Ministry; Sofyan Djalil, an Acehnese and former head of Indonesia’s Strategic Industries Agency, who had been part of the government negotiating team on Aceh in 2005; Dr Farid Husain, a confidante of former vice-president Yusuf Kalla who had been deeply involved in the initial outreach to the Aceh rebels and subsequently joined the government team in Helsinki; and Lt Gen (ret) Bambang Darmono, who served as martial law administrator in Aceh from 2003-2004, then became a key figure in the conflict resolution process before being appointed to head the National Resilience Council.

Everyone in the group recognised, in a way that many in the government did not, that to treat Papua exclusively as an economic development problem was a dead end. Indonesian sovereignty was non-negotiable, but anything else, including the history of Papua’s integration into the republic, could be discussed.

Several developments seemed to be increasing this group’s influence. The widely publicised rejection of special autonomy by Papuan groups in June 2010 reverberated in Jakarta, leading the president to ask where the money had gone and why there had been no progress.⁶⁵ Dogged efforts

by members of the JDP to get parliamentarians and officials to focus on the need for a Papuan strategy seemed to be paying off. On 1 December 2010, President Yudhoyono convened a small meeting on Papua and instructed three of the participants – Bambang Darmono, Farid Husain and his adviser on Papua, Velix Wanggai, to come up with solutions. Each had different ideas. Of the three, Velix clung closest to the original concept of accelerated development.⁶⁶ Farid wanted to use the Aceh template and reach out directly to the OPM. Bambang Darmono was the most interested in a process of dialogue, even though the word itself had become anathema to conservatives in Jakarta because it implied two equal parties. Instead, “constructive communication”, first used in President Yudhoyono’s August 2010 national day speech to parliament, became the formula of choice but no one offered details of what it might involve.⁶⁷

With support from Coordinating Minister Djoko Suyanto, the mandate of UP4B gradually widened. In Draft No.19 from March 2011, the preamble acknowledged the difference in perceptions of needs and development between Papuans and the government; the problems of special autonomy; and Papuan distrust of the government.⁶⁸

The unit, directly responsible to the president, was to coordinate programs for accelerated development in Papua through two approaches, one socio-economic, the other political and cultural “to build constructive communication between the government and the people of Papua and West Papua with a view toward resolving their complaints and discontent”.⁶⁹ The political approach would involve a mapping of the Papuan conflict, in both political and legal-human rights terms; mapping of and outreach to “strategic groups” in Papua to improve understanding of political and cultural problems between Papuans and the government; preparing policies in this area for building trust between Papuans and the government; and “develop[ing] the mechanism for and substance of constructive communication between the government and representatives of the people of Papua and West Papua with a view toward resolving the conflict within the framework of the Unitary State of

⁶³ Crisis Group interview, governor’s staff, Jakarta, 2 July 2011.

⁶⁴ At some point in late May or early June 2011, officials considered changing the name of the proposed unit to UP2TP, where the letters “TP” referred to “Tanah Papua” instead of the more cumbersome “Papua and West Papua”. But there was apparently concern that the term “Tanah Papua” for the whole region was too politically charged, so later documents revert to the original name.

⁶⁵ For more on the rejection of special autonomy see Crisis Group Briefing, *The Deepening Impasse in Papua*, op. cit.

⁶⁶ See Velix V. Wanggai, *New Deal for Papua*, Jakarta, July 2009.

⁶⁷ “Komunikasi konstruktif dengan Papua”, *Kompas*, 21 August 2010.

⁶⁸ “Bahwa sejak diberlakukannya Otonomi Khusus, masih terdapat masalah perbedaan persepsi antara masyarakat Papua dengan pemerintah tentang pembangunan yang sesuai dengan kebutuhan masyarakat, belum optimalnya komunikasi konstruktif, kepercayaan masyarakat terhadap pemerintah yang belum meningkat, belum lengkapnya peraturan pendukung Otonomi Khusus, serta belum sejalanannya pengaturan wewenang antara Undang-Undang Nomor 21 Tahun 2001 Tentang Otonomi Khusus dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 Tentang Pemerintahan Daerah”. Draft Raperpres UP4B, 28 March 2011.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, Article 2(3)(b).

the Republic of Indonesia”.⁷⁰ In other words, UP4B was to develop a plan for dialogue by another name.

Most of the rest of the draft laid out guidelines for improving Papuan welfare and speeding up development. The unit was to have a life span of three years, from 2011-2014, until the end of President Yudhoyono’s second term. It would have the authority to propose, reject and evaluate programs at both a national and regional level related to accelerated development; decide how to improve implementation of programs in order to achieve specific targets; and resolve disputes that might arise between various agencies involved. A list of fourteen tasks that UP4B would undertake was then set out, mostly related to coordination and capacity building but including “facilitating political reconciliation and enforcement of the law and human rights in the interests of accelerated development”.⁷¹

With some minor changes, this became the draft regulation that was sent to the Cabinet Secretary for transmittal to the president – and stopped there through May, June and July.⁷² In August, the secretary requested that the draft regulation be divided in two, one for the concept of accelerated development, one for the institution of UP4B. In the meantime, the president approved Bambang Darmono as head and others were informally approached. Papuans in the JDP, including Neles Tebay, said they wanted a military person they trusted in the job, because a critical role would be to intercede as necessary with the president, the TNI and the police.⁷³ The problem was that no one could begin work officially without the presidential regulation in force.

By early August, doubts were beginning to creep in among prominent Jakarta-based Papuans and others that the new unit would ever come into being, and, as delays reduced its already short proposed lifespan, that it would be able to accomplish anything significant even it did. The peace conference declaration seemed to have raised doubts among some top policymakers about the wisdom of giving UP4B even a hint of a political mandate.⁷⁴ Without UP4B or the equivalent, however, one of the biggest obstacles to conflict resolution in Papua will re-emerge: Jakarta’s indifference to indigenous Papuan concerns.

⁷⁰ Ibid, Article 3(2)(d).

⁷¹ Ibid. Article 10(1)(l).

⁷² The delays were due in part to the slowness of the cabinet secretary in seeking input and comments from three coordinating ministers, as well as the ministers of Home Affairs, Finance and State Apparatus. Also, the government came under heavy criticism in 2011 for the large numbers of ineffective institutions outside the ministerial structure which were seen as a huge drain on state resources. The Yudhoyono administration has been extra-cautious as a result about setting up a new one.

⁷³ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, 21 June 2011.

⁷⁴ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, 21 July 2011.

B. THE NEED FOR INVOLVEMENT OF ELECTED PAPUANS

A group notable for its absence thus far in discussions about dialogue has been the large pool of directly elected Papuans. With 27 districts and municipalities in Papua and eleven in West Papua, each with elected heads and deputies, the number of elected executives is 70. In the two provinces combined, there are 100 elected and eleven appointed provincial legislators, and eight others elected to the national parliament. Each *kabupaten* has a district council, most with about 25 members (Puncak Jaya has 21, Jayapura city has 29, Jayawijaya has 30), making close to 1,000 across the two provinces. The civil society participants at the Papua Peace Conference may speak on behalf of “the people”, but these elected officials and legislators legally represent them.

Moreover, these are the men and women who can make and implement local policies and regulations as long as they do not conflict with national laws. Most have strong clan ties and at least a nominal affiliation with national political parties, making them a critical third pillar – together with Papuan civil society and the central government – in the construction of a peaceful Papua, even if a large number have been accused of corruption. The only way to move from the aspirations represented by the peace conference indicators to concrete programs is to involve these local decision-makers and get them to think about what steps they could take, however small, that it would be within their authority to perform – such as a mapping of customary land ownership within a particular district.

Pater Neles said after the peace conference that he hoped the indicators would be used almost as a set of performance goals for those elected to local office. If so, one task of the JDP and the UP4B might be to work with local officials and lawmakers to give substance to some of these ideas.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The JDP deserves credit for setting in motion a process for trying to redirect policy, think strategically, and help channel deeply-held grievances toward formulation of concrete solutions. The situation in Puncak Jaya, where counter-insurgency operations to confront an active armed rebellion have involved serious abuses, underscores the importance of doing so. The network will not be able to do much more without a committed partner from the central government. This is why the creation of a Papua unit in Jakarta composed of people who are genuinely interested in reaching out is so important – it could help change the atmospherics of confrontation that hardliners on both sides tend to foster.

At the same time, the JDP itself needs to do a little introspection about its own role. The more it can project an image of political neutrality, a body that can talk to all sides from the guerrillas to the government, the more effective it will be in fostering useful discussions. If it begins to be seen as representing the independence movement, then the door to dialogue may shut.

The network may also need to play a role in managing Papuan expectations and make clear that resolving the conflict is a long-term proposition, especially as the distrust on both sides has been accumulating for decades. At the same time, the government needs to think about some “quick wins”, not just on the economic side but on the political side as well. Freeing non-violent political prisoners is an obvious one. As long as there is no movement the more militant groups such as KNPB will continue to drive the political agenda.

One advantage of the peace indicators is that most are at least possible within a framework of autonomy. Ending intimidation need not require independence, nor does protecting customary land. Nor does everything depend on Jakarta; local governments at the provincial and district level can also work toward some of the goals that the conference participants articulated. At least there is a vision now of how to move forward. The challenge now is to make tangible changes that Papuans themselves would regard as progress.

Jakarta/Brussels, 22 August 2011


APPENDIX A

MAP OF PAPUA AND WEST PAPUA



APPENDIX B

MAP OF PUNCAK JAYA



Puncak Jaya is divided into eight subdistricts
(known as distrik in Papua and kecamatan elsewhere in Indonesia)

APPENDIX C

FINAL DECLARATION OF PAPUA PEACE CONFERENCE 5-7 JULY 2011

With thanks to Almighty God

We, the signatories represent the more than 500 participants at the Papua Peace Conference, consisting of representatives of religious groups, customary groups, women, youth, academics, student organisations and resistance groups from Papua who took an active part in the Papua Peace Conference. The conference was held in the auditorium of the Cenderawasih University, on 5-7 July 2011.

At the conference which had the theme: "Let us together make Papua a Land of Peace", we shared experiences and strengthened each other. We were also enriched by material that was presented by the following speakers:

1. Djoko Sujanto, Minister-Coordinator for Politics and Law of the Republic of Indonesia
2. Barnabas Suebu, Governor of the Province of Papua
3. Bekto Suprpto, Chief of Police of Papua
4. Erfi Triasunu, Commander of the Military Command XVII/Cenderawasih
5. Leo Laba Ladjar, Bishop of the Diocese of Jayapura
6. Tony Wanggai, Chairman of the Papuan Provincial Branch of NU and representative of the Papua Muslim Council
7. Sokrates Sofyan Yoman, Chairman of the Synod of the Alliance of Baptist Churches in Papua
8. Forkorus Yaboisembut, Chairman of the Papuan Customary Council

We reflected on the situation in Papua by deepening our understanding of its concepts and indicators. We also identified problems which have to be resolved in order to achieve our objective.

In accordance with the cultural traditions of Papua regarding ways to resolve conflicts by peaceful means:

1. We declare that dialogue is the best way to finding the solution to the conflict between the Papuan people and the Indonesian Government
2. We determine to find the solution to political, security, legal, human rights, economic, environmental and social-cultural issues in Papua by means of dialogue between the Papuan people and the Indonesian Government, mediated by a neutral third party
3. We welcome the initiative of the central government in support of the preparatory processes for a Jakarta-Papua dialogue

Through the Papua Peace Conference we decided on the criteria for Papuan representatives who should take part in the dialogue with the Indonesian government:

1. Fluency in English
2. Have no links of any kind with the system of Indonesia
3. Have the ability and experience to engage in diplomacy and negotiation (certified)
4. Imbued with the innermost belief and ideology of Papua Merdeka
5. Understand the history of the Papuan struggle
6. Have good ethics and morals
7. Not be temperamental
8. Negotiators who have a mandate from the leadership
9. One of the political resistance organisations of the people of West Papua and/or are recommended by one of the resistance organisations of the people of West Papua
10. Are acceptable to the majority of the political resistance organisations and the people of West Papua
11. Have the spirit of Papuan nationalism
12. Physically and mentally fit
13. Understand the Papuan problem and think creatively to seek a solution to the Papuan problem
14. Have integrity and loyalty towards efforts for the reconciliation and consolidation of the West Papuan revolution, including the commitment to accept all the consequences

15. Are capable of and willing to WORK TOGETHER as members of the West Papua Negotiation Team
16. KNOWLEDGE or EXPERTISE in one or more of the following is necessary: politics, law, economy, security, human rights, social-cultural affairs and the history of the national struggle of West Papua
17. The negotiation team shall be composed of a balanced proportion of men and women

Referring to the above criteria we propose that the following persons shall be members of the West Papuan negotiation team:

1. Rex Rumakiek
2. John Otto Ondawame
3. Benny Wenda
4. Octovianus Mote
5. Leoni Tangahma

Herewith we submit the Papuan Peace Declaration to all the People of Papua, the Indonesian Government and all people who are concerned with achieving peace in Papua;

Jayapura, 7 July 2011

Signatures:

Forkorus Yaboisembut, Chairman of the Papuan Customary Council
Em. Herman Awom, Moderator Papuan Presidium Council
Ev. Edison Waromi, Executive President of the West Papua National Authority
Septinus Paiki, Executive Council Committee of Independence and Sovereignty of West Melanesia
Eliazer Awom, Reconciliation Forum of Ex-Prisoners / political prisoners of Papua
Albert Kaliele, Reconciliation Forum of Ex-Prisoners / political prisoners of West Papua
Onesimus Banundi, Vice Chairman of Tabi's Customary Council
Mb. Yan Pieter Yarangga, Chairman of Saireri's Customary Council
Barnabas Mandacan, Chairman of Bomberay's Customary Council
Sir-Zet Gwasgwas, Chairman of Domberay's Customary Council
Stanislaus Gebze, Chairman of Anim Ha's Customary Council
Dominikus Surabut, Secretary of La Pago's Customary Council
Benny Ruben Edoway, Chairman of Me Pago's Customary Council
Abina Wasanggai, General Secretary of the Solidarity of Papuan Women
Benyamin Gurik, The Head of Student Executive Body of UNCEN
Selpius Bobii, Chairman of the United Front of West Papuan People's Struggle
H. Sarmadan Sabuku, Chairman of the Papuan Muslim Council

(as posted on www.humanrights.asia/news/forwarded-news/AHRC-FST-041-2011)

APPENDIX D

INDICATORS OF PAPUA, LAND OF PEACE

Produced by the Drafting Committee of the Papua Peace Conference, 5-7 July 2011

I. Political:

1. Indigenous Papuans feel safe, secure and are able to live a prosperous life on their land, living in harmony with each other, the land, and God.
2. There is no longer stigmatisation of indigenous Papuans as separatists or rebels.
3. Differences of opinion over Papua's political status are resolved.
4. The history of Papua is rectified without manipulation or machinations.
5. Indigenous Papuans are always involved in agreements related to the interests and future of the Papuan people.
6. The roots of the Papuan problem are resolved fully and with dignity.
7. Indigenous Papuans live without intimidation, discrimination or marginalisation.
8. Customs are valued and honoured, and their existence recognised and legitimised.

II. Law and Human Rights

1. Indigenous Papuans have freedom of expression, opinion and assembly.
2. State violence against indigenous Papuans, including against women and children, no longer takes place.
3. The perpetrators of state violence are brought to trial and sentenced in a way that gives indigenous Papuans and victims a sense of justice.
4. Law enforcement toward corruptors takes place in a way that gives the people a sense of justice.
5. Policies that hinder the freedoms of expression, opinion and assembly are no longer in force.
6. A Human Rights Court is established in the Land of Papua.⁷⁵
7. Customary justice is recognised in the formal legal system.

III. Economics and Environment

1. Customary land (*tanah ulayat*) of indigenous Papuans is fully mapped.
2. Customary rights of indigenous Papuans are recognised in law.
3. Transfer and control of customary land does not eliminate the right of land ownership by indigenous Papuans.
4. Management of natural resources is undertaken in a way that protects the environment, respects local wisdom and provides maximal benefits to indigenous Papuans.
5. Companies that damage the environment and cause losses to customary landowners incur legal and administrative punishments.
6. Forest and fields that are sources of production for indigenous Papuans are rehabilitated.
7. Forest conversion practices that contribute to global warming are stopped.
8. Customary leaders and communities are involved in the drafting of plans for natural resource investment.
9. Illegal fishing, mining and logging are stopped and the perpetrators prosecuted.
10. The empowerment of indigenous Papuans in different sectors of the economy is carried out according to regulations that discriminate in favour of indigenous Papuans and provide training and business capital.
11. The government and private sector prepare and implement affirmative action for indigenous Papuans so that they can fill employment vacancies in various sectors.

IV. Security

1. Security forces carry out their assignments professionally and in a way that respects human rights, so that indigenous Papuans feel safe.
2. Military posts are only established along international borders in non-residential areas.
3. Reduction of non-organic police and military personnel takes place across the Land of Papua.
4. The institutional development of the military is not based on the creation of new civil government units (village, subdistrict, district/municipality and province).
5. Intelligence operations marked by intimidation that generate a sense of insecurity are stopped.

⁷⁵ "Land of Papua" is used as a phrase to cover both the provinces of Papua and West Papua.

6. The military and police are banned from engaging in business or politics, with legal sanctions imposed on violators.
7. Government security forces are forbidden to work as adjutants or security guards for civilian officials.

V. Social-Cultural

1. Basic socio-cultural rights of indigenous Papuans, including norms and customs, are recognised and valued.
2. Labelling of indigenous Papuans as stupid, drunk, lazy and primitive ceases.
3. Attitudes that demean and debase indigenous Papuan culture, resulting in an identity crisis for Papuans, disappear.
4. Discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS disappears.
5. The mortality rate for indigenous Papuan women and children is brought down via professional health care services.
6. Health services in the form of medical personnel and facilities are established down to the most remote hamlets.
7. The distribution and consumption of alcohol and narcotics are stopped in the Land of Papua.
8. Entertainment places in the forms of bars and brothels are closed.
9. The quality of education is raised through improvement of facilities, increase in the number of teachers, improvement in the welfare of teachers, development of a more contextual curriculum and management of education funding in accordance with targets and goals.
10. Policies such as family planning programs that limit births and lead to the population decline of indigenous Papuans are stopped.
11. Policies that limit the flow of migrants to the Land of Papua are made and followed.

APPENDIX E

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels, with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one in London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing. The organisation currently operates nine regional offices (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina and Tbilisi) and has local field representation in fourteen additional locations (Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Bujumbura, Damascus, Dili, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo and Seoul). Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka,

Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russia (North Caucasus), Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela.

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August 2011

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