U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 2000 - Indonesia

Indonesia hosted more than 120,000 refugees and asylum seekers at the end of the year. The vast majority were East Timorese remaining in West Timor.

An estimated 440,000 Indonesians were believed to be internally displaced throughout the country, including some 370,000 persons from Maluku, 30,000 Madurese from Borneo, several hundred Acehnese, and 40,000 persons of Indonesian origin (transmigrants to East Timor) who also fled the violence in East Timor and relocated to Java or other Indonesian islands.

Inside East Timor, an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 persons remained internally displaced. Although most displaced persons had come out of hiding by year's end, many had not returned to their home villages. Because East Timor became a UN administered territory in October, the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) did not count internally displaced East Timorese in its end-of-year count of internally displaced persons in Indonesia.

At the end of 1999, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was assisting 34 recognized refugees (from 11 countries) and 18 asylum seekers in Indonesia. UNHCR recognized as refugees 25 of 92 asylum applicants who approached it during the year.

About 8,000 Indonesian refugees from the province of Irian Jaya (also known as West Papua) were living in Papua New Guinea at year's end. An unknown number of Indonesian Acehnese who may have been refugees remained in Malaysia. About 1,650 East Timorese asylum seekers were in Australia, in addition to 500 of an original group of 1,500 East Timorese admitted to Australia on a temporary basis in September.

During 1999, UNHCR and the Indonesian government discussed prospects for Indonesia's accession to the UN Refugee Convention and Protocol. At the end of the year, Indonesia's president signaled his willingness to become a party to these instruments, but no formal steps were taken.

Political Developments and Human Rights

Indonesia's longtime president, Suharto, resigned in 1998 (he was replaced by his hand-picked successor, B.J. Habibie). Economic and political discontent, violence, and separatism throughout the archipelago were the principal causes of the leadership transition. The political change did not diffuse tensions in 1999, which saw continued violence. Perhaps most tragic were the bloodshed and displacement following Indonesia's decision to allow an independence referendum for East Timor in late 1999.

In January 1999, surprising even his closest political and military advisors, Habibie announced that he would allow a referendum on independence for East Timor before the end of the year.

Although he had earlier declared he would serve out Suharto's remaining term, Habibie eventually capitulated to pressure and agreed to a presidential election in October. In June, 127 million Indonesians voted in the first free and fair parliamentary elections since 1955. Voters gave the party of Megawati Soekarnoputri (daughter of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno) a majority win in the general election. However, on October 20, the upper house of parliament elected Abdurrahman Wahid, a Muslim cleric known as "Gus Dur," as Indonesia's fourth president. Megawati was subsequently elected vice president.

Wahid announced that his top priorities would be to ease sectarian violence and to maintain the "territorial integrity" of Indonesia. Although Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country, it is not an Islamic state. With 360 tribal and ethno-linguistic groups and more than 250 different languages and dialects, Indonesia has experienced separatist movements in several provinces.

With the status of East Timor resolved before he took office, Wahid encountered the strongest separatism from Aceh in the far west and from the country's easternmost province, Irian Jaya. Other regions also experienced religious and ethnic violence.

Much of the violence led to displacement. In mid-November, the Indonesian government put the number of internally displaced persons at 640,000, although that figure included the East Timorese refugees in West Timor. Camps and settlements for the internally displaced existed in Aceh, North Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Sulawesi, and Maluku. At year's end, more than 120,000 East Timorese refugees remained in West Timor. In most areas, the Indonesian government – primarily through the office of the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare and Poverty Eradication – provided services to the refugees and internally displaced persons.

As 1999 closed, Indonesia continued to struggle with a difficult transition to democracy and, in particular, sought to redefine the role of the military – an institution accused of human rights abuses that caused much of the displacement.

East Timorese Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

Of a pre-referendum population of more than 800,000, up to 790,000 of East Timor's residents were displaced during 1999. Approximately 500,000 fled into the hilly interior of East Timor, becoming internally displaced persons. As many as 290,000 persons fled – or were forcibly moved – to West Timor or other parts of Indonesia. UNHCR estimated that approximately 40,000 of these 290,000 were "transmigrants" from other parts of Indonesia (many of whom soon returned to Java or other islands), leaving 250,000 East Timorese refugees in West Timor.

The violence that led to the displacement began in early April. Anti independence militia, backed by the Indonesian army, used violence and intimidation as part of a campaign to coerce East Timorese into voting for autonomy within Indonesia rather than independence. The tactics caused many East Timorese to flee their homes, often for the jungles.

In May, Indonesia and Portugal (East Timor's former colonial power, still regarded by the UN as the legitimate authority over East Timor) signed an agreement entrusting the United Nations with organizing and conducting the referendum. However, the spread of violence led the UN to delay the vote. Among the many concerns was the need to allow displaced Timorese to register for the vote. The militia exploited the requirement that voters register and vote in the same place, by forcing them to relocate and preventing them from returning.

Many of the displaced within East Timor were in church compounds or hiding in remote areas. Hundreds set up a tent city on the grounds of an unfinished cathedral.

In mid-August, political campaigning for the East Timorese referendum formally began. By then, however, the violence had forced an estimated 40,000 to 85,000 East Timorese from their homes. Hunger and disease were prevalent among the displaced, some of whom had fled to West Timor (indisputably Indonesian territory, sharing Timor Island with East Timor).

Defying the intimidation, nearly 99 percent of East Timorese turned out for the August 30 vote. More than 78 percent voted to reject autonomy, thus favoring independence. Immediately following the announcement of the pro-independence ballot results, the militia began a rampage throughout East Timor, destroying entire villages and decimating city centers, including that of the capital, Dili. Although Indonesia pledged to restore order, Indonesian soldiers openly joined the militia's violent campaign to force thousands of East Timorese from the territory. They rounded up East Timorese, loaded them on trucks, and took them to West Timor – most likely to maintain control over the population. They placed the refugees in "camps" – often schools, sports stadiums, or other structures. Unlike refugee camps run by UNHCR or aid agencies, these camps were controlled by the militia and Indonesian military or police. The refugees, while fearing return to East Timor, were also in effect hostages. Other refugees who crossed into West Timor on their own were also terrorized by militia members.

More than a week after the militia began its devastation of East Timor, Habibie refused internal calls to allow UN peacekeepers into the territory, despite growing evidence of killings and displacement. On September 8, the UN announced a total pullout from East Timor. The evacuation of the UN headquarters in Dili was delayed, however, by the presence of more than 1,500 East Timorese taking shelter at the compound. Refusing to leave the displaced in the hands of the militia, the UN staff evacuated the 1,500 East Timorese to Darwin, Australia.

On September 9, the United States suspended military cooperation with Indonesia. The international community subsequently pressed Habibie to relent to the peacekeepers. After nearly two weeks of deadly violence, Habibie agreed on September 12 to allow an Australian-led international peacekeeping force (INTERFET) to restore order. Two days later, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution authorizing the multinational force.

Without naming Indonesia, the UN resolution condemned all acts of violence in East Timor and demanded that those responsible be brought to justice. Habibie soon agreed to the formation of a "commission of inquiry" to investigate human rights violations (an agreement he later retracted). He also agreed to begin withdrawing Indonesian troops from East Timor.

The first of the multinational peacekeeping troops arrived in East Timor on September 20. They began a methodical but slow operation to reclaim the area taken by the militia. Even as INTERFET attempted to restore order, widespread displacement continued.

Most of the internally displaced were living in the hills, beneath trees, surviving on a diet of papaya leaves and roots. Indonesia initially refused to allow humanitarian agencies to deliver food and medicine by road, necessitating air drops. Agencies replaced the air drops them with truck deliveries once road access was obtained.

The peacekeepers' arrival was not sufficient to bring the displaced out of hiding. However, by late September, the displaced had cautiously begun to emerge. When conditions allowed, INTERFET encouraged the displaced to return home. In a September 28 ceremony, INTERFET welcomed back to Dili thousands of displaced persons who had been hiding in the hills. By mid-October, the returns proceeded at a swift pace. However, after weeks of militia rampage, the home villages of many returnees had been completely destroyed.

Approximately 250,000 refugees remained in West Timor. Among the many concerns regarding this group was the possibility that Indonesia would forcibly transmigrate them. In early October, Indonesia's transmigration minister had said all refugees in West Timor would be moved to other areas of Indonesia within two months. To facilitate this plan, the Indonesian government began registering the refugees in West Timor to identify their "preferences." On October 6, UNHCR issued a press statement expressing deep concern about the registration. It noted that the registration was occurring without international involvement and could expose pro-in dependence refugees to further threat from the militia. Indonesia eventually halted the registration.

Beginning October 19, thousands of barefoot refugees – at the rate of about 500 an hour – began streaming over the border from West Timor back into East Timor. An estimated 17,000 returned that first day. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) – which coordinated the effort along with UNHCR – had already repatriated nearly 3,000 persons by air and was planning boat returns. INTERFET forces screened returnees to prevent the re-entry of militia members.

Also on October 19 – the day before Indonesia's national assembly elected the country's new president – the assembly voted to confirm the result of the East Timorese referendum. By the end of the month, Indonesia had withdrawn all military personnel from East Timor.

The refugees remaining in West Timor were in a tenuous situation. UNHCR did not have access to many of the refugee camps. When the Indonesian government began helping UNHCR gain access, it occurred slowly, camp by camp. Militia leaders, who openly roamed the camps, were hostile to UNHCR's efforts to educate the refugees about conditions in East Timor and to help them return. In some cases, militia members violently attacked UNHCR staff.

UNHCR was forced to conduct what it called "snatch and run" operations – under the protection of Indonesian military and police – to get refugees out of the camps before the militia members could act.

At the end of the year, the climate in many camps remained tense. Some international agencies said the militia members' power was diminishing (especially given the withdrawal of their patrons, the Indonesian military), but there were still reports of intimidation and violence.

The situation of the remaining refugees in West Timor varied. Approximately 14,000 Indonesian civil servants and their families (a total of about 70,000 persons) were among the East Timorese who entered West Timor following the referendum, along with 24,000 members and families of the Indonesian armed forces (TNI). Of the 14,000 civil servants, about 6,000 chose to relocate to other parts of Indonesia, leaving about 8,000 in West Timor. While some of them may have wished to return home, their decision was complicated by the fact that they could only remain Indonesian civil servants and continue drawing their salaries (or pensions) if they remained in West Timor. For those who chose to stay, the Indonesian government was exploring ways to integrate them into the local civil service.

Of the 24,000 TNI members and families, about 14,000 were expected to be kept on active duty, either in West Timor or other areas of Indonesia. The Indonesian government was exploring demobilization and vocational training for others (particularly those within a few years of retiring), who would likely stay in West Timor. Still others were expected to resign and repatriate to East Timor, if their safety could be assured.

The remaining East Timorese in West Timor included at least three groups whose numbers were unknown: anti-independence militia members (or former militia members); East Timorese who supported autonomy over independence; and pro independence East Timorese – the group believed to be "held hostage" by the militia. While some observers believed that the majority of pro-independence East Timorese refugees had already returned home, there was no reliable way to assess the attitudes of most East Timorese remaining in West Timor

Near the end of 1999, the Indonesian government announced that it would cut off aid to the East Timorese remaining in West Timor at the end of March 2000. By that time, said the government, the refugees should decide whether they want to return to East Timor or remain in Indonesia. Given the ongoing difficulties surrounding the repatriation, UNHCR and other assistance agencies expressed concern that cutting off assistance prematurely could have negative consequences.

At the end of the year, more than 600,000 East Timorese were still refugees or internally displaced persons. While close to 130,000 refugees had repatriated from West Timor (either through organized repatriations or spontaneously), nearly 120,000 refugees remained in camps there at the end of 1999. Inside East Timor, an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 people remained internally displaced. Most of the displaced had come out of the mountains to Dili, but many had not yet returned to their home towns. Others were in their home towns but living in temporary shelters or with relatives or friends. The situation was similar for many returning refugees.

Of 1,500 East Timorese evacuated to Australia, nearly 1,000 had returned by year's end.

An unknown number of East Timorese may have been forcibly relocated from West Timor to other Indonesian islands through the Indonesian government's "transmigration" program.

As of October 31, all Indonesian military personnel had left East Timor, ending nearly 25 years of occupation.

Irian Jaya (West Papua)

Indonesia took control of Irian Jaya in 1963 and officially incorporated it as a province in 1969, following the "Act of Free Choice." In 1999, Wahid included a native Irianese in Indonesia's cabinet for the first time in the country's 54-year history. Throughout the year, however, Irianese continued to protest Jakarta's rule and to demand military accountability for human rights abuses.

Talks on autonomy for Irian Jaya, rather than independence, were stalled in 1999 due to national elections but were scheduled to resume in early 2000.

At the end of 1999, some 8,000 Irian Jayan refugees remained in Papua New Guinea.

(In early 2000, Wahid officially changed the name of Irian Jaya to West Papua to reflect more clearly the desires of the Irianese population.)

Displaced Acehnese

Aceh is located on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra. The Acehnese have sought independence for more than 120 years, first from Dutch colonizers and later from Indonesia. An armed separatist movement, known as GAM (translated as Free Aceh Movement), has been active in the province for more than 25 years. Like residents of other provinces, the Acehnese have resented not only the military presence but also the draining of local resources and "transmigration" of mostly Javanese settlers from Indonesia's dominant island, Java.

Following the 1998 discovery of mass graves in Aceh and the official end of a ten-year military operation period in Aceh, violence and tension increased in 1999 as calls for independence grew louder.

As of July, an estimated 130,000 to 140,000 Acehnese were internally displaced. In August and September, that figure dropped to around 25,000 to 30,000. By the end of December, only a few hundred remained displaced.

Although the level of military activity and human rights abuse were at a peak in 1999, the level of displacement did not correspond to those factors. Rather, displacement resulted from several other factors, possibly including some manipulation by GAM in an effort to draw international attention to Aceh's political and humanitarian problems. Regardless of the factors behind displacement, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) believed Acehnese civilians had genuine fears of persecution and human rights abuse. Military tactics included killings, torture, rape, and the widespread burning of homes and shops.

The internally displaced lived in and around mosques, schools, and other buildings in Aceh, in conditions ranging from fair to poor. Acehnese student groups (which supported a referendum on Aceh's independence, generally through peaceful means) provided logistical support for many of the camps for internally displaced persons, including organizing small amounts of assistance. Most assistance came from private businesses and local NGOs, with a minimal amount coming from the government, primarily through the Indonesian Red Cross. The lack of significant government assistance to the Acehnese (compared with that provided in West Timor and other areas of Indonesia) may, however, have resulted to some extent from the Acehnese people's refusal of such assistance.

In addition to displacement in Aceh itself, an unknown number of persons fled Aceh for Medan, a city just south of Aceh in the province of North Sumatra. One source put the number of displaced persons from Aceh in North Sumatra at more than 15,000. The displaced included not only native Acehnese but Javanese transmigrants. Many of the native Acehnese were living with family or friends, while others were in shelters established by long-time Acehnese residents of Medan.

The Javanese transmigrants said they fled threats and abuse from native Acehnese. At the end of the year, a few hundred recent arrivals were living in a meeting hall about 20 miles (32 km) outside of Medan. Most of them – including those with Acehnese spouses – said they did not wish to return to Aceh.

A small number of international NGOs operated in Aceh during the year, primarily conducting health services and water/sanitation programs. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), operating under the auspices of the Indonesian Red Cross, provided conflict victims with protection and some limited assistance.

Both the military and GAM were responsible for attacks and other abuse of local humanitarian workers and human rights activists attempting to assist conflict victims. Detailed reports of violence, intimidation, torture, and disappearances indicated that humanitarian workers were in frequent danger. While most reports cited abuse by Indonesian military and police, humanitarian workers also said many GAM rebels harassed or obstructed them.

At the end of the year, the political situation in Aceh was at a violent stalemate. A referendum on Aceh's independence seemed unlikely, although the government was willing to consider greater autonomy for the region (an offer the Acehnese said was meaningless, as such autonomy had been promised before). Many Acehnese leaders, as well as the student groups and organized Muslim clergy, were calling for a negotiated cease-fire between the military and GAM, though prospects for such a cease-fire were uncertain.

Violence and Displacement Elsewhere in Indonesia

In March, communal violence erupted once again in the province of West Kalimantan, on the island of Borneo, which Indonesia shares with Malaysia. Indigenous Dayaks and local Malays carrying machetes, spears, and guns attacked Madurese transmigrants (whom they blamed for the loss of jobs and tribal land) in the coastal district of Sambas. The attackers burned homes, decapitated people, and revived the tradition of eating the organs of the vanquished. The Indonesian military sent hundreds of troops to restore order.

The ethnic Madurese, who are predominantly Christian, come from the island of Madura, off the western coast of Borneo. Indonesia's former president, Suharto, began moving many Madurese to West Kalimantan in the 1960s to alleviate overpopulation on Madura. Since then, eight conflicts have broken out between Madurese and Dayaks, and one between Madurese and ethnic Chinese.

As a result of the renewed violence, at least 200 Madurese were killed and some 35,000 others (35 percent of the Madurese population in West Kalimantan) fled to the provincial capital, Pontianak, and other nearby towns. Others fled to Java.

Malaysia refused entry to fleeing Madurese, both by land and sea (see Malaysia).

Indonesian security forces escorted some of the fleeing Madurese in convoys, although ethnic Malays and Dayaks set up road blocks to stop them. In Pontianak, the displaced were housed in a converted sports center and other facilities. Others sought shelter with family or friends. Although local and national agencies provided some assistance, the facilities were reportedly poor and health problems were rampant. By June, almost 80 children under age five had died in the centers.

Indonesia pledged funds to build resettlement communities on the nearby islands of Padang Tikar and Tembang Kacang. Some Indonesian officials objected to the plan, saying that separating the ethnic groups would flout Indonesia's motto of "unity in diversity." In addition, many of the displaced refused the resettlement offer, not wanting to risk losing their land and belongings at home. Fearing renewed violence if the Madurese stayed in Pontianak, the government said it would help them return to their native Madura. The Madura authorities, however, appeared not to want them back.

Despite the objections, by the end of the year the Indonesian government had relocated an unknown number of Madurese to nearby islands. A few thousand were believed to have returned to Madura, while others remained displaced on Borneo.

Sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims also erupted in Ambon and other Moluccas islands (formerly known as the Spice Islands, in the province of Maluku). The violence began in early 1999 and continued throughout the year. In January, the government sent 1,000 troops to quell the violence. Nearly a year later, in December, the military announced it was taking charge of security in Maluku. The troops' presence failed to deter the fighting, and Wahid called the situation "out of control."

The displaced reportedly lived in squalid conditions, although the government and some international aid agencies provided assistance. In March, when nearly 16,000 people were taking shelter in 45 camps in and around Ambon, the ICRC began a relief operation in the camps.

In May, the official Indonesian news agency reported that 25 Ambonese living in makeshift centers in southeast Sulawesi had died of cholera in recent weeks, while 400 others were hospitalized with various diseases. Officials blamed dirty water and poor living conditions for their deaths.

After several days of violence in August, nearly 10,000 Ambonese sought shelter at the local naval base. That same month, the World Food Program began providing aid to displaced Ambonese.

By year's end, more than 1,000 people had been killed in Ambon and other Moluccas islands. An estimated 369,000 persons were internally displaced. Many had fled to Sulawesi, which continued to host refugees and displaced persons from East Timor, Irian Jaya, and even Aceh.

In late December, officials in Buton, North Sulawesi, said the 94,000 refugees and displaced persons there – both Ambonese and remaining East Timorese – could not be properly accommodated and were straining local resources. Displaced persons continued to flee both to and from Ambon, as local islands reconstituted their populations along religious lines. Government agencies and NGOs were distributing food to more than 72,000 displaced persons in Ambon alone, of whom 30,000 were in camps (many since January) and the rest in private homes with host families.

The area's latest violence erupted at the end of December in Halmahera Island in North Maluku. An estimated 30,000 persons crowded into mosques, schools, and warehouses around the harbor, preparing to flee.

(In January 2000, solidarity rallies occurred in major cities in Indonesia in support of Ambonese Muslims. Some of the rallies turned violent. On the island of Lombok, near Bali, a Muslim prayer meeting erupted in violence as participants burned churches and homes. Some 7,500 people, approximately 75 percent of the island's Christian population, fled to Bali.)