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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL PIKAMÄE, in Case C‑483/20 XXXX
v Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides (Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d'État (Belgium))
1. Migratory journeys are often the result of a combination of two elements: chance and necessity. In the case before the Court, a Syrian national, after travelling through Libya and Turkey, arrived in Austria, where, out of necessity, he lodged an application for international protection. After obtaining refugee status, he went to Belgium to be reunited with his two children, one of whom is a minor, and there lodged a new application for international protection, which was declared inadmissible in view of the prior recognition granted in the first Member State. 2. It is against that background that the question arises, to my knowledge for the first time, whether, in particular, the fundamental right to respect for family life enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), read in conjunction with the obligation to take into consideration the child’s best interests set out in Article 24(2) of the Charter, can override the inadmissibility mechanism for applications for international protection laid down in Article 33(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32/EU. (2) 30 September 2021 | Judicial Body: European Union: Court of Justice of the European Union | Legal Instrument: 2013 Dublin III Regulation (EU) | Topic(s): Refugee status determination (RSD) / Asylum procedures - Right to family life | Countries: Austria - Belgium - Syrian Arab Republic |
XY v Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl Case C-18/20
preliminary ruling on interpretation of article 40 Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection 9 September 2021 | Judicial Body: European Union: Court of Justice of the European Union | Topic(s): Refugee status determination (RSD) / Asylum procedures | Countries: Austria - Iraq |
Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in Case C‑18/20
(1) The concept of ‘new elements or findings [that] have arisen or have been presented by the applicant’, as used in Article 40(2) and (3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, must be interpreted as meaning that it also covers elements or findings which already existed before the procedure relating to a previous application for international protection was definitively concluded, but which were not relied on by the applicant in the context of that procedure. (2) Article 40(3) of Directive 2013/32 must be interpreted as meaning that the substantive examination of a subsequent application does not require a specific procedure, provided that the national procedure fulfils the requirements laid down in Chapter II of that directive. Article 42(2) of that directive, read in conjunction with Article 40(2) to (4) and Article 33(2)(d) thereof, must be interpreted as prohibiting the setting of time limits per se. (3) Article 40(4) of Directive 2013/32 must be interpreted as meaning that the condition relating to the absence of fault laid down therein cannot be applied in the context of an administrative procedure unless that condition is expressly laid down in national law in a manner that satisfies the requirements of legal certainty. It is for the referring court to verify whether this is the case here. 15 April 2021 | Judicial Body: European Union: Court of Justice of the European Union | Topic(s): Refugee status determination (RSD) / Asylum procedures | Countries: Austria - Iraq |
E 4682/2019-10
The contested finding therefore lacks a conclusive reason why there is no persecution relevant to asylum, in the absence of a discussion of the dangers that threaten the complainant due to the attempted forced recruitment, which has been found to be credible. Likewise, in connection with the examination of the requirements for the granting of the status of subsidiary protection, there is no comprehensible reason for the statement that the complainant is not at risk from the Taliban in Mazar-e Sharif and that a return there is safe and reasonable while the UNHCR guidelines basically assume that there is no internal flight alternative in Afghanistan for people who are persecuted by the Taliban 20 February 2020 | Judicial Body: Austria: Constitutional Court of Austria (Verfassungsgerichtshof) | Topic(s): Internal flight alternative (IFA) / Internal relocation alternative (IRA) / Internal protection alternative (IPA) - Military service / Conscientious objection / Desertion / Draft evasion / Forced conscription - Non-state agents of persecution | Countries: Afghanistan - Austria |
E3369/2019
The Federal Administrative Court (FAC) failed to provide the necessary justification for a finding about the supposed availability of an IFA in Mazar-e Sharif, despite the EASO Country-Guidance on Afghanistan (2018) and respective findings regarding the situation of Afghans who were born in Iran and/or who lived there for a long time. 12 December 2019 | Judicial Body: Austria: Constitutional Court of Austria (Verfassungsgerichtshof) | Topic(s): Internal flight alternative (IFA) / Internal relocation alternative (IRA) / Internal protection alternative (IPA) | Countries: Afghanistan - Austria - Iran, Islamic Republic of |
Mohammed Bilali v Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl (Case C‑720/17) (request for preliminary ruling)
Article 19(1) of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, read in conjunction with Article 16 thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State must revoke subsidiary protection status if it granted that status when the conditions for granting it were not met, in reliance on facts which have subsequently been revealed to be incorrect, and notwithstanding the fact that the person concerned cannot be accused of having misled the Member State on that occasion. 23 May 2019 | Judicial Body: European Union: Court of Justice of the European Union | Legal Instrument: 2011 Recast Qualification Directive (EU) | Topic(s): Cessation clauses - Complementary forms of protection - Statelessness | Countries: Austria |
Conclusion de l'Avocat general Bot dans l'affaire C-720/17 Mohammed Bilali contre Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl [demande de décision préjudicielle formée par le Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Cour administrative, Autriche)]
Une autorité nationale compétente peut-elle se fonder sur les dispositions prévues à l’article 19 de la directive 2011/95/UE (2) afin de procéder à la révocation du statut conféré par la protection subsidiaire à un apatride, et ce en raison d’une appréciation erronée des besoins de protection internationale dont elle est seule responsable ? 24 January 2019 | Judicial Body: European Union: Court of Justice of the European Union | Topic(s): Cessation clauses - Complementary forms of protection - Exclusion clauses - Statelessness | Countries: Algeria - Austria |
Ra 2018/18/0533
The applicant is an Afghan national and member of the ethnic group of Hazaras who was born and raised in Iran. He lodged an application for international protection in Austria in July 2015 which was rejected in first instance in September 2017.The Federal Administrative Court dismissed his appeal on 03/09/2018, arguing that even though the applicant cannot return to Sar-e Pol (where his family was originally from), there was an IFA available in Kabul or Mazar-e Sharif. It elaborated that the applicant had already gathered professional experience, had grown up in an Afghan family and was native speaker of one of the official languages and concluded that the applicant was familiar with the cultural circumstances in Afghanistan. The Austrian Supreme Administrative Court annulled this decision. It stated that the Federal Administrative Court's conclusion that the applicant was familiar with the cultural circumstances in Afghanistan was not evidence-based and emphasized that that the applicant had explicitly contested this. Furthermore the Supreme Administrative Court criticized that the Federal Administrative Court did not take into account and analyse the UNHCR-Afghanistan guidelines. A respective obligation derives from the respective Austrian case law as well as from European Union Law. The Court emphasized that according to UNHCR there was in general no IFA available in Kabul and that the availability of an IFA in other cities was questionable and needed to be assessed in a thorough manner on a case-to-case basis. 13 December 2018 | Judicial Body: Austria: Supreme Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) | Topic(s): Internal flight alternative (IFA) / Internal relocation alternative (IRA) / Internal protection alternative (IPA) | Countries: Afghanistan - Austria - Iran, Islamic Republic of |
Ahmad Shah Ayubi v Bezirkshauptmannschaft Linz-Land (C‑713/17) (request for preliminary ruling)
1. Article 29 of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides that refugees with a temporary right of residence in a Member State are to be granted social security benefits which are less than those received by nationals of that Member State and refugees who have a permanent right of residence in that Member State. 2. A refugee may rely on the incompatibility of legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, with Article 29(1) of Directive 2011/95 before the national courts in order to remove the restriction on his rights provided for by that legislation. 21 November 2018 | Judicial Body: European Union: Court of Justice of the European Union | Topic(s): Economic, social and cultural rights - Refugee / Asylum law | Countries: Austria |
The Queen on the application of:1) Hemmati; 2)Khalili;3) Abdulkadir; 4) Mohammed (Appellants) - and - The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent)
and Between The Queen on the application of SS (Respondent) -and- The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant)
The principal issues in the appeals concern the meaning and effect of Article 2(n) and Article 28 of Dublin III ("Article 2(n)" and "Article 28", respectively), which relate to the detention of an individual for the purpose of transfer to another Member State under that Regulation. Mr Hemmati and Mr Khalili also raise a distinct issue regarding whether Garnham J was right to hold that their detention was lawful by application of the usual principles of domestic law first adumbrated in Re Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704 and rehearsed in later authorities such as R (I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 888 and Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 245 ("the Hardial Singh principles"). 4 October 2018 | Judicial Body: United Kingdom: Court of Appeal (England and Wales) | Legal Instrument: 2013 Dublin III Regulation (EU) | Topic(s): Arbitrary arrest and detention - Prison or detention conditions | Countries: Afghanistan - Austria - Bulgaria - Iran, Islamic Republic of - Iraq - United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland |