CCCM Case Studies
2016-2019

Content

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Chapter 2 of the CCCM (Camp Management and Camp Coordination) case study collection focuses on camp management operations that utilised mobile and area-based CCCM approaches. The seven case studies were collected from five countries: Iraq (2), Afghanistan (2), South Sudan, Somalia, Lebanon. These case studies presented programmes at their early stages of implementation (Afghanistan B.2), programmes that have been ongoing for several years (Iraq B.3 /Somalia B.6), as well as reflections on past experiences (Lebanon B.5 /Iraq B.4).

As displacement trend increased in complexity, becoming more urban and protracted nature, majority of displaced population also have access to wider range of settlement options. Unfortunately, this have not always translated to increased in access to assistance and protection. In order to improve access to information, protection and services, while ensuring representation, CCCM actors have developed context-specific responses to respond to these needs to uphold their basic rights. This commonly result in a combination of mobile teams and Community (Resource) Centres (CRC) that target those in formal and informal sites, collective centres as well as host communities.

Mobile approaches have allowed operations to be as dynamic as the changing displacement context, where informal settlements and collective centres were not large enough to warrant a dedicated on-site Camp Management, and where eviction and relocation may be common occurrence. These mobile teams, composed of CCCM actors and technical specialists, undertook a spectrum of camp management activities including multi-sectorial needs assessments, service mappings and monitoring, facilitating community engagement and setting up community governance structures, as well as engaging and coordinating with local stakeholder. Specific emphasis was placed on the coordination and communication with the private land owners or "gate keepers" (Somalia B.6) and local authorities, as well as the setting-up and building capacity of community structures and committees. Self-managed communities were encouraged with the CCCM mobile team members' support. In Lebanon (B.5), specific focus was placed on the capacity building of the local authority to manage the informal sites through a mentorship program component.

Area-based approaches encouraged effective allocation of resources, provide clear access points for displaced population, host communities as well as service providers. The "Urban Displacement Outside of Camps (UDOC)"[1] is a CCCM publication exploring how CCCM resources, experiences and expertise can be applied to address the needs of displaced populations living in dispersed settings and within host communities. Iraq (B.3) and Afghanistan (B.1) developed area-based strategies following the UDOC approach. The strategies developed included Community (Resource) Centers (CRC) that were strategically located in areas that experienced high numbers of displaced people and/or high rate of returnees living interspersed with the host community. This established physical presence within the communities at an easily accessible distance. These CRCs were also places for local engagement, coordinating service delivery as well as provided information, feedback and referrals, between relevant stakeholders. Characteristic for area-based responses, the Community (Resource) Centres services were accessible by all individuals regardless of their status, including internal displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and vulnerable host community members.

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[1] https://cccmcluster.org/resources/urban-displacement-out-camps-review-udoc

Keyword Matrix

			B.1 AFGHANISTAN 2018-Ongoing	B.2 AFGHANISTAN 2018-Ongoing
DISPLACED POPULATIONS		Refugees		
		Internally displaced	●	●
		Returnees (refugees/IDPs)		
		Others of concern (e.g. migrants)		
LOCATION		Rural		
		Peri-urban		●
		Urban	●	
SETTLEMENT OPTIONS (ACCORDING TO SPHERE 2018)	**RETURNED**	Returnees		
	DISPLACED	Dispersed (rent / hosted / spontanous)	●	●
		Communal (collective centres / planned sites / settlements / unplanned sites)	●	●
CCCM RESPONSES/ APPROACHES		Formal / Camp Management		
		Site Management support		
		Mobile (response) teams	●	●
		Community centres	●	●
		Remote Management		
		Prepardness response		
CCCM ASSISTANCE TYPE	**REPRESENTATION**	Community Participation	●	●
		Capacity building	●	●
		Communication with Communities	●	●
		Women participation	●	
		Governance structures	●	
	COORDINATION & MONITORING	Information management		●
		Site / community level coordination	●	●
		Monitoring of services	●	●
		Multi-sectorial assessment	●	●
		Referral pathways	●	●
		Service mapping		●
	SITE ENVIRONEMENT	Disatser Risk Reduction	●	
		Site / settlement planning		
		Care & maintenance		
		Inclusion / accessibility		
		Safety & security	●	
		Gender based violence		
		HLP issues	●	
	STRATEGIC PLANNING	Durable Solutions		
		Mentoring of local authority		
		Localisation / local authorities	●	
		Camp closure		
STAKEHOLDER COORDINATION		District / area multi-stakeholder coordination	●	

	✳ B.3 IRAQ 2017-Ongoing	✳ B.4 IRAQ 2014-Ongoing	✳ B.5 LEBANON 2013-18	✳ B.6 SOMALIA 2017-Ongoing	✳ B.7 SOUTH SUDAN 2018-19
Refugees			●		●
Internally displaced	●	●		●	●
Returnees (refugees/IDPs)	●	●			
Others of concern (e.g. migrants)					
Rural		●			
Peri-urban		●	●	●	
Urban	●	●	●	●	
Returnees	●	●			
Dispersed (rent / hosted / spontanous)	●		●	●	●
Communal (collective centres / planned sites / settlements / unplanned sites)		●	●	●	●
Formal / Camp Management					
Site Management support					●
Mobile (response) teams	●	●	●	●	●
Community centres	●			●	
Remote Management					
Prepardness response					
Community Participation	●	●	●	●	●
Capacity building	●	●	●	●	●
Communication with Communities	●	●	●	●	
Women participation			●	●	
Governance structures	●		●	●	●
Information management	●	●		●	
Site / community level coordination			●	●	●
Monitoring of services	●	●		●	●
Multi-sectorial assessment	●	●	●	●	
Referral pathways	●	●	●	●	
Service mapping	●	●	●	●	●
Disatser Risk Reduction				●	
Site / settlement planning				●	
Care & maintenance		●			●
Inclusion / accessibility		●			
Safety & security		●	●		●
Gender based violence	●			●	
HLP issues	●	●		●	●
Durable Solutions	●		●	●	
Mentoring of local authority			●		
Localisation / local authorities	●	●	●	●	
Camp closure					
District / area multi-stakeholder coordination	●		●	●	

AFGHANISTAN AREA-BASED APPROACH

KEYWORDS:

MOBILE/AREA-BASED APPROACH, COMMUNITY CENTRES, COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES, LOCAL STAKEHOLDER COORDINATION, SERVICE INFORMATION, REFERRALS, COMMUNITY CAPACITY BUILDING

CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT	Protracted Conflict
DATE OF EVENT CAUSING DISPLACEMENT	1999 - ongoing
PEOPLE DISPLACED	1,286,000 IDPs nationwide[1]
PROJECT LOCATION	Kabul - Informal Settlements/ districts, (PD8/PD22/12/ Qarabagh)
PROJECT DURATION	June 2018 - Ongoing
NUMBER OF PEOPLE TARGETED BY THE PROJECT	40,000 (informal settlements)
CCCM COORDINATION MECHANISM	No cluster activated, Durable Solutions Working Group

SUMMARY:

The main project objective was to ensure that the displacement affected communities are protected and able to access life-saving assistance and durable solutions for their recovery. Activities included establishing and supporting community management structures ('committees') in informal settlements, Identifying needs and gaps - with focus on very vulnerable people who had fallen through the humanitarian assistance net - , sharing services and procedures information for accessing assistance, and establishing community centres for communities to access information, be referred to relevant services, access space for localised and inclusive coordination meetings, socialising/recreational activities, and provision of services by third parties.

✳	April 2018	**Project start**
1	April 2018	**Assessments in Kabul informal settlements through key informant interviews.**
2	May - June 2018	**Recruitment and training of mobile team.**
3	August - September 2018	**Further assessments (including participatory mapping); identification of locations for Community Centres; addressing urgent needs (e.g. shelter); identifying and building links with service providers.**
4	September - December 2018	**Establishment of Community Centres; establishment of male and female Settlement Committees; beginning capacity building of Committees; establishing Coordination mechanisms.**
✳		Ongoing

Hewadwal IDP settlement in east Kabul with around 450 families who mostly escaped war and conflict in Nangarhar or have returned or deported from Pakistan.

CONTEXT

The displacement situation in Afghanistan is one of the most complex and largest in recent history.[2] In 2018 there were 551,000 newly displaced people (an average of more than 2,000 every day)[3] as well as more than 700,000 new returnees from Pakistan and Iran, adding to a caseload of more than 1.2 million protracted displaced people.[4] Reasons for and locations of displacement are diverse and complex – ranging from drought or flood-stricken communities, to those fleeing localized and indiscriminate armed conflict, to returning refugees from Iran and Pakistan. The Government Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, the Afghan National Disaster Management Agency (in charge of IDPs), as well as the Displacement and Return Executive Committee (assisting returning refugees) are the responsible governmental bodies. The Government's strategy on internal displacement is guided by the 2013 National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons,[5] endorsing to uphold the UN/IASC Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, including obtaining durable solutions for IDPs. However, many of the challenges faced in drafting the policy and developing implementation strategies reflect the wider challenges in terms of law-making and policymaking in Afghanistan more generally.[6]

Besides the Government's strategy on displacement, the humanitarian strategy is set out in the annual Humanitarian Response Plan focusing on responses to the immediate needs of the newly displaced. Little attention is given by the Humanitarian Response Plan on 'bridging' the emergency phase with the protracted displacement situation towards durable solutions for the displaced population. Moreover with no CCCM Cluster active in country, a dedicated forum for the management and coordination of camp-like displacement setting is absent.[7]

In addition, a 'Durable Solutions Working Group' has been established to bring governmental, humanitarian as well as development stakeholders together to support displaced peoples' transition from displacement towards durable solutions. However, progress remains slow due to a wide spectrum of obstacles and bottlenecks.

Various policies and papers have been drafted, and in some cases approved to upgrade informal settlements in terms of the physical infrastructure and shelters or relocation strategies.

However, local and national authorities appear to be unable to implement the policies.[8] For example, in 2013 the Informal Settlements Upgrading Policy was launched by the Ministry of Urban Development and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), aiming to upgrade areas in major cities through a combination of tenure regularisation and infrastructure provision and improvement. However, despite receiving technical approval by the Government, the policy has never been presented to Cabinet for approval.[9] Similarly, the Ministry of Urban Development drafted a White Paper on Tenure Security and Community-Based Upgrading in Kabul in 2006, proposing spatial planning and management; principles and norms for land use; land titling and legislative measures to improve tenure security; and upgrading programmes to improve the existing situation in informal settlements. Endorsement by the Government has until now not been achieved and local authorities have not approved the upgrading of shelters and infrastructure development initiatives in Kabul's informal settlements.[10]

Informal settlements are widespread within Afghan cities, which are characterized by severely inadequate housing conditions and informal settlements account for 70% of the urban housing stock.[11] In Kabul there are approximately 55 informal settlements, ranging in size from dozens to hundreds of dwellings and accommodating some 55,819 internally displaced people and refugee returnees[12] living in mainly tents or mud brick and tarpaulin shelters. According to a February 2018 multi-agency profiling exercise led by the Kabul Informal Settlements Taskforce (KIS Taskforce)[13], 43% of Kabul's informal settlement residents live in tents and 44% in mud-brick dwellings. There is a significant variety between the settlements not only in terms of size, but also in terms of culture and ethnic composition of inhabitants, length of existence (from 2 to 20 years[14]) and nature of the land ownership on which settlements are located. Besides this variety, there are important commonalities across almost all these sites: The constant thread of eviction by the private or public landlords; poor physical conditions of the shelters and communal infrastructure; inadequacy of essential services; poor coordination of assistance between and within sites; and lack of information on the part of residents about available services and their rights.

PROJECT

PROTECTION RISKS

The displaced people living in the informal settlements face complex protection risks, ranging from the lack of safe shelters to protect them from the elements and harsh climate conditions, lack of safe sanitation facilities, flooding, as well as insufficient supply of clean and safe water. These inadequate physical living conditions leads to health issues which are compounded by a shortage in quality health services. Insecurity of tenure is one of the most significant protection risks exposing households to the constant threat of eviction and in some cases destruction of their shelters and belongings, preventing any sustainable upgrades to the settlements as well as levelling a heavy mental toll on residents. Psychosocial issues are experienced by all demographic groups, linked to both the reasons and subsequent consequences of displacement, as well as criminal activity linked to drug addiction and substance abuse.

CCCM ACTIVITIES

The project targets displaced people living in 20 scattered informal settlements in 3 Kabul districts with the highest density of informal settlements. The sizes range from just 24 households to nearly 900 with a total of over 36,000 inhabitants. Besides the residents of the settlements, there are also displaced persons and vulnerable host community members living in the urban neighbourhoods surrounding the settlements. While the settlement residents as well as the host community have an urgent need for support afforded by a Camp Management project, e.g. information provision, coordination of services, none of the informal settlements alone are large enough to warrant a permanent on-site presence by a Camp Management agency. In addition, authorities would be unwilling to give permission due to the political sensitivities around the existence and future for the settlements. In response to the complexity of the context, a mobile approach was adopted to be able to improve access to assistance and protection for the displaced people living in the informal settlements.

Implementing a mobile team approach contributed to address the protection risks in various ways, including the coordination with relevant stakeholders to allow physical upgrades to shelter and facilities in the settlements including bringing together those who can grant permission (such as landowners or authorities) and those who can contribute resources or skills (including both NGOs and community members themselves). Safety audits with Settlement Committees are being planned to identify hazards and threats in the settlements that can be addressed through community-based initiatives and/or NGO-supported interventions.

SELECTION OF BENEFICIARIES

The selection of the settlements themselves was done on an area-based approach, whereby administrative areas were identified within Kabul city that contained the most numbers of informal settlements and then targeted all 20 settlements within those three selected districts.

The project targeted the entire population of the informal settlements and the implementing agency aimed to support these at the community-level. As such, individual beneficiary selection was not a part of this project. The project included referrals of individuals to other departments from the implementing agency or external agency for possible assistance or services – these referrals were made based on the individuals/households meeting the selection criteria of the projects implemented by these third parties.

NRC's ICLA and Camp-Management team talking to the residence of Hewadwal IDP settlement in east Kabul.

Barikab Community Center
Mowlawi Maqfourullah Camp
Malik Janat Gul Camp

map not to scale

COMMUNITY CENTERS :

CHAR RAHI HAWZA 8

SAR TAPA

1   HUSSAIN KHIL

2   PUL SHINA

CATCHMENT AREAS :

for CHAR RAHI HAWZA 8

for SAR TAPA

for HUSSAIN KHIL
&   PUL SHINA

©NRC

Map of Kabul

IMPLEMENTATION

The mobile approach by the implementing agency is based on Mobile Outreach Teams visiting the sites on a regular basis, often multiple times a week. The Outreach Teams' composition is diverse both in terms demographics (men and women, different ages, and different ethnic backgrounds) as well as technical background (including engineering, protection, education, community health, and development), but all members are trained in community engagement, protection, psychological first aid and coordination.

The Outreach Teams are complemented by static community centres strategically located in walking distance from all the informal settlements to enable community members to access information and support without having to wait for an Outreach Team member to visit them in their site. The centres are staffed daily by community-based workers from the local neighbourhood and the informal settlements as well as the mobile Outreach staff, who move between sites and Centres.

Outreach Teams have diverse responsibilities, including:

• Providing information sessions on available services, the responsibilities and code of conduct of service providers and the rights and responsibilities of community members

• Establishing, training and providing ongoing support/ coaching to representative settlement committees, such as training in how to identify, prioritise, analyse problems as well as coming up with community-based solutions.

• Identifying and referring vulnerable individuals and households in need of specialized protection services, such as drug addiction, GBV or urgent health cases.

• Coordinating with service providers and local authorities facilitating inclusive coordination meetings which enable participation of affected community members in coordinating to solve problems in their sites and advocate for their needs.

Diagram illustrating the scales of intervention from larger area-based Community Centres to specific neighbourhood Site Committees.

IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

The project is still at a relatively early stage. However, some positive results have been observed. A monitoring survey undertaken in the targeted informal settlements in January 2019[15] showed that 86% of residents were aware of at least one of the mechanisms (i.e. community centre, site committee, or outreach staff) of the mobile camp management project and of those who were aware of the mechanisms, more than 94% found them useful for information. Of those surveyed, 16% were able to access assistance following their interaction with the implementing agency or a site committee; of those surveyed who had visited a community centre, 94% were happy or very happy with their visit – citing the fact that they could share their problem, they received useful information, or they could meet with others in their community.

From October to November 2018, 40 Site Committees were established (of which 41% of members are IDPs, and 39% returnees) in all of the Informal Settlements targeted and began training them in the essential components of their roles and responsibilities. The committees are still new, so although they have yet to make significant progress in their sites, the foundation has been established for ongoing work with the committees in 2019. Moreover, some of the committees are already coordinating externally (e.g. in one site the committee coordinated with other agencies for education activities) and solving problems through mobilizing their own communities (e.g. for joint purchase of sand for the road).

The project is also encouraging better coordination between stakeholders working in the settlements, e.g. a coordination event was held to bring together the various local and international organisations working in the sites. Moreover, external agencies are also using the implementing agency's Community Centres for the provision of services, for example health education and maternal health and family planning services.

COORDINATION IMPACT

As to date there is no CCCM cluster active in Afghanistan, a natural coordination space for Camp Management programming is absent; hence, extra efforts are required to ensure coordination at the site level.[16] As such, coordination meetings and events were held, including a one-off event bringing together local and international NGOs working in the informal settlements – kick-starting a productive dialogue between these agencies to support more holistic and integrated service delivery in the informal settlements and from the Community Centres located among them.

There are more than 60 informal settlements in Kabul, accommodating nearly 70,000 people in mainly mud brick and tarpaulin shelters in and around Kabul city.

ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

ACHIEVEMENTS

- The combination of static community centres – strategically located between multiple sites – and mobile outreach teams, complemented further by site committees, is proving to be successful to reach the informal settlement inhabitants with the needed information and assistance. Given a scattered case load of at least 36,000 people, it would be too resource intensive to have mobile teams of sufficient size to access the entire population in need regularly and thus difficult to ensure that vulnerable cases are not falling through the cracks. By having static centres alongside mobile teams, the community can "self-refer" to the centres.

- At the same time, the mobile teams can work with the community-based committees to visit people in their homes that might not be able to reach the community centres, as well as providing 'protection by presence' in the sites. The established community committees extend the reach of the mobile teams, further disseminating information and referring people to mobile teams and/or community centres.

- The mobile teams working closely with ICLA (Information, Counselling, and Legal Assistance) department to address the risk of eviction and worked towards establishing forms of tenure security, advocating for and identify rightful landowners to obtain permission for settlement upgrades.

CHALLENGES

- Coordination has proven to be challenging, given the lack of formal mandate for site management and lack of inter-site coordination, making it difficult to bring much needed assistance and services to the targeted sites. The complex local context and complex relationships with local authorities further intensifies the overall coordination challenges experienced.[17]

- Moreover, in Afghanistan generally there is a gulf in the needs affecting IDPs – included protracted displaced – and the services available. This makes it difficult to manage expectations of community members, who may not realise how little assistance is available for them. Nevertheless, a key part of the CM role is to direct the limited assistance to the most vulnerable and to communicate why/how this is done to the rest of the community.

- Managing a variety of activities that need to be established concurrently during the set-up phase of the project is challenging; for example, a strong field presence is required in order to understand internal dynamics within the settlements and to start to collect information to enable advocacy and coordination for more assistance; but the field presence inevitably raises expectations of the communities, which may not be immediately or even subsequently met.

LESSONS LEARNED

- In this context of scattered sites with no inter-site coordination, there is inevitably considerable inconsistency between the sites in terms of services and assistance available. Utilising a mobile team approach who work across several sites, facilitates the comparison between the sites and the identification of how resources could be better distributed to allow a more equitable distribution.

- The mobile approach has proved to be particularly suited to urban and dispersed displacement sites that are in proximity to one another and therefore several sites can be visited by the outreach team within the same day. In contexts where sites are located further apart from each other, the approach may need adjusting.

- **Referrals:** Working outside of a formal camp environment and without a formal mandate for site management, referrals to third parties are challenging. The results of referrals done through the project so far demonstrate that the team has not yet built up the required links with service providers to accept referrals. Learning from this experience, considerable time and effort needs to be invested in external coordination when responding to scattered informal sites – particularly when there is a low level or even absence of inter-site coordination, which is common in a context where the CCCM Cluster is not activated.

- **Empowerment of committees:** Working with community committees in scattered informal sites, which are comprised of vulnerable community members who struggle to pool resources to solve problems by themselves, requires regular follow-up over a long period of time. The community groups require regular support to leverage interventions by third parties. To effectively support this process, outreach team members require training and support, since they themselves may struggle in identifying the relevant stakeholders to ensure follow up.

[1] End of 2017, GRID

[2] Only in January 2015, at the height of the Syrian crisis, did Afghans finally lose the status that they had held for 30 years as the world's largest refugee population.

[3] Based on figure of 551,000 new IDPs displaced between January and October 2018

[4] Afghanistan - Cross-border return to internal displacement

[5] National IDP Policy

[6] An IDP Policy for Afghanistan: from draft to reality

[7] This has changed in December 2018 when a Task Force (under Shelter cluster) was established for site management coordination.

[8] Presidential Decree 305 on land allocation commits to finding and assigning state-owned land to displaced persons (IDPs and returnees), including those currently residing in inner-city informal settlements; despite being approved by the president in August 2018, so far no one has been relocated to allocated land under the Decree.

[9] UN-Habitat, Afghanistan Housing Profile, 2017, p.27

[10] UN-Habitat, Afghanistan Housing Profile, 2017, p.28

[11] As above p.15

[12] Kabul Informal Settlements Task Force, Kabul Informal Settlement Profiling, 2018. Note:

the profiling only considered informal settlements accommodating primarily IDPs and refugee returnees, and this is what is referenced by the term 'informal settlements' in this case study. However, there are also other 'informal settlements' in Kabul, which constitute any area of land which is inhabited informally (without permission), and which is either (a) within a Master Plan area, (b) built after the Master Plan was adopted, or (c) violates the Master Plan in some way (as per the draft Informal Settlements Upgrading Policy. There are larger and more dispersed settlements which accommodate a mixture of host community and protracted IDPs, are generally located on the outskirts of Kabul city, and older than the settlements hosting displaced families within the city. These informal settlements are not part of NRC's mobile CM approach, and thus not part of this case study.

[13] The Kabul Informal Settlements (KIS) Task Force was formed in 2010, and comprises 15 UN agencies and NGOs. By working collaboratively, the KIS Task Force is aims to coordinate and streamline its members' interventions in Kabul's informal settlements.

[14] The KIS Taskforce profiling found that families had been living in these sites for an average of 5.7 years.

[15] NRC internal monitoring survey, January 2019

[16] There is a 'Kabul Informal Settlements Working Group' in Kabul, barely active during 2018, with focus on the Settlements Profiling exercise.

[17] e.g. prohibition on digging wells or upgrading shelters by authorities or land owners.

AFGHANISTAN

MOBILE TEAM APPROACH WITH COMMUNITY TENTS

KEYWORDS:

INTERNALLY DISPLACED, URBAN, DISPERSED, MOBILE TEAMS, COMMUNITY CENTRES, COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, CAPACITY BUILDING, WOMEN PARTICIPATION

CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT	Primarily drought with combined drivers including insecurity, chronic poverty and lack of basic services
DATE OF EVENT CAUSING DISPLACEMENT	Ongoing drought crisis peaked during second half of 2018
PEOPLE DISPLACED	Estimated 250,000 in Herat and Badghis provinces[1]
PROJECT LOCATION	Herat (Injil District) and Badghis (Qala-i-Naw City and surrounding villages)
PROJECT DURATION	July 2018 - Ongoing
NUMBER OF PEOPLE TARGETED BY THE PROJECT	100,000 people
CCCM COORDINATION MECHANISM	No cluster activated

SUMMARY:

The project was established in response to a wave of internal displacement and subsequent proliferation of informal sites accommodating the IDPs. The project was based on Camp Management methodologies, concentrating on the following outcomes/outputs:

• **Support to Coordination:** through mapping informal sites and blocks/groups within them, undertaking IDP registration and intentions surveys, monitoring service provision (or lack thereof) and convening site-level coordination meetings.

• **Communication with Communities:** through mobile teams, Community Tents, Community Meetings, theatre performances and identification of IDP focal points.

• **'Light' Protection:** through protection monitoring and referrals.

2018

TIMELINE

MILESTONE 1
MILESTONE 2
MILESTONE 3

DROUGHT

2019

APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY

July 2018 — **Project start**

1 July - September 2018
- Rapid assessments of IDP sites and mapping of blocks and groups within them.
- Support to initial emergency distributions, including family tents.

2 September - December 2018
- Establishment of Community Tents and training of Mobile Teams
- Registration campaigns

3 January - April 2019
Commencement / consolidation of:
- Monitoring activities including protection monitoring, service monitoring and gate monitoring
- Information sessions and community meetings
- Referral procedures
- Verification and basic training of community focal points.

Ongoing

CCCM CLUSTER

Baghdis drone footage.

CONTEXT

In 2018, a 'prolonged dry spell' in Afghanistan escalated into a 'drought', primarily in areas with high rates of chronic poverty and limited services, many of which were also affected by protracted armed conflict. Three provinces escalated into Integrated Food Insecurity Phase Classification (IPC) Phase IV ('Emergency') in 2018, and one of these provinces are expected to persist throughout 2019 at IPC Phase IV (Badghis Province). The prolonged dry spells went largely unaddressed by the humanitarian community in terms of adequate preventive action, partly because of a humanitarian system geared towards responding to rapid-onset and acute needs including displacement (predominantly in government- controlled areas), rather than slow-onset disasters (often in non-government-controlled areas). The implementing agencies were mostly unable to respond in the contested areas to address the emergency there due to a combination of the lack of presence, lack of access and a frequently cited lack of a mandate to address chronic conditions as compared to a sharp focus on conflict-related displacements and needs. However, the drought impact resulted in mass displacements in mid-2018, at which point the humanitarian community was faced with a rapid-onset dynamic in Herat and Badghis provinces, with over 250,000 Afghans poured into the outskirts of the provincial capitals.

The displaced settled in several scattered and informal sites primarily located on private land. These sites were situated alongside existing highly vulnerable host communities, as well as conflict-induced protracted IDPs settled in older informal settlements. Despite the dire conditions in which displaced families were living, the humanitarian response was initially not forthcoming. This was linked to several factors including the founded fear of creating a "pull factor", pressure from

authorities and host communities not to respond, and a lack of capacity by humanitarians on the ground to scale-up operations. When a response finally arrived, it concentrated on short-term assistance (distributions of tents and food, emergency latrines, water trucking and mobile health teams), on the widely assisted assumption that this assistance could end within a few months since people would then either return home or a development response would take over. By January 2019, it became clear that people would not be returning home and so most assistance was extended to June 2019, still without a clear strategy of what would happen after that point.

Despite the evident presence of camp-like displacement sites, there has been a lack of consensus on an approach to camp management – both in terms of how to respond to the informal sites and with regards to establishing formal camps. On the latter, the Government of Afghanistan endorsed plans to establish formal sites (to which all IDPs would be moved) and obliged the Afghan Land Authority to assign state land for this purpose. However, the plans quickly lost momentum due to a number of factors: stubborn unrealistic requirements for site preparation works, ineffective humanitarian-government engagement on the topic, lack of clarity on land ownership of the proposed sites (as well as the suitability of their siting) and poor UN-NGO relations regarding operational coordination. The humanitarian community's support for government land allocation (thereby essentially endorsing establishment of a formal camp) was also fundamentally incompatible with its strategy of short-term assistance to be curtailed by the middle of 2019, as the establishment of formal camps implies a longer-term commitment.

PROJECT

PROTECTION RISKS

There were frequent reports of families resorting to child labour and child recruitment (mainly affecting boys), forced child marriage (mainly affecting girls) and sell of children. Due to depleted assets and lack of livelihoods, many households were in debt and forced to resort to such coping strategies when their creditors demanded repayment. IDPs also reported a fear of harassment and violence by Armed Opposition Groups if they chose to return to areas of origin. Women reported an increase in family violence – an expected consequence of the psychosocial stress levied on families due to displacement, scarce resources and dire living conditions. Finally for the vast majority of IDPs situated on private land, they faced frequent eviction threats by the landowners and/or were forced to pay rent despite not having financial resources to do so, which added to the cycle of debt and negative coping strategies.

CCCM ACTIVITIES

The project targeted people displaced to informal sites in Herat and Badghis provinces. In Herat, the sites consisted of many scattered, small clusters of tents as well as one formal camp; in Badghis there were three larger sites. Together, the sites were supported by NRC to have accommodated around 100,000 families at their maximum although this number was declining as some people have returned home. Besides IDPs there were also host communities and protracted IDPs from surrounding villages/protracted IDP settlements who have settled in the sites in search of assistance.

The mobile CM approach (known as "Site Management" for this context) was complemented by static "community tents", and comprised of the following key outputs:

- **Support to Coordination:** mapping informal sites and blocks/groups within them, undertaking IDP registration and intentions surveys, monitoring service provision (or lack thereof) and convening site-level coordination meetings

- **Communication with Communities:** through mobile teams, Community Tents, Community Meetings, theatre performances and identification of IDP focal points

- **'Light' Protection:** through protection monitoring and referrals.

IMPLEMENTATION

Mobile teams played a critical role in the early stages of the displacement by mapping out blocks and groups of IDPs in informal sites. This allowed for more organised and dignified registration activities and distributions of assistance. Mobile teams were assigned to different geographical areas or sites to follow-up on, and thereby visited all the sites on a regular (if not daily) basis to conduct tent-to-tent and site level meetings with residents as well as identified community focal points (male and female) who can both disseminate information to communities and provide information to NGOs about the situation. Mobile teams also conducted protection monitoring through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and household level interviews and undertook protection-related referrals where necessary and possible. Community tents were strategically placed between and within sites to allow IDPs to proactively access information and mechanisms for feedback and complaints.

Tents were staffed by Community Mobilisers which included people from both the host and IDP communities – five days per week, at least five hours per day. On a bi-weekly basis, NRC convened coordination meetings with IDP focal points inside the community tents.

IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

For the implementing agency, the project provided a way to structure and scale up its response across multiple sectors[2]. For example, the Site Management teams facilitated mapping of sites and mass registration campaigns in the sites, which in turn allowed for distributions of essential assistance including shelter, food and NFIs – both by the implementing agency and others. In turn, the Site Management teams were able to understand important dynamics of the target populations and use these insights to inform the broader response and communications with the communities' strategies. Without the Site Management projects, there was no site level coordination and therefore significant gaps and duplications in assistance which were now being mitigated through coordination meetings and evidence-based advocacy.

COORDINATION IMPACT

To date, there is no CCCM cluster active in Afghanistan, however, UN and NGO stakeholders agreed to establish a Site Management Task Force to support the work of Site Management agencies. This has helped mobilise other agencies for Site Management; agree on minimum activities/ responsibilities of Site Management agencies; develop shared tools (e.g. site monitoring and key messages); and discuss strategy for ongoing response.

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CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

CHALLENGES

- It has been difficult for the implementing agency (and other site management agencies) to consolidate and obtain agreement on key messages to disperse to IDPs, due to ever changing strategies and response plans by the humanitarian community.

- Mobile teams have often been the majority of or even the only community-facing staff who were regularly present in the informal sites and therefore had to bear the brunt of community frustrations about lack of assistance and information.

- Even with a large mobile team, it was challenging to understand and manage community power dynamics:

hundreds of men claimed to be IDP leaders, but there were also frequent changes in which leaders were representing which groups and many people complained about their so-called leaders. The role played by some influential leaders in the community (some of whom were also bolstered by support from local authorities) enabled them to foment violence against humanitarian agencies and to extort money and goods from vulnerable families.

- Strained relations between the government and local authorities have led to delays in humanitarian assistance and the relocation of distribution points to periphery locations to appease certain community leaders.

LESSONS LEARNED

- Community expectations must be addressed immediately: mobile teams were unable to manage expectations in the early stages of the project as they did not have basic information about forthcoming humanitarian assistance and there appeared not to be a response strategy by the humanitarian community. CM agencies that attempted to respond to informal, scattered sites must push for an agreement on key messages to disseminate to communities regarding the broader response strategy.

- Host community members opportunistically and violently forced themselves onto beneficiary selection lists, in part due to a lack of specific attempts to identify or engage with them. The response by CM agencies as well as others could have included a more systematic coverage of host communities, which would have likely reduced the risk that host community would take up pretences of being displaced.

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[1] OCHA, September 2018
[2] As stated in NRC's internal 'Emergency Response Review', completed at the end of 2018.

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IRAQ

COMMUNITY RESOUCE CENTRE INITIATIVE

KEYWORDS:

AREA-BASED APPROACH, COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTRE, ASSISTANCE / SERVICES MAPPING, INFORMATION PROVISION/ REFERRAL, COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, SUSTAINABLE RETURN AND REINTEGRATION, GOVERNMENT COLLABORATION

CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT	Conflict
DATE OF EVENT CAUSING DISPLACEMENT	2013 - present
PEOPLE DISPLACED	Total: approx. 2 million[1], Returnees: 4 million[2]
PROJECT LOCATION	Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din
PROJECT DURATION	December 2017- Ongoing
NUMBER OF PEOPLE TARGETED BY THE PROJECT	9,000-10,000 beneficiaries[3]
CCCM COORDINATION MECHANISM	Cluster activated

SUMMARY:

Centred around the strategy of Community Resource Centres (CRCs) as outreach hubs in the main governorates of return, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din. This coordination framework in partnership with the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Center (JCMC), on behalf of the Iraqi Government and in support of humanitarian and recovery/stabilization partners was charged with the establishment and operation of a network of CRCs to facilitate service delivery through information provision, referral to service providers and community engagement to support the safe, voluntary, non-discriminatory and sustainable returns and reintegration of mixed populations.

✳	December 2017	**Project start date**	
1	December 2017	**Official launch of the CRC initiative**	
2	April 2018	**Opening of the first CRC**	
3	Mid-year 2018	**Expansion of CRCs to 11 centres**	
4	March 2019	**Launch of CRC network data platform**	
✳	Ongoing		

Community Resource Centre in Mosul, Iraq

CONTEXT

BACKGROUND

Following the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) defeat in Iraq in December 2017, the country started to transition to a post-conflict context, characterized by recovery efforts and large-scale return and dynamic displacement trends. According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO 2019), in late December 2017, for the first time since the displacement crisis began in December 2013, there were more returnees (3.2 million individuals) than people displaced (2.6 million individuals) in Iraq. By the end of October 2018, more than 4 million displaced people returned home. Despite the scale of overall returns, more than 1.9 million individuals remain displaced, 50% of whom have been displaced for more than three years. Significant numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were women and children. A substantial majority of displaced people (71 per cent/1,5 million) reside outside of the camps, dispersed into urban and peri-urban context in informal settlements and in rented/ hosted apartments mostly within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Ninewa governorate. These 2 million IDPs are relatively evenly split between being displaced within their governorates of origin (49 per cent) and in other governorates (51 per cent).

CONTEXT

In general, conditions in the areas of return have dramatically affected the capacity for IDPs to return due to the widespread destruction of housing and physical infrastructure, overall conditions of safety and security in the area (including explosive remnants of war (ERW), armed groups controlling the areas), access to basic services such as shelter (including unresolved land/property issues), water and sanitation, health and education, as well as livelihoods opportunities (self-reliance).[4] IDPs returning home to the main return governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din have been identified as being particularly vulnerable and cite damage and destruction to housing (71 per cent)[5]; lack of job opportunities (54 per cent); and lack of safety in their locations of origin (40 per cent); as the main obstacles to return.[6]

PROJECT

PROTECTION COMPONENT

The HNO 2019 stated multiple pressing protection concerns remain including retaliation against people with perceived affiliations to extremist groups; ethno-sectarian violence; forced, premature and obstructed returns; a lack of civil documentation; IDPs and returnees who require specialized psychosocial support; high UXO (Unexploded ordnance) contamination of land (including private houses); as well as housing, land and property issues."[7] People perceived to be affiliated with extremist groups are among the most vulnerable, along with women, children, people with disabilities and the elderly. The governates of high returns of Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Anbar show the highest number of conflict-affected children at risk.

CRC STRATEGY

As people return to their areas of origin, there was a need to ensure that the conditions were improved to create a conducive environment to achieve durable solutions to displacement. In response, a nationwide CRC initiative was launched in Dec. 2017.[8] This initiative formulated a coordination framework centered around the establishment and operation of area-based Community Resource Centres (CRC) - outreach hubs - in the governorates experiencing the highest return rates[9] to support recovery and stabilization approaches that provide longer term sustainable solutions. The CRC has been a part of CCCM's approach to camp-like and non-camp (including urban) settings,[10] implementing an area-based multi-sectorial approach, to offer a service delivery mechanism that facilitates safe, voluntary, non-discriminatory and sustainable returns and reintegration of mixed populations. The CRC network supports humanitarian services and acted as a link between humanitarian and recovery activities serving as community-based coordination, information, and referral hubs where all community members (IDPs, returnees and host communities) can receive information on available services and assistance for their reintegration processes/efforts.

The CRCs established a physical presence within the communities in an easily accessible distance by the community. The CRCs offer workspaces and facilities to assist service delivery actors including governmental, international and non-governmental institutions to reach the dispersedly located conflict affected population. Depending on the area facilities include such as information desks and open internet access, community multipurpose rooms (separate women and men meeting rooms), as well as rooms for training and referrals.

SELECTION OF BENEFICIARIES AND CRC CATCHMENT AREAS

The CRC strategy took an area-based approach to beneficiary selection through the strategical selection and location of CRCs in the most affected governates by conflict, displacement and return. Areas were selected where high return has already been witnessed or was expected in the near future. Based on participatory assessments[11] neighbourhoods "catchment areas" were mapped out for establishment of CRCs. Within these catchment areas, the services of the CRCs were accessible by all individuals regardless of their status (including IDPs, returnees and host communities).

Operating under the coordination of the steering committee, each established CRC was operationalized flexibly by its implementing partner to respond to the specific needs and requests by the community, while maintaining the minimum agreed Basic Activities Set (BAS). This included the identification of locations for priority interventions, providing information, consultations and referral to beneficiaries, supporting community engagement in access to information and service provision, providing two-way information access and dissemination to affected communities (Communication with Communities (CwC); Complaints and feedback mechanisms, etc), supporting multi-sectoral coordination among humanitarian and recovery/stabilization actors and liaison with government, promoting an area-based approach to displacement management (mapping assistance and services provided in CRC catchment areas/Monitor assistance provision and living conditions).

Community Resource Centre in Mosul, Iraq

Map of Community Resource Centres (CRC) in regions of Iraq.

The map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM and the CRC Implementing Partners.

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IMPLEMENTATION

To date,[12] a total of 9,758 beneficiaries[13] have participated in activities, sought advice or referrals in the 11 operational CRCs and outreach hubs. The CRC's have provided a range of services and programmes across the neighbourhoods in the five Governorates,[14, 15] which at the time of project development hosted 97% of returnees.[16] Activities in the individual CRCs have been tailored to the specific context and needs of the local population. Overall, protection[17] activities, community engagement, referral, complaints and feedback mechanisms as well as livelihoods activities were prioritised. Activities included case management, legal assistance (awareness, consultation and representation), recreational and life skills activities for children, youth and adults, etc. Emphasis was placed on Gender-Based Violence (GBV) awareness sessions and women's participation through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and awareness campaigns on topics of importance to the women in the community, such as early marriage, access to income generating activities for women and empowering adolescent girls.

Access to employment/livelihood opportunities was one of the three main concern of IDPs[18] and returnees alike. To support the local population in re-establishing livelihoods activities, the CRCs offered a spectrum of livelihoods activities, such as application for grants and creation of business grants,[19] internet access and computer/ IT courses, educational trainings[20] and vocational training and job searches.

Neighbourhood committees were established, that are (to a certain degree) representative of the population within the catchment area. These committees meet regularly with stakeholders of their choosing, receive capacity building and lead/active role on community support/improvement projects.
In addition, the CRC Chairs in partnership with the National Protection Cluster and CwC task Force have worked on providing a general protection training to all CRC Staff, covering general protection concepts, protection mainstreaming accessibility, participation and empowerment and legal/ humanitarian frameworks.

Coordination meeting between implementing partners, community and local authority.

ONLINE PLATFORM AND NETWORKING CRCS

As part of the CRC Steering Committee and to ensure a common approach, an online platform was developed, including a service mapping tool and referral pathway to be used by all CRC partners within their CRC catchment areas. The aim of the tool was to have a comprehensive view of which partners are operating where, and which services are available in CRC catchment areas from the humanitarian actors and government. Beyond that, the tool aimed to provide information on beneficiary eligibility criteria, the duration of the projects, contact details and other key information. This tool also aimed to support actors' capacity in absorbing referrals from the CRCs. The platform planned to create an accessible database for other service providers, Clusters and government departments, communities to make the current activities visible and facilitate strengthening of coordination of their services and established links with the CRCs as local coordination platforms, increasing the outreach of the physical centres beyond their specific locality.

IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

To date, the CRC initiative facilitated a mechanism to work closely with the Government at the national level (JCMC) as well as the local level, with the aim to plan for an effective and sustainable hand-over of the project. The CRCs have established a platform for community engagement that targets the needs of the community holistically rather than based on displacement status or sectoral needs. Neighbourhood committees were gradually becoming the bridge between the community and humanitarian/development actors for information sharing, raising of gaps/needs and community referrals of cases. The impact of this was to gradually reduce dependence on outside support.

ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

ACHIEVEMENTS

- Communities have begun to regain/ establish trust in humanitarian actors, through the CRCs presence, continued services/activity provision[21] and prompt actions on complaints and referrals.

- Neighbourhood committees have been strengthened and were actively involved in programme design and activity implementation.[22]

- Good working relationships have been established by the CRCs operating agencies with other humanitarian actors,[23] who have shown goodwill to operate from the CRCs or receiving referrals from the CRCs.

CHALLENGES

- Availability of funding to establish and sustain current CRC as well as the short funding cycles of 12 month has been a challenge. Donors had limited understanding of the scope and strategy of CRCs and the need for multi-year, multi-sectoral funding in areas of intervention in order to achieve a sustainable impact.

- Setting up effective referral pathways was hindered by a lack of available services as well as service providers operating in the predominately urban CRCs' catchment areas. Service providers have specific beneficiary criteria,[24] that need to be clearly understood and communicated to the community to avoid miscommunication and undermining of carefully built trust relationships.

- Development of a sustainable hand-over strategy of the CRCs to the JCMC or other local NGOs/CBOs was challenging in respect of capacity as well as securing longer-term funding to maintain the CRCs facilities, staffing, as well as established activities.

LESSONS LEARNED

- Careful selection of catchment area for CRCs was essential to coincide with ongoing analysis of whether or not other humanitarian/NGO actors were present in the area, as opening a CRC in areas with no other organizational presence or plans could result in a lack of referral partners and service provision; ultimately undermining the core objective of building trust with the community and handing over the centres to the government/ local communities or local organizations.

- CRCs were structures that link humanitarian interventions with development initiatives and are not to be implemented as emergency, one-off or stand-alone. It has become clear that an ongoing dialogue with the donor community was required to allow for multi-year and multi-sectoral funding for the establishment for a meaningful community participation and build capacity of the community and government representatives to work towards a sustainable hand-over of the CRCs from the beginning. Humanitarian and development donors need to speak more clearly to each other as well as be transparent towards actors on the ground regarding future plans, so that early recovery programming such as the CRCs does not fall through the humanitarian – development crack.

- **Managing expectations** of communities from the onset was vital for the effective functioning of the CRC in the community. Key messaging and referral timeframe setting were developed and coordinated with the wider humanitarian community (e.g.: Iraq IDP Information Centre, relevant Clusters, etc.).

- **Increased information sharing of the CRC catchment areas' activities with the wider humanitarian and development community**, emphasized the CCCM responsibility of monitoring and advocacy as well as the CRC SC Chairs' role to advocate with recovery, stabilization and development actors outside of the scope of the cluster system. The CCCM background proved important to the CRC initiative to advocate other service providers to improve their community engagement and communication with communities.

- **Continuous close working relationship with government and local authorities** was essential to ensure government services were provided, and referrals can be accepted and sustainable handover processes are achieved.

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[1] HNO 2019

[2] As above

[3] Estimated number of beneficiaries coming to the 11 operational CRCs at time of writing.

[4] Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), sector specific assessments, in agreement with the JCMC. DTM Return Index

[5] Anbar, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din

[6] ILA III. Intentions surveys conducted by CCCM Cluster and REACH in August 2018 with 94,000 households in 128 formal camps confirm the key findings of ILA III (conducted through key informants) on livelihoods, safety and shelter, but provide more granularity on the issues related to safety, among them fear of discrimination, fear or trauma associated to returning, contamination with explosive hazards and lack of security forces.

[7] HNO 2019

[8] PCRC steering Committee established.

[9] Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din

[10] Urban Displacement and Out-of-Camp (UDOC) review

[11] Either organization-specific or through the Area Based Assessment from the REACH Initiative.

[12] February 2019

[13] Monthly CRC report feb. 2019

[14] As of Dec 2018

[15] namely Anbar, Ninewa, Salah-al-Din, Kirkuk and Diyala.

[16] IOM Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), Round 83, November 2017.

[17] Except GBV and other sensitive protection services. These are referred outside of the CRCs.

[18] IOM Integrated Location Assessment (ILA) Round III, 2018.

[19] Pitching under EOI (Expression of Interest of Enterprise development Fund).

[20] Courses on improving handwriting in Arabic language, catch up classes for high school.

[21] The attendance rates to the centres has remained high, not witnessing the expected dramatic drop-off after the initial month after opening.

[22] E.g.: Women's Committee in NRC's center in West Mosul, who regularly raise community concerns and influence programming.

[23] The CRC operating agencies has building strong relationships among actors operating within the CRCs catchment areas and through the coordination of different meetings and building good working relationships with Sectors, Clusters and governmental departments.

[24] Or lack of funds and capacity to accept referrals.

IRAQ

CAMP MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION THROUGH MOBILE TEAMS

KEYWORDS:

INTERNALLY DISPLACED, RETURNEES, DISPERSED, MOBILE TEAMS. COMMUNITY CENTRES, CAPACITY BUILDING, COMMUNICATION WITH COMMUNITIES, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT, HLP ISSUES, LOCALISATION

CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT	Conflict
DATE OF EVENT CAUSING DISPLACEMENT	2014 - 2017[1]
PEOPLE DISPLACED	1.8 million[2] Internally Displaced Persons
PROJECT LOCATION	17 camps: Dohuk, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Baghdad, Anbar, Salah al-Din, Ninewa, Kirkuk
PROJECT DURATION	2017 - ongoing (ACTED), 2016 - 2018 (ECHO)
CCCM COORDINATION MECHANISM	Cluster activated

SUMMARY:

The CCCM Cluster and partners adapted camp management to contexts across the Iraq response, including the use of mobile team responses for out-of-camp displacement settings. As nearly 70%[3] of the refugee and IDP population settled outside of camps in often critical conditions, CCCM partners have sought to develop an out-of-camp response aimed at applying traditional CCCM core activities to the management of smaller pockets of IDP settlements predominately in urban and peri-urban areas.

2014

TIMELINE

MILESTONE 1   MILESTONE 2   MILESTONE 3   MILE-STONE 4

CONFLICT

DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN

✳	2016	**Project start date**
1		• **Reduced flow of IDPs into camps through assistance and support of urban informal settings** • **Establishing referral pathways to protection** • **Improving Site management and mitigating site risks and hazards most notably for Salah al-Din and North governates**
2	June - August 2016	**Selection and training of Site Representatives for Anbar and Mosul**
3	Fall 2017	**Cash for work site maintenance success in infusion of small amount of cash into community**
4	May - June 2018	**"Minimum Service Package" developed through effective coordination**
✳	Ongoing	

Nabi Younes camp, Iraq

CONTEXT

The CCCM Cluster and partners working in Iraq have taken a multi-pronged approach to camp management including area-based and mobile team responses for camp-like and non-camp displacement settings. While the Mosul campaign forced much of CCCM's focus to shift to direct management of large formal camps, a large percentage of displaced people sought safety in a spectrum of urban settlement options.

In the response in Dohuk, support was provided via a mobile team to 17 camps[4] that were managed by the government. Dohuk was the governorate in Iraq hosting the largest number of camps and most of the camp residents have been displaced since 2014. Challenges persisted in their areas of origin and more than 85%[5] of camp residents were unwilling or unable to return soon.

In the response in Baghdad, Anbar, Salah al-din, Ninewa and Kirkuk, another project was conducted as part of a coordinated effort aimed to develop a flexible Mobile CCCM approach of applying core CCCM activities to small urban pockets of IDPs who have sought safety in dispersed locations of unfinished and damaged buildings and collective centres. With many IDPs settling outside of camps in abandoned, unfinished buildings and spontaneous settlements in urban, peri-urban and rural areas, traditional camp management was not feasible. Many of these sites were unsafe for living due to substantial damage to the buildings which left them open to the elements and with serious hazards, such as unsafe and informal electrical wiring and a lack of waste management.

PROJECT

CCCM ACTIVITIES

The CCCM activities were implemented through a Mobile Response Team (MRT) by the implementing agency to allow the coverage of larger areas with interspersed small pockets of IDP populations with vital assistance.

The MRT established referral pathways to protection and assistance, improving site management and mitigating site risks and hazards. A return study of the IDP population was conducted to understand the reasons for not returning to their areas of origin, after the area was re-taken by government forces. The coordination with the CCCM Cluster provided an integrated approach to communication with communities (CwC), provided key messaging and communications outreach for all the sectors (including NFI, Shelter, CCCM, and WASH).

In Dohuk, the project objectives focused on improving information management through the monitoring, mapping and referral of humanitarian needs in camps and camp-like settlements, increasing the camp management capacity of local actors and improving the existing site infrastructure to reduce environmental risks and hazards.

In Baghdad, Anbar, Salah al-din, Ninewa and Kirkuk, the project focused to provide outside of camp and camp populations with integrated NFI, Shelter, WASH, and CCCM support through a range of activities. Information management was inter-sectoral, with a centralized database, maps, and dashboards of assessed and assisted locations to ensure limited duplication amongst partners and to ensure that the most vulnerable conflict-affected populations received assistance. Information management of the ECHO Project was linked to the IM Cell of the CCCM Cluster,[6] led by the CCCM Cluster's Informal Sites Baseline, conducted regular assessments at non-camp locations in the Central Region of Iraq.

IMPLEMENTATION

Each Mobile Response Team (MRT) was generally composed of 3 to 5 team members that included a team leader, technical specialists and capacity building focal points. The teams made regular field visits to approximately ten to fifteen informal sites sheltering between six to forty households in unfinished/ damaged buildings, public collective centres or small informal settlements. The MRTs conducted a range of CCCM activities including Informal site and needs identification through the harmonized CCCM Cluster assessment tools, Development of Site Resident Database, Selection of Site Representatives, Mitigation of risks and hazards through site maintenance and Conducting Awareness Campaigns.

The CCCM Cluster assessment tools (Rapid RASP[7] and RASP[8]: Risk Assessment Prioritization Tool) encompassed the identification of all displacement sites in a given geographic area and prioritize the most vulnerable sites.[9] The rapid RASP identified the needs that could be covered through integrated services as well as referral to external partner and clusters. In addition, the assessment was linked to a budget prioritization tool, which facilitated budget allocation according to population, severity of risks identified as well as availability of other partners in the area. The full RASP was only conducted in the

10-15 most vulnerable sites targeted for interventions of "hard components" site risk reductions such as building repairs and "soft components" coordination, service mapping, referrals, awareness activities, community mobilization for the entire area including host and other IDP sites.

Selection and training of Site Representatives in CCCM (coordination, identification of need, leadership) were conducted, with the aim to build the capacity of site representatives to take the role of camp manager and being aware of the humanitarian system in their governorate. Small IDP sites clustered together and formed joint committees with host communities, including Site Management Committees (Maintenance Committees; Women's Committees; Youth Committees). All committees received training and established TORs, as well as support in activity organisations.[10]

Mitigation of risks and hazards through site maintenance and upgrading identified in RASP was prioritised by the implementing agency and included "hard components" such as smaller building works in coordination with the IDP Maintenance Committees[11] through Cash for work initiatives[12] and on-the -job training. Maintenance toolkits were donated to Maintenance Committees at the end of the project. It also included "soft components" such as identification of other partners working in the area and facilitating coordination of their services to avoid duplication and ensuring regular coverage, as well as Fire Prevention training. Awareness campaigns were also conducted through the committee structure on topics relevant to the sites and the level of cooperation / coordination with local authorities and specialized partners active in the areas. Campaigns included child safety; hygiene promotion; Housing, Land and Property (HLP) awareness, health awareness, etc.

The MRT interventions were generally implemented over a 6-month period with the MRT team leader functioning as an information focal point for site representative referrals. The "provider of last resort" concept was often invoked due to low presence, capacity and interest of other non-CCCM actors in supporting informal settlements.

IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

The MRT approach supported coverage of a large area with a spectrum of small informal, scattered sites, where permanent camp management presence was not feasible. The MRTs facilitated assistances to these small sites through multisectoral needs assessments and follow-ups. Essential safety of people was increased through the diverse expertise in the mobile teams' composition to conduct basic risk reduction activities and arrange small-scale building repairs works, especially relevant where referral to external partners was inaccessible. Even though MRTs were not permanently on-site, site committees were established, or existing ones strengthened, through MRT's training on camp management responsibilities, supporting advocacy for services and report incidents to humanitarian service providers.

ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

ACHIEVEMENTS

- Supporting IDPs in their chosen settlement option through the CCCM mobile approach to the predominately urban informal sites generally afforded greater privacy and dignity to the IDPs, as well as access to livelihoods or land for subsistence farming and integration with local community.

- The cash for work site maintenance works facilitated a successful infusion of small amounts of cash into the IDP community.

- The harmonized "minimum service package" developed by effective coordination between the CCCM implementing partners[13] ensure equal level of support and assistance to the displaced population.

CHALLENGES

- In densely populated urban areas, providing targeted assistance to IDPs living intermingled with the host communities, returnees, residual population (e.g. by renting space or apartments, living with host families, etc.) is likely to cause tension between these different groups.

- The IDP communities generally expected tangible benefits from the mobile teams. "Soft components" such as referral pathways, coordination and information sharing were only accepted in conjunction with the "hard components" of building repairs and maintenance.

- MRT support to very small IDP sites[14] is an ineffective approach, as in danger of losing community-focused nature.

- Lack of understanding of the CCCM mobile approach used for camp-like and non-camp settings by other sectors, partners and governmental authorities.

LESSONS LEARNED[15]

- To ensure buy-in and a sense of ownership among local actors (government, local camp management teams, communities), the MRT should assist in strengthening locally developed CM tools over introducing new unknown tools.

- The MRT may have to expand their role as "provider of last resort", due to the low presence, capacity and interest of other actors to support IDPs settled in camp-like and non-camp settings but focus on referrals, service mapping, community mobilization and information management, with site risk reduction as their priority activities.

- In rural camp-like and non-camp settings, IDPs often had greater capacity for local integration. MRTs to facilitate referral to development partners for longer-term support to resolve their displacement.

- When working in informal settlements, knowledge of HLP issues and instruments are essential for the MRT to avoid doing harm.[16]

- In the Iraq urban contexts, where socio-economic conditions are similar precarious for different community groups, focus on rental-assistance over small scale site maintenance works proved more effectively.[17]

- A wider suite of referral options should be pursued in response to eviction than referral to camps, including referral to shelter and development partners for rental/ transitional housing support, to contribute to longer-term solutions.

- There was a need for CCCM training that focuses on urban and informal settlement contexts.

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[1] OCHA. N.d. Iraq

[2] OCHA. N.d. Iraq

[3] IOM DTM. October 2018. DTM Round 106

[4] AACTED provides support to CCCM activities in Darkar, Bersev 1 and 2, Chammeshko, Kabarto 1 and 2, Bajed Kandal 1 and 2, Khanky, Rawanga, Shariya, Garmawa, Esyan, Mamrashan, Shekhan, Mamlyan, and Dawodeya camps through CCCM mobile teams.

[5] REACH. December 2017 – January 2018. Intentions Survey, Round II – National IDP Camps.

[6] CCCM Cluster Iraq Operational Portal

[7] Rapid RASP Tool

[8] RASP Tool

[9] Only sites with 5 households or more were targeted.

[10] English lessons, awareness sessions, events, etc.

[11] Making electric installations safe, installing toilets and sanitary installations, installing doors/ windows for privacy, installing balustrades for protection of falling, insulation and roofing for climate control, installation of fire extinguishers and first aid kits etc.

[12] Larger structural works, drainage and sanitation installations were referred to Shelter or WASH partners.

[13] NRC, DRC, IOM

[14] Of fewer than 10 households

[15] As the ACTED project is ongoing it should be noted that below listed lessons learned are based on discussions held during coordination meetings. Further learning and recommendations are to follow during the project evaluation phase.

[16] E.g.: making improvements to the infrastructure which causes the landlord to increase the rent or evict the family.

[17] As site maintenance works were not well received by the communities and contribute to social cohesion issues.

Women sitting in shelter within Tigrit informal settlement

LEBANON

MOBILE COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACH

KEYWORDS:

REFUGEES, PERI-URBAN, CAPACITY BUILDING OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES, COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES, COMMUNITY LEVEL COORDINATION, REFERRAL PATHWAYS

CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT	Syrian War
DATE OF EVENT CAUSING DISPLACEMENT	2012 - ongoing
PEOPLE DISPLACED	Approx. 1.5 million, 224,000 living in informal settlements[1]
PROJECT LOCATION	North Lebanon, Bekaa Valley - Informal Settlements
PROJECT DURATION	2013 - 2018
NUMBER OF PEOPLE TARGETED BY THE PROJECT	Approx. 40,000 people
CCCM COORDINATION MECHANISM	No cluster activated

SUMMARY:

The Collective Site Management and Coordination (CSMC) programme started in 2013 as a Camp Management response to Syrian refugees in Lebanon. UNHCR established the term 'Collective Site Management and Coordination' in early 2014 to describe the informal nature of the camp response in Lebanon and to include collective shelter and collective centre management and coordination. The CSMC programme used a mobile approach centred around Community Capacity Building (CCB), in order to hand over site management and coordination responsibilities to refugees and local authorities, and thereby to reduce dependence on NGOs. The project was implemented in more than 250 Informal Settlements in the Bekaa Valley and North Lebanon, the implementing agency reaching nearly 40,000 refugees.[2]

The project involved the focus areas of establishing and training settlement committees; coordinating with service providers for service delivery at community level as well as referral of individual cases; and building the capacity of local authorities through staff secondment and training.

NOTE: project was implemented at a municipal or site level, and therefore milestones took place at repeated and various points throughout the 5+ years of programming, according to a phased approach whereby the programme gradually added more Settlements to its 'portfolio'.

❋	September 2013	**Project start date**
1	1 - 4 weeks	**Municipal area selection** according to the following criteria: number and density of Settlements in the area; accessible in terms of security; potential for other NGOs to provide services; and presence of other NRC services.
2	1 - 4 weeks	**Assessments:** mobile teams visit sites to collect basic information and to ascertain interest of the residents in the project.
3	1 - 4 weeks	**Site profiling and community meetings:** mobile team collects population data and starts disseminating information about the project
4	1 - 4 weeks	**Committee Selection:** mobile team facilitates FGDs with different demographic groups in the site to select a representative by consensus

5	2 - 12 weeks	**Committee meetings and follow-up on issues:** Weekly meetings with committee commence, during which mobile team identifies key problems affecting the site and refers these as well as individual cases to relevant service providers
6	4 - 8 weeks	**Committee training/capacity building:** Mobile teams begin to deliver core 'Community Capacity Building' (CCB) training modules, which are based heavily on the NRC CM Coaching Guidelines
7	1 week	**Stakeholder capacity building:** NRC invites around 2 members of each committee to participate in a full 2 day CSMC training (adapted camp management training), which is also attended by service provider staff, host community, and local/national authorities
8	3 - 24 months, depensind on needs	**Coaching and community projects:** Mobile teams provide ongoing coaching support for committees through regular site visits and meetings – ideally fortnightly and then monthly. In addition, in most sites NRC provided resources and support for committees to implement a project to address a communal problem in the site
❋	Ongoing	

A view of a refugee settlement of the Ghazzeh informal tented settlement in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

CONTEXT

Due to the no-camp policy of the Lebanese government, and no formal or subsidized housing support, Syrian refugees self-settled in private rented accommodation spread throughout the country. The implementing agency's CSMC project targeted the 17-20%[3] of refugees that were residing in around 4,000 Informal Settlements. The remaining Syrian refugees were scattered in urban and peri-urban areas renting private buildings.

The scattered and informal nature of the accommodation of displacement made coordination of services and identification of the most vulnerable extremely challenging. At the same time, achievement of humanitarian minimum standards in the Informal Settlements was constrained by restrictions on site and shelter improvement imposed by government, local authorities, or landlords. This was further exacerbated by a lack of accountability mechanisms to highlight the underperformance of service providers. Moreover, basic municipal services and infrastructure could barely meet the needs of existing host communities, let alone the additional refugee population. Particularly waste collection, safe water provision, and sanitation networks were most critically overstretched.

The refugees faced chronic needs, linked to reduced availability of cash and food support, combined with Government restrictions in livelihoods opportunities compounded by the depletion of savings and assets. Refugees were constrained in their movement due to fear of arrest linked to invalid residency, limited resources due to lack of livelihoods, and in some cases due to fear of harassment by neighbours. In some areas, local authorities would impose further restrictions, such as curfews or bans on use of motorbikes by refugees.

Prior to the CSMC intervention[4], there were no representative governance structures in place in informal settlements, and most service providers resorted to working through pre-existing self- appointed 'leaders' known as Shawish. The Shawish tended to exploit their position of power, interfering with impartial distribution of assistance for their own gain.

PROJECT

PROTECTION RISKS

Governmental restrictions meant that the vast majority of refugees were not permitted to work. This led many to resort to negative coping strategies – including amassing further debts increasing their vulnerable to extortion and exploitation, taking on low-paid and harmful work which included sex work, and engaging in early marriage practices.

Even though the informal settlements were on private land, very few refugees had any written lease agreements, making them particularly vulnerable to evictions by landowners, and forced many to resort to negative coping strategies to avoid eviction. Furthermore, the Lebanese Armed Forces evicted many displaced from the informal settlements in northern governorates.

CCCM ACTIVITIES

By the end of the project in 2018, the CSMC programme had supported around 40,000 refugees living in more than 250 informal settlements, ranging in size from just 3 to 200 households. The large number, small size, and geographical disbursement of settlements rendered it unfeasible to establish a full Camp Management (CM) set-up in every (or indeed any) single settlement. Moreover, authorities initially denied the need for any kind of Camp Management response[5], due

to sensitivities around the existence and future of the informal settlements and refugee population. Given this context, the implementing agency – along with other agencies[7] - adopted a mobile community-based approach to be able to improve access to assistance and protection for refugees. Principally, the approach involved the following two elements:

1. Establishment and training of representative community governance structures at the Settlement level

2. Building the capacity of local authorities to undertake coordination of Informal Settlements.

SELECTION OF BENEFICIARIES

The implementing agency coordinated with other agencies on which areas and sites to target. Despite several agencies implementing CSMC projects[7] there was still a lack of capacity to cover all the settlements in Lebanon: more than 4,000 scattered across 380 cadastrals. As such, the coordinated targeting strategy focused on cadastrals with the highest density and/or largest size of settlements in order to reach as many individuals as possible. This meant that the implementing agency could reach around 17-20% of Informal Settlement residents despite working in only 6% of the sites.

Jamile Hussein, 35, a mother of five who fled to Lebanon almost two years ago from her home in Idlib in Syria, is now the representative for women on the Community Capacity Building (CCB) committee at the Arab Rajab informal tented settlement in Al Marj, in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

A woman carries waste water through the Arab Rajab informal tented settlement in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

IMPLEMENTATION

The CSMC programme involved the establishment and training of community governance structures - "Committees" by mobile teams. These teams visited the selected settlements on a regular basis. In the beginning of the intervention, the visits were multiple times a week and gradually reduced to monthly visits as the community became more able to manage without the mobile team's support. Team members were trained in basic principles of camp management, with a particular focus on community engagement and community capacity building. Different members of the mobile team were assigned different sites and committees to support involving the following core responsibilities:

- Facilitating a participatory process to establish Settlement Committees – comprised of men and women from different demographic groups (youth, adults, elderly, persons with specific needs).

- Training and providing ongoing support/coaching to Committees to enable them to take on site coordination and management responsibilities. The core "Community Capacity Building" modules were: Service mapping (including presentations by local service providers); concept and importance of participation; problem identification; action planning to address problems; and internal/external representation and reporting. In addition, committees received training in fire safety/firefighting.

- Facilitating coordination meetings within the settlements or at area level (e.g. for clusters of settlements), bringing together community members alongside local authorities and service providers.

- Facilitating the development and implementation of Community Projects with Committees.

- Identifying and referring vulnerable individuals and households in need of emergency support or specialized protection services.

Complementary to the work of the mobile teams, the programme also involved secondment of staff to local authorities. "Municipal Support Assistants" were trained and mentored by the implementing agency, however retained an official reporting line to the Head of Municipality. The "Municipal Support Assistants" functioned as the Municipality focal points for all refugee related issues – coordinating with service providers, host community, refugees, and other authorities.

Members of the Community Capacity Building (CCB) committee meet at the Arab Rajab informal tented settlement in Al Marj in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

• Initially, 'CSMC' was coordinated under the Shelter Working Group, then became a taskforce reporting to the Protection Working Group. This allowed for:

  ○ Geographical division of labour for CSMC activities

  ○ Shared strategy, with Theory of Change and indicators

  ○ Harmonisation of tools and approaches, including minimum standards for Community Capacity Building trainings, guiding principles for referrals, common CSMC training package, and standardised reporting tools

  ○ Promotion of the work of CSMC agencies among other sectors as well as highlighting the role of the Settlement Committees as local coordination actor.

  ○ Coordination with other sectors to limit the potential 'mushrooming' of committees – i.e. through integration of sectoral focal points into the CSMC-led committees.

• Besides participating in NGO and UN-led coordination, the programme also supported the role of municipalities in coordinating at the local level –through the secondment of Municipal Support Assistants (MSAs) to municipalities. MSAs were responsible to support the refugee response in their areas through coordination with NGOs, UN agencies, host community, the refugee committees and other government authorities/ministries. Interaction of committees with authorities seems to have been greatly improved by the presence of an MSA, where 80% of committees in areas with an MSA reported having contact with the authorities, versus just 40% from areas without an MSA.[8]

ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

ACHIEVEMENTS

- An external evaluation of the CSMC approach[9] concluded that it helps to coordinate and optimise service provision and hold duty bearers to account. In this context of increased need and more limited response options, it is a particularly valuable intervention for directing limited resources to the most needy.[10]

- The project enhanced the role of women. A greater proportion of female committee members compared to men reported an enhanced ability to improve the site situation and influence service providers.[11] Moreover, the external evaluation found that overall female refugees were more positive than male in their perceptions of improvements in information availability since the committee was established.

- Many committee members highlighted the importance of being able to participate in the humanitarian response and to feel they themselves contributed. By far the most frequently reported rewards of being a committee member were (1) being able to help and make a difference, (2) being able to communicate and coordinate better with service providers, and (3) feeling equal to staff from NGOs, because they were helping other refugees to reach services and respond to their needs, underlining the value of the CSMC programme in protecting and enhancing people's dignity despite displacement.

- After the closure of the project[12], committees continued to play a critical role in management and coordination of humanitarian activities in their sites, for example, supporting assessments and distributions, and referring vulnerable cases.

CHALLENGES

- Although the programme improved the inclusiveness of coordination by linking refugee community members to service providers, committee members noted that it was most challenging to receive feedback from service providers. In some cases, this led to residents mistrusting them, blaming them for the lack of response, or even perceiving that the committee was personally benefiting.

- During Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with committees, members noted the lack of follow-up by the implementing agency during the 'exit' phase. This made it harder for them to solve problems and influenced service providers. Generally, they felt that their ability to influence service providers was very much linked to the mandate given to them by the implementing agency.

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Marya Bakkar fled to Lebanon from Syria a month ago. She now lives with her husband and three-month-old daughter in the Ghazzeh informal tented settlement in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

LESSONS LEARNED

- One of the key assumptions of the programme was that training would be sufficient to enable refugees to become the camp managers and 'independent' from service providers. However, external conditions undermined this assumption; namely, the on- going social and economic vulnerability of refugees, lack of durable solutions, inadequate service provision, and inability/ unwillingness of service providers to facilitate participation of refugees. A key finding of an external evaluation of the programme[13] suggested that full independence of the refugee governance structures was a 'fantasy' given these external constraints. The traditional 'camp manager' role should be emphasised even without the formal mandate. Suggesting that the CSMC agencies should be recognised as responsible for undertaking coordination, referrals, and advocacy for needs/gaps to be covered, and not only concentrating on building capacity of communities to take on this role.

- The external CSMC evaluation found that the approach was quite "heavy" and inefficient in responding to the small scattered settlements. As the mobile team expended similar effort on sites of five households as one with two hundred households. It was recommended to 'cluster' sites together under one committee with single focal points from each small site, and/or task committees from larger sites to follow up with smaller neighbouring sites. The evaluation recommended to take an area-based approach to support municipal-level coordination and action planning, where there was a high concentration of settlements within the same municipal area, in conjunction with the authorities, ideally with the help of an MSA.

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[1] As of 2017

[2] More than 100,000 refugees were reached by all agencies combined.

[3] The proportion varied at different times during the five years of programme implementation.

[4] By NRC and other agencies.

[5] Regardless of terminology used to describe Camp Management activities.

[6] Solidarités, Concern, IRC, Première Urgence-AMI, UNHCR.

[7] Five at the program's peak.

[8] External evaluation of the CSMC

[9] Implemented by NRC and two other INGOs.

[10] Joint Evaluation: Collective Site Management and Coordination (CSMC) in Informal Tented Settlements (ITSs)

[11] 94% and 91% (compared to 81% and 76% for men). This was corroborated by comments made by female committee members in FGDs, who noted that being in the committee helped them to be recognized by and make a contribution to their community.

[12] The project closed in March 2019; however, the same teams continued working with committees under another project relating to emergency response.

[13] External evaluation of the CSMC

SOMALIA MOBILE CCCM APPROACH

KEYWORDS:

AREA-BASED APPROACH, COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTRE, ASSISTANCE / SERVICES MAPPING, INFORMATION PROVISION/ REFERRAL, COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, MOBILE AND AREA-BASED APPROACH

CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT	Conflict / Drought
DATE OF EVENT CAUSING DISPLACEMENT	November 2016 - present[1]
PEOPLE DISPLACED	Total: 2,6 million; Outside of camps and camp-like settings: 800.000; Informal settlements: 1,8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs)
PROJECT LOCATION	South Central: Baidoa Puntland: Garowe
PROJECT DURATION	May 2017- Ongoing
NUMBER OF PEOPLE TARGETED BY THE PROJECT	Informal settlements: Baidoa: 250,000 Garowe: 75,000
CCCM COORDINATION MECHANISM	Cluster activated

SUMMARY:

CCCM partners in Somalia have been using a mixed approach of traditional and mobile activities to respond to the 2.6 million displaced people in the country. Partners were focused on strengthening coordination of services, improving living conditions in sites through care and maintenance and ensuring diverse community governance systems for better overall site management.

❋	May 2017	**Project start date**
1	May 20, 2017	**CCCM Cluster was activated in Somalia**
2	July 2017	• **Mobile teams start CCCM activities in Baidoa.** This includes site monitoring of services and communication with communities (CwC) activities. • **First site verification** was conducted in July to understand how many sites were in Baidoa, the population of the sites and the GPS coordinates. • **Movement trend tracking** was started to track flows of populations in and out of sites as well as to alert partners such as nutrition to where the new arrivals settled so they can be targeted. • **CCCM Cluster trains 30 partners and government authorities** on CCCM core principles to ensure smooth coordination and buy in to the project. • **8 Community Resource Centres are constructed in Baidoa.**

3 3A	January 2018	**CCCM: Training on Camp Coordination and Camp Management** for local authorities, informal settlement gatekeepers and communities and stakeholders in Garowe.
3B	April 2018	• **National Sub-Cluster Activation** in Garowe • **Mobile team began Service Delivery Monitoring:** first circulation of the dataset with partners in Garowe • **Camp Management Committees revived/established** within all informal settlements (24) in Garowe
3C	June 2018	**Community Resource Centres built** and established in clustered locations of informal settlements within Baidoa district.
4 4A	July 2018	**Local authorities donated public land** in Baidoa for temporary settlements for displaced populations for the first time after the CCCM Cluster initiated negotiations with the district authority
4B	August 2018	**A Public Site task force was created** to coordinate and plan relocations of sites to public land. The task force was made up of clusters, government authorities, NGOs and UN agencies.
❋	Ongoing	

Kabasa IDP site - Dolow

CONTEXT

An estimated 2.6 million people have been displaced in Somalia. The displaced population's coping mechanisms have been affected over successive years of drought and conflict, leaving them vulnerable to shocks and inhibiting sustainable return to places of origin. Marginalized clans and vulnerable groups have reported to be particularly affected and at risk of discrimination.

Out of the 2.6 million displaced persons, 1.8 million have settled in almost 2,000 recorded IDP sites across Somalia, the majority of which are informal settlements on private land in urban or peri-urban areas. The remaining estimated 800,000 IDPs have been dispersed within host families and rented spaces and currently accurate information is not available for this group.

There were no formal camps in Somalia and very few (around 8%) of sites were on public land. The majority of displaced people were moving from rural areas to urban centres, which usually have better security and access to basic services and humanitarian assistance. Displaced people arrive in an urban area and joined existing IDP settlements on private land. Service provision has been poor inside these sites, so most aid was delivered outside of the informal settlement within the city.

Evictions have increased significantly, putting further stress on displaced families who can be forced to move multiple times and limiting their ability to integrate into social structures.

Although the scale of displacement was massive, before the activation of the CCCM cluster, there was no consolidated data on the number of sites in the country, the number of people living in sites, or on the services available in these sites. Existing coordination and management mechanisms were largely informal, with most informal settlements being managed by Informal Site Managers such as community leaders or gatekeepers employed by the landowners. These mechanisms have limited accountability and little adherence to minimum standards. There were no mechanisms set up for monitoring of service provision to ensure that minimum or agreed standards have been met or that people were able to access these services. As a result of inadequate site level information and assistance monitoring, assistance did not efficiently and effectively reach the most vulnerable such as women, girls, minorities, people with disabilities and the elderly, making them more vulnerable and subject of higher rates of discrimination and exclusion of service provision.

PROJECT

PROTECTION RISKS

Vulnerable people in the informal settlements lack access to information about their rights and available services. Displaced communities, especially new arrivals, need improved access to information to make choices about where they reside, how they can receive services and how to plan for their future. Minority populations have often been completely left out of community consultations or governance structures and therefore have little chance of receiving aid. Stronger identification of displaced communities' needs, complaints, gaps and return intentions or concerns were needed to inform policies and assistance to be provided to these communities.

Gender-Based Violence (GBV) risks are heightened in these informal sites: overcrowded shelters, shelters with no internal partition, lack of lightening in the shelters and in the public spaces, as well as the lack of WASH facilities and below standards facilities increase the risk of GBV. Due to the small size and private land ownership of the settlements, no health facilities are within the sites and the existing health facilities are often far from the settlements, making it difficult for GBV victims to access support. GBV has been a taboo and sensitive topic, causing obstacles in circulating referral pathways as agencies' focal points fear retaliation.

CCCM ACTIVITIES

To respond to the sectorial coordination requirements linked to the growing displacement in Somalia, the CCCM cluster was activated in May 2017. The aim of the Cluster was to improve the living conditions and protection of IDPs in sites and settlements and ensure equitable access to services and assistance of all persons in need, with a clear focus on moving toward attaining durable solutions with full participation of the displaced and host communities.

Until September 2018 CCCM partners worked in 715[2] informal sites across the country, and this case study focused on the two districts of Baidoa in South West State and Garowe in Puntland. Baidoa hosts 371 IDP sites of roughly 250,000 people,[3] whereas Garowe hosted 24 sites of 75,000 people. Baidoa district experienced one of the highest influx of newly displaced populations in 2017 due to drought in addition to hosting one of the largest populations in protracted displacement.

Almost all IDP sites in Somalia are informal and on private land. These informal settlements are typically small, hosting on average 200-500 households and are scattered throughout urban and peri-urban areas. Gatekeepers are typically employed by the landlords to manage and oversee the activities within the sites. Consequently, service provision within the sites in Baidoa and Garowe district are minimal and most people access services, such as nutrition centres, hospitals and schools, in the city centres shared with the host communities.

Due to the private ownership of the land, populations are at constant threat of eviction.[4] Eviction has been one of the main protection concerns, making timely coordination between Camp Management (stronger community links and field presence) and Housing, Land and Property (HLP) colleagues particularly important. CCCM partners worked on eviction risk monitoring with HLP partners to ensure that evictions have been mitigated and responded to.

Traditional camp management activities were not possible in the Somali context, so a "blended approach" of a CCCM mobile response and Community Resource Centres with some traditional camp management methods were developed to focus on: monitoring of service provision at site and intra site level, improving community participation and self-management, and improving living conditions in sites. Through the mobile CCCM modality, all sites in the urban area (district) benefited from camp coordination activities. Typically, sites with the largest population, with the worst conditions and/or service availability, as well as newly established sites were prioritised by the CCCM mobile teams.

Community Resource Centres (CRCs) were established in Baidoa and Garowe urban centres close to clusters of the small IDP sites in collaboration with the district authorities. These centres were newly built on land donated by the government. The CRCs are the base for the mobile teams to reach the dispersed sites and also provide referrals and information on services available within the city, such as schools, health facilities and nutrition centres. The CRCs also house the complaint and feedback mechanisms which receive complaints for all sectors that were then referred to the appropriate partner. CRCs additionally have a meeting hall attached that was used for community meetings, service provider meetings or trainings. The halls can be used by all partners or community groups. Each of the CRCs was able to tailor their activities to the specific needs of the displaced people within its local area. For example, in Garowe the focus was on women's activities.

© IOM

Relocation and Site Planning in Kabasa - Dolow

IMPLEMENTATION

The CCCM Mobile approach by the implementing agency allowed for flexibility and a bigger geographical coverage as the small mobile teams were able to cover clusters of small sites dispersed within a larger area/ district and could adapt rapidly to change of context, such as influx of newly displaced people.

Each mobile team was organised flexibly, in general consisting of several members focusing on a cluster of sites, prioritising newly established sites. For 300 sites, 75 field staff were employed who were split between camp management and community mobilization.

Activities conducted included:
* Carried out rapid needs assessments – typically during floods or post mass eviction;
* Service monitoring and site level coordination of service delivery to monitor gaps and duplication of activities;
* Holding site/area level coordination meetings with camp management committees, local authorities and partners;
* Establishment and training of site committees (camp management committees and site maintenance committees) to support site management, maintenance and communication with site population.
* Supporting community led site maintenance activities to ensure upkeep of sites, including cash-for-work activities, grants for site improvement and distribution of tools;

* Conducting safety audits in collaboration with GBV partners to identify risks in the site and related to service delivery;
* Monitoring risk of eviction (recording tenure agreements, length and status and then flagging to local authorities and HLP partners when sites are at risk of eviction);
* Creation of site level information management tools such as service maps, camp/site profiles, contact lists and monitoring maps to advocate for multi-sectorial responses in sites;
* Establishment of site level advertised referral pathways, IDP hotlines or complaint and feedback mechanisms;
* Conducting information campaign which circulate information on service provider activities available and collecting feedback;
* Movement Trend Tracking (monitoring of movement in and out of the sites on a permanent and semi-permanent basis);
* Establishment of CRCs, community centres or information centres within the area of a cluster of sites, making available protection referrals and general information. These can be either static or mobile.

A group photo at the end of CMCs training in Garowe

DISPLACEMENT PROFILING

Due to the massive scale of displacement, the cluster decided to focus on tracking displacements only to IDP sites. Data on the IDP sites and population in Somalia has been captured by the Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN).[5,6] IDP sites were informal and partners often found push back from the government when they delivered services in these informal sites. In addition, there were often fake IDP sites created to attract aid. Therefore, it was necessary for CCCM partners to work closely with local authorities and partners to verify sites so that they could then receive humanitarian services. To gather a baseline of information that could be regularly updated, the cluster developed a two-pronged strategy:

In districts with CCCM coordination structures (Technical Working Groups):[7] Camp management partners conducted quarterly site verifications to understand how many sites existed in the district and the populations of the sites. These verifications were organised by the district government in collaboration with the CCCM cluster partner mobile teams. The mobile teams partnered with volunteers from NGO and UN agencies. The initial verifications focused on location and population, however throughout the year, questions on multisector service availability have been added. The final site list was validated by the government. The multi-agency effort strengthened buy-in from partners and ownership for the government.

In districts without CCCM coordination structures: The CCCM Cluster developed the Detailed Site Assessment (DSA). The purpose was to provide multisector information on access/availability to basic services in displacement sites to ascertain gaps in service provision and monitor services being provided to ensure minimum standards were being met. This data was collected twice a year. As there was no camp management partner in the areas where the DSA was conducted, this tool was more comprehensive so that partners could analyse the data on their own to help them design their interventions. The questionnaire was administered by a trained enumerator to a key informant. Two key informants were interviewed for each site: one camp leader and one women's representative. The assessment used a grid search pattern to ensure that all sites within the district were visited.

GBV ACTIVITIES

In Garowe, CCCM partners worked with the GBV Area of Responsibility (AoR) to conduct site safety audits using Safety Audit tools developed for Somalia with support of the GBV integration guidelines team.[8] In addition to the tool, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted in the sites to discuss GBV risks affecting women and girls and obstacles to participation and empowerment. Workshops were conducted with GBV partners to discuss ways to improve GBV referral pathways in the informal settlements. This initiative has now being replicated in Baidoa.

IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

The project has a positive impact on the lives of the affected population: although services provided at the site level still presented many gaps, through improved coordination and community participation, CCCM Mobile teams were able to channel complaints to the competent service providers and concretely use the data collected through the monthly service monitoring tool to improve lives of the displaced communities. IDPs sites that had previously been excluded from service provision due to poor targeting or marginalisation of minority populations finally received attention through site monitoring and access to feedback mechanisms. There was a notable improvement in WASH services in Baidoa after the WASH cluster received information from CCCM on water provision. The WASH cluster was able to use the data to mobilise resources and coordinate an improved response.

Through site planning trainings, camp clean up days and distributions of sanitation tools, communities have been able to re-plan the space available within the sites more effectively, to make them safer and cleaner. For instance, footpaths have been added and waste disposal has improved, achieving more and better quality shared outdoor space for families.

ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

ACHIEVEMENTS

- The Mobile approach allowed flexibility through its small mobile teams covering a large geographical area of the dispersed smaller sites reaching a greater number of displaced people. This has been important in the context of Somalia, since the scale of displacement has been very large and additionally since the cluster was new and slow to attract funding. As most sites were in urban areas, there were constant evictions and establishment of new sites.

- The Mobile approach facilitated the possibility to adapt rapidly to change of context, for example, prioritising newly established sites after an influx of displaced people.

- As the drought crisis in Somalia subsided and the displacement became protracted, the Mobile approach allowed for more community level self-management of the sites and minimised the risk of creating dependency. Many of the households have been displaced for years and have developed their own coping strategies. A facilitating approach taken by the mobile teams allowed them to fit in already existing governance structures at the site level, building their governance capacity without hindering the coping mechanisms and structures that the communities have been developing for years.

CHALLENGES

- Due to the scale of displacement and the quantity of sites, it was challenging to guarantee individuality of each site. Instead, sites had to be grouped into geographical clusters of sites to analyse data, conduct meetings, or deal with feedback.

- It was challenging to retain balance between providing assistance to all the dispersed settlements and at the same time retain the capacity to respond to the specific needs of each community.

- The lack of constant presence in the site meant that partners often failed to coordinate through CCCM mechanisms. CCCM partners had to put a lot more energy into coordination from a service coordination perspective as compared to in a site or camp where partners are present all together on the ground.

- As much as the 'light touch' of a mobile approach can reduce dependency, it also compromises heavily on service quality. Services were not monitored in the same way as in sites with permanent access and presence. CCCM was only able to be successful in this approach if both the community and the service providers were committed and bought in to the approach. This meant that a lot of effort had to be focused into capacity building and training of both beneficiaries and partners (agencies and local authorities) so there was clarity on CCCM's responsibilities.

LESSONS LEARNED

- The Mobile Approach should go hand in hand with constant presence on the ground through community committee members: building relationship and trust was key to ensure a coordinated and effective approach between the Mobile team and the community. This was especially true in the context where the gatekeepers were frequently suspicious of any community engagement activities within the sites they were employed to manage by the landowners.

- The Mobile Team had to keep a good balanced relationship - a facilitating role - between the gatekeepers, the community, government and other service providers in order to build trust and transparent decision-making processes. In some instances, community members called CCCM team members late at night to report events in the sites and seek for support, demonstrating the trust relationship established between CCCM teams as the primary support and contact point advocating for issues concerning the sites and the life in the sites.

- Coordination at the site level was crucial in Somalia: in a context where often projects were implemented for short period of time and lack continuity or exit strategy, where security conditions often allow only a limited presence in the field and community engagement was either poor or superficial (i.e. stops at beneficiary selection), coordination at the site level and reliable information management supports fact-based advocacy and improved widespread service delivery.

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[1] Operational Portal, CCCM Cluster Somalia

[2] ACCCM Cluster Dashboard, September 2018

[3] Baidoa CCCM Site Verification, September 2018

[4] Since 2015, when the Protection Cluster Eviction Tracker started to be operated by the NRC, on average each year more than 155,000 individuals have been evicted across Somalia. In 2015, according to the tracker, approximately 130,000 individuals were evicted; approximately 162,000 individuals in 2016; and, including the estimated total affected individuals of the 29th and 30th December eviction, 190,000 individuals in 2017. Source, Back-to-square-one, NRC, 2017

[5] AUNHCR, Somalia Displacement Dashboard, Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN)

[6] UNHCR Operational Portal, Somalia

[7] CCCM Cluster Somalia Strategy, Technical Working Groups (Pg 8)

[8] In June 2018

SOUTH SUDAN MOBILE CAMP MANAGEMENT

KEYWORDS:

INTERNALLY DISPLACED, COMMUNAL, MOBILE (RESPONSE) TEAMS, CAPACITY BUILDING

CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT	Conflict in UN House PoC
DATE OF EVENT CAUSING DISPLACEMENT	August 2018 – January 2019
PEOPLE DISPLACED	Outside of camps: UNMISS facilitates: 3,600 IDPs – Self relocated in the proceeding weeks: 1,200
PROJECT LOCATION	Mangateen IDP site, Juba, Jubek State
PROJECT DURATION	August 2018 – January 2019
NUMBER OF PEOPLE TARGETED BY THE PROJECT	Mangateen IDP site: 3,600
CCCM COORDINATION MECHANISM	Cluster Activated (active prior)

SUMMARY:

Following a sudden outflux of at least 3,000 IDPs from the Juba UN House Protection of Civilian (PoC) site after the outbreak of internal conflict, the CCCM cluster called on partners to launch one of the first formal mobile camp management responses in the country. The sudden displacement and the small population size meant that a full-scale camp management response was not required and the overall goal of the response was to support suddenly displaced people to equitably access humanitarian services and to ensure that the affected population is empowered to manage their own site management and coordination activities.

2018

TIMELINE

2019

MILESTONE 4

MILESTONE 3

CONFLICT

JUL   AUG   SEP   OCT   NOV   DEC   JAN   FEB

A 12 August 2018[1] A largescale outbreak of conflict in UN House Protection of Civilian site (PoC) between two community groups.

B 13 - 24 August 2018 One community was forcibly displaced into the weapon free zone (WFZ) to the north of UN House Protection of Civilian site (PoC) 3 in Juba, South Sudan.

✳ 15 August 2018 Project start date.

1 23 August 2018 Movement of population to Mangateen by UNMISS begins.

2 26 August 2018 CCCM mobile response formally launched.

3 Throughout Advocacy to secure land.

4 15 - 30 November 2018 Intensive capacity building of site committees.

✳ 1 December 2018 Project Handover.

✳ 10 February 2019 OCHA request reactivation of Mobile response due to failings in finding transitional solutions across the humanitarian community.

CCCM CLUSTER

CONTEXT

Displacement in South Sudan was caused by multiple and overlapping drivers. South Sudan has faced years of conflict and violence driven by a multitude of armed groups vying for resources, territory and political power. Despite a peace process in 2017 that culminated with a signed ceasefire agreement, inter-communal violence has continued. Violence targeting civilians has led to large-scale displacement as have reductions to agricultural output, leading to limited livelihood opportunities and food insecurity that drives further displacement. Sudden-onset hazards such as floods occur regularly and additionally add to hardship and displacement.[2] OCHA estimated that 1.9 million people were internally displaced, and an additional 2.1 million South Sudanese refugees were living in neighbouring countries[3]. South Sudan also hosts over 200,000 refugees who likewise lacked resources and were highly vulnerable to natural hazards and the ongoing violence. IDPs in South Sudan were living in a variety of displacement sites, including informal settlements, collective centres and UNMISS Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites[4]. The Mangateen site had limited services and little coordination at this stage. On 25 August, the CCCM cluster commenced the emergency mobile camp management intervention through the implementing agencies.

PROJECT

PROTECTION RISKS

Relocation to Mangateen was not a durable solution for the affected population. There was little time to conduct a safety audit or in-depth analysis of housing, land and property (HLP) rights. HLP rights remain an issue at the site in December 2018. The rapid requirement of service scale-up was a challenge, with the mobile camp management team working amongst a range of stakeholders to advocate at both national and local level for increased services. Upon initial arrival at Mangateen in late August, protection actors were immediately deployed to establish Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) services, setting up a women and girls' friendly space and establish case management given the risk of SGBV that the population faced during residence in the PoC, the relocation and subsequent residence in the new site.

CCCM ACTIVITIES

The Mangateen site was not prepared for an influx, however humanitarian organisations planned to support the site with short-term humanitarian responses. The government was requested to allocate new land to resettle the newly displaced population, and this site could then have proper site planning and layout. This new land has not yet been allocated and the influx from PoC 3 remain at Mangateen as of March 2019.

Shelter provision was by far the largest immediate need in the site. The initial assessment identified a large warehouse of approximately 720 sqm to accommodate 600 IDPs, which was not sufficient to accommodate the 3,379 people that moved into Mangateen. The site remained overcrowded, with camp management continuing efforts to coordinate effective space planning with shelter actors and the community. Relations with the host community in Mangateen had proved to be a challenge in the past given the increased access to resources that IDPs received compared to long term residents, and tensions could potentially spill over. Camp management continued to advocate for peace-building activities throughout the project, working to establish joint leadership structures that included both host community and IDP representatives and facilitating continued dialogue between different groups.

The implementing agencies activities at Mangateen site included:
- Strengthening coordination mechanisms
- Service mapping
- Chairing coordination meetings involving humanitarian agencies and executive leadership
- Establishment of regular communication with the CCCM State Focal Point
- Establishment of technical meetings (protection/SGBV meetings/education meetings)

Enhancement of information management
- Updating the site map
- Registering the self-relocated IDPs

Community engagement for displacement affected communities
- Creation of site committees including women, youth and elders
- Facilitating training for effective feedback collection with community mobilizers and outreach workers from the community

Site maintenance
- Building a community centre/office desk for the site committees to use
- Improving water drainage and monitoring for flooding

Service monitoring and advocacy
- Conducting site level service mapping to end service duplication and report service gaps to relevant clusters
- Using a CCCM Rapid Site Assessment Tool[5] to ensure adequate service provision

At this time[6], further funding was required to continue to support essential protection and WASH services. Mangateen could transition from a site served by humanitarian efforts to a sustainable transit site for current and future populations.

The multi-sector approach used in Mangateen

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IMPLEMENTATION

The situation of Mangateen was opportune for launching one of the first formal mobile CCCM responses in the country due to the presence of two agencies available to support the response with a smooth transition. There was a limited funding basket available for the launch of a full-scale response, which was deemed unnecessary since many of the newly displaced had gained experience and understanding of camp management while staying in the POC site. Beyond this, in considering the long-term, the CCCM cluster had a State Focal Point working in the area for monitoring and follow-ups. The mobile response was launched based on the idea that Mangateen would be a small site with a population that, building on their experience and knowledge additional training on key components of camp management, would have enabled the community to be capable of day-to-day site management. This has been cited as the "community-based CCCM model in South Sudan."

The newly displaced population had resided in a PoC for up to 5 years, so they were familiar with camp management and had good relations with the implementing agencies as a camp management agency. Furthermore, a number of members of the population had either held positions on site committees in the PoC or had attended training on camp management and coordination previously. A community-based camp management approach to prepare community committees to take over camp management responsibilities was appropriate for the context.

For this intervention to be successful, two core phases were planned:
- Phase 1 saw the establishment of coordination and community engagement mechanisms;
- Phase 2 saw the handover and intensive capacity building of the community to take on their own site management duties with follow up support to be provided by the CCCM State Focal Point.

In Phase 1, the aim was to provide emergency coordination and establish mechanisms amongst all responding partners in the site, keeping in mind that the UN Peacekeeping Mission made a rapid decision to move a significant number of IDPs out of the UN House PoC site to Mangateen. The circumstances were complex, and there were real concerns about the safety of the population.

Phase 2 focused on building site committees' skillsets in managing their own camp management duties, chair their own coordination meetings and work directly with humanitarian service providers. During this phase, capacity building was conducted via classroom training as well as hands-on support, such as having community leaders chair humanitarian coordination meetings with support and guidance from a member of the mobile team. Once the implementing agency exited as the camp management agency, the State Focal Point was tasked with the regular monitoring of the site.

During the initial drafting of this case study in December 2018, Phase 2 was almost at completion. However, due to needs on the site, the implementing agencies were requested to return to Mangateen as Camp Management agency to ensure minimum service delivery as well as begin the implementation of a transitional approach to Mangateen. At the time of writing this document[7], funding was being discussed to turn Mangateen into a formal transit site in Juba, in the context of discussions regarding transitional solutions with respect to positive outcomes of the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan.

IMPACT OF THE PROJECT

The project had a positive impact on the affected population. Despite the initial confusion of large number of humanitarian service providers in Mangateen, camp management initiated strong coordination and collaboration between the community leadership and humanitarian service providers during Phase 1. Service mapping and establishing coordination meetings among humanitarian agencies and community leaders, including protection/SGBV meetings set a schedule of activities that can be continued after handover of camp management to the camp committees. Tools, registration lists, and maps were also developed for handover, and site planning mitigated some of the risks faced by the Mangateen community.

During Phase 2, the community leadership has been empowered to take over their own camp management on the site through intensive training. This included the community leadership undertaking site management meetings, coordinating service mapping and provision and acting as a linking point between the community and humanitarian service providers. The community leadership was supported for a time-limited period with mentoring on the ground and follow up support to address key issues.

ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

ACHIEVEMENTS

- The mobile approach allowed flexibility and a rapid response. It utilised core CCCM methodologies and activities to establish rapid coordination mechanisms onsite at Mangateen where a duplication of services and/or gaps existed.

- The implementing agencies ensured a sustainable exit from the site from the onset of planning the response. Day-to- day coordination and management activities were always intended to be left to the community, leaving space for follow-up monitoring.

- The Mangateen response capitalised on the knowledge of the population, who had previous experience with camp management and with the implementing agencies from living in the PoC in Juba. The methodology facilitated community leaders to be directly linked into the humanitarian coordination system, allowing for transition of responsibility directly to the community.

CHALLENGES

- During the initial influx into Mangateen site, a lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities between responding partners and the CCCM Cluster was clearly visible.

- Land rights of Mangateen site were unclear and remain an ongoing challenge. Discussions to establish a form of security of tenure remain unresolved.

- Given the general situation in South Sudan of multiple displacements and a history of tensions at the UN House PoC there was a lack of preparation and readiness of the responders to prepare for sudden outflux from the PoC.

LESSONS LEARNED

- Setting an inflexible timeframe for phases of a mobile response is not feasible due to contextual influences, community engagement and host community relations, the level of learning within the population and the willingness and buy-in of the community to establish representative site committees with clear mandates and term times.

- Understanding the role and responsibilities of camp management should be enhanced with all stakeholders, including other responding partners.

- Having an exit strategy from day one is crucial. Beyond this, the community should understand and contribute to establishing the roles and responsibilities of the mobile team from the outset.

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[1] For a detailed timeline, please see Mangateen: Reflections // A roadmap, published by ACTED

[2] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). 2018. South Sudan.

[3] OCHA. 30 November 2018. Humanitarian Bulletin: South Sudan.

[4] PoC 1 site remains the smaller of the two PoC sites in Juba, with a total of 7,515 people currently living there, while the PoC 3 site hosts 24,598 individuals. IOM, DTM, 19.1.2019,

Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites, Juba

[5] Included in tool section

[6] March 2019

[7] March 2019

Shelters at Mangateen site.

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