BADAKHSHAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

Report

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 26 October 2015, a powerful 7.5 magnitude earthquake struck Jurm district in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province.[1] By 3 November 2015, at least 15 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces had verified damage reports with the north-eastern region being the most severely impacted.[2] Badakhshan and Baghlan provinces suffered the most serious damage; however, there were reports of severely damaged and destroyed homes as far south as Kabul, and even Khost, provinces.[3]

The earthquake, striking in late October, increased the **rapid need for emergency winterized shelter assistance to earthquake-affected communities**. On the instruction of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), 2.64 million USD from the Reserve Allocation of the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) were released to support emergency interventions. This effort aimed to ensure that families whose homes were lost, damaged or who were at risk of exposure to winter conditions, received timely support to access appropriate shelter solutions.[4] Due to the urgent need for winterized shelter and the difficulty in accessing the worst affected areas, the CHF, with technical assistance from Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Item (ESNFI) cluster partners, decided that a cash transfer programme (CTP) would be the best suited assistance option. The emergency shelter response plan included both one-off upfront payments and four monthly payments of varying amounts depending on whether those displaced were considered to be of Category A (house completely destroyed) or Category B (house damaged) households. These cash distribution programmes were implemented in the worst affected province by partner members of the Afghanistan ESNFI cluster.

REACH, on behalf of the global shelter cluster, conducted this ESNFI Cluster Evaluation Response assessment to **evaluate the effect of the emergency shelter responses on household shelter conditions**, following the October 2015 Badakhshan earthquake. Specifically, the assessment evaluates the ESNFI cluster's response to the Badakhshan earthquake in relation to a) the use of cash assistance as an emergency shelter intervention approach, b) the change in shelter conditions and c) any assistance gaps or limits to recovery. In addition to evaluating the ESNFI intervention as a whole, the report provides also an endline assessment concerning household conditions and current damage level from data gathered in October and November 2015.

Baseline data concerning the number of those affected and relevant damage levels was based on a secondary data review (SDR) of various documents. These include rapid assessment forms (RAF), ESNFI partner datasets, post-distribution monitoring reports and OCHA situation reports from November 2015 concerning Badakhshan, Baghlan and Kabul, three provinces in which the cash assistance programme was implemented. Although there is no single coordinated baseline assessment, these materials provide the best information in order to produce a comparison in terms of household damage and repairs. To do so, the evaluation assessed a random sample of earthquake affected households taken from beneficiary lists of implementing partners. As initially identified in the baseline, this sample resulted in the assessment of 48% destroyed (category A) and 52% damaged (category B) households.

a) The use of cash assistance as an emergency shelter intervention approach

The percentage of assistance spent on shelter material by households across all three provinces amounted to 25% for houses completely destroyed and 50% for those with damages. In Baghlan, households with

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[1] United States Geological Survey, 26 October 2015 http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/us10003re5#executive
[2] OCHA, Afghanistan Earthquake: Overview of Reported Damages and Affected Population (updated 3 November 2015)
[3] Ibid.
[4] Afghanistan – Common Humanitarian Fund 2nd Reserve Allocation (2015) – Earthquake Response Guidance on Eligible Partners & Activities

completed repairs spent on average 50% of their cash assistance package on shelter, whilst households with repairs not started and on hold spent on average 19%. Kabul households spent the higher rate of the original assistance package on shelter materials and labour (on average 56%), resulting in 36% of households assessed having completed their repairs. Yet, **in the 30 days prior to data collection they reported an average monthly expenditure of just 4% on shelter repairs and, as a result, recorded only 1% of household with repairs ongoing**. Also, across all three provinces, and especially in Kabul, spending on shelter has subsided since the cash assistance packages were distributed. As a result, the **54% of households that have repair work on hold or not started are unlikely to begin until more funds for shelter repairs are being made available, and the 14% with repairs ongoing are at risk of having to put them on hold if they cannot continue to afford them**.

Badakhshan households on average spread their original cash assistance package more thinly across several needs and, as a result, they initially spent the least of the three provinces on shelter materials. Consequently, **they reported the lowest number of completed households (22%) but currently have 21% with repairs ongoing; this is higher than in other provinces**. This may be due to harsh Badakhshan winters, with households preferring to wait until the spring before engaging in large scale repairs. Thirty days prior to the assessment, Badakhshan households spent the most of their monthly income on shelter which further supports their high number of repairs ongoing.

Reportedly, cash usage of the original assistance package and household income expenditure during the 30 days prior to the assessment are starkly different. Food expenditures increased from **23% to 49%,** health expenses more than tripled from **5% to 18%,** whilst shelter spending dropped from an overall average of **61% to just 23%.** Therefore, most of the cash assistance was spent on shelter, however, as soon as the assistance came to an end, other expenditure items were given priority over shelter needs. Therefore, **those households who spent heavily on shelter from their original assistance package are more likely to have houses complete or near complete now** in comparison to vulnerable households who equally divided their initial assistance package between food and shelter. Households who had to divide their assistance package to support other household expenditures are thus unlikely today to be able to fully recover without additional aid assistance.

b) The change in shelter conditions

Across the three provinces, the evaluation found that shelter conditions have improved and now **32% of households have reported that repairs are completed, while 29% are still missing doors and windows, a roof or both, and 39% are still inhabitable**. The highest percentage of household living areas still inhabitable are to be found in Kabul (54%), followed by Baghlan (35%) and Badakhshan (53%). The situation is particularly alarming in the districts of Andarab and Fereng Gharu, Baghlan, where this percentage ranges between 63 and 82%. On a different aspect, participants reported a large number of households still to be repaired in Badakhshan (53%), followed by Baghlan (23%) and Kabul (12%). **Where household repairs remained incomplete (68% of all households), a considerable number of participants maintained that their repairs and reconstructions had either not yet started, or had started but are currently on hold; this was the case for 75% of destroyed and 42% of damaged houses.**

Additionally, the assessment outlined that more households in Baghlan and Kabul were found to have completed their repairs than in Badakhshan. One of the barriers in Badakhshan that limited their reconstruction was a heavy need to spend on shelter labour, as they spent 20% of their package compared

to 6% in Kabul and just 4% in Baghlan. This could be explained by the fact that, in Kabul and Baghlan, unskilled and uncontracted work was one of the most popular income generating activities; an abundance of unskilled workers may have driven the price of labour down.

c) Any assistance gaps or limits to recovery

When asked *why repairs* were not completed, 92% of households not having completed repairing reported that, despite the cash assistance they received, they could not afford shelter materials and 83% reported they could not afford labour. This is despite the fact that labour was obtainable, as only 3% of households with repairs not started or on hold reported that it was unavailable at the market.

Concerning build back better (BBB) methods, almost every repairs completed and ongoing household assessed had lintels, and their windows and doors were 60cm away from corners. Without a baseline assessment of household structure safety and building habits, it is impossible to say if there has been an improvement but they are definitely two key methods of construction advised to protect households against structural damage. However these households are still not entirely protected against future disasters. A large proportion with repairs completed and ongoing failed to incorporate other key BBB methods as **73% had no plinth bands, 70% reportedly had cracks and 53% had no corner bracing.**

As a result of the evaluation assessment the following recommendations are suggested by the ESNFI cluster to improve post-disaster cash assistance programmes in the future:

1.   Shelter Needs Assessments

1.1 **Displacement coping mechanisms** ought to be included in a shelter needs assessment so as to better identify those most in need and help inform a tailored shelter response. An assessment of household damage leads to assumptions regarding numbers of those displaced and their coping mechanisms. As such, **the level of household damage might differ from household vulnerability and shelter needs**. For example, those with completely destroyed households may be staying in an improvised shelter with no protection from the weather or may be safe, sheltering with family or friends.

1.2 **Gender analysis** ought to be included in a baseline investigation concerning shelter interventions in Afghanistan. Due to cultural conditions, it is far more likely that when a natural disaster strikes, females are the most to be initially affected, as they tend to be inside shelters due to daily tasks and drudgery. **It is thus crucial to understand the perspectives of women and girls in the household and female headed households as part of a baseline**. Not only so to ensure that their specific needs are met after the disaster, but also to look at how reconstruction, repairs and shelter interventions are understood by female headed households and how they have improved, or failed to improve, their lives.

1.3 A **standardised shelter assessment tool** would be useful for all ESNFI partners to implement when a specialist shelter assessment is needed following a displacement emergency or natural disaster. This **tool would ensure that all partners are using the same indicators and would simplify the sharing of information and assistance if one partner has the capacity to deliver assistance where another does not.** It would ensure that a standardised baseline exists in all areas affected by a disaster regardless of which ESNFI partner supported this area. This will allow future response evaluation assessments to be more methodical in their comparisons between past and present, different geographical areas and different organisations' responses.

2.   Targeting Criteria

2.1 **Shelter vulnerability analysis should include food security and livelihood indicators** in order to understand cash usage and where intended spending might be sacrificed in place of other needs. Implementing partners of the cash assistance programme performed market assessments and household assessments in order to design the post-earthquake cash assistance programme. **However, these assessments failed to identify that among earthquake affected populations food remained a top priority even after food assistance**.

2.2 **Income generating habits** should be considered as part of the design of post-disaster cash assistance programmes in order to design cash intervention strategies that are suited to livelihood profiles. In this assessment, in areas where cash crop farming was a popular income source, household spent much less on food which allowed them the freedom to spend more on shelter. On the contrary, **by identifying income earning habits, cash assistance interventions can be modified to suit populations' needs and be more efficient in the long term**. For example in a post-disaster area with high unemployment where unskilled daily labour is a popular income source, a cash for work scheme might work well alongside the cash assistance intervention.

3.   Response Design

3.1 **Transport prices and labour prices** ought to be included in a market assessment, particularly in rural areas, in order to truly identify reconstruction costs and thus tailor the cash assistance amounts to the needs of those affected. Although market surveys were conducted, they concentrated on price fluctuations and market access in relation to distance, time and security. **The transport of household reconstruction materials and labour may, especially in rural and mountainous areas, involve complex transportation possibly involving large expensive vehicles**. Similarly labour prices were not included, which can depend upon the amount of skilled labourers available to hire.

3.2 **BBB and disaster risk reduction (DRR) training** ought to be prioritized as part of a cash assistance intervention that involves large scale repairs and reconstruction, as it reduces risk of future destruction. If a cash assistance intervention is chosen as the best option to provide emergency shelter to affected families and to financially support the redevelopment of their homes, then BBB and DRR training should be an essential module of that intervention prior and during assistance. DRR is often largely the responsibility of the household themselves and making sure that BBB methods are used as part of their household structure is an important and approachable DRR tactic. **Beneficiaries should receive training/awareness sessions on the importance of BBB for future safety and how to incorporate BBB methods into the reconstruction process**. This should also be followed up with a monitoring assessment that identifies if BBB methods/materials have been used and if not why not.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
ANDMA	Afghan National Disaster Management Authority
ARCS	Afghan Red Crescent Society
BBB	Build Back Better
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ESNFI	Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items
NAC	Norwegian Afghanistan Committee
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PIN	People in Need
PPS	Probability Proportional to Size
SDR	Secondary Data Review

GEOGRAPHICAL CLASSIFICATIONS

Region	Unrecognised by Government but commonly used by the humanitarian community
Province	Highest form of official governance below the national level
District	One level below province, each province is subdivided on average into 11 districts

INTRODUCTION

On October 26th 2015 a 7.5 magnitude earthquake struck Afghanistan's Badakhshan province. Assessments conducted one month after the earthquake indicated that 136,967 people were in need of humanitarian assistance as a result of the disaster, with a heavy emphasis on shelter and NFI assistance, as a result of the **12,794 homes damaged and the 7,834 homes destroyed**[5].

Ninety-five per cent of people affected by the earthquake received some level of immediate life-saving food and shelter assistance from the Government and humanitarian actors during the first month following the earthquake.[6] This assistance was vital during the immediate aftermath of the disaster. However it was recognized by the aid community as **nowhere near enough to provide adequate shelter conditions throughout the harsh winter months to those worst affected**.[7]

Assistance efforts were hindered due to a variety of reasons: insecurity and ongoing conflict in certain districts, the mountainous terrain and rural nature of many affected communities, extreme winter weather and continuous seismic activity in Badakhshan province which included a 5.7 magnitude earthquake a month after the initial disaster[8] and a 6.3 two months after.[9] It is possible that these repetitive earthquakes may have contributed to additional damage to households and further limited shelter repairs.

As a result 2.64 USD from the Reserve Allocation of the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) were released to support emergency interventions. A cash transfer programme (CTP) programme was chosen **to provide beneficiaries with choice, flexibility and dignity whilst also stimulating local markets and economic recovery**[10]. The implementing partners of the CHF cash assistance programme included Danish Refugee Council (DRC), AfghanAid, People in Need (PIN), Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC) and the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED).

As part of this response, the Afghanistan Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items (ESNFI) cluster's primary objective was to ensure that affected communities living in damaged or destroyed houses were provided with suitable short-term shelter solutions[11]. The secondary objective was to ensure that disaster displaced persons were adequately protected from the weather and had privacy for family life through the provision of emergency shelter and NFIs[12]. Households receiving assistance were divided into two Categories, A (house completely destroyed) and Category B (house damaged). A full definition of the categories, as well as an outline of the cash assistance packages and their intended uses, will be detailed later in the report.

The initial categorisation of household damage was taken from a variety of sources consulted during the SDR which included RAF, ESNFI partner datasets, post-distribution monitoring reports and OCHA situation reports. Together these materials form the baseline of this assessment, allowing an understanding of the key

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[5] OCHA, Afghanistan Earthquake: Situation Report No. 4 (as of 23 November 2015)
[6] OCHA, Afghanistan Earthquake: Situation Report No. 4 (as of 23 November 2015)
[7] Afghanistan – Common Humanitarian Fund 2nd Reserve Allocation (2015) – Earthquake Response Guidance on Eligible Partners & Activities
[8] United States Geological Survey 22 November 2015 http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/us100040ct#executive,
[9] United States Geological Survey 25 December 2015 http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/us100049i1#executive
[10] Dewast, C. Global Shelter Cluster – Literature Review of the Use of Cash in Shelter
[11] Humanitarian Country Team Strategic Response Plan Afghanistan (2015) – ES/NFI Cluster Strategic Objective 1
[12] Humanitarian Country Team Strategic Response Plan Afghanistan (2015) – ES/NFI Cluster Strategic Objective 2

statistics concerning the number of households affected and whether they are Category A destroyed or Category B damaged. No official ESNFI cluster baseline assessment exists and so these assessments taken by various partners in November 2015 are the best source available for understanding the scale of damaged households. The data included in this assessment was collected one year later in October and November 2016. The questionnaire included questions concerning level of damage and current household conditions. Thus when analysing shelter repairs and conditions we can compare our baseline data, drawn from a variety of sources, to the endline data gathered as part of this assessment.

The report will include an in-depth methodology, followed by a brief demographic introduction to the areas of intervention and the affected population from which the data has come. This will be followed by the assessment findings split into the two main objective sections; change in shelter conditions and assistance which will also include an evaluations of assistance gaps and limitations. Finally the report will focus on areas of success and conclusions including a list of recommendations.

OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSESSMENT

Key stakeholders include all members of the Afghanistan ESNFI cluster, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) and all other local, civil society, non-government and international organisations that have an interest in the provision of emergency shelter assistance in Afghanistan.

The assessment aim is to appraise the ESNFI cluster and its partners' intervention following the October 2015 earthquake in Badakhshan. It will evaluate to what extent affected families' shelter conditions improved as a result of the cash based assistance and whether, if aspects of the intervention had been different, they may have improved more. The evaluation will investigate limitations in the intervention and advise recommendations for future actions. The report's aim is to re-evaluate post-disaster shelter assistance interventions in Afghanistan so as to result in a more tailored, effective, resourceful and long lasting response.

In order to better inform future ESNFI cluster post-emergency interventions, cash-based or otherwise, the report will concentrate on answering the following research questions:

Change in shelter conditions
RQ #1 How have shelter conditions improved for affected families?

Assistance
RQ #2 How useful was the shelter intervention in enabling families to recover?
RQ #3 What residual gaps and limitations existed in the intervention?

Reconstruction and Recovery
RQ #4 What is limiting affected household's recovery?
RQ #5 What measures have been taken that have had a positive affect?

The conclusion of the report will be recommendations focussed so as to improve emergency shelter assistance programmes in the future and to serve as tool to inform potential future allocations of cash assistance to those affected by the Badakhshan earthquake. The report will provide ESNFI partners with a comprehensive understanding as to the current level of reconstruction in areas that received cash assistance packages. It will identify where shelter repairs are limited or non-existent and why, so as to better inform future post-disaster shelter interventions.

METHODOLOGY

SECONDARY DATA REVIEW

Prior to the launch of primary data collection REACH conducted a thorough SDR to identify information gaps in the target areas with regards to shelter vulnerability. This involved studying previous beneficiary lists, ESNFI partner data sets, Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) reports and needs assessments, both Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM) and Rapid Assessment Forms (RAF). This was done in order to determine the ideal data collection method, sampling strategy, target area and other crucial tenets of the primary data collection. The SDR not only aided the design of the chosen primary data collection approach but was also utilised to triangulate data collected by enumerators in the field. The methodology of the assessment was developed together alongside ESNFI cluster members. They worked together to outline the assessment strategy and finalise the tools used so as to achieve harmonized results.

Locations

As per the nature of the assessment the geographical areas of study chosen had to include those areas that received cash assistance packages as part of the CHF and ESNFI cluster shelter intervention. This included Badakhshan, the earthquake's epicentre and the province that sustained by far the most damage, and Baghlan, noted by OCHA to have the second largest number of damaged and destroyed homes after Badakhshan[13]. Kabul was chosen as another area of assessment not only because it also received assistance as part of the ESNFI intervention but because it is Afghanistan's most populous district with differing household structure, size and dynamic. It offered the ESNFI cluster a good opportunity to investigate how emergency shelter cash assistance packages manifest themselves in the urban and peri-urban environments.

PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION

Sampling Strategy

The assessment used a simplified stratified sampling method in order to give a complete picture of the shelter situations of households in the districts of Badakhshan that sustained the highest levels of shelter damage as a result of the October earthquake, in addition to districts where information gaps existed.

A sample of households with a 95% level of confidence and 5% margin of error was drawn from each beneficiary list (Category A and Category B) of the districts of interest in order to achieve:

1. The widest possible geographical coverage concerning districts that received assistance and those not previously assessed
2. A minimum acceptable level of precision when disaggregating EITHER by district OR by type or assistance
3. Best comparability with the baseline assessment

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[13] OCHA, Afghanistan Earthquake: Overview of Reported Damages and Affected Population (updated 3 November 2015)

Where logistically feasible, geographical areas included difficult to reach mountainous areas and places at risk to future monsoon/glacial melt flooding and landslides. A significant number of districts covered in the baseline assessment were evaluated, including many hard to reach areas in the north-eastern region.

In line with the baseline methodology, communities were randomly selected within each district according to the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) method. A random sample of households to be interviewed was taken from the beneficiary lists of those partners who implemented the cash assistance programme. Primary data collections resulted in **954 household surveys being completed in 3 priority districts** as identified during the SDR.

Figure 1: Number of household surveys completed by category and province

Category A   Category B

DATA COLLECTION
Questionnaire:

The questionnaire was developed in partnership with key members of the ESNFI cluster and included questions that matched the suggested indicators. After its approval by the cluster coordinator and steering committee it underwent a secondary validation review at REACH's headquarters before being finally released. The full questionnaire is attached to this report as **Annex 1.**

Enumerators:
Data collection was completed using staff seconded by shelter cluster partners. The enumerators were sourced from AfghanAid, PIN and ACTED, three of the organisations who distributed cash as part of CHF ESNFI shelter intervention. These organisations provided REACH with accessibility, working knowledge of difficult to reach areas and offered their assistance in data collection in order that they may learn more about the impact of their emergency shelter activities. All enumerators were trained in specific REACH data

collection techniques and spent a considerable amount of time familiarising themselves with the research questionnaire prior to entering the field.

Logistical Support:

As with data collection staff, vehicles and transportation for the purpose of the assessment were sourced from shelter cluster partners. As part of their role as enumerators, AfghanAid, PIN and ACTED took charge of managing their own logistics.

Data Entry and Analysis:

All primary data collection at the household level was conducted using Samsung S7 Android smartphones running the data collection software KoBoToolbox. Completed assessment forms were uploaded to the offline data aggregator or, at the earliest opportunity, to the online data aggregator for evaluation and cleaning. Throughout the data collection period REACH conducted a basic cleaning, spell check and translation of text followed by a more rigorous data cleaning method after collection had finished. Following cleaning and preliminary analysis REACH held a presentation with shelter clusters partners and other relevant actor. During the presentation input was received to help direct and guide further analysis and facilitate the production of the final analytical report.

LIMITATIONS

A small variety of challenges and limitations presented themselves throughout the assessment, most of which were previously identified as being a risk during the assessment planning period.

- As the data collection was done by a selection of different ESNFI cluster members, there was some difficulty in coordinating schedules and harmonizing the data collection process. This resulted in data from different areas and organisations being delivered at different times. These was not a large problem as the time between collections was used to further verify and clean the data gathered.

- The data collection was carried out up to a year after the initial cash assistance package was distributed. Thus for questions concerning cash usage there is a risk of recall bias attributed to amount spent per category. This unfortunately is unavoidable hazard of assessing cash usage so long after distribution however a rigorous data cleaning made sure that any outliers were removed.

- Comparison between the baseline and endline assessments concerning levels of household damage and reconstruction can only be considered indicative. The baseline used in this report is a combination of various rapid assessments, partner datasets, situation reports and post distribution monitoring reports from differing organisations. Each of these assessments resulted in the identification of affected households as completely destroyed or partially damaged. The endline assessment of current household conditions uses definitions, explained in full later in the report that may well differ from those of the original baseline assessments. Thus, explanations that compare the two and analyse the improvement of a Category A household that is now considered Category B or even completed, are by no means exact as the baseline and endline assessments are from different sources and use different definitions. However these comparisons are still informative in offering an understanding as to household improvements.

- There was difficulty in representing the female voice and perspective of female headed households in the assessment. Female headed households across all three earthquake affected provinces assessed were difficult to identify and access. Questions concerning females in the household that were asked to the male household head are unlikely to truly capture the actual perspective of the females living there. In fact often questions concerning pregnancy, breastfeeding and other female issues were left unanswered due to cultural reservations about discussing these issues with outsiders. These are both recurrent problems in assessments countrywide and are something REACH is currently endeavouring to manage and negotiate for future assessments. Similarly the 'baseline' materials consulted as part of the assessment often lacked the female position regarding the Badakhshan earthquake. In Afghanistan, due to cultural conditions concerning females leaving the house, it is often women that are always at home when natural disasters hit and thus are more likely to be directly affected. Thus it is more important than ever that we do everything possible to capture an equal perspective.

ASSESSMENT FINDINGS

The primary data collection took place across three different Afghan provinces, all of which were badly affected by the October earthquake and received cash assistance as part of the CHF ESNFI shelter intervention. The assessment covered 8 districts of Kabul, 7 of Baghlan and 11 of Badakhshan.

Demographics and Household Arrangements

Across all three provinces household heads were overwhelmingly male with 97% in Kabul, 98% in Badakhshan and 99% in Baghlan. All household heads were on average between the ages of 42 and 49 and in Baghlan, 3% were under the age of 20, the highest percentage of any province. Households in all three provinces contained on average 2 children under the age of 5 years old.

Dependency levels were much more positive in **Badakhshan where a household depended on average of up to 4 breadwinners/income earners over the age of 16 compared to 1 in Baghlan and less than 1 in Kabul**. This statistic is even more crucial due to the fact that household size on average was 9 persons in Badakhshan and Baghlan and 11 persons in Kabul. In Kabul exactly 50% of the sample reported their household as having no breadwinner at all.

Figure 2: Proportion of household members over the age of 16 and contributing to income generating activities

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7+
Kabu	50%	26%	15%	6%	3%	0%	0%	0%
Baghlan	7%	64%	26%	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%
Badakhshan	4%	9%	20%	19%	19%	11%	8%	10%

The high number of income earners in Badakhshan might be linked to their particular source of income. Cash crop and livestock farming, an income earning activity that can easily involve many family members, accounted for 52% of primary income in Badakhshan compared to 28% in Baghlan and 16% in Kabul.

Numbers concerning self-reported vulnerable household members varied across the provinces and were dependent upon on their specific vulnerability. The differences were mainly between vulnerability characteristics concerning health and those attributed to pregnancy and child feeding. housholds in Badakhshan had the highest numbers of pregnant women (24%) and breastfeeding mothers (59%) and lowest number of disabled household members (18%) and chronically ill household members (16%). For Kabul however these results were the opposite as **they had the highest number of disabled and chronically ill household members and the lowest numbers of pregnant and breastfeeding women**. Baghlan remained somewhere in the middle but their numbers were generally closer to those of Badakhshan.

Figure 3: Proportion of households than contain vulnerable members

The average household size in Kabul was 11 members compared to nine in both Baghlan and Badakhshan and, possibly as a result, households in Kabul were generally more crowded than in Baghlan or Badakhshan. In Kabul not a single one room house contained fewer than five people. Ninety per cent of one room houses contained between five and nine people compared to 72% in Baghlan and 67% in Badakhshan, and 91% of two-bedroom houses in Kabul contained between five and fourteen members.

In both categories A and B, houses in Baghlan were generally smaller than in Badakhshan and Kabul.The average house in Baghlan consisted of two rooms within which household members lived whilst in both Badakhshan and Kabul the average house had three rooms. Two-roomed houses in all three provinces contained on average eight persons. In Badakhshan and Baghlan three roomed houses held on average nine persons whilst for Kabul it was 11 persons.

Figure 4: Average number of household members per household per province

	One room	**Two rooms**	**Three rooms**	**Four rooms**	**Five rooms**
Kabul	7	8	11	11	14
Baghlan	7	8	9	10	13
Badakhshan	7	8	9	9	12

As a result of crowding, homes containing a separate indoor living space for women were far less prevalent in Kabul than in other provinces assessed. Only one in three houses in Kabul had one, compared to one in two in Baghlan and just under two in three in Badakhshan. Of those whose household repairs were complete 66% reported having a separate indoor living place for females whilst **of those whose repairs have not started only 34% had a seprate living area**. This shows that whether displaced or living in a damaged shelter, unrepaired households are struggling to provide female family members with separate indoor living areas.

CHANGE IN SHELTER CONDITIONS

During the weeks following the earthquake all reporting assessments agreed that Badakhshan province, the epicentre of the original 7.5 magnitude earthquake in October 2015, suffered by far the worst damage and recorded the highest number of houses severely damaged and completely destroyed. As of 3rd November 2015, of the 7,815 families thought to be affected in the assessed provinces of Badakhshan, Baghlan and Kabul, **54% were considered to be Category A household, that is "houses completely destroyed", and 46% were category B households, "houses partially damaged"**.[14]

However these numbers were not evenly split between the provinces. Badakhshan recorded much higher damage than in either Baghlan or Kabul, registering 50 times more damaged households than in Kabul. In Kabul and Baghlan a higher proportion of houses were Category B, "houses partially damaged", whilst in Badakhshan, the epicentre of the earthquake, a higher percentage of houses were recorded to be Category A, "houses completely destroyed"

Figure 5: Proportion of Category A and B households per province[15]

Most rapid assessment tools concentrated on fatalities, injuries, households damaged and households destroyed but very quickly expanded their focus to humanitarian needs along thematic lines i.e. WASH, hygiene, protection etc.[16] These tools are invaluable for determining levels and direction of humanitarian assistance and although they allow the ESNFI cluster an understanding of household destruction they do not give us concrete information regarding levels of displacement or preferred coping strategies.

Despite a rigorous SDR process **very few post-disaster assessment materials were found to have focussed on the direct question of displacement** by questioning families on whether they are displaced and where they have sought shelter. This is an important question to address early in the immediate assessment process as it allows international organisations an understanding of various community coping strategies and which families are more likely to return to their land immediately in order to move themselves out of dependency.[17] It gives organisations an immediate insight into not only where immediate emergency shelter assistance is needed but where long term shelter reconstruction intervention might flourish, thus introducing a **shelter recovery dynamic into the assessment of immediate emergency needs**.

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[14] OCHA, Afghanistan Earthquake: Situation Report No. 4 (as of 23 November 2015)
[15] OCHA, Afghanistan Earthquake: Overview of Reported Damages and Affected Population (3 November 2015)
[16] Ibid.
[17] UN-HABITAT Scoping Report: Addressing Land Issues after Natural Disasters (2008)

One rapid assessment conducted in November 2015 that did focus on displacement directly in Badakhshan and Baghlan province noted that of the total number of damaged households recorded, 78% of families in Badakhshan and 40% in Baghlan were reported to be living outside of their homes.[18] When questioned further regarding their specific method of dealing with the disaster induced displacement, i.e. open space, tent / improvised shelter, camp / informal settlement or hosted by family / relatives, the answers are quite telling of displacement copying mechanisms in these provinces. **Of the 78% in Badakhshan and 40% in Baghlan reportedly living outside their homes, 94% of both samples were being hosted by friends or relatives**.

State of Repairs

Figure 6: Endline categorisation diagram

When questioned about the current state of the household living areas in the earthquake damaged shelter **many described substandard levels of reconstruction**. Regardless of the BBB methods, which will be discussed later in the report, the poor levels of reconstruction are concerning given the length of time that has passed since the ESNFI shelter cash assistance package intervention.

Figure 7: Proportions of baseline Category A and B households per province compared to endline Category A and B

In the graph above we can see **how in all provinces the number of Category A households has gone down as households have completed enough reconstruction that their house could be considered as Category B**. Baghlan had the best results as Category A households have been reduced from 59% to 35%. At the same time Category B households in all provinces have also gone down as many have managed to complete their recovery and state that their home is 'complete' with foundation, walls, roof, windows and doors. **In Badakhshan however it is clear that the number of Category B households has not subsided as much as in Baghlan and Kabul**. Assessment participants reported a large number of Category A households remaining destroyed or with only foundations, 28% in Badakhshan, 35% in Baghlan and 54% in Kabul. In order to better inform future shelter cash assistance inventions it is important for us to understand geographically where in Badakhshan and Baghlan, as these provinces received so much more assistance than Kabul, these areas of non-recovery are and what is limiting their rehabilitation.

Of those assessed, **only 23% of Category A households were described as now having a foundation, walls, roof, doors and windows, along with 36% of Category B**. For the purpose of this assessment this level of repairs is considered as a household with repairs complete. It is interesting to note <u>of</u> the 77% of Category A and the 64% of Category B incomplete households, what outstanding repairs are still remaining and what current condition are the households are in.

Figure 8: Current state of household living areas in the unfinished earthquake damaged shelter

The ESNFI cluster's assessment questionnaire used for this evaluation has identified new conditions for Category A and B. The baseline used identified two different categories, households completely destroyed and households damaged. These new endline identifications of Category A and B will be used to assess and compare earthquake affected households current shelter conditions and level of shelter reconstruction with the baseline. **A completely destroyed household and a household that only has a foundation is considered Category A**, as they both are unable to offer any shelter benefits and must be completely rebuilt. **A house with walls but missing a roof, or with a roof but missing doors and windows is considered Category B**, "houses partially damaged". This is because the house needs to be repaired, not completely rebuilt, and even a damaged or destroyed roof can be repaired temporarily using tarpaulin so long as the household walls are still standing. Thus all houses reported to have a foundation, walls, roof, door and

windows are considered as complete, regardless of whether their repairs were reported as ongoing or started but on hold.

It is positive to see that 19% of baseline Category A households are now only missing doors and windows however it is worrying that the same percentage of Category B households are still missing doors, windows *and* a roof. **Twenty-three per cent of Category B households identified the current state of their household living area as 'completely destroyed'**. This is a disconcerting figure due to the fact that it was Category B households that were identified in the RAF as being 'houses partially damaged' and thus received a smaller amount of cash assistance.[19]

This could well be an exaggeration on the part of the beneficiary or it could be other reasons. One suggestion might be that the beneficiary has been displaced, living elsewhere and, perhaps for financial reasons or otherwise, has been unable to begin repairs on their shelter. Over the course of a year partial damage might have spread and worsened resulting in a completely destroyed house. There is also the fact that Badakhshan was hit by another large earthquake in November 2015 and a 3rd in December that resulted in an additional 1,242 houses suffering damage in Badakhshan.[20] There is a possibility that some households assessed as part of the RAF and deemed to be partially damaged at the time, were later damaged further in the earthquakes that hit in the following months We have seen how, with repairs and reconstruction, households can improve from Category A to Category B. Thus there is no reason why similarly, through poor weather, no immediate reconstruction and further earthquakes, houses cannot also move down the scale from Category B to Category A.

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[19] Northern Afghanistan – Humanitarian Regional Team Meeting, UNICEF, Mazar-e-Sharif 30 December 2015
[20] OCHA Afghanistan – Badakhshan Earthquake Flash Update No. 1 = 27 December 2015

**Figure 9: Percentage of Category A households in assessed districts where households remain incomplete**

The map displays households in Badakhshan and Baghlan that are incomplete and thus failing to provide adequate protection and shelter. It shows the percentage of currently incomplete houses that are category A and thus in most need of future assistance with the remaining amounts being Category B households.

Current state of repairs

Given that much of the cash assistance was given to both categories to ensure access to emergency winterized shelter and to support and stimulate post-earthquake shelter reconstruction, it is alarming to notice that **in all 3 provinces assessed a considerable number of respondents maintained that their repairs and reconstruction had either not yet started, or, had started but were currently on hold**.

Figure 10: Current status of household repairs

Baseline Category A

The redevelopment of Category A households has been slow and the results show a high proportion of household repairs having either not started or being on hold. It is to be expected that those houses that were completely destroyed during the October earthquake would take much longer to reconstruct but it is still worrying that **37% have not started at all whilst 29% have started but are currently on hold**. For those Category A households who have started repairs but have had to stop, their homes remain at various levels of reconstruction however **50% are close to completion as they are currently only missing windows and doors.**

Figure 11: Reconstruction status of Category A households with repairs on hold and not started

Category A	Completely destroyed	Foundation only	Foundation and walls	Foundation, walls and roof
Repairs on hold	0%	19%	31%	50%
Repairs not started	99%	0.5%	0%	0.5%

When asked why repairs are on hold or have not started yet the Category A answers were almost unanimously financial. Two percent of respondents said they did not need to repair the houses because they did not plan to use the house again and another 5% said they could not reach the market because transport was too expensive. However most answers were directly concerning a lack of funds, with **90% of participants saying they could not afford materials and 87% saying they could not afford labour**.

Baseline Category B

Repairs concerning category B households are moving forwards at a steadier pace than those of Category A. A much lower proportion are currently on hold or not started and there are thus good results concerning household repairs that are completed or are currently ongoing. There are still concerns as **19% of Category B household repairs have started and are currently on hold and of particular concern is that 23% of households have not yet begun their repairs**. Cash assistance to Category B households was given with the intent that it be used for tools, materials and immediate repairs so it is worrying that so many seem to have not yet started their repair work.

**Figure 12: Reconstruction status of Category B households with repairs on hold and not started**

Category B	Completely destroyed	Foundation only	Foundation and walls	Foundation, walls and roof
Repairs on hold	0%	7%	33%	60%
Repairs not started	99%	1%	0%	0%

When asked why repairs have not yet started the answers of Category B were very similar to those of Category A in that they were almost entirely linked to financial troubles. One difference is that 5% of respondents identified a lack of available labour as a barrier to their reconstructions efforts. Aside from this, lack of funds was the main factor with **93% saying they could not afford materials and 79% saying they could not afford labour**.

As requested by CHF, implementing partners undertook a household level needs assessment in order to inform the design of their emergency cash assistance programmes.[21] Beneficiaries' access to a market is essential to the success of cash assistance programmes so it is positive to see that this was not reported as a key challenge to people's reconstruction efforts. **Of those who did report a lack of access to the market due to expensive travel, 80% were from Badakhshan**. One reason for this might be the difficult mountainous terrain, poor road networks and long distances between villages. Moving construction materials and labour from a market to rural mountain villages in Badakhshan is likely to be more difficult and thus more expensive than in other earthquake affected provinces. As part of their project design implementing organisations undertook a market assessment that focussed on market access, proximity and material prices. For future shelter cash assistance interventions, an assessment of transport costs and the price of moving reconstruction materials and labour between the market and affected villages is essential.

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[21] Afghanistan – Common Humanitarian Fund 2nd Reserve Allocation (2015) – Earthquake Response Guidance on Eligible Partners & Activities

Figure 13: Completed and repairs ongoing households with BBB methods incorporated

A large number of houses from all three provinces whose repairs are either completed or are currently ongoing were reported to have cracks, no plinth bands and no corner bracing. In some provinces the results were particularly concerning as nearly 100% of households were missing these key BBB structures. In Baghlan, 99% of households who had repairs completed or ongoing households and answered the question reported that they had no plinth bands, **81% said their households contained cracks and 78% said they had no corner bracings**.

Kabul also displayed negative BBB results as **70% reported having no plinth bands and 72% had no corner bracing**. There were however some positive results concerning BBB methods. An average of 95% of households with completed and ongoing repairs in all assessed provinces reported having drainage leading away from the house, lintels installed, doors and windows at least 60cm from corners. The reason that these BBB methods were so prevalent in all assessed areas whilst the others were rare was not directly assessed but could possibly be linked to finances, BBB training topics and the ease of procuring materials. Although housing materials had little to no effect on the prevalence of BBB methods. Between 73-90% of households in all three provinces reported roofs made of mud and grass and between 73-84% reported their walls were also made of mud.

Although implementing partners reported that cash sensitization sessions advised communities on BBB standards, much of the guidance was not used. Post-disaster cash assistance interventions ought to have **a defined BBB section as part of their overall programmatic structure** as opposed to making it a part of the distribution process. Financial vulnerability has been outlined throughout the assessment as a key barrier to shelter reconstruction. An investigation into households' current understanding of and access to BBB materials could also form a key part of a post-disaster assessment that would help inform better shelter interventions.

ASSISTANCE TO BENEFICIARIES

Within days of the October 26th earthquake striking Badakhshan rapid assessments revealed the need for a large scale coordinated response in order to provide assistance to those affected in Afghanistan's north-eastern region. While some immediate food and shelter needs were met through prepositioned emergency

stocks of the Government and humanitarian actors, **a gap was quickly recognized in terms of providing adequate emergency winterized shelter solutions to those most in need**, particularly those living in mountainous and hard to reach areas.[22] The ESNFI cluster, Cash Voucher Working Group (CVWG) and CHF decided together that direct cash assistance distributed to those communities most in need was the most suitable option for a variety of reasons.

The terrain, rurality, insecurity, limited road network and approaching winter conditions at the time meant that when intervention was most needed many affected districts would have been cut off from assistance channels.[23] Multi-purpose cash grants were seen as a **fast and flexible form of assistance** that mitigated the risk of inconsistent humanitarian access during the winter months. It was an intervention method that would **stimulate and strengthen local markets** whilst also granting beneficiaries the freedom to take ownership of their needs, rehabilitation and shelter reconstruction.[24]

Modalities of Shelter Assistance

The specifics of intervention differed depending on the implementing organisation. In general Category B households received a one-off cash package whilst Category A households received both a monthly cash assistance package paid in two separate instalments and a one-off package. This one-off household payment was to assist families sheltering in tents/improvised shelter or being hosted by the local community, with differing amounts for each of these two displacement coping strategies.

The implementing partners that distributed cash and NFI packages as part of the CHF funded response were amongst others, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) AfghanAid, NAC, ACTED and PIN in seven different provinces including Badakhshan, Baghlan and Kabul[25]. The cash assistance packages could be utilized in any way the beneficiary households deemed necessary for their families; however there were certain intentions that came with them, the foremost being **to solve the situation for both affected communities**. The aim was that the one-off payment for Category A may be used for emergency winterization materials such as blankets, stoves, tarpaulin, fuel and other urgent NFIs or, if hosted, it could be used to support the needs of the hosting family.[26] The Category A monthly payment could thus be used for emergency shelter upgrades and future reconstruction. The Category B one-off payment was intended to support tools, materials and reparations. Cash sensitization sessions were conducted as part of the distribution in order to inform beneficiaries on market prices, efficient fuel-use and DRR strategies.[27]

Category B households in all three provinces received almost the same amount of cash with an average of 10,003 AFN per household. For Category A the amounts differed with Badakhshan households receiving on average 16,926 AFN, Kabul 17,125 AFN and Baghlan 21,178 AFN. The 4,250 AFN difference in average assistance received by Category A households in Badakhshan and Baghlan is equivalent to just under 65 USD. A pre-distribution market analysis conducted in Baghlan's capital Pul-e-Khumri focussed on key winter NFIs and materials required by affected families. It noted that there is a general inflation during the lead up to winter of items such as blankets, tents and tarpaulin and that in the weeks after the October

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[22] Afghanistan – Common Humanitarian Fund 2nd Reserve Allocation (2015) – Earthquake Response Guidance on Eligible Partners & Activities
[23] Ibid.
[24] Dewast, C. Global Shelter Cluster – Literature Review of the Use of Cash in Shelter
[25] CHF – 2015 Annual Afghanistan Report (2015)
[26] Afghanistan – Common Humanitarian Fund 2nd Standard Allocation (2015) – Strategy Paper
[27] ACTED – Emergency multipurpose cash assistance for earthquake affected Category A and B families in Baghlan: Monitoring Report (2016)

2015 earthquake these price climbed even more so.[28] The same assessment take four months after the earthquake reported that prices for blankets were less than half of what they had been in November 2015.[29] This might suggest one reason as to why the average cash assistance given to Category A households in Baghlan was higher.

Figure 14: Percentage of assistance money received spent on various items/services

Baseline Category A

Food assistance was not identified as part of the cash assistance intervention as a priority need. This is because one month after the earthquake up to 81% of those affected in the north-east worse hit provinces had received food assistance. Despite this however **food was the primary source of usage for Category A household cash assistance**. However in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake emergency NFIs were supplied by the government and humanitarian actors.[30] Similarly one post distribution monitoring report stated that 52% of affected families mentioned that, as well as the cash assistance package, they received some additional assistance from other NGOs, national government and local authorities which included kitchen kits, food and NFIs.[31] This additional support, might have allowed *some* Category A households to spend less money on food and NFIs and more on shelter materials and repairs which is a positive result.

When asked about income expenditure over the past 30 days the average amounts spent were higher than the entire assistance packages given. Category A households spent the lowest in Badakhshan with 21,007 AFN, in Kabul it was 24,097 AFN and as with the assistance package Baghlan was the highest with 24,221 AFN. Spending patterns were also different. On average over the past 30 days, households in all three assessed provinces spent a higher percentage of their monthly income on food, health, loans etc. than they did of their cash assistance package. However **the amount currently being spent on shelter materials and labour is significantly less**. The average monthly expenditure is higher than the cash assistance package received and regular monthly needs of affected households i.e. food, health, transport etc. had to be supplemented using the assistance package. This shows that for many household the emergency shelter

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[28] PIN – Post distribution monitoring CHF earthquake response (2016)
[29] Ibid.
[30] Afghanistan – Common Humanitarian Fund 2nd Reserve Allocation (2015) – Earthquake Response Guidance on Eligible Partners & Activities
[31] NAC – Post Distribution report for Emergency Support for Households Affected by the October Earthquake in Badakhshan Province (April 2016)

package was not enough as funds had to be used for other means which in turn slowed down shelter repairs, in some cases stopping them entirely

Baseline Category B

As intended Category B households prioritized shelter repairs and reconstruction. Shelter materials and labour accounted for 61% of their cash assistance usage, with another 25% spent on food. As with Category A, food was not identified in the baseline as an urgent priority need for Category B households but the cash usage has shown otherwise. Similar to Category A, the cash expenditure of Category B households in the past 30 days is significantly higher than the assistance package. Badakhshan was again the lowest with 14,000 AFN, then Kabul with 25,687 and finally Baghlan, whose average monthly expenditure was 31,845 AFN. **This is more than three times the average assistance package given to Category B households in Baghlan province**. Again this shows that many of the households assessed are struggling to cope financially and so it is not surprising that their cash assistance package was used in part to support other needs. As one year since the earthquake has now passed and this cash assistance package has been used it is thus not surprising to see that so many household repairs are on hold.

Household spending patterns between the original cash assistance package and income expenditure during the last 30 days are starkly different. **The average food expenditure in all three provinces doubled from 23% to 49%, health more than tripled from 5% to 18% whilst shelter materials and labour dropped from 61% of the cash assistance package to 23% of the monthly expenditure**. The cash intervention was designed and intended to support repairs and reconstruction but for both Category A and B households a large proportion of the assistance money was spent on food. In the 30 days prior to data collection, houses in all three assessed provinces spent 50% of their monthly income on food so it is not surprising that they cannot continue shelter reconstruction. For example **in Kabul, 63% of households assessed reported their repairs are either on hold or have not started. Of this 63% shelter spending represents only 4% of their total expenditures.**

Dependency Levels and Income Earning Habits

Households' main source and secondary source of income varied by province rather than by damage category. It serves as a good tool to help understand household spending habits both as part of both the cash assistance package and during the last 30 days.

Figure 15: Primary source of income by province

	Kabul	Baghlan	Badakshan
Cash crop farming	15%	25%	43%
Livestock farming	1%	3%	9%
Business / service/ sale of goods	6%	5%	11%
Unskilled daily labour (no contract)	32%	28%	20%
Skilled daily labour (no contract)	3%	4%	4%
Formal job (with contract)	35%	31%	9%

In Badakhshan, the primary source of income was cash crop farming (reported by 43% of respondents) and 21% and 28% of respondents reported that cash crop and livestock farming were their secondary sources of income. This might explain Badakhshan's positive dependency ratio as farming is an income earning activity that many household members can easily help out with. **Only 4% of households in Badakhshan reported that they had no income earner, compared to Kabul's 50%**, Also in Badakhshan 67% of households reported four or more members over the age of 16 and contributing to income. Households in Badakhshan also spent less of their cash assistance on food, 21% compared to 32% in both Baghlan and Kabul, which might be linked to the abundance of subsistence farming throughout the province.

Although Badakhshan had the lowest number of completed households with 22%, **the province reported the highest percentage of ongoing repair works, 21% compared to just 1% in Kabul and 11% in Baghlan**. Cash sensitization sessions mentioned in PDM reports trained beneficiaries in the benefits of reconstructing households in the spring.[32] In the harsh winter conditions of Badakhshan this would have been even more important and the level of ongoing works and percentage of monthly income currently spent on shelter implies that affected communities listened to the advice. In one sense it could be recommended that the timing of cash assistance ought to be scheduled to meet the best seasonal reconstruction conditions of the affected province. However in October 2015 emergency shelter assistance was critical and as Badakshan shows, those provinces that didn't spend greatly on food initially, were able to spend money of shelter repairs for a longer period of time.

In Baghlan and Kabul unskilled day labour was the second most reported primary income earning activity. **Unlike Badakhshan, which spent 20% of its cash assistance on shelter labour, Baghlan only spent 4%.** With plenty of daily labourers in Baghlan is it likely affected communities were able to find good labour prices and/or friends and family with minimal construction skills who were able to help them with their repairs. **Baghlan has the highest number of reconstructed houses as 46% of households sampled reported that their repairs were now complete. Completed houses spent on average 50% of their original cash assistance package on shelter repairs compared to those households with repairs not started or on**

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[32] ACTED – Emergency multipurpose cash assistance for earthquake affected Category A and B families in Baghlan: Monitoring Report (2016)

hold who only spent 19%. In Baghlan however 12% of respondents reported borrowing money or loans as their secondary income source. This is a negative coping mechanism and resulted in households assessed in Baghlan reportedly spending 8% of their current monthly income on repaying loans and 7% of the cash assistance package.

Figure 16: Percentage of cash assistance package spent on shelter

Category A households in Kabul spent 51% of their cash assistance on shelter material and labour, and Category B households spent 60%, more than either category in Baghlan or Badakhshan. Yet in the past 30 days both Category A and B households in Kabul have spent on average just 3% of their monthly income on shelter repairs compared to 23% in Baghlan and 28% in Badakhshan. This is despite the fact that **54% of houses assessed in Kabul were reported as being either completely destroyed or having a foundation only, a higher proportion than in Baghlan or Badakhshan**. Although 36% of households assessed in Kabul reported their repairs as complete only 1% were reported as ongoing. This is definitely a result of financial issues as affected **communities in Kabul are currently spending the least on shelter repairs** and have a highly negative dependency ratio with 50% of assessed households reporting no income earning members.

CONCLUSION

The assessment identified that the cash assistance response was successful in a number of ways:

- **It gave those affected by the earthquake the freedom to manage their own redevelopment** by spending money in their own time and on personally identified priorities. Cash assistance interventions are dependent upon access to markets and **only 3% of households reported any difficulty in accessing the market.** For post-disaster cash assistance programmes it is crucial that the affected communities have access to the reconstruction materials they need from a nearby market. **Only 2% reported that the items, materials and labour they needed were not available at the market**.

-**Cash assistance was in many cases largely spent on shelter materials and labour costs**. The cash intervention was flexible in that beneficiaries could spend it on what they identified as their key priorities. However there was a hope and intension behind the intervention that cash to Category A households would be spent on emergency shelter and winter NFIs whilst Category B would spend it on tools, materials and shelter repairs. This was largely achieved as **Category A households spent on average 24% of their assistance money on shelter and Category B households 47%.**

-**The shelter conditions of many households have improved** and they now have safe protection from harsh weather conditions and privacy for family life.[33] Affected families lives have improved as their household shelters have been fully repaired and destroyed homes have started to be rebuilt. The assessment identified that **one third of household repairs are completed whilst one third have begun their repairs but they are currently either on hold or ongoing**. It is assumed that with the development and completion of these repairs many displaced will thus have been able to return home.

-**The safety of household members has improved** alongside the repairs and reconstruction of their homes. BBB used as part of the repair and reconstruction process mean that these households will be less at risk in the future and likely to require further humanitarian assistance. Of the completed households, **95% incorporated half of the suggested BBB methods into their reconstruction**. These homes should now offer improved and more solid protection against future natural disasters in Afghanistan.

The cash assistance intervention allowed many displaced communities staying in informal shelters or hosted by family/friends to access fuel and other essential winter NFIs and it supported the reconstruction of many households. However **one third of those assessed reported that their repairs had still not started**. Despite not being identified in any rapid assessment as a priority need, households assessed spent on average **29% of their original cash assistance package on food compared to 36% on shelter**. It was those who spent heavily on food who underspent on shelter repairs and thus struggled to repair their homes. Of those whose repairs had not started or are currently on hold, **90% reported that this was due to a lack of funds for labour/materials.**

The cash assistance evaluation identified that the intervention succeeded in providing many disaster affected communities with adequate protection from the weather, privacy for family life and emergency winterized

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[33] Humanitarian Country Team Strategic Response Plan Afghanistan (2015) – ES/NFI Cluster Strategic Objective 2

shelter.[34] However there were gaps in the cash assistance which the evaluation identified may have limited intervention's success. These limits are focused on three separated areas:

a) **Assessments**: Some aspects not included in the rapid assessments conducted after the earthquake limited the success of the cash intervention. A lack of an assessment of displacement coping mechanisms limited cash assistance intervention as it failed to identify those who are displaced and most in need: sheltering in informal settlements or improvised shelters.

b) **Targeting:** Food security was not flagged as a priority need during the rapid assessment and yet, after shelter, this was the primary use of the assistance money. During market assessments prices and accessibility were assessed but not transport costs. When access to markets was reported as limited it was the expensive transport costs that was predominantly reported as the reason.

c) **Programmes:** As part of the design of the cash assistance intervention it did not seem that income generating habits of specific provinces was taken in consideration. Popular income earning activities played a subsequent part in how money was used and thus affected communities' reconstructions efforts. BBB methods and DRR awareness was raised as part of a cash sensitization session during the assistance distribution. However full training on these reconstruction tactics and why they are important to incorporate was not given.

These limitations to the intervention may be mitigated by the following recommendations:

1.   Needs Assessment and Baseline

    1.1 **Displacement coping mechanisms** ought to be included in the rapid assessment mechanism. An understanding, not only of houses damaged and destroyed, **but common displacement practices in an area will help to better inform the assistance given**. In areas were an assessment identifies that 95% have been hosted by family and friends and thus provided with shelter, an intervention can be designed that prioritizes long term reconstruction and redevelopment. An assessment that interprets household vulnerabilities based on their damage category is not going to be able to precisely inform the type of assistance needed.

    1.2 **Female perspectives** ought to be further included in a baseline investigation concerning shelter interventions in Afghanistan. Due to cultural conditions regarding females leaving the house in Afghanistan, **it is far more likely that when a natural disaster strikes that females will be inside an unsafe shelter and thus are the most likely to be initially affecte**d. It is crucial to understand the perspectives of household females and female headed households as part of a baseline. Not only so that specific needs may be met but also so that follow up monitoring assessments can look at how reconstruction, repairs and shelter interventions are understood by female headed households and how they have improved, or failed to improve, the lives of those females in the house.

    1.3 A **standardised shelter assessment tool** would be useful in ensuring that both the above targets are met. It would be useful for all ESNFI partners to implement for when a specialist shelter assessment is needed following a displacement emergency or natural disaster. This tool would

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[34] Afghanistan ESNFI Cluster Strategy 2016 (2016)

ensure that all partners are using the same indicators and would simplify the sharing of information and assistance if one partner has the capacity to deliver assistance where another does not. **It would ensure that a standardised baseline exists in all areas affected by a disaster regardless of which ESNFI partner supported this area**. This will allow future response evaluation assessments to be more methodical in their comparisons between past and present, different geographical areas and different organisational responses. In some respects the Household Emergency Assessment Tool (HEAT) does provide this however it is very much an emergency tool and does not include some of the useful shelter specificities nor the gender disaggregation that a ESNFI cluster tool might include.

2.   Targeting Criteria

2.1 **Food security and needs** should be prioritised as part of assessments in post-disaster scenarios. As reported after the earthquake, many households reported receiving food assistance from NGOs, the UN and the government.[35] Despite this, a large proportion of assessed communities spent much of their assistance package on food. This may have been more prevalent in the northeast where winters are long and hard so stockpiling food is common tactic. By spending less on shelter and more on food communities' obstructed their own reconstruction efforts. In planning cash assistance interventions assessments ought to focus on food and other hidden priority needs **in order to understand where shelter spending might be sacrificed in place of other needs**.

2.2 **Income generating habits** should be considered as part of the design of post-disaster cash assistance programmes. Popular income earning activities in post-disaster interventions ought to be assessed as they can play a large part in cash usage and reconstruction efforts. As has been mentioned in Badakhshan where cash crop farming is popular, communities spent less on food than in Kabul. In Kabul, where there is an abundance of unskilled day labourers, communities spent less on labour. A thorough understanding of income generating habits would **help in the design of cash assistance interventions that are tailored to the targeted community**. It may help cash to be spent on the intended purpose or identify where a cash for work element may be beneficial.

3.   Project Design

3.1 **Transport prices and labour princes** ought to be included in a market assessment. Of those who reported there were shelter items and labour they could afford but not access, 66% said it was because they could not reach the market because it was too expensive. Assessments calculated the cash assistance package given based on damage reports, materials/labour needed and local market prices. Many of the areas worst affected by the earthquake were rural, mountainous and hard to reach where casual day labourers are not as abundant as in the city. The high price of moving household reconstruction materials and labour from the market to their homes seriously hindered repairs. **Transport prices ought to be included as part of the market assessment in**

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[35] IOM – Afghanistan Earthquake Situation Report October 30 2015

order to calculate the ideal amount of cash given.

3.2 **BBB and DRR training** ought to be prioritized as part of a cash assistance intervention that involves large scale repairs and reconstruction. BBB and DRR awareness and training as part of a cash assistance package would **help to improve cash usage, safety and would reduce the risk of further destruction**, **displacement and assistance needed in the future**. All implementing NGOs mentioned a cash sensitization segment as part of the distribution but the evaluation found that **only half of the suggested BBB methods had been incorporated into repairs**. BBB and DRR training might also include an assessment in specific BBB materials and their availability in affected communities' local markets. When cash assistance is provided with the intention that it is used to rebuild households then **it is important these households are rebuilt stronger**. It is crucial that they are not rebuilt using the same structurally unsafe methods that contributed to their damage and destruction during the initial disaster. The improvement of capacity building, technical support and trainings concerning BBB and DRR methods, alongside rigorous monitoring assessments to ensure these tactics are being successfully implemented, **will heavily improve the sustainability of shelter interventions in the future**.

Through a thorough SDR and primary data collection methodology this assessment report endeavoured to evaluate the ESNFI cluster and its partners' response to the 2015 earthquake that hit Afghanistan's north-eastern region. It aimed to identify **to what extent the ESNFI cluster's cash assistance was successful in improving affected communities shelter conditions** and providing families with a secure space throughout the harsh winter. Although numerous successes have been found **the report also aimed to discover limits in coverage and where residual gaps in intervention exist**. As a result a number of recommendations have been offered in the hope that they might help to improve post-disaster cash assistance interventions in the future.

ANNEX 1 HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction		
1. Select the NGO that assisted the beneficiary *[Select one]*	ACTED	PIN
	Afghan Aid	NAC
2. Enter beneficiary ID or serial number *[Select/enter]*		

3. Select type of package distributed to beneficiary *[Select one]*	Category A: Cash for heating and NFIs	Category B: Cash for repairs	Not known

General Information		
4. Province where household is located *[Select province]*		
5. District where household is located *[Select district]*		
6. Is the household head female or male? *[Select one]*	Male	Female
7. How old is the household head? *[Enter age in completed years]*		
8. Number of household members aged less than 5? *[Enter number]*		
9. Number of household members are aged at least 16 AND currently contributing an income? *[Enter number]*		
10. Number of physically disabled household members? *[Enter number]*		
11. Number of breastfeeding household members? *[Enter number]*		
12. Number of pregnant household members? *[Enter number]*		
13. Number of chronically ill household members? *[Enter number]*		

Shelter Cash Use			
14. What amount did you receive in assistance from the organisation *[ACTED/ Afghan Aid / PIN / NAC]*?			
15. Did you or any household member receive information about how to give feedback to the organisation that gave you the cash? *[Select one]*	Yes	No	Not sure

16. What amount out of that you received did you spend on each type? *[Amount AFN spent on each category-total of all categories must be equal to Amount received]*	Food	Repaying loans	Rent
	Livestock	Fodder	Health
	Education	Shelter material	Shelter labour
	Fuel heating/cooking	Clothing	Transport
		Other (specify)	
17. Were there any shelter materials or labour or NFI items that you could afford and wanted to buy with the cash, but it was not possible? *[Select all that apply. "No" cannot be selected with other option.]*	No - did not have this problem	Yes - Shelter materials	Yes - Shelter labour
	Yes - Rented accommodation	Yes - Fuel (heating/cooking)	Yes - Blankets
	Yes - Clothes/Shoes	Yes - Hygiene items	Yes - Kitchen utensils
	Yes - Other shelter/NFI (specify)	Other, please specify	

Shelter Cash Use Barriers			
18. Main reason why Shelter Materials were not available to buy? *[Select one]*	Items/labour not available to buy in the market;	Could not reach the market - transport too expensive;	Could not reach the market - insecurity;
	Could not reach the market - other barriers (specify)	Not applicable	Other, please specify
19. Main reason why Shelter Labour was not available to buy? *[Select one]*	Items/labour not available to buy in the market;	Could not reach the market - transport too expensive;	Could not reach the market - insecurity;
	Could not reach the market - other barriers (specify)	Not applicable	Other, please specify
20. Main reason why Rented accommodation was not available to buy? *[Select one]*	Items/labour not available to buy in the market;	Could not reach the market - transport too expensive;	Could not reach the market - insecurity;
	Could not reach the market - other barriers (specify)	Not applicable	Other, please specify

21. Main reason why Fuel (heating/cooking) was not available to buy? *[Select one]*	Items/labour not available to buy in the market;	Could not reach the market - transport too expensive;	Could not reach the market - insecurity;
	Could not reach the market - other barriers (specify)	Not applicable	Other, please specify
22. Main reason why Blankets were not available to buy? *[Select one]*	Items/labour not available to buy in the market;	Could not reach the market - transport too expensive;	Could not reach the market - insecurity;
	Could not reach the market - other barriers (specify)	Not applicable	Other, please specify
23. Main reason why Clothes/Shoes were not available to buy? *[Select one]*	Items/labour not available to buy in the market;	Could not reach the market - transport too expensive;	Could not reach the market - insecurity;
	Could not reach the market - other barriers (specify)	Not applicable	Other, please specify
24. Main reason why Hygiene items were not available to buy? *[Select one]*	Items/labour not available to buy in the market;	Could not reach the market - transport too expensive;	Could not reach the market - insecurity;
	Could not reach the market - other barriers (specify)	Not applicable	Other, please specify
25. Main reason why Kitchen utensils were not available to buy? *[Select one]*	Items / labour not available to buy in the market;	Could not reach the market - transport too expensive;	Could not reach the market - insecurity;
	Could not reach the market - other barriers (specify)	Not applicable	Other, please specify
26. Main reason Rented accommodation were not available to buy? *[Select one]*	Items / labour not available to buy in the market;	Could not reach the market - transport too expensive;	Could not reach the market - insecurity;

	Could not reach the market - other barriers (specify)	Not applicable	Other, please specify

Economic vulnerability			
27. How much did this household spend in total during the most recent 30 days on basic needs?	Food *Amount AFN*	Repaying loans *Amount AFN*	Repaying loans *Amount AFN*
	Education *Amount AFN*	Livestock *Amount AFN*	Fodder *Amount AFN*
	Health *Amount AFN*	Shelter *Amount AFN*	Clothing *Amount AFN*
	Transport Amount AFN	Other (Specify) *Amount AFN*	Other expenditures, *please specify*
28. What was the main source that covered these household expenditures incurred in the last 30 days? *[select one]*	Income from cash crop farming (for sale)		
	Income from livestock farming (for sale)		
	Income from rent		
	income from business / sale of goods / services		
	Unskilled daily labour (NO contract)		
	Skilled daily labour (NO contract)		
	Formal job (salaried WITH contract)		
	Government payments (e.g. pensions)		
	Humanitarian assistance		
	Gifts / remittances		
	Borrowing / loans		
	Savings		
	Other primary (specify)		
29. What was the main source that covered these household expenditures incurred in the last 30 days? *[select one]*	Income from cash crop farming (for sale)		
	Income from livestock farming (for sale)		
	Income from rent		
	income from business / sale of goods / services		
	Unskilled daily labour (NO contract)		

	Skilled daily labour (NO contract)
	Formal job (salaried WITH contract)
	Government payments (e.g. pensions)
	Humanitarian assistance
	Gifts / remittances
	Borrowing / loans
	Savings
	Other secondary (specify)
30. What was the main source that covered these household expenditures incurred in the last 30 days? *[select one]*	Income from cash crop farming (for sale)
	Income from livestock farming (for sale)
	Income from rent
	income from business / sale of goods / services
	Unskilled daily labour (NO contract)
	Skilled daily labour (NO contract)
	Formal job (salaried WITH contract)
	Government payments (e.g. pensions)
	Humanitarian assistance
	Gifts / remittances
	Borrowing / loans
	Savings
	Other tertiary (specify)

Earthquake damaged shelter	
31. Check what is the current state of the household living areas in their EQ damaged shelter? *[Check what is the current state of the household living areas in their EQ damaged shelter?]*	House remains totally destroyed
	Foundation is completed
	All walls are completed
	Roof is completed
	All windows and doors are completed
32. What is the current status of repairs of the household living areas in the EQ damaged	Repairs not started
	Repairs started but now on hold

shelter? *[Select one]*	Repairs ongoing
	Repairs completed
33. Why are repairs on hold or have not yet started? *[Select all that apply]*	Lack of funds to buy labour
	Lack of funds to buy material
	Lack of available labour in the market
	Lack of available materials in the market
	Could not reach the market - transport too expensive;
	Could not reach the market - insecurity;
	Could not reach the market - other barriers (specify)
	No need for repairs / do not intend to use the original house
	Other (Specify)
34. Check the EQ damaged shelter: what is the main wall material (primary infill) of household living areas? *[Select one]*	Timber
	Stone
	Mud
	Mud bricks
	Baked bricks
	Concrete
	Other (Specify)
	Do not know
	Other, please specify
35. Check the EQ damaged shelter: what is the main roof material (covering)? *[Select one]*	CGI
	Slate
	Mud & grass
	Other (Specify)
	Do not know

Build Back Better (BBB) *[Check EQ damaged shelter: has it been rebuilt/repaired using methods to protect against future EQs:Data collector direct observation - select one]*			
36. Is the shelter safe from site hazards? *[Select one]*	Yes		No
	Not clear		Not applicable

37. Is the shelter foundation free from cracks? *[Select one]*	Yes	No
	Not clear	Not applicable

38. Does the shelter have ANY plinth bands? *[Select one]*	Yes	No
	Not clear	Not applicable

39. Does the shelter have ANY corner bracing? *[Select one]*	Yes	No
	Not clear	Not applicable

40. Do ANY doors and/or windows have lintels? *[Select one]*	Yes	No
	Not clear	Not applicable

41. Are all door and window edges starting AT LEAST 60 cm from all corners? *[Select one]*	Yes	No
	Not clear	Not applicable

42. Does water drain away from the shelter? *[Select one]*	Yes	No
	Not clear	Not applicable

43. Have any trees been cut down and/or hillsides been excavated? *[Select one. If there never were trees or hill sides the answer is No.]*	Yes	No
	Not clear	Not applicable

Adequacy		
44. What is the current accommodation arrangement where most household members live? *[Select one]*	Owned with documentation;	
	Owned without documentation;	
	Rented;	
	Hosted by friends/family for free;	
	Staying in accommodation for free with owner's consent;	
	Staying in accommodation for free without owner's consent	
45. How many rooms are currently lived in by this household? *[Enter Number]*		
46. Number of HH members living together in current accommodation? *[Enter number]*		
47. Is there a separate room available for female household members? *[Enter number]*	Yes	No	Not applicable (no female household members)

48.	Are livestock kept in the same indoor living space as household members? *[Select one]*	Yes	No	Not applicable (no livestock)
49.	What is the documented land access status of this household? *[Select all that apply. "Household has no documented ownership or permit" cannot be selected with other option.]*	Household owns land		
		Family / relatives own land		
		Household has document permit to construct on land		
		Household has no documented ownership or permit		

WASH		
50. What is the current primary drinking water source of the household? *[Select one]*	Handpump	Dug well
	Stream/river	Piped (tap) water
	Kandas	Other (Specify)
51. What is the current primary latrine used by the household? *[Select one]*	Open defecation for all	Community latrine for women only
	Community latrine for all	HH pit latrine
	HH VIP latrine	Other (Specify)
52. How does the household mainly dispose of solid waste? *[Select one]*	Buried	Burned
	Putting in Garbage dumping area	Thrown outside/in the street
	Other (Specify)	

Geo Coordinates		
53. Record location of the shelter *[GPS coordinates can only be collected when outside]*	latitude (x.y °)	longitude (x.y °)
	altitude (m)	accuracy (m)