

Consultant's Report on

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Improving the Effectiveness of  
UNHCR's Evaluation Function

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**Simon Lawry-White**

**Vine Management Consulting**

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Commentary**

The Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU) commissioned a brief review of recent developments in UNHCR's evaluation structure and practices, looking for further guidance on how UNHCR can strengthen its evaluation function.

UNHCR has made progress in the last year in establishing the EPAU and increasing the scale and range of evaluation activity. The EPAU has more personnel and a larger consultancy budget than pre 1999 but this is still inadequate to provide a basic minimum level of accountability for UNHCR operations.

A new approach to evaluation based on transparency, independence, consultation and relevance has been introduced. Evaluation reports have been declassified and are now published in full on the Internet. Donors and NGOs appreciate this new openness.

It is still early days but overall the work of the EPAU is viewed favourably within UNHCR.

UNHCR has set up an Evaluation Committee, which is yet to meet, but which has the potential to tie evaluations and their findings more closely into the Oversight function of the organisation.

The Kosovo evaluation was significant because it shows UNHCR management, perhaps for the first time, making a systematic response to a major evaluation exercise. This may be an exception as interviews with UNHCR staff and other stakeholders show that the climate of accountability within the organisation is generally weak. A few key donors continue to be concerned about the lack of a plan for strengthening the evaluation function across UNHCR's operations. Without further initiatives, UNHCR will continue to find these donors critical of its evaluation practices.

Staff are frustrated that staff rotation disrupts personal and organisational learning and that the same mistakes seem to be repeated. While UNHCR paints itself as a learning organisation, advances in this direction are modest judging by comments both from staff and outsiders. Against this backdrop, the impact and therefore value of evaluations will remain limited.

The level of understanding of, and engagement with, evaluation by operations staff is very low. Evaluation is seen as the job of EPAU and is not taken seriously as a management responsibility by the majority of UNHCR managers, including senior managers.

UNHCR can and should strengthen its evaluation function by adding limited extra resources into EPAU and bureau-managed evaluation budgets. More importantly, the pressing need is for forward planning, the introduction of new management requirements for evaluation, and the development of the understanding and skills of operations managers to both self-evaluate and to commission external evaluations.

**Summary of Principal Recommendations for Improving UNHCR’s Evaluation Function**

Refer to	Principal Recommendation
Section 2.2	UNHCR to adopt a broad definition for Evaluation and encourage a variety of approaches
Section 3.2	UNHCR to adopt the following goals for its evaluation practice: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ UNHCR will undertake more evaluations of its operations and make better use of them for accountability and learning</li> <li>◆ Operations managers will take increasing responsibility for initiating and managing evaluations</li> <li>◆ Evaluation findings will be followed up by the designated evaluation project owner</li> <li>◆ UNHCR will disseminate the findings of evaluations more widely and feed them into policy development</li> </ul>
Section 3.3	UNHCR to adopt 4 components to deliver a strengthened evaluation function: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Outreach to bureaux and field programmes, explaining what evaluation is and its benefits</li> <li>◆ Building commitment by showing examples of good practice, and through senior management leadership</li> <li>◆ Management rules for how many evaluations of what types should be conducted</li> <li>◆ Resources placed in EPAU and in the regional bureaux (in the first instance) dedicated to evaluation, with EPAU and each bureau developing an annual evaluation plan.</li> </ul>
Section 3.4	UNHCR to adopt and publish a plan for the next three years for a phased approach to the decentralisation of responsibilities for evaluation. This plan to be marketed to obtain additional donor funding for evaluation.
Section 3.6	UNHCR’s Evaluation Committee Terms of Reference to be revisited and strengthened. Each regional bureau to be represented on the Committee. The Committee to be responsible for monitoring management follow-up, rather than EPAU.
Section 4	UNHCR to allocate one additional P4 and one additional administration post to EPAU, and UNHCR to fund the whole staff budget itself, rather than relying on donors for part funding of staff. Depending on the results of negotiations, UNHCR to take up donor’s offers of seconding personnel to EPAU.
Section 5.1	EPAU to play a quality assurance and advisory role, rather than being responsible for conducting all evaluations. EPAU to update its mission statement to reflect this.
Section 5.7	EPAU to have one specialist evaluation post
Section 6.1	EPAU to revise its procedures for managing consultants, to set up consultants registration on-line and to provide access organisation wide to consultants records.

(Other recommendations, proposals and suggestions are distributed through the text)

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Background**

In 1999, the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU) was created following a report by Canadian consultant Frans Anema of Plan:Net 2000, "Report on Enhancement of the Evaluation Function in UNHCR", November 1998. The consultant's report highlighted deficiencies in UNHCR's planning, monitoring and evaluation functions. In doing so, it raised the profile of the debate around evaluation.

The report recommended the establishment of an evaluation service with an annual budget of US\$2.4 million, including a central team of 7 posts (5 professional and 2 support) and 3 further posts within Bureaux, plus a \$1.1 million outsourcing budget for external consultancy. At that time, there was only one full time evaluation post within the Inspection and Evaluation Unit. In response to the report, UNHCR established the EPAU as a separate unit from Inspection with 4 posts (3 professional and 1 support) and an increased consultancy budget. EPAU reports directly to UNHCR's Assistant High Commissioner.

### **1.2 Purpose and Scope of the Review**

This review is a brief follow-up (8 days total) to review progress and make recommendations on increasing the effectiveness of the evaluation function now that a unit has been established to support evaluation, albeit a smaller one than the previous consultancy recommended. The report contains several recommendations for UNHCR and for the EPAU. The Terms of Reference are attached as Annex 1.

This review has relied on documentation review and interviews. EPAU were successful in setting up several very useful interviews. Schedules of documents consulted and people interviewed are enclosed as Annexes 2 and 3. Unsuccessful attempts were made to interview field office managers. It was also not possible to talk to the Inspector General, as he was away on mission at the time of the consultant's visit to Geneva.

The report focuses on strategy and management issues relating to increasing the effectiveness and scale of evaluation in UNHCR and pays little attention to evaluation methodology, except to highlight and encourage the use of a variety of types and methods.

### **1.3 Progress in Strengthening the Evaluation Function**

- ◆ The EPAU was established in 1999. The full team has only been in place for 9 months. The UNHCR internal feedback on the role and work of the unit so far is generally positive.
- ◆ The EPAU has set in place the 4 principles of transparency, independence, consultation, and relevance. UNHCR managed to break with the past by publishing the full text of the Kosovo evaluation as a sign of UNHCR's commitment to transparency. This was something of a PR coup, gaining good will from donors and NGOs. All other recent evaluation reports have also been declassified.

- ◆ EPAU has established evaluation and policy analysis pages on the UNHCR web site, with access to evaluation and research reports, links to other relevant sites and announcements of consultancy opportunities
- ◆ EPAU has tested evaluation methodologies new to UNHCR, including real-time and participatory evaluation.
- ◆ Over the last year, the practice of lessons sharing via workshops has increased, using the results of formal and informal evaluations. A 2-day workshop was held on the findings of the Kosovo evaluation and there are forthcoming meetings planned, for example, on the Eritrea/Sudan real-time evaluation.
- ◆ UNHCR has recently established an Evaluation Committee to be chaired by the Inspector General. The Committee is due to hold its first meeting soon. The current terms of reference for the Committee are attached as Annex 4. The practice of convening a Steering Committee for each major evaluation has recently been put in place.
- ◆ DFID (UK Government) has provided unsolicited funds for evaluation consultancies, training and workshops that have substantially boosted the EPAU budget for this year.
- ◆ The Kosovo evaluation was a significant advance for a number of reasons:
  - ◆ The evaluation was undertaken against a backdrop of severe criticism of UNHCR's performance in Kosovo and the results had to be taken seriously by the organisation.
  - ◆ The evaluation itself was generally seen as a quality piece of work, with a more consultative approach than previous external evaluations.
  - ◆ Some significant decisions have resulted, especially the strengthening of UNHCR's emergency response capacity - though it is too early to see significant changes in practice.
  - ◆ The EPAU inherited the evaluation and made substantial changes to its design and execution, which are seen as having improved the product.
  - ◆ Perhaps most importantly for this review, the Kosovo evaluation was the first example of UNHCR management responding systematically to an evaluation report's recommendations. While far from perfect, the recently prepared "Follow-up to recommendations of the Kosovo evaluation" appears to be the organisation's first attempt at a documented recommendation by recommendation response, with actions taken or to be taken for each point. The document is let down by an absence of individual assigned responsibilities, lack of time scales and, at some points, inadequate explanation of why recommendations are not accepted. All the same, it points the way to improved follow-up mechanisms.

#### **1.4 External Context**

- ◆ Key donors, including the Canadian, British and Danish governments are still waiting for UNHCR to develop and implement a plan for the development of the evaluation function. They are still looking for a plan for the next 2-3 years showing how the organisation's capacity to undertake and learn from evaluations will be developed. Donors are looking, not so much for more evaluations to be done, but for a strategic rationale for the selection of thematic or crosscutting evaluations.
- ◆ In general, those donors taking the closest interest in the development of evaluation within UNHCR recognise that some progress has been made but remain unconvinced by what they see as UNHCR's half-hearted measures so far. Strengthening evaluation is seen as a key

indicator of UNHCR's commitment to transparency and effectiveness. While the publication of evaluation reports is seen as a positive step, there is more to transparency than publishing reports. There seem still to be doubts about how open the organisation really is with regard to scrutiny of its effectiveness.

- ◆ NGOs are happy with new transparency policy by which all evaluation reports are published in full. They would still like to see far more follow up with partners, including NGOs, on the issues raised in evaluations, rather than the findings being fed solely into an UNHCR internal management process. NGOs may not want to be too overtly critical, because of the sub-contracts that UNHCR provides them with and given that some do not have totally transparent evaluation policies either.
- ◆ DFID has developed an improvement plan for UNHCR. The DFID Interim Strategy for UNHCR, July 2000, calls for more major evaluation exercises and the introduction of mechanisms for field offices to evaluate their own performance and learn lessons. AusAid are also to submit their own improvement proposals but these are not yet available.

### **1.5 Internal Context**

- ◆ UNHCR is suffering from declining budgets, requiring cuts in staff numbers at field and HQ levels (100 jobs reduced at HQ since 1998). One factor in falling budgets appears to be a lack of donor confidence in the quality of UNHCR management and accountability mechanisms.
- ◆ HCR's spend on evaluation is amongst the lowest as a percentage of operations of any UN, NGO or bilateral agency in humanitarian aid.
- ◆ UNHCR field offices are said to be fed up with ever increasing reporting demands. Any moves to widen evaluation practice could be viewed as just another task to be done for HQ, which demands multiple reports then appears to do little or nothing with them. Some will be asking - why go to the bother of producing an evaluation report that won't be followed up on?
- ◆ There is a very little interest in, and understanding of, evaluation within UNHCR, though this is improving with the interest generated by EPAU internal consultations and by the high profile Kosovo evaluation.
- ◆ There is a continuing confusion between Evaluation and Inspection amongst HQ and field staff alike. Even senior managers did not seem to be clear on the difference.
- ◆ The impression that comes through clearly in both internal and external interviews is that there is a weak accountability climate in UNHCR. Despite a battery of Oversight mechanisms, managers are not held to account for the results of their programmes. Weak performance management will severely restrict the progress that can be made in evaluation, because no one is sure that anything will change as a result of an evaluation exercise. There is now more genuine interest being taken on the topic of accountability. UNHCR has an "accountability framework" but this is currently focused much more on financial issues than programme results.
- ◆ The prevailing philosophy in UNHCR is 'save lives, drop everything else if need be'. Given the organisation's mandate this is laudable but the result is that any activity seen as peripheral is cut when management calls for prioritisation, i.e. budget cuts.

- ◆ There is a general fear of being criticised and, in particular, a fear of and resistance to HQ missions on the part of field offices.
- ◆ Evaluation is seen as the job of EPAU. Field or HQ operations managers seldom take the initiative for evaluation. The more cynical HQ staff see EPAU as a convenient corner for senior management to park evaluation in.
- ◆ UNHCR is committed to becoming a learning organization and the High Commissioner has stated that this as a priority. Interviews suggested that the organisation has yet to make significant progress in this direction.
- ◆ Almost every internal interviewee raised the subject of job rotation. No one wanted to do away with the practice but it is seen to have drawbacks. People have time to build up their expertise but then have to move on to a different location and discipline. Organisational learning is similarly disrupted, with the entire membership of some teams turning over in a few years. Staff are frustrated that the organisation apparently repeats the same mistakes because of the dissipation of learning. One interviewee put the “learning loss” from the rotation policy at 70%. Apart from a few specialist posts, UNHCR has professional grade posts filled by generalists and it is hard to see how can UNHCR reach its aspiration of being the leader in its field while this continues. With the rotation policy also having a negative impact on staff retention, there is hope that the policy will be modified within the next year.
- ◆ The Staff Development Section has developed a new development approach based largely on on-the-job learning. There are three new development packages aimed at the three levels of staff, team, and organizational learning. This could be made to work in well with what UNHCR terms “self-evaluation”. The Operations Learning Programme is under design and the EPAU could usefully input to the design to ensure evaluation is incorporated. It is noteworthy that the otherwise comprehensive senior and middle management development programmes do not deal with evaluation. The senior management module alludes briefly to the assessment of programme results under the subject of accountability but provides no detail.
- ◆ The Delphi change management programme of 5 years ago led to the development of a series of working papers, including a paper on planning and another on evaluation<sup>1</sup>. Training continues on the Operations Management System, which has recently covered the adoption of a new programme-planning framework including some elements of the logical framework, known as the Hierarchy of Objectives. If properly implemented this will provide a basis for evaluation for the first time by setting aims, goals, objectives and indicators. To some extent the future success of evaluation depends on how well this system is used.
- ◆ There is still concern that administrative procedures for operations may be too complicated. There is talk of streamlining of processes but interviewees did not seem convinced that this is happening.
- ◆ UNHCR is in transition with a new High Commissioner expected to be in place by end 2000. The organisation could have a strategic plan by mid 2001.

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<sup>1</sup> While all these papers were “approved” by the OMS Project Board, this body seems to have had no real executive power



## 2 EVALUATION IN UNHCR

UNHCR needs a more self-critical and learning approach across its operations. To facilitate this, it is recommended that it should adopt a broad definition of evaluation. UNHCR is already engaged in a number of evaluative activities and this diversity should be further encouraged. In particular, EPAU should not try to restrict the use of the word Evaluation to its own activities.

### 1.6 Evaluations - what for?

Evaluations have a variety of purposes

- ◆ Lesson learning – how can we do better next time?
- ◆ Giving stakeholders a say (refugees, staff, partners, donors, government)
- ◆ Accountability – were the planned results achieved?

Evaluation can be justified for any *one* of these reasons, but the best value comes from incorporating all three purposes into the design of the evaluation exercise. In all cases, evaluation concerns operations/programme results – that is, benefits for refugees.

Evaluations without a follow-up process are a waste of time and money. Two types of follow-up process are required; firstly to ensure that managers respond appropriately to the recommendations of any evaluation, and secondly to make sure that any lessons learned from the evaluation are disseminated around the organisation and shared with partners. Such lesson learning should be one of the key building blocks within organisational change, but as already noted, the current management culture of the organisation tends to mitigate against such learning.

### 1.7 Evaluation Types

UNHCR should encourage a “mixed economy” in evaluation and should retain a loose definition for evaluation to encourage a varied approach:

*Why?*

- ◆ Routine accountability – what was achieved?
- ◆ Special cases - was it really that good/ was it really that bad?
- ◆ Extracting learning from a pilot/innovative exercise

*When?*

- ◆ Real-time, mid-term (operations review), interim (between project phases) or ex-post, with focus on the future, present, past or on all three

*What?*

- ◆ Project specific
- ◆ Country portfolio
- ◆ Inter-agency (UNHCR has already agreed in principle to undertake an evaluation with OCHA, UNICEF, WFP)
- ◆ Joint UNHCR-NGO evaluation – in 1999 four NGOs received \$10 million plus each (IRC \$25 million) – UNHCR should consider evaluating NGOs. The only check on them at the moment is financial reporting. 40% of UNHCR operational spend goes to 500 NGOs.
- ◆ HQ departments – no evaluations or inspections of HQ departments are being done, though inspections used to be. This should be re-considered.

*How?*

- ◆ Formal and external – what some would see as “proper” evaluation.
- ◆ Thematic or so-called “cross-cutting” evaluations are undertaken mostly to develop or refine policy. These may be global in scope and use case studies from specific operations.
- ◆ Self-evaluation may be a short one or two-day exercise managed from within the operation to review lessons learned, perhaps using an external facilitator. This ties directly into the new approach to team learning being encouraged by the staff development section. The OMS training team is also promoting this approach, using the UNHCR’s own booklet “Planning and Organising Useful Evaluations”. The OMS team have recently drafted a strategy paper on the reinstatement of self-evaluation, giving the rationale for carrying out self-evaluation and further guidance.
- ◆ Real-time - e.g. Eritrea/Sudan involves the deployment of a staff member or consultant into an operation from start up
- ◆ Participatory - e.g. Guinea where stakeholders and especially beneficiaries are provided with tools to give their own perspectives on UNHCR operations

*Who?*

- ◆ Varied composition of evaluation teams is possible and desirable. For impartiality the team leader should generally be an external consultant, but team members may include staff, partners or other stakeholders. Being part of an external evaluation team can be a valuable personal development opportunity for UNHCR staff members.

Given the varied approaches possible, it is vital that the Terms of Reference for each evaluation spell out clearly the why, when, what, how and who.

## **1.8 Evaluation versus Inspection**

For many UNHCR staff the difference between Evaluation and Inspection is far from clear. In general, UNHCR staff perceive inspections as a form of management audit. According to the leaflet on inspections produced by the Inspector General’s office, an inspection mission will “review internal management, external relations, and the overall appropriateness of the objectives and the effectiveness of actions to achieve them.”

**Inspection:**

- ◆ is about conformance to UNHCR management process/procedure
- ◆ provides a “broad review of the functioning of UNHCR representation at all levels”, including some attention to programme content
- ◆ is undertaken by UNHCR staff
- ◆ goes office by office on a 5-year cycle
- ◆ does not tackle thematic management issues
- ◆ reports are confidential

**Evaluation:**

- ◆ is operations results focused
- ◆ pays some attention to management issues
- ◆ is carried out mostly by outsiders
- ◆ may be programme specific or thematic
- ◆ has no fixed timetable
- ◆ findings are published

There is some overlap between inspection and evaluation with regard to operations management. The same stakeholders will be interviewed within inspection and evaluation and they themselves

may not understand the difference between the two. The boundaries do need clarifying, but this is beyond the scope of this review.

### **3 STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING THE EVALUATION FUNCTION**

#### **1.9 What is the “Evaluation Function”**

There seems to be some confusion in the organisation about the meaning of “Evaluation Function”. The EPAU is not the evaluation function, nor is a plan for evaluations. Rather the evaluation function is the totality of UNHCR’s management practices, training, methodology and activity in evaluation. Donors are justifiably frustrated that UNHCR persists in not developing a plan for the development of the evaluation function. It may be that UNHCR has not properly understood what the most vocal donors are looking for. Certainly the EPAU’s own report, *Enhancement of the Evaluation Function in UNHCR – Proposed Plan of Action – June 1999*, seems to miss the point, as does the latest paper on evaluation activities prepared for Excom (A/AC.96/935).

#### **1.10 Goals for the Evaluation Function**

It is recommended that UNHCR adopts the following goals for its evaluation function:

- ◆ UNHCR will undertake more evaluations across its operations and make better use of them for accountability and learning
- ◆ Operations managers will take increasing responsibility for initiating and managing evaluations
- ◆ Evaluation findings will be followed up by the project owner
- ◆ UNHCR will disseminate the findings of evaluations more widely and feed them into policy development

#### **1.11 Components in the Development of the Evaluation Function**

It is recommended that UNHCR adopts four components required to put these goals into practise, encompassing:

- ◆ Soft measures – to create understanding and commitment
- ◆ Hard measures - management rules and resources dedicated to evaluation

##### **1.1.1 Outreach to bureaux and field programmes**

Up to now EPAU has put more effort into communicating with donors, other UN agencies, NGOs and HQ units than it has to explaining the purpose and benefits of evaluation to UNHCR field offices. This emphasis now needs to be reversed.

##### **1.1.2 Building commitment**

Commitment needs building at two levels:

- ◆ Firstly, in winning hearts and minds, operations managers need to see good examples of evaluation taking place and to see managers who undertake or invite evaluation being affirmed by their managers
- ◆ Senior management needs to put out a message along the lines of:  
“When budgets are tight *more* attention needs to be given to evaluation, not less. While the goal is *protecting/serving refugees*, this depends on being cost-effective, listening to

refugees, learning, improving and *showing* that all these are happening. The reputation of UNHCR depends on commitment to self-critical learning and openness to evaluation. Funds will continue to be under pressure if the organisation under-performs in this area”.

### **1.1.3 Management rules**

Because the level of understanding, interest and activity in evaluation is low, UNHCR needs to add a few easily understood operations management regulations to kick start the process of managers taking the initiative. The aim should be for managers to be approaching EPAU for assistance because they need/want to, rather than EPAU having to sell the idea to the unreceptive UNHCR, and specifically the Evaluation Committee, will need to agree and publish these rules. These should cover, for example:

- ◆ Each bureau to commission and manage at least one major externally led evaluation per year, with management follow-up process including time scales and designated responsibilities for action. Bureau heads to be responsible for compliance.
- ◆ All projects cumulatively costing \$20 million plus to be formally evaluated at least once every three years – so as to capture long running programmes no longer in the news
- ◆ EPAU to directly manage three thematic evaluations per year leading to policy recommendations
- ◆ Each evaluation has a designated owner responsible for follow-up

It is recommended that UNHCR puts in place a follow-up mechanism for evaluations similar to that used for inspection. Each evaluation report will contain a consolidated list of recommendations to which the specified project owner must respond point by point, specifying what action is to be taken in response, by whom and by when. The Evaluation Committee will monitor how well recommendations are assessed and followed up.

### **1.1.4 Resources**

Evaluation is not just another programme support/administration cost. UNHCR management will need to show its commitment to evaluation by placing funds in the most appropriate budget lines so that they will be both put to best use and not cut at the first sign of financial stress. The key question then becomes where best to locate evaluation budgets? The options are to put budget lines into:

1. All programme budgets (as per the OMS Working Paper on Evaluation)
2. Country level or region
3. Bureaux – this budget line already exists, though generally not used
4. Within EPAU (in addition to EPAU’s own consultancy budget) but for the use of operations managers only

Option 2 is the ideal but it is recommended that, in the first instance, option 3 is adopted with each Bureau developing an evaluation plan and budget for the year. EPAU will co-sign for each evaluation project to assure the quality of the terms of reference, consultant selection and budgeting. Over time, and as evaluation practice improves, budgets should be further decentralised – as in Option 2.

### **1.12 Plan of Action**

In order to increase the effectiveness of the evaluation function in UNHCR the organisation needs a step by step programme for increasing the understanding, good practice and wider application of evaluation across its operations. Strengthening the evaluation function will involve the gradual

decentralisation of responsibility for evaluation away from EPAU while building up managers' skills and providing tools for managing evaluations. A phased approach is recommended.

UNHCR will need to decide for itself the details of a forward strategy. Some elements are suggested below as a starting point for discussion by the Evaluation Committee, leading to a firm plan of action for presentation to Excom.

Now

- ◆ Develop strategic plan for strengthening of the evaluation function and promote to the upcoming Excom meeting - Excom is likely to ask for this anyway.
- ◆ Strengthen the Evaluation Committee by having one person from each Bureau as a member.

2001

- ◆ Put additional evaluation budgets into the Bureaux (say \$500k in total for 2001) with the proviso that these funds can only be used for evaluations.
- ◆ EPAU to provide training to the Bureaux and co-sign evaluation TORs and budgets.
- ◆ Allow country operations to budget for and manage evaluations from 2001 following, on a voluntary basis.
- ◆ Strengthen EPAU resources (See more on this below).

2002

- ◆ Programme instructions to make evaluation a budget line for every country, requiring an evaluation plan and budget for the year. This is where field managers will start taking ownership of evaluation for themselves, if they haven't already started to do so.
- ◆ Training for selected field operations.

Donors will be encouraged by such a plan and it will strengthen their hand in allocating both unearmarked funding to the UNHCR single budget and earmarked funding to evaluation.

### **1.13 Setting Priorities**

The process by which evaluation topics are selected is not very clear. In the absence of an overall UNHCR operations strategy, priorities for EPAU-run evaluations are set by a judicious mix of consensus amongst staff (EPAU have been active in consultation on priorities) and senior management views, partially informed by donor priorities. The Evaluation Committee will need to revisit the prioritisation process. There are plenty of candidates for thematic evaluations already, more than enough to carry the programme of evaluations forward until a new UNHCR overall strategy is developed.

### **1.14 Evaluation Committee**

This committee is yet to meet but potentially provides the key to:

- ◆ putting authority behind evaluation findings
- ◆ tying evaluation into the oversight function without combining it with Inspection

It is advised that this committee should not be called the Evaluation and Performance Review Committee. While the organisation clearly needs a revised performance review framework, it should not be the job of the Evaluation Committee to develop that framework.

The relationship between the Evaluation and Oversight Committees will need to be clarified.

All bureaux should be represented on the Evaluation Committee.

The Committee's TOR will need refining, re-affirming and re-communicating. The Committee will:

- ◆ Review progress in evaluation organisation-wide
- ◆ Monitor staffing and spending on evaluation across the organisation
- ◆ Review evaluation policy. The current "policy" is the four principles – a new policy will need to be developed and published once management rules for evaluation have been agreed
- ◆ Agree Bureaux and EPAU plans for evaluations for the year, ensuring they are in line with priorities set out in UNHCR's strategic plan for its operations, once the plan exists
- ◆ Monitor quality of work of evaluation project teams
- ◆ Monitor responses to and action on evaluation recommendations
- ◆ Act as guardian of UNHCR's rules and procedures on evaluation

#### **4 RESOURCES ASSIGNED TO EVALUATION**

Currently UNHCR is using less of its resources for evaluation than other comparable UN agencies, for example UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP, as the previous consultant's report showed.

The total budget for EPAU including staffing and consultancies is about 0.2% of UNHCR's operations budget. It does not seem to be possible to track spending on evaluations initiated elsewhere, although there are programme reviews taking place outside EPAU. Conceivably, UNHCR's total spend on all types of operations reviews and evaluations could be as much as 0.3% of the operations budget.

This does not compare favourably with other agencies, though it should be born in mind that spending on evaluations of emergency programmes is generally lower as a percentage of budget than evaluation of development programmes. Literature on evaluation suggests 2-3% of programme budget as a norm; but it is highly unlikely that spending on humanitarian emergency evaluation is as high as this.

UNICEF, for example, has a central evaluation team of three and a monitoring and evaluation officer in each of their seven regional offices. It also has a theoretical commitment to spending 5% of budget on evaluation. Despite this, it is only just getting started on the evaluation of its emergency programmes. ICRC is aiming for 0.5% of total budget as its spend on evaluations. Evaluation of emergency programmes is a relatively new practice but it is growing, as the recent rash of 20 plus evaluations in Kosovo illustrates. UNHCR cannot afford to be left behind and given the current level of scrutiny it enjoys, should try to be ahead of the game.

HCR's own resourcing of evaluation is actually less than the 0.2% mentioned above because, of the \$1.18 million for EPAU in 2000, \$710K came directly from donors. Of this, the British Government (DFID) has provided \$560K<sup>2</sup> and the US Government \$150K for research. DFID is likely to continue to support evaluation in UNHCR as long as it sees progress being made in the development of the evaluation function. It is recommended that UNHCR fully funds the core costs of staffing within the unit.

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<sup>2</sup> Of the \$560k provided by DFID, it was agreed that 50% would be seen as part of the single budget and 50% would be additional funding

The EPAU is on track to use its consultancy budget if funded at the predicted 80% level, and will be slightly under-spent if 100% of the budget is funded. EPAU's budget is vulnerable because it depends on continued donor support. However, a well formulated forward strategy for the evaluation function should provide a fundraising tool in its own right.

In order to strengthen EPAU, it is recommended that one additional P4 post and one extra administration post be added in order that the unit can fulfill the roles as described below. In general, UNHCR is facing pressures to cut its budgets and there is currently a recruitment freeze. However, there is a good case for making evaluation an exception.

Ideally, all bureaux should have their own evaluation officers. Africa has something close in a Senior Policy Research Officer but no other bureau has such a post. In order to get bureaux initiating and managing evaluation, it is not necessary at this stage to add evaluation officers to the regional Bureaux. If EPAU supports operations managers in developing their capacity to organise evaluations as they respond to new organisational imperatives to conduct evaluation, this could be an effective alternative.

Some donors have offered to provide an extra person to strengthen EPAU. There are hurdles to be overcome in relation to the current recruitment freeze, the number of floating staff in UNHCR and the donors placing conditions on the nationality of the additional personnel. Hopefully these barriers can be overcome to allow at least one gratis placement or secondment.

(On a point of detail revised budget codes are required for evaluation to separate it out from research and sub-codes are needed for consultancy fees and training in evaluation.)

## **5 ROLE OF EPAU**

### **1.15 QA and Advisory**

EPAU should be playing a quality assurance and advisory role not an executive one. In the first instance, perhaps for the next two years, EPAU should be represented on each evaluation steering committee but should generally not be the chair of that committee. For thematic evaluations covering the whole of UNHCR's operations the chair of the committee should be the Assistant High Commissioner, especially where the purpose is the review of a key UNHCR policy. In some circumstances the AHC may delegate the chair to the Head of EPAU.

EPAU should not be responsible for evaluation follow-up but will need to play a monitoring role, reporting to the Evaluation Committee when it is concerned that recommendations are not being pursued by management. It is inappropriate in any case for the Head of the Unit at P5 level to be trying to ensure that D1/D2 managers are acting on evaluation results. The authority backing evaluations should be coming from the Evaluation Committee.

### **1.16 When to be user-friendly**

EPAU has worked hard to establish a user-friendly, responsive approach following the separation of the central evaluation capacity from the former Inspection and Evaluation Unit. This has contributed to the generally positive feedback to EPAU's work. However, some interviewees reported that the approach taken by EPAU staff when undertaking evaluations is too soft. EPAU will need to adopt a more rigorous and harder edge when carrying out evaluations itself, having

the courage of its own convictions, and giving its views without clearing them with others – as per the principal of Independence. EPAU should retain its facilitative style when helping other operations managers to engage with and manage evaluations.

### 1.17 More than Evaluation

EPAU's remit goes beyond evaluation. It also has responsibilities for policy analysis and the Head of the unit has also brought some responsibilities for research with him into the new unit. Donors have questioned the combination of policy and evaluation within the same unit but potentially this combination is a very good idea because of the scope for applying lessons from evaluations directly to operations policy. UNHCR could do more to sell this concept to Excom.

There is also a danger that resources will be diverted away from evaluation into ad hoc requests from senior management for work on policy issues and into involvement in various working parties. There is some evidence that this diversion is already taking place. The Research papers commissioned by EPAU are certainly valued inside UNHCR and, reportedly, beyond. Several papers on issues relevant to UNHCR field operations have been produced in the last year – see list in Annex 5. EPAU does not have the personnel to cover properly the management of evaluations, taking part in evaluations, policy analysis and ad hoc requests.

### 1.18 Commissioning versus Conducting Evaluations

The EPAU has been concerned that its members should take part in evaluation exercises rather than simply managing teams of consultants. This is understandable given that only the head of the unit has any prior experience in evaluation. Unit members feel that job satisfaction would be greatly reduced without active participation in evaluation. As the number of evaluations across the organisation increases, the amount of time that EPAU members can spend doing evaluation will reduce. It is suggested that a future time split for the unit's evaluation effort might be as follows :

40%	Commissioning and managing thematic evaluations
40%	Advising, monitoring bureaux/offices, developing good practice guides/systems, training operations staff on how to devise, commission, manage and follow-up, reviewing TORs, consultant selection, methodology, costs <sup>3</sup> .
20%	Doing evaluations

EPAU should confine itself mostly to undertaking and managing evaluations that are either policy focused or test new evaluation methodologies. It will not be possible for EPAU to carry out or manage all the evaluation of individual operations that will be required to provide a basic level of accountability as defined in the new rules, so more time needs to go into building the capacities of others to do so.

### 1.19 Managing Evaluations

EPAU is learning how to commission and manage evaluations and has discovered how much time it takes to manage major evaluations projects well, even when they are farmed out to consultancy firms that have the capacity to handle their own administration. In the light of this, it

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<sup>3</sup> The Permanent Mission of Canada wants to encourage UNHCR to use the currently under-utilised Canadian Trust Fund to help fund the development of systems and skills in evaluation



may be wise to revisit the list of evaluations that EPAU has committed itself to undertaking or overseeing in the next year. It is recommended that:

- ♦ some of the planned evaluations are cut out or pushed forward into 2002. Donors are not looking for lots of evaluations but for strategic prioritisation and policy development resulting from the learning gained.
- ♦ the evaluations are presented in a more coherent and strategic way - there is actually more strategic thinking behind the composition of the evaluation plan than the Excom paper reveals

## **1.20 Dissemination**

EPAU are aware that this is an underdeveloped area at the moment. This review has not had time to look at this topic in detail. Dissemination is about good communication – getting the message across. It is not making multiple copies of reports and circulating them. In a paper-ridden organisation such as UNHCR, this is unlikely to cause lessons learnt to penetrate anyway. Initiatives to be taken by EPAU could include:

- ♦ The first task is to explain to field offices what evaluation is. A briefing note is required and EPAU needs to take advantage of other fora, for example regional strategy workshops. (When there are some management rules in place, people will be keener to listen). At the same time, EPAU can help to make these meetings good self-evaluation events in themselves. Diplomatically piggybacking on other meetings can be a good way to raise awareness and gauge the training needs of operations staff.
- ♦ EPAU should consider publishing paper summaries of evaluations, 2 sides at most, with some desk-top-publishing to make them attractive and easily and quickly read.
- ♦ EPAU already makes input to the UNHCR Intranet and web site, with full text versions of evaluation and research documents. (UNHCR is planning to move to Adobe format but it is suggested that HTML is retained as well because Adobe Acrobat is tedious to use for those with slower computers, modems or poor phone lines)
- ♦ UNHCR already has the KIMS CD-ROM containing evaluation documents, research papers etc. This could be enhanced by adding best practice guidelines on evaluation methodology and guidelines on managing evaluations.
- ♦ EPAU could produce an Evaluation newsletter. EPAU could invite contributions from programme managers, summarise findings from evaluations, discuss new developments in methodology and cite interesting examples from sister and partner agencies. There are already many UNHCR internal newsletters, so it would have to be very well produced to gain a readership.
- ♦ EPAU will need to develop a central Consultants Database to which the whole organisation will have access. As operations managers in the field commission their own evaluations, regional databases of consultants will also be needed and field managers are likely to turn to EPAU for advice on this. Some international NGOs already have databases of this kind and they could be consulted on their experience.

## **1.21 Professional Development**

EPAU should be ensuring the professional development of its own members. While training is currently being planned for the members of the unit and a few other interested HQ staff, EPAU should be in a position to provide training itself. The link to the UK-based ALNAP<sup>4</sup> network should be exploited because it is currently the best-developed network of evaluation specialists in

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<sup>4</sup> Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance

the humanitarian field. Their meetings are often in the UK but the investment and time in traveling to them would be worthwhile.

The issue of specialist posts was raised a number of times in interviews. Evaluation is one area where it is recommended that organisation retain at least one specialist in EPAU. This would have two benefits:

- ♦ **Credibility.** As things stand, EPAU members will find themselves interacting with partner organisations with more developed expertise in evaluation, so there could be an issue of professional credibility. Currently, only the Head of EPAU has a track record in evaluation.
- ♦ **Continuity.** Generalist posts can be rotated frequently, especially if the personnel have come to Geneva from non-hardship posts. Two of the three professional grade posts in the unit are due to be rotated in 2002 – hardly conducive to supporting the establishment of an effective evaluation function. UNHCR needs to consider how to stop the unit's current progress from being undermined by rotation.

If this revised role definition for EPAU is accepted, it is recommended that its Mission Statement is updated to reflect the roles described above.

## **6 MANAGING EVALUATION CONSULTANCY ASSIGNMENTS**

### **1.22 Evaluation Consultancy Assignments**

The process for managing evaluation consultancies and providing properly formulated information for management follow-up needs improvement.

Competitive tendering for consultancies is now a requirement in UNHCR with the exception of small consultancies undertaken by individuals. Competitive tendering is a good way of ensuring value for money but, as EPAU has discovered, it can generate a good deal of work. EPAU can take steps to limit the work effort.

It is recommended that there is a move to on-line registration of firms of consultants and individual consultants to save EPAU the work of entering consultants' details. The 250 or so consultants with CVs already sent to EPAU should be asked to re-submit on-line. It is recommended that EPAU talks to other agencies, for example UNOPS, about their experience with on-line registration. There will also be a need for on-line searching facilities so that Bureaux and field offices will be able to access relevant consultant's records.

EPAU has recently been moving towards the use of lump sum consultancy. This move is supported because it requires less management and puts more emphasis on paying for a finished product rather than simply buying consultancy time. EPAU should review its blanket application of DSAs within consultancy budgets because it is probably losing money through this practice.

It is recommended that EPAU publishes consultancy opportunities on the web and invites Statements of Capability from consultants rather than expressions of interest. This then allows consultants to be shortlisted before inviting them to tender, thereby considerably reducing the work involved for the evaluation steering committee in assessing the consultants' bids. In the move to use consultancy firms who are able to be self-managing, EPAU should take care not to exclude individual consultants with specialist expertise, but who may not be able to manage consultancy teams or to pre-fund consultancy costs.

It is recommended that EPAU organises a workshop of four to five UN agencies and perhaps a few international NGOs to look at best practice in managing evaluation consultancies (rather than best practice in evaluation). This might be a two-day facilitated workshop and could provide useful information to input into an UNHCR manual on managing evaluations. Both EPAU and operations managers could benefit from such a manual. This in turn could form part of an Evaluation Manual, as previously recommended in Anema's 1998 report.

### **1.23 Steps in the Evaluation Process**

Members of EPAU have requested further guidance of the sequence of steps in managing evaluation consultants.

- ◆ Form Evaluation Steering Committee and appoint the Chair who is the project owner (for example, Head of a Regional Bureau in Africa would be the project owner for the evaluation of a country programme within that region)
- ◆ Steering Committee drafts and agrees terms of reference in consultation with field managers and, where possible, refugee representatives and partners

(Next 4 steps relevant when using external consultants)

- ◆ Advertise consultancy requirement on the web giving details of scope, approximate timing and outputs required but not an expected cost, and inviting statements of capability
- ◆ Steering Committee to shortlist consultants and invite tenders
- ◆ Steering Committee to appoint consultants and (optionally) negotiate with consultants for inclusion of UNHCR staff member or partner representative in evaluation team
- ◆ Agree budget - contract to be drawn up by Supply and Transport Section
- ◆ Evaluation team carries out evaluation
- ◆ Evaluation report to contain executive summary of two sides maximum and consolidated list of recommendations immediately following the executive summary (the same recommendations may or may not appear in the body of the text)
- ◆ Evaluation team may optionally produce a covering letter containing any highly sensitive feedback that needs to be communicated outside the report
- ◆ The evaluation reports should be scrutinised for conformance to the TOR, and for clearly set out recommendations. Text should not need major editing or correction and should be returned to the main author unapproved if it does. (EPAU is putting too much time into editing and proof reading of reports – either insist on a better product to start with, or outsource the revision work).
- ◆ Project owner is responsible for collating management response to the recommendations, stating who is responsible for implementation of any changes and when they will be achieved (it is not the job of the evaluation team to assign these responsibilities)
- ◆ Evaluation Committee to follow-up on compliance, with advice from EPAU where necessary
- ◆ Review of project owner's response to the evaluation becomes part of the their annual performance review

## 7 OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS


### 1.24 Accountability Framework

UNHCR has an Accountability Framework, which is described in the Financial Management Accountability booklet issued to all managers and around which there has been a substantial training programme.

It is recommended that a parallel booklet with a title such as “Accountability for Operational Results” be developed to set out a manager’s responsibilities. As it stands, accountability for operational results is so far undefined in UNHCR.

EPAU has produced a paper, “UNHCR's organisational oversight and performance review framework”, which helpfully brings together descriptions of the overlapping functions of audit, inspection, investigation, and evaluation. This is a good aide memoire but it is recommended that UNHCR provides its managers with an integrated accountability framework that sets out their obligations and the support they can expect to receive in all these areas.

A more comprehensive accountability framework might encompass :



## ANNEX 1

### **TERMS OF REFERENCE IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EVALUATION FUNCTION IN UNHCR**

UNHCR's Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU) was established in September 1999, with the purpose of reinforcing the capacity and impact of the evaluation function. The purpose of this consultancy is to take stock of the unit's work and to recommend practical ways in which the evaluation function might be more effectively linked to the organization's operational bureaux and other UNHCR units involved in institutional learning, oversight and change. More specifically, the consultancy will examine:

- How the EPAU work programme is planned
- How individual evaluation projects are established, managed and implemented
- How evaluation findings are disseminated
- How learning from the evaluations is extracted and disseminated
- The role of management in responding to and following up on evaluation results
- The way in which UNHCR manages its response to external evaluations
- How the impact of the evaluation function can be assessed
- The organisational relationship between EPAU and other relevant sections at UNHCR headquarters

The bulk of consultancy will be conducted in the UNHCR offices in Geneva and will include:

- A review of relevant documentation
- Face to face and phone interviews with key stakeholders, including the EPAU team, a selection of programme and other managers, and donors.

The consultancy will be undertaken in August/September 2000.

The consultancy company will provide a debriefing to EPAU at the end of the mission in Geneva, and a report of between five and ten pages within two weeks of the completion of the consultancy contract. A copy of the report will be provided to DFID, which will fund the consultancy. The report may also be placed in the public domain.

UNHCR will arrange meetings with key stakeholders and will arrange hotel accommodation, which the consultancy company will pay for from the contract sum.

3.8.2000

## ANNEX 2

### SCHEDULES OF INTERVIEWEES DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

#### Interviewees

<b>UNHCR HQ, Geneva</b>		
Jeff Crisp	Head	EPAU
Arafat Jamal	Evaluation Officer	EPAU
Naoko Obi	Evaluation Officer	EPAU
Diana Cipollone	Assistant	EPAU
Sue Mulcock	Administrator	EPAU
Rick Barton	Deputy High Commissioner	
James Lattimer	Senior Change Management Officer	Operations Management Systems
Sajjad Malik	Senior Rural Settlement Officer	Operational Field Support
Arnulv Torbjornsen	Head	NGO Coordination
Soren Jessen-Petersen	Assistant High Commissioner	
Khassim Diagne	Senior Policy Research Officer	Africa Bureau
Luc Stevens	Senior Inspection Officer	Inspection Unit
Michel Gaud—	Acting Head	Emergency Response Section
Jean-Marie Fakhouri	Controller/Director	Division of Resource Management
Diane Goodman	Training Officer	Department of International Protection
Pierre-Francois Pirlot	Acting Director	Division of Operational Support
Chris Talbot	Senior Education Officer	Health and Community Development
Pirrko Kourala	Head	Inter-Organisation Affairs
Mike Alford	Head	Staff Development Section
Bjorn Johanssen	Staffing Review	
<b>Donors/Others</b>		
Louise Lavigne	Counsellor	Permanent Mission of Canada
Anne Marie Sloth Carlsen	Deputy Permanent Representative	Permanent Mission of Denmark
Mukesh Kapila	Head, Complex Humanitarian Disasters	DFID (UK Government)
Wayne MacDonald	Head, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation	ICRC
Martin Murama	Project Officer, Emergency Programmes	UNICEF Geneva
Robin Medforth-Mills	Senior Programme Officer	
Robert Fuderich	Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser	
Ed Shrenkenburg	Chief Executive	ICVA

## ANNEX 3

### KEY DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Enhancement of the Evaluation Function in UNHCR – PLAN:NET 2000, November 1998

Enhancement of the Evaluation Function in UNHCR – Proposed Plan of Action – June 1999

Comments by Denmark on the Proposed Plan of Action, June 1999 – July 29 1999

Comments by Canada on the Proposed Plan of Action for the Enhancement of the Evaluation Function in UNHCR, July 2 1999 – undated

Project Submission to the UK Department for International Development – Office of the UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Unit – undated but early 2000

UNHCR Memo 11.7.2000 – Evaluation and Performance Review Committee – includes proposed TOR

Draft Proposal to Design and Conduct Pilot Evaluation Training for UNHCR EPAU – June 13 2000

Update on the Change Management Process – Excom paper Sept 4 2000

UNHCR’s Evaluation Activities – Excom paper August 10 2000

UNHCR’s Excom Follow-Up – from ICVA web site

Leaflet from Inspector General’s Office on Inspections and Investigations - undated

Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit – Mission Statement – undated

EPAU Checklist of current and planned activities – undated

UNHCR’s organisational oversight and performance review framework – August 29 2000

The Kosovo refugee crisis – an independent evaluation of UNHCR’s emergency preparedness and response – A Suhrke et al., EPAU, February 2000

Follow-up to the recommendations of the Kosovo evaluation – compiled by EPAU August 29 2000

Working as a Manager in UNHCR – June 2000

Sample Inspection Reports – various 2000

Financial Management Accountability - UNHCR, November 1997

UNHCR Interim Strategy Paper – DFID – July 2000

Review of UNHCR Country Programmes – Synthesis of Findings – DFID May 2000

OMS Working Paper – Evaluation in the OMS – undated

OMS Working Paper – Enhancing Programme and Project Design – September 11 2000

Strategy Paper on the Reinstatement of Self-Evaluation as an integral part of the Operations Management Cycle – draft

Planning and Organising Useful Evaluations – UNHCR Inspection and Evaluation Service - Jan 1998

Achievements and Impact – UNHCR Global Report 1999

## ANNEX 4

### EVALUATION COMMITTEE TERMS OF REFERENCE

The purpose of the Committee will be twofold: to provide guidance and support to UNHCR's evaluation and policy analysis function; and to maximize the impact of that function by ensuring that it is effectively linked to other parts of the organization, especially those involved in organizational learning, policy development and oversight activities.

The Committee will meet on a quarterly basis and will consist of representatives from the Executive Office, the four 'pillars', and at least one regional bureau. The Committee will initially comprise the following staff members: N. Morris (Executive Office and Chairperson of the Committee); M. Alford (DRM); R. Ashe (DOS); K. Diagne (RBA); I. Khan (DIP) and P. Kourula (DCI). Jeff Crisp (EPAU) will act as secretary to the Committee. Additional staff members may be invited to contribute to specific meetings and agenda items of the Committee.

The Committee will:

1. Review the EPAU work programme prior to submission to the High Commissioner and SMC; and to make proposals for the inclusion of new evaluation and policy analysis projects;
2. Review completed evaluation and policy analysis projects and make proposals for the effective dissemination, follow-up and implementation of evaluation findings;
3. Be kept informed of significant evaluation and policy analysis activities taking place outside of UNHCR, including external evaluations of UNHCR programmes and projects;
4. Facilitate the effective exchange of ideas and information between units and staff members involved in institutional learning, policy development and oversight activities.

Members of the Evaluation Committee may be asked to review the Terms of Reference for evaluation and policy analysis projects; to provide comments on draft evaluation and policy analysis papers; and to sit on Steering Committees established in relation to specific evaluation and policy analysis projects.



## ANNEX 5

### EPAU COMMISSIONED PAPERS ON NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH

- Working Paper No. 29: *Are refugee camps good for children?*, Barbara Harrell-Bond, Distinguished Adjunct Professor, Forced Migration and Refugee Studies, American University in Cairo, Dept. 417, P.O. Box 2511, Cairo 11511, Egypt (August 2000)
- Working Paper No. 28: *Africa's refugees: patterns, problems and policy challenges*, Jeff Crisp, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, UNHCR, CP2500, CH-211 Geneva 2, Switzerland (August 2000)
- Working Paper No. 27: *Towards a common European migration and asylum policy?*, Colleen Thouez, Consultant, UNHCR, CP2500, CH-211 Geneva 2, Switzerland (August 2000)
- Working Paper No. 26: *Refugee involvement in political violence: quantitative evidence from 1987-1998*, Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 292 Main St. E38-6th floor, Cambridge MA 02139, USA (July 2000)
- Working Paper No. 25: *Conflict, displacement and reintegration: household survey evidence from El Salvador*, Sarah Gammage and Jorge Fernandez, International Center for Research on Women, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA (July 2000)
- Working Paper No. 24: *Humanitarian agendas, state reconstruction and democratisation processes in war-torn societies*, David Moore, Economic History and Development Studies, University of Natal, Durban 4014, South Africa (July 2000)
- Working Paper No. 23: *The role of African regional and sub-regional organisations in conflict prevention and resolution*, Abiodun Alao, African Security Unit, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, University of London, Strand WC2R 2LS, United Kingdom (July 2000)
- Working Paper No. 22: *International refugee aid and social change in northern Mali*, Stefan Sperl, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, United Kingdom (July 2000)
- Working Paper No. 21: *'Return is struggle, not resignation': lessons from the repatriation of Guatemalan refugees from Mexico*, Steffanie Riess, Flat 7, St. Stephen's Mansions, Monmouth Road, London W2 5SE, United Kingdom (July 2000)
- Working Paper No. 20: *Forced migration and the evolving humanitarian regime*, Susan F. Martin, Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA (July 2000)
- Working Paper No. 19: *Refugee identities and relief in an African borderland: a study of northern Uganda and southern Sudan*, Jozef Merckx, UNHCR, CP 2500, CH-1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland (June 2000)
- Working Paper No. 18: *Negotiating humanitarian access in Angola: 1990 - 2000*, Anna Richardson (June 2000)
- Working Paper No. 17: *Access to safety? Negotiating protection in a Central Asian emergency*, Arafat Jamal, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, UNHCR, CP2500, CH-211 Geneva 2, Switzerland (February 2000)
- Working Paper No. 16: *A state of insecurity: the political economy of violence in refugee-populated areas of Kenya*, Jeff Crisp, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, UNHCR, CP2500, CH-211 Geneva 2, Switzerland (December 1999)

- Working Paper No. 15: *Returning refugees or migrating villagers? Voluntary repatriation programmes in Africa reconsidered*, Oliver Bakewell, 27 Tynemouth Road, Tottenham, London N15 4AT, United Kingdom (December 1999)
- Working Paper No. 14: *Aiding peace ... and war: UNHCR, returnee reintegration, and the relief-development debate*, Joanna Macrae, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, Portland House, Stag Place, London SW1E 5DP, United Kingdom (December 1999)
- Working Paper No. 13: *Partnerships in the protection of refugees and other people at risk: emerging issues and work in progress*, Larry Minear, Humanitarianism and War Project, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA (July 1999)
- Working Paper No. 12: *"Who has counted the refugees?" UNHCR and the politics of numbers*, Jeff Crisp, UNHCR, Geneva, Switzerland (June 1999)
- Working Paper No. 11: *Changing opportunities: refugees and host communities in western Tanzania*, Beth Elise Whitaker, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA (June 1999)
- Working Paper No. 10: *Deflecting international protection by treaty: bilateral and multilateral accords on extradition, readmission and the inadmissibility of asylum requests*, Karin Landgren, UNICEF, New York, USA (June 1999)
- Working Paper No. 9: *Angry young men in camps: international assistance and changing hierarchies of authority amongst Burundian refugees in Tanzania*, Simon Turner, International Development Studies, Roskilde, Denmark (June 1999)
- Working Paper No. 8: *The humanitarian operation in Bosnia, 1992-95: the dilemmas of negotiating humanitarian access*, Mark Cutts, UNHCR, Geneva, Switzerland (May 1999)
- Working Paper No. 7: *Policy challenges of the new diasporas: migrant networks and their impact on asylum flows and regimes*, Jeff Crisp, UNHCR, Geneva, Switzerland (May 1999)
- Working Paper No. 6: *Responding to the arrival of asylum seekers: control and protection in asylum procedures*, Jens Vedsted-Hansen, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark (May 1999)
- Working Paper No. 5: *The end of asylum? The changing nature of refugee policies in Africa*, Bonaventure Rutinwa, Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford, UK (May 1999)
- Working Paper No. 4: *Rejected asylum seekers: the problem of return*, Gregor Noll, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden (May 1999)
- Working Paper No. 3: *The evolution of US immigration and refugee policy: public opinion, domestic politics and UNHCR*, Michael J. McBride, Whittier College, Whittier, USA (May 1999)
- Working Paper No. 2: *From resettlement to involuntary repatriation: towards a critical history of durable solutions*, B. S. Chimni, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi (May 1999)
- Working Paper No. 1: *Globalization and the dynamics of international migration: implications for the refugee regime*, Sarah Collinson, ActionAid, London, UK (May 1999)

