



UNHCR
The UN Refugee Agency

CENTRALIZED
ES/2018/11e

Evaluation of UNHCR's Livelihoods Strategies and Approaches

TURKEY CASE STUDY
FINAL REPORT
DECEMBER 2018

Conducted by:
Tim Frankenberger
Maryada Vallet
Tango International

TANGO
INTERNATIONAL
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE to NGOs

UNHCR Evaluation Service

UNHCR's Evaluation Policy confirms UNHCR's commitment to support accountability, learning and continual improvement through the systematic examination and analysis of organizational strategies, policies, and programmes. Evaluations are guided by the principles of independence, impartiality, credibility and utility, and are undertaken to enhance the organization's performance in addressing the protection, assistance and solution needs of refugees, stateless people and other persons of concern.

Evaluation Service
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Case Postale 2500
1211 Genève 2
Switzerland
www.unhcr.org

Published by UNHCR

Evaluation Service Copyright © 2018 UNHCR

This document is issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for general distribution. All rights are reserved. Reproduction is authorized, except for commercial purposes, provided UNHCR is acknowledged.

Unless expressly stated otherwise, the findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this Evaluation Report are those of the Evaluation Team, and do not necessarily represent the views of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States. The depiction and use of boundaries, geographic names and related data shown on maps and included in lists, tables, and documents in this Evaluation Report are not warranted to be error free, nor do they necessarily imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNHCR or the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to acknowledge the high quality of engagement and assistance from colleagues at UNHCR Turkey, in particular Damla Taskin, Cansu Gungor, and Imren Arslanoglu, as well as Ziad Ayoubi who joined the mission from the Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion Unit in Geneva, whose time and thoughtful reflections helped make this case study a success. The Turkey livelihood team facilitated the field visits, providing crucial support for which TANGO is very grateful. We would also like to thank the valuable input received from stakeholders from partner organizations and United Nations agencies, government representatives, and the private sector operating in Turkey. We would especially like to thank the generous communities and beneficiaries who provided the evaluation team with insight into their experiences.

Evaluation information at a glance	
Title of the evaluation:	Evaluation of UNHCR's Livelihoods Strategies and Approaches
Timeframe covered:	2014-2018
Expected duration:	June-December 2018
Type of evaluation:	Centralized evaluation of Livelihoods strategies and approaches (theory-based)
Countries covered:	Global strategy review with primary data collection in Ghana, Costa Rica, India, Rwanda, and Turkey
Evaluation initiated by:	UNHCR Evaluation Service
Evaluation manager / contact in UNHCR:	Christine Fu, Senior Evaluation Officer

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	i
Table of Contents	ii
List of abbreviations	iii
1. Introduction of country context.....	1
2. Summary of country-specific methods.....	3
3. Evaluation findings.....	5
3.1. Effectiveness and efficiency.....	5
3.1.1. Internal factors.....	6
3.1.2. External factors	8
3.2. Impact.....	9
3.3. Relevance of UNHCR's role.....	12
3.4. Sustainability and scalability	14
4. Summary of evaluation question findings	15
5. Programme-specific recommendations	16
6. Conclusions to contribute to overall livelihood strategy.....	17
Annex 1: References.....	18
Annex 2: Interview Lists	19
Key informants.....	19
Beneficiary interviews.....	21
Annex 3: Resilience capacity indicator examples	22
Annex 4: Positive deviant refugee story.....	24
Annex 5: UNHCR Turkey pathways to scale	25
Annex 6: Photos	26

List of figures

Figure 1: UNHCR Turkey livelihoods programme contributions to resilience capacity	23
Figure 2: UNHCR Turkey pathways to success and scale	25

List of boxes

Box 1: Big brand advocacy	8
Box 2: Information provision for PoC, programme outputs.....	9
Box 3: Social cohesion.....	11

List of abbreviations

AGD	Age, gender, diversity
CBI	Cash-Based Initiatives
CO	Country Office
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
ET	Evaluation Team
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoT	Government of Turkey
HQ	Headquarters
IDI	In-Depth (Individual) Interview
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization on Migration
ISKUR	Turkish Employment Agency (in English)
KEQ	Key Evaluation Question
KII	Key Informant Interview
MC	UNHCR's Minimum Criteria for Livelihoods Programming
MoAF	Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
MoCT	Ministry of Customs and Trade
MoFLSS	Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services
MYMP	Multi-Year and Multi-Partner
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
PoC	Persons/People of Concern
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
TANGO	Technical Assistance to Non-Governmental Organizations International
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
VQA	Vocational Qualifications Authority
WFP	World Food Programme
3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan



DECEMBER 2018
Turkey Case Study

I. Introduction of country context

1. This Turkey case study report is part of the global evaluation of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) livelihood strategy. The centralized evaluation was commissioned by the UNHCR Evaluation Service and independently conducted by Technical Assistance to Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO) International. The overarching purpose of this evaluation is to gather strategic and timely evidence on the effectiveness of refugee livelihoods programming from 2014-2018. The evaluation will inform organizational strategy and practice within UNHCR and external to UNHCR with partners, aiming to improve the economic inclusion of refugees and other people of concern (PoC). See the full evaluation report for the overall findings and recommendations.
2. **Country context:** The Republic of Turkey has faced a major refugee influx for nearly a decade resulting from unrelenting conflicts, insecurity, and humanitarian crises across their borders with Syria and Iraq. In recent years Turkey has hosted the largest number of refugees in the world, currently at 3,567,658 (as of 27 September 2018), which is 63 per cent of the total number of registered Syrian refugees and significantly surpasses any other country.¹ Other PoC hosted by Turkey include: 169,000 persons from Afghanistan, 145,000 from Iraq, 35,000 from Iran, and 4,500 from Somalia, among 10,500 of other nationalities.² Of all PoC in Turkey, two million are people of working age (18-59 years).
3. Turkey's macroeconomic achievements are being tested by both domestic challenges and the deteriorating geopolitical environment, including the Syria crisis, which has negatively impacted exports, investment, and growth.³ Turkey is an upper-middle-income country with a population of over 80 million.

¹ UNHCR (2018). Note: the first reference of the paragraph applies to all subsequent sentences in the paragraph until a new source is cited.

² UNHCR Turkey (2018a).

³ World Bank (2018).

Economic growth in Turkey peaked in 2015 at over six per cent per year, but declined to just under three per cent in 2016 after the failed coup attempt; at the same time, tourism declined sharply, and unemployment and inflation have steadily increased. The service sector was the largest contributor to gross domestic product (GDP) (61 per cent) in 2017, the industry sector added 32 per cent, and agriculture seven per cent.⁴ Manufacturing comprises the vast majority of Turkey's exports.

4. Turkey is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, yet maintains the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention.^{5,6} Since the start of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has been working on various legislative and institutional reforms to ensure their national asylum system is in compliance with international standards. In April 2013, Turkey's Parliament endorsed its first asylum law. The Law established the main pillars of Turkey's national asylum system and formed the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) to implement the system. Turkey also adopted the Temporary Protection Regulation in October 2014, which established the rights, obligations, and procedures for grantees of temporary protection. This is the legal framework by which DGMM registers and verifies Syrians under Temporary Protection, which then allows them access to public services through the various public authorities.⁷ There is a currently a parallel system, for Syrians and for people of other nationalities; Syrians⁸ receive temporary protection status on a *prima facie* or group basis, whereas people from other countries of origin must apply for international protection status as individuals and are subject to status determination by DGMM.⁹

5. In January 2016, a significant change was made by the Government of Turkey (GoT) to promote refugee livelihoods and self-reliance, adopting the Regulation on Work Permits of Refugees Under Temporary Protection.¹⁰ These work permits apply to formal employment only and must be renewed every year.¹¹ Thus, Syrians under temporary protection are not allowed to work independently or to be employed without a legally issued work permit. If this is violated, the employer or PoC (if working independently) is fined, with increases in the fine and eventual workplace closure with repeat offenses. In addition, in any given workplace, the number of employed refugees cannot exceed 10 per cent of the employed Turkish citizens unless the employer receives special permission because the vacant jobs could not be filled by Turks. The work permit requirements are similar for asylum seekers of other nationalities who are applicants for international protection.

6. **Programme overview:** The UNHCR Turkey operating level (OL) livelihoods budget dramatically increased from US\$ 944,667 in 2015 to \$11.8 million in 2017, with a decline to \$6.5 million for 2018.¹² Still, it is the second largest UNHCR livelihood programme in the world, after Syria. UNHCR's underlying strategy for livelihood and self-reliance is three-pronged: i) institutional, legal, and administrative enabling environment, ii) the capacity and skills of refugees, and iii) the economic capacity and potential of local labour markets to absorb refugee labour. The livelihood intervention priorities include:

- Enhancing capacities of national systems and increased cooperation;
- Increasing access to skills, language, and vocational training according to market demands and individual interest;
- Increasing refugee access to information and services leading to employment; and

⁴ UNHCR Turkey (2018b).

⁵ This allows Turkey to retain resettlement to a third country as the most preferred durable solution for refugees arriving due to events that occur outside of Europe.

⁶ UNHCR Turkey (2018c).

⁷ 3RP (2018).

⁸ This also includes stateless Palestinians originating from Syria.

⁹ AIDA/ECRE (2018).

¹⁰ 3RP (2018).

¹¹ Turkish Labor law (2016).

¹² UNHCR Turkey (2018b).

- Facilitating and strengthening access to enterprise development, and greater market access.¹³

7. The UNHCR Turkey livelihoods team has designed and monitored projects of nine **implementing partners**. The interventions include language and vocational trainings, entrepreneurship start up and development, apprenticeship and job placement, youth social cohesion activities, and employment-related awareness raising. The implementing partners include international NGOs, national NGOs, municipality and chamber of commerce partners, and United Nations agencies. In 2018 there are eight partners receiving direct funding or in-kind funding (equipment or staffing) from UNHCR: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), ACTED, CONCERN, YUVA, Habitat, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce, Support to Life, and Turkish Red Crescent.

8. UNHCR Turkey collaborates with the GoT to ensure inclusion of PoC into national systems. This does not include direct funding; instead, UNHCR provides trainings, tools, equipment, and staffing support, in addition to advocacy and technical advising. These **GoT partnerships** include:

- Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Service (MoFLSS), for work permits, advocacy, joint awareness raising with private sector, registering PoC job seekers in national database, capacity strengthening of their staff (including ISKUR, employment agency staff/job counsellors trained across 81 provinces);
- Ministry of Customs and Trade (MoCT), to support small business;
- Vocational Qualifications Authority (VQA), for certification of PoC skills, and translation of qualifications standards into Arabic;
- Ministry of National Education (MoNE), for improvement of the capacity of Public Education Centres by subsidizing teachers and providing technical equipment for vocational trainings;
- Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MoAF), who provides training and agricultural job placement support for the joint programme with FAO;
- and partnerships with numerous municipalities, governorates and sub-governorates for awareness raising on work permits, and in some locations, supporting their implementation of language and vocational training programmes including PoC.¹⁴

9. Finally, the programme actively **collaborates with private sector**, including multinational companies and their supply chains (e.g., H&M, Puma, Adidas, Tesco, and many others), Turkish companies, organized industrial zones, Fair Labour Association (FLA), chambers of commerce, and business associations.¹⁵ UNHCR provides the private sector with information on labour regulations and hiring refugees, and provides support in the work permit application process.

10. According to the August 2018 Turkey livelihoods factsheet on achievements, the programme has supported over 3,000 refugees to participate in entrepreneurship trainings and over 100 Syrians have licensed their businesses since 2016; additionally, over 300 government employment agency (ISKUR) staff have received capacity building support to provide job counselling/matching support to refugees.¹⁶

2. Summary of country-specific methods

11. **Evaluation questions:** The evaluation team assessed three key evaluation questions (KEQ):

¹³ UNHCR Turkey (2018d).

¹⁴ UNHCR Turkey (2017).

¹⁵ UNHCR Turkey (2017).

¹⁶ UNHCR Turkey (2018e).

- KEQ 1: How effective are UNHCR-funded livelihood interventions in reducing protection risks, strengthening resilience, and improving employment, income and/or savings levels of targeted persons of concern?
- KEQ 2: To what extent is there a positive correlation between desired livelihoods programme outcomes and high adherence to UNHCR's Minimum Criteria (MC) for Livelihoods Programming?
- KEQ 3: What are the different roles UNHCR has played in livelihoods programming? What has worked well in such roles and what are some constraints? What are lessons learned to inform the next iteration of the livelihoods strategy going forward?

12. While all KEQs are addressed as part of this 'deep dive' case study evaluation, the evaluation team (ET) focused foremost on KEQ 3 during the field mission. This is because the ET found the UNHCR Turkey livelihoods programme represented an important case to learn from regarding UNHCR's role.

13. Households' perception of their resilience capacity was determined by qualitative inquiry about the nature of shocks, who is most affected, how households cope with shocks, and people's views on whether they are better prepared to deal with future shocks. UNHCR defines resilience as: the ability of individuals, households, communities, national institutions and systems to prevent, absorb and recover from shocks, while continuing to function and adapt in a way that supports long-term prospects for sustainable development, peace and security, and the attainment of human rights.¹⁷ Three categories of capacities contribute to resilience: adaptive, absorptive, and transformative capacities. Absorptive capacity refers to the ability of households and communities to minimize exposure to shocks if possible and to recover quickly after exposure¹⁸ (e.g., disaster preparedness, access to evacuation routes).¹⁹ Adaptive capacity is the ability of households and communities to make active and informed choices about their lives and diversified livelihood strategies based on changing conditions (e.g., access to market information). Transformative capacity relates to system-level changes that ensure an enabling environment, including good governance, formal safety nets and access to markets, infrastructure, and basic services. Social capital, oft described as the "glue" that binds people in society together, contributes to all resilience capacities. It is based on perception of norms, reciprocity, and trust between community members (i.e., bonding social capital); individuals and groups (i.e., bridging social capital); and individuals or groups linking with higher levels (i.e., linking social capital).²⁰ Linking social capital is often conceived of as a vertical link between a network and some form of authority (e.g., government or NGOs). Such links can provide resources and information and are thus important for economic development and resilience.²¹ See Annex 3 for more information. This case study uses qualitative data to explore the resilience capacities of programme beneficiaries and how the programme contributes to the capacities.

14. **Methods:** The ET used a mixed-methods approach to ensure triangulation of information. The ET conducted a desk review of secondary data (e.g., Focus Data: aggregate indicator reports, programme documents, partner reports) and external literature, and collected primary qualitative data. Qualitative data collection comprised of focus group discussions (FGDs) and/or positive deviant²² in-depth interviews (IDI) with 53 PoC beneficiaries, and 52 key informant interviewees (KIIs) with UNHCR Turkey staff, host community members benefiting from the programme, government officials, partners, and private sector representatives. See Annex 2 for the interview lists.

15. Field work was conducted 10-19 September in the three urban areas of Ankara, Istanbul, and Mersin. These sites represented the locations with the largest refugee populations and where significant

¹⁷ UNHCR (2017)

¹⁸ Definition adapted from Béné, C. et al (2015).

¹⁹ Vaughan, E. (2018)

²⁰ Chaskin, R. J. (2008)

²¹ Aldrich, D. (2012).

²² Three refugees who participated in the UNHCR programme and successfully improved their livelihood were identified as positive deviants and asked to participate in the IDIs.

livelihood programming is being implemented with government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private sector, and United Nations partners. The ET employed a purposive sampling method to identify sites and projects to be visited during the fieldwork, in close collaboration with UNHCR. The sampling was based on criteria including: size and characteristics of the programme sites; accessibility; and sites with particular achievements or challenges relating to current or future programming. The beneficiary interviewees represented a range of age/gender/diversity (AGD) views, reflecting the composition of the livelihoods programming in the specific context, and focus groups were conducted separately for men and women. The ET was hosted and accompanied by the Country Office (CO) livelihood officers. Before departure, the ET provided a debriefing presentation for the livelihood team and deputy country representative.

16. **Limitations/constraints:** Due to time constraints, a fourth site of importance to the programme, Gaziantep, could not be included in the field mission. While field interviews were not conducted in Gaziantep, the ET still included information about Gaziantep in the desk review and consulted UNHCR staff on that status of the programme in that location. Another limitation to the study is the lack of quantitative data. The GoT coordinates and conducts all data collection with PoC, so a household survey was not possible to include in this case study. Additionally, with a purposive sample of beneficiaries, the findings are not meant to be generalizable to the entire PoC population, but instead, exemplary of key emergent themes related to livelihood strategy and the KEQs.

3. Evaluation findings

3.1. Effectiveness and efficiency

Main findings: Factors that affect effectiveness and efficiency

Design factor:

- **The market-demand focus and the government ownership of programme activities are key attributes of the programme design that contributed to effectiveness. Municipality/chamber partnerships are a flagship innovation, in line with the CRRF and UNHCR's Expanding Partnerships goal.**

Internal factors:

- **The small, but highly capable, livelihood team has accomplished the most possible through strong relations with operational partners and through strategically managed implementing partners. The MC provided a useful structure at the start of the programme.**
- **The referral pathway and collaboration between protection and livelihood teams within the CO is key to promoting safety, dignity, and self-reliance with the most vulnerable PoC.**
- **Internal systems and procedures related to the annual project cycle is the main internal hindering factor to effectiveness and efficiency. The mechanism for cash transfers to livelihood beneficiaries could be adjusted to promote financial inclusion for PoC.**

External factors:

- **The political and economic environments are largely in support of refugee economic inclusion. However, psycho-social, cultural/language and aid-**

dependency barriers still exist in integrating the Syrian workforce within the Turkish labour market.

Finding on resilience:

- **The enabling political and economic environment combined with UNHCR's key government and private sector partnerships are the building blocks for transformative resilience capacity, which strengthens systems and national institutions to support PoC.**

17. **Programme design.** The market-demand focus and the government ownership of programme activities are key attributes of the programme design that contributed to the effectiveness of the programme. According to KIIs with programme staff and programme documents, the design was based on thorough market assessments and the potential of labour markets to absorb refugees.²³ With this information, the programme then examined the institutional, legal, and administrative supports and barriers for PoC access to markets and livelihoods. Close coordination with a multitude of institutional partners was thus a priority.

18. The **partnerships** with Ankara Municipality, Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce, and municipalities in Istanbul are important innovations in the sector. UNHCR worked with the local municipalities to develop and expand the language learning and vocational training programmes offered to PoC. According to field visits to the Ankara Municipality, UNHCR providing funding for project staff positions and for key vocational machinery purchased for the training centre. This kind of partnership is promising because the local governments recognize their role in ensuring PoC have the opportunities to integrate and contribute to the economy. The Ankara Municipality described the importance of this mindset shift away from considering refugees as a burden on social services, and they would like to share about their learning through cross-visits with other local governments. They have been very pleased with the partnership because UNHCR's approach was collaborative and flexible; the municipality felt ownership of the project and they expect to take over after 2019.

19. Thus, not all partners in the Turkey programme fit the traditional UNHCR implementing partner profile of international NGOs. UNHCR (HQ) has partnership policies and procedures in place to limit risk to the agency, and the policy specifies a preference for programmes to continue with known partners with whom they have experience.²⁴ The UNHCR Turkey livelihoods team noted that this can pose a challenge to forming new partnerships because more extensive justification has to be given for seeking non-traditional or new partners. At the agency level, UNHCR has recognized the need to expand more partnerships to local as well as development, government and private sector actors in the context of the Grand Bargain and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), and it has set the goal of 25 per cent of programme funding going to local and national partners by 2020.²⁵ While this issue did not actually hinder the effectiveness of the Turkey programme, the ET feels it is worth noting because it applies to the global strategy.

3.1.1. Internal factors

20. **Internal enabling factors.** The internal factors contributing to an effective programme include a small, yet **high-capacity, livelihoods team with strong social capital** among key stakeholders. The team of three has accomplished the most possible considering their small team size.

²³ UNHCR Turkey (2018b).

²⁴ UNHCR (2013).

²⁵ UNHCR (2017).

21. According to KII with partners and staff, the team has built strong relations and functional operational partnerships with government and private sector. This has been possible because the team is comprised of experienced national staff with previous social capital to draw upon. All government representatives interviewed by the ET voiced great respect and appreciation for their partnership with UNHCR's livelihood team, as well as a desire to expand the collaboration. This sentiment was echoed by the private sector representatives interviewed. UNHCR has had a facilitator and capacity building role with these stakeholders, providing them with the information and support needed to link PoC with their respective services or employment opportunities. The strong relations with government and private sector has also helped the team link the most vulnerable PoC to appropriate livelihood opportunities.

22. A **two-way referral system** has been developed between the protection and livelihoods teams. Through UNHCR's work with sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) victims, they established links between protection and livelihoods partners, and they started referring LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex) people and vulnerable women to partners to find work. There are potentially more ways the livelihood work could be better integrated within the CO, and from discussions with UNHCR staff across units, there appears to be the need for increased understanding of how livelihoods and economic inclusion contribute to the mandates of UNHCR, to refugee resilience and self-reliance.

23. According to KII with programme staff, the **MC for Livelihoods Programming** were useful in the start-up of the programme in 2015 because it provided a structure to follow, including helpful guidance on staff job descriptions, market analysis, and partner mapping. The MC baseline assessment requirement was challenging to implement in this context where only the GoT gathers quantitative data on PoC. Due to this, the programme was scored as "partially compliant" according to the MC criteria for assessments and monitoring.²⁶ In addition to secondary data from government assessments, when available, the programme used smaller, qualitative assessments to guide programme appropriate design and implementation.

24. **Internal hindering factors.** From KIIs with UNHCR staff and partners, the ET finds there are two main internal UNHCR systems hindering the success of the programme. First, the **one-year budget cycle** affects the planning and results of the programme. With drastic budget changes from one year to the next, it is extremely difficult to plan with partners, and the most significant livelihood results simply cannot be achieved in one year—to attempt to do so may even cause harm for PoC. For example, if refugee entrepreneurship trainees are pressured to register their businesses before they are ready, or if they receive little follow-up by partners at year-end, they may be set up for failure. KIIs with partners and FGDs with beneficiaries noted that building key skills for livelihoods, both language and vocational, take more time than the few months provided in the programme. For particularly vulnerable PoC, the building of their self-efficacy also takes time and requires a sequence of interventions before they can transition into stable employment.

25. Second, the **cash transfers** to livelihood training beneficiaries delivered by the cash-based initiatives (CBI) unit **are not currently designed to enable PoC financial or economic inclusion.** This topic was discussed during a group discussion between the ET, CBI officers, and other CO units. When it comes to how and when the cash is transferred, the livelihood beneficiaries are treated the same as those PoC receiving a protection stipend i.e., they lose all money not spent from the account at the end of the month, and the account is not building their profile with the financial institution so as to access other financial products in the future. If UNHCR has a large sum of money in the bank, the bank will be more likely to provide loans to UNHCR beneficiaries. In addition, the transfers to livelihood beneficiaries are processed late on some occasions, as reported by beneficiaries and UNHCR staff. Late payments to livelihood beneficiaries, as reported by both refugees and Turk community members, sends the wrong message about taking their on-the-job training seriously and about what they should expect from future

²⁶ UNHCR Turkey (2016).

employers. Promoting financial inclusion of refugees, including their future ability to save and access credit, are key indicators of building the resilience capacities of PoC.

3.1.2. External factors

26. **Enabling external factors:** According to programme documents, KIIs and FGDs, the main external factors enabling an effective and efficient programme are the **political and economic environments** conducive to refugee economic inclusion. The political environment for refugee livelihoods has substantially improved in recent years, notably with the 2016 legislation allowing work permits for those with temporary protection, which was a direct result of UNHCR close coordination and advocacy with government. The conducive economic environment includes name-brands and big industries along with the Fair Labour Association who are also strong advocates for refugee jobs and rights (see Box 1). “What big brands say, other [retailers] will listen,” said the KII with Puma. This is important coming from major industries of the private sector because, as told to the ET by FGDs with PoC and KIIs with various partners, some employers want to keep an informal labour force, avoiding the work permit and social security fees of a formal employee.

Box 1: Big brand advocacy

Big brands like **Puma, Adidas, and Nike** wrote a letter to the GoT in 2015 lobbying for work permits for Syrian refugees. The big brands’ Syrian Working Group continues to meet and UNHCR is often involved.

KII with Puma conducted by ET.

27. While the GoT has acted inclusively toward Syrians, their status is still considered temporary, and this affects the **mind-set of refugees** with regards to if/where they will work e.g., refugees told the ET they are unsure what will happen with the one-year work permit or they may be unsure of their future plans in Turkey, so they do not want to lose their current benefits (see discussion on ESN below) by taking formal employment. Interviews with various stakeholders (partners and government) revealed that some have the perception that refugees do not want to work. This perception of refugees may be due in part to the future uncertainty felt by refugees noted above, as well as to the differences in the work culture in Turkey. Interviews with PoC and partners reported, for example, that Turkish work culture involves longer hours in the average work day as compared to Syria. An FGD with PoC women explained that they cannot leave the house to work for the full day because of their duties to care for the children and the home, but finding formal part-time work with a flexible schedule is very difficult.

28. Multiple government agencies told the ET that they see the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), implemented by World Food Programme (WFP) through the national safety net programme and funded by ECHO, as an impediment to refugees seeking formal employment. One impediment to formal employment among many, of course, with the language barrier and the large informal sector being others. Specifically, KII with government reported that PoC in the ESSN have become accustomed to receiving aid and have the mindset that they do not need to work while in Turkey. FGDs with male PoC explained that they can earn more income for the household if they work informally while also receiving ESSN assistance as opposed to only having formal employment pay and losing the ESSN.

29. According to the ET’s interview with WFP, ESSN began distributions of multi-purpose cash in December 2016 to 1.4 million beneficiaries, identified as the most vulnerable households due to disability, the number of dependents in the household, female-headed households, among other criteria. Beneficiary families receive 120 Turkish Liras per family member²⁷ (equivalent to about 20 euros or 22 USD as of December 2018). In the interview, WFP recognized that some beneficiaries originally deemed vulnerable may be able to transition into livelihood opportunities, and that the cash transfer is indeed a barrier to those beneficiaries seeking self-reliance. How to deliver unrestricted cash to the most vulnerable while also encouraging others to take advantage of livelihood opportunities is an issue at the

²⁷ See: <https://www.essncard.com/about-card/>

policy level that WFP is thinking about. A summary report from FGD monitoring of ESSN beneficiaries in November 2017 shared with the ET found that the majority of participants identified not having work permits as the main barrier to accessing secure and well-paid jobs; they also raised concerns about losing their eligibility when obtaining legal residence and formal employment.²⁸ At the time of the evaluation, WFP reported that a large assessment was underway to guide the transition approach and new targeting guidelines for the ESSN; UNHCR’s role in this transition is discussed in Section 3.3.

3.2. Impact

Main findings: Impact

- **UNHCR supported thousands of refugees to find work and a sense of normalcy in life; according to PoC interviews, some programme participants feel better prepared for various durable solutions.**
- **One of the best ways to promote protection for refugees is through livelihoods, a theme that emerged across interviews with UNHCR staff, partners, government, and beneficiaries. In addition, protection, livelihoods, and social cohesion are closely linked.**
- **The most important contributions by UNHCR to refugee livelihoods through its catalytic role with government and private sector are not being captured in regular reporting.**

Finding on resilience:

- **The programme is contributing to strengthened absorptive and adaptive resilience capacities of beneficiary PoC and their households (see Annex 3).**

Livelihood outcomes: According to KIIs with government, partners and UNHCR staff, and programme documentation, thousands of refugees have accessed **work permits and jobs** through UNHCR’s advocacy and capacity building efforts. UNHCR worked with ISKUR to develop an informational campaign related to the work permit policies (see Box 2). The ET finds that because of UNHCR’s capacity building with ISKUR it contributed to the 43,232 Syrians total who have received work permits (of which UNHCR directly assisted nearly 2,000). These jobs are contributing to local economies and to the Turkish Social Security. In addition, through meetings, trainings, and speaking engagements, UNHCR has reached out to 1500 private companies. The jobs provide benefits, a minimum wage, and regular income; this job stability is very much appreciated, according to the refugee employees of a factor visited by the ET. As a result, the refugee employees and their families enjoy regular nutrition and sleep, a benefit reported by employees and factory management.

Box 2: Information provision for PoC, programme outputs

16,291 PoC in 2016 and **74,511 PoC** in 2017 were provided with guidance on labour market opportunities.

UNHCR Turkey (2018f). Indicator Aggregation Report.

“Life becomes normal for them.”

~Factory manager, on the impact of gaining formal employment for refugees

²⁸ WFP (2017).

30. Linking refugees to formal employment **fills needs in the labour market**. UNHCR's market assessments, conducted in coordination with government partners, focused on the value chains of industries who faced labour shortages such as in textiles, agriculture, furniture manufacturing, mechanics and automotive.²⁹ Despite high youth unemployment in Turkey and a high rate of informal employment, some industries cannot fill these jobs, which offer at least minimum wage and benefits. KII with private sector revealed that many Turks do not want factory or manufacturing jobs. According to KII with government and private sector, there is potential to expand refugee jobs in more factories, the greatest barrier being that companies do not know how to hire refugees, guidance that could be provided by UNHCR. Yet, through KIIs corroborated with discussions with programme staff, the ET finds that the livelihood team lacks the staff to be able to sufficiently follow up with these companies.

31. Another impact of the private sector partnerships is the **corporate social accountability** built with big brands and extended to other retailers, with the support of the Fair Labour Association.³⁰ The "brands" working group meets on their own volition to find ways to support Syrian refugees in Turkey (refer to Box 1), and they welcome ongoing guidance from UNHCR, e.g., on targeting women refugees.

32. In 2017, UNHCR supported the **first grant programme for refugee entrepreneurs in Turkey**, implemented through their partner Habitat. The programme provided incubator workshops, trainings on various business development topics, licensing and other supports: 361 grants were awarded and 116 businesses formed.³¹ In total, from the timeframe of 2010-2018, the GoT licensed 7,664 Syrian-owned businesses, 3,687 Iranian-owned businesses, and 1,749 Iraqi-owned businesses. In 2017, Building Markets and Syrian Economic Forum conducted a market assessment of small and medium enterprises owned by Syrians in Turkey.³² The study found that Syrian-owned businesses are contributing to local economies in significant ways: Syrians have invested approximately US\$ 334 million into formal companies since 2011; the average business employs 9.4 people, most employees of whom worked previously in the informal sector; and 76 per cent of the interviewed businesses intend to keep their businesses in Turkey even after the war ends, but also plan to expand to Syria.

33. The ET conducted three IDIs with entrepreneurial beneficiaries identified as positive deviants by programme partners. They were not yet positive deviants because of business success, as they were still completing or new graduates of the training programmes. The ET observed a pattern of capacities across the IDI that would support them on a resilience pathway:

- all had **access to capital** through family or other assets that would help them start a business;
- all possessed the **confidence to adapt** and the willingness to learn new skills and language; and
- all had **aspirations to expand** their businesses both in Turkey and in Syria when the war is over.

34. Annex 4 provides an example of one of these stories of a young Syrian man who is being training in the FAO programme and plans to start a flower business.

35. **Improved social cohesion**: There is the positive unintended result of building social cohesion and bridging social capital³³ with the interactions between Turks and refugees in the workplace, as reported by refugee and host community beneficiaries, as well as KIIs with partners and private sector. Employers interviewed report that the diversified workplace improves productivity for all workers and

²⁹ UNHCR Turkey (2018b).

³⁰ FLA conducts outreach with member companies around supply chains and labour rights. They do the auditing and compliance, and hold brands accountable for supply chain working conditions, according to the interview with FLA.

³¹ UNHCR Turkey (2017).

³² Ucak, S. et al (2017).

³³ From Annex 4: Bridging social capital for this evaluation means ties to the host community, indicating greater social inclusion. e.g., those with social ties outside their immediate community can draw on these links when local resources are insufficient or unavailable. Some PoC may depend on remittances, which is also a form of this social capital.

social cohesion between Turks and refugees. A factory manager told the ET a story about workers in the factory who held a football match every year. The first year that refugees entered the factory, teams were formed around nationality (e.g., Turkish team v. Syrian team), but by the next year, the employees opted to integrate the teams. Indeed, interviews with host community members, private sector, partners, and refugees reported that the mixed work environment was the first time they had the chance to interact with one another, thereby reducing social stigma held by both groups. Similarly, these interviews explained that supporting refugee business owners to obtain licenses and permits through municipalities reduced tensions among Turkish business owners who suspected refugee businesses were not paying taxes.

Box 3: Social cohesion

Interviews with host community members, private sector, and refugees reported that the work environment was the **first time they had the chance to interact** with one another.

36. **Protection outcomes:** According to KII with UNHCR staff, government, and partners, and FGDs with PoC, the ET finds that livelihoods are a significant contributor to protection for refugees in Turkey. The safety and dignity of refugees is ensured when their self-reliance comes from livelihood opportunities that are sustainable, safe, and fair. The risks of labour exploitation and abuse are greatly reduced in the formal sector. UNHCR's focus on livelihoods creates an entrée to government and the private sector, building good relations to enable them to also uphold protections in the long term. And as noted above, the livelihoods work promotes social cohesion, reducing social tensions or resentment by host communities. Istanbul field office staff describe how they work closely with religious leaders and neighbourhood heads on protection issues, and they had a "mind-set shift" to always include livelihoods information in their community trainings because they see protection, livelihoods, and social cohesion as linked. Ankara protection staff noted that as a result of their functioning internal referral pathway between the protection and livelihood teams, 39 protection cases have been referred to the livelihoods team; they were able to find and keep jobs since February 2017. This also demonstrates the importance of this programme in building absorptive resilience capacity, that is, the capacity of households and communities to face stressors (including protection issues) and not resort to negative coping strategies.³⁴ UNHCR's integrated protection and livelihoods work involving community leaders ensures the basic needs and protections are assured for the most vulnerable refugee households.

37. **Resilience and self-reliance building:** In all, the improved skills and human capital of PoC, access to diversified livelihood opportunities and stable income, and strengthened social capital are all ways the programme has strengthened the adaptive resilience capacity of refugees.³⁵

38. **Contribution to durable solutions:** While the ET recognizes the evidence is anecdotal, the FGDs and IDIs with refugees participating in the programme revealed a theme of double impact related to durable solutions: i.e., some refugees, youth in particular, report feeling more prepared for various durable solutions, from local integration to voluntary return if that becomes an option. They could envision continuing their life in Turkey or applying their new skills or business back in Syria if that were a possibility. This was particularly evident in an IDI with a young architect who was trained in Aleppo, but fled to Turkey nearly seven years ago when the fighting started. He is a graduate of Habitat's entrepreneurship program, funded by UNHCR. He is currently developing a business in Turkey, which he hopes can support the rebuilding of Syria someday. UNHCR Turkey's draft livelihood strategy reports that the only viable durable solution currently is resettlement to a third country, and this is very limited; local

³⁴ Absorptive capacity refers to the ability of households and communities to minimize exposure to shocks if possible and to recover quickly after exposure. Definition adapted from Béné, C. et al (2015).

³⁵ Adaptive capacity is the ability of households and communities to make active and informed choices about their lives and diversified livelihood strategies based on changing conditions. Definition adapted from Béné, C. et al (2015).

integration is occurring in practice despite the temporary status of Syrians, and voluntary repatriation is not currently achievable.³⁶

39. **Unmeasured results:** UNHCR Turkey has played a catalytic role in refugee livelihoods, which will be discussed in the next section (3.3 Relevance of UNHCR's Role). The ET finds that the most important contributions by UNHCR to refugee livelihoods are not being captured in regular monitoring and reporting. This is due, in part, to the monitoring system oriented toward measuring intervention results that are either directly implemented by UNHCR or through funded partners. The recent Turkey factsheet on livelihoods achievements, for instance, focuses on the outputs of implementing partners (e.g., "Over 360 refugees received entrepreneurship grant");³⁷ the numbers appear low, indeed, because the work by funded partners is only one component of UNHCR's strategy in country. The Focus Data are primarily output indicators and limited in showing meaningful outcome or impact results. For example, Focus Data indicators include: Number of PoC receiving life-skills training for livelihood purposes, language training, and entrepreneurship training; number of PoC provided with guidance on business market opportunities; and indicators on access to education and basic needs. There is a need for UNHCR to explore how to report on the larger-scale, yet indirect, results of UNHCR's capacity building and facilitator role.

40. Through the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as the livelihood sector lead, has aggregated listings of projects and assessments conducted by livelihood actors, though the listings reviewed by the ET do not include a complete profile of UNHCR's livelihood programme and is missing their facilitative work with MoFLSS and ISKUR.³⁸ A livelihood sector logframe with a resilience component was recently developed, which may provide the potential for joint monitoring. The main objective indicators for the logframe are (i) improved employability and (ii) income for Syrian and host community households.

3.3. Relevance of UNHCR's role

Main findings: Relevance

- **UNHCR's role as catalytic facilitator is the best fit for a context with political and economic environments amenable to refugee economic inclusion, and it aligns with global priorities such as the Global Compact on Refugees and CRRF.**
- **UNHCR's comparative advantage in livelihoods is knowing refugees.**
 - **This is a key strength recognized by partners and stakeholders, but that should be better utilized through partnerships with other United Nations agencies and development actors responding to the refugee crisis.**
- **There is room for improved coordination and partnership between UNHCR and other United Nations agencies and with The World Bank. The ET finds it is critical that UNHCR is the liaison between refugees and other United Nations agencies, partners, government, and private sector in this phase of the response.**

Finding on resilience:

- **UNHCR has an important role in building capacity of government to work with refugees in the long term and to promote protection under the legal framework. This contributes to the transformative resilience capacity of PoC (see Annex 3).**

³⁶ UNHCR Turkey (2016, draft).

³⁷ UNHCR Turkey (2018e).

³⁸ UNDP (2018).

- **UNHCR also can play a key role among various actors (UN agencies, development actors, government, etc.) to ensure an integrated approach for building absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities.**

41. **Deciding on the role:** It is through the partnership mapping of the MC process in 2014-2015 that UNHCR realized that few other actors were focused on refugee livelihoods at that time. UNHCR started focusing on livelihoods when others were not and has gained a lot of respect because of this. The head of the livelihood team brought her previous development and private sector experience to the position, and she determined that UNHCR would be most effective as a “bridge” to support refugees in accessing government support and private sector opportunities for livelihoods (see quote below).

“From the development point of view, be the bridge. Help them see there is a need, there is supply for their need, then bring in the partners.” ~UNHCR livelihood staff

42. **Facilitator role:** UNHCR’s role is as a catalytic facilitator, facilitating adaptation and integration between refugees and the labour market. This entails doing advocacy with government to ensure refugee inclusion into programmes, raising awareness among the private sector, and ensuring vocational training centres exist where there is industry need; but this also means undertaking the more simplistic task of helping to translate key employment-related documents, policies, or curriculum into Arabic for information campaigns. This role is aligned with UNHCR’s global positioning around the Global Compact for Refugees and CRRF. As demonstrated by the strong relationship with ISKUR (government employment agency) voiced during interviews, UNHCR has supported them in developing their social policies that integrate both refugee and market needs; ISKUR is now better prepared to counsel and match refugees to job openings through their nationwide system. This work with government and national systems directly strengthens transformative resilience capacity.³⁹

43. **UNHCR’s comparative advantage in this role:** A key reason that UNHCR is the best fit for this role is because UNHCR *knows* refugees. This is an important capacity that UNHCR brings to the table in partnerships with government, United Nations agencies, host communities, and other partners. UNHCR is best positioned to do advocacy and awareness-raising about/with refugees among government and private sector. The MoFLSS, for instance, expressed the desire to conduct more joint assessments with UNHCR and recognizes they are a partner with both “the eyes on the ground” and with the big picture of the refugee situation. The ongoing verification exercise by the GoT will enable further government collaboration with UNHCR such as planning future trainings, among other activities. UNHCR has also found a niche in this context by developing in-depth knowledge about the government policies and processes for accessing work permits and trade/technical certifications. UNHCR thus has an important role in building capacity of government to work with refugees and to promote protection under the legal framework.

44. **Strategic positioning moving forward:** According to KII with government, UNHCR staff, and partners, the ET finds United Nations agencies could enhance their work together on livelihoods. UNHCR attends meetings together with WFP, International Labour Organization (ILO), and UNDP. UNHCR has provided guidance related to refugee programming to these agencies, but formal partnerships or joint programming efforts have not been arranged. The UNHCR livelihoods team has important expertise and experience to share on livelihoods and social protection in the transition strategy of the ESSN. While

³⁹ Transformative capacity relates to system-level changes that ensures sustained resilience, including formal safety nets, access to markets, infrastructure, and basic services. Definition adapted from Béné, C. et al (2015).

UNHCR has been consulted by WFP in the process, it may be possible for UNHCR to join as a partner in the next phase of the activity. The ET finds the livelihoods team also has an important role to play in the 3RP sector coordination and the Syria Task Force, and the CO should ensure this team has a seat at the table in discussions on how the larger refugee livelihoods strategy in country moves forward. Lastly, UNHCR could pursue a strategic partnership with The World Bank, who has been conducting research related to PoC in Turkey and recently approved a project to work on business development and entrepreneurship for Syrians and Turkish citizens.⁴⁰ This could bolster UNHCR's ability to conduct research while UNHCR provides the expertise on refugee livelihoods and protection programming.⁴¹

3.4. Sustainability and scalability

Main findings: Sustainability and Scalability

- **There is huge potential for UNHCR's approach to move toward increased sustainability and scale in the coming years, and this potential is largely through non-funded partners.**

Finding on resilience:

- **Building ownership of programme activities by government and other partners is key for moving to sustainability and scale, as well as to building transformative capacity.**

45. **Pathway to sustainability and scale:** UNHCR's catalytic approach focuses on market-driven access to jobs and ongoing advocacy. As long as the political and economic environments remain friendly to refugee livelihoods, this is a sustainable approach. The livelihood team needs to develop a multi-year strategy for how to move the programme more in the direction of sustainability and scalability over the coming years. See Figure 2 in Annex 5 for a model that shows the livelihood programme activities in relation to the pathway to achieve scale. The model shows that to achieve job placement or business development for refugees, UNHCR supports the following complimentary set of activities: Employee recruitment (through ISKUR and job counsellors), vocational and language trainings (through municipalities, MoNE, etc.), access to technical certifications (VQAs) and business licensing (MoCT), ensuring private sector readiness (through the Big Brands, chambers, etc.), working on empowering messaging to address mind-set barriers for PoC (with Protection, and applies to the ESSN), and conducting ongoing advocacy; UNHCR provides awareness-raising across these activities.

46. The current programme activities that are the 'case management' approach are the least sustainable (e.g., paying individual work permits and case by case job referrals or entrepreneur mentoring, not including the most vulnerable/protection cases). These activities are time-intensive for staff and implemented both by funded partners and UNHCR's small team. Too much focus on these activities prevents results at scale. The ET finds that the NGO partners are doing commendable work, but they will not achieve scale with these activities unless they support institutional partners to absorb the activities. UNHCR's non-funded partners have the largest potential for sustained activities and impact at scale: i.e., UNHCR trained 300 ISKUR staff in well-rounded topics from refugee protection to communication skills, and this included 81 provincial staff. ISKUR provided employment opportunities for one million people in 2017, including refugees; this pathway has great potential to increase job placement for the two million refugees of working age.

47. **Government ownership is key:** The capacity building and collaboration that UNHCR has with ISKUR, MoFLSS, MoAF, among others provides a model for other countries to follow. It has also given the GoT a leadership position with the upcoming Global Refugees and Employment Summit.

⁴⁰ World Bank (2018).

⁴¹ Note: the ET's interview with World Bank in Turkey was cancelled due to scheduling issues.

“There is a Turkish saying, ‘You will not have Spring with only one flower.’ We need sustainability and continuation of success.” ~ISKUR (related to desire for increased collaboration with UNHCR to provide services in refugee areas)

4. Summary of evaluation question findings

KEQ 1: Effectiveness

48. The ET believes the UNHCR Turkey livelihood programme is a flagship operation for livelihoods for many reasons: e.g., it conducts joint assessments with government, the jobs are market driven, it has continuous dialogue with government in terms of advocacy on key issues (e.g., the legal framework for protection, economic, financial, and social inclusion), it focuses on capacity building and awareness raising among government and private sector, and it provides training opportunities on protection with the government, private sector, and other community stakeholders. Through the efforts of this programme, the government and private sector have been supported to provide thousands of jobs for refugees, building their adaptive and transformative resilience capacities. In turn, these jobs/and businesses in the formal sector help refugees take care of their families and return to a sense of normalcy in their lives, as well as improve social cohesion both among PoC and between Turks and PoC. These outcomes strengthen the absorptive resilience capacity of PoC and their households (see Annex 3).

49. The ET concludes the livelihood team needs better data on direct and indirect refugee employment results, which will help the team better capture their impact, and they can support the government to do this better.

KEQ 2: Minimum Criteria

50. There are several components of the MC for Livelihoods Programming that were useful in the design of the programme. The market and value chain analyses required by the MC before programme start-up are helpful in creating demand-driven training opportunities. The partnership mapping led UNHCR to see their role in livelihoods before many were involved.

51. In a context where PoC are only surveyed through the GoT, the livelihood team could not collect its own quantitative primary data. Future livelihood programming criteria should be more flexible to consider this reality; the livelihood team has indeed been able to contribute to large-scale government data collection efforts and will be able to access the data through this partnership. Additionally, in a one-year programme cycle, impact measurement for livelihoods is also very difficult (if not, arguably, impossible).

KEQ 3: UNHCR’s Role

52. The ET finds UNHCR Turkey’s comparative advantage as a livelihoods actor and facilitator includes: Joint assessments and data sharing with government; UNHCR providing the refugee focus and expertise for government and development actors; and ensuring capacity building and good communication and coordination with government, private sector, and partners. UNHCR is positioned to continue doing important advocacy on refugee-related policies.

53. UNHCR’s role also involves strategic engagement with other partners, including United Nations agencies to ensure the livelihoods approach is not just United Nations as “one” but the whole-of-society⁴²

⁴² The “whole-of-society” approach is promoted in the recent Concept Note by HQ Livelihoods: UNHCR (2018g).

as one. There is opportunity for UNHCR to be more strategic in its engagement with other United Nations agencies such as doing joint advocacy with UNDP.

5. Programme-specific recommendations

Recommendations for UNHCR Turkey livelihoods team: (to be implemented by mid-2019)

- I. **Revise Multi-Year Livelihoods Strategy.** The livelihood team should use findings from this evaluation to revise a multi-year Livelihoods Strategy for the next three years. There should be a strategic focus moving toward state integration and hand-over, and private sector expansion. There should be a **strategic shift away from the case management approach** within this three years (note: support for the most vulnerable cases in coordination with Protection should be continued), and this includes moving NGO partners to be facilitators with government both for entrepreneurship projects and vocational trainings. Additionally, the CO should work with HQ on piloting a three-year livelihood programme.
- II. **External coordination.** There are several opportunities to promote better coordination involving the livelihood team: 1) UNHCR has a significant role to play in sector coordination, and can help position the government for co-chair of 3RP livelihood sector. 2) The livelihood team should be represented on the Syria Task Force when relevant discussions are scheduled. 3) The livelihood team should be engaged with the transition strategy and phasing out of the ESSN programme.
- III. **Small improvements to vocational training activities and enhanced coordination.** As vocational trainings are increasingly handed over to new and existing partners per Rec. I, above, UNHCR should continue to advocate for training coordination with partners and 3RP actors. The livelihood team should review and seek to harmonize the stipends provided across vocational trainings. There is also the need for better communication and linkages between the vocational training projects/sites to give PoC access to trainings based on their previous skills or experience (i.e., to address mismatch of skills in different provinces).
- IV. **Internal promotion.** The livelihood team needs opportunities for internal advocacy, to promote understanding of the programme approach and build connections within the office. This could be through “brown bag”⁴³ discussions, information provided in a CO newsletter, etc.

Recommendations for CO management and other CO units (with management support): (to be implemented by mid-2019)

- V. **For: Management.** The livelihood team should expand. Three positions are needed for: intensive engagement with the private sector; for ramped up capacity building of ISKUR/MoFLSS so they can expand; and for support to an increased number of municipalities to combine protection and livelihood activities.
- VI. **For: Programmes team.** The programmes and livelihoods teams should review the results framework/monitoring of achievements for livelihood activities revising these tools to better capture the catalytic and multi-year approach.
- VII. **For: Procurement.** Procurement procedures for hiring national technical staff or consultants for vocational trainings need to be flexible in order to provide salaries and recruit proficient trainers at the necessary technical level (positions that will be paid by UNHCR until handover to partners is complete).

⁴³ “A brown bag meeting, or a brown bag seminar, is an informal meeting that occurs around lunchtime.” See: <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brown-bag-meeting.asp>

- VIII. **For: CBI.** A CO-level internal plan is needed on financial inclusion strategies such as how to leverage cash in the bank to allow beneficiaries access to additional financial services. CBI should be monitored for impacts and process related to this strategy.

Recommendations for CO livelihood team: (to be implemented *IF* team is expanded and/or funding for three-year pilot is established)

- IX. **Develop information dissemination strategy.** Information dissemination on work permits can be greatly expanded to refugees (addressing misconceptions) and private sector. This includes supporting the “Brands” working group to be expanded.
- X. **Further study on barriers to work.** The livelihood team should consider a study, which may be conducted jointly with relevant partners, on refugee barriers and misconceptions to joining the workforce, particularly for women, as well as for PoC with countries of origin other than Syria.
- XI. **Continued advocacy is needed.** The livelihood team should continue advocacy, such as related to the following: to allow refugees of other nationalities the same benefits, to expand work permits beyond one year, to increase transparency on how permanent residency or citizenship can be obtained, etc.

6. Conclusions to contribute to overall livelihood strategy

Note: these final points will contribute to the strategic recommendations provided in the centralized evaluation report, but as such, they are not written to be specific recommendations.

54. The **catalytic role of this programme is a model** for longer term and larger livelihoods impact. The programme wisely resisted the “hairdresser” approach and kept a larger strategy in mind, building bridges with government systems and private sector stakeholders. This aligns with UNHCR’s global positioning around refugee economic inclusion and with the recent 2019-2023 Global Strategy Concept Note. The learning and achievements of the Turkey livelihoods programme could be applied to other programmes with an enabling environment. The UNHCR Turkey livelihoods team should be utilized to share learnings in other relevant operational contexts.

55. This is a flagship context to pilot a **multi-year and multi-partner (MYMP) livelihood programme**. Livelihood programming should be removed from the OL budget, shifting it to be project-based and multi-year, possibly with trust funds. There is huge potential to unleash in a programme like this, but it depends on the MYMP investment. This shift is only possible if UNHCR’s contribution to livelihoods, refugee resilience and self-reliance is understood as a critical part of the overall operational strategy **by management at various levels** of HQ, RO and CO.

56. The programme demonstrates how **“HQ to HQ” leverage** can better enable programme partnerships. For instance, UNHCR’s HQ-level partnership with institutions like World Bank or other financial or private institutions can support country-level partnership and coordination. In addition, how the **Partnership Policy** is implemented by operations to effectively select non-traditional or new partners should be reviewed.

57. Finally, this case study demonstrates how refugee **protection is promoted in the long term** through a livelihoods and development approach.

Annex 1: References

- Aldrich, D. (2012). *Building resilience: Social capital in post-disaster recovery*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Asylum Information Database (AIDA) and European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) (2018). Introduction to the asylum context in Turkey, accessed 10 December. Retrieved from: <https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/introduction-asylum-context-turkey>
- Béné, C., T. Frankenberger and S. Nelson (2015). *Design, Monitoring and Evaluation of Resilience Interventions: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations*. Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Working Paper, Volume 2015 (Issue No. 459), July.
- Turkish Labor law (2016). Turkey grants work permit for Syrian refugees (and other pages on the site), accessed 10 December. Retrieved from: <https://turkishlaborlaw.com/news/legal-news/362-turkey-grants-work-permit-for-syrian-refugees>
- Ucak, S., Jennifer Holt and Kavya Raman, (2017). *Another side of the story: A market assessment of Syrian SMEs in Turkey*. Produced by Building Markets and Syrian Economic Forum.
- UNDP, (2018). Livelihood Sector Excel documents shared with ET: Logframe-final, LH assessment reports, Livelihood Projects-final (11092018), and partners mapping table-final (11092018).
- UNHCR, (2018). *Refugee Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion: 2019-2023 Global Strategy Concept Note*, October. Provided by Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion Unit, Geneva.
- UNHCR Operations Portal, (2018). Syria Regional Refugee Response, 27 Sept. Retrieved from: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria#_ga=2.125137417.2096875853.1531348210-324365210.1528217248
- UNHCR, (2017). *Expanding Partnerships*. Global Report 2017.
- UNHCR, (2013). *Selection and Retention of Partners for Project Partnership Agreements*. Implementing Partnership Management Guidance Note No. 1, July. UNHCR/FP/S1-2.
- UNHCR Turkey, (2018a). *Key Facts and Figures*. March.
- UNHCR Turkey, (2018b). Turkey Operation Livelihoods Interventions. PPT for Evaluation Inception Meeting, 12 July.
- UNHCR Turkey, (2018c). Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey, accessed 13 July. Retrieved from: <http://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey>
- UNHCR Turkey, (2018d). *Turkey: Self-reliance and Livelihoods*. May.
- UNHCR Turkey, (2018e). *Turkey: Self-reliance and Livelihoods*. August.
- UNHCR Turkey, (2018f). Indicator Aggregation Report. Excel “Focus Data” provided to the evaluation team, August.
- UNHCR Turkey, (2017). Livelihood Activities, 29 November. PowerPoint.
- UNHCR Turkey, (2016). MC Compliance Plan 2016. Excel spreadsheet provided to the evaluation team.
- UNHCR Turkey, (2016, draft). Turkey Livelihoods Strategy 2016 Draft.
- WFP, (2017). ESSN – Focus Group Discussions, Summary Report. November 2017.
- World Bank, (2018). Turkey Overview. Country Context/ Projects & Programs, accessed 12 December. Retrieved from: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey>
- 3RP, (2018). *Regional, Refugee and Resilience Plan 2018-2019*. In Response to the Syria Crisis. Strategic Overview.

Annex 2: Interview Lists

Key informants

List of persons and institutions consulted.

Note: both individual and small group interviews were conducted

Total Number Key Informants: 52 (30 male/22 female)

STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION- KEY INFORMANTS				
Name	Male (M)/ Female (F)	Title	Date (Day/ Month/ Year)	Location
UNHCR CO				
Jean-Marie Garelli	1M	UNHCR Turkey Deputy Representative	10/09/18	Ankara
Katharina Lumpp	1F	UNHCR Turkey Representative	10/09/18	Ankara
Margarita Vargas Angulo (Asst Rep for Operations), Hamed Barekzai (Prog Officer), Yasin Tamer (Prog Associate), Iraj Imomberdiev (Sr Prog Officer), Livio Mercurio (CBI Officer), Yunus Emre Gercek (CBI Asst), Irina Isomova (Protection Officer), Hassan Abdalla (Sr Supply Officer), Gaye Ulutas Khanal (Asst Supply Officer)	3F/6M	UNHCR Turkey: Group discussion with protection, supply, programme, and CBI units, and assistant representative	10/09/18	Ankara
Damla Taskin, Cansu Gungor, Imren Arslanoglu	3F	Briefing by Livelihoods Unit	10/09/18 (through-out mission)	Ankara
Elif Selen Ay, Ipek Miscioglu Kuruuzum	2F	UNHCR Istanbul: Head of Field Office, Senior Protection Assistant	12/09/18	Istanbul
Government stakeholders and partners				
Sadettin Akyil	1M	MoFLSS: Director General of International Labour Force	11/09/18	Ankara
Askin Toren	1M	ISKUR: Head of Department	11/09/18	Ankara
Ismail Ozdogan and 3 colleagues Adem Ceylan	5M	VQA: Head of International Relations and team, and visit with President	11/09/18	Ankara
Emre Keskin (Project Manager), Nilay Kantarcioğlu (ABB Project), Yakup Yildiz (ABB), Derya Kandur Ozbay (ABB), Emire Ozdemir (ABB), Emnah Metin (ABB), Dilek Korukcu	4F/4M	Ankara Municipality Vocational Training Centre	17/09/18	Ankara

(Project Asst), Deniz Erdogan (Project Asst)				
Arif Abali and Halil Okur, Mehmet Akbaş, Barış Kılınç, Mustafa Nevzat Zayim	4M	MoAF: Deputy Provincial Director and staff	18/09/18	Mersin
NGOs, UN Agencies, Donors				
Alpay Celikel	1M	Global Operations Manager, Fair Labour Association (FLA)	12/09/18	Istanbul
Seval Kalkan, Mustafa Ozer	1F/1M	HABITAT: IMECE Programme Director, Grants and Finance Coordinator	14/09/18	Istanbul
Cagatay Cebi, Sheikh Ahaduzzaman, Aysegul Selisik, And 2 other colleagues	2F/3M	FAO: Livestock Expert, Programme Officer, Assistant FAO Representative, other team members	17/09/18	Ankara
Leontine Specker, Ozlem Cavusoglu	2F	UNDP: Resilience Advisor and Livelihoods Sector Coordinator	17/09/18	Ankara
Sebnem KOC, Louise Guibal-Engler, Alex Davies, Merve Kara	3F/1M	ACTED: Livelihood Project Manager, Project Development Officer, Area Coordinator, and Livelihoods Project Officer	18/09/18	Mersin
Homaira Sikandary	1F	WFP, Programme Policy Officer	16/10/18	Skype
Private Sector Partners or Finance Institutions				
Selcuk Sen	1M	Gezer Shoe Factory: Deputy General Manager	12/09/18	Istanbul
Olgun Aydin	1M	Manager of Supply Chain Sustainability, PUMA/ Brands Group	13/09/18	Istanbul

Beneficiary interviews

Beneficiary Interviews Summary:

Total number of beneficiary interviewees: 53 (33 males, 20 females)

Type if applicable (e.g., entrepreneur group)	# of participants	# of males	# of females	Date (D/M/Y)	Location
FGDs (all with refugees unless indicated otherwise)					
Gezer Shoe Factory: brief discussion with refugee employees	5	5	0	13/09/18	Istanbul
HABITAT Accelerator phase II participants	6	4	2	13/09/18	Istanbul
Ankara Language Centre- men's group	5	5	0	17/09/18	Ankara
Ankara Language Centre- women's group	4	0	4	17/09/18	Ankara
ACTED vocational training (textiles)- women's group	4	0	4	18/09/18	Mersin
ACTED vocational training (textiles)- men's group	5	5	0	18/09/18	Mersin
FAO training- women's group	5	0	5	18/09/18	Mersin
FAO training- men's group	10	10	0	18/09/18	Mersin
FAO training- host community beneficiary group	6	2	4	18/09/18	Mersin
IDIs					
HABITAT entrepreneur – current- IDI	1	0	1	13/09/18	Istanbul
HABITAT entrepreneur – graduated- IDI	1	1	0	14/09/18	Istanbul
FAO training – current - IDI	1	1	0	18/09/18	Mersin

Annex 3: Resilience capacity indicator examples

1. **Absorptive capacity is the:** Ability of households and communities to minimize exposure to shocks if possible and to recover quickly after exposure.

- Informal Safety Nets (e.g., involvement in savings groups, *zakat*, mutual help groups, civic or charitable groups, religious groups, women's groups)
- Asset Ownership (e.g., productive assets and livestock gained through the programme)
- Local shock preparedness plan or protection structures in place and disaster risk reduction (DRR) (e.g., awareness of disaster preparedness plans (for natural hazards) and about their awareness of how to prevent protection risks such as SGBV trainings or through conflict management committees, or how to report abuses.
- Household savings (e.g., use savings to cope with shock, not negative coping strategies such as distress sale of productive assets, withdrawing children from school to work, or taking on consumptive debt)
- Bonding Social Capital (e.g., connected to informal safety nets, above, it is seen in the bonds between community members. It involves principles and norms such as trust, reciprocity and cooperation, and is often drawn on in the emergency context, where PoC work closely to help each other to cope and recover)

2. **Adaptive capacity is the:** Ability of households and communities to make pro-active and informed choices about their lives and their diversified livelihood strategies based on changing conditions.


- Livelihood diversity (e.g., what have been the opportunities for PoC to diversity their livelihoods and income sources? What livelihoods can be sustained in the face of different kinds of risks/shocks?) and asset ownership (same as above)
- Human capital (e.g., basic literacy, primary or higher education, trainings received)
- Access to financial services (e.g., access to bank accounts, loans, micro-credit)
- Psychosocial adaptations (e.g., confidence, perceived ability to adapt and be self-reliant)
- Bridging social capital with the host community and to others in different risk environments (e.g., those with social ties outside their immediate community can draw on these links when local resources are insufficient or unavailable. Some PoC may heavily depend on remittances, for example. For this evaluation, it may also mean ties to the host community indicating greater social inclusion.)

3. **Transformative capacity is the:** System-level changes that ensure sustained resilience, including formal safety nets, access to markets, infrastructure, and basic services.

- Access to basic services (e.g., nearby health centre, primary school, security services, etc.)
- Policy changes regarding work permits and mobility.
- Access to formal safety nets (government, NGO, or UN- provided food or cash assistance for relief or for the most vulnerable)
- Access to infrastructure (e.g., water and sewerage systems, shelter, electricity, telecommunications, paved roads)
- [For rural areas] Access to livestock services or natural resources (e.g., grazing land)
- Access to markets (e.g., regulations and policies allow PoC to access work permits, land, formal employment in all sectors)
- Linking social capital (e.g., a refugee group leader is designated to participate in local government decision making)

An example of how resilience capacities apply to the Turkey livelihoods programme is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: UNHCR Turkey livelihoods programme contributions to resilience capacity



Source: TANGO International, an example and “working” model developed by the ET during fieldwork.

Annex 4: Positive deviant refugee story

Turkey: a young refugee's story of diversifying his livelihood skills and planning for the future



Age

0-28 Yosef* was born in Syria. He completed college and studied English. After his studies, he was married and had one child. He owned a business designing greeting cards and also worked as an Arabic-English translator. This **business and language background** would indeed be useful in his future.



29-31 He fled Syria with his family about five years ago. He travelled through Turkey to Germany, hoping to reach relatives who lived in Germany. Yet, because Yosef was not authorized to be there, he was held in a camp for unauthorized migrants for two and a half years.

Germany eventually sent him back to Turkey.



32-35 **Confidence to adapt:** Yosef was able to join the FAO agricultural training project. He wanted to go into the flower business and saw an opportunity through the training to learn a new profession. He is currently in the training and **working hard to learn Turkish**, which he knows is vital to his future business.



When the training is over, Yosef plans to set up a greenhouse and **develop his flower business** in Turkey, which he believes has the most potential for success. For **start-up capital**, he is selling a house he owns in Syria.




Aspirations for the future: When the war is over, Yosef has developed a business plan to expand into Syria. He plans on going back and forth from Turkey to Syria to further develop this business.

*Name changed

Annex 5: UNHCR Turkey pathways to scale

Figure 2: UNHCR Turkey pathways to success and scale



Source: TANGO International, an example and “working” model developed by the ET during fieldwork.

Annex 6: Photos



Photo 1: Employment kiosk at ISKUR to assist refugees. [Note: All photos in this annex were taken by the evaluation team, with the exception of Photo 1, which was provided by the CO livelihoods team.]



Photo 2: Warning signs translated into Arabic at shoe factory employing Syrian refugees.



Photo 3: Future site of the Ankara Municipality vocational training centre for refugees.




Photo 4: The ET listens to the business pitch of a HABITAT entrepreneurship training programme participant.




Photo 5: Vocational training in textiles in Mersin.



Photo 6: Poster at the UNHCR Istanbul office linking livelihoods with long-term sustainability and protection.