

AFGHANISTAN PROTECTION CLUSTER

Protection Overview (Southern Region - 2010)

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Introduction


The Afghanistan Protection Cluster initiated a Protection Overview for the Southern Region (SR) in December 2010 for a comprehensive understanding of the priority protection issues there and to inform appropriate response. Need for a holistic protection view was felt following increasing reports of human rights violations, armed offensives and internal displacements in the region through the course of 2010. This exercise will additionally provide support to and complement the SR IDP Task Force which co-ordinates responses to the internally displaced in the region. In addition, after advocacy with national level clusters, donors and other relevant groups, further actions on basic service provision will be followed by the clusters/ humanitarian working groups and the HRT SR including advocacy on civil-military related issues.

Security Incidents: Recent incidents in the last two months of 2010 include a suicide attack in District Shinkai of Zabul; an air attack on a shop in Kandahar city resulting in civilian casualties; a road side blast killing civilians in District Sangisar Kandahar; targeted killing of Education Literacy section Supervisor, Kandahar city; Several late night road side blasts in Kandahar city; a road side blast in District Spin Boldak resulted in the death of 3 civilians while some 15 other civilians were wounded. On 18 December, in Kandahar City, a blast killed two civilians including a child, while ten other civilians including six children were wounded. On another occasion, a roadside IED explosion killed one child with four others wounded. On 27 December, a car exploded at midday near a police compound and Kabul Bank killing 3 people and injuring 26.

I. Human Rights Violations¹

1. Basic Right to Security and Freedom of Movement:

Reports on Human Rights violations abound with increasing civilian casualties reported from the SR. Outstanding concerns relate to 43% increase in civilian deaths in the SR which witnessed the most civilian casualties with more than half of assassinations and executions killing more than 100 Afghan civilians. The number of war casualties at Mirwais Regional Hospital in Kandahar hit record highs in fall of 2010. The ICRCsupported hospital registered almost twice as many new patients with weapon-related injuries in August and September 2010 as



during the same months last year, with close to 1,000 victims compared with just over 500 during the same period in 2009.

Civilians assassinated and executed included teachers, nurses, doctors, tribal elders, community leaders, provincial and district officials, other civilians including children, and civilians working for international military forces and international organizations². In addition to increase in

¹ Please Note: All 2010 data is in the process of verification and may be considered as tentative

² Afghanistan Mid Year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2010 by UNAMA Human Rights, Kabul, 12 August 2010. Please see UNAMA HR Website for further details; and Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission Mid Year Report on Civilian Casualties, 2010 by AIHRC, 8 August 2010

civilian assassination, examination of the nature of the wounds treated at the Kandahar Physical Rehabilitation Centre at Mirwais Hospital shows that the number of maimed and injured civilians also increased in 2010^3 . *The above chart illustrates the human cost of the conflict*.

Restrictions on mobility have a compounded effect on women, especially for accessing basic services such as health. Women's rights are extremely limited and the current situation prevents access to assess the SGBV status in the SR. Cases rarely get reported and there are no mechanisms in place to provide redress either by communities, organisations or the government.

Intimidation tactics have seen a rapid rise and while not reflected in the casualty figuresabductions and assassinations, the establishment of illegal check points and the distribution of night letters have caused further deterioration in the security situation across affected areas.

These have proven to be extremely effective in spreading fear in exerting control over civilian populations and undermining support for the Afghan government and its international military allies. UNAMA HR noted that figures of abductions are often under reported for obvious reasons. Abductions are predominant in the SR. **AGE check points** remain rampant across the Region and are used for extortion and as tools of intimidation and harassment. These have a direct impact on the freedom of movement and impact on a range of rights including livelihoods and access to basic services such as health facilities. It is pertinent to note that International Military (IM) Forces check points in Marja and Nad Ali during Operation *Moshtarak* hindered the movement of civilians including the injured in need of medical assistance. **Night letters** are another intimidation tactic and warn entire communities to not send daughters to school, not let sons join the ANSF and to stop civilians from working with the Government etc.

The Spill-Over Effect of the casualties relates to disruption of Government activities due to attacks on government buildings, health and educational facilities (with direct impact on ability of children to attend school, women to visit health clinics etc. This has discouraged civilians from approaching provincial authorities for redress. Attacks on Government service providers such as teachers, doctors, and nurses not only deters access to such services but diminishes the impact of many critical services with direct negative effect on women and children who are often those primarily in need of these services. Overall this has resulted in weakened Protection of Civilians mechanisms, especially for women and children. The cultural context already makes it hard for women to report cases of violence and seek redress further compounding the situation.

There is reported information of affected women escaping violent homes and/ or forced marriages and ending up in prison. In Kandahar province, no shelter facilities are available for females abandoned by their families or fleeing domestic violence. In addition, reportedly some female prisoners cannot be released due to the absence of a male relative⁴.

2. <u>Children as Direct and Indirect Victims of the Conflict⁵</u>:

The **recruitment and use of children** by armed groups and national security forces was observed in the SR, especially within the Afghan National Police (ANP). **Children are detained due to their alleged association with armed groups** at NDS premises. Access to detention facilities is difficult to obtain and information/ tracing of cases is particularly challenging. Children are also detained by IM forces at international detention facilities in contravention of IHL, and in the context of conflicting jurisdictions guiding such detentions. There is concern that such detainees are not treated as children in line with international standards. Reportedly, no special protections

³ Physical Rehabilitation Centre run by Handicap International, Mirwais Hospital, Kandahar City, 2009 – 2010


⁴ "Afghanistan, Women remain prisoners", IRIN, 2 December 2010, <u>http://:www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=91270</u>

⁵ All data on Child Protection is indicative and shall be updated following finalization of the 2010 Report

are provided for such juveniles in IM Forces detention except the requirement that they must be accompanied by a special representative, not necessarily a lawyer, at their Detainee Review Board (DRB) hearings. However there is no evidence that such a requirement is consistently applied.

Killing and maiming of children continues, although the child casualty rate as a consequence of military operations by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)/ IM Forces was lower in 2010 than in 2009, children continue to be killed and injured due to air strikes and ground attacks, particularly due to imprecise targeting or misinformation. Killing of children by Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) on the suspicion that they were spies or for being associated with or supporting the IM Forces was reported. UNAMA Child Protection has reported that **494 children were killed and maimed in the South alone, amounting to 27.3% of total casualties in Afghanistan in 2010**. Figures show that in Kandahar and Helmand alone, 444 children were killed and injured in 2010

Graph of child casualties in the SR




| Month | Victims | Killed | Injured |
|-----------|---------|--------|---------|
| January | 48 | 21 | 27 |
| February | 44 | 28 | 16 |
| March | 46 | 16 | 30 |
| April | 28 | 14 | 14 |
| May | 25 | 9 | 16 |
| June | 59 | 32 | 27 |
| July | 67 | 36 | 31 |
| August | 47 | 16 | 31 |
| September | 30 | 4 | 26 |
| October | 53 | 26 | 27 |
| November | 24 | 11 | 13 |
| December | 23 | 12 | 11 |

Breakdown by perpetrators:

| Perpetrator | Number |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Pro Government Forces (PGF) | 98 (Killed and injured) |
| Anti Government Elements | 290 |
| Unclear | 106 |

| Province | Total victims | Killed | Injured |
|----------|---------------|--------|---------|
| Kandahar | 218 | 83 | 135 |
| Helmand | 226 | 112 | 114 |
| Nimroz | 5 | 5 | |
| Zabul | 23 | 10 | 13 |
| Uruzgan | 22 | 15 | 7 |
| Total | 494 | 225 | 269 |

According to UNAMA the first three months of 2010 showed high child casualties in the SR. The fighting season is usually the most intense through the summer months, which explains the high level of casualties shown in the table above. Operation *Mushtarak* in Marja/ Nad Ali districts of Helmand (which started in February 2010) caused many casualties. The indiscriminate methods of war by AOG resulted in high civilian casualties with 290 children killed (out of a total of 494 children) and maimed by AOG in the South in 2010 which is 59% of all child casualties there. Pro Government Forces (PGF) that include ANA, ANP, NDS and IM Forces are also responsible for 20% of child casualties in the SR. Perpetrators for 21% of the casualties remain un-attributed due to lack of access for verification and investigation purposes as a result of the insecurity in the SR.



Breakdown by Cause of death/ injury. The most common cause for child casualties in the SR in 2010 were IED detonations. IED is commonly used by AOGs to target PGF and their vehicles and cause civilian casualties. Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are the second cause of child casualties. Air strikes (conducted by IM Forces) caused 63 casualties among children.

The discrepancy in terms of number of casualties between cities (Lashkargah and Kandahar) and the districts is an indication of reduced access to rural areas. It could also be an indication of the difference of threats posed to children in particular and civilians in general whether they live in **rural or urban areas**, as the former face the possibilities of cross-fire, execution or air strike in the rural areas, while the latter are exposed to IEDs, which cause the greatest number of casualties in urban areas.

3. Impeded Access to Education, Health, Food and Other Critical Services:

Attacks on schools and hospitals: The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children Affected by Armed Conflict MRM CAAC recorded an increase in the number of explosives in schools and their vicinity, armed attacks against schools, collateral damage, schools affected by

military operations, and those used for political/ military purposes. Large scale closure of schools was noted as of March 2010 in the provinces of Helmand (more than 70%) and Zabul (more than 80%). Schools, students and individuals working for educational institutions have been attacked. 52 cases of attacks on schools, students and educational staff were recorded in all five Southern provinces and children's education was heavily affected in Kandahar and Helmand, where 39 of the incidents occurred.

| onateral damage, schools affected by | | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| Province | Number of attacks on education | | |
| Kandahar | 22 | | |
| Helamand | 17 | | |
| Zabul | 2 | | |
| Uruzgan | 10 | | |
| Nimroz | 1 | | |
| Attacks and Schools students and advectional | | | |

Attacks on Schools, students and educational staff

Due to absence of humanitarian access to remote parts of the SR where fighting and insecurity prevails and fears of retaliation, it is believed that incidents affecting health facilities are significantly under-reported. However, the deteriorating security situation and continued attacks on health workers and facilities have forced many health facilities to close or scale down services, resulting in no or limited access to basic healthcare.10 attacks were recorded on health facilities and staff in 2010 in Helmand and Kandahar provinces and most of these occurred during the first five months of the year. The incidents include search operations, IED, burning and closure of hospitals.

Access is constrained, while the health needs remain acute. As a result of insecurity, the Health Cluster estimates that access to the most basic health care (such as Community Health Workers - CHWs) is the lowest in the country, with between 30% and 55% of the population having difficulties or no access to health services. For example, in Kandahar (pop-1.1 million), only 48% of health facilities are functioning. The rest are closed due to insecurity, suspension or are still being built, namely in Shrabak, Reg, Ghorak and Miyanashin districts. In Kajaki district, there are no health partners available. In Maruf district, one Extended Programme on Immunization centre (vaccination programme for children) and 1 one basic health centre covers the needs of a population of 15,000 to 30,000 persons. In Zabul province, population coverage by CHWs is a mere 23%. Daichopan, Atghar, Arghandab, Qalat, Tarnak -O- Jaldak and Shahjoy districts have no active basic or comprehensive health facilities or district hospitals. In Helmand province, Musa Qala, Reg -i- khan sheen, Washeir, SanginQalah, Dishu, Nawa-I- Barak Zayi, NawZad, Kajaki districts have either no or inactive comprehensive and/or basic health facilities.

Population mobility to functioning health facilities is also impaired by road insecurity and/or prohibitive transport cost. In Helmand, patients attending provincial hospital reported that the cost of transportation from Helmand to Lashkargar is 3,000 AFG. Lack of access to specialised health services for **pregnant women** with complications can be fatal for the mother and the newborn.

The SR is frequently affected by epidemics that by-pass the local response capacity (200 outbreaks in 2010). The vast majority of these epidemics are affecting children and are caused by vaccine preventable diseases. WHO reports that 90% of the 24 **polio** cases reported in Afghanistan for the year 2010 (a decrease as compared with 2009) took place in 13 high risk districts of the Southern Region, namely Kandahar, Spin Boldak, Panjwai, Maiwand/Ziarai, Shah wali kot (Kandahar province), Musa Qilla, Nade Ali, Sangeen, Nauzad (Helmand Province), Urozgan, Dehrawod, Tirinkot, Shahid Hasas (Uruzgan Province).

The Southern Region is an **endemic cholera outbreak** area, and while medical teams are trained and on standby to respond in 48 hours, some places are unreachable for ambulances and mobile teams. Displacement also increases outbreaks as illnesses resulting from overcrowding such as measles or TB, are likely in camp-like environments. Vector-borne illnesses such as malaria are also a threat for displaced people, as they are shifted to a new environment with a strain to which they are not immune. Finally, with conflict and difficulty to access populations, vaccinations such as polio and vitamin A supplementation, including de-worming campaigns, are disrupted.

Ongoing conflict also severely affects **food security** as it impedes food routes and access to markets. For example, reports indicate that owing to escalation of PGF military operations in Malajath area (located around 4 km from Kandahar), an important vegetable supply area for Kandahar city, vegetable supplies are becoming rare in local markets and prices are increasing, further impacting on the poorest and most vulnerable families.

The impact of military operations on standing crops/ orchards/ fields including on homes has resulted in displacement of populations including destruction of traditional livelihood measures. For instance the destruction of pomegranate orchards including the impact of land mines/ ERW will deter resumption of this traditional livelihood activity.

4. Military tactics violate International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

Location of Military Facilities in civilian areas is of concern as attacks on them lead to increased civilian casualties. The risk is also evident from IM/ ANA forces due to misfired rockets and mortars that fall short of or miss their targets. Escalations of force issues (PGF attack on a civilian vehicle if it fails to stop) have resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties, with the majority occurring in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. Transparent Investigations and improved conduct of tactics are essential especially as it violates IHL and IHRL (imperative for conflicting parties to distinguish between civilians and combatants).

The impact of **large scale military operations**⁶ in the SR has not yet visibly resulted in increased protection for civilians, many of whom remain in displacement, besides the perpetual risk to those who still remain in places of origin. Elders have reported from the Kandahar area that prior information by IM/ ANA to launch military operations caused the Taliban to plant more IEDs and


⁶ According to NATO sources, cited in the UNAMA Political Update (13-19 December 2010), Special Forces conducted more than 1,700 operations between October and early December 2010. The New York Times report that 10,000 American and allied forces are stationed in Kandahar area. "In the Taliban's heartland, US and Afghan forces dig in" 4/02/2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/world/asia/05afghanistan.html? r=1&ref=global-home

intensify their campaign of intimidation against PGF. This resulted in increased risk to life as well as loss of farm lands, harvest and access to livelihood among others⁷.

Forceful Eviction and Internal Displacement includes unlawful eviction of civilians for military purposes. At the border of Panjwai and Maiwand District (Kandahar Province) and especially in Zhari district (Kandahar Province), reports from communities were received of IM Forces damage to houses, agricultural lands and properties as new roads are made to avoid normal routes that are mined. Evicted individuals are reported to be living with host families (men sleep in mosques and women with host families). This forced displacement is in violation of international humanitarian law IHL (Additional Protocol II to Geneva Conventions, art.17) and compensation should be provided to the owners of damaged and destroyed properties and lands upon their return, as indicated in the *Pinheiro Principles*.

Redress and Compensation to those affected by the armed offensives remains unclear as there is limited knowledge and access to procedures. Advocacy efforts including by the Afghanistan Protection Cluster, resulted in the **North Atlantic Council issuing non-binding guidelines for civilian compensation** to all troop-contributing nations in Afghanistan. This is seen as a positive step however, due to their non-binding nature and absence of proper implementation guidance, these guidelines have failed to provide a unified compensation scheme, leading to continued gaps in redress and compensation. Urgent need for a transparent and functional mechanism for tracking and investigating claims of civilian casualties and damages is underscored.


Land Mines - According to the National Database of Mine Action, managed by the MACCA, **260 communities** (out of a total of 5,613 communities in the 34 districts) **are contaminated** in the SR by landmine and ERW, affecting more than 686 hazardous areas with a total size of 167 square kilometers of contaminated land⁸. In 2010, 34% of the victims of landmines and ERW were from the five provinces of the SR. Within the SR, Kandahar Province as a major battle ground is currently one of the most heavily contaminated provinces in the country (representing around 13% of the country's contaminated area despite over 100 million square meters already cleared). Landmines and ERW also highly contaminate the northeastern districts of Helmand Province (including Sangin, Nawzad, Kajaki and NahriSarraj) down through Panjwai-Zhari valley and Maiwand districts located Southwest of Kandahar city as well as some southeastern districts of Kandahar including Daman, Spin Boldak and Arghistan.



Data from the National Database of Mine Action as of 31st December 2010. NB. Insecurity in the region makes it difficult to continually update the landmine and ERW data.

⁷ This information was made available to UNHCR by community representatives seeking assistance for the internally displaced. ⁸ Data from the National Database of Mine Action as of 31st December 2010

Victims - Although nationally the rate of casualties caused by mines and ERW has dropped significantly in the last ten years, the SR has seen this number fluctuating between 2003 and 2008 (with a peak in 2007) and increasing between 2009 and 2010. Unfortunately, it has remained constant, which is likely due to the ongoing conflict restricting humanitarian access and in some cases (e.g. Abandoned IEDs) increasing contamination. 211 landmines and ERW casualties were recorded by the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) in 2010. These figures exclude casualties caused by IEDs. *The following chart illustrates a yearly breakdown*.



Abandoned IED (AIED) fields - Abandoned Improvised Explosive Devices (A-IEDs) are threatening the lives of civilians, causing accidents leading to casualties, prohibiting economic development, livelihoods and impact on the right to housing and property restitution. In 2010, over 12 square kilometers of A-IED area has been recorded in the SR and some clearing efforts are underway⁹.

At the border of Panjwai and Maiwand districts, Kandahar Province, especially in Zhari districts Kandahar Province (where fighting is ongoing), IM Forces/ ANA are building and paving new roads for military purposes to avoid the areas contaminated with mines and IEDs, leading to the destruction of and damage to properties and lands. With no properties providing protection and sources of income, some inhabitants have left their villages and now live with host families.

5. <u>Internal Displacement</u>

(Information on internal displacements due to the conflict is provided in Annexe 1.)

Through the course of 2010 an estimated 84,298 persons have been reported as displaced due to the conflict in the SR. This includes vulnerable families identified through the three rapid profiling initiatives between September-December 2010 in Kandahar city and does not include the numbers scattered across the urban and semi urban areas of the SR. Due to the absence of humanitarian access to the remote parts of the SR where fighting and insecurity prevails, information on numbers of persons displaced along with their living condition and protection situation is limited. This **absence of timely information has a critical impact on any possible humanitarian redress.**

Reports of rampant land mines/ UXOs and destruction of crops/ fields/ homes/ properties is bound to have a direct impact on the ability of the displaced populations to consider **voluntarily return** to their places of origin and to resume livelihoods even on rapid cessation of the conflict. Given the trends of 2010, it is apparent that the period spent in displacement will be longer for those affected by the conflict in the SR as opposed to past trends.

⁹ Due to the ongoing conflict in the South, where in some areas IEDs are being laid in a way similar to that of historical minefields, MAPA has exceptionally collected in 2010 information on these devices.

Deterioration of the protection situation of IDPs in places of displacement can be expected in the medium term, especially given the harsh climate of the SR and the absence of critical services/ facilities available in places of displacement. The likelihood of secondary displacement to semiurban/ urban areas within and outside the SR is high for this reason. Heightened risk of already vulnerable groups (women/ children/ elderly/ disabled etc) amongst the IDPs is imminent in the absence of an expedited return to normalcy leading to voluntary return of IDPs in safety and dignity to their places of origin.

| | Place of | Displacement | Displaced Population | | Place of Origin | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|--|--|
| * | Province District | Displaced Population | | Province District | Cause of Displacement | | |
| | | District | Family | Individuals | . 1041108 | District | |
| 1 | Hilmand | Lashkargah City | 4,260 | 27,000 | Hilmand | Marjah & NadAli | Joint Military Operation "Mushtarak" [02/2010] |
| 2 | Hilmand | Lashkargah City | 25 | 150 | Hilmand | Nad Ali | Joint Military Operation "Tor Shehzad" [06/2010] |
| | Total D | isplaced | 4,285 | 27,150 | | | |
| 3 | Kandahar | Kandahar City | 629 | 4536 | Kandahar | Arghandab | Joint Military Operation "Hamkari" [05/2010] |
| 4 | Kandahar | Kandahar City | 2004 | 15,249 | Kandahar | Zhari, Panjwai, Maywand & Arghandab | Joint Military Operation "Dragon Strike" [09/2010] |
| 5 | Kandahar | Kandahar City | 130 | 780 | Kandahar | Maywand | Joint Military Operation & Conflict, [12/2010] |
| 6 | Kandahar | Arghandab | 1,650 | 9900 | Kandahar | Arghandab | Joint Military Operation & Conflict, [08/2010] |
| 7 | Kandahar | Zhari | 1,000 | 6000 | Kandahar | Zhari | Joint Military Operation & Conflict, [10/2010] |
| Total Displaced | | 5413 | 36465 | | | | |
| 8 | Zabul | Qalat | 1,492 | 8952 | Zabul | Ataghar, Shinkay, Nawbał | Insecurity, armed conflict and drought, [02/2010] |
| 9 | Zabul | Shahjoyee | 554 | 3324 | Zabul | Shahjoyee | insecurity, aremed conflict and drought, [02/2010] |
| | Total Displaced | | 2,046 | 12,276 | | | |
| 10 | Uruzgan | Uruzgan | 778 | 4668 | Uruzgan | Khas Uruzgan, Chora & C | Insecurity, armed conflict and drought,[04/2009] |
| 11 | Uruzgan | Uruzgan Center | 277 | 1,939 | Uruzgan | Khas Uruzgan | Internal dispute (Hazara & Pashtun), [06/2010] |
| Total Displaced 1.055 6.607 | | | | | | | |
| 12 | Nimroz | Khashrod | 300 | 1,800 | Helmand | Nad Ali | Joint Military Operation "Mushtarak" [02/2010] |
| | Total D | isplaced | 300 | 1,800 | | | |
| Grand Total South 13,099 84,298 | | | | | | | |

Matrix indicating estimates of persons displaced due to the conflict in the SR IN 2010¹⁰

II. Humanitarian Access

Humanitarian access to vulnerable communities is compounded in the SR by several factors, security being the chief concern with implications for the severely limited humanitarian presence in the region. Denial of humanitarian access considered a violation of international humanitarian law remained a persistent constraint through 2010.

Threat and Attacks on humanitarian personnel, UN and NGOs: National and International humanitarian actors present in the SR face serious security challenges that limit their ability to reach, identify and assist persons in need. 2010 trends indicate that the level of threat against humanitarian staff remained high and stable, while the number of attacks by AOG was steady and high in most provinces, although rising in Helmand and Uruzgan provinces. At the same time, PGF launched several military operations (*Moshtarak* in February, *Hamkari* in May, *Dragon Strike* in September and *Tor Shahzad*). Most of these continue currently and further limit humanitarian movements and action.

Analyzing the possible risks to UN staff (with 5 indicators being armed conflict, terrorism, crime, civil unrest and hazards), UNDSS estimated that both Helmand and Kandahar provinces' security level are high, while the level is deemed "substantial" for Nimroz, Zabul and Uruzgan regions.

¹⁰ The Matrix has been developed based on information available with UNHCR through its implementing partners and through communities. Some of the displacement information included is still under verification.

According to ANSO, 4 NGO staff were abducted in 2010 in Kandahar¹¹ and 4 attacks targeted NGO personnel, killing 7 NGO staff in the South (all working for de-mining NGOs)¹².

Both Kandahar and Helmand provinces saw respectively 1162 and 1387 attacks led by AOGs, which constitute for the latter **a 124% increase from 2009**. 356 and 353 attacks were conducted in Uruzgan and Zabul, and 108 in Nimroz¹³. At district level, the most affected districts were are Nad Ali, Sangin, NahriSarraj and Lashkar Gah in Helmand province; Panjwai and Kandahar in Kandahar province; TirinKot and Chora for Uruzgan province; and Qalat in Zabul Province¹⁴. It is noteworthy that the number of attacks in Uruzgan has risen since 2009, exceeding the 200 attacks threshold in 2010¹⁵.

Denial of humanitarian access: Denial of humanitarian access to civilians and attacks against humanitarian workers are prohibited under the 4th Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols¹⁶. Such denial of access including attacks may constitute crime against humanity and/or war crime.¹⁷ The principle of customary international law that parties to a conflict must allow and facilitate aid to any civilian population in need, subject to their right of control may be noted¹⁸.

54 specific cases of denial of humanitarian access cases were recorded with most of the incidents in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. These include all actions taken by parties to the conflict that prevents access and assistance to civilians in need. This entails (but is not limited to) IED attacks, intimidation to humanitarian agencies, attacks on humanitarian offices and convoys, looting and destruction of goods, checkpoints, illegal

| Province | Number of incidents denying humanitarian Access |
|----------|---|
| Kandahar | 31 |
| Helmand | 13 |
| Zabul | 3 |
| Uruzgan | 3 |
| Nimroz | 4 |

detention and abduction of staff. In 2010, reports show that the checkpoints erected by both parties were a critical issue, as it hindered the access of civilians to hospitals.

Specificity of Kandahar: According to the ANSO report, the number of incidents caused by AOG in Kandahar showed an increase in 2010¹⁹. In addition, trends indicate that the military operations within the city may further rise in early 2011. This is particularly concerning since Kandahar constitutes the main SR humanitarian hub for several agencies and NGOs operating in there. The city also hosts IDPs uprooted by various military operations in the region. Rise in incidents and military activities in the city will lead to further risks and reduced movement of humanitarian organizations and their assistance operations within and outside the city. This will have direct consequences for vulnerable families living in Kandahar and in neighboring areas.

Possible security trends for early 2011: Given the increase in insecurity and incidents affecting civilians in 2010, the security situation in the SR is expected to remain unstable in the early part of 2011. The ongoing military operations are reportedly expanding to remote areas, in the North and South of the SR and to other districts of Helmand, Zabul and Uruzgan Provinces with intensive military activities in Kandahar province and within the city itself.

¹⁷ Art. 8(2)(b), 8(2)(e) Rome Statute

¹¹ ANSO Quaterly Data Report (4), 2010, p.13

¹² ANSO Quaterly Data Report (3), 2010, p.6 and 8

¹³ ANSO Quarterly Data Report (4), 2010, p.13

¹⁴ In those districts, UNDSS report in 2010 between 150 and 499 security incidents

¹⁵ ANSO Quarterly Report, 2010, p. 14. Please refer p.12 for more detailed information, with AGF attacks broken down by district

¹⁶ Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Art. 23 and 142; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, art. 54, 70 and 77; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, art. 14 and 18.

¹⁸ Customary Rule 55 in: Customary Rules 1 – 6 in: ICRC, *Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. 1: Rules*, Cambridge University Press (2005), p. 193

¹⁹ The daily attack rate has grown from 0.1 (week 1) to 2.8 (week 35), ANSO Quarterly Report, 2010, p 13

Insufficient civil-military cooperation: Despite a coordination mechanism in place in the South²⁰ and repeated requests, International Military and Afghan military forces remain reluctant to share with humanitarian actors any relevant information about displacement within military operational areas. This situation is further hampering the ability to access and offer primary humanitarian protection and assistance to affected population. The role of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) has also been widely questioned especially in terms of the blurring of lines between humanitarian action and that of the PRTs. Moreover information sharing by PRTs on their assistance responses has been lacking.

Humanitarian Presence: Humanitarian access is further compounded by the relatively small number of humanitarian organizations working in the region compared to the rest of the country, despite urgent and vital needs. Humanitarian actors present on the ground are key UN agencies and their national implementing partners (including governmental departments), ICRC, Afghanistan Red Cross Society and a few international organizations (Tearfund, Emergency Life Support for Civilian War Victims, BRAC, Save the Children and MSF)²¹.

²⁰ OCHA Co Chairs Monthly Civil-Military Coordination meetings with the Military

²¹ OCHA 3W for the Southern Region

ANNEXE 1

CONFLICT INDUCED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT in 2010 (SOUTHERN REGION)

Note: The figures reflect those identified due to their visibility in displacement especially in urban centres, except where information was made available by community representatives. The data does not include those displaced within remote/ non-accessible locations and those scattered in small groups in urban and semi urban areas or those who have fled to outside the SR.

I. Helmand

1. Displacement within Helmand from Marjah and Nad Ali to Lashkargah City – February to April 2010: 4260 families/ 27,000 persons displaced. Recent survey indicates that 900 families remain in Lashkargah

As a result of military operation *Mushtarak* in Helmand which started on 08 February 2010 - July 2010, **4,260 families/ approx. 27,000 individuals** were reported to have been displaced from Marjah and Nad Ali areas of Helmand province. Of these 3,830 families settled in Lashkargah City, 300 families fled to Khash Rod and 130 families to Nawa. All those recorded as displaced were assisted with food and non-food items by WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF in July 2010. 52% of displaced families were initially reportedly staying with host families, while 46% were in rented accommodation. In addition, approx. 80 IDP families who had no alternative accommodation were hosted in Mukhtar IDP settlement.

The Department of Refugees and Repatriation (DoRR) has reported return of IDPs from Lashkargah City to Marjah and Nad Ali in October 2010 with **3,499 families** having returned. The return process was reportedly spontaneous and scattered and could not be monitored by DoRR. According to DoRR Helmand, about **900 families** (300 families from Nad Ali and 600 families from Marja) still remain in Lashkargah City. However, further displacement of 573 IDP families was reported. *There is no confirmation of the arrival of alleged IDP returnees to their places of origin in Marjah and Nad Ali. It is not known whether they have moved on to secondary displacement elsewhere*.

Families who have fled from Marjah provide the following reasons for their re-displacement: Concern of being caught between the AOG, the IM and ANSF; AOG using civilian homes to target ANSF/ IM Forces checkpoints; Abandoned houses used by the AOGs as well as the tendency to plant IEDs outside civilian homes. The situation in Marjah and Nad Ali reportedly continues to prevent IDPs from returning home, as reports from the area indicate that the overall security situation has not improved. Prevailing insecurity and continued presence of AOG in villages of origin in Marjah and Nad Ali districts has been a deterrent to return. Clean up operation was ongoing in Marjah and Nad Ali at the end of 2010. Following the mid-term assessment conducted by UNHCR and its partners on the ground, a second round of food distribution to IDPs in Lashkargah from Marjah and Nad Ali was completed in September. A fresh survey was conducted in November-December to enable assessment of winterisation needs.

2. Displacement within Helmand: IDPs to Lashkargah City from Nad Ali (Operation *Tor Shehzadah*) July 2010: (25 families)

Due to military operation *Tor Shehzadah* which reportedly started in end July 2010 in Nad Ali district of Helmand province, 25 families were displaced from Chah-e-Angeer, Chah-e-Merza and Ali Abad villages into Lashkargah City. As per the reports some of these families moved to Nawa and other parts of the district.

3. Displacement from Nad Ali, Sangen and Nawzad to Lashkargah – December 2010: According to DoRR and HAPA, some families have been uprooted to Lashkargah from Nad Ali, Sangen and Nawzad districts including Babaji, division of Lashkargah City (located on the other side of Helmand river) in the course of December 2010. This movement was reportedly caused by the establishment of new security posts by IM Forces in the area where families were caught in the crossfire. 20 Tajik families reportedly fled from Lewar Kanai valley to Nawzad (bordering Ghor province) due to threats from the AOG who reportedly killed three members of their families considered to be linked to the IM Forces. This information is currently being verified.

II. Kandahar

1. Displacements into Kandahar City from Arghandab (military operation *Hamkari*): 629 Families/ 4,536 Individuals in July 2010

The military operation *Hamkari* started in May 2010 and extended to nearby districts mainly in Arghandab in July and led to the displacement of large number of families, of whom **629 families/ app. 4,536 individuals** were identified as vulnerable in Kandahar City mainly in and around districts 9, 1, 8, 7, Loya Wala and Merza Mohammad Khan Kalacha. In response to IDP arrivals into Kandahar city, UNHCR led rapid assessments in collaboration with local government authorities (DoRR & ANDMA) and a local implementing partner (HAPA) from August 21 to September, where they identified the 629 extremely vulnerable IDP families. The need assessment and profiling exercise was followed by a joint response by UNHCR and WFP to the immediate distribution of food and non-food items to affected displaced families in August. The distribution process was undertaken jointly with DoRR, HAPA, RRD and ANDMA. The findings of this assessment highlighted, beside the immediate needs (food and NFIs), need for potable water, shelter, health services and education.

2. Displacements from Zhari, Panjwai, Arghandab, Dand & Maywand to Kandahar City (Military Operation *Dragon Strike*) September 2010: 2,400 Families/ 15,249 Individuals

Following *Hamkari* Military Operation extension in Kandahar, another operation *Dragon Strike* started in September focusing on Zhari, Panjwai and Arghandab districts. A joint survey comprising DoRR, ANDMA, RRD and HAPA including WFP PAT teams and initiated by UNHCR was conducted in October and recorded 1,189 families/ 9286 extremely vulnerable IDPs. The place of origin of displaced families was stated as Arghandab 791 families, Zhari 708 families, Panjwai 296 families, Dand 131 families and Maywand 75 families.

815 families were additionally identified as extremely vulnerable IDPs from the mentioned locations into Kandahar City, according to another rapid assessment undertaken in end December 2010 by WFP, DoRR and UNHCR. Heavy fighting (shelling and air strikes) reportedly forced people to leave their homes and which also caused damage to their agriculture and properties.

The extremely vulnerable IDP families are located in different parts of Kandahar City mainly Loy Wala, Mirwais Mina, Haji Arab, Mirza Mohammad Khan Qalacha, Irazi and other parts of Kandahar City. The assessment findings reveal that the immediate needs of IDP families are food, non-food items, kitchen utensil, plastic sheeting, blankets and jerry cans and potable water. Distribution of food and non-food items was undertaken in November 2010 for all 1,189 IDP families and in December for the newly identified vulnerable families.

3. Displacements within Arghandab District due to Military Operations: 1650 families

As a result of the conflict in 2010, **1650 families** have been reportedly displaced within Arghandab district (mainly to the North-west of Arghandab river and some close to the district centre). Humanitarian agencies have been unable to access to the area to monitor the situation of

displaced families, due to armed conflict. Information has been trickling in on the number of displaced families collected from community representatives who visited UNHCR in Kandahar.

Representatives of the *Arghandab Shura* reported that due to the summer operation a large number of families were affected and forced to leave their places of origin. Some of those families moved to Kandahar City while most vulnerable families have remained within the district. Reportedly 100-150 houses were completely destroyed and affected families are living in difficult conditions with host families (males are living in mosques while women and children are with host families). By end of December 2010 no assistance had been provided but the authorities have promised to help rehabilitate the damaged houses in the area. The families indicate reluctant to return unless the area is cleared of landmines, especially since the roads are heavily mined and to avoid these, the military forces are forging access through cultivated lands, vegetable plots, houses, etc resulting in further damage to the affected populations.

4. Displacements within Zhari District (military operations 2010): 1000 families

As a result of the conflict, **1000 families** have been displaced within Zhari district (Zhari desert to the west). Humanitarian agencies have not had access to the area due to the conflict. Information on the number of displaced families has been collected from IDP representatives and *Zhari shura* members. According to the District administrator of Zhari, the operation of September 2010 affected almost 187 villages in Zhari District except Sanzarai area. Most of the people have left due to the insecurity, including destruction of their houses. Most of the houses were destroyed when mines were planted inside reportedly to prevent access to coalition forces. The military therefore exploded most of suspected houses in the area. The families are living with host families and/or in the mosques in difficult conditions.

The District administrator said that they have reported the situation to local authorities and have received instructions from the Presidential office to re-evaluate the situation and report. They will, therefore conduct a survey of the damages in the area as well as the displacement during the operation. They have promised to share the findings on completion of the survey.

5. Arrivals from Bandi Timor village of Maiwand District - A further new group of 130 families has arrived into Kandahar city from Bandi-Timor of Maiwand District in December. The IDP families have moved to the Loya Wala and Zore Shahr areas of Kandahar city.

The Extremely Vulnerable Individuals thought to be comprising over 4000 IDP families are expected to remain during the winter in Kandahar City.

III. Zabul

Displacements within Zabul district in February – April 2010: 2000 families

Due to insecurity and conflict coupled with drought, in mid 2010, some **2000 families** have been displaced from various districts of Zabul province (Ataghar, Shinkay, Nawbahar, Shumulzai, Shahjoy, Deh Chopan and Khaki Afghan) within and around Qalat City. Reportedly, the displaced families are living with host families, in rented houses and tents. Need assessment survey has been conducted by Provincial Disaster Management Commission (PDMC) including WFP monitors and HAPA (UNHCR IP). Findings reveal that the major humanitarian needs of the affected IDP families are food and NFIs including health and education for their children. In September, distribution of food and non-food items was completed by UNHCR and WFP. As per DoRR Zabul, number of IDP families has increased to **2,046 families** (1,492 in Qalat and 554 in ShahJoy district). DoRR Zabul is in the process of verifying new arrivals.

IV. Uruzgan

1. Displacements from Khas Uruzgan and within Trinkot, Chora & Char Chinar, due to Insecurity, Armed Conflict and Drought in March April 2009: 778 Families

Due to conflict and drought, **778 families** originally from districts of Uruzgan (Khas Uruzgan, Chora and Char China) have been displaced within the districts and provincial center in Trin Kot (353 families), Chora (266 families) and Char China (159 families) districts of Uruzgan. The reported information is pending further verification.

2. Displacements to Uruzgan District Centre from Uruzgan Khas due to insecurity in June 2010: 277 Families/ 1,939 Individuals

As reported by DoRR Uruzgan, due to internal dispute between Hazara and Pashtuns, **277 families** left their village of origin Baghochar for Shashper and Seros villages in the proximity of the district centre. The Hazara village of Baghochar is located approximately 15 km from the Khas Uruzgan district centre. Reportedly, 242 families live with host families in Shashper village, 20 families occupy a girls' school, and 15 families live in Sero village mosque. Due to the conflict the area is inaccessible for government and NGOs. Access is further challenged due to IEDs particularly around Mehrabad area 4 KM from the district centre.

According to indications the situation of the displaced families was not life threatening, but could become worse if not addressed, due to the winter. Provision of assistance is limited from Terin Kot for security reasons. Other routes through other provinces mainly Ghazni (Jaghori district) might be deliberated as all routes connecting to the district are insecure except through air. It is believed that the US Military (USSF) unit in Khas Uruzgan has provided several shipments of Humanitarian supplies (clothing primarily) to assist the families with short-term needs. Immediate needs of the affected families are reportedly woollen clothing, boots/shoes, bedding, blanket, heaters and fuel, cooking items, lamps and kerosene. At the mid-term tents and shelters are needed as with the onset of the school session they will need to evacuate the school.

IV. Nimroz

Displacements from Helmand – Nad Ali and Marjah to Kashrod area of Nimroz (Military operation *Moshtarak*): 300 families. However these families are said to have left Nimroz and are assumed to have returned to Nad Ali

As a result of joint military operation 'Moshtarak' in February 2010 in Helmand, **300 families** were displaced from Marjah to Khashrod district of Nimroz province. Following immediate need assessment by local authorities, NGOs and community elders in Khashrod district, all 300 families were identified to be in urgent need of food and non-food items. An emergency plan of action was implemented and the affected families provided with food and non-food items by WFP and UNICEF. These families are reported to have returned to Nad Ali, however confirmation of the return is yet to be obtained.
