

Impact Evaluation

The Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations: its impact and role in Rwanda (2007–2011) - Vol. I Full Report

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Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons

Prepared by TANGO International team:

Phil Sutter, Team Leader and Quantitative Supervisor
Jeanne Downen, Livelihoods Specialist and Qualitative Supervisor
Tamsin Walters, Nutrition and Gender Specialist
Brigitte Izabiriza, Qualitative Team Member (local consultant)
Rutere Salome Kagendo, RONTO Investment Co.
Mark Langworthy, Quantitative Specialist
Brad Sagara, Quantitative Analyst
Monica Mueller, Research Associate

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World Food Programme



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Disclaimer

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Evaluation Management

Evaluation Manager, WFP:	Marian Read, Senior Evaluation Officer
Director, Office of Evaluation, WFP:	Helen Wedgwood
Evaluation Manager, UNHCR:	Angela Li Rosi, Senior Policy Officer
Director, Policy Development and Evaluation Service, UNHCR:	Jeff Crisp

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Fact Sheet-WFP's Food Assistance in Protracted Refugee Situations: Rwanda


PRRO funding levels against full project period

Type	WFP Project #	Title	Time Frame	Total WFP Cost	% funded
PRRO	10531.0*	Assistance to refugees and recovery operations for the most vulnerable households	01 Jan 2007 31 Dec 2009	US\$54,033,547 ¹	61.9% ¹
PRRO	200030	Assistance to refugees, recovery support to host communities and the most vulnerable households	01 Jan 2010 31 Dec 2011	US\$39,143,591 ²	64.1% ²

* PRRO 10531.0 was planned to start in January 2007 but actually started in July 2007. Before that, the regional PRRO was operating in Rwanda.

¹ Resource Situation 01 Feb 2011 (PRRO 10531.0); ² Resource Situation 25 Jan 2012 (PRRO 20030)

Planned vs actual refugees, by year



Sources: WFP SPRs(2007-2010); Project document 200030 (planned 2011); Executive Brief (actual in December 2011)

WFP operations by activity (# refugees shown, when disaggregated data are available)

Operation	Supp. Feeding	Therapeutic Feeding	GFD	FFW
PRRO 10531.0	X	X	2007: 50,981 2008: 51,803 2009: 53,719	X*
PRRO 200030	X	**	2010: 53,004 2011:53,434	0***
Average			52,588	

*FFW is for the host population.

**Therapeutic feeding activities handed over to UNHCR at end of 2008.

***No FFW due to limited funding

Source: WFP SPRs 2007-2010 & WFP Executive Brief (as of 19 Jan 2012)

UNHCR contributions to Rwanda refugee operations, 2007 – 2011*

2007	US\$4,171,434
2008	US\$5,874,965
2009	US\$6,013,809
2010	US\$5,824,834
2011	US\$8,398,646
Total	US\$30,283,688

*Excludes repatriation assistance

Source: Budget Exp 2006_2011.UNHCR

Donors


Multilateral funders, USA, Japan, Canada, Ireland, Finland, Turkey, Luxembourg, UN CERF Common Funds and Agencies, UN, Norway

Partners

Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Africa Humanitarian Action, American Refugee Committee, Forum for African Women Educationalist, German Technical Cooperation, Jesuit Refugee Services

Source: WFP SPRs 2007-2010

Map of Rwanda Showing Locations of Refugee Camps



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Executive Summary

Introduction

Evaluation Features

1. This impact evaluation was commissioned jointly by WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and conducted by an independent evaluation team of specialists in evaluation, food security, livelihoods, nutrition and gender, with appropriate experience of Rwandan and refugee context.
2. Serving both accountability and learning purposes, the evaluation was intended to:
 - assess and explain the outcomes and impact of food assistance interventions for Congolese refugees in protracted refugee camps within Rwanda from 2007 to 2011; and
 - identify the changes needed to improve the contribution of food assistance to self-reliance and/or durable solutions for protracted refugee populations in Rwanda.
3. A theory-based approach was taken to assess the extent to which activities carried out by WFP and UNHCR resulted in the expected outcomes, and how external factors and assumptions affected results. The theory of change derived from UNHCR and WFP policies and programme guidance posits that inputs and activities will produce:
 - short-term outcomes including increased food consumption, increased use of water, sanitation and protection services, increased school attendance, and improved livelihoods;
 - intermediate outcomes including improved or stabilized nutrition, an improved food basket, and successful income-generating activities; and
 - long-term outcomes resulting in self-reliance, resettlement, repatriation, or integration within Rwanda.
4. To examine this theory the evaluation examined four main questions:
 - i) Overall, what are the differential impacts of food assistance on the protracted refugee population in Rwanda?
 - ii) What are the impacts on food security and nutrition status?
 - iii) How does food assistance affect coping strategies?
 - iv) What are the impacts on protection and the protective environment?
5. The evaluation team employed a mixed-methods approach including:
 - a quantitative household survey of 1,200 randomly selected refugee households in Kiziba and Gihembe camps; 38 focus group discussions with

refugees and members of the host population in/around all three camps; 54 key informant interviews with WFP, UNHCR, the Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs, partner non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and donors;

- analysis of secondary data sources, including three joint assessment mission (JAM) reports,¹ agency reports, and various assessments, monitoring data and proposals; and
- transect walks and observations of conditions in the camps.

6. As all refugees in camps received WFP and UNHCR assistance, analysis focused on cross-sectional differences among camps and, to a lesser extent, among socio-economic groups within the refugee population. Quantitative survey methods allowed statistical comparisons between two camps on some indicators.

7. There were limitations to the evaluation:

- A lack of systematic nutrition data collection in the camps and surrounding areas affected nutrition analysis. An anthropometric survey conducted in May 2011² used survey sampling methods that did not allow the analysis of indicators by camp.
- Although the interpretation of qualitative data applies to all three camps, quantitative data was collected and analysed only for the situation of refugees living in Kiziba and Gihembe camps; time and financial constraints precluded a quantitative survey in Nyabiheke camp.
- Resource constraints compelled WFP to halve food rations for the general food distribution (GFD) in all three camps in September 2011. This situation may have influenced refugee interviews approximately one month later.

Context

⇒ *Refugees in Rwanda*

8. As a Party to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Government of Rwanda has an open policy of allowing refugees into the country and remains committed to implementing international agreements and protocols on the rights of refugees. Rwanda has hosted refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since 1994, following regional instability and conflict in eastern DRC.


9. Most of the 53,600 refugees (2011 data) reside in three camps: Gihembe in Northern Province, Kiziba in Western Province, and Nyabiheke in Eastern Province. Of these refugees, 74 percent have been displaced for more than ten years.³ Figure 1 shows the trend of refugee numbers from 1994 to 2011.

¹ The purpose of UNHCR/WFP JAMs is to build understanding of the situation, needs, risks, capacities and vulnerabilities of refugees and host populations with regard to food and nutrition needs, to inform joint decision-making (UNHCR/WFP. 2008. *Joint Assessment Mission Guidelines*. Rome).

² WFP. 2011. Rwanda pre-JAM household assessment report: Food security and nutrition survey. Kigali, WFP Rwanda Country Office.

³ American Refugee Committee (ARC) 2011. Intention Survey Preliminary Findings: Gihembe, Nyabiheke, and Kiziba Refugee Camps – Rwanda. 5 September. Kigali.

Figure 1: Historical trend in the refugee population in Rwanda (1994–2011)



Source: UNHCR Statistical Online population Database, 2011.

⇒ ***WFP and UNHCR support to refugees 2007–2011***

10. WFP and UNHCR have been working jointly to support refugees in Rwanda since 2007, with complementary roles and responsibilities. From 2007 to 2011, WFP provided support under two protracted relief and recovery operations (105310 and 200030) budgeted at US\$93 million and funded at 63 percent – US\$58.5 million. About US\$38 million, or 65 percent, covered GFD.⁴ During the same period, UNHCR contributions to Rwanda refugee operations totalled US\$30 million, with annual contributions doubling from US\$4.2 million to US\$8.4 million.

11. WFP oversaw activities related to operation assessment, planning and monitoring as well as procurement, transport and storage of food assistance. GFD rations were distributed monthly to all refugees, by the Ministry of Local Government from 1994 to 2009 and by Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA) from 2010. Targeted supplementary feeding programmes (SFPs) were implemented through American Refugee Committee in Gihembe and Nyabiheke and AHA in Kiziba.⁵

12. UNHCR oversaw all camp management and protection-related activities; ensured refugee registration; provided fresh foods for supplementary feeding activities; managed supplementary and therapeutic feeding; provided non-food items (NFIs); and supported, managed and monitored the partner NGOs implementing community education and health services, water system management, protection services combating sexual and gender-based violence (GBV), and livelihood promotion and environmental protection activities.

⁴ Both operations also supported mother-and-child health and nutrition and HIV activities for Rwandans.

⁵ ARC and AHA manage health and nutrition programmes in the refugee camps.

13. Over the evaluation reference period, the policy orientation of both agencies shifted towards assisting refugees in attaining self-reliance.⁶ In Rwanda however, WFP and UNHCR continued to prioritize relief, care and maintenance activities within the constraints of funding shortfalls. These budget constraints meant that UNHCR was able to make only limited investments in income-generating activities for livelihood promotion to support durable solutions or refugee self-reliance.

Outcomes and Impact of Food Assistance on the Protracted Refugee Population in Rwanda

Impacts on Food Security and Nutritional Status

14. **Food security and nutrition status overview.** The evaluation found that food insecurity remained problematic for all the Congolese refugees, with no major differences among camps. Nutrition and health results were mixed: global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates⁷ were below alert levels, while chronic malnutrition levels exceeded the humanitarian standards' threshold for classification as critical. From 2008 to 2010, health centre records showed positive trends for mortality, supplementary feeding recovery and low birthweight rates, which surpassed the UNHCR/WFP standards for a stable situation (JAM guidelines) in all camps.⁸

15. **Food consumption.** Based on analysis of food consumption scores⁹ and household diet diversity scores,¹⁰ the evaluation found that food insecurity remained problematic for the refugee population. Quantitative survey results found that a narrow majority of refugees – 58 percent – attained acceptable food consumption scores.¹¹ However, there were significant differences among camps: 69 percent of refugee households in Gihembe households had acceptable scores, compared with only 46 percent in the remoter Kiziba camp.

16. **Dietary diversity.** The evaluation found that refugee diets were very monotonous and highly dependent on the food ration basket of maize, beans, oil and salt, all of which were consumed nearly every day. Meat, eggs, fish, fruit and dairy products were not consumed at all, or were consumed less than once per week; green vegetables, manioc or cassava were consumed one to three days per week. With a diet diversity score of 4.7 – from a maximum of 12 – Gihembe households consumed slightly more items than did Kiziba households, with a score of 4.4. The relatively diverse market for foodstuffs in the town next to Gihembe camp likely explains this difference in scores.

⁶ The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between UNHCR and WFP (July 2002) states: “UNHCR and WFP will promote the use of assistance to encourage and build the self-reliance of beneficiaries.” This was elaborated in the 2011 MOU.

⁷ United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Rwanda. 2008. *Rapport d’Evaluation de l’etat nutritionnel dans 2 Centres de Transit et 4 Camps de Réfugiés au Rwanda*. Kigali, March.

⁸ The Sphere Project. Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. 2011 Edition. Rugby, UK; UNHCR and WFP. September 2008. UNHCR/WFP Joint Assessment Mission Guidelines, Second Edition. Geneva/Rome.

⁹ WFP uses this score to measure the nutrient density and frequency of household consumption, enabling nutrition analysis based on the frequency and types of foods consumed, indexed by higher values for animal-protein foods, pulses and green vegetables, and lower values for oil and sugar. (WFP. 2009. *Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment Guidelines*. Rome.)

¹⁰ WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations use this score to represent the average number of food groups – from a total of 12 – consumed by households during a 24-hour period.

¹¹ Set at >38.5, based on the inclusion of oil as an integral part of the food assistance ration.

17. **Vulnerability groups.** Principal component and cluster analyses were used to compare refugee groups' vulnerability rankings and examine the differential effects of food assistance. The team found that the degree and intensity of chronic food insecurity varied by refugee group and type of household. A small group – 4 percent – of refugee households was found least vulnerable to food insecurity; a substantially larger 39 percent was moderately vulnerable; and the largest group, of 57 percent, was most vulnerable. Nearly two-thirds of the most vulnerable group were households headed by women with large numbers of dependents. Obstacles to obtaining food did not vary by vulnerability group, but other factors such as access to income-generating activities varied significantly.

18. **Nutrition.** A UNICEF 2008 survey⁷ revealed GAM rates of 5 to 10.6 percent¹² and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rates of 0.7 to 3.5 percent (see Table 1). The survey revealed some differences among camps, but these were not statistically significant.

19. Stunting/chronic malnutrition rates in the 2008 nutrition survey were 45.4 percent in Gihembe, 48.1 percent in Kiziba and 49.3 percent in Nyabiheke – all exceeding the international humanitarian threshold for critical, of >40 percent.¹³ The 2011 pre-JAM² found that 60 percent of the 329 children aged 6–59 months tested were anaemic, exceeding the humanitarian threshold for severe, of >40 percent.¹⁴

Table 1. Prevalence of Malnutrition in the camps, 2008 (%)

	GAM	SAM	Stunting
Gihembe	5.0	0.7	45.4
Kiziba	9.1	2.6	48.1
Nyabiheke	10.6	3	49.3

Source: UNICEF Rwanda, 2008.

20. Camp records revealed that the prevalence of low birthweight – <2.5 kg – has remained low, ranging from 0 to 5.6 percent between 2008 and 2011 in the three camps, well within the humanitarian standard of <15 percent. UNHCR health information system reports indicated low crude mortality and under-5 mortality rates in all camps between 2008 and 2010.

21. **Water and sanitation.** Against the international humanitarian standard of >20 litres per person per day, in August 2011, water access was found adequate only in Kiziba, where easily accessible water points provided refugees with approximately 33 litres per person per day. Access was problematic in Nyabiheke, with 14 litres per person per day, and Gihembe, with 6.5 litres. Depending on the camp, there were 22 to 24 people per communal drop-hole, slightly below the humanitarian standard of <20.

¹² The international humanitarian threshold for an alert is GAM of 10–14 percent.

¹³ The current estimate for the Rwanda population is 44 percent (Demographic and Health Survey 2010), unchanged since 2005.

¹⁴ Anaemia in children aged 6–59 months in Rwanda is currently 38 percent, including 1 percent severe (Demographic and Health Survey 2010).


How Food Assistance Affects Coping Strategies

⇒ *Coping strategies overview*

22. Overall, negative coping strategies were found to be both frequent and severe, with a slightly worse situation in Gihembe than in Kiziba. Refugee households sold food rations to generate funds to cover other costs, including milling, cooking fuel and other foods. Coping strategies were found to have negative effects on refugee children’s education. Income-generating activities were minimal, with fewer than half of households reporting any income in the previous year.

23. The quantitative survey found that camp residents deployed a variety of negative coping strategies. The aggregate coping strategies index scores averaged 38 for both camps¹⁵ – 35.7 in Kiziba and 40.4 in Gihembe. More than 80 percent of households limited portion sizes, reduced the number of meals, consumed less preferred foods and/or reduced adult consumption to allow children to eat more and more frequently. Between 50 and 80 percent of households borrowed food from neighbours, skipped food for entire days, purchased food on credit, and sought work or sold rations to purchase food (see Figure 2). Most refugee households ate 1.6 to 2 meals per day: children averaged 1.7 to 2.2 meals.¹⁶ In Kiziba 67 percent of households and in Gihembe 75 percent indicated that at least once in the past 30 days they passed an entire day without eating.

Figure 2: Coping strategies used at least once in past 30 days, by camp - % of households




Source: Technical Assistance to NGOs (TANGO) International Household Survey 2011.

¹⁵ This index is used by WFP and is composed of the 13 indicators shown on the horizontal axis in Figure 2. High scores indicate that households have frequently employed comparatively severe coping strategies, (see footnote 9).

¹⁶ Refugee households traditionally consume two meals per day according to focus group participants and corroborated by key informants from implementing agencies.

24. Refugees used the food rations as currency. Overall, households sold 20 to 21.5 percent of the maize and 55 to 60 percent of the vegetable oil – slightly more in Gihembe than in Kiziba (see Figure 3) – to purchase other livelihood needs. Food was sold at poor terms of trade. Refugees used the cash generated from sales to buy cooking fuel and clothing and to cover maize milling costs¹⁷ and education expenses for high school students attending schools outside the camp.

Figure 3: Mean percentages of maize and vegetable oil rations sold, by camp



Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011.

⇒ **Education**

25. Coping strategies were found to have negative effects on refugee children’s education. Total enrolment rates in primary and lower secondary schools for boys and girls aged 5–18 years were high, with only 7.8 percent of children in Kiziba and 5 percent in Gihembe never enrolling – percentages were higher among girls than boys.¹⁸ However, attendance was affected by the availability of food in the household, and records indicate falling attendance in the fourth week following monthly food distributions. Survey findings found that 15 percent of households in Kiziba and 21 percent in Gihembe had withdrawn children from school at least once in the previous month (see Figure 2).

26. Qualitative interviews reported that adolescent girls faced cultural and financial restrictions to pursuing secondary-level education. NGOs stated that it was unusual for girls attending secondary school to become pregnant and drop out; in contrast, many of those who were unable to pursue secondary level became pregnant.

⇒ **Indebtedness overview**

27. Focus group discussions revealed that refugees were compelled to sell rations to buy food and NFIs, ran out of food the last one to two weeks of the month, borrowed

¹⁷ Milling costs required an estimated 20 to 30 percent of the cereal ration and were higher in Kiziba, at Rwandan Franc (RWF) 1,300 per month, than Gihembe, at RWF 796 per month. RWF 604.25 = US\$1 (July 2012 United Nations exchange rate).

¹⁸ In Kiziba, 6.8 percent of boys, and 9.6 percent of girls; in Gihembe, 4.4 percent of boys, and 5.7 percent of girls.

to buy food to cover this gap and used the new ration to repay the loan. This kept many refugee households in a cycle of recurring debt.

⇒ ***Indebtedness and gender***

28. Qualitative analysis revealed a gendered aspect to retaining ration cards.¹⁹ In line with WFP guidelines, women were encouraged to retain the ration cards and collect the food. Women also obtained the credit to manage their households' food and other needs throughout the month. This resulted in the unintended consequence of refugee women bearing the debt burden.

⇒ ***Income-generating activities***

29. Most refugees were farmers prior to seeking asylum. In the camps, however, only 0.7 to 5.7 percent of households cultivated, and about 5 percent owned livestock. Some refugees engaged in income-earning activities, but these were very limited. Fewer than half of households reported any income in the previous year; of these households, nearly two-thirds worked inside the camp. Gihembe camp adjoins the town but had only slightly more households reporting earned income, at 44.6 percent, than the much more isolated Kiziba camp, at 40.3 percent.

30. Among women reporting earned income, the most frequent activity was petty trade, mainly buying fruit and vegetables in town for resale in the camps. Profit margins were reported to be very small. Men were predominantly employed in the camps as non-agricultural day labourers, engaging in such activities as emptying latrines, digging pits and undertaking construction work. Focus group discussions reported that daily rates of RWF 400/US\$0.67 had not changed since 1997.

Impacts on Protection and the Protective Environment

31. **Protection overview.** Overall results regarding protection and the protective environment were mixed. Refugees appreciated the physical security and freedom of movement accorded by the Government of Rwanda, but women and girls were vulnerable to GBV when they ventured outside the camp for fuelwood, and to sexual exploitation when they sought casual employment. Mutual benefits, such as improved local markets, roads and health care services affecting both the host population and refugees, helped to create a protective environment. However, environmental damage from the camps and competition for fuelwood between the host population and refugees were major sources of tension, marring an otherwise cordial relationship.

32. **Gender and protection.** Women and girls faced protection risks when rations were sold and NFIs were insufficient, which – as reported previously – was the norm. Camp administrative records in both Gihembe and Kiziba registered declines in reported GBV cases over the period,²⁰ but the evaluation found that GBV was underreported for cultural reasons. Cultural constraints and ascribed gender roles were also found to limit women's participation in the activities of camp committees.

¹⁹ The quantitative survey found that women were ration cardholders in 60 percent of households: 59.1 percent in Kiziba and 61.7 percent in Gihembe.

²⁰ UNHCR/ARC/AHA programme information.

33. Impacts on the host community. The benefits that the host community derived from the refugee camps fostered a protective environment. In interviews, members of host communities reported positive impacts on local markets and labour availability from the refugees' presence. Markets were held more frequently and were more active, and there was a supply of cheap food, especially maize and oil, from resales. Host communities provided refugees with casual labour opportunities, although these were often low-paid, and opened their schools to refugee children. In several host communities, primary and secondary school infrastructure was expanded to accommodate refugee children. Host communities realized some ancillary benefits from the services provided to refugees, notably in Kanyege town, near Kiziba camp, which now has improved roads, access to health care services, safe drinking-water, and expanded employment opportunities.

34. Impacts on the natural environment. The host population considered the refugee camps to be detrimental to the natural environment. In interviews, all communities reported deforestation of communally owned land outside the camps, caused by refugees harvesting fuelwood. Residents around Kiziba camp reported that they now have to purchase fuelwood because there is none left to harvest. Every community reported significant environmental damage caused by camp houses and structures.

35. Durable solutions. The evaluation found that WFP food assistance did not contribute to the long-term durable solutions of self-reliance, resettlement, repatriation or local integration in Rwanda. WFP had not planned activities for achieving durable solutions. In interviews, UNHCR reported that it had not promoted voluntary repatriation because DRC remained insecure, although repatriation was deemed to be the most viable durable solution.²¹ UNHCR reported that 1,268 refugees – 2.3 percent of the total – resettled in the 2007–2010 period, mainly in Finland and the United States of America. As reliable work at reasonable wages and land for cultivation and livestock rearing were severely limited, there was little permanent movement of refugees out of the camps leading to self-reliance or local integration in Rwanda. In the quantitative survey, 8 percent of refugee households in Gihembe and 4.8 percent in Kiziba indicated a preference for staying in Rwanda, reflecting the difficulty of aiming for self-reliance through local integration.

Explanatory Factors for Impact

Contextual Factors beyond the Control of WFP/UNHCR

36. The effectiveness of food assistance – its ability to generate intended short-term, intermediate and long-term outcomes – was limited by external factors beyond the control of WFP and UNHCR. These included government policy, the limited local resources, the insufficient donor support for livelihood programmes and the uncertain political situation in DRC.

²¹ Although UNHCR did not track people who spontaneously repatriated, in the quantitative survey 3.6 percent of households in Kiziba and 8.8 percent in Gihembe reported having a member return to DRC. In interviews, refugees reported visiting family members or checking on their land as the reasons for returning to DRC.

37. Together, these factors kept refugees reliant on food assistance and other basic relief services and supplies, and prevented them from realizing successful income-generating activities, agricultural production and asset-building. Contextual factors also negatively affected their prospects for repatriation.

38. Government policy permitted refugees freedom of movement and access to local schools and some forms of employment. However, refugees were forbidden to engage in livestock production, given the severe land shortages in and around the camps. Land constraints also precluded agricultural production opportunities for refugees.

39. Donor support over the reference period met only 63 percent of planned food assistance requirements,²² resulting in little or no support for training in income generation or other programme activities to support livelihoods such as food/cash for work. In some cases, donor funding regulations did not permit support for long-term livelihoods programme activities.

40. During the evaluation, virtually all refugees clearly stated that instability had kept them from returning to DRC, and that they did not want to return until peace and security were established.

Implementation Factors within the Control of WFP/UNHCR

41. The evaluation team analysed the programme delivery and coordination of WFP and UNHCR to assess how these factors affected outcomes. The team found that the mix of activities undertaken was dominated by care and maintenance support and had not progressed beyond providing basic needs, with few or no supporting activities to promote refugee self-reliance and durable solutions.

42. With some interruptions, WFP provided a stable supply of food assistance to the camps. However, the food basket of five commodities did not provide the planned 2,238 kcals per person per day, achieving only 1,976 to 2,112 kcal. The nutritional value was reduced to 1,998 kcal per day when corn-soya blend was withdrawn in early 2010. The ration lacked essential micronutrients, fulfilling only 54 percent of vitamin A requirements and 44 percent of calcium, and providing no vitamin C.

43. Recognizing that refugees sell significant quantities of food and bear high milling costs, WFP is exploring alternative forms of food assistance. A recent feasibility study on the use of cash and/or food vouchers in the camps found that these alternative food assistance tools could be effective and efficient, but further analysis of local markets, including their potential to adjust over time, is needed.

44. Budget constraints compromised UNHCR's efforts to distribute and replenish NFIs systematically. Refugees and the agencies confirmed that there were shortages of many NFIs, including fuelwood and soap.

²² WFP's approved operation included food-for-work support to host communities from 2010. As resources were insufficient to cover planned activities, WFP prioritized GFD for refugees and did not undertake any activities with the host population.

45. Supplementary feeding programme activities supported by UNHCR and WFP reached potentially malnourished and moderately malnourished children, pregnant and lactating women and other vulnerable groups. However, the effectiveness of the SFPs in the three camps was difficult to assess because they were not specifically treating moderate acute malnutrition as intended; there were inclusion errors.

46. Few UNHCR resources were devoted to livelihood programme activities that could create economic opportunities for refugees.²³ Income-generating activity programmes enabled 3 percent of adult refugees to start small businesses, 5.6 percent to undertake professional training, and 38.5 percent to form savings and loan associations. These programmes built the vocational skills needed to generate reliable income and contributed to durable solutions by preparing refugees to pursue more diverse livelihoods.

47. UNHCR ensured that quality basic education was available to all children through grade 9 of secondary school; however, financial support for grades 10 to 12 was discontinued after 2007 because of budget constraints.

48. UNHCR offered several programme activities to protect refugees from violence and abuse, including child protection activities, counselling and referral services for victims of GBV, and household conflict resolution initiatives. Qualitative interviews reported that GBV would have been much worse without the commitment of UNHCR and its partners to prioritizing activities to protect women and children. Although the evaluation found underreporting, as mentioned above, NGOs noted a decrease in the number of reported GBV cases between 2008 and 2011.

49. WFP and UNHCR carried out effective monthly coordination with the Rwandan Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs and other implementing partners, including NGOs working in the camps. The agencies engaged in JAMs in 2006, 2008 and 2011, but follow-up on JAM recommendations was inconsistent and insufficiently prioritized, especially regarding activities related to annual nutrition assessments, vocational training, livelihood support and improvements to the food ration and NFI provision.²⁴

Interactions among Factors

50. The main factors that interacted to influence the impact of food assistance on durable solutions were the underresourced food and NFI provision, and the limited livelihood and asset-building opportunities supported by the agencies and donors. The combined resources of WFP and UNHCR were designed to provide refugees with an adequate, balanced food basket and NFIs that met essential needs. However, the food basket had to be reduced, and was monotonous and lacking in sufficient kilocalories and micronutrients, which – coupled with shortages in essential NFIs – forced refugees to convert food assistance to cash to cover other essential needs. The result was a situation of food insecurity, chronic malnutrition and the adoption of negative coping strategies, involving particularly women in a cycle of indebtedness. These factors reduced the impact of food assistance on short-term outcomes, and

²³ UNHCR in Rwanda devotes approximately 90 percent of its budget to care and maintenance activities.

²⁴ Following JAMs, UNHCR and WFP are expected to fine-tune the ongoing operation in line with recommendations, including by updating complementary strategies for food and related assistance and for self-reliance.

undermined the intermediate outcomes of successful income-generating activities or asset building, thereby blocking the pathway to the long-term outcome of self-reliance.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

51. In testing the theory of change, the evaluation found that WFP food assistance activities and outputs, in combination with support from UNHCR, the Government and the host community, were often insufficient to meet all refugees' basic needs; major assumptions regarding the refugees' use of food assistance did not hold; and as a result the planned short-term and intermediate outcomes were only partially achieved. The pathway for ensuring that food assistance can contribute to the achievement of long-term outcomes – durable solutions – was not found in the refugee camps in Rwanda.

52. Short-term outcomes. The evaluation team found that food insecurity remained problematic for all refugees living in camps. Most refugees were categorized as either most vulnerable (57 percent) or moderately vulnerable (39 percent) to food insecurity, with only 4 percent falling in the least vulnerable category. Of the most vulnerable group, nearly two-thirds were households headed by women with large numbers of dependents.

53. Intermediate outcomes. Nutrition and health results were mixed, with GAM rates below alert levels while chronic malnutrition rates exceeded the threshold for critical. Overall, negative coping strategies were found to be both frequent and severe. Income-generating activities were minimal. Results regarding protection and the protective environment were mixed. Women and adolescent girls were highly vulnerable to GBV, although there was a decline in reported GBV cases over the period.

54. Long-term outcomes. The evaluation found that WFP food assistance did not contribute to the long-term durable solutions of self-reliance, resettlement, repatriation or local integration in Rwanda. UNHCR's activities promoting small business and professional training reached a small proportion of refugees, and contributed to durable solutions by preparing this group to pursue more diverse livelihoods. However, durable solutions and self-reliance for most refugees were not achieved, largely because of external factors beyond the agencies' control. Continuing insecurity in eastern DRC, severely limited resettlement opportunities, and severe constraints to self-reliance and/or integration in Rwanda resulted in few refugees moving permanently out of the camps during the period.

55. There was little variation in the results among different refugee camps or socio-economic groups; when differences existed, they were marginal. Gihembe camp performed slightly better than the more remote Kiziba camp regarding overall food security, income-generating activities and children's school enrolment rates. However, it scored worse on overall negative coping strategies and water availability.

56. This impact evaluation tested the theory of change, which provides the rationale and expected short-term, intermediate and long-term outcomes for programme activities. The agencies achieved some of the outputs, but others have not been fully

achieved. WFP provided refugees with a monthly ration of 1,998 kcal per person per day, which falls short of the planned 2,238 kcal; UNHCR did not systematically provide refugees with NFIs on a timely basis; and income-generating activities were accessible to only a very small percentage of refugees.

Recommendations

Implementation, Management Standards and Programme Approach

57. **Recommendation 1:** WFP should ensure that all refugees are provided with a balanced and diverse ration that includes the necessary micronutrient content and sufficient kilocalories for health and development. In addition to implementing GFD and blanket and targeted supplementary feeding in line with set standards, WFP, in cooperation with UNHCR, should identify opportunities for optimizing the use of food-, cash- or voucher-based approaches. Building on WFP's feasibility study, a market assessment followed by a pilot should be conducted, to provide evidence of the effects of a cash/voucher programme on the local economy and markets, and on intra-household food availability.

58. **Recommendation 2:** UNHCR should carry out methodologically sound nutrition surveys in each camp on an annual basis – namely the standardized expanded nutrition survey implemented in coordination with the Ministry of Health, WFP and, if required, UNICEF. In addition, UNHCR and WFP, in partnership with UNICEF, should ensure adherence to joint UNHCR/WFP guidelines and national protocols for the provision and management of curative nutrition programmes.

59. **Recommendation 3:** UNHCR should mobilize funding to increase livelihood options for refugees in the camps, especially women. This should include scaling up income-generating programme savings and loan activities with adequate financial, material and technical support. Women refugees should be targeted to increase the equity of income-earning opportunities.

60. **Recommendation 4:** Mechanisms to ensure follow-up to address JAM recommendations should be established by WFP and UNHCR, according to a prioritized action plan.

61. **Recommendation 5:** UNHCR and WFP should minimize the use of firewood for cooking through the intensified distribution of fuel-efficient or alternative-energy stoves and sufficient quantities of environmentally friendly fuel. Alternatives exist and should be tapped as important strategies to enhance protection for women and girls.

Longer-Term Strategy and Durable Solutions

62. **Recommendation 6:** UNHCR and WFP should collaborate and coordinate more effectively in pursuing joint programming, funding and advocacy activities to ensure international support for durable solutions. UNHCR and WFP should pursue a joint funding strategy with donors, and seek ways of diversifying the donor base.

63. **Recommendation 7:** WFP should initiate food-for-work/cash-for-work programming to broaden income opportunities for refugees, especially for

households headed by women and unemployed youth, and to improve social and economic relations between refugees and host communities.

64. **Recommendation 8:** UNHCR and donors should identify ways of increasing access to educational opportunities, especially for girls, as a major strategy for achieving durable solutions. UNHCR and donors should prioritize funding to enable families to meet the costs of a full secondary school education – grades 10 to 12 – in accordance with the Government of Rwanda’s policy of universal access. Increasing girls’ access to education is a strategy for reducing the GBV and discrimination experienced by adolescent girls. The overall strategy should include creating greater access to national vocational and technical training schools and linking training to market needs and livelihood opportunities in Rwanda and DRC.

65. **Recommendation 9:** Over the longer term, UNHCR and WFP should pursue strategies for promoting repatriation or integration within Rwanda. Notwithstanding the complexities of the situation, it is important that the international community engages with the governments of Rwanda and DRC, together with UNHCR and WFP, to pursue strategies for promoting repatriation. Repatriation would require the Government of DRC’s commitment to ensuring that land for cultivation and homesteads is returned to repatriated refugees and their security is assured. Similarly, the international community, with the Government of Rwanda, UNHCR and WFP, should develop strategies for overcoming constraints to local integration, including donor funding to facilitate integration through livelihood support for refugees.


66. **Recommendation 10:** Donors supporting the refugee programme should devote a larger proportion of funds to refugee self-reliance and durable solutions. Donors are urged to overcome barriers related to funding restrictions, to support long-term durable solutions in both DRC and Rwanda. Strong, proactive donor support would help to overcome the limitations encountered by UNHCR and WFP in implementing activities aimed at achieving durable solutions and refugee self-reliance.

1.Introduction

1.1. Evaluation Features

1. Rationale, objectives, and scope: The World Food Programme (WFP) and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) have commissioned a series of four evaluations during 2011 and 2012 to provide evidence and inspiration for future strategies to improve the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions for refugees and host populations in protracted refugee situations. The initial evaluation was undertaken in Ethiopia in 2011. Rwanda provides the backdrop for the second evaluation, which seeks to provide a detailed assessment of the impact of food assistance provided to refugees between 2007 and 2011 in the three Rwanda refugee camps. Evaluation findings will seek to promote evidence-based decision-making on appropriate forms of food assistance in protracted refugee situations. The primary intended users of this second evaluation are staff from WFP and UNHCR Country Offices, implementing NGO partners and the government oversight partner – the Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR).
2. Serving both accountability and learning purposes, the evaluation intended to:
 - a. Assess and explain the outcomes and impact of food assistance interventions to Congolese refugees within the protracted refugee camps of Rwanda from 2007 to 2011; and
 - b. Identify changes needed to improve the contribution of food assistance to self-reliance and/or durable solutions for protracted refugee populations of Rwanda.

Figure 1 Theory of Change: WFP and UNHCR Support to Refugees in Camps in Rwanda 2007-2011



3. **The Theory of Change:** To determine whether the interventions that have been implemented by the two agencies over the past five years are likely to lead to durable change and self-reliance, the evaluation team has critically reviewed the theory of change (Annex 1) that underlies these operations through time, drawn from a logic model (Annex 2) for WFP and UNHCR inter-related interventions in the protracted refugee context of Rwanda. Through this review, the team sought to determine if the intervention logic is coherent and to identify strengths and weaknesses in the approach for the purpose of informing future programming. The evaluation has tested some key short-term, intermediate and long-term assumptions (outlined in depth in Annex 2: Logic Model and Annex 3: Methodology).

4. The theory of change postulates that UNHCR and WFP outputs and activities – rations for general distribution, supplementary and other special feeding, water supply, health care, income-generating activities (IGA), non-food item (NFI) distribution – will produce the following short-term effects, intermediate outcomes, and long-term impact:

- Short-term effects should include increased food consumption amongst the general refugee population and malnourished individuals, increased use of WASH and protection services, increased enrolment and attendance in schools, and improved livelihoods through the use of enhanced skills and opportunities.
- Intermediate outcomes should include improved or stabilized nutrition and neonatal health care, improved food basket, successful IGAs and agricultural activities, asset-building, and improved education.
- Long-term impact should result in self-reliance, resettlement, repatriation, or local integration within Rwanda.

5. **Evaluation Questions:** In addition to evaluating a theory of change, the evaluation assesses outcomes and impacts of UNHCR and WFP activities and implementation strategy as expressed in the logic models of WFP's two successive Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRROs 105310 [2007-2009] and 200030 [2010-2011]). Drawing from the theory of change and the PRRO logical framework, the evaluation team developed an evaluation matrix, which outlines the methods employed and strategic logic used to answer the following four key evaluation questions (the evaluation matrix is outlined in Annex 4):

- 1) What are the differential impacts of food assistance on the protracted refugee population in Rwanda?
- 2) What are the impacts on food security and nutritional status?
- 3) How does food assistance affect coping strategies, including adoption of new coping strategies?
- 4) What are the impacts on protection and the protective environment?

6. **Methodology:** The evaluation team employed a combination of data collection procedures in order to triangulate information gathered from a wide variety of sources and stakeholders, most prominently involving the participation of refugees residing in the three Rwandan camps. (The urban refugees and refugees living in rural areas outside the camps are outside the scope of this evaluation.) The mixed-methods approach generated quantitative interpretations of statistical representation of the effects and impacts of food assistance on the lives and livelihoods of the refugee populations living in a protracted refugee situation in two camps. The statistically representative quantitative data garnered through interviews with refugee households in the two camps was supplemented by qualitative data

involving interviews and focus group discussions (FGD) with a sample of all stakeholders (Annex 9 provides a list of persons interviewed) in three camps – Nyabiheke as well as Kiziba and Gihembe. Evaluation methods included:

- Quantitative household survey of 1200 refugee households randomly selected in two camps (600 households in each camp) using UNHCR data bases (The survey instrument is included as Annex 10);
- Qualitative FGD with various types of refugee groups, targeted vulnerable groups, and committees and host populations disaggregated by sex in three camps (topical outlines are included as Annex 11; completed focus group matrices are included in Volume II - Annexes);
- Key informant interviews with WFP, UNHCR, other UN agencies, MIDIMAR, NGO partners, and donors in Kigali and three refugee camps;
- Interviews with small business owners in three camps;
- Transect walks and observation of conditions in three camps and warehouses;
- Analysis of several secondary data sources, including Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) reports, agency reports, various assessments, and proposals.

7. The Terms of Reference (ToR) for this impact assessment are included as Annex 5; data collection methods are included in Annex 3; the sampling strategy is included as Annex 6.

8. **Limitations:** No baseline assessment was conducted, which makes comparability of indicators over time problematic. This report therefore does not analyze impact of food assistance in terms of changes over time in the different dimensions examined; rather, it looks at cross-sectional differences between camps and socio-economic groups.

9. Similarly, the evaluation does not include analysis of treatment versus control groups (i.e., receiving food assistance versus not receiving food assistance) because all refugees residing in camps do receive food assistance and there are no sufficiently comparable substitutes for a control group (such as general population or refugees outside the camp). Mitigating for these first two limitations, the study tests the logic of the interventions, represented by a theory of change with short-, medium-, and long-term outcomes and assumptions.

10. Although the interpretation of qualitative data applies to all three camps, the interpretation of quantitative data is limited to the situation of refugees living in Kiziba and Gihembe camps and should not be generalized to all refugee camps or settlements within Rwanda.

11. The lack of systematic nutritional data collection in the camps and surrounding areas rendered nutritional analysis difficult. Time series analysis was impossible. The pre-JAM sampling was not disaggregated by camp. Therefore while it shows the nutritional situation across all camps, it does not allow analysis of indicators by camp.

12. Resource constraints compelled WFP to halve the food rations in the GFD to refugee families in the three camps for one month (in September), a development that may have influenced refugee interviews approximately one month later. The evaluation team designed quantitative and qualitative interview questions to probe before and after food security/food insecurity contexts in relation to changing ration scenarios.

13. The definition of female-headed and male-headed households may be problematic in the context of the Rwandan refugee population. WFP and UNHCR have promoted a food collection process encouraging women to manage the rations by assuming possession of the ration cards. As a result, many households may have declared the woman of household as the household head, contravening cultural norms whereby the man of the household would assume that responsibility.

14. The evaluation team requested clarification from UNHCR regarding the “Rwandan ID card” and any effect of card ownership on refugee (re-)registration; at the time of this writing the team has received no further information on this issue.²⁵

15. The report does not include an analysis of cost-per-beneficiary information because the available information is not sufficiently disaggregated by beneficiary type (i.e., refugees versus other categories of recipients of WFP assistance) and because planned versus actual figures were not available for UNHCR.

1.2. Context

16. **Overview:** In the early 1990s, Rwanda was characterized by civil war, severe political and economic problems, and finally, the 1994 genocide that killed an estimated 800,000 Rwandans (CIA 2011a). In recent years Rwanda has been transitioning to a more stable and peaceful nation through initiatives such as Rwanda Vision 2020²⁶ and the Government of Rwanda’s (GoR) Economic and Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy. Presidential elections were held peacefully in August 2010 (UNHCR Global Appeal 2011) and the present political situation in Rwanda is stable.

17. With 369 inhabitants per square kilometre (2008 estimate), Rwanda has one of the highest population densities in Africa (UN Statistics Division 2011). The overall population estimate is 11,370,425 (July 2011) (CIA 2011a), with a higher growth rate in urban areas (4.2%) than rural ones (2.4%) between 2005 and 2010 (UN Statistics Division 2011). Agriculture accounts for 80% of the labour force and generates about 45% of export revenues; the sector is the most important in the Rwandan economy, comprising 36% of the GDP (World Bank 2011a). Rwandan agriculture is characterized by small, semi-subsistence farms that are increasingly fragmented; the 2009 CFSVA found that 59% of households had access to less than 0.5 ha, and only 4% had access to 1 ha or more (UN 2009). In compliance with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) compact, the GoR allocates at least 10% of its budget to agriculture, with a focus on increasing productivity (World Bank 2011a). Rwanda has a strong GDP growth rate (11% in 2008 (UN Statistics Division 2011)) and real growth rate (7.5% in 2010 (World Bank 2011a)).

18. Poverty and food insecurity are prevalent in Rwanda. The country’s Human Development Index (HDI) value²⁷ is below the regional average for sub-Saharan Africa, and it places 167 out of 182 countries in the 2009 index (UNDP 2009).²⁸ Rwanda ranks 60 out of 122 countries in the Global Hunger Index (IFPRI 2011),²⁹

²⁵ This is mentioned in Sections 1.1 and 3.2

²⁶ Vision 2020 identified six pillars of work: good governance, market-oriented agriculture, development of the private sector, human resources development, transportation and other physical infrastructure, and regional economic cooperation and integration (GoR 2000).

²⁷ Rwanda’s 2009 HDI value is 0.460

²⁸ The HDI for 2010 has been calculated but has been contested by both the GoR and the UN in Rwanda because it is based on obsolete information. This report therefore gives the HDI for 2009, which is an accepted figure.

²⁹ Based on data from 2004 to 2009.

which is in the “alarming” status category. About 59% of the population lives below the national poverty line, and about 90% lives at US\$2 per day (2005 figures) (World Bank 2011b). The country’s high rates of malnutrition³⁰ are attributed to inadequate dietary intake, disease, and inadequate child care practices (WFP 2010b). Groups particularly vulnerable to food insecurity include low-income agriculturalists, agro-labourers, and those who support themselves by marginal activities such as assistance, remittances, and hunting/gathering (UN 2009, WFP 2010a). Labour availability in Rwanda exceeds employment opportunities.

19. The persistent poverty and food insecurity in Rwanda are closely associated with various contextual factors, including environmental and climate factors (e.g., low rainfall, drought, erosion, deforestation), lack of agriculture marketing infrastructure, a food deficit situation (due to high food prices because of lack of land, high transport costs for imports, high import prices, and high demand (WFP 2007a)), commodity price volatility, HIV and AIDS prevalence, and civil conflict and insecurity in the region. Additional constraints to food and livelihood security in Rwanda are general poverty, limited access to clean water, limited access to education, illiteracy, poor health infrastructure, poor transportation infrastructure, inadequate social services and lack of employment opportunities (WFP: SPR 200030, 2010).

20. There are 105,968 Rwandan refugees and 9,648 Rwandan asylum seekers outside the country³¹ and Rwanda continues to receive returnees. These households remain highly dependent on outside support. The challenges to self-reliance are similar to those of the general population and of refugees and include lack of land,³² limited opportunities for income generation, low skills level, and limited educational access (UNHCR Global Appeal 2011). The GoR has requested that UNHCR invoke the cessation clause of refugee protection status to Rwandan refugees, which is expected to catalyse voluntary returns in 2012 and beyond. The new PRRO (200343) has been designed with this consideration, and anticipates 40,000 returnees over the duration of the operation. PRRO 200343 will offer support to returnees and foresees this support to end no later than 2014 (UNHCR Global Appeal 2011, PRRO 200343).

21. **Refugees in Rwanda:** The majority of Congolese refugees are from North Kivu province, which has been plagued with violent disputes over land rights, longstanding ethnic tensions, and rebel activity (Rwanda News Agency 2010). A recent survey of 1,124 refugees from the three camps found that 74% of the Congolese refugees have been displaced for more than ten years (ARC 2011). Annex 7 shows a timeline of major developments affecting refugees and host communities.

22. Exit strategies that lead to durable solutions for the refugees in Rwanda have been part of the orientation of both WFP and UNHCR operations there since their inception, with an emphasis on repatriation. While this has been achieved to a large extent for Burundian refugees, approximately 53,600 refugees from DRC remained in the camps in 2011 (UNHCR 2011c). In the period 2007-2010, UNHCR reports that

³⁰ The 2009 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis and Nutrition Survey (CFSVA) found that in rural areas, the levels of stunting, wasting and underweight among children 6 to 59 months of age are 52%, 4.6% and 15.8%, respectively; seven percent of women of reproductive age (15-49 years) are malnourished (UN 2009).

³¹ MIDIMAR March 2012 figures, cited in GoR official email communication.

³² The Organic Land Law (no. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005) specifies use and management of land and property issues including the allocation of reclaimed and donated land (WFP 2007a). Land access remains a major problem for returnees who did not leave family members behind. While refugees are permitted to buy houses and land, there is limited availability (WFP 2010b).

1,268 refugees have been resettled in other countries, primarily Finland (407) and the United States (358).³³ The security situation in eastern DRC remains volatile and the absence of state authority and rule of law make it difficult to implement durable solutions for Congolese returnees, including development and humanitarian programmes. Elections being held between November 2011 – May 2013 may result in further insecurity. Reconciliation committees have been established in all areas of major return, and UNHCR’s 2012 strategy for DRC includes protection activities, community-based and individual assistance and peacebuilding.³⁴ Nevertheless large-scale return in the near term is not viewed as feasible (WFP 2011c).

23. Refugees reside in three camps: Gihembe (Gicumbi District, Northern Province), Kiziba (Karongi District, Western Province) and Nyabiheke (Gatsibo District, Eastern Province) and two transit centres (Nkamira and Nyagatare). A relatively small proportion of all refugees live in Kigali. The Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR) manages the three camps and the transit centres. The subject of this evaluation is strictly Congolese refugees residing in camps in Rwanda.³⁵ Basic camp information is in Table 1. These data, from the camp health centres recognized by the Ministry of Health, are reported by the UNHCR nutrition teams in the camp fact sheets.

Table 1: Basic camp information

	Kiziba	Gihembe	Nyabiheke
Date established	Dec 1996	Dec 1997	Apr 2005
Population	18,950 (Aug 2011)	20,068 (Sept 2011)	15,118 (Sept 2011)
Overall size	280,000 m ²	270,000 m ²	275,000 m ²
Plot size	4.5m x 3.5m		
Shelter size	4m x 3m		
Number of shelters	4,200		
Avg family size	5	5	5

Source: UNHCR camp fact sheets 2011

24. **Host population characteristics:** The Kiziba camp is located in a district (Karongi) with relatively high food insecurity as compared to other districts. In Karongi, 5.6% of households have a “poor” Food Consumption Score (FCS),³⁶ compared to the national average of 4% prevalence. By comparison, in Gatsibo District, host to Nyabiheke camp, 0.2% have a poor FCS, and in Gihumi (Gicumbi) District, home to Gihembe camp, 1.2% have a poor FCS.³⁷ Community-level problems identified by communities themselves showed both similarities and differences between camp-hosting districts, as shown in Table 2.

³³ UNHCR communication, “Refugees resettled since 2007_1”. Other resettlement countries are Denmark (151), Canada (117), Australia (111), Sweden (53), Norway (40), Netherlands (17), and Belgium (14).

³⁴ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Rwanda. <http://www.unrwanda.org/unhcr.htm#Links>. Accessed 13 March, 2012.

³⁵ The evaluation excludes refugees in Kigali, which has a small number of refugees, and refugees in transit centres.

³⁶ The 2009 CSFVA for Rwanda specifies the FCS categories are as follows: scores <21 are classified as “poor” food consumption, >21 and ≤35 as “borderline,” and > 35 as “acceptable.”

³⁷ It is worth noting that since the 2006 CFSVA, the FCS has improved in all three districts and that while this may be due to a general improvement in food security, it may also reflect simply that the surveys were taken after agricultural cycles with harvest yields that were quite different (CFSVA 2009: 13, 15, 61).

Table 2: Main community-level problems identified by households in 2009 CFSVA community survey (% of responses) (multiple response)

Strata	Land	Poverty	Education	Health infra-structure	Other infra-structure	Job
Karongi-Rutsiro (Kiziba camp)	40.0*	62.9*	14.3	25.7	57.1*	40.0*
Rulindo-Gicumbi (Gihembe camp)	51.4*	32.4*	37.8*	13.5	13.5	27.0*
Nyagatare-Gatsibo (Nyabiheke camp)	24.4	48.8*	43.9*	36.6*	39.0*	14.6

*Indicates that this was among the top four problems named by households in this stratum

Source: CFSVA 2009

25. Temporary migration is a strategy of less than 7% of households nationally, and in none of the districts host to refugee camps do more than 10% out-migrate for work. The most common destination for migrants from districts hosting refugee camps is “town.” The most common types of work are non-agricultural wage labour (38% of migrants from Karongi and 49% from Gihembe/Gicumbi) and agricultural wage labour (49% of migrants from Gatsibo). While 27% of migrants from both Karongi and Gatsibo migrate for income-generating activities, only 6% from Gihembe/Gicumbi do. These figures suggest that refugees face some competition from seasonal migrants in the Rwandan labour market in urban areas.

26. Refugees may move and interact freely with the host communities where the camps are located: refugees are free to leave the camps and have access to local markets. There are no laws denying employment to refugees.³⁸ The context of poverty and food insecurity throughout the country poses both challenges and opportunities for host communities, as will be discussed in Section 2.6.

27. **GoR refugee policies and strategy:** Rwanda is a party to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol.³⁹ The contents and principles of these commitments are reflected in the Rwandan National Refugee Law of 2001, amended in 2006 (Law No.29/2006).⁴⁰ The GoR is also a party to the 1969 Organization of African Union Convention Covering Specific Aspects of Refugees in Africa and has signed – but not ratified – the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (“Kampala Convention”). Rwanda is also a party to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (UNHCR 2010a). Refugees are recognized as a vulnerable group under the GoR social protection policy (WFP 2011a), and the GoR awards prima facie refugee status to persons from the DRC.⁴¹ As of 2010, Rwanda’s gender law aims to ensure gender

³⁸ United States Department of State. 2010 Human Rights Report: Rwanda. April 8, 2011.

<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154364.htm>

³⁹ Rwanda acceded to both the Convention and the Protocol in 1980.

⁴⁰ The procedures for the determination of refugee status are governed by Articles 12-20 of the National Refugee Law of 2001. Three steps of processing are involved: 1) country of origin screening and registration by the Immigration Services 2) registration, examination and eligibility hearing by the National Council for Refugee Affairs 3) hearing of appealing proceedings by the High Court of Justice (UNHCR 2011a).

⁴¹ (From TOR) Source: UNHCR Statistical Online Database. Data extracted: 6/04/2011.

equality at all levels and guarantee the economic self-reliance of women; this should include refugee women (UNHCR Global Appeal 2011).

28. Refugee registration is conducted by UNHCR and MIDIMAR. Camp security has generally not been problematic. In 2008, policemen were deployed in all camps with an effort at gender parity, enabling refugees to report incidents to posts nearby their place of residence (UNHCR 2011a). Community Watch Teams, usually comprised of male camp residents, also patrol the camps for safety and security. Their authority is limited to mediating disputes; more serious issues are brought to the local police (UNHCR 2011a).

1.3. WFP's and UNHCR's Provision of Food Assistance to Refugees in Rwanda

29. **Overview:** WFP and UNHCR have been collaborating on refugee assistance since before the first Memorandum of Understanding was signed between them in 1985, working to ensure that the food security and related needs of refugees are adequately addressed. WFP has had a central role in food assistance, addressing organizational objectives in saving lives in emergencies (Strategic Objective 1) as well as restoring and rebuilding livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations (Strategic Objective 3). These are consistent with UNHCR's Global Strategic Objectives 2010-2011. In protracted refugee situations, both agencies are oriented toward assisting refugees to attain self-reliance, a shift from prior modes of operation that were more focused on relief, care and maintenance.

30. From 2007 to 2011 WFP provided support to refugees in Rwanda under two operations budgeted at US\$93 million of which 63% or US\$58.5 million was funded. About US\$38 million (65%) covered general food distribution (GFD) to refugees.⁴² During the same period, UNHCR contributions to Rwanda refugee operations totalled US\$30 million doubling from US\$4.2 million (2007) to US\$8.4 million (2011).

31. The scope of this evaluation is food assistance and related activities serving refugees in Rwanda in WFP PRROs 105310 and 200030. The target groups for both operations are refugees, returnees, and other vulnerable groups throughout Rwanda (malnourished women and children and HIV patients on antiretroviral therapy (ART)). In 2010, refugees represented around 56% of all beneficiaries reached through the PRRO (WFP/UNHCR 2011a). Although WFP had planned to provide support to the host population through food-for-work (FFW) from 2010, support to refugees was prioritized when overall resources were limited; hence host population activities have not yet started (WFP/UNHCR 2011a). An overview of WFP operations is provided at Annex 12.

32. WFP and UNHCR have distinct but interrelated roles with relation to refugees in Rwanda. WFP is the main partner of the GoR and UNHCR in providing food rations to refugees, and has also assisted with the repatriation of Rwandan refugees. UNHCR has the foremost authority on how the camps are managed, ensuring protection interventions, monitoring overall activities, ensuring proper registration, and providing material support such as supplementary feeding for vulnerable groups, non-food items, and firewood/other fuel. UNHCR issues food ration cards, which serve as identification documents and is very important for integration

⁴² In addition to refugee support, both operations included MCHN and HIV activities for Rwandans.

possibilities. (In 2010 the GoR began to issue identity cards – similar to national identity cards – for refugees in Rwanda to facilitate their freedom of movement within the country and general access to other rights that necessitate identification, for example bank services.⁴³) UNHCR oversees voluntary return of Congolese refugees to DRC and has also assisted host communities in Rwanda, such as by assisting in building classrooms in government schools in communities that are absorbing refugee students (UNHCR 2011d).

33. Joint responsibilities of UNHCR, WFP and the GoR include joint planning and monitoring; assessing the numbers of refugees eligible for food assistance; agreeing on the modalities of food assistance and distribution, the composition of the food basket, ration size, duration of assistance, and related non-food inputs; periodic review through joint assessment missions; addressing protection concerns resulting from tensions between refugees and local communities; engaging in advocacy for the inclusion of refugees in existing national nutrition and food security programmes, as appropriate; and defining and implementing comprehensive livelihood support programmes to encourage and build the self-reliance of both refugees and host communities.

34. WFP and UNHCR also work with various implementing NGO partners in camp management; provision of community services; education; non-formal education/adult literacy; hygiene and sanitation; distribution of sanitary materials; health and nutrition; sexual and gender-based violence psychological support; reproductive health, management of water systems and distribution; environmental protection; provision of energy saving stoves; and livelihoods protection. Table 3 shows the main NGO partners and their roles.

Table 3: Roles of implementing NGO partners in refugee assistance

Organization	Role in refugee assistance
Adventist Development and Relief Agency	Children’s education; transport and logistics
Africa Humanitarian Action	Camp management; health and nutrition services
American Refugee Committee	Camp management, health, shelter, construction, water, sanitation, and infrastructure activities, vocational training (Nyabiheke)
Forum for African Women Educationalist (FAWE)	Education and vocational training for girls (all camps)
German Technical Cooperation	Transport; fuel management; warehouse services
Jesuit Refugee Services	Vocational training (Kiziba and Gihembe); education and community services

35. **Monthly general food distribution (GFD):** Food assistance from WFP is the main source of food in the camps (WFP 2011b). The GoR does not provide land to refugees for cultivation (WFP 2011b). Food is provided based on need as determined between WFP and UNHCR; UNHCR advises the monthly requirements based on the ProGres refugee database (WFP 2007a; WFP/UNHCR 2010b). Rations are distributed monthly. In October and November of 2008, WFP, UNHCR and MINALOC conducted a joint refugee verification exercise, and WFP provided new family ration cards for refugees. In all refugee households with a mother (90% of households), a ration card was written in her name, in order to give mothers more

⁴³ “Refugees to receive ID cards this year.” The New Times. January 28, 2010.

control over the household rations (WFP 105310: SPR 2008). Many households are headed by women with families.

36. During the period 2007-2010, WFP provided food assistance to around 52,600 refugees (54% female). Yearly GFD figures are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Refugees receiving general food distribution rations, 2007-2011

Project	Year	Planned	Actual			% actual/ planned
		Total	Male	Female	Total	
PRRO 105310	2007	45,000	22,730	28,251	50,981	113%
	2008	35,000	24,080	27,723	51,803	148%
	2009	58,000	25,785	27,934	53,719	93%
PRRO 200030	2010	56,000	23,889	29,115	53,004	95%
	2011	60,000	NA	NA	53,434	NA
Average		50,800	24,121	28,256	52,588	104%

Source: WFP SPRs 2007-2010, Project Document 200030 (planned 2011); Executive Brief (2011 actual as of December 2011)

37. A comparison of the amount of commodities distributed against plan shows that actual distribution has been consistently lower than planned. The figures in Table 5 show actual and planned tonnages for all beneficiaries covered under the two PRROs in this evaluation, i.e. refugees and other groups served.

Table 5: Tonnage of commodities distributed

Year	Planned (mt)	Actual (mt)	% actual/ planned	GFD to refugees Actual	% GFD to refugees vs total
2007 ^{1,2}	26,685	8,804	33%	3,959	45%
2008	21,975	17,399	79%	8,330	48%
2009	21,648	14,656	68%	9,856	67%
2010	20,793	12,256	59%	10,305	84%
2011	20,137	12,505	62%	10,077	81%
Total	111,238	65,620	59%	42,527	65%

¹ Project (10531.0) duration in 2007 was six months, however the planned figures are for the entire year, creating a low actual versus planned achievement. (Source: SPR 2007)

² The year 2007 excludes the regional PRRO as the team has not included the regional project in the report.

Source: SPRs, RMED (Rwanda Monitoring & Evaluation Database)

38. **Non-food items (NFI):** The UNHCR programme mandate provides for a standard NFI package based on available supplies. UNHCR camp factsheets stipulate that soap be provided monthly, blankets and jerry cans annually, plastic mats and kitchen sets every three years, sanitary materials for women periodically, and new and used clothing as available (UNHCR camp fact sheets, 2011). Other possible items include sleeping mats, cooking stoves, housing materials, and jerry cans.

39. **Education:** All children in the camps have free access to primary school. Classroom overcrowding due to lack of land for expansion has been a consistent challenge throughout the evaluation period (WFP/UNHCR 2011b). The only camp that had nursery education was Gihembe. A strike at the school in September 2010 strained relations between school management and the refugee community, and JRS closed its education services in the camp in March 2011. JRS re-opened primary and secondary schools after interventions from the GoR, UNHCR and JRS in May 2011, but nursery and vocational training programmes remained closed (WFP/UNHCR 2011b).

40. **Vocational training:** FAWE, JRS, and ARC have been the UNHCR's implementing partners for providing vocational training, as such: FAWE (all camps) – electricity, cooking and literacy for girls (WFP/UNHCR 2008a); JRS (Kiziba and Gihembe, shut down in Giziba in 2011) – electricity, culinary art, domestic management and computer training; ARC Nyabiheke) – catering, tailoring, literacy, and construction.⁴⁴ Both the 2008 and 2011 JAM missions pointed out that such opportunities were limited, and recommended an increased emphasis on this activity, especially for youth.⁴⁵

41. **Food for Work/Assets/Training (FFW/FFA/FFT):** FFW, FFA and FFT projects were planned for 2010 “to improve the productive capacities of refugee host communities and returnees by addressing the effects of environmental degradation”. However these activities have not been carried out as a consequence of inadequate support from donors; rather, direct support to refugees has been prioritized (WFP 2011a).

42. **Resources:** Over the period of 2007 to 2011, the Rwanda programme has experienced consistently low levels of donor support. A March 2011 evaluation of WFP's country portfolio in Rwanda found that the low level of funding – at about half of needs – affected WFP's activities and credibility (WFP 2011a).

43. **Donors:** The main donors of cash and in-kind support to WFP's food assistance to refugees in Rwanda in the period 2007-2010 were Canada, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Turkey, United States, United Nations and United Nations CERF Common Funds and Agencies, and multilateral donors. Multilateral donors were the main source of cash contributions (approximately 18,189 mt), followed by the United States (14,993 mt) and Japan (6,486 mt). These three sources made contributions in all four years (2007-2010). Annex 14 shows a breakdown of contributions by donor.

2. Results: Outcomes and Impact of Food Assistance to Refugees

44. This section examines key dimensions of the contributions made by food assistance and their differences between camps and between resident groups. The section lays out the evidence against which the validity of the Theory of Change and its assumptions will be assessed in Section 3. Four key evaluation questions relating to the impact of food assistance on the lives and well being of refugees in the Rwandan context are addressed:

1. What are the differential impacts of food assistance on the protracted refugee population in Rwanda?
2. What are the impacts on food security and nutritional status?
3. How does food assistance affect coping and livelihood strategies?
4. What are the impacts on protection and the protective environment?

45. These key evaluation questions are testing a theory of change that indicates that UNHCR and WFP outputs and activities have produced:

⁴⁴ Numbers of participants as reported in UNHCR Briefing Notes for 2011 are as follows: ARC (Nyabiheke) – catering 35, tailoring 20, literacy 48, construction 11. JRS (Kiziba) - 6-month training: electricity 13, culinary art 29, domestic management 13; 3-6 month training: computer (“CTA”): 131 (111M, 20F) not including 1,168 secondary students using the CTA as part of their curriculum and 413 primary school students.

⁴⁵ Note that the figures in the annex are taken from the 2011 JAM, which reports on a 6-14 age group for primary school, while the current evaluation covered the 5-18 age group.

- Short-term effects, including increased food consumption, increased use of WASH and protection services, increased enrolment and attendance in schools, and improved livelihoods through the use of enhanced skills and opportunities;
- Intermediate outcomes, including improved or stabilized nutrition and neonatal health care, improved food basket, successful IGAs and agricultural activities, asset-building, and improved education;
- Long-term impact, resulting in self reliance, resettlement, repatriation, or local integration within Rwanda.

46. The evaluation has also tested key assumptions, including:

- Short term assumptions: a complementary strategy of interventions has been provided to refugees, including supplementary and therapeutic feeding as needed, NFIs, and WASH; predictable food and NFI delivery; security and protection within the camps; food is eaten at no financial cost to the household; refugees are not burdened by financial or food indebtedness; firewood collection incurs no costs; host communities are receptive; and milling services are available;
- Intermediate assumptions: refugees access educational services; housing and WASH meet minimum standards; legal status allows for employment; coping strategies are positive; sufficient land exists for agriculture and refugees are allowed access to land; IGA associations are formed; households include a sufficient number of productive adults to support the household; households can access credit; livestock raising is legal and undertaken in camps; and host populations share natural resources with refugees;
- Long-term assumptions: conflict in DRC subsides, allowing refugees the option of returning, and land is available upon return to DRC.

2.1 What are the differential impacts of food assistance on the protracted refugee population in Rwanda?


47. This section outlines findings related to impacts of general food distribution for refugees in the camps. It seeks to answer to what extent short-term outcomes of increased food consumption and immediate outcomes of improved food basket have been achieved. The team analysed the ration actually distributed (outputs), food consumption score, household diet diversity score and coping strategy index, all indicators of food security. The section answers the questions: How long does food last during the month? Is the food basket appropriate? What food groups do refugees in Rwanda consume? Is the food basket sufficient? What are the coping strategies used by different types of refugee households? It further analyses a number of short-term and intermediate assumptions. When possible, a comparison of results is presented between Kiziba and Gihembe camps, between full-ration and half-ration distribution, and between male- and female-headed households. (Differential impacts comparing vulnerability and gender specific groups are further defined and discussed in Section 3.)

48. **Camp demographics:** This section presents findings regarding overall and intra-camp characteristics of camp and refugee households from the quantitative survey. These data provide context for interpreting the evaluation findings and relate to the hypothesis that these characteristics have a bearing on the evaluation questions. Figure 2 suggests that the refugee population is growing rapidly due to

high birth rates and low child mortality rates in the two camps, resulting in a very young population.⁴⁶ Older household members, including adolescents who are no longer attending school, sometimes leave the camps to search for opportunities in towns within Rwanda or (rarely) in DRC. Children less than nine years of age comprise more than one-quarter of the population; children under 14 constitute 42% of the population; and approximately six out of ten refugees are age 19 or under. The age dependency ratio – measuring the number of children and aged people as a proportion of household members – is noticeably high and highly unfavourable for most households in the two camps of Gihembe and Kiziba. Dependents generally require special attention and resources while independents have higher productive capacity and are therefore more likely to be net contributors to household resources. The age dependency ratio therefore provides an estimate of the demand on household resources relative to the supply; the higher the dependency ratio, the greater the demand relative to productive capacity. There are 140 persons in the dependent ages (under age 15 and over age 65) for every 100 persons in the working ages. A dependency ratio of 0.90 is considered to be high. (For example, the Ethiopia impact evaluation found age dependency ratios of 0.5 in the Eritrean refugee context, considered a low dependency ratio, contrasted with an age dependency ratio of 1.1 in the Somali refugee context, considered to represent “extremely high” household dependency.) Transect walks through the camps confirm at all times a very young population dominated by children and very young people wandering throughout the camps.

⁴⁶ Population pyramids for Rwanda and DRC general populations are given for comparison in Annex 14, Figures 1 and 2. This annex includes additional population data, namely, Table 1 Population distribution comparison for UNHCR data, Table 2 Population distribution for dependent and independent age groups for Kiziba and Gihembe camps; Table 3 in this annex provides the source data for the population pyramid presented here.

Figure 2: Population pyramid for refugees residing in Kiziba and Gihembe camps⁴⁷



Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

49. Figure 2 also demonstrates that women above the age of 20 far outnumber men in the camps. Men are more likely to be outside of the camps in cities seeking income earning sources, as reported by men and women in each of the camp FGDs. More women made the journey from Eastern DRC to the camps in the first place; more men than women were killed in events compelling DRC residents to flee to Rwanda. Some of the men may have remained in Eastern DRC to protect their land holdings, as most of the refugees were displaced from rural farming communities. Most of the households in both camps are headed by women – 56% in Kiziba and 58% in Gihembe. UNHCR and WFP have made a concerted effort to provide women with ration card control as household heads in order to ensure more efficient use of the food rations, promote women’s full engagement in the ration distribution system, and enhance food ration consumption within the households. The refugee context has altered traditional household gender dynamics in significant ways. Men in FGDs complained of feeling emasculated; violence within the household, which is highly problematic (and discussed in more detail in sections 2.4 and 2.5) can be partially explained by the changing gender roles in the household within a refugee context

⁴⁷ Unless otherwise indicated, all of the tables, figures, and graphs in this document are derived from the household survey undertaken by TANGO International for the WFP-UNHCR Impact Evaluation of Food Assistance to Refugees in Protracted Refugee Situations – Rwanda.

where women take responsibility for food rations and men cannot often provide for their families.


50. Table 6 however, indicates that women head significantly smaller households – averaging 4.7 household members as opposed to 5.9 for male-headed households, which is not surprising since many female-headed households lack men. Far more significant however, is that female-headed households experience substantially higher dependency ratios. Income-earning opportunities are more difficult to achieve in female-headed households, as we shall see. Income sources play an essential role in explaining household vulnerability. Female-headed households are more likely to be vulnerable to food insecurity (see Figure 3); more than six out of every ten female-headed household are highly vulnerable to food insecurity; approximately half of all male-headed households are classified as most vulnerable.

Table 6: Key household characteristics, by sex of household head

	Kiziba		Sig	Gihembe		sig
	Male	Female		Male	Female	
Mean household size	5.9	4.7	***	5.5	4.7	***
Mean dependency ratio ⁴⁸	1.2	1.5	***	1.2	1.5	**
n	262	337		252	348	

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

Figure 3: Distribution of vulnerability groups, by sex of household head




Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

51. Vulnerability and adult literacy in the camps have some correlation. The variables on illiteracy were cross-tabulated with the vulnerability groups. Lack of literacy among males remains constant across vulnerability groups, though much lower than females in all but the least vulnerable group. There is a strong relationship between female literacy and vulnerability, with 45% of females in the most vulnerable households lacking education as opposed to 23.5% of females in the least vulnerable households (Figure 4). Households in which more females are literate are more likely to be less vulnerable.

⁴⁸ The age-dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of household members of less productive capacity, i.e. dependents (individuals aged 0-14 years and individuals over the age of 64) to household members of greater productive capacity (individuals aged 15-64 years).

Figure 4: Illiteracy rates of household members aged 18 and above, by sex of member and vulnerability group



Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

To what extent does food assistance benefit refugee households?

52. Refugees readily agreed that “food [provided by WFP] has preserved our life.” The food ration sizes have fluctuated during the past five years (the fluctuations are detailed in Section 3.2 and Table 18), but WFP general food rations, provide individuals with 1998 kilocalories per day at the time of the evaluation, less than the WHO and UNHCR standard of 2100 kcals per day, are distributed as the following four commodities:

- A cereal, invariably maize – 11.4 kg per person per month
- A pulse, invariably beans – 3.6 kg per person per month
- Vegetable oil – 0.9 litres or kg per person per month
- Salt – 0.15 kg per person per month


How long does the food last during the month?

53. Food assistance provides refugees with less than sufficient dietary intake throughout the month, and food insecurity intensifies for refugee families during the second half of month, when rations tend to run out or are consumed in smaller quantities or less frequently (fewer meals) during the day. Refugees also sell a substantial proportion of their vegetable oil and maize (see section 3.2) to purchase other food and non-food items. Facing severe resource constraints, WFP was able to distribute only half rations of maize and beans during September, an event freshly imprinted in the minds of refugees during the primary survey data collection in October. Half rations of maize and beans, complemented with full rations of oil and salt, provide individuals with 1132 kcals per day (665 kcals of maize, 201 kcals of beans, and 266 kcals of oil). Figure 5 illustrates the additional hardship in September endured by refugee households, whose rations are usually insufficient. Beans normally last for 16 days, but only for 11 days following the half-rations. Although sold in larger quantities, vegetable oil lasts for more than three weeks, because very little oil is actually used to cook the meals. Salt lasts for more than two weeks. Refugees have never received the proposed complete ration package of 2238 kcal which would theoretically provide individuals with sufficient food rations to last the month, under the unrealistic assumption that rations will not be sold, and have not received 2100 kcal of rations since CSB was withdrawn from the food basket in early

2010. As we shall see in Section 3.2, resource constraints have prevented WFP from delivering planned full ration packages.

54. Debt burdens have compounded the problem. Many households borrow food from less vulnerable neighbours within the camp or from the host community during the second half of the month to be repaid the following month, usually with interest, if borrowed from host communities (as reported in male and female FGDs in the three camps); these households have intensified their debt burden after receipt of the September half rations. Refugees report that maize normally runs out within three weeks of the month; the maize lasted little more than two weeks during the half-rations of September, when refugees sold a smaller proportion of their rations than usual (see section 3.2). Refugee focus group discussions invariably included complaints about the lack of variety month after month.

Figure 5: Mean number of days each ration lasts, by ration amount and camp




Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011.

Is the food basket appropriate? What food groups do refugees in Rwanda consume?

55. Refugee dietary diversity is poor. The refugee food basket has been devised to ensure nutrient adequacy, defined as a diet that meets the minimum requirements for energy and all essential nutrients. Refugee diets are highly dependent on the food assistance ration basket, dominated by maize, beans, oil and salt, which are all consumed nearly every day. Meat, eggs, fish, fruit, and dairy products are virtually non-existent in the refugee diet. Gihembe households, who reside next to a town with a relatively diverse market for foodstuffs, consume a slightly more diverse diet than do Kiziba households, selling some of their vegetable oil and cereal rations to purchase green vegetables for two or three days a week and manioc or cassava (included in the “tuber” category of Figure 6) for a day or two. Selling most of their vegetable oil (see section 3.2), refugees consume very small amounts of oil on a daily basis. Green vegetables and manioc are usually purchased at the local camp market.

Figure 6: Food consumption patterns in past seven days, by camp



Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

Is the food basket sufficient?

56. The household diet diversity score (HDDS), which represents the average number of food groups consumed by households in the sample during a 24-hour period, taken from a list of 12 food groups (12.0 is the perfect score), indicates extremely poor diet, especially at Kiziba camp (score of 4.4) and amongst the most vulnerable households (also 4.4). Not surprisingly, the few least vulnerable households consume marginally more diverse diets (Table 7 and Table 8). For comparative purposes, the recent survey of food assistance in Ethiopian refugee camps revealed HDDS of 5.3, which is substantially better than refugees fare in Rwanda, but also represents poor diet diversity (WFP and UNHCR, 2011).

Table 7: Food security indicators, by camp

	Kiziba	Gihembe	Sig
HDDS	4.4	4.7	***
FCS	39.3	40.7	***
CSI	35.7	40.4	**
n	599	600	

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

Table 8: Household dietary diversity, by vulnerability group

	Most vulnerable	Moderately vulnerable	Least vulnerable
HDDS	4.4	4.6	5.0
n	688	462	47

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

57. An essential indicator of food insecurity, the food consumption score (FCS) measures the nutrient density and frequency of household consumption, allowing a nutritional analysis based on the frequency and types of foods consumed, indexed by higher values for foods with animal protein, pulses, and green vegetables, and lower

values for oil and sugar. Used by WFP and others to measure food consumption and food insecurity, FCS standards normally include:

- Poor food consumption – score of less than 21, or less than 28 when oil and sugar are included as part of the food assistance basket;
- Borderline food consumption – score of 21.5-35 or 28.5-42 (with oil and sugar);
- Acceptable food consumption – score of more than 35, or 42 (with oil and sugar).

58. Because oil is consumed as an integral part of the food assistance ration but sugar is not consumed, the evaluation team has created the following poor, borderline, and acceptable food consumption thresholds:

- Poor food consumption – score of less than 24.5;
- Borderline food consumption – score of 25-38.5; and
- Acceptable food consumption – score of more than 38.5.

59. Overall, 58% percent of refugees in the camps have a food consumption score (FCS) that is at or above the “acceptable” level (FCS > 38.5). This is another indicator of the monotonous diet consumed by refugees every year. The FCS is slightly lower in the relatively remote Kiziba camp, where food insecurity is more problematic than at Gihembe. More than two-thirds of Gihembe households have acceptable food consumption scores, but less than half of refugee households in Kiziba, which is more remotely located, have acceptable food consumption scores. Only two percent of all households have poor food consumption scores. FCS or HDDS do not differ by sex of household head or family size (see Table 9).


Table 9: Food consumption score, by camp (% of households)

	Kiziba	Gihembe	Total
Poor (FCS = 0-24.0)	2.0	2.0	2.0
Borderline (FCS=24.5-38.5)	52.1	28.2	40.1
Acceptable (FCS>38.5)	45.9	69.8	57.9
n	599	600	1199

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

60. Other measures indicate that food insecurity is problematic for the majority of refugees who constitute the most vulnerable group residing in the camps. The degree and intensity of chronic food insecurity varies by refugee group. The food assistance allows most refugee households to eat 1.6 to 2 meals per day: their children average 1.7 to 2.2 meals (see Figure 7). Adults often reduce their consumption as a coping strategy to allow children to eat more often, as we shall see below; this pattern was profoundly illustrated during the month of half rations, when adults averaged 0.9 to 1.1 meals per day while their children averaged 1.1 to 1.5 meals a day. The number of meals consumed varies substantially by vulnerability: children in least vulnerable households averaged 1.5 meals per day during the month of half rations, whereas most vulnerable children averaged just over one meal per day. Refugee households traditionally consume two meals per day according to focus group participants and corroborated by implementing agency key informants.

Figure 7: Mean number of meals consumed per day before and after ration quantity augmentation, by vulnerability group



Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

61. Food rations clearly do not completely support refugee food security throughout the month, a result of several constraining factors (explored in detail in section 3.2). Because refugees remain dependent on food assistance for the major portion of their food security needs and their food rations often run short during the month, many vulnerable refugee households normally struggle to meet full nutritional needs acceptable food consumption and adequate diet diversity for 30 days per month.

What are the coping strategies used by different types of refugee households?


62. Because food insecurity intensifies during the second half of the month, when food assistance rations dwindle and disappear for most refugee households, households deploy a variety of coping strategies. A relatively simple and efficient indicator of household food security that corresponds well with other more complex measures of food insecurity, the Coping Strategies Index⁴⁹ (CSI) measures the frequency and severity of consumption or adaptation coping behaviours. High CSI scores indicate that households have employed comparatively severe coping strategies with high frequency. The average CSI scores for both camps were high, especially in comparison to CSI scores in other surveys undertaken in East Africa in recent years, averaging 38 (35.7 at Kiziba and 40.4 at Gihembe), another indicator of relatively intensive food insecurity (CSI scores comparing the Rwandan and Ethiopian refugee contexts are presented in Annex 16).

63. Figure 8 presents the most widely deployed coping strategies in the two camps. All households commonly limit portion sizes, reduce number of meals, consume less preferred foods, reduce adult consumption to allow children to eat more and to eat more often, and borrow food from neighbours or host communities. Most surprisingly, seven out of every ten households reported to the survey team apparently skipping the entire day without eating at some point during the previous month. This outcome probably reflects the hardship of coping with the distribution

⁴⁹ The CSI is compiled by multiplying a severity weight established for each type of coping strategy by the frequency of coping strategy usage (every day = 7, often=4.5, occasionally=1.5, once/week=0.5, never=0), then multiplying that value by a severity weight established for each coping strategy; see Annex 15 for further elaboration

of half rations, for which refugee households were not prepared. Refugees had collected half-rations of maize and beans for the first time in many years immediately prior to household survey data collection, a severe change in the normal ration distribution. Approximately two-thirds of refugee households also occasionally purchase food on credit, a debt burden that becomes compounded during periods of shock, such as when food rations are distributed as half-rations. Focus group participants in all three camps mentioned that the September half-rations had added an additional burden. Some of the most vulnerable households repay rations frequently borrowed in earlier months at the time of the subsequent food distribution the following month; the half rations received in September compounded the food debt burden on some of the most vulnerable households.

Figure 8: Household coping strategies used at least once in past 30 days, by camp; percentage of households



Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

Do different types of refugees consume their fair share of food assistance and have equal access to services and assistance?

64. The vulnerability analysis has revealed differential effects of the food assistance: some refugee groups have benefited more than others. PCA and cluster analyses (the methodology is outlined in Annex 8) identified five indicators that together describe the most robust vulnerability clusters explaining why some households are most vulnerable, moderately vulnerable, or least vulnerable. PCA enabled the extraction of principal components, which yielded the most significant differences by five variables or indicators, resulting in three different clusters corresponding to the i) most vulnerable households, comprising 57% of all refugee households, ii) moderately vulnerable, which comprise 39% of households, and iii) the least vulnerable cluster of households, comprising the remaining 4%. The indicators that most powerfully explained levels of household vulnerability include:

- Household food consumption score;
- Weighted asset index;
- Number of income earners in the household;
- Number of income sources; and
- Number of months in the past 12 months households had access to income.

65. The vulnerability indicators outlined in Table 10 present a definitive picture of vulnerability in the camps. Only comprising 4% of the refugee households, the least vulnerable refugee households are relatively food secure as measured by the number of meals consumed, despite lacking a diverse diet; and relatively more livelihood secure as measured by income opportunities, market use, savings, access to and use of loans, and accumulation of some assets such as mobile phones, radios and a few livestock. In contrast, comprising approximately 57% of refugee households, the most vulnerable households are highly food insecure as measured by very low HDDS signifying a dismal diet and consumption of few meals; they are completely livelihood insecure as measured by few income opportunities, virtually no savings, fewer credit opportunities, and few assets. The most vulnerable are dominated by female-headed households. The least vulnerable households are better educated; a large portion of most vulnerable adults are illiterate. Least vulnerable households are more than twice as likely as most vulnerable households to have family members migrate for work or for education. Host community residents told the evaluation team that a few least vulnerable households have been able to bypass the policy forbidding refugees from owning livestock, which are disallowed in the camps. A few of the least vulnerable own businesses that sometimes include money-lending or lending in kind (food) to more vulnerable households at interest, which has indebted some of the most vulnerable households, who lack access to income earning opportunities.

Table 10: Vulnerability group profiles

	Most vulnerable	Moderately vulnerable	Least vulnerable
Demographic indicators			
% of households in two camps	57.5	38.6	3.9
% adults illiterate	34.3	29.0 ^a	19.7 ^{a,b}
% female headed HHs	62.1	51.5 ^a	40.4 ^{a,b}
Mean HH size	4.8	5.5 ^a	6.5 ^{a,b}
% HHs with any migrant (outside HH for >3 months)	27.4	43.3 ^a	57.4 ^a
Food security indicators			
Mean HDDS	4.4	4.6 ^a	5.0 ^{a,b}
Livelihood indicators			
% HHs with any income	0.3	99.4 ^a	100.0 ^a
% HHs selling food items on markets	30.5	41.1 ^a	53.2 ^a
% HHs with livestock	3.9	6.9 ^a	19.1 ^{a,b}
% HHs practicing agriculture	0.6	2.4 ^a	8.5 ^{a,b}
% HH with any savings	17.2	40.5 ^a	57.4 ^{a,b}
% HHs with any loans	30.5	50.4 ^a	57.4 ^a
Physical capital indicators			
Mean number of rooms	2.2	2.5 ^a	2.8 ^{a,b}
% HHs owning mobile phones	37.8	58.7 ^a	80.9 ^{a,b}
% HHs owning radios	13.5	25.3 ^a	42.6 ^{a,b}
% HHs owning sewing machines	0.4	1.9 ^a	17.0 ^{a,b}
	687	462	47

^a Statistically significant difference from Most Vulnerable category; p<.05

^b Statistically significant difference from Moderately Vulnerable category; p<.05

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

What kinds of households tend to be included in the most vulnerable group?

- **Female-headed households.** Female-headed households have relatively few income earners, and must therefore cope with extremely high dependency ratios and few income-earning opportunities, limiting their chances of supplementing food rations.
- **Households unable to access income sources.** Household access to income-earning opportunities is a key indicator of vulnerability; households unable to access income sources are thus highly vulnerable to food insecurity.
- **The elderly and children under five.** These groups are disadvantaged due to the lack of CSB in the rations, which would otherwise provide essential micro-nutrients and easily-digestible food.
- **Unregistered households or unregistered members of households who lack access to food assistance rations.** The corollary is the presence of households in the camps who managed to obtain more than one ration card over time, in the context of a protracted refugee scenario. Partially in response to this reality, the UNHCR re-validation and subsequent re-registration exercises, currently ongoing in the camps, is an important effort to ensure that refugees living in the camps are properly registered and eligible for food and other assistance provided by UNHCR and WFP.

Do women have equal access to services and assistance?

66. WFP, UNHCR and partners have made efforts to ensure women's representation on committees, however their active participation and the significance of their contribution are variable and there remains a ceiling above which they do not venture for reasons of culture and education.

67. Food distribution committees vary in gender balance by camp: in Nyabiheke a committee of six is 50% female. WFP SPRs suggested that the 50% target for female membership and leadership objective – a pre-condition of field-level agreement – was usually ensured (e.g. WFP 105310: SPR 2008). Similarly, UNHCR reports that camp coordination committees have a 50% quota for female representation (UNHCR 2011a). While women are nominated as the ration card holders and receive the food, the quantitative survey shows that both sexes are cardholders (40.7% men, 59.1% women Kiziba; 38% men, 61.7% women Gihembe). Nearly three-quarters of women in both camps reported being the person responsible for the ration (72.5% Kiziba, 76.7% Gihembe) although this does not necessarily mean that women and men have equal power in the household; women's control over the use of the food at household level varies and merits further study. Some focus group participants (female youth, corroborated by key informant interviews with implementing agencies) reported that food distribution within their households is equitable when managed by women.

68. Various refugee committees exist, and UNHCR has reported that “It remains a big challenge to engage more women in refugee committees ... although they have repeatedly been encouraged in this respect. They continue to be under-represented and do not seem interested in being involved in camp management for cultural reasons” (UNHCR Gihembe Briefing Note, September 11).

69. Women have explained their absence from committees as follows:

- They are too involved in domestic tasks such as taking care of the children, small-scale business trading and fetching water. These tasks are not assigned to men for cultural reasons.
- Most female refugees are illiterate. They fear being unable to meet the required expectations and standards for a member of a committee. They also have no experience in expressing their views in public; hence, they are reluctant to stand as candidate (Kiziba Briefing Note August 11).

70. While NGO-run projects in the camps involve women in selection of activities and implementation, their capacity and self confidence, advocacy and leadership skills are considered to be very low. As one interviewee commented, “No woman would stand for camp president.” There remains a need for training of women leaders to build their capacity and self-confidence. Exposure to strong women leaders in Rwanda and mentorship could catalyse this process.

71. Gender roles have changed in the refugee context, partly due to the nature of camp life (e.g., as compared to living in one’s own community, and with basic needs being provided for by international organizations), and also due to the way food assistance is provided. Men are traditionally the breadwinners in the family yet the majority of the male population is unemployed in the camps. Key informants said that men now feel ashamed and disempowered as they cannot provide for the family as they have in the past, saying to their wives, “UNHCR and WFP is your husband now because it takes care of you.” This sense of disempowerment, combined with the lack of fulfilling roles for men, can lead to family conflicts, with some men turning to drink or abandoning the family. However, because women receive the food, they are the ones who must obtain credit (and go into debt) to manage the household; refugee women stated that they have it harder than men in this respect as men do not contribute to household expenses because they do not have jobs.

72. The traditional norms that govern behaviour are also being challenged in the context of food and NFI shortages. Some refugee women and adolescent girls pursue transactional sex in order to provide NFIs for their families or themselves, often receiving minimal payment. It is primarily NFIs that have been in shortest supply, prompting women to seek out undesirable livelihood options, whereas food – as the sole commodity provided regularly – is traded to purchase all other necessities. Therefore it is difficult to disentangle the effects caused by the inadequacies of NFIs from those caused by inadequate food assistance.

73. Two-thirds of the most vulnerable households are headed by women. These households are less well-off than households headed by men by most measures (income, education, dependency ratio).

74. Cultural restrictions and lack of education contribute to a sense of despair and powerlessness that is most poignant in the case of adolescent girls. Many girls complete primary school, but faced with limited resources for schooling, parents send the boys to secondary school while the girls are left to idle in the camps. With no skills, these girls can only earn income through housework, where they are often sexually exploited by their employers, or from transactional sex. Girls as young as 14 years of age become pregnant as a result. Once they have children to care for, their mobility and income options are even more limited, setting into motion a cycle of sex in exchange for support. Female orphans who head their own one-person households are even worse off, seemingly disconnected from decision makers and power structures in the camps. Adolescent girls feel that younger girls can escape their fate

if there is equal opportunity to complete secondary school or to have vocational training. As one young woman summarized, “This training will be the land for each one.”

75. Changing family dynamics are a further consequence of refugee life and living with handouts and frequent shortages of basic needs. Adults reported that youth are no longer as respectful of their parents as in the past, which is exacerbated by the fact that their parents are not able to provide for them and have less ability to govern their behaviour, as well as the need for families to send adolescents out to work to bring in money for the household, a reflection of food insecurity tied to the need to sell food rations to pay for other food and non-food items. The increasing use of sex by adolescent girls to gain the items they need or desire, as well as sexual exploitation in the workplace of young women who lack both power and income, have led to teenage pregnancies and increased numbers of single mothers.

2.2 What are the impacts on food security and nutritional status?

76. Nutritional support to vulnerable groups in the three refugee camps in Rwanda includes supplementary feeding programmes (SFP) for moderately malnourished children under five, pregnant and lactating women and PLHIV; therapeutic feeding programmes (TFP) for severely malnourished children under five; and a recently established anaemia project that treats identified anaemia cases using MoH treatment protocols and provides cooked food as well as fruit and vegetables to people identified with anaemia. SFP for vulnerable groups (malnourished children under five and pregnant/lactating women) under the PRRO 20030 is complemented by UNHCR services such as de-worming, provision of antibiotics, vitamin A/folic acid supplements, and treatment of common diseases (WFP 2010b).

What have been the nutritional trends in the camps during the past five years?

77. **Nutritional content of general food ration:** Table 11 indicates the kilocalorie and micronutrient value of general food rations per person per day distributed at the time of the evaluation visit (Annex 17 shows historical information on ration size, composition and kilocalories). This ration meets only 95% of energy requirements and is deficient in several important micronutrients including vitamin A (54% provided), iron (92%), calcium (44%) and riboflavin (73%). The ration is completely lacking in vitamin C.

Table 11: Kilocalorie and micronutrient content of WFP food basket ration, 2011

Commodity	Amount (g)	Kcal	Protein (g)	Fat (g)	Vit C (mg)	Vit A (µgRE)	Iron (mg)	Calcium (mg)	Ribofl (mg)
Cereal (maize grain)	380	1 330	38.0	15.2	0	0	10.3	27	0.76
Pulses (beans)	120	402	24.0	1.4	0	0	9.8	172	0.26
Oil	30	266	0	30.0	0	270	0	0	0
CSB	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Salt	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	535	1 998	62	46.6	0	270	20.1	199	1.02
		95%	118%	117%	0%	54%	92%	44%	73%

Source: WFP/UNHCR Joint Assessment Mission Report 2011

78. **Prevalence of undernutrition:** Surveys in 2008⁵⁰ revealed some differences between the three camps in levels of global acute malnutrition (GAM) (Table 12), however, the overlapping confidence intervals indicate no statistically significant differences in GAM rates between the camps. Severe acute malnutrition (SAM) prevalence also reveals no significant differences between camps.

Table 12: Prevalence of malnutrition in the camps, 2008

	GAM	SAM
Gihembe	5.0% (1.4-8.5)	0.7% (0-2.1)
Kiziba	9.1% (4.6-13.6)	2.6% (0.1-5.1)
Nyabiheke	10.6% (5.5-15.6)	3.5% (0.5-6.6)

Source: UNICEF Rwanda, 2008

79. Both WFP's PRRO and UNHCR standards aim to maintain the GAM rate below 5%. It can be seen that in 2008 the programme was not meeting this target; however GAM was below the WHO alert level of 10%, except possibly in Nyabiheke. In 2005 wasting was 5% at the national level for the Rwandan population and has decreased to 3% in 2010 (DHS). While it has been recommended to conduct nutritional surveys regularly,⁵¹ since 2008 no nutrition surveys were conducted in the camps until the pre-JAM of 2011, which found a GAM rate of 6% in a sample of children from the three camps. Because this recent survey is considered methodologically inconsistent and the sample size is too small, however, these results must be interpreted with measured caution.⁵² It is UNHCR's responsibility to undertake annual nutritional surveys; another survey is scheduled for March 2012 (UNHCR regional office and WFP country office comments on draft report, Feb 2012).

80. Stunting, or chronic malnutrition, was 45.4% in Gihembe, 48.1% in Kiziba and 49.3% in Nyabiheke in 2008, which is comparable to the Rwandan population where the current estimate is 44% (DHS 2010), unchanged since 2005. These figures represent a critical situation. The pre-JAM 2011 found that more than a quarter (26.7%) of 410 non-pregnant women (15-49 years) tested for anaemia in the three camps was anaemic. This is comparable to prevalence in the Rwandan population of 27.3% among non-pregnant/non-lactating women reported in the 2007/08 Interim DHS.

81. In response to the high rates of stunting in the 2008 nutrition survey and the removal of CSB from the general ration in 2010, UNHCR with its partners AHA and ARC started a new anaemia project in August 2011 that provides iron and folate tablets to beneficiaries, as well as three meals a day: two porridge meals and one cooked meal of meat, vegetables and iron-rich foods. This project, however, may not

⁵⁰ UNICEF Rwanda. 2008. Rapport d'Evaluation de l'etat nutritionnel dans 2 Centres de Transit et 4 Camps de Refugies au Rwanda. March.

⁵¹ The Country Portfolio Evaluation cited (see specifically p. 29, paragraph 132) does not specify which nutritional data should be collected – the emphasis of the recommendation is seemingly on frequency – but presumably this refers minimally to GAM and SAM.

⁵² The nutrition survey was conducted as though the three camps represented one population, whereas separate surveys in each camp would be more appropriate in order to identify and investigate differences between the camps. In addition the sample size was calculated for the number of households, whereas normal practice in nutrition surveys is to first calculate the number of children required in the sample. 530 households formed the calculated sample size, with an expectation that 0.8 children could be found in each household. This suggests that the survey intended to include 424 children, though it is not stated. Thereafter, the tables in the Pre-JAM report concerning nutritional indices report total numbers of children measured as 324 (table 16), 330 (table 17), 316 (table 19) and 314 (table 20). This suggests that roughly 25% of the expected sample is missing. Due to these inconsistencies the evaluation team considers it is not possible to extrapolate the data confidently as truly representative of the actual camp population.

sufficiently address iron deficiency given the limited source of animal protein, as noted in the HDDS analysis, as well as the monotonous diets, exemplified by low FCS and the inherent limited bioavailability of iron as a result of cereal-based diets that have high phytates.

Do children and pregnant and lactating women have sufficient access to supplementary foods?

82. **Supplementary Feeding Programme (SFP):** Food deliveries for supplementary (and therapeutic) feeding programmes are made every two months to UNHCR-contracted implementing partners within each camp (WFP 2007a). SFPs have served an average of 674 children under 5 and 1,154 PLWs per month up to July 2011 (across three camps), an increase from 353 children and 693 PLWs per month in 2007. The majority of the increase was seen in 2009 and 2010 in Nyabiheke camp, which follows population influxes in Nyabiheke. The reasons for small increases in Gihembe and Kiziba caseloads in those years are inconclusive but may be attributable to a mixture of improved outreach, reduction in the general ration size and changes in programme entry criteria.

83. The SFPs have successfully outreached into the three camps to register potentially malnourished and moderately malnourished children to take advantage of supplementary feeding services, which has undoubtedly reduced malnutrition rates in the three camps. Having said that, however, the effectiveness of the ongoing SFPs in the three camps is difficult to assess as they are currently not adhering to UNHCR/WFP and national guidelines and protocols regarding nutrition programmes and are therefore not strictly treating moderate acute malnutrition as intended; inclusion error is present because not all beneficiaries have moderate acute malnutrition. Programme entry criteria include both weight-for-age and MUAC, and in former years have also included weight-for-height. While MUAC and/or weight-for-height are appropriate indicators for measuring acute malnutrition, weight-for-age is a composite indicator of both acute and chronic malnutrition, and is therefore less responsive to supplementary feeding.

84. Programme data reveal that very low death rates and default rates have been seen in SFPs since 2008, which is commendable, resulting in high success rates in terms of percentage of exits who are cured (Table 13), far exceeding Sphere standards of >75%, except 2008 in Nyabiheke where a high level of defaulters in October resulted in a lower recovery rate.

Table 13: Performance of SFP 2007-2010: percentage of children 6-59 months cured

	2007	2008	2009	2010
Kiziba	96.1	96.8	98.8	99.0
Gihembe	100	100	98.8	100
Nyabiheke	97.6	71.5	98.5	100

Source: WFP Rwanda Country Office database

85. Anaemia in children 6-59 months in Rwanda is currently 38% at the national level, including 1% severe (DHS 2010). More than half (60%) of the 329 children aged 6-59 months tested during the pre-JAM 2011 were anaemic, which is indicative of a serious situation that, if truly representative of the entire camp population, is substantially worse than the Rwandan national context. It further suggests that young children may be experiencing a range of micronutrient deficiencies and is illustrative of the inadequate quality of their diet, no doubt exacerbated by the

removal of CSB from the general food ration, which occurred in March 2010. Anaemia not only increases the risk of maternal and child mortality, but has negative consequences on the cognitive and physical development of children and on work productivity in adults. Anaemia testing was not systematically undertaken prior to the 2011 pre-JAM. Although malaria is often strongly associated with anaemia, malaria prevalence rates in the camps are low. Refugee food rations are highly deficient in micronutrients since the removal of CSB. Although 92% of iron requirements are provided (presuming that each person eats their appropriate share), the ration lacks any vitamin C, which is essential for efficient absorption of iron from non-meat sources.

86. Inadequate nutrient intake for pregnant and breastfeeding women can lead to pregnancy complications, maternal mortality, low birth weight (LBW) infants (<2500 grams) and a decline in maternal nutritional status associated with lower concentrations of certain nutrients in breast milk. Qualitative data collected during the evaluation suggest that SFP for pregnant and lactating women has assisted in maintaining the health and nutritional status of mothers and their infants under six months of age. Health indicators reveal that the prevalence of LBW has stayed low, ranging from 0%-5.6 % between 2008 and 2011 in the three camps, against a target of less than 15%.

87. A team of health animators is active in the community, screening children and referring them to SFP or TFP when necessary, and staff are confident that this outreach system is successful and that all eligible children have access to the programme.

88. The removal of CSB from the general ration was considered detrimental by all interviewed in qualitative discussions, particularly for children under five years and the elderly. Health staff and animators considered that cases of malnutrition had increased in the absence of CSB; however admissions data do not necessarily support the qualitative impressions.

89. **Therapeutic feeding programme (TFP):** Therapeutic feeding was provided by WFP until the end of 2008, at which point this activity was handed over to UNHCR. UNHCR is responsible for ensuring TFP supplies are available to the programme. TFP suffers from the same constraints as SFP with regard to adherence to protocols, with a mixture of underweight and acutely malnourished children being included. TFP faces a further constant challenge of inadequate supplies of therapeutic milks/foods as a result of the allocation system: provision of supplies is dependent upon distribution systems at the District Hospital from which supplies are ordered from UNICEF. It appears that there is no caseload-based ordering system from the health centre to the District Hospital, with the result that the hospital fails to disperse supplies according to health centre needs. Staff reported long periods with inadequate supplies, often lasting several months. In the interim they resort to various alternatives, including cows' milk and CSB, neither of which is appropriate for treating severe acute malnutrition. Fortunately all camps report very few deaths in TFP since 2007 (annually below the Sphere standard indicator of <10%) and recovery rates exceed the Sphere standard indicator of >75% (Table 14). Children in recovery in TFP are provided with a daily nutritious meal comprising vegetables, meat or eggs, which offers an important boost to their well-being and diet.

Table 14: Recovery rates in TFP (Sphere standard indicator is >75%)

	Nyabiheke	Gihembe	Kiziba	All camps
2007	76%	100%	86%	
2008	84%	100%	87%	
2009				89%

Source: WFP Rwanda Country Office database

90. Agronomists in the nutrition centres support households with a child in SFP or TFP to start kitchen/sack gardens, keep poultry, rear rabbits or cultivate mushrooms in order to improve their nutritional status in the longer term and prevent malnutrition. This is a new initiative that holds much promise.

91. **Child feeding practices:** The nutrition survey of 2008 noted that the introduction of weaning foods at six months was very low (<37%) in the three camps, however the 2011 pre-JAM suggested a good early initiation (73.9% within one hour of birth) and duration of breastfeeding beyond six months, with more than 45% of mothers continuing beyond 18 months.⁵³

92. Child feeding practices have proved increasingly challenging since 2010 due to the lack of CSB in the general food ration, forcing many mothers to sell part of their ration to be able to purchase fresh vegetables and potatoes for their young children who have difficulty consuming maize and to boost the quality of the diet, which is now sorely lacking in micronutrients essential for health and development of young children.

93. The frequency of infant and young child feeding over the course of the day is often sub-optimal due to mothers spending the day working, looking for work or in the market and leaving young children at home, which has serious consequences for adequate breastfeeding practices in particular.

94. While health animators work within the community to promote nutritional education and complement the advice provided at the nutrition centres, practical application of nutritional messages proves challenging for mothers and carers since advice is not adequately tailored to the context and its limitations. This could be improved with simple messages on preparation of available foods for young children, rather than promotion of ideal, inaccessible foods.

To what extent is HIV/AIDS a problem? What activities have been implemented to mitigate HIV/AIDS?

95. The table below shows HIV cases and rates, by camp.

Table 15: HIV prevalence, by camp

	Kiziba	Gihembe	Nyabiheke
HIV cases	76 (76% F)	306 (61% F)	154 (64% F)
HIV prevalence (nation: 3%)	.33%	1.4%	1.9%

Source: UNHCR camp fact sheets 2011

⁵³ The way an infant or young child is fed has a large impact on their vulnerability to disease, malnutrition and death: good breastfeeding practice has the capacity to reduce mortality in children under five by 12% to 20%, more than any other preventative measure, while adequate complementary feeding could prevent a further 6% of deaths. WHO advises exclusive breastfeeding of infants to six months of age, after which complementary foods should be introduced alongside continuation of breastfeeding to 24 months and beyond. See: Black, et al., 2008; Save the Children UK, 2009; Black, et al., 2003 ; Jones, et al., 2003.

96. While the camps have high coverage of voluntary counselling and testing, due to lack of funding, no HIV prevalence survey has been conducted in the camps since 2005 (UNHCR 2011a).

97. PLHIV in all three camps are supported by SFP in recognition of their enhanced nutritional needs and to promote healthy positive living. Approximately 473 PLHIVs receive SFP in the three camps, 261 of whom are on ART. A nutritional supplement of 250g CSB, 15g sugar and 25g oil per person per day was provided until September 2011, after which time the CSB was reduced to 150g. In addition PLHIV on ART are provided – according to availability – with fresh fruit, vegetables and dried fish, to fortify their diet and assist with consumption of medications. Beneficiaries reported that these take-home rations are often shared within the household, resulting in supplies only lasting a few days, however these supplements provide an important contribution to their diet.

98. Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) services have high coverage in the camps and have been shown to be protective for women in Rwanda in terms of abstinence, low levels of high-risk sex, and condom use with high-risk sex (GoR 2010a). The PMTCT programme ensures women are counselled and assisted to prevent transmission of HIV to infants during delivery and infant feeding, in line with the new 2010 WHO recommendations for PMTCT. Feeding options follow the Rwandan national protocol, which promotes breastfeeding with ART for mother and/or infant while supporting mothers who do not wish to breastfeed with supplies of infant formula. The latter option requires that an adequate and consistent supply of formula milk be maintained and that AFASS (acceptable, feasible, affordable, sustainable, and safe) conditions are met. This (AFASS conditions) has proven to be an almost impossible condition to meet in the refugee camp context so is often not a viable alternative.


99. High levels of sensitization activities are ongoing in the camps and are credited with maintaining the low prevalence rates of HIV of 1.4% in Gihembe, 1.9% in Nyabiheke and 0.3% in Kiziba (UNHCR Briefing notes 2010). Rates have remained low since 2008 when the JAM reported prevalence to be below 3% in all camps. Of the registered cases of HIV in the camps, women are disproportionately affected, representing 61% of cases in Gihembe, 64% in Nyabiheke and 76% in Kiziba.

100. PLHIV associations also benefit from mushroom-growing and vegetable-growing initiatives that provide them with fresh produce for consumption and sale.

What is the extent of significant health problems in the camps?

101. Mortality rates in the camps are very low (Figure 9) and far surpass the UNHCR standards of a maximum of 1.5 deaths/1000/month for crude mortality and 3 deaths/1000/month for under-5 mortality. This is indicative of a relatively good health and nutrition situation and a testament to the effective provision of basic health services, although child and under-5 mortality rates increased disproportionately in 2010 at Gihembe camp, an anomaly that health staff in the camp were unable to explain.

Figure 9: Crude and under-5 mortality rates in the camps 2008-2010, expressed as deaths/1000/month



Source: Health Information System - Annual Camp Reports compiled by UNHCR

102. The pre-JAM 2011 found immunization coverage in the camps to be excellent, with 98% for measles (card verified and recall); and 100% for BCG (card verified and recall) and the pentavalent⁵⁴ vaccines. Almost 88% vitamin A supplementation of children aged 6 months and over was recorded, and 98% de-worming of children 12 months and older during the last 12 months.


103. In Kiziba camp, respiratory tract infections are the most common cause of morbidity on an annual basis (AHA annual reports, Health and related activities), followed by intestinal parasites and diarrhea.⁵⁵

104. Figure 10 shows data from the evaluation quantitative survey which reflects the same major causes of morbidity, though respiratory tract infections are lower in priority, most likely due to the time of year. Qualitative data collected during November 2011 also further confirms reports of diarrhea and worms, along with gastritis.

⁵⁴ A pentavalent vaccine is a combination of five vaccines in one: diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, hepatitis B and Haemophilus influenza type b (the bacteria that causes meningitis, pneumonia and otitis).

⁵⁵ Data were not provided for Gihembe and Nyabiheke camps.

Figure 10: Mean number of episodes of illness reported in the two weeks preceding the quantitative survey



Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

105. Diarrhoea and intestinal parasites are likely a result of hygiene problems related to inadequate sanitary facilities (importantly, the lack of hand washing facilities was noted in the camps), and to lack of space. The average camp area per refugee is 16 m², against a standard of 45 m² (UNHCR 2010a); in 2008 the area per refugee was highest in Nyabiheke (20.5 m²) and lowest in Gihembe (14.9 m²) (UNHCR 2011a). Past reviews have highlighted how this overcrowding causes sanitation and hygiene problems and “social ills” (UNHCR 2010a and UNHCR 2011a:4).

Is access to water and sanitation facilities sufficient?

106. Water access is adequate only in Kiziba, where water points are easily accessible, providing refugees with approximately 33 litres per person per day (Table 16). Access to potable water, however, has frequently been problematic in Nyabiheke, where water use averages 14 litres per person per day, and particularly at Gihembe. Throughout the evaluation period (2007-2011), Gihembe residents have experienced inoperable water points within the camp and frequent electricity and water cuts, leading to severe shortages pumped from the national utility company; water usage averaged 6.5 litres per person per day in August 2011. UNHCR and partners have needed to truck in water to compensate for these shortfalls, but have struggled to meet the UNHCR standard of ≥20 litres per person per day.

Table 16: Water and sanitation information, by camp

	Kiziba	Gihembe	Nyabiheke
Water and sanitation			
Avg water supply (standard: >20 litres)	33 l/p/d	6.5 l/p/d	14 l/p/d
# water points	57	67	26
# of communal latrines in use	109	154	96
# persons per communal drop-hole (standard: <20)	23	24	22

Source: UNHCR camp fact sheets 2011 except for # persons per communal drop-hole (source: JAM 2011)

107. The inconsistent supply in Gihembe has compelled women and young girls to seek water outside the camp, exposing them to risks of GBV as well as friction with the host community.

108. None of the camps meet the standard for number of persons per communal drop-hole (standard is maximum of 20). This situation has changed little since 2008; it remains a challenge to meet the standard for communal latrines due to issues of land scarcity and latrine design. Communal pit latrines are filled within six months and the decomposition of human waste requires at least six years due to the low quality of the soil. Consequently, shelters have to be moved to liberate space for the construction of new latrines, further exacerbating the problem of inadequate space and shelter in the camps. “This accumulation of human waste puts pressure on the land and results in a social dent as some families constantly have to leave the place where they were established to rebuild their house and community network elsewhere” (UNHCR 2011e).

2.3 How does food assistance affect livelihood strategies, including the adoption of new coping and livelihood strategies?

109. This section analyses the short-term outcomes of improved livelihoods through the use of enhanced skills and opportunities and increased school enrolment and attendance.

What are the major sources of income for different types of refugees?

110. **Livelihood options:** The quantitative survey found that livelihood options for camp residents are very limited; this was corroborated in focus group discussions. Less than one half of households reported any income in the past year and of those, the majority found employment inside the camps rather than in the external economy. Gihembe camp, which adjoins the town of the same name, has only a slightly higher number of households reporting income (44.6%) than the much more isolated Kiziba camp (40.3%), reflecting the limited job opportunities in the Rwandan economy.

111. Male-headed households are significantly more likely to have any income than female-headed households (46.2% versus 35.8% in Kiziba, $p < .05$; 51.8% versus 39.4%, $p < .01$ in Gihembe), as well as a higher mean number of income earners (1.18 versus 1.08 in Kiziba, $p < .05$; 1.13 versus 1.09 in Gihembe). This average of only one income earner per household reflects very high dependency ratios that further tax limited household incomes and contributes to low levels of livelihood security independent of resources provided for the refugees by WFP/UNHCR. For both male- and female-headed households, the mean number of income sources barely exceeds one per household in either camp, further indicating the dearth of income-earning opportunities that inhibit livelihood diversification by refugee households. Over seven months of income were reported on average by both sexes, though this indicates months in which some income was earned and is not necessarily indicative of a full month of work. In qualitative interviews, refugees stated that many adults and adolescent youth regularly seek jobs but usually find only intermittent, casual day labour when they do obtain work.

112. This is also reflected in Table 17, which shows that non-agricultural day labour is the primary source of income for around half of income-earners, while the second most common source, petty trade, accounts for only 6.5% of total reported income. Agricultural day labour, the third most common source of income, provides only

about one-tenth of refugee income, particularly around Kiziba, where farm land is of poor quality. In Gihembe, where one-eighth of refugee households work in agricultural day labour, host community members stated in focus group discussions that the use of refugee labour has brought daily wages down. A few skilled workers find salaried employment (7.4%), for example, as teachers or NGO employees, and a small minority has service-oriented businesses or small retail shops in the camps. In focus groups held with unmarried female youth, they reported that housework was one of the few income-earning opportunities available to them, but one which frequently exposes them to gender-based violence and sexual exploitation. Some women also pursue sex work outside the camps, which puts them at risk of acquiring HIV. The quantitative study reports that the sale of food rations *as a source of cash income* is very low. However based on survey questions regarding selling particular commodities and on qualitative interviews with female refugees and NGO staff in the camps, the evaluators believe that selling food rations is under-reported for this particular survey question because it is not seen as a source of cash income but rather as a means of exchange to obtain foods for a more varied diet or essential non-food items like soap and firewood. Food ration selling patterns are further discussed in Section 3.2.

Table 17: Primary source of income, by camp (%)

	Kiziba	Gihembe
Non-agricultural day labour	52.0	47.2
Petty trade	16.4	14.1
Agricultural day labour	9.0	12.3
Salaried employment	7.4	8.2
Business/service provision	7.4	8.2
Housework	6.1	8.2
n	244	269

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

Table 18: Characteristics of primary livelihood sources, by camp

	Kiziba	Gihembe
Non-agricultural day labour		
Number of months income	6.1	5.9
Participants		
<i>Men</i>	68.8	70.3
<i>Women</i>	39.1	35.2
<i>Boys</i>	1.6	3.1
<i>Girls</i>	2.3	1.6
Location		
<i>Inside camp</i>	62.5	55.5
<i>Urban area outside camp</i>	35.9	35.2
<i>Farm area outside camp</i>	1.6	9.4
n	128	128

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

113. **Livelihood sources by gender and vulnerability group:** Quantitative survey data show that the two primary livelihood sources are located inside the camps. Nearly two-thirds of households work inside the camp, with one-third finding work outside the camp. Women predominate in the petty trading sector, and in

qualitative interviews reported that their main activity is buying fruit and vegetables in town to resell in the camps, which yields a very small profit. Non-agricultural day labourers are generally men, also mainly employed in the camps. Much of this employment is manual labour (emptying latrines, digging pits, construction work).

114. The primary sources of income for the moderately vulnerable and least vulnerable households are in non-agricultural day labour, petty trading, salaried employment, business, agricultural day labour, and housework. The number of responses for the most vulnerable is not representative and thus is not discussed here.

115. The daily wage of 400 RWF (US\$0.67) for refugees was brought up repeatedly by refugee men in focus group discussions, where they stated that the wage has not changed since 1997, while prices have increased. Male refugees reported that their income is also reduced as they now work half time due to NGO budget reductions, and outside the camp work jobs are more scarce than before, and difficult to obtain without a Rwanda identity card. Child labour is very low and NGOs involved in education confirmed that very few children are taken out of school to help earn income for the family.

116. Less than 20% of refugee households report receiving any training or technical support, usually from UNHCR, ARC (Gihembe) and AHA (Kiziba). Over 30% reported receiving technical support from other refugees according to the quantitative survey.

117. **Remittances:** Remittances, which can help smooth household consumption, are quite low, with very few households reporting any external sources of income from abroad, according to the evaluation survey data. Remittances from DRC, the refugees' country of origin, flow to only 1.3% of households in Kiziba camp (which is geographically close to DRC) and to 0.8% of households in Gihembe. Remittances from within Rwanda and gifts are the most common form of external income, though received by slightly more than 10% and 13% of households respectively, and are mainly from family members who have migrated to towns to work. Remittances from other countries are the smallest source of external income, received by only 2.2% of households in Kiziba and 0.7% of households in Gihembe. Overall, households in Kiziba camp have slightly more access to external income than those in Gihembe.

118. **Agriculture and livestock ownership:** The majority of the original refugees from DRC are farmers whose main livelihood was agriculture, and who regard livestock as an important asset and a contributor to household food security. However, very few cultivate (Table 19), and only about 5% of households own livestock (mostly goats and sheep, though some in Kiziba had cattle). In focus group interviews with host communities and refugees, both confirmed that there is little land available to rent around the camps, and little money with which to do so, so the majority of refugees do not cultivate land. According to NGO sources, the July 2011 decision by the GoR to ban livestock from the camps for health reasons reportedly required many people to sell their livestock at low prices, depriving

Table 19: Agriculture and livestock ownership, by camp

	Kiziba	Gihembe	Sig
% of households cultivating field crops	2.5	0.7	*
% of households cultivating garden crops	5.7	5.5	
% of households rearing livestock	5.8	5.5	
n	599	600	

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

households that own few material goods of a prime asset (see Table 20).

Table 20: Percentage of households owning each type of asset, by sex of household head

	Kiziba			Gihembe		
	Male	Female	sig.	Male	Female	sig.
Bed	83.2	78.9		87.3	84.8	
Net	98.1	97.9		90.5	92.5	
Stove	90.8	89.3		85.7	83.3	
Pots/ utensils	99.6	99.1		98.8	98.3	
Watches	4.6	1.5	*	2.4	1.1	
Radio	25.2	14.6	**	27.8	12.9	***
Chairs	22.5	13.4	**	22.6	21.6	
Phone	47.7	35.7	**	59.9	49.4	*
n	262	337		252	348	

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

119. **Asset ownership:** Information was collected on assets and a weighted index of assets was created for the survey. Table 20 shows that ownership of assets that are distributed as NFIs (cooking pots, mosquito nets, stoves) is largely equal among vulnerability groups and between male vs female-headed households. However, those assets that require cash to purchase (mobile phones, radios, watches) are much more prevalent among the least vulnerable and among male-headed households.

120. **Market activity:** Quantitative survey data reveal that one-third (33.3%) of households in Gihembe and slightly more (37.6%) households in Kiziba sell food items on markets. Most of these food sales take place inside the camp (68.7% in Gihembe, 89% in Kiziba), though nearly a quarter of Gihembe households that sell food are able to sell outside the camp due to their proximity to a town, while only 7% of Kiziba refugees are able to do so. Both host communities and refugees reported that they sell in the camp market. In focus group discussions, host community members said that market activity had improved as a result of the refugees' presence, noting that this benefitted them through the cheap prices for refugee food, improved prices for local foodstuffs due to increased demand from the refugees, and the opportunity to sell firewood and agricultural goods.

121. The most vulnerable households are the least likely to sell food items, and only 30.5% of the poorest sell food items compared to 53.2% of the least vulnerable families (Table 21).

122. **Savings and debt:** There is a high degree of savings and loan activity in the camps. The survey data show that the most common loan source is a friend or relative. The second most common source is a refugee camp organization or cooperative, and there are many such organizations in the camps – in Gihembe alone, there are reportedly 135 Savings and Loan Associations (SLAs) with 10 to 25 members in each member-owned association. Many associations were established by NGOs as part of income-generating and training projects, though informal (“merry-go-round”) loan associations also exist. An interest rate of 10% for a 30-day loan is common, set by the members of the SLA themselves.

Table 21: Market sales, by vulnerability group

	Most vulnerable	Moderately vulnerable	Least vulnerable
% HH selling food items	30.5	41.1	53.2
n	688	462	47
<i>Location of sales</i>			
Inside camp	76.3	81.9	88.0
Outside camp	18.5	12.4	12.0
Both	5.2	5.7	0.0
n	211	193	25

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

123. In Nyabiheke, ARC organized refugees into SLAs in 2007 as part of an IGP. The IGP initially organized training sessions for refugee community facilitators and for committees of SLAs on the organization and operation of such associations. Committee members in turn trained other members of their respective associations.

124. The programme has had a positive impact since it enabled refugees to borrow money at a considerably lower rate of interest than is available from private lenders, to meet basic needs (e.g., medical care costs, school fees, food diversification and clothing). In focus group discussions with SLA members, they reported that before 2007, no such programmes existed and interest rates were 50% per month. The initial share varies from 1,000 to 5,000 RWF/month or from 2,000 to 10,000 RWF/month, depending on the means of members. Members of an association meet annually to examine their financial statements and then share the capital and dividends in a proportional manner.

125. There are another 86 associations in Nyabiheke camp formed around doing the same business together, and refugees may join those cooperative associations (petty or informal trade, tailors, crop growers in kitchen gardens, construction workers). These associations also benefited from the financial support of an IGP, which invested 30,000 RWF for an association of five people. However, SLA members reported in focus group discussions that the SLAs are more successful than the cooperative associations because individuals are more motivated to work for their own profit rather than as a member of a group enterprise.

126. Nearly half of households in Gihembe camp and more than one in three households in Kiziba camp have a currently outstanding loan (Table 22). While a small percentage of borrowing supports education or business, the majority of households take loans for non-productive purposes. By far, the most common reason for borrowing money is to buy food, followed by the purchase of household goods. In qualitative interviews refugees described how they sell rations to buy food and non-food items, and as a result run out of food the last one to two weeks of the month. They then borrow to buy food to cover the gap and use the new ration to repay the existing loan. This keeps many refugee households in a cycle of recurring debt. In extreme cases, focus group members reported that outstanding loans exceed a household's monthly ration, so that their entire ration is seized by a single creditor, leaving them still in debt to other creditors and without food. As described by participants in male, female, and food distribution focus groups, the indebtedness cycle has been exacerbated by the distribution of half-rations in September, the month directly preceding survey data collection.

127. The least vulnerable and moderately vulnerable households hold significantly more loans than the most vulnerable (Table 22). The least dependent households are far more likely to apply for and secure loans from formal camp institutions than are the more vulnerable households, who tend to rely on friends or relatives for credit. While there is some variation in loan sources, there is little variation in loan reasons – over 75% of households in all income categories use loans to purchase food. Based on information from qualitative interviews, it appears that the most vulnerable are more likely to be purchasing food mainly for consumption while the least vulnerable may be purchasing food to generate income through petty trading. Around 10% of better-off households use loans for business reasons, compared to less than 3% of the most vulnerable households.

Table 22: Percentage of households with current loan, by vulnerability group

	Most vulnerable	Moderately	Least vulnerable
% of households with current loan	30.5	50.4	57.4
n	688	462	47
<i>Loan source</i>			
Friends/relatives	41.4	42.1	14.8
Refugee camp org/NGO	33.8	31.5	51.9
Cooperative	23.3	32.8	33.3
Money lender	7.1	10.2	18.5
CBO	5.2	5.1	11.1
<i>Loan reason</i>			
To purchase food	76.2	76.0	81.5
To buy household goods	44.3	48.5	51.9
For difficult times	31.0	36.5	37.0
For education/training	10.0	10.7	14.8
Medical expenses	10.5	11.2	3.7
To replace lost assets	4.3	8.6	11.1
To start/help business	2.9	7.7	11.1
n	210	235	27

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

Who works outside the homestead to earn cash or in-kind income for the household?

128. **Mobility:** Certain members of refugee households are fairly mobile, especially within Rwanda. The quantitative survey shows that approximately one-third of households have members who have migrated (31.7% Kiziba; 37.5% Gihembe, $p < .05$). In Kiziba, the mean number of migrants per household is 1.3, and 1.4 in Gihembe. More males than females migrate: in Gihembe, 44.4% of migrants are male and 32.5% are female; ($p < .001$). The data also show that it is usually an adult child within a refugee household who migrates (49.4% of migrants in Kiziba are adult children and 39.9% in Gihembe). A lower percentage of household heads migrate (20.9% Kiziba, 25.8% Gihembe) than do adult children from the household.

129. Refugees migrate most frequently for work (40.9% of migrants in Kiziba went for work; 43.5% in Gihembe) and for study (33.2% Kiziba; 28.6% Gihembe). Urban areas within Rwanda are the preferred destination (50.6% in Kiziba; 47.3% in Gihembe), followed by schools in Rwanda (28.5% Kiziba; 25.9% Gihembe). During focus group discussions with female refugees in each of the three camps, many mentioned having adult children who were working in towns, reflecting the quantitative survey finding that over 40% of households have a family member who

has left the camp to find work. Many of these same women also indicated that they had not heard from, or had regular contact with, these family members. Men are more likely than women to migrate from the camps in search of work in Rwandan towns or (more rarely), return to DRC to try to protect land or regain land lost in the conflict. Most of these migrants are reportedly employed in part-time and low-paying jobs such as housework or construction, which helps explain the low level of remittances. A sizeable minority are gone three months or more to visit a relative (12.6% in Kiziba; 9.5% in Gihembe); focus group members mentioned that people go to visit family members in DRC or may go to check on their land. While UNHCR does not track people who spontaneously repatriate, between 3.6% (Kiziba) and 8.8% (Gihembe) of households report having had someone return to DRC. A small number of refugees move between camps – 3.2% in Kiziba and 1.9% in Gihembe – and a few households report having a family member resettled in another country (0.4% Kiziba; 1.3% Gihembe).

What is the relationship between food assistance and school attendance?

130. Education is a critical factor to attaining a secure livelihood and eventually becoming independent of food and other material assistance, especially among youth. Total enrolment falls short of JAM guidelines for 100% enrolment in primary and lower secondary education for boys and girls aged 5-18. In Kiziba camp, 7.8% of children have never been enrolled, and JRS is currently addressing this through a campaign for 100% enrolment. In Gihembe, 5% of school-age children have never been enrolled. In both cases, the percentage of ‘never enrolled’ is slightly higher among girls.

131. However, for those who are enrolled, attendance rates are high (Table 23) and there are no differences in school attendance by vulnerability group, indicating good access to education for all households. Classes are large, averaging over 40 students per class in all three camps. In 2009, Gihembe camp residents themselves established the Hope School, supported by community contributions, though in Gihembe school-aged children are slightly more likely to be attending school regularly. A substantial minority report that their parents cannot afford school (27% Kiziba; 15.5% Gihembe); and up to 10% of children have to work, either outside the home (6.3% in Kiziba, 4.5% in Gihembe) or at home (1.3% in Kiziba, 6.3% in Gihembe); focus groups stated that secondary school, although free, does require parents to make cash contributions toward the upkeep of the school or teacher’s stipends that they cannot afford.

Table 23: School attendance of school-aged children (5-18), by camp

	Kiziba			sig	Gihembe			sig
	Boys	Girls	Total		Boys	Girls	Total	
School attendance								
Regularly attending (at least 75%)	90.4	86.3	88.6	*	92.9	91.8	92.3	
Absent >1 week in past month	2.9	4.2	3.6		2.7	2.5	2.6	
Never enrolled	6.8	9.6	7.8		4.4	5.7	5.0	
n	666	742	1,408		729	716	1,445	

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

132. Teacher qualifications and high teacher turnover were identified as problems that affect the quality of education in the 2011 JAM: in 2010 only 44% of teachers serving Nyabiheke camp were sufficiently qualified (WFP/UNHCR 2011b).

Discussions with NGO staff and teachers in the host communities indicate that, in their opinion, the quality of education is adversely affected by the restricted incentive paid to teachers in the camp resulting in low commitment and uneven attendance by teachers. For example, teachers in Nyabiheke receive only half the salary as those in the other two camps, though JRS tops up teacher salaries in Gihembe and Kiziba to RWF 25,000 per month. Reportedly, the best refugee teachers seek work in schools outside the camp where they are paid far better salaries. However, even in the public sector, teachers are not considered well paid. The average total net basic income of a certificate level public or government-subsidized primary school teacher in Rwanda is around 27,000 (US\$46) per month, about one-third of similarly qualified government servants in other types of posts (World Bank 2011c).

133. Despite problems with the quality of refugee education, JRS reported that refugee test scores for the third year of secondary school compared favourably to Rwandan school leavers. In Gihembe camp, 85% of primary school students in 2011 passed the National Examinations (UNHCR 2011e). This compares favourably to Rwandan national pass rates; for example, in 2008, 70% and 71% of girls in public and government-subsidized schools, respectively, passed the national primary exam, along with 80% and 78% of boys (World Bank 2011c). ADRA, through the Howard Buffet Foundation, is providing scholarships for 295 girls to attend secondary school outside the camps, though the need for such support exceeds the resources.

134. School attendance itself is affected by availability of food in the household and is noted to be higher during the first three weeks following food distribution, falling off in the last week of the month. Many families eat only once a day; consequently children do not eat breakfast and as lunch time approaches they get sleepy in class and their attention falters. Of those children ages 5-18 who are not attending school, a quarter report that they are too weak or sick (Kiziba 28.3%; Gihembe 24.5%). Refugees reported in the 2011 JAM mission that reduced CSB in the ration, hunger (especially in the week before distribution) and the lack of shoes and school uniforms have negatively affected continuity of attendance; some refugee school committees have introduced school fees to support daily meals at school and teachers' salaries (WFP/UNHCR 2011b). School feeding for all children in camp schools is included in the safety net activities of the new PRRO (200343); all pupils in attendance each school day will receive a hot meal consisting of supercereal and sugar (WFP 2011c).

135. There is a huge challenge facing the youth of secondary school age in the camps. Financial support for higher education was discontinued after 2007 due to budget constraints, and the refugee population faces the threat of a 'lost generation' as children growing up in the camps reach adulthood without either adequate schooling or the agricultural skills that supported their parents' livelihoods.

136. DRC culture values boys' education over that of girls, but girls are more exposed to risks if they do not have an education. NGOs that support education report that it is not common for girls at secondary school to get pregnant and drop out, unlike many girls who are unable to complete school. Teachers observe that after students complete their Grade 9 studies they create problems in camp; they are easily manipulated by others and can get involved in "bad" activities. Once young people have left school through dropout or completion of the maximum level

"If you are not educated you meet a barrier in life and can go no further."

- Key informant, Nyabiheke camp

to which they are supported – there is no opportunity to continue their studies and very few opportunities for satisfying or challenging employment.

137. Education alone is not sufficient for refugees to attain an independent livelihood. There must be sufficient job opportunities in the larger economy and equal access to those opportunities for refugees. However, the inability of children to attend school beyond primary and up to Grade 9 is contributing to serious social stresses within the camps and in the host communities. Teenagers who are not in school are idle and are more likely to engage in socially unacceptable behaviours, such as criminal activity, transactional sex, and violence against adults.

2.4 What are the impacts on protection and the protective environment?

138. This section presents the evaluation team’s analysis of the impacts of food assistance on protection and the protective environment.

What is the relationship between food assistance and gender-based violence?

139. Refugees report that they appreciate the security and respect for their rights provided by GoR and that they have freedom of movement outside the camp. They express feeling accepted in terms of their ethnic and linguistic identities, which they hold in common with their host communities. However refugees report being discriminated against in the economic sphere:

“After a food distribution there is a good atmosphere all around the camp; people are happy, there are few problems. However, the last week of the month, when the food has run out, sees a big change. Relationships are tense; school attendance falls down; even the teachers don’t come as everyone is out looking for food.”

-Nyabiheke

they are viewed as cheap labour and do not receive the same pay as workers from host communities, nor do they have access to the same work opportunities.

140. However, there are various challenges related to assistance in the camp environment that create protection issues for female refugees. When food is insufficient (including reduced ration size due to removal of CSB in Feb/March 2010 and the half-ration distribution in September 2011) or there are breaks in the distribution of NFIs, particularly firewood and soap, rations may be sold to meet other needs and women and girls seek additional commodities outside the camp, sometimes by asking for food or seeking casual work – situations in which they are easily exploited and that make them highly vulnerable to GBV. For example, women reported that they are frequently subject to sexual exploitation by employers outside the camp. (By contrast, women said they feel safe when moving about inside the camps, even at night, because the camp has its own security guards.) Young women seek work as housekeepers in nearby towns or in Kigali, in order to supplement family incomes with both food and non-food supplies.

141. Some women engage in sex work, and adolescent girls trade sex for food and non-food items, causing teenage pregnancies and exposing them to HIV. This frequently results in teenage pregnancies, and young women stated that they returned to the camp with a life “ruined, and no hope for the future.” Indeed, sexual exploitation and under-age pregnancies were reported in all camps as men proffer gifts of soap and essential toiletries in exchange for sex with young women and girls, who report that they have little access to income to purchase basic items themselves.

142. Although camp residents are aware of the teenage pregnancies, it is not condoned and carries some social stigma. In Rwanda, teen pregnancies nationally are low, around 1%.⁵⁶ Newborn children and their teenage mothers receive health services and food assistance regardless of their marital status although teen mothers in a focus group in Nyabiheke camp complained that the nurses treated them badly. Family planning services in the refugee camps are available only to married women, not to unmarried teenagers even if they are sexually active or have children already. However, underage teenagers who are pregnant and attending maternal and child health services receive family planning trainings.⁵⁷ Camp nurses encourage youth to use condoms, which are freely available in the camp, but report that frequency of use is low.

143. Focus groups of refugee women, both adults and adolescent girls, also reported that the threat of sexual assault is high for women and adolescent girls when they venture outside the camp to collect firewood, which tends to be the work of women and girls. Qualitative discussions furnished reports of women caught looking for firewood or taking it from private lands suffering rape as a consequence, as well as a few reports of men being beaten.

144. The overcrowded conditions in the camp, such that large families occupy small houses, means that in order to engage in sexual relations parents have to send children away. This has led to cases of children being sexually exploited in the homes of neighbours, as well as to a recently observed phenomenon of children engaging earlier in sexual behaviour, possibly due to over-exposure.

145. **Reporting and control of GBV:** GBV remains under-reported due to cultural reasons as well as the fact that prosecution of perpetrators and police follow-up is usually unsuccessful, and there remains a patriarchal discriminatory attitude of “blaming the victim” in respect to violence against women. There is an internal structure of conflict management in the camp starting bottom-up from the quartier level, passing through the Committee of Wise Elders and the Refugee Executive Committee before the matter is brought to the attention of the camp police. However in practice, complaints are not adequately dealt with through these mechanisms due to conflicts of interest among the groups and insensitivity to the topics of GBV and abuse. Women are not well represented in the different committees; for instance, the domestic violence resolution committee in Gihembe is a small structure of seven members: five male and two female elders. While some survivors request a referral to their clan chief, they often face disappointment as cases are frequently handled in favour of men.

“School drop-outs and the lack of meaningful activities for non-school going youth and gender-based violence, are among the most pressing issues in the camp.”
- *Gihembe (briefing note September 11)*

146. When cases are reported, ARC, AVSI, and AHA provide assistance to the victims and try to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice. The main types of GBV reported in the UNHCR/ARC/AHA programme include rape, sexual

⁵⁶ WHO Department of Making Pregnancy Safer, Rwanda Country Profile. Statistics are for women 15-19 years of age having their first child, while refugee camp first-time mothers were 14 and some had two children by age 19.

⁵⁷ Family planning services in the camps are in line with MoH guidelines. Family planning uptake in camps is very low, less than 3%, compared to 27% nationally (WHO Department of Making Pregnancy Safer, Rwanda Country Profile, undated).

exploitation, physical and psychological violence and “economic harassment.”⁵⁸ It is difficult to quantify the extent of the problem due to under-reporting, but both Gihembe and Kiziba have registered a decline in reported cases over the past three years: in Gihembe, four to five cases have been reported per month on average in 2011, compared to five to eight cases per month in 2010 and eight to eleven cases per month in 2009; Kiziba currently sees nine cases per month in 2011, with a total of 92 cases between January and October 2011, compared to 101 in 2010 (January to December) and 145 in 2009. The majority of reported cases are domestic violence within the camp.

147. **Prevention and care related to GBV:** UNHCR and partners are engaging in a concerted effort to protect refugees from violence and abuse, including child protection programmes, GBV programmes and household conflict resolution initiatives. Services offered include counselling, household visits, mediation, representation, safe rooms, as well as material support and linkages to income-generating projects, nutrition centres and other forms of support where necessary. A vibrant programme of GBV awareness-raising sessions with all groups and ages in the refugee community is also working hard to render GBV unacceptable, improve relationships and understanding between men and women/girls and boys and encourage reporting and exposure of offences. Sensitization activities to destigmatize HIV are also included.

What is the relationship between refugees and host populations?

148. Qualitative focus group discussions were held with separate groups of men and women in all three host communities, which reported cordial relations with the refugee community characterized by mutual visits, sharing drinks, friendships, and intermarriage between townspeople and refugees. Refugees and host communities also share culture, traditions, and language. Host communities said that the refugees’ presence has had a positive impact on local markets and labour availability. Local markets have grown in size and frequency as a result of the increased activity brought by the refugees; host community members noted that markets are held more frequently and are more active, and there is a supply of cheap food (especially maize and oil) and cheap labour from the refugees.

149. However, some stresses on the host community have also been reported with relation to market prices. The prices of local foodstuffs produced by townspeople (cassava, bananas, and potatoes) have increased due to higher demand, as has the demand for firewood. Food prices for townspeople have also increased as a result of increased demand from refugees, one of the negative impacts experienced by communities. Other problems commonly cited by host communities are frequent theft of food crops, especially by children, though the community members said that they understand that the children steal due to hunger. This has increased over the past few months due to ration cuts in the camps. Some refugees come to borrow food or to beg around the beginning of the month when their food runs out. Theft, vandalism of crops,

“We received refugees as hosts and are in a good relationship. But when guests outstay their welcome in your home it’s good for them to go home and you can still keep good relations.”

-Host community women’s focus group, Gihembe

⁵⁸ That is, while women have the ration card and thus receive food, some men harass them to sell the food in order to have money to spend; some men try to obtain any money in the household to spend on alcohol or their own needs.

disrespectful behaviour and drinking or drug-taking by teenagers was a complaint among all of the female focus groups for the host communities.

150. Complaints about refugee behaviour were mostly related to the behaviour of youth and children, and to increased prostitution around Gihembe and Nyabiheke camps. Outside the camp, focus groups in host communities reported that they are intimidated by the attitude and occasional threats from refugee youth and recently, some adolescent boys have committed violent crimes against people from the town. There are some small groups of violent refugee youth who are reportedly enjoying impunity for their actions within and outside the camp; complaints about theft and youth behaviour presented to camp authorities or local police are not satisfactorily addressed. This worry was especially pronounced in Kanyege village near Kiziba camp, where host community residents voiced their fears about future security. There is clearly a desire to ensure that refugees are subject to the same severity of punishment as Rwandan citizens through the country's legal apparatus. At present there is a struggle to achieve this and a concern that justice is not adequately meted out to refugee perpetrators of violence.

151. Refugees themselves have largely benefitted from their relationships with the host communities. Local residents sometimes aid the refugees with non-food items and with food

“Refugees are so protected and think that they have the right to do what they want, even if we accuse them to local authorities nothing is done to change their behaviour.”

-Host community men's focus group, Nyabiheke

handouts when their rations run out, stating that the support to refugees is insufficient. Host communities provide casual labour, though it is often low-paid, and have opened their schools to refugee children.

What is the impact on local resources? Is there competition for resources between refugees and host populations?

152. Focus group discussions were held with six host communities, and every community reported that environmental damage by camp residents and structures has been significant. Deforestation around the hilltop camps has led to unchecked water runoff, causing soil erosion in fields, damaged crops; it has undermined road infrastructure and even destroyed houses. The need for firewood regularly brings refugees into competition with local communities for natural resources. All communities strongly complained of deforestation and the unauthorized cutting of community trees by refugees, to the degree that residents around Kiziba camp report that they must now purchase their firewood because there is none to harvest. As noted, theft of food crops is extensive, so that farmers close to the camps report that they cannot cultivate some food crops as they are all stolen before harvest. Refugee livestock also reportedly damages crops. Environmental damage from the camps and competition for firewood between local residents and refugees are major sources of tension, marring what is otherwise a largely cordial relationship. Refugees do not receive firewood sufficient for their needs from UNHCR, so they supplement their supply by cutting trees from private and public lands belonging to farmers and townspeople. This ultimately has an impact on the refugee community because it affects their relationship with the host communities. The current evaluation found these issues to be consistent with descriptions in project documentation: Prodoc PRRO 105310 in particular noted that environmental degradation and its effects related to the refugee presence have “triggered signs of resentment against the long-

term presence of refugees” (WFP/UNHCR 2010b). Support to host communities for repairing environmental damage related to the refugee presence is agreed by the GoR and partners to be critical to peace between the communities and the refugees (WFP 2010b).

153. Host communities realize some ancillary benefits from the services provided to refugees, notably in Kanyege around Kiziba camp. This isolated community now has improved roads, access to health care services and safe drinking water, and expanded employment opportunities as a result of the refugee camp. In several communities, primary and secondary school infrastructures have been expanded to accommodate refugee children.

3. How Does Food Assistance to Refugees Create Impact?

154. Chapter 2 presented evaluation findings by presenting data analyzed according to a theory of change for the refugee programme in Rwanda that posited the realization of several short-term effects, intermediate outcomes, and long-term impact. Four key evaluation questions were considered. Chapter 3 will assess the overall findings concerning the factors that explain why and how the outcomes and impacts have taken place and been realized. To this effect, the evaluation team has considered two additional key evaluation questions:

- i) To what extent has the type of food assistance and the way it is delivered affected progress towards longer-term durable solutions?
- ii) To what extent has the interaction between WFP and UNHCR been a key factor explaining the results?

155. This section ends with a discussion of the extent and nature of WFP and UNHCR’s contributions to durable solutions for refugees.

3.1. How do government and agency policy and contextual factors impact on refugee food and livelihood security?

156. Government policy, local resources, donor resources for livelihood programming, demographics of the refugee population, and the uncertain political situation in DRC were external factors that influenced the outcomes and impact of UNHCR/WFP refugee assistance activities in Rwanda.

157. **History and role of GoR ministries:** MIDIMAR took over from the Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs (MINALOC) as WFP’s and UNHCR’s main government partner in 2009-2010. MINALOC was far more engaged in direct implementation than MIDIMAR has been; for example, they controlled the camp warehousing and food distributions. MIDIMAR now provides oversight but doesn’t actually implement; UNHCR partner NGOs have the implementation function. The new system has functioned more effectively under MIDIMAR than under MINALOC.

158. **GoR policy on refugees:** The government allows refugees freedom of movement and access to local schools and to some forms of employment. Refugees may work outside the camps, though most, because of their refugee status, are able to find only low-paying informal employment. Previously, refugees had only their ration cards for identification. In 2010, the GoR began issuing refugee identity cards to facilitate the refugees’ freedom of movement and access to services such as banking. An alternative for some refugees is to apply for a Rwandan national identity card, which if granted acknowledges citizenship, and thus requires that they forfeit their

refugee status and their WFP/UNHCR relief assistance. Otherwise, they retain their refugee status, rights and obligations. Given the challenges of resettling large numbers of refugees from DRC in Rwanda, it is likely that this option is limited. During the verification exercise carried out late 2011, local media reported that refugees with national identity cards were required to choose between the card and re-registration as a refugee, and that many who had acquired the national identity card – reportedly illegally and usually in order to get work – surrendered their cards in order to retain their refugee status.⁵⁹ This information was later corroborated in two key informant interviews with officials in two camps.⁶⁰

159. GoR policy on refugees: Basic education is a key component to securing a sustainable livelihood and therefore to supporting durable solutions. Nine years of free basic education (expanding to 12 years in 2012) is available to all children, though parents reported that their inability to afford required contributions for maintenance and teacher incentives forced them to withdraw children from secondary school. Successful secondary school students are eligible to attend higher education, though most are unable to find the financial resources to do so.

160. UNHCR wage rates for refugees: UNHCR established a wage rate of 400 RWF per day (US\$0.67) for refugee labour in 1996, which remains unchanged in 2011 despite steep increases in the price of food and other goods. This wage takes into account the value of WFP/UNHCR assistance, but employers outside the camps use this as their benchmark wage, and the competition for casual labour gives refugees little bargaining power. Skilled refugees such as teachers are better able to find regular, fully-paid employment⁶¹ outside the camps. However, the majority of refugees lack technical skills and education and the jobs available to them pay less than US\$1 per day, so their contribution to sustainable livelihoods is insignificant. Many refugees engage in petty trading and services such as tailoring but the income from these activities is not sufficient to ensure food security at the household level.

161. Donor resources for livelihood programming: IGPs help build vocational skills needed to generate reliable income and can contribute to durable solutions by preparing refugees to pursue more diverse livelihoods. For example, IGPs supported by ARC have enabled 7,641 people to form savings and loan associations, 604 people to start small businesses, and 1,111 to receive professional training. While NGOs have trained many, the total number is a small percent of refugees. In order to make a significant contribution to durable solutions, these activities would need to be implemented on a significantly larger scale but severe funding shortfalls for WFP and UNHCR operations have meant there are few funds available to support IGPs. FFW programmes, which could provide some cushion to families who are short of food due to borrowing or enable households to accrue some resources, have not been implemented due to the same funding limitations.

162. The major donor to WFP Rwanda, BPRM, states that while it does not discourage activities that assist the host population, 80% of its funding should be used for refugees.⁶² A small amount of WFP funding is provided to help mitigate

⁵⁹ The New Times. 20 August 2011.

⁶⁰ Asked to comment on this information, UNHCR in Rwanda was unable to confirm or deny.

⁶¹ That is, full time jobs that are paid at full wages, unlike the reduced wages that refugees receive in the camps because they receive relief assistance.

⁶² FY 2012 Funding Opportunity Announcement for NGO Programs Benefiting Refugees and Refugee Returnees in Rwanda, the DRC, Tanzania and Uganda, Bureau of Population Refugees and Migration, US Dept of State, Oct. 6, 2011.

environmental impacts on donor populations, usually through FFW, but currently WFP does not have funding to undertake planned activities.

163. **Uncertainty of return:** The continuing political instability in the regions of DRC that are home to the refugees leaves the majority uncertain about the prospects of return.

When asked about their long-term goals, women said they would like repatriation or resettlement – to be able to find a livelihood, work and be more productive. “Then life can continue; here it is stuck.”

-Female refugee focus group, Kiziba

How has land and agriculture policy affected refugee ability to practice agriculture?

164. Severe land constraints in Rwanda inhibit access to agricultural land for cultivation or livestock rearing inside and outside the camps, activities that could enhance food security and strengthen livelihoods. Only around 5.5% of households in Gihembe and Kiziba cultivate kitchen gardens, mainly due to lack of space around houses. As noted, government has banned livestock in the camps, causing many households to divest themselves of assets that support food and livelihood security.

3.2. What is the impact of implementation factors? To what extent has the type of food assistance and the way it is delivered affected progress toward durable solutions?

How has WFP adjusted programme deliveries to fit changing contexts and circumstances?

165. **WFP food pipeline delivery:** WFP allocates food commodities for disbursement to each camp by drawing on UNHCR camp databases, which list the number of refugee individuals and households per camp. UNHCR is responsible for warehousing and food distribution within the camps. WFP attempts to deliver commodities to each camp within a week of the scheduled food distribution, which varies by camp, so that all commodities are in place in the camp warehouses, which are managed by the partner NGO AHA – Africa Humanitarian Action – prior to the distribution to refugee households.

166. From 2007 through February 2010, WFP provided a food basket of five commodities – a cereal, invariably maize, a pulse, normally beans, vegetable oil, salt, and corn-soya blend. With the exception of CSB, the commodities have remained the same during this evaluation period. The quantity of each food commodity distributed to refugees, however, has fluctuated over the years, a result of food pipeline shortages and resource constraints, which have plagued the programme. CSB was removed from the GFD ration basket from February 2010 and has never been reinstated. CSB continued to be distributed to other groups, but in reduced amounts: the ration size of CSB for children and lactating women was reduced in August 2011 from 200g/person/day to 150g, and for pregnant women, from 300g to 150g. Even prior to the removal of CSB, the GFD ration basket, which included (at that time) 400g of maize, 100g of beans, 10g of vegetable oil, 5g of salt as well as 40g of CSB per person per day, only provided refugees with 1976 kilocalories and only 74%, 69%, 92% and 54% of fat, Vitamin C, iron and Vitamin A requirements, respectively. The programme has always managed to meet protein and iron requirements. The CSB deficiency, however, has removed the only Vitamin C source from the food basket. The programme tried to partially compensate for the removal of CSB by increasing ration

sizes of other commodities: since 2009 refugees have received 380g per capita per day of maize, 120g of beans and 30g of vegetable oil, but the general ration only provides refugees with 1998 kcal per day, including only 54% of Vitamin A and 44% of calcium requirements.

167. The GFD has never managed to provide refugees in the camps with 2100 kcals, much less the 2008 JAM recommended 2238 kcals, a recommendation based on demographic factors, the relatively cold weather in the high altitudes of the camp environments – camps are perched atop small mountains – as well as the extreme refugee household dependence on GFD food rations to supply their consumption needs. But these food provisioning patterns describe the best months; most years included months when some food commodities were in short supply: cereal rations were reduced by approximately 85% for three months in 2007. Refugees received full rations throughout 2008, but maize rations were again reduced from 380g to 320g for five months and refugees received half rations of CSB for nine months in 2009. Except for CSB, full rations were distributed throughout 2010 and 2011 except September 2011, when resource constraints forced WFP to halve the maize and beans deliveries to the camps.

168. WFP food distribution documents provide us with the following information on general distributions by camp since 2007 (Table 24).

Table 24: General food distributions, by camp, 2007-2011

	CEREALS	CSB	OIL	PULSES	SALT	GFD by camp (Mt)	Total (Mt)
2007	9 months of cereal rations of 400g pp, 3 months at 340g	11 months of CSB at 40 (Gihembe); 12 months (other camps)	Full supply of oil (10g only)	Full supply of pulses (100g)	Full supply of salt (5g)	>Gihembe 3,460 >Nyabiheke 955 >Kiziba 3,533	7,948
2008	Full supply of cereals	Full supply of CSB at Gihembe & Kiziba; delivered for half the year at Nyabiheke	Full supply of oil	Full supply of pulses at Gihembe & Kiziba; no pulses one month in Nyabiheke	Full supply of salt	>Gihembe 3,112 >Nyabiheke 1,669 >Kiziba 3,549	8,330
2009	Only 7 months of cereals at full rations of 380g, 5 months at 320g	Only 3 months of full CSB rations, 8 months CSB at half rations, one month no CSB	Full rations of oil (30g)	Full rations of pulses (120g pp)	Full rations of salt (5g)	>Gihembe 3,591 >Nyabiheke 2,667 >Kiziba 3,597	9,856
2010	Full basket of maize	CSB was discontinued in the GFD from March	Full supply of oil	Full basket of beans	Full supply of salt	>Gihembe 3,800 >Nyabiheke 2,810 >Kiziba 3,695	10,305
2011	Full basket of four commodities except for September, when half rations of maize and beans were delivered and distributed	-	Full supply	Full basket of four commodities except for September, when half rations of maize and beans were delivered and distributed	Full supply	>Gihembe 3,726 >Nyabiheke 2,780 >Kiziba 3,571	10,077

169. There have been no significant pipeline breaks in the programme, despite substantial funding challenges. WFP has successfully delivered food commodities on time for the vast majority of months of the operation, although some delays were reported by camp distribution partners and refugees at least once a year and particularly in 2011. WFP uses a combination of their own trucks and privately contracted trucking companies to move the food from their warehouses in Kigali to the camps. Late deliveries frequently involve the private contractors; finding reliable truckers in Rwanda has been problematic in past years. The programme also sometimes faces a lag time between funding, procuring, and transporting the food commodities. Partners and refugees from each of the three camps reported late truck arrivals for three or four of the ten months of 2011, depending on the camp. Late

arrivals compel the distribution team to delay the food distribution, which, as we shall see, adds an extra burden to many refugee households, especially those in the most vulnerable category.

170. Food quality and quantity: More problematic has been the inconsistent quality and quantity of food commodities arriving at the warehouses for distribution within the camps. Refugees, distribution committees, warehouse staff, and partners in all of the camps complained about the quality of maize and beans received during much of 2011. The problem has been that budget constraints in 2011 compelled WFP to borrow maize and beans from local stocks stored in Rwandan warehouses, and the food loaned to the programme under WFP supervision was often below standard. Much of the beans stocks were old, requiring hours of cooking; some of the food stocks were older than desirable. Although WFP implements a process of cleaning commodities of questionable quality, much of the maize stocks were spoiled. Although WFP has a process of cleaning maize procured through such channels, it is clear that poor quality maize arrived in camps during the year. For example, the evaluation team observed poor quality maize being distributed in Kiziba camp. Nine bags of maize were later returned to be replaced, which is WFP policy. However, many more poor quality bags of maize remained in the camp. Distribution committee members and refugees often decide to accept receipt of such food commodities rather than work with the warehouse staff to return the commodities for replacement several days or weeks later. In the Kiziba example, the evaluation team observed refugees receiving and then hauling poor quality maize and beans away from the distribution area; some refugees were later observed in the camp market attempting to sell poor quality maize.

171. Refugees and warehouse staff in all of the camps also complained of receipt of underweight bags of maize and occasionally jerry cans of oil and bags of salt. As they do with reported cases of poor quality commodities, WFP replaces underweight bags, but warehouse staff, refugee food distribution committees, and final refugee recipients repeatedly explained to the evaluation team that they preferred to accept short weight bags rather than send them back for replacement at a later date. Within the group distribution system (described below), refugee households shared in distributing the losses. One of the problems is that warehouse personnel do not systematically weigh the commodities as they are off-loaded; at Kiziba for example, bags are sometimes weighed during the distribution. At Gihembe, the evaluation team took note of one waybill that included 47 bags of maize that had been weighed. Of the 47 bags, 36 (77%) were slightly underweight, including 11 bags at 48 kg, 8 bags at 48.5 kg, 13 bags at 49 kg, and 4 bags at 49.5 kg. The storekeeper accepted the consigned slightly underweight bags, which together totalled 49 kg less than expected when distributed to refugee groups as full rations.

Does the commodity management system fulfil food assistance needs?

172. Camp warehousing, which is currently managed indirectly by UNHCR and directly by AHA, which operates as the UNHCR partner, is below normal WFP standards. (WFP will assume increased responsibility for camp warehousing in the subsequent PRRO as a consequence of the poor standards.) The physical structures are sub-standard. The three camps are all served by the original second-hand Rubb Halls, which were erected 15 years ago. The Nyabiheke and Gihembe Rubb Halls leak in at least three places along the walls; both Rubb Halls have holes along the bottom of the walls,

"We share food with cats that sneak into the warehouse."

-Nyabiheke

against which the warehouse managers have attempted to stack pallets to ward off thieves, but thieves have easily broken through the makeshift pallet-walls to steal cans of vegetable oil and other commodities in the two camps. Guards, who are paid an incentive of RF12,000 (approx. US\$19.50) per month, were involved in at least one of the Gihembe thefts. (The inconsistency of incentive payment amounts is problematic: Refugees are paid only RF 6000 to off-load commodities, whereas cleaners receive RF 12,000.) Lacking proper guardhouses at Nyabiheke, guards apparently frequently leave the premises during rain showers. Some of the warehouses were filthy at the time of the evaluation team visit. The Rubb Halls have not been fumigated for years; the Nyabiheke warehouse is plagued by rats as well as cats. Observing the off-loading process, evaluation team members noticed the lack of tarpaulins at the back of trucks to protect against bag leakages. Each warehouse is equipped with pallets, but many are broken and in need of replacement. Partially-opened bags of poor quality maize were observed stacked next to good quality maize and oil was stacked directly atop sacks of maize in one nearly empty warehouse. All warehouses have been equipped with hanging weighing scales, but the weighing scales were only actually hanging and being used systematically at Gihembe. At the other two camps, warehouse staff told the evaluation team that they lacked the wherewithal to hang the scales.

173. AHA assumed the responsibility of operating the camp warehouses from 2010, taking over from MINALOC; warehouse operations have apparently improved since the change. Although WFP field monitors occasionally provide warehouse staff with on-the-job training (OJT) on basic commodity management subjects such as ledger, stake card, and waybill accounting, warehouse training has not been systematized. The ledger used to record food commodity receipts, dispatches, and distributions appeared to indicate some inaccuracies at one camp; at a second camp, the ledger figures were written over, a violation of basic accounting principles. Camp warehouse personnel have been issued with two different sets of stack cards; one set has been filled out, although the stack cards are not actually attached to the stacks, because commodities are disbursed to the camp on a monthly basis in exact numbers, leaving no excess stocks at the end of the distribution. Excess stocks might allow warehouse staff to replace poor quality food or underweight bags with full bags of good quality food commodities during the distribution. A warehouse theft of powdered milk at Kiziba in 2010 involved AHA staff, who were subsequently fired.

174. **Food distribution system:** Refugees and WFP/UNHCR partners appreciate the food distribution system in the three camps, which apparently minimizes the phenomenon of under-scooping known to occur in other refugee contexts. The food distribution system operates as a group distribution, as opposed to an individual household distribution. Camp village representatives are given the responsibility of collecting food commodities at the food distribution site, calculated according to the number and sizes of households in the village. At Kiziba, the executive committee designs a monthly distribution plan which allows village representatives to collect rations for village groups on a specifically assigned day. In two camps – Gihembe and Nyabiheke – refugee representatives collect the rations by family size as assigned on the ration cards; large family sizes collect first. The distributions normally occur over the course of five to six days, depending on weather conditions. Although refugees generally like the system, food sometimes runs out during the last distribution day, especially when underweight bags or poor quality rations are set aside for replacement later. The problem might be alleviated with additional pre-positioning of commodities. The distribution centres require some rehabilitation. The Nyabiheke

food distribution site was completely open air at the time of the evaluation team visit following the destruction of the protective hanger and fencing during a rainstorm.

175. Food distribution monitoring: WFP has assigned two Field Monitors (FMs) to cover the food distribution process in three camps. Although the FMs do not reside in the vicinity of the camps – one assigned to Kiziba operates from Butare in the South; the other FM covers Gihembe and Nyabiheke from Kigali – refugee food committee members and AHA warehouse and distribution supervisors are well aware of the FMs and appreciate their work in the camps. However, food monitoring carried out by WFP or UNHCR may not be sufficiently intensive in the camps, which lack full-fledged monitoring presence. Time constraints may thwart monitors from employing some monitoring tools, such as random spot checks during and after a distribution or random weighing. A larger problem is that WFP, which does not manage the warehousing in the camps, currently lacks the formalized authority to respond in a timely fashion to distribution or warehousing improprieties or to undertake a formal training regimen to ensure proper commodity management and accounting implementation. The communication and reporting system is currently inefficient. As a result, WFP logistics, warehousing and commodity management talents are not fully utilized at the camp level.

176. Milling costs: *How is food prepared?* After collecting their rations, refugees take the maize for milling. Refugee households normally combine a portion of their rations to be milled usually outside of the camp. Other portions of the rations are sold to pay for other food and non-food items including other expenses. The logic model presumes the accessibility and affordability of milling facilities and assumes that refugees may sell a portion of their rations to cover milling costs. However, the exorbitant milling costs displayed in Table 25 require an estimated twenty to thirty percent of the cereal rations; milling costs help determine how much of their maize will be sold. Milling costs are particularly high at Kiziba, where sixty percent of households regularly access a privately-owned mill in the camp (the owner is apparently a non-refugee), expending an average of more than RF 1300 every month. Gihembe households, who are relatively advantaged to live in a semi-peri-urban setting adjacent to a town, pay approximately sixty percent what Kiziba refugees pay; milling costs in Byumba for refugees are RF 20-30 per kg. Milling costs are higher in Nyabiheke, which is more rural and higher yet in Kiziba, which is the most remote of the three camps. Some of the most vulnerable households apparently only mill a small portion of their rations to save money; the small amounts milled are put aside for children. Refugees estimate losing up to thirty percent of their grains during the milling operation, particularly when grain is dry or damaged, which occurred more frequently in 2011 than in previous years. Past JAMs have recommended bringing in milling machines to reduce milling costs, which could be controlled, and promote a cooperative income generating activity.

Table 25: Use of mills (in %) by location and costs (in FRws)

	Kiziba	Gihembe	sig
Mill location			
Private mill outside camp	37.8	96.0	***
Private mill in camp	60.0	3.5	***
Other	1.0	0.2	
Mill provided by UNHCR or WFP	0.8	0.0	
Manually at home	0.3	0.3	
n	598	600	
Mean amount paid per month	1,340.2	795.6	***
n	598	600	

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011


What are the food ration selling patterns? Refugee households invariably sell a substantial portion of some of their rations in order to purchase other food (especially for children) or non-food items or to take care of other livelihood needs such as clothing, which is not provided; education expenses for those households who send high school students to a school outside of camp; cooking fuel, which is distributed in insufficient quantities; and milling costs. Refugees also sell food rations to contribute to SLA dues or to pay for mandatory contributions toward refugee social services. This finding is supported by both the household survey (see Figure 11) and the qualitative interviews, wherein virtually all of the refugees reported selling a sizeable portion of their rations for the purposes described above. It also supports the findings of previous JAMS: for example, the 2011 pre-JAM report states that 47% of refugee households in the camps relied on sales of food aid as an income generating activity.⁶³ The 2008 JAM found that the top economic activity by refugee households was the sale of food aid (44.2%),⁶⁴ indicating that sales of food aid have increased.

177. Beans are only occasionally sold and salt is rarely sold. Most households invariably sell up to sixty percent of their vegetable oil rations and more than one-fifth of their cereal rations. Vegetable oil is considered the most valuable commodity, because it fetches the best price. Kiziba refugees even described paying custom taxes of RF 300 to 400 per litre of vegetable oil to the Rwanda Revenue Authority for the right to haul vegetable oil from the camp down to Kibuye, where vegetable oil prices are substantially better than prices that sellers could garner at the camp market. Refugees sell a substantial portion of their maize even though the maize market is always a buyers' market at the time of food distribution, when refugee sellers can only garner RF 100 to 120 per kg, approximately 1/3 to 2/5 the normal price. It is simply necessary to sell some rations.

⁶³ Rwanda Pre-JAM Household Assessment Report Food and Nutrition Survey, WFP Rwanda, May 2011.

⁶⁴ Rwanda Secondary Data Analysis on Food Security and Vulnerability, Draft 4/30/2008. Dominique de Bonis for WFP Rwanda.

Figure 11: Mean percentage of ration sold (maize and vegetable oil), by camp



Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

What are refugee constraints to obtaining food?

178. Given the constraints to obtaining sufficient food to maintain household food security throughout the month delineated in the previous paragraphs and in section 2.1, refugees were not shy about discussing this problem. Asked about obstacles in obtaining food, survey participants focused their answers on the quantity and quality of food assistance (Table 26). Given the need to sell a substantial portion of their rations to fulfil other livelihood requirements, participating survey respondents universally complain that the food aid as well as household income is insufficient. Terms of trade disfavour refugee households, who sell their rations at low prices in camp or local community markets to purchase other items at relatively high and increasing prices. Half of the respondents also mentioned that food is occasionally distributed late, requiring households to borrow or undertake relatively severe forms of coping strategies. Obstacles to obtaining food do not vary by vulnerability groups.

Table 26: Primary obstacles to obtaining food, by camp

	Kiziba	Gihembe
Quantity of food aid	93.3	97.5
Poor quality of food	73.0	83.5
Food aid arrives late	60.3	44.0
No money to buy food	35.6	51.7
Non-preferred food	32.7	49.8
Food too expensive	13.5	34.5
Not enough land to cultivate own food	10.0	18.0
n	599	600

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

179. Constraints to food security correlate strongly with limited refugee livelihood or income earning opportunities, low wages for jobs in the camps and sometimes outside the camps, very limited land access or cultivation opportunities, as well as the problems of diet diversity, food quality and quantity. Although the government allows refugees the flexibility to seek work outside the camps, their actual opportunities to pursue paid work is limited and virtually never undertaken by the least vulnerable households in the camps. Refugees face tough competition with Rwandans for formal employment. The government ban on livestock in the camp restricts another income generating source. Finally, the three JAMs carried out in 2006, 2008 and 2011 verify this evaluation's findings that the ration basket is insufficient to meet basic food requirements for the vast majority of refugees

continuing to confront limited possibilities for self-reliance. (UNHCR/WFP 2006; 2008; 2011).

How has UNHCR adjusted programme deliveries to fit changing contexts and circumstances?

180. The UNHCR Programme Mandate is threefold: to protect refugees, provide humanitarian assistance, and promote durable solutions.

181. **Protection:** UNHCR provides very strong protection services, contracting out much of the protection activities to NGO partners in the camps, including GBV protection, HIV prevention and support to PLHIV, family services, and child protection. UNICEF is peripherally involved in child protection activities. GBV remains highly problematic in the camps, but would be much worse without the commitment and prioritization of UNHCR and partners to protect women and children. HIV remains stigmatized, but UNHCR partner prevention services have reduced stigma and increased voluntary testing. This effort is slowly changing attitudes and entrenched cultural patterns that serve to discriminate against PLHIV, who told the evaluation team in FGDs that if people in DRC or outside of the camp setting discovered that they had contracted HIV/AIDS, they could be killed and most certainly would be isolated and vilified.

182. **Humanitarian assistance** implemented through partner NGOs includes interventions in health, education, supplementary food distribution, water, shelter and physical protection. UNHCR provides excellent support to NGO partner implementation in the camps. Health services are effective and health supplies above standard in the three camps. Water supply is fully sufficient in one of the three camps, barely adequate in another, and quite deficient in the third. Kiziba refugees average approximately 33 litres per person per day, far better than the UNHCR standard of 20 litres a day. Water supply remains highly problematic at Gihembe, where refugees only average 6.5 litres per day. Nyabiheke refugees access an average of 14 litres per person per day, which is below the standard but not ranked by refugees as problematic.

183. **Quality basic education** is available to all children through Grade 9 Secondary school, but the inability of the programme to support secondary education in the camps (or outside the camps) is a deficiency impacting on all refugee households with teenagers, the vast majority of whom lack skills and education, cannot work or enrol in a trade school in lieu of being deprived of school after Grade 9 Secondary, prompting many to initiate bad habits inside the camps or in surrounding host communities. The GoR is installing a new policy mandating secondary education for all Rwandan children; this policy provides an opportunity to UNHCR to seek support for complete secondary school education for refugee children.

184. **Shelter** is also problematic, but mostly beyond the control of UNHCR. Each of the three camps was established on the tops of major hills; land is insufficient to adequately house several thousand households in each camp. For example, Kiziba camp comprises 28 hectares, or 15 sq metres of land per person; the standard is 78 hectares, or 45 sq metres of land per person. Many small two-room houses provide shelter for 12 or even more people. The one shelter issue seemingly within the control of UNHCR is that of plastic sheeting, but budget constraints and the prioritization process have resulted in the distribution of insufficient quantity of plastic sheeting to adequately cover approximately half the houses in the camp. Refugees in focus

groups reported receiving relatively poor quality plastic sheeting prone to leakage and high humidity.

Distribution of non-food items in relation to food assistance.

Have refugees received and used non-food items?

185. The problem described above relates to the distribution of NFIs. The 2008 JAM emphasized the importance of providing NFIs to meet refugee priorities and noted great progress from 2006 in the provisioning of the basic NFIs of firewood and soap (WFP/UNHCR 2008a). UNHCR has also supported NGO partner efforts at camp beautification and creating a healthier camp environment, usually involving planting flowers and trees, especially at Kiziba and Nyabiheke.

186. Budget constraints have severely dampened UNHCR's ability to systematically distribute and replenish NFIs, however. This is despite UNHCR standards regarding redistribution of specified NFIs within specific timeframes (see Sec. 1.3). While UNHCR has managed to distribute all of the mandated items, redistribution of many NFIs either does not occur or occurs infrequently and irregularly. As shown in Table 27, refugees reported shortages of many NFIs. At the time of the evaluation, for example, soap had not been distributed for three months. The survey findings are consistent with problem areas identified in documentation from the evaluation period: delivery delays and inadequate supplies of firewood (WFP and UNHCR 2011b), delays in providing sanitary material due to shipment-related issues (UNHCR 2011a), inadequate supply of sanitary napkins for school-going females, and the inability to provide school uniforms to all students attending camp schools due to budget (UNHCR 2011a).

"I'm not happy to come here to talk to you without washing myself."

- Kiziba youth discussing the recent absence of soap

Table 27: Shortage of NFIs as reported by households, by camp, by percentage of households

	Kiziba	Gihembe	Sig
% of households with NFI shortage	91.3	85.3	**
n	599	600	
Kitchen utensils	77.5	86.3	
Blankets	74.8	85.4	
Sleeping mat	73.1	76.0	
Soap	72.6	74.6	
Clothing	66.0	73.6	
Water jerry can	53.7	70.5	
Cooking fuel	19.6	52.0	
Building material	25.8	45.7	
Sanitary pads	19.7	24.2	
Cooking stove	6.4	35.7	
Mosquito nets	9.1	17.0	
Productive tools	7.3	13.7	
Other	2.2	3.9	
n	547	512	

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

187. Refugee households therefore frequently sell part of their food ration to generate income to replenish their NFI supplies and cover basic needs including clothing, which UNHCR has not supplied, firewood for cooking, and in Gihembe,

sometimes water. This common strategy of selling the ration – also a finding of the 2011 JAM – increases household food insecurity. In addition, NFIs themselves are often sold in order to pay debts and meet other priority needs.

188. In addition to budget constraints, factors that contribute to the challenge of NFI supply and are that the branch office is understaffed and trucks are insufficient, resulting in delays in procuring and delivering goods and NFIs. Logistics management has been problematic for UNHCR, not helped by difficult bureaucratic government procedures on importing goods and services.

Firewood and cooking fuel: What are refugee sources of energy?

189. Refugees remain dependent on firewood for their cooking needs (Table 28). Refugees take advantage of the fuel wood distributed by UNHCR partners every month, but must supplement that by purchasing firewood or more commonly, searching for wood outside the camp. This adds to tensions with host populations, who are unhappy with refugee incursions into the natural resources of the area. More than half of Kiziba households and nearly two-thirds of Gihembe households gather wood from outside the camp. UNHCR faces problems of maintaining sufficient funding to provide refugees with many thousands of steres of firewood that must be procured by cutting into Rwanda’s natural resource base. Budget constraints have disallowed UNHCR from purchasing and supplying good quality fuel-efficient stoves or alternative-energy stoves to allow refugees in the camps to cook their food.

Table 28: Type of fuel used and source, by camp

	Kiziba	Gihembe
Type of fuel used		
Wood fuel given by UNHCR	82.3	90.3
Wood fuel gathered	53.1	63.2
Wood fuel purchased	20.5	39.0
Charcoal (made by HH)	0.2	0.2
Fuel source		
UNHCR distributed	99.0	98.3
Gather from outside	62.1	66.7
Purchase in camp	15.4	22.0
Purchase outside camp	5.2	31.8
n	599	600

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

How has the food assistance programme affected durable solutions? What are refugee medium-term and long-term durable solution options?

190. WFP does not programme its food assistance to promote durable solutions, in large part the effect of budget constraints and the prioritization of food provisioning to mitigate against acute food and nutrition insecurity. Although “promoting durable solutions” remains UNHCR’s third major goal, financial and human capital resource support and commitment for durable solutions lags far behind support and commitment for protecting refugees and providing humanitarian assistance. UNHCR in Rwanda devotes approximately 90% of its budget expenditures to supporting “care and maintenance” activities and UNHCR personnel are committed to ensuring that the care and maintenance programme is implemented.

191. A small portion of expenditures is devoted annually to “repatriation assistance.” Although repatriation is deemed to be the most viable durable solution, UNHCR has reiterated that refugees in Rwanda cannot return to DRC, which remains insecure in North Kivu and elsewhere (election confusion was ongoing as this report was being written); DRC is not ready to welcome refugees back; and the refugees remain unsure about the status of the land and houses they left 15 years ago. UNHCR is therefore not ready to promote voluntary repatriation, especially given continued security problems encountered in IDP camps in eastern DRC. The recent revalidation exercise uncovered only approximately 4% to 5% of camp refugees (depending on the camp) actually willing to return.

192. Refugees speak the same language and essentially share the culture of the people of Rwanda, but integration – the second potential durable solution – is problematic given the lack of employment opportunities to provide households with incomes for self reliance, the intense pressures on the land – the vast majority of the generation of refugees entering Rwanda 15 years ago were farmers – and the difficulty facing the GoR to allow integration of 55,000 refugees, especially given the existence of other people in the region who might want to enter Rwanda to add to the integration figures if they ascertained a policy change. MIDIMAR representatives, however, indicated to the evaluation team their willingness to consider local integration of refugees if donors would financially support efforts to identify livelihood options. Such an effort would require commitment and resources over the medium term but could offer the most efficient and effective durable solution over time.

193. The third durable solution, resettlement to a third country, is viable only for very few refugees, as evidenced by the few numbers of refugees that have actually managed to find a new home as resettled individuals or households.

Can refugees find durable solutions within the current environment?

194. As noted in the quotation at right, WFP in Rwanda focuses its efforts on maintaining a quality care and maintenance approach within its refugee programme, although “we are even struggling for emergency funding.” Both WFP and UNHCR discussed with the evaluation team

“Our struggle is just finding enough funding for care and maintenance.”

- Discussion with WFP Senior Management, Kigali

the unfortunate disconnect between what the agencies would like to achieve and what is possible given the resource constraints. WFP operates on a short-term timeframe of 2 to 2 ½ years within the PRRO framework, within which programme activities are planned for three to six months. Only a longer-term country office plan would allow WFP to think about durable solutions.

195. UNHCR lacks the financial and human resources in Rwanda to implement livelihoods programming activities as a potential semi-durable solution, which one senior manager described as really the same as local integration. According to the senior management team, budget cuts have essentially disallowed livelihood activities or programming activities that might promote some form of self reliance. In addition to lacking land for cultivation or livestock production, refugees lack skills or training and cannot access IGAs (see discussion in the following paragraphs). UNHCR supports a few discrete projects that employ approximately 1000 refugees, who are paid only a small incentive of less than US\$1 a day (RF400) to occasionally repair structures after rains or in response to other circumstances. Some refugees

work outside but often at exploitable daily wages. Through NGO partners, UNHCR also promotes kitchen gardens on the small amounts of land available in the camps or small animal rearing, such as rabbits or chickens, targeting vulnerable groups such as PLHIV. Yet overall, programme partners are implementing activities at too low an intensity to make a difference for the vast majority of the refugees: activities are unconnected, too few and too small. The scale of IGA and vocational training activities, discussed below, is very small compared to the need.

196. Employment and income-generating activities: Refugees are permitted to sell (and buy) from local markets. Refugees do operate small businesses within the camps such as restaurants, shops, hairdresser studios, tailoring services and selling food and NFIs on the market (WFP/UNHCR 2011b). Some NGOs have managed to secure small funding to promote income generation. However the 2008 JAM (p. 31) found that while there had been efforts to increase IGA opportunities since the 2006 JAM, opportunities in the camps and surrounding areas were highly limited. In Nyabiheke camp, considered to have likely the maximum IGA participation, no more than 5 % of refugees were direct beneficiaries in ARC's IGA programmes (WFP/UNHCR 2008a).

197. Vocational training and other livelihood promotion activities: JRS has been a vocational training provider in the camps, but these activities have stopped and there are few vocational and life skills training opportunities (however ARC still offers courses). Vocational training attendance has been low, especially in Gihembe (see Annex 13), where refugees tend to seek work outside the camp (WFP/UNHCR 2011b). Most refugees are not able to earn an income from their vocational skills for several reasons: lack of means and materials for production (e.g., sewing machines, start-up equipment, capital); training course certificates are not recognized outside the camps; the skill level acquired in the training is lower than is required to be competitive in the Rwandan labour market; and the difficulty of securing a job outside the camps without a Rwandan ID card (WFP/UNHCR 2011b). Kitchen gardens, rabbit rearing and poultry rearing have been introduced in the camps to encourage refugees to supplement the ration diet, although refugees live in severely cramped environments within the camps, constraining garden and small livestock options.

198. Savings and loans: ARC has supported voluntary savings and loan associations (VSLAs), whereby people contribute cash on a monthly basis to facilitate loans. The associations, initially supported through Income Generating Projects, have been used by refugee members to invest in small petty businesses and to purchase NFIs such as clothing. Although most of the associations have not succeeded in realizing successful viable IGAs, a few small VSLAs have grown, such as tailoring associations in Nyabiheke. The small scale of these income generating programming efforts however, has demonstrated limited impact. Other forms of savings and loans include informal women's groups using food (e.g., oil) for savings, and individual loan systems among refugees (kirimbo) (WFP/UNHCR 2011b).

How has the interaction between WFP and UNHCR been a factor explaining the results?

199. WFP and UNHCR coordination and interaction: WFP and UNHCR senior managers agree that relations between the two agencies are excellent "at the technical" level and constructive in "some of the camps." WFP and UNHCR coordinate monthly in the camps to regularly discuss programme issues and plan for

the food distribution. These monthly meetings include the other implementing partners such as MIDIMAR and the various NGOs working in the camps. Relations have been less formalized at the Kigali head office level in that although senior managers frequently talk and meet, they do not meet systematically on a weekly or bi-weekly basis. Following years of coordination problems between the two organizations, WFP and UNHCR coordination of field activities, meetings, joint monitoring, and support to external missions has reportedly improved immeasurably since 2011.

200. WFP and UNHCR also regularly engage in joint assessments and nutrition surveys. For example they have carried out JAMs in 2006, 2008, and 2011. The problem is that follow up to these assessments does not always take place. Although WFP and UNHCR got together in 2009 to draft an active plan to respond to or implement 2008 JAM recommendations, the action plan lacked coherence, was poorly presented, and was therefore never seriously considered. (UNHCR and WFP were undertaking an Action Plan exercise to respond to the recent 2011 JAM recommendations during the evaluation team visit, a process that appeared promising.) Follow through has been highly problematic until now. As a result the same unfulfilled recommendations have been repeated in consecutive JAMs. The agencies have failed to undertake annual nutrition assessments, which could provide the programme with crucially important progress information on nutrition, food security, and health indicators. This is an example of a JAM recommendation on which no action ensued.

One-UN: How has the UN promoted a coherent approach within the refugee programme context?

201. The One-UN forum offers a modality to promote joint planning and joint activities amongst UN agencies. Coordination activities occur through individual agencies taking the lead. One-UN comprises five thematic working groups, each creating separate plans of action involving coordination and collaboration by agency. For example, FAO and UNICEF are collaborating to pursue and improve school gardens in Rwanda. UNHCR, WFP, and FAO are collaborating to support PLHIV by assessing nutrition and gender dynamics. UNHCR and WFP have developed a joint intervention to generate a communication system and strengthen MIDIMAR's capacity to manage and effectively respond to disasters using Geographic Information Systems (GIS). The One-UN process creates a window to jointly raise money and design and develop coordinated proposals. Because of the nature of the One-UN structure and prioritization process vis-a-vis GoR development priorities, the refugee programme has not yet been able to fully take advantage of the One-UN strategy to develop coordinated programmes that would utilize the skills of other agencies, for example UNICEF's comparative advantages relating to nutrition and child education. UNHCR has attempted to engage UNICEF in participating in refugee programming activities, including classroom construction, ensuring health and nutrition standards, and child protection.

3.3. To what extent has the interaction between factors contributed to realizing or hindering durable solutions?

202. In the theory of change constructed by WFP/UNHCR for the Rwandan refugees (Annexes 1, 2), many of the underlying assumptions related to inputs/resources and outputs/activities have not been fulfilled. This compromises the realization of durable solutions up to this point. The primary factors that interact to influence the

impact of food assistance on durable solutions are the limited livelihood and asset-building opportunities, under-resourced food and NFI support, lack of emphasis on finding external funding to support JAM recommendations relating to durable solutions, and continuing conflict in DRC.

203. Long-term food assistance and durable solutions: Food assistance has the potential to support durable solutions when it provides CFW or FFW opportunities that enable households to build assets, or when it supports access to secondary education. Given the absence of this support due to funding constraints, the majority of refugees – the moderately and most vulnerable households – remain dependent on WFP/UNHCR assistance, which in itself is not sufficient to meet daily needs for most households. The majority of refugees appear motivated to improve their livelihoods, as demonstrated by the number of households that pursue a wide variety of means to earn income, but since assistance at this time is concentrated on ensuring the provision of an acceptable level of food security and health and not on protecting or building assets, there is little scope for refugees to plan beyond present needs. Another aspect of a programme strategy that is constantly focussed on the short-term goals of provisioning and protection is that programme staff in UNHCR and WFP are not geared toward conceptualizing long-term durable solutions beyond hoping that conditions improve in Eastern DRC or donors provide resettlement opportunities to larger numbers of refugees.

204. Linkages between internal implementing factors: The combined resources of WFP and UNHCR are supposed to provide refugees with an adequate, balanced food basket and NFIs that meet essential needs for hygiene, shelter, and food preparation. With basic survival needs met, refugees would have a solid base from which to seek employment and build assets. In reality, because the food basket is monotonous and does not meet full nutritional requirements, and because of shortages of essential NFIs, refugees are compelled to convert an already reduced food basket to cash to cover basic needs. This produces a cycle of debt that reduces the impact of food assistance on food security and undermines any potential livelihood gains, particularly for a large group of refugees (the majority of refugee households) defined in this evaluation as the most vulnerable. This majority of most vulnerable households lack access to other livelihood options and sources of income beyond selling their food rations.

205. Justice on gender-based violence and durable solutions: Gender-based violence remains under-reported and many perpetrators enjoy impunity, due to cultural reasons and the failure of refugee camp leaders and police to follow up with prosecution of perpetrators. Failure to access justice and impunity for perpetrators of violence can have serious long-term repercussions on social cohesion within the refugee community and between refugees and host communities, and thus will affect prospects for the achievement of durable solutions.

206. JAM recommendations and durable solutions: The JAMs present a long list of recommendations that are not prioritized and do not adequately emphasize the need to support expanded livelihood activities to realize durable solutions. WFP and UNHCR have not collaborated sufficiently to secure donor resources to carry out recommendations aimed at durable solutions put forward by the JAMs, with the result that many recommendations from the 2008 JAM were not implemented by the time of the 2011 pre-JAM, and were repeated in the latter assessment.

207. **External factors and durable solutions:** Profitable livelihood options outside the camp, such as reliable paid work at reasonable wages or land for cultivation and livestock rearing are severely limited, which contributes to the continuing dependency on relief assistance. The refugees' realization of the limited livelihood options available in Rwanda is reflected in the low percentages of people who wish to stay in Rwanda for the long term (Table 29). Protracted refugee durable solutions within Rwanda need to bring donors, the Government of Rwanda, host communities, and refugees together on the same page. GoR regional development plans can incorporate refugee and host community involvement in ways that can promote livelihood approaches as well as environmental protection activities with refugee participation. Durable solutions within Rwanda targeting protracted refugee populations can only succeed in concert with local and regional planning and host community involvement. The One-UN system should assume a leading role to promote such a strategy.

Table 29: Preferred long-term action, by vulnerability group

	Most vulnerable	Moderately vulnerable	Least vulnerable
Move to a new country	67.6	63.2	45.7
Return to home country	24.3	27.1	41.3
Stay in Rwanda to earn money	6.5	6.3	8.7
Other	1.6	3.5	4.3
n	688	462	46

Source: TANGO International Household Survey 2011

208. Another external factor that influences the ability to achieve durable solutions is continuing instability in DRC. While the complex political and security conditions in DRC were not part of the core focus of the study, in considering durable solutions the quantitative survey did ask refugees about their own goals for permanent settlement. Virtually all refugee households state that they have not returned to DRC due to instability (99.7% in Gihembe; 97% in Kiziba), nor do they want to return unless there is peace and security. By contrast, only a small percentage said they have not returned to DRC because they lack the means (7.7% Kiziba; 8.2% Gihembe); and a very small percent said they have not returned because of the food assistance they receive (2.3% Kiziba; 3.3% Gihembe). A majority of refugee households in all vulnerability groups (70.7% Kiziba; 59.3% Gihembe) prefer to move to a new country while substantially fewer (22.6% Kiziba; 29.5% Gihembe) prefer to return to home country. Only 4.8% (Kiziba) and 8.2% (Gihembe) want to stay in Rwanda. Refugees will only seriously think about returning to DRC when conditions improve in Kivu and efforts are undertaken to ensure that land is available to farmers.

209. In addition to concerns about security, another factor influencing desires about long-term goals is the refugees' perception of the possibilities of resettlement in a third country. In qualitative interviews, many refugees claimed to know, or to have heard of someone who was resettled in a developed country. This appears to have created an exaggerated perception, particularly among youth, that they need only wait for an opportunity to be resettled in one of these countries rather than pursue other long-term options.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

4.1. Overall Assessment

210. The evaluation team critically reviewed the theory of change that underlies the inter-related WFP/UNHCR interventions in the protracted refugee situation in Rwanda to determine whether the interventions that have been implemented by the two agencies from 2007-2011 are likely to lead to durable change and self-reliance. This required assessing the inputs and resources provided over time, the outputs and activities, the participants and their reactions to these interventions, and the outcomes. In particular, the evaluation team looked at the assumptions underlying the envisioned change process to determine if they were realistic.

211. The evaluation has also sought to assess WFP and UNHCR's effectiveness and efficiency in achieving the two strategic objectives associated with this programme under PRROs 105310 and 200030:

- Save lives and protect livelihoods of refugees, returnees and relief victims (WFP Strategic Objective (SO) 1: "save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies").
- Improve productive capacities in returnee and refugee host communities, including addressing the effects of environmental degradation (SO3: "restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post disaster or transition situations"). These are consistent with UNHCR's Global Strategic Objectives 2010-2011.

212. In protracted refugee situations, both agencies are now oriented toward assisting refugees to attain self-reliance, a shift from prior modes of operation that were more focused on relief, care and maintenance. The agencies have preserved the lives and the overall health of the refugee, as is the intent of SO1. However, the improvement of productive capacities in refugee and host communities as envisioned in SO3 has been largely unrealized. Self-reliance activities have been few as funding has failed to meet even half of requirements – a shortfall attributed to low levels of donor support, the global economic situation, and the need to support other humanitarian crises. Although WFP had planned to provide FFW support to host communities from 2010, support to refugees was prioritized instead due to funding limitations, and host population activities have not yet started (WFP/UNHCR 2011a).

213. The theory of change provides the rationale for the programme activities. For the theory of change to work, the intervention logic must be coherent and the assumptions reasonable. In the case of Rwanda, a number of assumptions that form the foundation for the pathways leading to change were met, particularly assumptions attached to desired short-term effects, but not fully enough to create the necessary conditions for transformational change, especially for desired intermediate and long-term outcomes.

214. The agencies achieved some of the short-term effects such as access to health facilities, SF and TF support, security and protection, and potable water (in two camps). However, other critical short-term inputs have not been fully provided. WFP has never met the standard of providing a full monthly ration consisting of a diverse food basket providing 2100 calories per day; UNHCR has similarly not provided refugees with NFIs on a timely basis; and IGA activities are not accessible. A substantial portion of refugee rations serve as an indirect form of income; refugees

monetize a portion of their rations in order to purchase other food and non-food items.

215. Particularly due to the gaps in these inputs, the programme has not progressed beyond preserving life and mitigating hunger to providing a pathway to improved livelihood opportunities and expanded assets. Refugees are not food secure throughout the month, have very limited livelihood opportunities or IGAs, have few assets, and are not self-reliant. This is particularly true for the majority of refugees who are most vulnerable to food insecurity.

216. Other short-term outcomes regarding adequate household food consumption, use of supplementary livelihood activities and opportunities, and refugees employing skills and labour to improve livelihoods have been met, but only partially and not to a degree that promotes asset-building or self-reliance. This is largely because key assumptions have not held, including adequacy of resource inputs for food, predictable delivery of NFIs, no financial loss when food sold, household support from remittances, and accessibility of IGAs.

217. Some short-term outcomes – adequate access to and use of water and sanitation services and facilities, refugees using security and protection services, children attending school, and host communities cooperating – have been more successful and have helped to stabilize life for the refugee population.

218. Intermediate-term outcomes for improved/stabilized nutritional status, improved neonatal and under-five outcomes, protection services and improved education outcomes have been successful. However, the majority of intermediate outcomes relating to improved food security as measured by discrete food security variables, households with successful agricultural activities and cash income from successful IGAs, asset building and improved livelihoods have not been realized for the majority of households. The care and maintenance approach has precluded durable solutions related to improved livelihoods from increased incomes, IGAs, or agricultural production options, although successful SFP and TFP interventions and outcomes in the three camps have helped to mitigate the potentially detrimental effects of inadequate access to a full food basket, non-food items, and income generating opportunities.

219. Finally, the long-term outcomes regarding the attainment of self reliance that underlies the success of repatriation, resettlement or local integration options have not been achieved because of the breaks – the inadequate inputs – in the pathways to change described above.

220. Health and nutrition: Basic health services are effectively provided, as attested by the low crude mortality and under-5 mortality rates. Qualitative data suggest that SFP and TPF have been successful but do not adhere to nutritional programme protocols, rendering evaluation of overall effectiveness of these interventions difficult. Child feeding practices are a challenge due to the removal of CSB from the GFD and the need to sell part of the ration to secure foods appropriate for small children.

221. Water access is adequate in Kiziba and Nyabiheke but has been problematic in Gihembe, forcing women and young girls to seek water outside the camp, which exposes them to potential GBV and causes friction with the host community.

222. PLHIV are well supported with supplementary rations – though the impact is diluted by sharing at home – and with mushroom- and vegetable-growing activities that provide fresh produce for consumption and sale.

223. **Coping strategies:** The food ration – reduced in calories, diversity, and nutritional quality from earlier years – constitutes the refugees’ main source of income and collateral. The inability of UNHCR to provide adequate NFIs and the absence of viable livelihood activities means in practice that WFP’s barely adequate food basket is subsidising basic non-food requirements. This situation forces refugees to employ negative coping strategies, the most common being limiting food intake in various ways and borrowing or buying food on credit.

224. **Education and IGAs:** Nine years of free basic education is available to all refugee children, regardless of gender. The majority of families cannot afford to send any child through secondary school and beyond. For this reason girls have less opportunity to complete secondary school, and the camp vulnerability profiles show that the most vulnerable households are those headed by poorly educated females. The barriers to higher education seriously compromise the future ability of refugee children to earn a livelihood as an adult, or to develop the skills needed for an eventual exit from camp life.

225. Skill training for IGAs and some follow-up support is provided but neither the quality of training nor the material start-up support is robust enough to make most trainees competitive enough to earn a livelihood in the open market.

226. **Gender and social structure:** WFP and UNHCR have taken important steps to address some of the areas in which women are most vulnerable, for example by issuing ration cards in women’s names, providing GBV counselling and protection services, and looking after the nutritional needs of PLW and children under five. However, female-headed households remain among the most economically vulnerable in the camps, and young women lack opportunities for higher education or skill training that could afford them better futures. Youth, who predominate in the camps, in general lack opportunities for either an education or livelihood skills sufficient to sustain them and their future families.

227. **Protection services and security:** UNHCR protection services have worked to report, prosecute and reduce GBV inside the camps. Women report that they feel safe in the camps, even when moving about at night. Women remain vulnerable to GBV when they venture outside the camp for firewood and to sexual exploitation when they seek outside employment. Women and adolescent girls are sometimes forced to resort to negative coping strategies, particularly transactional sex, making them vulnerable to unwanted pregnancies and possible contraction of sexually-transmitted infections or HIV.

228. **Environment:** The camps have caused environmental damage to host communities, which has had negative impact on farmers. Plans by WFP to assist host communities to mitigate some of this damage have not been carried out due to a shortage of funding.

229. **Durable solutions:** As donor funding has fallen far short of projected basic needs, few funds have been devoted to activities that support durable solutions such as education and IGA training, and none to other livelihoods programming such as FFW. In some cases, donor funding mechanisms do not allow support for long-term activities that may include durable solutions in the form of livelihood programming.

Such is the case with BPRM, a major supporter of the Congolese refugees residing in Rwanda, which provides funding on an annual basis.

230. Refugee Programming in Protracted Refugee Contexts: The current approach to food assistance in this and other protracted refugee contexts remains primarily oriented to maintaining the bare minimal levels of food consumption, but fails to promote or even protect livelihoods or livelihood strategies or manage risks. Refugees who have been receiving food in the protracted situations reviewed in this evaluation are dependent on food aid.

231. Although difficult to predict, refugee scenarios often evolve into protracted refugee contexts. Refugee programme planners can employ strategies from the beginning, or at least after the first months of emergency provisioning and protection activities, to prepare for a protracted scenario and begin to promote durable solutions. Strategies would include at an early stage support for activities to promote self-reliance, including development and environmental planning in concert with local, regional and national development plans, particularly including the participation of host communities, as well as education and skills training for youth.

4.2. Recommendations

232. The recommendations have been devised to assist WFP and UNHCR to promote durable solutions to the protracted refugee situation in Rwanda. The position of the recommendation does not imply its level of importance.

Implementation, Management Standards and Programme Approach

233. Recommendation 1: WFP should ensure that all refugees are provided a balanced and diverse ration that includes the necessary micronutrient content and sufficient kilocalories for health and development. In addition to implementing general food distribution, blanket and targeted supplementary feeding in line with set standards, WFP, in cooperation with UNHCR, should identify opportunities to optimize the use of approaches based on food, cash or vouchers. Building on WFP's feasibility study, a market assessment followed by a pilot should be conducted to provide evidence on the effects of a cash and/or voucher programme on the local economy and markets, intra-household food availability.

234. Recommendation 2: UNHCR should carry out methodologically sound nutritional surveys in each camp on an annual basis – namely, the Standardized Expanded Nutrition Survey, implemented in coordination with the Ministry of Health, WFP, and if required, UNICEF. In addition, UNHCR and WFP, in partnership with UNICEF, should ensure adherence to joint UNHCR/WFP guidelines as well as national protocols in the provision and management of curative nutrition programmes.

235. Recommendation 3: UNHCR should mobilize funding to increase livelihood options for refugees in the camps, especially women. This includes scaling up income generating programme savings and loan activities with adequate financial, material and technical support. Female refugees should be targeted to increase the equity of income-earning opportunities.

236. Recommendation 4: Mechanisms to ensure follow-up to address the JAM recommendations should be established by WFP and UNHCR, according to a prioritized action plan.

237. Recommendation 5: UNHCR and WFP should minimize the use of firewood for cooking through intensified distribution of fuel-efficient or alternative-energy stoves and sufficient amounts of environmentally-friendly fuel. Alternatives exist and should be tapped as important strategies to enhance protection for women and girls.

Longer-term Strategy and Durable Solutions

238. Recommendation 6: UNHCR and WFP should collaborate and coordinate more effectively in pursuing joint programming, funding and advocacy activities to ensure international support for durable solutions. UNHCR and WFP should pursue a joint funding strategy with donors, and seek ways to diversify the donor base.

239. Recommendation 7: WFP should initiate food-for-work/cash-for-work programming to broaden income opportunities for refugees, especially for households headed by women and unemployed youth, and to improve social and economic relations between refugees and host communities.

240. Recommendation 8: UNHCR and donors should identify ways to increase access to educational opportunities, especially for girls, as a major strategy to achieve durable solutions. UNHCR and donors should prioritize funding to enable families to meet costs of a full secondary school education (Grades 10-12) in accordance with the Government of Rwanda's policy of universal access. Increasing girls' access to education is a strategy to reduce GBV and discrimination experienced by adolescent girls. The overall strategy should include creating greater access to national vocational and technical training schools and linking training to market needs and livelihood opportunities in Rwanda and DRC.

241. Recommendation 9: Over the longer term UNHCR and WFP should pursue strategies to promote repatriation or integration within Rwanda. Notwithstanding the complexities of the situation, it is important that the international community engages with the Governments of Rwanda and DRC, together with UNHCR and WFP, to pursue strategies to promote repatriation. Repatriation would require the commitment from the Government of DRC to ensure that the land for cultivation and homesteads is returned to repatriated refugees and their security assured. Similarly, the international community with the Government of Rwanda, UNHCR and WFP should develop strategies to overcome constraints to local integration including donor funding to facilitate integration through livelihood support for refugees.

242. Recommendation 10: Donors supporting the refugee programme should devote a larger proportion of funds to refugee self-reliance and durable solutions. Donors are urged to overcome barriers related to funding restrictions to support long-term durable solutions in both DRC and Rwanda. Strong, proactive donor support would help to overcome limitations encountered by UNHCR and WFP in implementing activities aimed at achieving durable solutions and refugee self-reliance.

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