

Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for only 14 per cent of the world's population, but almost half of new conflict displacement took place in the region.⁶² There were 5.5 million new displacements associated with conflict and violence in 2017, double the figure for the previous year.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was hardest hit, with almost 2.2 million new displacements, more than twice the number in 2016 and more than the next three worst-affected countries in the region combined. Together, South Sudan, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic (CAR) accounted for a total of more than 2.1 million new displacements.

The international response to the crisis in **DRC** is severely underfunded despite the UN declaration of a level-three emergency in the country and the huge number of people newly displaced, second only to Syria globally (see spotlight, p.20).⁶³ In the meantime, 857,000 new displacements were recorded in **South Sudan**, the result of food insecurity fuelled by conflict and widespread violence targeting civilians.⁶⁴ There is little or no humanitarian access to some regions and communities, making an already dire situation worse.

In addition to DRC, in Central Africa there were 539,000 new displacements in CAR, more than ten times the figure for 2016, and 86,000 in neighbouring Republic of Congo. In the Lake Chad Basin a combination of the Boko Haram insurgency and clashes over diminishing

resources led to 279,000 new displacements in **Nigeria**'s North-Eastern states, 99,000 in **Cameroon**'s Far North region, 40,000 in **Niger**'s Diffa region and 5,800 in **Chad**'s Lac region. The Basin as a whole accounted for eight per cent of new displacements associated with conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa (see spotlight, p.21).

The Horn of Africa accounted for a fifth of the region's new displacements, the result not only of conflict but also sudden and slow-onset disasters and the complex, overlapping dynamics between them. ⁶⁵ In **Ethiopia**, border disputes and revenge attacks, and competition over increasingly scarce resources such as land and water in the Oromia and Somali regions triggered more than 725,000 new displacements, most of them in the last quarter of the year. Ongoing instability in **Somalia** caused by al-Shabaab attacks and food insecurity continued to drive the country's protracted conflict, triggering 388,000 new displacements.

The causes of flight in **Somalia** are closely interlinked and it is difficult to disaggregate estimates by trigger, or the event that ultimately left people with little or no choice but to flee their home. Figure 4 (p.18) shows the complexity of the situation, laying out the range of triggers that appear in the data sources.

We are able for the first time to estimate the number of new displacements associated with drought, and the figure is high, at 858,000 out of the total for the

country of 1,287,000. Included in the overall figure are new displacements associated with sudden- and slow-onset disasters and various types of conflict and violence – clan conflict, military offensives by the Somali army and the African Union's military mission, and other conflict that mainly covers attacks by al-Shabaab and other militias against the civilian population. Also included is the inability to access healthcare, education and humanitarian assistance due to insecurity.

The complexity of the crisis in Somalia and the Horn of Africa more widely, coupled with the lack of highquality disaggregated data on displacement and its drivers and triggers, means the number of IDPs reported for the sub-region is likely to be an underestimate.

Disasters also triggered significant displacement elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2017, forcing almost 2.6 million people to flee their homes. Drought triggered most of the 434,000 displacements recorded in Ethiopia, cyclone Enawo displaced 247,000 people in Madagascar, floods 189,000 in Niger and cyclone Dineo most of the 170,000 in Mozambique. Other countries affected by disasters were Nigeria (122,000), Uganda (95,000) and Malawi (84,000).

This type of displacement in the region tends to involve short-term movements before people return and rebuild. Small-scale and frequent disasters go relatively unnoticed as conflict takes centre stage, but what these localised crises illustrate is that displacement is more about an endogenous problem of poverty and lack of development than the consequence of external threats posed by natural hazards. Sub-Saharan Africa's population and urbanisation rate are predicted to increase dramatically in the coming decades, putting more people at risk of disasters. If unaddressed, poverty, vulnerability and climate change will increase the risk of displacement.66

The drivers of displacement in the region are a complex overlap of social, political and environmental factors, particularly slow-onset hazards such as drought, desertification, coastal erosion and land degradation. A combination of conflict and loss of livelihoods attributed to diminishing grazing land and loss of livestock, continues to cause displacement in the Horn of Africa and Sahel region.

Against this backdrop, attacks by extremist groups triggered displacement in many African countries during the year with al-Shabaab in **Somalia**, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, and local Islamist groups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Mozambique. Despite some regional dimensions and ties to global jihadist movements, these insurgencies are, first and foremost, the product of local socioeconomic and political grievances in areas worst affected by slowonset hazards. Conflict over natural resources such as precious stones and minerals in CAR and DRC, and oil in Nigeria and South Sudan have also triggered some of the worst violence and largest waves of displacement in the region.

Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa is not only a growing humanitarian crisis, but also an obstacle to the region's development. The continent as a whole is in a unique position, however, because in 2009 it adopted a legally binding regional instrument, the Kampala Convention, which aims to reduce the number of people displaced by





FIGURE 4: Disaggregation of displacement triggers in Somalia



conflict and disasters and guarantees their protection. Article 10 also highlights the need to address displacement associated with development projects.⁶⁷

States have taken a range of measures to implement the convention and its provisions, which entered into force in 2012, including the development of national laws and policies on internal displacement and the establishment of structures for the coordination and monitoring of responses. Forty countries have signed the convention, and 27 have ratified it.⁶⁸ Some, such as **Sudan** and **Kenya**, have not signed, but have developed their own national laws and policies independently.⁶⁹ This reveals a widespread recognition of internal displacement as a problem, and the need to address it and reduce future risk.

Progress in domesticating and implementing the convention's provisions, however, has been modest. The reasons vary from country to country, but can be summarised as lack of capacity, failure to make the issue a political and economic priority, and unclear budget allocations at the national level. Additionally,

domestic courts have not made specific provisions to prosecute state or non-state perpetrators of crimes under the convention.⁷⁰ This major gap raises the issue of accountability and responsibility for the protection of people displaced by conflict. The situation in terms of displacement associated with disasters and development projects is even more complex, given the role of the private sector and multinational investors, and the fact that measures to mitigate growing risk have not been laid out in clear legal frameworks.

As with the Kampala Convention, however, the growing gap between words and action is concerning, and the displacement figures we present in this report show that the adoption of policies does not necessarily translate into change on the ground. The region should do more to implement existing laws and policies, and in doing so, realise its potential as a leader in addressing the impacts of internal displacement.