The case concerned the applicant’s removal to Sudan by the Belgian authorities in spite of a court
decision ordering the suspension of the measure.
The Court found in particular that on account of procedural defects attributable to the Belgian
authorities prior to the applicant’s removal to Sudan, he had been prevented from pursuing the
asylum application that he had lodged in Belgium and the Belgian authorities had not sufficiently
assessed the real risks that he faced in Sudan.
In addition, by deporting the applicant in spite of the court order to suspend the measure, the
authorities had rendered ineffective the applicant’s successful appeal.
The observation by the court in MIAB at paragraph 68 that many of the time-limits in the Dublin III Regulation are solely intended to regulate the position as between different member states is, at least as regards the six month time limit in article 29(1), inconsistent with the Court’s ruling that an applicant is entitled to rely upon expiry of the time limit in order to resist a transfer to the requested state. The same goes for the obiter observation of the Lord Ordinary in BM at paragraph 26 that the time limits in article 29(1) are solely intended to regulate the matter between member states.
nothing in Shiri that casts any doubt on the correctness of the views expressed in both MIAB and BM regarding the suspensive effect of an administrative cancellation of removal directions falling within article 27(4).
