



Home Office

**Border &  
Immigration Agency**

REPORT OF FACT FINDING MISSION 11– 15 JUNE 2007

# SOMALIA

---

20 JULY 2007

# Contents

---

## Introduction

## Background

### Humanitarian situation - Mogadishu

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) .....	2.01
Availability of food and water .....	2.05
Availability of shelter .....	2.08
Availability of health care .....	2.10

### Humanitarian situation – outside Mogadishu

Internally displaced persons .....	3.01
The effect of IDPs .....	3.04
Availability of health care.....	3.06
Re-opening of schools .....	3.08

### Security situation - Mogadishu

Outbreaks of violence .....	4.01
Transitional Federal Government.....	4.10
Clan conflict .....	4.18
Police presence .....	4.23
African Union presence.....	4.26
Checkpoints .....	4.27
Security situation – ordinary Somalis and returnees.....	4.28

### Security situation - elsewhere

Transitional Federal Government.....	5.01
Outbreaks of violence .....	5.04
Checkpoints security.....	5.06
Clan protection.....	5.12

### Travel

Between the airport and the city.....	6.01
In the city .....	6.10
Away from Mogadishu.....	6.13

## Statements of Sources

S1 An executive of an internationally recognised NGO .....	27
S2 An airline executive .....	30
S3 A security adviser of a relevant department of the UN .....	32
S4 Executives of an internationally recognised NGO .....	34
S5 A relevant department of the UN .....	37
S6 A security adviser to Western governments .....	40
S7 An airline executive .....	42
S8 Somali NGO executives, of Somali descent.....	44
S9 A relevant department of the UN .....	45
S10 An academic researcher of Somali descent.....	47
S11 An adviser to an EU institution.....	49
S12 Somali NGO executive of Somali descent .....	51
S13 Security advisers on Somalia .....	53
S14 An executive of an NGO operating in Somalia.....	55
S15 An embassy official .....	57
S16 A journalist for an international news agency .....	59
S17 Somali NGO executive of Somali descent.....	61
S18 Somali contacts of a relevant department of the UN.....	63
S19 Security advisers of a relevant department of the UN.....	65
S20 An executive of an NGO based in Somalia.....	68
S21 A researcher for a major NGO .....	70

## Annexes

- Annex A – Glossary
- Annex B – Guide to clans
- Annex C – Map of Somalia
- Annex D – References to source material

## Introduction

---

- i In the light of continually and rapidly changing events in Mogadishu during May 2007, a mission led by Country of Origin Information (COI) Service visited Nairobi in order to obtain up to date information on conditions in central and southern Somalia. The mission was carried out during the period 11 – 15 June 2007.

### TERMS OF REFERENCE

- ii The terms of reference for the fact-finding mission were to gather information on the humanitarian and security situations in Mogadishu, and more generally in central and southern Somalia, and the limitations of travel in the region. The mission did not seek to obtain information about Somaliland or Puntland in the northern part of the country.

### METHODOLOGY

- iii This report has been compiled by the Country of Origin Information Service for use by officials involved in the asylum / human rights determination process. The report comprises information obtained whilst visiting the country and from reports from a variety of recognised sources. It is not exhaustive; if some facts or events are not mentioned this is by no means an indication that they do not exist, but invariably due to the information either not being available or the fluidity of the present situation. The report does not include any Home Office opinion or policy.
- iv All individuals and organisations referred to in this report were advised of the purpose of this report and care has been taken to present their views in an accurate and transparent way. Every interlocutor has seen the note of their interview in draft form, made amendments where necessary, and given explicit consent for it to be published. Several of the interlocutors requested that they should not be directly identified in the report and the level of anonymity required has been reflected in the descriptor for each source. Care has been taken to present the views of the various interlocutors in an accurate and transparent way. A full list of news sources is at Annex D.
- v The mission team was based in Nairobi and held meetings with a number of individuals and organisations with detailed knowledge of the position on the ground in Mogadishu and central and southern Somalia. These included an adviser to an EU institution; inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations; Kenyan airline executives; an expert advisor to a western government; and a journalist from an international news agency. Unfortunately it has not yet been possible to contact sources [4], [5], [9] and [11] to obtain their confirmation of our record of the meeting with them. For this reason the note of their interviews are in draft form, pending their approval, which we expect to obtain shortly.
- vi The programme of meetings for the mission was organised by the British High Commission to Kenya and COI Service is very grateful for the assistance and support provided.

Country of Origin Information Service  
Home Office  
Apollo House  
36 Wellesley Road  
Croydon CR9 3RR  
United Kingdom

Email: [cois@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:cois@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk)

Website: [http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/country\\_reports.html](http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/country_reports.html)

### ADVISORY PANEL ON COUNTRY INFORMATION

- vii The independent Advisory Panel on Country Information was established under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to make recommendations to the Home Secretary about the content of the Home Office's country of origin information material. The Advisory Panel welcomes all feedback on the Home Office's COI Reports and other country of origin information material. Information about the Panel's work can be found on its website at [www.apci.org.uk](http://www.apci.org.uk).
- viii It is not the function of the Advisory Panel to endorse any Home Office material or procedures. In the course of its work, the Advisory Panel directly reviews the content of selected individual Home Office COI Reports, but neither the fact that such a review has been undertaken, nor any comments made, should be taken to imply endorsement of the material. Some of the material examined by the Panel relates to countries designated or proposed for designation for the Non-Suspensive Appeals (NSA) list. In such cases, the Panel's work should not be taken to imply any endorsement of the decision or proposal to designate a particular country for NSA, nor of the NSA process itself.

#### **Advisory Panel on Country Information contact details:**

**Email:** [apci@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:apci@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk)

**Website:** [www.apci.org.uk](http://www.apci.org.uk)

**[Return to contents](#)**

## Background

---

The following summary of background events is taken from the BBC Timeline for Somalia. [7c]

- 1.01 The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was inaugurated at a ceremony in Kenya in 2004, but was prevented from fully functioning in Somalia due to insecurity in the country and internal divisions over where the new parliament should be based. The TFG became physically unified for the first time in Baidoa in early 2006. Soon after this, during March – May 2006, battles between rival militias in Mogadishu killed hundreds of civilians and injured many others. During June – July 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) (particularly favoured by the Hawiye clan) took control of Mogadishu and other parts of the south after defeating rival clan warlords.
- 1.02 The UIC and the TFG were unable to reach agreement in the peace talks held in Khartoum, Sudan. The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles, announced that Ethiopia was technically at war with the Islamists in Somalia because they had declared *jihād* on his country. In response to this perceived Islamist threat Ethiopian troops and the TFG launched an attack against the UIC on 22 December 2006 and succeeded in ousting them from Mogadishu. Following this, the TFG installed itself in the city, and by the end of January 2007 the TFG and Ethiopian forces controlled, to some extent, most of central and southern Somalia.
- 1.03 On February 20 2007 the UN Security Council authorized the African Union to establish a peace keeping mission in Somalia for six months with the aim of supporting the national reconciliation conference. During March – April 2007, heavy fighting between the insurgents and the government forces, described by the UN as the worst fighting the country had seen for sixteen years, displaced approximately 390,000 people from the city. More sophisticated, targeted attacks by the insurgents have continued since that period of the heaviest fighting, including an attempted suicide car bomb attack on Somali Prime Minister Ghedi. Many civilians have been killed in the retaliatory spray shooting by TFG/Ethiopian forces when there have been suspected insurgent attacks.
- 1.04 The National Reconciliation Conference, scheduled to begin on Monday 16 July 2007, was postponed shortly after it began. Organizers explained the sudden adjournment was due to the lack of key players' presence and have rescheduled the conference to Thursday 19 July 2007, to allow more time for delegates to arrive. Several mortar shells had landed near the venue the night before the conference was due to recommence but President Yusuf said that violence would not deter the talks. [7c]

[Return to contents](#)  
[Go to list of sources](#)

## HUMANITARIAN SITUATION - MOGADISHU

### Internally Displaced Persons

- 2.01 The estimates of those internally displaced by the heaviest fighting in Mogadishu during March – April 2007 have varied considerably. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has estimated that 30,000 people fled the city during this period. However, most approximations presented to the fact finding team average around the “certain base figure of 300,000”. [S1.9] The highest estimate given to the fact finding team was provided by executives of an internationally recognised NGO who stated that the number of IDPs reached nearly 390,000, and added that many more Somalis would have left Mogadishu but they lacked the means to do so. [S4.1] Another source used his recent visit in Mogadishu to give the base figure of 200,000 displaced from the city, which was the lowest estimation given to the delegation. In addition to this, the source told the delegation that approximately 40,000 – 50,000 people may be currently displaced within the city itself. [S21.1] Executives of an internationally recognised NGO claimed that approximately 68 percent of Mogadishu’s population had been displaced. However the sources stressed to the fact finding team a need to understand “normal life” in a Mogadishu sense, where there is an acceptance of a mobile type of life created by displacement. [S4.12]
- 2.02 The number of the returns of refugees to Mogadishu after the recent displacement has varied. The UNHCR reports of June 2007 have mentioned numbers of around 90,000 returnees [6a], which was supported by the information provided to the fact-finding team by an Embassy Official. [S15.6] However the fact finding team were told by two sources that the number of returnees may reach up to 200,000 in reality. [S5.4], [S9.1] Four sources explained the difficulty in estimating the numbers of those returning to Mogadishu as many IDPs seem to be moving back and forth, entering the city only to evacuate it again due to security concerns and lack of food and shelter. [S5.4], [S1.9], [S4.1], [S8.5] Although this was supported by two other sources [S1.9], [S8.5], a relevant department of the UN told the fact-finding team that there is no evidence that returnees are leaving the city again [S3.8] This source explained that about 50 percent of those displaced in the fighting earlier this year [2007] have now returned to Mogadishu and that people are continuing to return, but that the rate of return has slowed down. [S3.8] One source explained that 49 percent of refugees would go back to Somalia if the situation permitted. [S9.3] However, a human rights campaigner told the delegation that Somalis have “a lot of fears about the security situation in Mogadishu and people are still leaving whenever they get the chance”. [S17.4] On 12 July 2007 Shabelle Media Network reported people fleeing the capital once again due to the ongoing grenade and mortar explosions [1f] UNHCR estimates that “nearly 7,000” have fled Mogadishu during June and July due to the ongoing insecurity in the city. [8a]
- 2.03 The IDPs returning to Mogadishu are mainly those that had fled but remained in the outskirts of the city. These people have little to no means of support and find it very difficult to continue living outside Mogadishu [S5.5] The fact finding mission were informed that many female headed households have attempted to return to Mogadishu because of their vulnerability to rape, sexual abuse etc, but in some cases these families have left Mogadishu again after their vulnerability was also exploited within

the city. [S4.1] Somali NGO executives added that returning to Mogadishu is really only viable for families if they have strong or powerful men to protect them. [S8.5]

- 2.04 A researcher for a major NGO told the fact finding team that though there is a general fear of returning to Mogadishu due to the danger from unexploded devices etc, some Somalis will not return because they hope to find a better life elsewhere in Somalia or outside the country. [S21.2]

### Availability of food and water

- 2.05 IRIN reported on 8 June 2007, that “the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) distributed 557Mt of food in May [2007] to 25,000 people in the city.” [3a] A researcher for a major NGO asserted that there is enough food and water to go round in the city and that at present there is “no alarming humanitarian situation in Mogadishu”. [S21.3] Seven sources agreed that the problem was not in the lack of supplies but in their distribution. [S21.3], [S13.8], [S15.7], [S3.7], [S14.2], [S5.7], [S9.4] In this sense, access to Mogadishu is particularly difficult. [S9.4] Medicins sans Frontieres has been targeted in the north of Mogadishu and affected by a roadside bomb and a mortar attack. [S9.4] On 13 July 2007, BBC news reported that at least three people died after Somali security forces opened fire at a crowd demanding food aid in Mogadishu. [7b]
- 2.06 Bakara market is up and running, but food prices have risen as a result of pirate attacks on ships, and there are deficits of food. [S1.20] On the issue of trade resumption one source explained that livelihood activities were currently on hold and that there are fewer and fewer income generating activities in Mogadishu. It may be the case that if the situation in Mogadishu does not improve, there will be no way for many Somalis to make any money in order to obtain the basic necessities for life. [S4.11]
- 2.07 Eight sources stressed that the supply of water is still one of the main humanitarian problems [S1.20], [S3.7], [S4.4], [S5.7], [S8.3], [S9.2], [S14.8], [S17.6] Water is provided by the NGOs but only where tankers can gain access [S14.8] In Mogadishu, potable water is scarce [S9.2] and is saline in parts of city. [S1.20] It will be some time before clean water can be provided. [S14.8] One source explained that traditionally water is boiled to rid it of any impurities and it is then transported to different villages on donkey carts. Due to the urgent need for water, the source doubts that the water being transported at the moment has been boiled before distribution. This has led to outbreaks of cholera and watery diarrhoea. [S17.6] However OCHA has reported that humanitarian organizations have “successfully contained the outbreak in areas where the security situation permits humanitarian access. A decrease in the number of new cases has been reported in all ten regions of central and southern Somalia.” [8a]

### Availability of shelter

- 2.08 Seven sources stressed the severity of the crisis facing IDPs regarding shelter. [S1.20], [S4.4], [S5.7], [S12.2], [S14.2], [S17.5], [S21.4]. Prior to the recent conflict during March – April 2007, IDPs had been located in an estimated 267 settlements throughout Mogadishu (140 of which were public buildings).



Approximately a third of these sites were abandoned during the recent conflict and the TFG are currently preventing the return of displaced people to them. [S15.6] A relevant department of the UN stated that the TFG had evicted IDPs from 77 public buildings in total. [S9.6] Although three sources said that the main purpose of this prevention has been seen as an attempt to bring the public buildings back to state control [S1.9], [S10.3], [S21.4], a relevant department of the UN told the fact finding team that to some extent this can be seen as clan politics – it is the desire of some TFG officials to expel parts of the Hawiye clan from the city. [S5.6]

- 2.09 Executives of an internationally recognised NGO told the team that the TFG has not provided a long term housing solution for the evicted IDPs. [S4.1] This has been exacerbated by bandits exploiting the vulnerability of IDPs by charging them ‘rent’ for sheltering under trees on the roadsides. [S5.5]

### Availability of health care

- 2.10 A relevant department of the UN told the delegation that there is still a long way to go to reach the targets for humanitarian aid in Mogadishu. After some difficulty getting food aid through to those who needed it, the TFG is now being more co-operative and supplies are being delivered. However, healthcare provision continues to be far less than adequate and what there is is provided almost exclusively by aid organisations [S3.7] Another relevant department of the UN told the fact finding team that Medina hospital in Mogadishu is adequately administered, but that it is heavily dependent upon international agencies’ support. The source added that although Medina hospital was adequately managed, healthcare services were so lacking that even those with money could not find the healthcare they needed [S9.9] He added that during the recent bombardment many of those wounded would not go to Medina hospital for fear of being arrested by the TFG (who have control of the hospital). [S9.9] Two further sources stressed the lack of healthcare in Mogadishu: a Somali NGO executive said that for most people Medina hospital was “miles away” and therefore inaccessible, meaning that for many there was effectively no healthcare, [S12.3] and an executive of an NGO operating in Somalia explained that there is very limited access to healthcare in the city, with only a few organisations providing drugs. [S14.2] In contrast, another relevant department of the UN claimed that there were more than two functioning hospitals in Mogadishu, although many of the other health centres are privatised. He also considered Medina Hospital in Mogadishu to be better than the hospitals operating in the whole of Somalia; the hospital in Hargeisa being the only exception [S5.18]

[Return to contents](#)  
[Go to list of sources](#)

## HUMANITARIAN SITUATION – OUTSIDE MOGADISHU

### Internally displaced persons

- 3.01 The fact finding team received conflicting information regarding the humanitarian situation for IDPs in Somalia. Two sources told the delegation that the situation for IDPs was desperate, with most IDPs receiving no humanitarian aid as distribution was limited to safe areas in Somalia. [S14.2] [S8.3] However, a relevant department of the UN informed the delegation that aid is getting to all significant populations of IDPs at a minimal level [S3.8]; and security advisers on Somalia told the delegation that in general, the distribution of food was improving. [S13.8] Another relevant department of the UN said that of the 390,000 IDPs, 368,000 had received some non-food aid and 338,000 had received some food aid. [S9.4] Executives of an internationally recognised NGO explained that the percentage aid distribution across Somalia is very difficult to quantify. In some areas, up to 50 percent will have received provisions, but in some inaccessible areas, zero percent have received aid. [S4.14]
- 3.02 There have been problems with accessing water and sanitation in many IDP settlements. The delegation was told by one source that many people were afraid to leave the settlement for their own safety and for fear that their places in the camp would be taken by other displaced persons. [S15.7] Eight sources stressed that access to water is one of the main humanitarian concerns. [S1.20] [S3.7] [S4.4] [S5.7] [S8.3] [S9.2] [S14.8] [S17.6] There are water sellers but the quality of water is poor, and there is widespread malnutrition [S1.20]. Somali NGO executives told the delegation that there are serious problems in the country with disease including diarrhoea, cholera and malaria. IDPs are suffering “beyond imagination”. Women are particularly vulnerable and although there are a few instances of aid organisations trying to target their efforts on women and families, in most cases it is men who are able to get their hands on the aid – sometimes for the simple reason that they are able to carry the heavy bags of grain. [S8.3]
- 3.03 On 12 July 2007 United Nations experts expressed their concerns about the difficulties in providing food aid to vulnerable populations in the country. OCHCHR notes that “the climate of continuing insecurity through large parts of Somalia, coupled with massive displacement and the extreme underdevelopment of infrastructure in remote areas, hamper the timely delivery of food aid”. [6b] IRIN reported on 18 June 2007 that the food security and nutrition situation in southern Somalia’s Lower and Middle Shabelle regions is deteriorating due to the cumulative effects of conflict, insecurity and civilian displacement within the Shabelle region. FSAU noted that the level of acute malnutrition in Somalia is increasing with ‘the extremely high rates of severe acute malnutrition of 4.9 percent and mortality rates above the alert threshold’. [2e] On 5 July 2007 60 World Food Programme food trucks were able to cross the Kenya / Somalia border following appeals from the international community. The food was expected to target 200,000 people in the Gedo region. [2d]

### The effect of IDPs

- 3.04 In the worst affected areas the IDP population can exceed the locals by as much as 250 percent. This dramatic increase in the population has affected local resources such as agriculture, and has increased the number of human rights abuses. [S4.14] Instances of rape, of IDPs in particular, increased greatly during the recent hostilities, when it was used as a weapon of war, and have remained high since. The problem now is greatest outside Mogadishu, but instances do happen in the city as well. [S8.4]
- 3.05 The IDPs who had been settled since 1991 have been particularly badly affected by the latest conflict, with their livelihoods gone and assets now running out due to the increased number of new IDPs using their resources. [S4.13] One source explained that waves of IDPs will go back to wherever they feel secure, in most cases back to clan areas, where “the first safety net is the sub-clan”. [S9.10] On the question of whether clans were disrupted by such movement, one source said that this was not the case, adding that people moved as clans, and were received as families with the sub, sub-clan structure. [S10.2] However, two security advisers on Somalia said that clan maps cannot be used any longer even as a guideline, because groups have been displaced and are now disputing who is the original occupant of various lands. [S13.10]

### Availability of health care

- 3.06 An internationally recognized NGO claimed that apart from Medina Hospital and Keysaney, which are both functioning at the present time, all other healthcare has broken down to barely functioning. [S1.18] [S21.5] There has been a significant “brain drain” from the system and all health care is privately run. [S1.18] In addition, a relevant department of the UN said that a lack of trained medical staff was the main problem. The sources recounted the story of a doctor, aged 50, who when asked what was the greatest challenge for healthcare in Somalia, said “my own death”, meaning that there were no younger medical personnel emerging in Somalia to eventually replace the few surviving doctors. The clans used to provide a rudimentary social care program, but that was now breaking down. [S19.11]
- 3.07 A relevant department of the UN told the fact finding team that the TFG are not concerned with social policy or resources. As such, Baidoa hospital is “a disaster” with no drugs available there. [S9.7] An internationally recognized NGO explained that in Somalia generally, there is enough medication for the wounded but not enough medical equipment. This is because many of the hospitals have been damaged in the fighting that took place between March and April 2007. [S21.5] However, a leading Somali journalist told the fact finding team that the insurgents have not been targeting hospitals and that the humanitarian situation was beginning to improve. [S16.10]

### Re-opening of schools

- 3.08 A journalist from an international news agency told the delegation that the insurgents have not been targeting schools. [S16.10] Three sources further confirmed that some schools have reopened, [S21.5] [S1.19] [S3.7] even including rudimentary universities, and again all are private initiatives. There has been some money from the Middle East to fund this area. The

Government is trying to get schools in Mogadishu back in operation but they have not been able to do so in the areas worst hit by the fighting. [S8.6] [S12.5]

[Return to contents](#)  
[Go to list of sources](#)

## SECURITY SITUATION - MOGADISHU

### Outbreaks of violence

- 4.01 A journalist from an international news agency stressed to the delegation that Mogadishu is in effect “the centre of the [security] problem” as it is the city in which the majority of fighting had taken place and where the TFG continues to focus its efforts. [S16.8] He stressed that the current conflict (post the heavy fighting during March – April 2007) is the worst time that the country has faced for sixteen years. This is due to the sheer volume of hostility and mistrust among officials and civilians alike. [S16.2]
- 4.02 Seven sources [S2.7] [S10.1] [S21.9] [S12.5] [S13.4] [S4.15] [S20.7] stressed the unpredictability and volatility of the security situation in Mogadishu. Three sources explained that the north of the city is more dangerous than other parts of Mogadishu. [S3.6] [S1.3] [S11.10] A relevant department of the UN stated that although the north of the city is more volatile and dangerous than the south, in both areas a degree of relative normality has returned, more so in the south, but even in the areas in the north which are most unstable. [S3.6] An executive of an internationally recognised NGO said further that the north was disrupted by TFG cordoning-off and house to house searches; however this has not occurred in the southern parts of the city. [S1.3] One source explained that most of the fighting has taken place around 30th street (the main road in Mogadishu), particularly north of the street and some central areas to it. When asked what the situation was like on this street the source said that the road is very hostile, with few people residing there and with little still functioning. The source explained that he had recently been in Mogadishu and travelled through this area at his own will. He did not encounter any hostilities towards him [S21.6]. OCHA, in its Situation Report dated 6 July 2007, noted that house to house weapon search operations have intensified since 4 July, coinciding with the increased security incidents. [2d]
- 4.03 Six sources agreed that most of the violence in Mogadishu has become more sophisticated and political in nature, precisely targeting TFG and Ethiopian forces, high profile political targets, law enforcement agencies, Ethiopian troops and occasionally at African Union forces. [S13.4] [S6.1] [S3.6] [S15.5] [S11.9] [S19.4] On 11 July 2007 Shabelle Media Network reported that the Bondhere District Commissioner was wounded in Mogadishu after unknown gunmen shot him on his way home from work. [1i] An embassy official added UN staff and their personnel, and westerners, specifically white people, to the above list of possible targets [S15.8]. However this contrasted with the information provided by one source who claimed that the TFG and Ethiopian troops were attacking anyone and any visible target that they perceive to be a threat to them. He told the delegation that “anyone who is remotely perceived to be anti-TFG, and anyone who is perceived to be Arabic, anyone who is perceived to be a radical Islamist (to give just three examples), are targets” [S16.2].
- 4.04 Three sources stressed that there were virtually always civilian casualties either from the insurgent blast itself or from gunfire in retaliatory action by the targeted forces. [S3.6] [S6.2] [S13.4] A relevant department of the UN explained that the rate of such incidents, excepting roadside and suicide bombs, has remained broadly steady since the TFG announced victory on

26 April 2007 [S3.6].

See the section on [Security situation – ordinary Somalis and returnees](#) for more information.

- 4.05 An adviser to an EU institution explained that the Shabaab is damaged but has become more targeted in its attacks. There are suicide bombers, and more being trained. [S11.5] A relevant department of the UN stressed that the insurgents are now making a comeback with almost daily attacks in the city. [S19.4] Terrorism Focus, in its weekly journal dated June 19 2007, noted that “the recently established Mujahideen Youth Movement has emerged as the most potent military group [in Somalia].” The group emerged in April claiming to have attempted to assassinate two prominent Somali officials. The report also claims that the Mujahideen Youth Movement were responsible for the attack on Prime Minister Ghedi on June 3 2007. [9a]
- 4.06 A relevant department of the UN claimed that the clan militias were now regrouping around powerful individuals or factions and that: “most clans had some network in operation in Mogadishu, though most people were now playing on personal rather than clan connections” [S19.12]. There is also evidence that the armed opposition groups both inside and outside Somalia are ‘coalescing’. This could greatly increase the resources available to the armed opposition groups operating in Somalia, although there is also a suggestion that the Shabaab have signalled frictions with exiled opposition groups. [S6.3]
- 4.07 However an internationally recognized NGO claimed that violence had reduced to ‘Mogadishu normal’ and the group thought that the Ethiopians’ more powerful weaponry was responsible for the previous higher level of violence. [S4.7] An adviser to an EU institution stated that the streets felt ‘safer’ in as much as there was a large military presence. [S11.3]
- 4.08 A relevant department of the UN explained that the since the TFG’s raid on Bakara market in early June [2007], which hitherto had been traditionally held as a key neutral point, where all clans were able to trade and give protection to trade, there has been disagreements along clan lines. Since then Bakara has also become a target of grenade attacks by alleged insurgents. [S19.5] Shabelle Media Network reported an attack on Bakara Market which took place on 11 July 2007. The attack was targeted at Somali police in the area, however three civilians were wounded in the blast. [1j]
- 4.09 A journalist from an international news agency summed up the current security situation as a vicious circle because every time the TFG manage to affect some level of peace and security, this peace spurs the insurgents to attack as it is their aim to prove to the wider world that Mogadishu is not safe / controlled and that the TFG is ineffective with no support from Somali citizens. [S16.3]

### Transitional Federal Government

- 4.10 Three sources confirmed that there were organisational problems within the structure of the TFG [S5.11], [S7.7] [S16.3] with “no official chain of command” [S5.11], and power struggles and vested interests among its top officials. [S16.3] One source explained that due to this “what many call the government in Somalia cannot really be classified as such”. [S16.3]



- 4.11 All sources who were asked stated that there were at least four competing factions within the TFG:
- The regional government comprised of Mohamed Dheere and his forces; which one source described as ‘the personal force of a very powerful warlord, and the worst dictator in Somalia’. [S10.7] Another source stated that Dheere’s police were based in 16 police stations in the city, mounting ad hoc mobile patrols [S11.2].
  - the Ethiopians with their own troops, which one source described as stationed strategically through out the city at main locations, mounting patrols, but not proceeding far from their bases [S11.2].
  - the ‘TFG’ with its own forces
  - ‘other TFG collaborative forces’.
- 4.12 There was some discrepancy as to whether the AU could be classed as a fifth security force on the streets (see [Presence of the African Union](#) section).
- 4.13 There was discrepancy regarding the third and fourth groups detailed in the above list; namely as to what the TFG comprised and what the TFG and collaborative forces were. A relevant department of the UN claimed the TFG were in collaboration with Ethiopian forces and that this collaboration was mainly seen at joint checkpoints [S5.11]. However an academic researcher of Somali descent said that in addition to Dheere’s police and Ethiopian troops, were the “presidential protection unit, who do not answer to anyone and are highly independent”, and the national security service, under the Ethiopians and President Yusuf [S10.7]. The adviser to the EU institution claimed that in addition to Dheere’s police and the Ethiopian troops were “the TFG troops trained in Puntland” and “the Federal police, run by the commissioner of police” [S11.2]. A Somali NGO detailed the third, fourth, and fifth groups in the ‘government’ to be: the TFG troops trained in Puntland; the anti-terrorist unit of the TFG police; and the state intelligence service. [S12.6]
- 4.14 All sources asked agreed that not one of these four groups has complete control over Mogadishu, and there is little effective communication between the groups. A relevant department of the UN explained the complications of this: “At the moment it is unclear where real power lies in Mogadishu. It is difficult to identify exactly who is behind the armed groups, the general opposition and the media shutdowns.” [S19.6] “There is a proliferation of government uniforms, with three different types of police or militias claiming to be police or government security forces. There is also no way for lay observers to tell the difference between TFG and Ethiopian troops” [S19.7].
- 4.15 In addition, three sources stated that there were fake TFG uniforms for sale in Mogadishu [S20.7]. [S13.6], [S18.6]. Security advisers on Somalia explained to the delegation that anyone can buy TFG uniforms on the market and there are fake TFG operations as a result, with reported robberies and looting [S13.6]. An NGO operating in Somalia explained further that Mogadishu is facing “a time of insecurity and flux, with inflation running at 25 percent over the past three months, with fake shillings being circulated on the market, and security force uniforms for sale” [S20.7]. Only one source doubted the claim that it was possible to buy illegal uniforms on the market. [S17.7]
- 4.16 When asked to what extent the TFG controls Mogadishu, sources gave a

varied response: the TFG forces were relying on the Ethiopian troops and AU forces, who had the real power on the streets; [S4.5] [S16.4] the TFG has control but is “deeply unpopular”; [S11.5] “the TFG has a symbolic power but not much power in reality.” [S21.8] An Embassy official claimed the TFG to be less in evidence, now mainly being patrols of police with Ethiopian troop support. [S15.5]

- 4.17 One source detailed that many Somalis considered that the TFG had done “a good job in cleansing the city” and there was the hope that this would have an effect outside the city. [S4.5] However, there were conflicting reports as to whether the TFG has been able to effect disarmament. One source said that there are no weapons apparent on the street as most have been hidden, [S1.12] another source detailed that there were ‘few visible weapons’ on the streets [S4.9] and another that ‘there was no formal ban on carrying weapons, and disarmament attempts were ineffective’. [S11.4] One source said that the government is trying to take away people’s weapons but the problem is that Somalis ‘do not know who has the guns anymore’. [S17.7]

### Clan conflict

- 4.18 Many sources explained that the internal conflict within the TFG was for the most part not due to clan differences. [S16.3]. One source gave the example of Ali Ghedi and Mohamed Dheere who although are from the same sub clan (Hawiye Abgal), do not work together because of the underlying struggle for power between them. The source explained further that although many see the current crisis in Somalia as a Darod-Hawiye clan conflict, this is deceptive. In fact, the Darod-Hawiye war is now over with the main conflict now being political in nature and between the Abgal and Habr Gedir of the Hawiyes. This political, internal conflict among the warlords and government officials has little popular support as many civilians believe it to be nothing more than a struggle for power, land, money and dominance between warlords. This can be seen by Mohamed Dheere’s systematic targeted arrest of hundreds of Somalis (all Hawiye, many of them powerful businessmen) last week whom he perceived to be a threat to the TFG. The arrests even included those from Dheere’s own sub clan, the Abgal. [S16.3]
- 4.19 A Somali NGO referred to most of the conflict as being centred around money and power, but she also stressed that there is a concerted effort by the TFG to ‘destabilise, impoverish and reduce the status of mainly the Hawiye business community’. She explained that this has little to do with clans, but was mainly about the snatching of resources by powerful men. Politicians are particularly targeted, with death and extortion threats received. [S12.7]
- 4.20 An executive of an internationally recognized NGO claimed that the TFG has been using the war on terror as an excuse for clan discriminatory arrests and that in Mogadishu it is mainly the Habr Gedir sub clan that has been targeted. [S1.3] This was supported by two other sources. [S11.7] [S6.1]
- 4.21 An internationally recognized NGO described Mogadishu as facing a “complex military situation”. [S1.3] A relevant department of the UN expanded on this by explaining that the political complexity was due to many overlapping groups in Mogadishu, mainly drawn from the Hawiye clan, who are repositioning. The sources particularly identified the business community as being the shapers of politically and militarily powerful individuals. [S19.12]



- 4.22 Joint Somalia and Ethiopian forces launched a major house by house search throughout Mogadishu on 6 June 2007, which included, according to Mayor Mohammed Dheere, “around 1,000 young boys, most of them under [sic] the age of 16, who were being trained to be suicide bombers were seized” in north Mogadishu. [1c]

### Police presence

- 4.23 The fact-finding team received conflicting information regarding police presence in Mogadishu. An researcher for a major NGO claimed that the TFG does have its own police force: 2,000 have already been trained and a further 2,000 are currently in training. [S21.7] An advisor from an EU institution said that about 300 police recruits were being trained a month, in Puntland, however the training was very basic. [S11.3] A Somali NGO also stated that the security forces were given little training and added that most security operations were revenue-based, “legitimised looting”, starting from the Prime Minister down. [S12.7]
- 4.24 Executives of an internationally recognised NGO told the delegation that the police, though apparent, were not really implemented as a force. [S4.6] A relevant department of the UN said that the police do reportedly have a presence on the streets of Mogadishu however there are insufficient numbers of police to exert any effective control. [S5.10] He added that the police force has not been expanded yet and that little had been achieved other than basic initiative measures. [S5.10]
- 4.25 An internationally regarded NGO told the delegation that the trained police are from a mixture of clans and most are ex police officers. [S21.7] Another executive of an internationally recognised NGO said that the police force was influenced by clan issues, with splits into clan-based sections. [S4.6]

### African Union presence

- 4.26 A Somali researcher held that the African Union was the best force operating in Somalia at the present time. [S10.7] A journalist for an international news agency said that the Ethiopians and the AU are the forces with the most power on the streets. [S16.4] Security advisers on Somalia noted that the African Union was one of the three forces on the streets of Mogadishu together with the TFG and Ethiopians. [S13.4] However an adviser from an EU institution held that the African Union troops cannot be classed as a security force on the streets because they were based in Villa Somalia, and only patrol infrequently and close by. [S11.2] A relevant department of the UN explained that the AU does have some presence in the city centre to guard the President’s offices but that ‘the AU have generally tried to stay in the background’. [S19.2] A Somali NGO explained that there is a fear of further attacks on the AU and as such they are based at the air and sea port only. [S15.5] [S19.2] [S20.2] Executives of an internationally recognised NGO said that in general, the AU are not being targeted anymore. [S4.15]

### Checkpoints

- 4.27 An adviser to an EU institution told the delegation that the six main

checkpoints in Mogadishu were not permanently operated but rather utilised in periods of high tension. [S11.2] A journalist from an international news agency explained that the TFG have cleared the city of all checkpoints that are not Ethiopian/TFG, with the effect of enforcing a 'general' level of security in a period of great insecurity. He explained that the number of checkpoints in the city can be an indicator as to the level of hostilities at any one time, i.e. when it is feared that there are an increased number of insurgents, there will be an increased number of checkpoints with the aim of regaining some form of control over the city. An example is in 2004, when there was a high level of uncertainty in Somalia, and there were a reported 54 checkpoints from Mogadishu to Afgoye. [S16.4].

Regarding checkpoints in Mogadishu, see [checkpoints](#).

### Security situation – ordinary Somalis and returnees

- 4.28 The fact-finding team received semi-conflicting information regarding the security situation for ordinary Somalis. One source told the delegation that although the security situation in Mogadishu is unpredictable, it is rare for an ordinary Somali to be randomly targeted in a shooting. [S2.7] A Somali researcher said that in his opinion, except for attacks on TFG and associated forces, and the often over-zealous retaliatory action on the part of those forces, in which civilians are often victims in the cross-fire, levels of violence in Mogadishu are currently fairly low. But there is still general insecurity and high levels of crime, so although people can and do move around, on the whole they tend to stay in their home area. [S6.2] An NGO working in Somalia claimed that there is also the risk of arrest to ordinary Somalis as after a suspect insurgent attack, the security forces would arrest anybody near the scene, and also arrest ordinary citizens for extortion purposes as well, with ransom demands sent by phone. [S20.7] A native Somali researcher told the fact-finding team that, "if you are not from the Abgal (the Prime Minister's sub-clan) or from the Majerten (the President's sub-clan), then you are not immune from TFG attacks, and that if you are in anyway associated with the TFG, you are also not immune from the insurgent attacks". [S10.8]
- 4.29 A Somali NGO stressed the unpredictability of the security situation for ordinary Somalis by explaining that because at the moment there is no central command, ordinary Somalis were being frequently oppressed by different agencies. [S12.6] This leads to a situation which is tense, with people mistrusting the security forces and fearing for their safety. [S17.7]
- 4.30 An internationally recognized NGO said that there have been no reports of renewed clan violence in Mogadishu. They stressed that there has always been a level of clan fighting in Somalia, and this is likely to continue if Ethiopian troops withdraw. [S4.7] A Somali researcher stressed that there is not routine targeting of members of particular clans but there is a general risk of being detained for questioning by TFG or associated forces and people may be locked up – generally for a day or two but possibly longer. Sometimes these actions proved to be justified and arms and explosives found, but sometimes there is no apparent evidence to support the action. The risk may be higher for members of certain clans, e.g. Hawiye, (especially the Hebr Gedir and the Abgal), people who may be perceived to be politically active, and also students of Koranic schools [S6.1]. This was

supported by an adviser to an EU institution who claimed that the TFG are mounting intelligence operations, and are repressing on a clan basis, with certain sub clans of the Hawiye being the main targets of revenge [S11.7].

- 4.31 Regarding clan representation/protection in Mogadishu, the delegation were told by one source that the city is relatively 'cosmopolitan', with all clans represented in terms of presence. [S13.3] However, a researcher for a major NGO said that clan protection was not really the issue when assessing someone's relative safety. This is because in reality there is little protection from one's own clan and therefore even if someone were from a major clan they are still at risk. When asked how he reached this conclusion the source said that an acquaintance of his is from a major Somali clan and his own clan attempted to shoot him. [S21.10] The source explained: "the problem is, in reality, other than a few hundred people who have arms, government support and their own militia to protect them, you could be shot down/targeted at any time in Somalia, regardless of which clan you are from." [S21.9]
- 4.32 The fact-finding team received semi-conflicting information regarding the feasibility of a returnee arriving safely at their destination from Mogadishu in the light of the current security situation in Somalia. A researcher for a major NGO said that in his opinion it would be "madness" to send a Somali to Mogadishu if one were concerned with their safety. [S21.9] An airline executive claimed that revenge assassination attacks occur frequently when Somalis have left the country for economic betterment and then return after a period of time: they are then considered 'traitors'. The source claimed that because Mogadishu is a small city, where every second person will know/recognise each other, it will be clear that a returning Somali has not been living in the city for years. When asked how the source reached this conclusion she explained that she used to spend a lot of time in Mogadishu and therefore knows the extent one can be recognised in the city. Further, a close friend of hers recently returned to Somalia after a period of many years and was shot on his return. [S2.7]
- 4.33 When asked if a Somali returning from overseas would arouse suspicion when travelling through Mogadishu one source stated that this may possibly be the case. This is due to the heightened security measures the TFG are taking to catch 'terrorists'. If a Somali is returning from overseas the conclusion may be reached that they had terrorist links. [S5.17] However another source said that the TFG would not bother anyone who had been away from the country for some time. They would arrest anyone they suspected as a terrorist, but normally they do so on tip-offs rather than at random. [S7.5]

**[Return to contents](#)**  
**[Go to list of sources](#)**

## SECURITY SITUATION - ELSEWHERE

### Transitional Federal Government

- 5.01 The TFG actually controls very little in central and southern Somalia: they do not control the 300 – 400km between Belatweyn and Galkayo as this area is mainly controlled by the sympathizers of the Islamic courts. [S21.8] The TFG also do not control the area between Kismayo and the Kenyan border as there is little support for the TFG here. [S21.8] The TFG however does not have an effective control over all of Somalia, and anti-TFG attacks will continue. [S14.7] One source gave an opinion that the TFG leadership seemed to be in disarray, with ministers appointed outside Somalia who had no resources to perform their office. Many ministers have been fired, demoted or not assigned posts. [S7.7] However the group said it was difficult to get a perspective on the TFG's control of central and southern Somalia, as the power-sharing arrangements were so complex and localised. [S4.9] There were some elements of stability in Somalia generally, however this varies from area to area and is as such 'a mixed picture'. [S4.9] This level of stability fluctuates on a daily basis and it is near impossible to say whether an area will be safe for any period of time. Two examples of this fluctuation are the recent upsurge of violence in Merka, and the increase in violence in the Sanaag and Gedo regions. [S4.9]
- 5.02 Outside Mogadishu, TFG authority remains very limited. They have appointed officials in several parts of the country but in many cases, e.g. in Beled Weyne, the authority of these appointees is disputed and their role is no more than titular. TFG and associated forces' troop movements south of Mogadishu have led to speculation that an assault on Kismayo and the surrounding area may be planned. There are concerns that this could actually destabilise the situation in that area further – the Marehan have issues with the TFG but at present are not implacably opposed to the reconciliation process. There are signs that the Hawiye, although they will not immediately participate in the reconciliation process, are developing a more coherent voice through the establishment of a new committee which met for the first time over the weekend of 9 – 10 June. There is also evidence that the armed opposition groups both inside and outside Somalia are 'coalescing'. This could greatly increase the resources available to the armed opposition groups operating in Somalia, although there is also a suggestion that the Shabaab have signalled frictions with exiled opposition groups. [S6.3] The TFG has no capacity to impose its presence in Kismayo at the current time. [S13.11]
- 5.03 The TFG is hoping to expand its rule across central and southern Somalia and has appointed 'administrators' in Lower and Middle Shabelle (Afgoye, Balad, Johar and Merka). However, there is not, as of yet, a TFG/Ethiopian presence on the streets in these areas. The source also describes how the TFG were 'kicked out' of Kismayo recently over land disputes. If the opposition have more weapons than the TFG army then the government has no choice but to withdraw. [S16.8]

### Outbreaks of violence

- 5.04 Regarding the situation in central and southern Somalia, one source said that it was relatively 'normal' and 'calm'. The people in these areas are tired

of fighting and so have managed to live in relative peace. This however could change tomorrow. Farmers have suffered considerably in the latest conflicts as nomads now face more checks and there are no livelihoods due to theft. [S16.6] Apart from around and south of Kismayo, “the security situation is ‘no worse than it has always been’.” [S3.9] They do know of problems developing in Kismayo. [S4.5]

- 5.05 Shabelle Media Network reported on 6 June 2007 that inter-clan fighting in Kismayo has led to the deaths of “more than 16 people” over the period of a week. [1a]

### Checkpoints security

- 5.06 Outside Mogadishu, the TFG are only present in Baidoa. Baidoa is secure, but the atmosphere is hostile. There are no TFG checkpoints on the road between Baidoa and Mogadishu. The road here is usually safe, with a good flow of commercial vehicles, and “if you can secure a package, then you can secure a person”. Commercial traffic is running right down to Kismayo. There are however insurgents in Johar. IDPs were subject to abuse. [S11.8]
- 5.07 One source added that clans can and do protect their clan mates, and will find money for TFG ransoms if required. However, if the arrested clan member is held to have been close to the UIC, then any assistance that the clan can offer is limited if not non-existent. [S1.5] Returning to safety in Mogadishu, the same source noted that the extreme southern point, around Medina, was the “safest” area in Mogadishu. [S1.5]
- 5.08 Within Mogadishu itself, the north of the city is more volatile and dangerous than the south, but in both cases a degree of relative normality has returned, more so in the south, but even in the areas in the north which are most unstable. There are security incidents in Mogadishu everyday but these are precisely targeted at government forces or suspected insurgents. However, this does mean there is some risk to civilians either in the original attack or in retaliatory action. The rate of such incidents, excepting roadside and suicide bombs, has remained broadly steady since the TFG announced victory on 26 April 2007. [S3.6]
- 5.09 There has been a “remarkable” reduction in checkpoints, with fewer bandit checkpoints, and less interest in clan affiliation. Only occasional TFG / Ethiopian checkpoints exist, typically only one on a long road. [S11.6] When asked about why ordinary Somalis would not be targeted, the source explained that it is a politically targeted risk now, not aimed at ordinary Somalis. [S11.6] The distribution of clans throughout Mogadishu is more or less the same as it was 4 to 5 years ago. [S3.6]
- 5.10 The number of robberies on the roads is lower now than it was before the latest hostilities. [S3.9] An internationally recognized NGO told the delegation each day brings changes as to what may happen. However, all see white people, “muzungu”, as rich targets, and seen as “trophies”. [S1.17] When questioned on the different Somali checkpoints, one source said that the situation has recently changed and that now the main checkpoints were in the south. [S21.12]
- 5.11 Aside from the Oromos and former UIC suspects, the source has not heard

of checkpoints discriminating Somalis on a clan basis. It is possible that the Hawiye may be targeted more than most but this is a wider political issue and is not seen as directly related to the activities at the checkpoints. [S5.14] When asked if a Somali returning from overseas would arouse suspicion when travelling through Mogadishu the source stated that this may possibly be the case. This is due to the heightened security measures the TFG are taking to catch 'terrorists'. If a Somali is returning from overseas the conclusion may be reached that they had terrorist links. [S5.17] The TFG would not bother anyone who had been away from the country for some time, but would arrest anyone they suspected as a terrorist, but normally they do so on tip-offs rather than at random. [S7.5] On checkpoints, one source said that extortion tended to happen at night and robberies done surreptitiously from time to time. Generally, there is a vacuum of law and order. The source concluded that if you are not from the Abgal (the Prime Minister's sub-clan) or from the Majerten (the President's sub-clan), then you are not immune from TFG attacks and that if you are in anyway associated with the TFG you are also not immune from the insurgent attacks. [S10.8]

### Clan protection

- 5.12 Outside Mogadishu, protection used to be arranged within clan lines, but now there is a fragmented pattern of fiefdoms and emerging factions There has also been an upsurge in inter-clan fighting. The political situation around Kismayo is complex, with clans left to their own arrangements as TFG forces are diverted to Mogadishu. Out in the countryside, there are the old enmities and there has been a general rise in insecurity. There has also begun a proliferation of freelance militias in areas outside Mogadishu. [S19.12] When asked on the importance of clan protection the source stressed that the clan is most important in times like these, 'when they need each other the most'. Even though this was the case the source said that if you have close friends in Somalia then you may be more likely to contact them than your own clan if you need somewhere to stay etc. [S19.12]
- 5.13 The source stated that the clan traditionally supports both men and women, but women "do not count as much as men". In this sense, men will most certainly be welcomed back into the clan regardless of how long they have been absent from Somalia because of the shortage of males and the importance of their role in the clan. [S17.9] However, according to another NGO source, only Somalis know the exact assistance they could obtain from their clan. [S20.6]

[Return to contents](#)  
[Go to list of sources](#)



## TRAVEL

### Between the airport and the city

- 6.01 All sources who were asked agreed that Mogadishu International Airport (MIA) was operational with flights regularly arriving and departing. However, the fact finding team received information that conflicted in some details regarding the possibility of travelling from Mogadishu International Airport into central Mogadishu. A relevant department of the UN told the delegation that there is minimal public transport from Mogadishu International Airport into Mogadishu city. There are no minibuses and only a small number of dilapidated taxis. [S3.2] This was in contrast to three other sources: an executive of an internationally recognised NGO who stated that there is ad hoc public transport into Mogadishu and that mini buses are running [S1.11]; an airline executive who said that taxis were “freely available” [S7.2]; and a Somali NGO who asserted that there is not only public transport into central Mogadishu, but that there are “many minibuses running” and that taxis waited at the airport. [S8.2] A representative from the Norwegian Embassy said that it would not be difficult to find someone to hire who would take a Somali into the city. [S15.2]
- 6.02 A researcher for a major NGO claimed that there may be taxis waiting at the airport but that you could not trust the drivers of these vehicles and it is imperative to prearrange any transport in and around the city. [S21.13] A security adviser on Somalia supported this point by asserting that although it is possible to get public transport from the airport, this is best arranged privately. [S13.2] Shabelle Media Network stated on 10 July that there were reports of TFG soldiers demanding payments from bus drivers. One bus driver told the reporter that he is often threatened at gunpoint to pay the extortion money immediately. [1g]
- 6.03 The delegation spoke to two airline executives regarding transport from Mogadishu International into the city itself. One executive explained that most of their passengers will have made prior travel arrangements to get to their destination. [S2.3] The other executive’s airline operates its own minibus to transport its staff from Mogadishu International Airport into and around Mogadishu city, including to the airline’s three offices in North, South and Central Mogadishu. Although not technically for airline passengers’ use, on the infrequent occasions when regular public transport has been interrupted, the airline’s minibus has been used to transfer passengers into the city. The airline had not encountered any difficulties in operating this service and at no time had its staff or passengers come to any harm. [S7.2]
- 6.04 In addition to the airline’s own transport, the executive informed the delegation that there were regular minibus services from the airport into the city and taxis were freely available. To illustrate the ease with which travel from the airport to and within Mogadishu could be undertaken, the source invited a member of the delegation to speak on the telephone with a member of his staff who was based in and lived in Mogadishu. The source called the member of staff on his mobile telephone, explained why the delegation wished to speak to him, and told him to answer honestly any questions he was asked. The staff member in Mogadishu told the delegate that he had driven in his private motor car from Mogadishu International Airport to his home in the Halanie district, on the opposite side of

Mogadishu, two hours previously. He makes this journey every working day and, apart from routine checks at TFG operated check-points, has never encountered any difficulty. Nor had he ever heard of any airline passenger being mistreated en route from the airport into the city, and seemed surprised at the question. [S7.3]

- 6.05 Although a relevant department of the UN told the delegation that there continue to be numerous security incidents along the main road from MIA into Mogadishu and that this road has always been dangerous, the same source told the team that passengers arriving at MIA or K50 airports should generally not have any difficulty travelling into Mogadishu or anywhere else. He expanded on this point by asserting that although there was some risk of robbery and of being caught up in cross-fire if they were in the wrong place at the wrong time, a Somali wishing to travel from either airport into Mogadishu would not need a protective escort. [S3.5] This was supported by another department of the UN who claimed that public transport from the airport tended to consist of minibuses, with no need for armed protection for ordinary Somalis. [S19.3] However, an executive of an internationally recognised NGO claimed that if one suspects that one might be a target, then it is sensible to arrange protection. [S1.11] The same source assured the team that if one had money, then one could go wherever one wanted, with protection included. A Somali NGO was also confident that now the TFG has no control in some areas of the city there is less difficulty for ordinary Somalis (even women) to travel from Mogadishu International Airport to central Mogadishu. The people who would be at risk would generally be foreigners, diaspora people and high profile Somali figures. [S8.2]
- 6.06 Most sources from the fact finding mission agreed that there were mainly TFG checkpoints between Mogadishu International airport and the city. However the number of checkpoints from the airport to the city was disputed. A Somali researcher thought there to be around six TFG and associated forces check-points between Mogadishu International Airport and Mogadishu town. [S6.5] However, an executive of an internationally recognised NGO told the delegation that when he last visited Somalia (in early June 2007), there were 21 TFG checkpoints on the route from the international airport to central Mogadishu. He noted that foreigners were likely to be arrested; likewise “anyone who seemed strange to the place”. [S1.15] However, an airline executive said that there were only four main checkpoints on the road to the city, manned by the TFG and Ethiopians. [S7.4] When asked about what normally occurs at the checkpoints, the source said the TFG will check passengers’ tickets, passports, their origin, to ensure that people are not trying to escape from the authorities. He stressed that the TFG are looking for particular individuals at checkpoints, or those who they suspect may be engaged in armed opposition, but they are “very friendly” to others who pass through. [S7.4] This was supported by a relevant department of the UN who stressed that those who can demonstrate that they do not fit into the category of people sought by the TFG should not have any problems with these check-points. [S3.4]
- 6.07 The same source warned that the road from the airport to the city has always been dangerous and that there are numerous roadblocks on the route from MIA into central Mogadishu. [S3.3] He explained that the TFG forces in particular are often poorly trained and so there is still some risk to ordinary Somalis. [S3.4] This was supported by a Somali researcher who



explained that except for the risk of being arrested by government forces on suspicion of involvement in the armed opposition, or caught in a roadside bomb attack, the main risk travelling this route is from ill-trained and disciplined government forces. [S6.5] This point was developed by another relevant department of the UN who explained that the lack of communication and organization within the TFG can be seen most clearly at checkpoints as it is impossible for the leaders of the TFG to know what is going on at these points and whether troops act on their own individual initiatives. [S5.11]

- 6.08 An internationally recognized NGO told the fact finding team that there may be freelance militia checkpoints set up on the road into Mogadishu to extract money. [S1.4] This was contrasted by another source who claimed that there were no freelance check-points along this route. [S6.5] Security advisers on Somalia explained to the delegation that the presence of additional checkpoints differs from day to day. [S13.2]
- 6.09 When asked if these freelance checkpoints were just revenue-raising, an internationally recognized NGO said that it depended on the place, that in Mogadishu some checkpoints are also targeting on clan membership. He expanded on this by stating that an average Somali could travel safely from the airport to the city if 'safely' meant by travelling through the criminal, freelance checkpoints by paying the correct toll. However he also claimed that there could be a clan element if the checkpoints chose to make it an issue. [S1.4] The latter point was not raised by any other sources. Both airline executives explained that many of their respective airline staff have made the journey from the airport to the city and continue to make it frequently without encountering any security problems. [S2.3], [S7.3] Another source detailed that ordinary Somalis would not make the journey unnecessarily but nor would they not make it if they needed, for example, to collect relatives from the airport. [S6.5]

### In the city

- 6.10 An executive of an internationally recognised NGO said that it has been for a long time difficult to move across Mogadishu from north to south and south to north, but that it has recently become easier. [S1.11] OCHA in its Situation Report dated 6 July 2007 stated that districts in Mogadishu are being sealed off causing restrictive movements for the people. [2d]
- 6.11 Regarding movement in the city, an adviser to an EU institution claimed that there are minibuses moving freely. This was supported by a relevant department of the UN who claimed that a "rudimentary private transport network" operates in Mogadishu. [S3.6] The adviser to an EU institution also stressed that returning Somalis can move around the city, and not be targeted as insurgents, but despite this, it would be 'better' (i.e. safer) if they could hire a car. [S11.6] All sources asked agreed that there is no problem traveling through rival clan areas except at times of inter-clan clashes. [S3.6]
- 6.12 When asked about the location of the current fighting in Mogadishu an internationally recognized NGO explained that most of the fighting has taken place around 30th street (which he claimed was the main road in Mogadishu), particularly north of the street and some central areas to it. When asked what the situation was like on this street the source said that the road is very hostile, there are few people in the areas where the fighting has taken place and there is little still functioning. When asked if it would be possible to avoid

this area if one was traveling around the city, the source said that it was certainly possible. This is based on the source's recent experience in Mogadishu in which he was not only able to avoid this street if he wished but even traveled through it at his own will. He did not encounter any hostilities towards him. [S21.6]

Please also refer to the information in the Security Situation – Mogadishu for further information regarding the possibility of travelling safely across the city.

### Away from Mogadishu

- 6.13 Two sources confirmed that there is public transport around Somalia [S6.4], [S18.12], one claiming that 'buses are running to all parts of Southern Somalia' and that there are 'no official restrictions of the movements of local Somalis'. [S18.12] A Somali researcher explained that the average bus will have a light weapons on board for protection against robbery but there is a risk that if these are confiscated at a TFG check-point the coach will be vulnerable to subsequent attacks. [S6.4]
- 6.14 Somali NGO told the fact finding team that using public transport to other places in southern/central Somalia is more problematic than using public transport around the city. When asked how she reached this opinion the source explained that she had heard of several cases of looting and rape of passengers on public transport outside the city. [S8.2]
- 6.15 A security adviser to western governments claimed that many of the previous TFG and freelance militia check-points around central and southern Somalia have dissipated and there is movement around the country. [S6.4] The claim that there is free movement around Somalia was supported by three sources [S1.11], [S16.7], [S18.12]. A relevant department of the UN claimed that checkpoints no longer impeded public transport or traffic in general unless there was a security operation underway. [S19.8] However, the Norwegian Embassy said that the roads outside Mogadishu were 'problematic' with a growing trend of fake checkpoints set up for robbery. He claimed that there had recently been an approximate 30 percent increase in criminal activity which he detailed as the only violence directed towards ordinary Somalis. [S15.3] However, when questioned further, the source considered ordinary Somalis to be able to move around freely without attack, and he explained that the level of violence, though still higher than in the ICU period, had greatly reduced. [S15.3]
- 6.16 An internationally recognized NGO said it was rare for ordinary Somalis to encounter hostages/kidnaps etc at checkpoints outside Mogadishu. Long hold ups are much more likely to occur than serious incidents detailed above. The source said that in some southern areas a TFG vehicle would be shot down before it even reached the checkpoint as those who are manning the checkpoints sometimes hide in trees to determine what cars are approaching. The source said that it is possible that a UK government car may also be targeted because "everyone is at risk and no one can predict what may happen at these checkpoints". [S21.12]
- 6.17 On the question of whether a returnee Somali may be targeted at these checkpoints, both the Norwegian Embassy and an internationally recognized NGO said that it depends on whether the stranger was perceived as having money or goods that could be stolen. [S15.4], [S21.14] Sources from a relevant

department of the UN stated that although being found holding a foreign passport at a checkpoint was not a problem in itself, lately there have been arrests of young men with foreign passports because the authorities believe that young men from the diaspora are spearheading some of the insurgent attacks. Arrests as a form of extortion are now decreasing, and no longer happening routinely. [S19.8]

- 6.18 An internationally recognized NGO and a relevant department of the UN both claimed that outside Mogadishu most private and militia checkpoints were a matter of money and, assuming a traveler has money, there should be no serious problems. [S1.4], [S3.9] Members of powerful clans may be excused paying such 'tolls' for fear of retribution. [S3.9]
- 6.19 A journalist from an international news agency explained that ordinary Somalis can travel around Somalia without the need for protective escorts. He also explained that protective escorts now need TFG permission first and so this whole system does not really work. [S16.7]
- 6.20 The European Delegation gave an illustration of how ordinary Somalis could move freely around Mogadishu and central and southern Somalia. The source explained that the EC Delegation office is situated in north Mogadishu approximately three buildings away from the Prime Minister's compound. When there was an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Gedi, a senior security guard at the delegation office was killed as a bystander. The body was transported with a funeral procession comprising the whole office's staff and their families, from the office in Karaan in north Mogadishu to a mosque in Medina, in south Mogadishu for traditional prayers. From there the procession went to Galgaduud, central Somalia, staying there for three days and then traveling back to north Mogadishu. The funeral convoy comprised three public transport vehicles and two private cars, with a few people carrying guns, but no hired escorts. The funeral party was primarily Hawiye, with two Marjeteen. At no time did the funeral party encounter any difficulty. All the office staff are still working in north Mogadishu. [S11.10]

[Return to contents](#)  
[Go to list of sources](#)

## STATEMENTS

### S1: An executive of an internationally recognised NGO

1. The source was in Somalia in the past few weeks, and stated that the NGO had recently sent in medical teams into Mogadishu, though with no official base in the city. The NGO were more active in the southern and central areas of Somalia, particularly in the area between Mogadishu and Kismayo. The teams are staying in hotels, with a low profile. Although the hotels have been targeted for attack (because they are perceived to have links to the TFG), they are secure with private guards. The teams are mixed international missions.

2. The source said that there were mainly TFG checkpoints between Mogadishu International airport and the city. There were freelance militia checkpoints that are set up to extract money, along with similar freelance militia checkpoints in central and southern Somalia. When asked if they were just revenue-raising, the source said that it depended on the place, that in Mogadishu the checkpoints are also targeting on clan membership. There are also unofficial TFG checkpoints that 'arrest' people to extort money from the clans, and that can also be used to arrest sub clans of the Hawiye and send them to jail. The amount of money demanded at the checkpoints varies - anything from a few dollars to 1,000 dollars. This is an unofficial figure because the TFG has an unstructured chain of command that can vary from week to week. Last week hundreds of people were arrested at such checkpoints. The TFG's rationale seems to be one which uses the global war on terror as an excuse to make targeted arrests.

3. As to the security situation in Mogadishu, the north was disrupted by TFG cordoning off and house to house searching; however this has not occurred in the southern parts of the city. The TFG had been using the war on terror as an excuse for clan discriminatory arrests. In Mogadishu it is mainly the Habr Gedir sub clan that has been targeted. Overall, it is a complex military situation, with the TFG strong in some places such as Baidoa and the central region.

4. Asked if an average Somali could travel safely from the airport into Mogadishu city, the source said that it all depended upon what happened on the day: 'yes' to safely if meant by travelling through the criminal, freelance checkpoints, if able to pay; but qualified that there could be a clan element if the checkpoints chose to make it an issue.

5. Returning to safety in Mogadishu, the source noted that the extreme southern point, around Medina, was the 'safest' area in Mogadishu. He added that clan can and do protect their clan mates, and will find money for TFG ransoms if required. However, if the arrested clan member is held to have been close to the UIC, then any assistance that the clan can offer is limited if not non-existent.

6. On whether all clans were represented in Mogadishu, the source said that it depended on 'represented', saying that, for instance, Issaqs may be doing

business in Mogadishu, but not represented in terms of political voice. There was a very small Isaaq presence in Mogadishu, and really they were only protected in Somaliland, not Mogadishu.

7. The source said that the solidarity of Somalis in the face of non-Somalis was formidable.

8. When asked about the mapping of clan dominance, the source said that new power sharing aspects post-conflict had meant that a new clan map was emerging in Somalia, but the situation was that it was still not clear who was in charge where. The old clan maps could not be relied upon any longer. The exceptions were the Bantu as a slave group, and the minority groups such as the Benadiri, who were still in the same places. The sub-clans were now bargaining chips between the larger clans.

9. On the issue of returnees, the question of returning was dominated by the issue of "property". The source stated that the IDPs had been living in public buildings and that the TFG was making attempts to seize the buildings back to state control. The issue of access to land in recompense was highly problematic. Of the numbers who had fled from Mogadishu, there were many estimates, but at least 300,000 was a certain base figure, there had been so many trains of people moving out of the city. He also stated that there were cases last week of people returning to Mogadishu and then leaving again.

10. Asked about whether the national reconciliation meeting was to go ahead on 14 June, the source said yes, to be held in the north of Mogadishu, but that the TFG had been stalling on the arrangements, claiming at times that there was no money available to fund the conference. He mentioned that the TFG would not give up political seats but were arranging to talk on "social issues". He agreed that the mass arrests of the TFG cordoning off in the north of the city was associated with the national conference, but in turn the conference was also something of a ruse to excuse clan-related arrests.

11. Regarding taxis, the source had no idea whether one could find regular transport, but there is ad hoc public transport into Mogadishu. If one had money, then one could go wherever one wanted, with protection included. It has been for a long time difficult to move across Mogadishu from north to south and south to north, but has recently become easier. There are minibuses, not usually needing protection; but if one suspects that one might be a target, then it is sensible to arrange protection.

12. There are no weapons apparent on the street, and most have been hidden. There is presumably a higher price currently in the black market on weapons.

13. The source showed the mission the devastation of the seafront buildings in Mogadishu.

14. The source explained that the Somali Diaspora was remitting back 700 million to 1 billion US dollars per year. Money currently plays a large part in whether a person moves throughout Somalia, but that might not be so in the

future if the TFG develops clan repression.

15. On the number of checkpoints, the source noted that when last visited (in early June 2007), there were 21 TFG checkpoints on the route from the international airport to central Mogadishu. He noted that foreigners were likely to be arrested; likewise anyone who seemed strange to the place.

16. On the new police trainees, the source had no information. Generally, there was no need for protective escorts: it is only when clan tensions flare up on occasion that matters change. The source had no information about minorities needing protection.

17. Most checkpoints were a matter of money outside Mogadishu, though there are TFG checkpoints around Baidoa, but not central Somalia. Each day brings changes as to what may happen. However, all see white people, *muzungu*, as rich targets, and seen as “trophies”. The source however has built up networks and the Somalis are sympathetic. In Puntland, he heard that two white people had been kidnapped. White people usually travel with two bodyguards at US\$ 500 a day. The clans however look after their own clan members for free.

18. On hospitals and medical care, Medina and Keysaney were identified as the only fully functioning hospitals, with adequate supplies of medical supplies and staff. All other healthcare has broken down to barely functioning. There has been a significant brain drain from the system. All health-care is privately run.

19. Schools are running again, even including rudimentary universities, and again all are private initiatives. There has been some money from the middle east to fund this area.

20. As to food and water, again everything is privatised. There are water sellers. Water quality is poor, and is saline in parts of Mogadishu. Bakara market is up and running, but food prices have risen as a result of pirate attacks on ships, and there are deficits of food. The quality is poor, and there is widespread malnutrition. The TFG has reduced levies on food.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)



## S2: An airline executive

1. The interlocutor has not been into Mogadishu for some years. However she has previously worked for Somali Airlines, UNISOM and ECHO and regularly corresponds with sources in Mogadishu.

2. The source noted that all land borders are closed. She added that the Kenyan border is currently closed to Somali refugees. The airline she works for flies into Somalia via Djibouti. The flights are weekly, having previously been twice weekly. The source claimed that the flights are very safe and that the airline has not experienced any security problems. The flights to Somalia are always full.

3. When asked about transport from Mogadishu airport, she explained that most passengers will have made prior arrangements. It is possible for UN staff to make arrangements with the TFG for transportation from the airport for no cost. However, it is feasible to use public transport from K50 airstrip into Mogadishu. On the question of potential security issues at checkpoints on this route the source claimed that there should not be a problem. She qualified this by explaining that many of the airline staff have recently made this journey several times without encountering any security problems.

4. When asked if the airline would carry deported criminals on their flights, the source said that they would not get involved in such matters. When asked if this would be the case even for chartered flights, the source claimed that in that case the TFG would have to be notified beforehand. The source claimed that the TFG does have the ability to ensure a person's safety from Mogadishu to their destination.

5. When asked about the humanitarian situation in Somalia the source claimed that there were fewer refugees attempting to leave the country via the airline than during the worst fighting in March – April 2007. However there was still a feeling of insecurity in Somalia.

6. When asked how the UK could ensure the safety of a Somali returnee from the airport to their destination the source stated that this could be ensured by arranging transportation with major warlords who have their own militias and therefore a high degree of protection. The source claimed that certain warlords would be willing to assist the UK in such matters. This is based on her close friendship with three well known Somali warlords.

7. The source explained that the security situation in Mogadishu was very unpredictable. However, it is rare for an ordinary Somali to be randomly targeted in a shooting – most assassinations occur for a reason. When questioned further, the source stated that many assassinations are revenge attacks. This occurs frequently when Somalis have left the country for economic betterment and then return after a period of time: they are then considered 'traitors'. The source claimed that because Mogadishu is a small city, where every second person will know/recognise each other, even if a person has not been living in the city for years. When asked how the source

reached this conclusion she explained that she used to spend a lot of time in Mogadishu and therefore knows the extent one can be recognised in the city. Further, a close friend of hers recently returned to Somalia after a period of many years and was shot on his return.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)



### S3: A security adviser of a relevant department of the UN

1. The source had returned from Somalia on the weekend of 9 – 10 June 2007.
2. The source said that there is minimal public transport from Mogadishu International Airport into Mogadishu city. There are no minibuses and only a small number of dilapidated taxis.
3. There continue to be numerous security incidents along the main road from MIA into Mogadishu. This road has always been dangerous. Since 12 May there had been around ten successful detonations of roadside bombs and as many or possibly more had been prevented from exploding. All such attacks were targeted at TFG forces (mainly), high profile political targets, law enforcement agencies, Ethiopian troops and three at African Union forces. However, there were virtually always civilian casualties either from the blast itself or from gunfire in retaliatory action by the targeted forces.
4. There are numerous roadblocks on the route from MIA into central Mogadishu. These are predominantly operated by TFG or Ethiopian forces and are aimed at insurgents. Those who can demonstrate that they do not fit into this category should not have any problems with these check-points but the TFG forces in particular are often poorly trained and so there is still some risk.
5. But the source did not anticipate that passengers arriving at MIA or K50 airports would generally have any difficulty travelling into Mogadishu or anywhere else, and although there was some risk of robbery and being caught up in cross-fire if they were in the wrong place at the wrong time when there was an insurgent attack on a TFG etc. target, a Somali wishing to travel from either airport into Mogadishu would not need an escort.
6. Within Mogadishu itself, the north of the city is more volatile and dangerous than the south, but in both cases a degree of relative normality has returned, more so in the south, but even in the areas in the north which are most unstable. There are security incidents in Mogadishu everyday but these are precisely targeted at government forces or suspected insurgents. However, this does mean there is some risk to civilians either in the original attack or in retaliatory action. The rate of such incidents, excepting roadside and suicide bombs, has remained broadly steady since the TFG announced victory on 26 April 2007. A rudimentary private transport network operates in Mogadishu and there is no problem travelling through rival clan areas except at times of inter-clan clashes. The distribution of clans throughout Mogadishu is more or less the same as it was 4 to 5 years ago.
7. There is still a long way to go to reach the targets for humanitarian aid in Mogadishu. After some difficulty getting food aid through to those who needed it, the TFG is now being more co-operative and supplies are being delivered. There is still not universal access to clean drinking water. Healthcare provision

continues to be far less than adequate and what there is provided almost exclusively by aid organisations. Schools are reopening.

8. About 50% of those displaced in the fighting earlier this year have now returned to Mogadishu. The return continues but the rate has slowed. There is no evidence that returnees are leaving again. Humanitarian aid is getting to all significant populations of IDPs but it is at a minimal level.

9. Outside of Mogadishu in South/Central Somalia, the area around, and south of, Kismayo is currently a no-go zone for international agencies, although the TFG is beginning to mobilise in the area. Otherwise, the security situation is 'no worse than it has always been'. There are numerous militia and private check-points but these are concerned solely with extracting money and assuming a traveller has money there should be no serious problems. Members of powerful clans may be excused paying such 'tolls' for fear of retribution. The number of robberies on the roads is lower now than it was before the latest hostilities. There is no public transport; only few private transports are available.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## **S4: Executives of an internationally recognised NGO**

1. The three sources began with information on IDPs generally. They said that many more Somalis (other than the reported 390,000) would have left Mogadishu but they lacked the means to do so. The IDPs currently in Mogadishu have been split into two major groups: those displaced from private buildings, and those displaced from public buildings. The latter group, known as the 'squatters', are currently being evicted by the TFG with no long term solution to their housing. Of the 391,000 IDPs, 50 percent have attempted to return but many cannot go back as their housing no longer remains or is accessible, and there are still security concerns. Some have even returned to Mogadishu only to leave the city again due to the instability.
2. In Mogadishu, there are still clashes and violence, but different areas of the city have different levels of safety. The group identified the four coastal districts as relatively stable areas or 'safe pockets' where many people are returning to.
3. When asked if there were movement trends in clans, the group thought not. They said that prior to the conflict the clans were well settled. However they did not have any new information on clan movements. They explained that no NGOs were able to work in north Mogadishu (the area recently cordoned off by the TFG).
4. On the availability of food and water, water prices were inflated, and NGOs noted an increase in demands for more water projects.
5. When asked to what extent the TFG control Mogadishu, the sources said that in general, the TFG forces were relying on the Ethiopian troops. Many Somalis did consider the TFG had done "a good job in cleansing the city" and there was the hope that this would have an effect outside the city. However the group said it was difficult to get a perspective on the TFG's control of central and southern Somalia, as the power-sharing arrangements were so complex and localised. They do know of problems developing in Kismayo.
6. When asked about the TFG police, and whether it was a mixed clan force, the group said no, although it was influenced by clan issues, with splits into clan-based sections. They added that the police, though apparent, were not really implemented as a force.
7. Asked about different levels of security for clans, the group had no information about the new clan makeup or security. They just knew that the TFG was being targeted for attack, with no reports of renewed clan violence in Mogadishu. They stressed that there has always been a level of clan fighting in Somalia, and this is likely to continue if Ethiopian troops withdraw. Violence had reduced to 'Mogadishu normal' and the group thought that the Ethiopians' more powerful weaponry was responsible for the previous higher level of violence. They added that most violence came from TFG retaliation.
8. The group noted that there were no attacks aimed at international aid

organisations, but all were still not keen on being based in Mogadishu.

9. Mogadishu was still a focus area of violence, and more volatile than other areas. However, Johar is only eight kilometres away from Mogadishu and is very peaceful with few visible weapons. There were some elements of stability in Somalia generally, however this depends from area to area and as such is 'a mixed picture'. This level of stability fluctuates on a daily basis and it is near impossible to say an area will be safe for any period of time. Two examples of this fluctuation are the recent upsurge of violence in Merka, and the increase in violence in the Sanaab and Gedo region.

10. The group related how they had sent people into Somalia, going in on two flights a week to Johar. They did not know from personal experience conditions at Mogadishu International Airport. They had not experienced any problems regarding TFG checkpoints around Johar. With checkpoints, there may be difficulties going one way but not the other, and you are unlikely to encounter difficulty if you know the TFG group on guard.

11. On the issue of whether public transport was available, the group had passed minibuses and thought that there must be some public transport running in Mogadishu; there was certainly business freight running. In Mogadishu, businesses were operating, and cash was being used in the markets. Many IDPs had gone back to the city but found they could not afford the prices. There were fake checkpoints that were set up for robbery.

12. For IDPs, there are areas in which they cannot go, particularly after the public building evictions. However, the group impressed a need to understand 'normal life' in a Mogadishu sense, where there is an acceptance of a mobile type of life created by displacement. In this current conflict, there had been many displacements within the city of Mogadishu, with 68 percent of the city's population affected.

13. Displacement has severely disrupted people's livelihoods. Non-food items are being sold below market price in an effort to raise instant cash. Small businesses have disappeared due to the TFG moving makeshift stores in their effort to 'clean the city'. Now only larger markets operate, with higher prices for food. The IDPs who had not moved since 1991 have been particularly badly affected by the latest conflict, with their livelihoods gone and assets now running out. However, despite all this chaos, the banking system in Somalia is still working effectively.

14. The group had no up to date information about healthcare, and were not involved in medical issues. The group stressed that most international organisations could not predict what was going to happen in the near future, and their partnership was focusing on current emergency needs. As to the percentage of distribution of aid to IDPs, the sources said that this was very difficult to quantify. In some areas, up to 50 percent will have received provisions, but in some inaccessible areas 0 percent have received aid. It is not accurate to give a generalised figure for the whole of Somalia as delivery figures fluctuate too much from area to area and as such this does not represent the severe crises faced in some of the worst affected areas. In

these areas the IDP population can exceed the locals by anything as much as by 250 percent. This dramatic increase in the population has affected local resources such as agriculture, and has increased the number of human rights abuses. The IDPs included a high level of female headed households, who were vulnerable to rape, and other sexual violence, with cases of slavery, child labour, and an increase in prostitution.

15. The group stressed the impossibility of predicting what may happen in Somalia but they did speculate that national reconciliation might work if begun whilst the Ethiopians were still in the country. They thought in these situations that the limited acceptance of such forces was fast running out. The AU force however was no longer being targeted. Generally, there was possibly a non-acceptance of policing as a whole generation of Somalis had grown up without it. There is also a growing realisation among the clans that clan violence is a stumbling block to gaining international support, however this is teamed with the impression of Somalis that they and their clans are merely 'puppets of international politics'.

16. On the issue of whether IDPs were now moving back out of Mogadishu having once recently returned, the group said they no information, and referred to another source.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## S5: A relevant department of the UN

1. The source started by talking about the IDPs, and referring to the latest wave of IDPs displaced between 1 February 2007 and the current date. He defined two types of IDPs affected in the latest wave: those who had initially settled from the first periods of displacement in the early 1990s, numbering 300-400 thousand people, and more temporary IDPs.
2. The interlocutor stated that from 1 February 2007 – present (12 June 2007) there have been over 300 000 people displaced from Somalia. On the question of the humanitarian situation for these people the source explained that it is important to clarify the exact meaning of 'IDP' as there are many types of displaced persons in Somalia to the extent that practically anybody living in Somalia could be classed as an IDP.
3. The source explained that over the last two years there have been over five waves of internal displacement. There are the second/third generation of IDPs that left Somalia after the war and also the temporary IDPs that have fled the city after the recent fighting during March – April 2007. The situation has been aggravated by the recent flooding that has taken place in the city.
4. On the question of how the estimations of the numbers of IDPs are reached, the interlocutor explained that the figure is derived from the Population Tracking System which has approximately 30 – 40 parties stationed on the ground in Somalia. The Population Tracking System has reported that approximately 90,000 IDPs have returned to Mogadishu. The interlocutor explained that the figure may reach up to 200,000 in reality. It is difficult to estimate the exact numbers of those returning to Mogadishu because many IDPs seem to be moving back and forth, entering the city only to evacuate it again.
5. When asked as to the type of IDPs that are returning to Mogadishu the source explained that it is mainly those that fled to the outskirts of the city. These people have little to no means of support and find it very difficult to continue living outside of Mogadishu. This has become an increasing problem as some bandits have exploited the vulnerability of IDPs by charging them 'rent' for sheltering under trees on the roadsides.
6. On the question of internal displacement within Mogadishu itself the source explained that the government's attempts to reclaim public buildings have contributed to this phenomenon. To some extent this can be seen as clan politics – it is the desire of some TFG officials to expel parts of the Hawiye clan from the city. The Galgadud area is the home base of the Hawiye, yet few have returned.
7. Outside of the 16 Mogadishu districts, life for the IDPs is "more miserable than that of an ordinary Somali". To put this into context, even before the heaviest fighting had taken place only 30% of Somalis had access to clean water.

8. On the question of humanitarian support provided by NGOs the source explained that this had not reached all of those in need. Many NGOs have a system of assessing which groups of IDPs are most in need of support. In some cases this may simply be a question of access criteria, i.e. which groups the NGOs can actually reach.

9. On the issue of trade resumption the interlocutor explained that livelihood activities were currently on hold. In fact, there are fewer and fewer income generating activities in Mogadishu. It may be the case that if the situation in Mogadishu does not improve, there will be no way for many Somalis to make any money in order to obtain the basic necessities for life.

10. When questioned on the proposed plans to increase the government's police force in Mogadishu the interlocutor agreed that this was hoped for but the hope had not transpired into a reality as of yet. Little has been achieved other than basic initiative measures. The police do reportedly have a presence on the streets of Mogadishu however there are insufficient numbers of police to exert any effective control.

11. The source explained that there are serious organisational problems within the structure of the TFG. Put simply, there is no official chain of command in the TFG. There is the regional government comprised of Mohamed Dheere and his forces; the TFG with its own corresponding forces; the Ethiopians with their own troops and other TFG and Ethiopian collaborative forces, mainly seen at some joint checkpoints. Not one of these four groups has complete control over Mogadishu, and there is little effective communication between the groups. This can be seen most clearly at checkpoints as it is impossible for the leaders of the TFG to know what is going on at these points and whether troops act on their own individual initiatives.

12. The interlocutor stressed the importance of understanding the internal political mistrust within the TFG, especially the power struggle between Mohamed Dheere and the Prime Minister.

13. On the issue of how political instability may manifest at checkpoints the source claimed that minorities were most at risk here. The Oromos in particular are systematically arrested at checkpoints, together with former UIC suspects. It is difficult to know what happens when individuals are arrested as external authorities do not have access to the detention centres.

14. Aside from these groups, the source has not heard of checkpoints discriminating Somalis on a clan basis. It is possible that the Hawiye may be targeted more than most but this is a wider political issue and is not seen as directly related to the activities at the checkpoints. Regarding the number of checkpoints in central Mogadishu, the source explained that there are six main checkpoints on the six main roads in Mogadishu. The checkpoints are there for the purpose of fare collecting and checking for criminals. Out of the six main checkpoints there are some in which there have been more arrests and detentions, namely Balad checkpoint. It is possible to avoid the two



checkpoints if travelling from Mogadishu International Airport into the city, but not if one is travelling from the K50 airstrip.

15. Although the source is not aware of transportation from Mogadishu International Airport to Mogadishu centre, he deduced that there must be transport systems in place as people are moving around the city. The ban on weapons carrying had reduced the number of arms that are openly on show.

16. On the question of protective escorts the interlocutor stated that most drivers will have ways of protecting themselves. Many minibuses were armed, however the TFG is trying to reduce the number of armed vehicles operating in the city.

17. When asked if a Somali returning from overseas would arouse suspicion when travelling through Mogadishu the source stated that this may possibly be the case. This is due to the heightened security measures the TFG are taking to catch 'terrorists'. If a Somali is returning from overseas the conclusion may be reached that they had terrorist links.

18. The source claimed that there were more than two functioning hospitals in Mogadishu, although many of the other health centres are privatised. The source considers Medina Hospital in Mogadishu to be better than the hospitals operating in the whole of Somalia; the hospital in Hargeisa being the only exception.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)



## S6: A security adviser to western governments

1. Most of the violence in Mogadishu has become more sophisticated and is precisely targeted at TFG and Ethiopian forces and high profile political targets. There is not routine targeting of members of particular clans but there is a general risk of being detained for questioning by TFG or associated forces and they may be locked up for a while – generally a day or two but possibly longer. Sometimes these actions proved to be justified and arms and explosives found, but sometimes there is no apparent evidence to support the action. The risk may be higher for members of certain clans, e.g. Hawiye, (especially the Hebr Gedir and the Abgal), people who may be perceived to be politically active, and also students of Koranic schools. There is a suggestion that it may be lower profile people who are liable to be detained for longer – higher profile people are detained for a shorter period as a warning. Although there have been allegations that detainees have been handled roughly, there have been no reports of serious mistreatment or torture. The same groups may also be subject to official harassment – e.g. house searches and more intensive questioning at check-points.

2. Except for attacks on TFG and associated forces, and the often over-zealous retaliatory action on the part of those forces, in which civilians are often victims in the cross-fire, levels of violence in Mogadishu are currently fairly low. But there is still general insecurity and high levels of crime so although people can and do move around, on the whole they tend to stay in their home area.

3. Outside Mogadishu, TFG authority remains very limited. They have appointed officials in several parts of the country but in many cases, e.g. in Beled Weyne, the authority of these appointees is disputed and their role is no more than titular. TFG and associated forces' troop movements south of Mogadishu have led to speculation that an assault on Kismayo and the surrounding area may be planned. There are concerns that this could actually destabilise the situation in that area further – the Marehan have issues with the TFG but at present are not implacably opposed to the reconciliation process. There are signs that the Hawiye, although they will not immediately participate in the reconciliation process, are developing a more coherent voice through the establishment of a new committee which met for the first time over the weekend of 9 – 10 June. There is also evidence that the armed opposition groups both inside and outside Somalia are 'coalescing'. This could greatly increase the resources available to the armed opposition groups operating in Somalia, although there is also a suggestion that the Shabaab have signalled frictions with exiled opposition groups.

4. There is public transport around Somalia generally. Many of the previous TFG and freelance militia check-points have dissipated and there is movement around the country. The average bus will have light weapons on board for protection against robbery but there is a risk that if these are confiscated at a TFG check-point the coach will be vulnerable to subsequent attacks.

5. There are a number of TFG and associated forces check-points between Mogadishu International Airport and Mogadishu town – probably around six. There are no freelance check-points. Except for the risk of being arrested by government forces on suspicion of involvement in the armed opposition, or caught in roadside bomb attack, the main risk from travelling this route is from ill-trained and ill-disciplined government forces. There are however alternative routes and many people routinely take a more convoluted route to avoid the check-points and also the traffic congestion at the K4 roundabout at the city end of the main road. There is regular and routine traffic between the airport and the city. Ordinary Somalis would not make the journey unnecessarily but nor would they not make it if they needed to e.g. to collect relatives from the airport.

6. The route from K50 airstrip into Mogadishu is likely to be more risky because the greater distance means more check-points and the greater distance of these from the centre of power in Mogadishu makes them less accountable.

7. We asked the source explicitly about the treatment of a male returnee who had been convicted of sexual offences in the UK on return to Somalia if his crimes became known. It was the source's view that Somali justice is concerned more with retribution and restitution than morality and punishment, so that crimes against people who are not known to the Somalis do not carry much if any stigma.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## S7: An airline executive

1. The source said that flights continue to operate between Nairobi and Mogadishu International Airport via Aden and Berbera. Traffic is now building up again after the conflict. Numbers have been thin on the flight into Mogadishu, but the source did not consider that this was because of the security situation. Normal turnaround for the flights in Mogadishu is 45 minutes to 1 hour, and they remain in Mogadishu for a maximum of four hours. No flight has ever been cancelled for security reasons.
2. The airline operates its own minibus to transport its staff from Mogadishu International Airport into and around Mogadishu city, including to the airline's three offices in North, South and Central Mogadishu. Although not technically for airline passengers' use, on the infrequent occasions when regular public transport has been interrupted, the airline's minibus has been used to transfer passengers into the city. The airline had not encountered any difficulties in operating this service and at no time had its staff or passengers come to any harm. In addition to the airline's own transport, the source informed the delegation that there were regular minibus services from the airport into the city and taxis were freely available.
3. To illustrate the ease with which travel from the airport to and within Mogadishu could be undertaken, the source invited a member of the delegation to speak on the telephone with a member of his staff who was based in and lived in Mogadishu. The source called the member of staff on his mobile telephone, explained why the delegation wished to speak to him, and told him to answer honestly any questions he was asked. The staff member in Mogadishu told the delegate that he had driven in his private motor car from Mogadishu International Airport to his home in the Halanie district, on the opposite side of Mogadishu, two hours previously. He makes this journey every working day and, apart from routine checks at TFG operated checkpoints, has never encountered any difficulty. Nor had he ever heard of any airline passenger being mistreated en route from the airport into the city, and seemed surprised at the question.
4. On checkpoints, the source mentioned that there were four main checkpoints on the road to the city, manned by TFG and Ethiopians. When asked about what normally occurs at the checkpoints, the source said the TFG will check passengers' tickets, passports, their origin, to insure that people are not trying to escape from the authorities. The TFG are looking for particular individuals at checkpoints, or those who they suspect may be engaged in armed opposition, but they are 'very friendly' to others who pass through.
5. Out towards Baidoa, there are nine checkpoints manned by war-lord militias. The TFG would not bother anyone who had been away from the country for some time, but would arrest anyone they suspected as a terrorist, but normally they do so on tip-offs rather than at random.
6. Regarding security incidents, the source said he had heard of two suicide bombers in Mogadishu in the past six months, and four roadside bombs in the

previous two weeks.

7. The source gave an opinion that the TFG leadership seemed to be in disarray, with ministers appointed outside Somalia who had no resources to perform their office. Many ministers have been fired, demoted or not assigned posts.

8. The source referred to deportations. He said deportees on his flights were not separated from ordinary passengers, and upon touch down, were indistinguishable from other arrivals.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## **S8: Somali NGO executives, of Somali descent**

1. The Somali source was last in Mogadishu in March 2007 for a period of approximately three weeks. During this time she travelled extensively throughout the city and noticed that there were fewer people in Mogadishu than usual and also less public transport. The source recounted that at this time there were even threats that aircrafts attempting to use Mogadishu airport would be shot down if they did not withdraw their travel to the airport. The source stressed that this is not currently the case and that the situation has changed dramatically since this time.
2. The source was confident that now the TFG has no control in some areas of the city there is less difficulty for ordinary Somalis (even women) to travel from Mogadishu International Airport to central Mogadishu. The people who would be at risk would generally be foreigners, diaspora people and high profile Somali figures. There is public transport into the city – with many minibuses operating, and taxis waiting at the airport. There are no clan issues travelling into the city. Transport out of Mogadishu to other places in southern/central Somalia was more problematic with several cases of looting and rape of passengers on public transport.
3. On the humanitarian situation, the source told the delegation that the situation is worse than it has ever been. Humanitarian relief is insufficient, ‘a drop in the ocean’ and some people are having to shelter under trees and rely on rainfall for water. There are serious problems with disease including diarrhoea, cholera and malaria. IDPs are suffering ‘beyond imagination’. Women are particularly vulnerable and although there are a few instances of aid organisations trying to target their efforts on women and families, in most cases it is men who are able to get their hands on the aid – sometimes for the simple reason that they are able to carry the heavy bags of grain.
4. Instances of rape, of IDPs in particular, increased greatly during the recent hostilities, when it was used as a weapon of war, and have remained high since. The problem now is greatest outside Mogadishu but instances do happen in the city as well.
5. IDPs have returned to Mogadishu in large numbers but many have left again having found that the public buildings they previously occupied are now out of bounds. In some cases female headed households have left again after the daughters were raped. Return is really only viable for families if they have strong or powerful men to protect them.
6. The government is trying to get schools in Mogadishu back in operation but they have not been able to do so in the areas worst hit by the fighting. The healthcare situation is very, very poor.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## S9: A relevant department of the UN

1. The source stated that he was last in Mogadishu three weeks' ago, and was going back the next day. The source was asked about IDPs, and stated that there were only estimates. The overall estimate for the period February to May 2007 for IDPs fleeing Mogadishu ranged from the 390,000 of the UN population tracking service (comprising the data of 34 NGOs) to the 40,000 claimed by the TFG. Of that wave of IDPs, between 100,000 - 200,000, roughly between 40 - 60 percent, had returned to Mogadishu. The source said it was very difficult to estimate.
2. In Mogadishu, potable water is scarce, and food that is provided by the World Food Program is hindered from delivery by recent piracy activity. In Mogadishu, there were 250,000 IDPs in 259 different sites.
3. In terms of refugees, the source said there were Somalis spread over many countries. Though there are many who just seek a better life, there are those who are affected by the political situation, but 49 percent wish to go back to Somalia.
4. On the question of how much aid is getting to IDPs, the source said of the 390,000 IDPs, 368,000 had received some non-food aid and 338,000 had received some food aid. When asked whether access was the criteria for distribution, the source said yes, Mogadishu is particularly difficult. Medicins sans Frontieres has been targeted in the north of Mogadishu and affected by a roadside bomb and a mortar attack.
5. Of the 582 incidents since January 2007, only 55 have been clan related.
6. On the question of IDP public building evictions, the source explained that the TFG had evicted IDPs from 77 public buildings. There is the promise (by the TFG) of land for resettlement but the source explained that many people think this may be a form of social re-engineering.
7. The source added that during the bombardment many of those wounded would not go to Medina hospital for fear of being arrested by the TFG (who have control of the hospital). Baidoa hospital is "a disaster"; the TFG are not concerned with social policy or resources. There are no drugs in Baidoa hospital. Medina hospital is adequately administered, however it is heavily dependent upon international agencies' support. The source added that healthcare services were so lacking that even those with money could not find the healthcare they needed.
8. Outside Mogadishu, malnutrition has increased, from 18.3 percent to 19.0 percent in Gedo, with 4.3 percent of children suffering severe malnutrition.
9. There are on-going security issues: for instance, all the local staff of the source's agency have been involved in at least one security incident, most involving mortar attacks.
10. In the recent waves of IDPs, the minorities, have not been particularly

discriminated against. The source said the Bantus were not noticeably discriminated against either. The source explained that IDPs go back to wherever they feel secure, in most cases back to clan areas, with “the first safety net is the sub-clan”. In this sense, the clan maps are still valid, as people go back to clan areas. He added that it was very difficult for outcasts. The source said that the clan assisted female-headed households, unlike the treatment of widows in other African scenarios.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)



## S10: An academic researcher of Somali descent

1. The source is a Somali, and he informed the interviewers that although he was knowledgeable about Somalia, his academic interest was on a broader Horn of Africa regional level, and had been involved in a mixture of NGO and academic initiatives. He communicates with his Somalia contacts almost daily. On Somalia, he said that although a Somali and well-connected, the only prediction he could be sure of is that "Somalia is new to me each day".

2. He noted that though the Somalis were originally pastoralists, insecurity has prompted rapid urbanisation. On the question of whether clans were disrupted by such movement, he said no, adding that people moved as clans, and were received as families with the sub, sub-clan structure.

3. When asked about access to property, the source mentioned that the UIC had begun a register of property according to Shari'a law; however the TFG were only interested in the restitution of public buildings. The TFG cannot use the public buildings for administration, as they are weak and there are no resources to do so, and so have given the vacant buildings to Ethiopian troops.

4. The active anti-government forces were split into:

- Opposition drawn from the Hawiye clan, though not active as a fighting force
- Somali nationalists across clans
- The Islamist group made up of businessmen, moderate politicians, and radicals such as the Shabab, estimated at 5,000 in Mogadishu.

5. There is no active fighting in Mogadishu after the period of nine days when the remaining anti-government forces fought with the Ethiopians. The fighting suddenly stopped but now the radical anti-government forces are conducting targeted sporadic attacks.

6. For the first time in almost three years, the Transitional Federal Institutions are concerned with human rights, only after the raid on the former president's compound.

7. There are five security forces on the ground:

- The presidential protection unit, who do not answer to anyone and are highly independent. They are from Puntland.
- The Ethiopian forces
- The national security service, under the Ethiopians and President Yusuf. A majority of them also come from Puntland.
- The African Union (mainly Ugandan) troops, held to be the best of the

forces.

- The police force under Mohammed Dheere, which the source held to be the personal force of a very powerful warlord, and the worst dictator in Somalia.

8. On checkpoints, the source said that extortion tended to happen at night and robberies done surreptitiously from time to time. Generally, there is a vacuum of law and order. The source concluded that if you are not from the Abgal (the Prime Minister's sub-clan) or from the Majerteen (the President's sub-clan), then you are not immune from TFG attacks and that if you are in anyway associated with the TFG you are also not immune from the insurgent attacks.

9. Finally, the source made one observation on the fact that although a criminal has no place anywhere except his/her home country, today's Somalia does not provide the required conducive environment for possible deportation and/or voluntary repatriation of Somalis. Instead, such deportees would only capitalize on the chaotic situation prevailing in the war-torn country.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## S11: An adviser to an EU institution

1. The source stated that he had been in Mogadishu ten days ago [3 June 2007] and was in touch with Mogadishu contacts daily. He had arrived via K50 airstrip, having obtained a visa from the Somali embassy in Nairobi. He mentioned that Mogadishu International Airport was controlled by the TFG.

2. He stated that the Ethiopians were stationed strategically through out the city at main locations, and though they mounted patrols, they did not proceed far from their bases. The TFG loyal to Mohammed Dheere were based in 16 police stations in the city, mounting ad hoc mobile patrols. The six main checkpoints were not permanently operated, but utilised in periods of high tension. He identified four types of security force working on the street:

- The Ethiopian troops
- The TFG troops trained in Puntland
- The Federal police, run by the commissioner of police,
- TFG police loyal to Mohammed Dheere

The African Union troops, based in Villa Somalia, and who patrol infrequently and close by, and cannot be classed as a security force on the street.

3. He mentioned the streets felt 'safer' in as much as there was a large military presence. Regarding the police, he mentioned that about 300 recruits a month were being trained in Puntland, given basic training.

4. With regards to visible weapons on the street, he stated that there was no formal ban on carrying weapons, and disarmament attempts were ineffective, but people knew to keep weapons concealed. There could not be a formal ban because it would stimulate a reaction from the insurgents.

5. The TFG has control but is "deeply unpopular". Any effective control has to be political not forced - any city can be pacified by force - and this has now happened, with the backbone of the military opposition broken in major battles. The clan and the criminal militias were now out of the picture. The Shabaab is damaged but has become more targeted in its attacks. There are suicide bombers, and more are being trained.

6. Regarding movement in the city, there are minibuses moving freely. There has been a "remarkable" reduction in checkpoints, with fewer bandit checkpoints, and less interest in clan affiliation. Only occasional TFG / Ethiopian checkpoints, typically only one on a long road. Returning Somalis can move around, and not be targeted as insurgents, but it is better if they can hire a car. When asked about why ordinary Somalis would not be targeted, the source explained that it is a politically targeted risk now and not aimed at ordinary Somalis.

7. The main violence is the retaliation of the TFG / Ethiopian forces. The TFG

are mounting intelligence operations, and are repressing on a clan basis, with Hawaye being the main targets of revenge.

8. Outside Mogadishu, the TFG are only present in Baidoa. Baidoa is secure, but the atmosphere is hostile. There are no TFG checkpoints on the road between Baidoa and Mogadishu. The road here is usually safe, with a good flow of commercial vehicles, and “if you can secure a package, then you can secure a person”. Commercial traffic is running right down to Kismayo. There are however insurgents in Johar. IDPs were subject to abuse.

9. The source stressed that the latest conflict was political in nature, and is not a general ethnic conflict. The political campaign was to reduce the status and wealth of the Hawaye clan, with politicians, business people, and militia leaders targeted.

10. The source gave an illustration of how ordinary Somalis could move around Mogadishu. He explained that the EC Delegation office is situated in north Mogadishu approximately three buildings away from the Prime Minister’s compound. When there was an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Gedi, a senior security guard at the delegation office was killed as a bystander. The body was transported with a funeral procession comprising the whole office’s staff and their families, from the office in Karan in north Mogadishu to a mosque in Medina, in south Mogadishu for traditional prayers. From there the procession went to Galgaduud, central Somalia, staying there for three days and then travelling back to north Mogadishu. The funeral convoy comprised three public transport vehicles and two private cars, with a few people carrying guns, but not hired escorts. The funeral party was primarily Hawaye, with two Marjeteen. At no time did the funeral party encounter any difficulty. All the office staff are still working in north Mogadishu.

11. The source concluded that overall, the conflict was a political conflict, and was likely to continue as such, with sporadic attacks over the next weeks, unless Ethiopian troops withdraw or the TFG collapses.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## **S12: Somali NGO executive, of Somali descent**

1. The source recounted that she had to leave Mogadishu in November 2006, but is in regular contact with Mogadishu.
2. The source talked about how there were a number of local NGOs operating in Mogadishu, distributing resources provided by the diaspora. As far humanitarian issues went, she identified shelter as the main concern, followed by the supply of medicine and regular food aid. She talked particularly of the plight of the “tree people” - the poorest of IDPs forced to rent trees as shelter in the areas just beyond Mogadishu.
3. The source referred to outbreaks of cholera amongst the IDP populations. When asked about healthcare, the source said there was effectively none, as Medina hospital was miles away and inaccessible to most.
4. On female-headed families, the source agreed that there might be some protection afforded by the clan as a whole if in a clan area, but that the clans were now relatively powerless. In short, women and children IDPs were very vulnerable to attack.
5. On whether schools were operating, the source said, no, not really. She held that Mogadishu was ‘traumatised’, with high levels of mistrust, and a highly unpredictable security situation.
6. The source identified the following as the security forces in Mogadishu:
  - The Ethiopian troops
  - The TFG troops trained in Puntland
  - TFG police loyal to Mohammed Dheere
  - The anti-terrorist unit of the TFG police
  - The state intelligence service

The source felt that Somalia was moving towards a dictatorship, but there was at the moment no central command, and ordinary Somalis were being frequently oppressed by different agencies.

7. The source stated that the security forces were given little training and that most security operations were revenue-based, “legitimised looting”, starting from the Prime Minister down. The source referred to most conflict as being centred around money and power, with a concerted effort by the TFG to destabilise, impoverish and reduce the status of the mainly Hawiye business community. It has little to do with clan, but mainly about the snatching of resources by powerful men. Politicians are particularly targeted, with death and extortion threats received by phone.

8. On the national reconciliation conference and process, the source felt that

“a military solution would never win” and that political dialogue was essential, with “a need for serious and honest debate”. She felt however the [then] forthcoming meeting had been stage-managed by the TFG, with elements of the TFG disinclined towards reconciliation, such as the Prime Minister who saw himself as the first political casualty of the meeting. The chairman, the source stated, had little respect as he had previously not prevented politically-motivated mass arrests.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## S13: Security advisers on Somalia

1. The sources are in Somalia about once or twice a month, but they have not recently been to Mogadishu. They had recently been in Bosasso for a week, and also Jowhar.
2. As far as the sources are aware, Mogadishu international airport is operational. It is possible to get public transport from the airport, but this is best arranged privately. There are some standard checkpoints on the route, as well as major checkpoints around K4. The presence of additional checkpoints differs from day to day.
3. Mogadishu is relatively 'cosmopolitan', with all clans represented in terms of presence in the city. The diaspora go in and out of the city all the time.
4. The insurgents know who they are targeting, and these targets are politically motivated but most casualties are civilians caught in the crossfire. The security forces were held to be the TFG, the Ethiopians and the AU. Weapons were not visible on the streets.
5. When asked about Mohammed Dheere's TFG forces, the sources replied that Mohammed Dheere was the 'strong man' in Mogadishu and that the TFG forces in Mogadishu were effectively his own force.
6. Anyone can buy TFG uniforms on the market. There are fake TFG operations as a result, with reported robberies and looting. The broader scale fighting has reduced and attacks have become more targeted. A major threat to the civilians' safety is Ethiopian/TFG retaliation. This retaliation now manifests as spray-shooting during incidents rather than indiscriminate shelling.
7. On the issue of whether criminals from abroad would be targeted by Somalis, the sources explained that both customary law and Shari'a are essentially retributive, with the aggrieved party makes demands. This means unless the crime was committed against a Somali in the community, it would not be of interest to them.
8. Food distribution is getting better. However, not even half of the latest wave of IDPs has returned to Mogadishu. The sources' current advice to NGOs is that there is a high risk to one's safety in Mogadishu, and NGOs should therefore avoid the city.
9. The insurgency has been reduced but not defeated. Rather, the insurgents are still present, but have merged into the general population.
10. On clan maps, the sources said that they cannot be used any longer even as guideline, with groups displaced and disputing who is the original occupant of the various lands.
11. On the issue of whether the TFG has full control, the sources explained



that the TFG has no capacity to impose its presence in Kismayo at the current time. On the issue of the national reconciliation congress, the sources told the delegation a maxim that summed up the situation: "You cannot reconcile with friends, you must reconcile with enemies" meaning that the conference had no opportunity for free discussion because it was limited in its invitation.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## S14: An executive of an NGO operating in Somalia

1. The source recounted that he had joined the organisation in December 2006. He had visited Puntland seven or eight times, and was last in Mogadishu in December 2006, having to leave hurriedly on 25th December. He was due to visit Mogadishu again shortly. He claimed to have good contacts in Mogadishu, with irregular contact with the TFG.
2. On the issue of IDPs, his organisation estimated that only 80,000 of the 390,000 had returned to Mogadishu. The humanitarian situation for IDPs was desperate; with most IDPs receiving no aid as aid distribution is limited to safe areas. Shelter is the most pressing issue, and the source's organisation had provided assistance to nearly 2,000 families. All IDPs were vulnerable, in the source's estimation, with very limited access to healthcare, and with only a few organisations providing drugs.
3. In Mogadishu and in Kismayo, there were food and non-food items available, including some medicines, but in Puntland, the focus had moved on to infrastructure projects. These included healthcare and water projects, dealing with building, education, and equipping aspects. The source's organisation had been officially started in Somalia in May 2006, but had worked in the country since 2002 through implementation of irregular food distribution in cooperation with national NGOs.
4. The source felt that the humanitarian situation was getting worse in Somalia. In the UIC era, there were minimal disruptions – it is generally regarded as the most peaceful period. However even in the warlord era, access could be negotiated. The source illustrated how bad the situation was during the warlord era with the example of a hotel manager whose salary was practically totally extorted by those providing his protection.
5. The source regarded the Somali people as being strong in their allegiance to Islam, "they know the principles and symbols" but have little formal knowledge.
6. The source felt most Somalis were supporting the fight against the TFG because they feel that the TFG has done little for them.
7. On the issue of weapons, the source said that weapons and armed protection were cheap, (you could for example, hire a bodyguard for a US dollar a day) but the display of weapons is now banned and only held with TFG permission. The TFG however does not have an effective control over all of Somalia, and anti-TFG attacks will continue.
8. The supply of water is still one of the main humanitarian problems. Water is provided by the NGOs but only where tankers can gain access. Cholera and diarrhoea outbreaks are spurring renewed efforts by NGOs to the IDPs. Water can be found, but it is not potable, and it will be some time before clean water can be provided. The source's organisation hopes to assist with clean water projects over the next two months, and provide chlorine over the next six months.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## S15: An embassy official

1. The source stated that he had been in post less than a month, so he was effectively relaying back comments from the Mogadishu office of the Norwegian Refugee Council.
2. Regarding Mogadishu International Airport, the source's contacts said that flights were regularly arriving and departing, and that there was transport available between the airport and the city. Traffic is normal with only regularised TFG checkpoints. He claimed that it would not be difficult to find someone to hire who would be able to take you from the airport to the city.
3. The roads outside Mogadishu were more problematic. There was a growing problem of fake checkpoints set up for robbery, with an approximate 30 percent increase in criminal activity. Criminal activity is the only violence that is directed towards ordinary Somalis, as opposed to the insurgents' targeted attacks on the security forces.
4. The source considered ordinary Somalis to be able to move around without attack, and that the level of violence, though still higher than in the ICU period, has reduced recently. On whether a returnee would be picked out as a stranger, the source said that it depends on whether the stranger was perceived as having money or goods that could be stolen.
5. On the security forces, the TFG were less in evidence, now mainly being patrols of police with Ethiopian troop support. Last week on Tuesday and Wednesday [5-6 June 2007] the Ethiopian forces were on high alert. Usually the Ethiopians are only able to move around freely in the Karaan district of north Mogadishu. The AU troops are only present around the airport and seaport.
6. On IDPs, the source said that their estimation was of a return of about 90,000 (as and up to 25 May 2007) of the 390,000 who had fled Mogadishu in the latest conflict. He noted that there were about 250,000 IDPs in Mogadishu. The IDPs had been located in 267 settlements throughout the city (140 of which were public buildings) prior to the conflict. About a third of these sites were abandoned during the latest conflict and now the TFG are preventing the return of the displaced to them.
7. The IDPs are in an extremely difficult situation. The Norwegian Refugee Council was handing out emergency kits but have found it near impossible to target everyone in need. Food and water were available in general, but there was a question of access and of price. In many IDP settlements, there were problems with accessing water and sanitation as people were afraid to leave the settlement for their own safety and for fear that their places in the camp would be taken by other displaced persons.
8. The source had no information available on whether the clans had been disrupted. He informed the delegation that the current clear targets for attack by the insurgents are perceived members of the TFG; UN staff and their personnel; and westerners, specifically white people.

9. The source also noted that IDPs who had fled from private property had lost their property to squatters; and this has confused the picture of returning IDPs to Mogadishu.

10. The source's organisation was giving priority to IDPs, coordinating information between humanitarian aid programs, and arranging shelter. The TFG (Dheere's faction) have accused NGOs of assisting the insurgents, and thus there have been difficulties in distributing both food and non-food items.

11. When asked if having money made any difference, the source said, yes, of course. He mentioned that the telecommunications and banking systems were functioning normally. However, there was a problem with disrupted livelihoods for most Somalis. The main source of conflict between Somalis is over land and shelter. The source's organisation is currently surveying the property situation in Mogadishu and surrounding areas to present to the UN a framework for property resolution.

12. On the national reconciliation conference, the source stated that though some see it as an opportunity for peace, others see it as engendering more violence. The situation is too unpredictable at the moment to be able to make any predictions regarding people's safety or on returns to Somalia. It is not known if the radical and moderate Islamists are still in Mogadishu. Although the source had no information about the insurgents, he mentioned that most Somalis were temporarily united in an anti-Ethiopian position.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## S16: A journalist for an international news agency

1. The source was last in Mogadishu in November – December 2006. He had previously spent the last seven years reporting from various parts of Somalia including Mogadishu, Puntland and Baidoa. The source stressed that it was currently too dangerous for him to report in Somalia, telling the delegation that one of his colleagues had been killed there in 2005 and how the TFG continue to issue threats to journalists. Although he does not report from Somalia, the source follows the country closely and speaks to his contacts in Mogadishu daily.

2. The source stressed that the current conflict in Somalia (post the heavy fighting in March – April 2007) is the worst time that the country has faced for sixteen years. This is due to the sheer volume of hostility and mistrust among officials and civilians alike. The TFG and Ethiopian troops are attacking anyone and any visible target that they perceive to be a threat to them. Anyone who is remotely perceived to be anti-TFG, and anyone who is perceived to be Arabic, anyone who is perceived to be a radical Islamist (to give just three examples) are targets.

3. The source explained that what many call ‘the government’ in Somalia really cannot be classified as such because there is no structure to the TFG and there are power struggles and vested interests among its top officials. An example being Ali Ghedi whom the source describes as holding a lot of power but not exerting it to useful effect because of his corrupt nature. As such his power is limited. Although he and Mohamed Dheere are from the same sub sub clan (Hawiye Abgal) they do not work together because of the underlying struggle for power between them. The source explained that although many see the current crisis in Somalia as a Darod-Hawiye clan conflict, this is deceptive. In fact, the Darod-Hawiye war is now over with the main conflict now being political in nature and between the Abgal and Habr Gedir of the Hawiyes. This political, internal conflict among the warlords and government officials has little popular support as many civilians believe it to be nothing more than a struggle for power, land, money and dominance between warlords. This can be seen by Mohamed Dheere’s systematic targeted arrest of hundreds of Somalis (all Hawiye, many of them powerful businessmen) last week whom he perceived to be a threat to the TFG. The arrests even included those from Dheere’s own sub clan, the Abgal.

4. When asked about President Yusuf’s (a Darod) role in the current conflict the source said that he has little power, the Ethiopians and AU forces are the ones with the most power on the streets of Mogadishu. They have cleared the city of all checkpoints that aren’t Ethiopian/TFG with the effect of enforcing a ‘general’ level of security in a period of great insecurity. He explained that the number of checkpoints in the city can be an indicator as to the level of hostilities at any one time, i.e. when it is feared that there are an increased number of insurgents, there will be an increased number of checkpoints with the aim of regaining some form of control over the city. An example is in 2004, when there was a high level of uncertainty in Somalia, and there were a reported 54 checkpoints from Mogadishu to Afgoye.

5. The source commented on the current clashes in the city which have manifested as roadside bombs, suicide bombers and land mine attacks. He explained that this period was worse than when the warlords had control prior to the Islamic Courts rule, and that the humanitarian crisis was worse than that faced in Darfur. He stressed that only peace talks, with a real desire for reconciliation, could improve the situation.

6. Regarding the situation in central and southern Somalia, the source said that it was relatively 'normal' and 'calm'. The people in these areas are tired of fighting and so have managed to live in relative peace. This however could change tomorrow. Farmers have suffered considerably in the latest conflicts as nomads now face more checks and there are no livelihoods due to theft.

7. On the question of travel the source said that ordinary Somalis can travel around Somalia without the need for protective escorts. He also explained that protective escorts now need TFG permission first and so this whole system does not really work.

8. When asked if the TFG only have control over Mogadishu, the source stressed that Mogadishu was the city in which the majority of fighting had taken place and where the TFG continues to focus its efforts. It is in effect 'the centre of the problem'. However, the TFG is hoping to expand its rule across central and southern Somalia and has appointed 'administrators' in Lower and Middle Shabelle (Afgoye, Balad, Johar and Merka). However, there is not, as of yet, a TFG/Ethiopian presence on the streets in these areas. The source also describes how the TFG were 'kicked out' of Kismayo recently over land disputes. If the opposition have more weapons than the TFG army then the government has no choice but to withdraw.

9. The current situation in Somalia is a vicious circle because every time the TFG manage to affect some level of peace and security, this peace spurs the insurgents to attack as it is their aim to prove to the wider world that Mogadishu is not safe / controlled and that the TFG is ineffective with no support from Somali citizens.

10. The source stressed that the insurgents have not been targeting hospitals and schools and that the humanitarian situation was beginning to improve.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)



## **S17: A Human Rights campaigner of Somali descent**

1. The source was last in Somalia in November 2005. She does have friends living in Mogadishu but only contacts them once in a while.
2. The source explained that there are many discriminatory practices against women in Somalia such as FGM. Violence against women such as rape and physical abuse have also increased specially since the civil war started in late 1990. Unfortunately there isn't a safe system in place for reporting and assessing these occurrences which means that most of these incidences go unnoticed.
3. The source confirmed that there are now more female single-headed households in Somalia due to the number of males killed in the war and the recent fighting (March – April 2007) would probably increase the number. The source also explained that while men traditionally protect and take care of the family, the women are usually the breadwinners in Somalia nowadays as men are mostly unemployed or lost their lives to the war. Often women will sell items on the markets etc. to make enough money to feed the family.
4. When asked about the security situation in Mogadishu and central and southern Somalia, the source explained that at the start of the anarchy (after Siad Barre's government fell in 1991) the only place to be safe was in your own village. So, people started migrating and in time they adapted to live in different areas. Regarding the most recent fighting (March – April 2007) the source stated that those who could afford to go back to Mogadishu, and to their original villages will do so. But there are still a lot of fears about the security situation in Mogadishu and people are still leaving whenever they get the chance. The problem is that many IDPs cannot afford to do so and if at all will only manage to run to the outskirts of the city which is still not safe for them in many ways.
5. Regarding the humanitarian situation for the most recent wave of IDPs the source stressed that the lack of shelter was the most pressing problem. She claimed that the TFG were refusing people entry into public buildings but she couldn't say for sure that the TFG were using the buildings for administrative purposes yet. But the idea is to reclaim public buildings for their original purposes.
6. When asked about the availability of food and water for IDPs, the source explained that water was available to some extent. Traditionally families boiled water to rid it of any impurities. It is transported to different houses, villages on donkey carts as mains pipes have been destroyed during the war. Due to the urgent need for water, the source doubts that the water being used at the moment is boiled because there is a charcoal shortage or many families may not even be able to afford it. This has led to outbreaks of cholera and watery diarrhoea.
7. As to the security situation in Mogadishu itself, the source said that the government is trying to take away people's weapons but the problem is that

Somalis 'don't know who has the guns anymore'. The situation is tense, with people mistrusting the security forces and fearing for their safety. However, the source doubted the claim that it was possible to buy illegal uniforms on the market.

8. When asked on the importance of clan protection the source stressed that the clan is most important in times like these, 'when they need each other the most'. Even though this was the case the source said that if you have close friends in Somalia then you may be more likely to contact them than your own clan if you need somewhere to stay etc.

9. The source stated that the clan traditionally supports both men and women, but women 'don't count as much as men'. In this sense, men will most certainly be welcomed back into the clan regardless of how long they have been absent from Somalia because of the shortage of males and the importance of their role in the clan.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## S18: Somalis contacts of a relevant department of the UN

1. The sources said that there were taxis available from Mogadishu International Airport. This was usually on the condition that they have information that a passenger plane is scheduled to arrive, checking with the local Airlines Companies. Taxis do not need to use protective escorts since they are 'only hired by ordinary Somalis not fearing to be targeted'. The sources stressed that foreigners need special arrangements with their host agencies/companies. When questioned further on this point the sources explained that taxis can be hired through prior arrangement but not exclusively. These arrangements can be made through local travel agents or relatives in the city. The traveller normally communicates his/her travel itinerary to whom he/she wants to be received by at the airport.
2. When asked how expensive taxis were from Mogadishu International Airport to the city the sources said that this depends on the distance from the airport and the time on standby. The minimum price would be US \$12.00 and maximum US\$18.00. Taxis take fares to all parts of the city.
3. Regarding protective escorts the sources explained that arrangements for this are usually made through local receiving agent / hotels / agency / company / relatives. There are no enterprises as such that provide protective escorts, rather informal arrangements to hire vehicles with escorts are based on requirements.
4. The sources said that from May 2007 there have been buses running between the airport and the city and the cost of travelling on them is less than US\$0.50 from all parts of the city.
5. When questioned on the security situation on travelling from Mogadishu International Airport to central Mogadishu the sources stated that this was not appropriate for any foreigner, however it was generally safe for local Somalis even without an escort, although 'the current security situation is so uncertain that unexpected checkpoints/mines can occur at any moment'.
6. The sources explained that travellers do encounter checkpoints at some junctions from the airport into the city. This is because "TFG police are on the look out for arms smuggling operatives". The number of the checkpoints varies according to the prevailing tensions and although the TFG operate the checkpoints in the main, "there might be sometimes fake checkpoints of criminals / gangs dressed like the TFG forces who deprive the civilians of their property".
7. When asked what incidents may occur at the checkpoints between the airport and the city the sources stressed that in general, this was just concerning non-payment for non-commercial transport. However, it should be noted that if there is a fake checkpoint then inevitably passengers are looted / forced to pay.

8. On the question of travelling within central Mogadishu itself, the sources explained that in general, ordinary Somalis can freely travel within the city “whether dominated by their clan or not, unless they are identified specifically as belonging to a rival/minority clan or targeted for other reasons of persecution”.

9. The sources stated that buses are running within the city itself and are ‘on every corner of the city and used by every resident in need of it’. However they are often restricted by the TFG whenever there are insecurities i.e. bombings and when there are important figures using the street. The cost of buses is normally less than US\$0.25. Somalis can in general travel through areas dominated by other clans without an escort. However, ‘there may be competition between buses owned by rival business men, based on criteria including clan’.

10. Regarding checkpoints within Mogadishu the sources stated that they are numerous and they are operated both by TFG and bandits setting up fake checkpoints.

11. When asked which minority groups are represented in Mogadishu the sources explained that there are “Transitional Federal Government and institutions presently operating in Mogadishu and the so-called minorities are in theory represented in half ratio equivalent to the major clans”.

12. Regarding travel away from Mogadishu the sources explained that buses are running to all parts of southern Somalia and that there are ‘no official restrictions of the movements of local Somalis’. There can be obstacles to movement depending on the characteristics of the individuals concerned. The sources gave the example of IDPs fleeing Mogadishu from February to April 2007 who reported that male members often sent their women and children by road (eg. Hebr Gedir/Saad to South Galkayo), but the men feared difficulties crossing the clan lines in case there was an ongoing blood vengeance (eg Saad/Sulieman of Hebr Gedir). Regarding the cost of travel this depended entirely on the distance and nature of the road (corrugated or smooth).

13. Some of the roads linking Mogadishu to other towns are not presently security guaranteed since there are various groups who do harm travellers on their way to other areas (e.g. the road from Mogadishu to Baidoa). However, ‘the TFG is presently occupied with securing the capital and the regional administrations appointed by the TFG are of questionable legitimacy in the eyes of the local population’.

14. When questioned as to what may happen at each type of checkpoint the sources reported cases of looting and rape, which have been documented on several routes out of Mogadishu, “although the primary function of the road blocks has been extortion”.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## S19: Security advisers of a relevant department of the UN

1. The Office now has a presence in Somalia, along with regular missions of international staff once or twice a month, mostly to Mogadishu, and also speaks regularly with Somali contacts on the ground.
2. The Ethiopian-backed TFG controls most of the capital city. AU troops were also present at the airport and the main seaport with some presence in the city centre to guard the President's offices. The AU have generally tried to stay in the background, and they have been helpful in providing security for visits of international dignitaries, including the UN.
3. Public transport from the airport tended to consist of minibuses, with no need for armed protection for ordinary Somalis. Weapons are no longer visible on the street. The TFG have attempted to enforce disarmament and although some weaponry had been surrendered, the sources believe that many people had retained and hidden their weapons.
4. The TFG maintain a presence, with Ethiopian backing. Insurgents have been using a variety of methods against them, including mortar fire, grenade attacks, road-side explosive devices, landmines as well as taking 'pot-shots' against TFG or Ethiopian troops at night, in spite of a curfew. Whether the insurgent attacks were proof of ineffective TFG control, the sources commented that the attacks were becoming more sophisticated, in terms of suicide and roadside bombs. The Ethiopians and TFG had previously been successful in as much as they had successfully neutralised three command centres of the anti-Government forces, without actually eliminating the insurgency, which forces the insurgents to go underground. The insurgents are now making a comeback with almost daily attacks in the city.
5. The political situation is complex. There many overlapping groups, mainly drawn from the Hawiye clan, who are repositioning. The sources identified the business community as being the shapers of politically and militarily powerful individuals. Bakara market, where the main arms trading goes on, is held to be a key neutral point, where hitherto all clans were able to trade and give protection to trade, but this agreement has started to break down. A raid of Bakara by TFG in early June prompted disagreement along clan lines. Since then Bakara has also become a target of grenade attacks by alleged insurgents.
6. At the moment it is unclear where real power lies in Mogadishu. It is difficult to identify exactly who is behind the armed groups, the general opposition and the media shutdowns.
7. The sources said that there is a proliferation of government uniforms, with three different types of police or militias claiming to be police or government security forces. There is also no way for lay observers to tell the difference between TFG and Ethiopian troops.

8. There are security issues regarding the occupation of public buildings. It is not known whether the Ethiopians have been given strategic access to the buildings, but they were involved in TFG operations there. The sources mentioned that the TFG were involved in the rounding up of 'child soldiers' of the insurgents in north Mogadishu the previous week, but it was difficult to assess what was actually going on in those reported raids, with figures of 'indoctrinated' children fluctuating wildly. It was all part of a political battle.

9. On checkpoints and patrols, the sources stated that checkpoints no longer impeded public transport or traffic generally unless there was a security operation underway. While being found holding a foreign passport at a checkpoint was not a problem in itself, lately there have been arrests of young men with foreign passports as the authorities now believe that young men from the diaspora were spearheading some of the insurgent attacks. Arrests as a form of extortion was now decreasing, and no longer happening routinely.

10. Continuing on checkpoints, the sources outlined the risk to ordinary Somalis. In the warlord era, there was always the danger of random, deliberate as well as accidental killings. During the ICU era, although there were no checkpoints, the security situation for the ordinary citizen had thought to have improved. However, killings were carried out by suspected extremists of people watching TV/films or selling alcohol/narcotics. Now general movement was a problem in as much as an ordinary Somali might get caught up in a security incident, and particularly in danger of being killed as a bystander in the retaliation.

11. Outside Mogadishu, protection used to be arranged within clan lines, but now there is a fragmented pattern of fiefdoms and emerging factions. There has also been an upsurge in inter-clan fighting. The political situation around Kismayo is complex, with clans left to their own arrangements as TFG forces are diverted to Mogadishu. Out in the countryside, there are the old enmities and there has been a general rise in insecurity. There has also begun a proliferation of freelance militias in areas outside Mogadishu.

12. On the level of healthcare, the sources said that a lack of trained medical staff was the main problem. They recounted the story of a doctor, aged 50, who when asked what was the greatest challenge for healthcare in Somalia, said "my own death", meaning that there were no younger medical personnel emerging in Somalia to eventually replace the few surviving doctors. The clans used to provide a rudimentary social care program, but that was now breaking down.

13. The old clan maps generally still gave a fair representation of the population, but not of the militias. The clan militias were now regrouping around powerful individuals or factions. Most clans had some network in operation in Mogadishu, though most people were now playing on personal rather than clan connections. Everything ultimately came down to money and power.

14. Robberies do take place at checkpoints outside Mogadishu. There are also rumours that security operations are conducted for revenue-raising, not strictly for political reasons.

15. When asked about the national reconciliation process and the prospects of reconciliation, the sources said that even when times are officially bad, Somalis will find ways to talk to each other, and continue to do so. In the back channels, a lot of business is done between groups. However, the political will of the parties to engage in genuine dialogue is lacking. It is of the utmost importance for a genuine and inclusive reconciliation process to commence in earnest and address some of the key political and security challenges.

16. On the issue of whether a returning Somali who had committed crimes in the UK would face any stigma or retribution, the sources explained that the Somali community was only concerned with punishing crimes that were committed within the direct community and as such would not be interested in crimes against UK citizens, unless convinced otherwise.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)



## **S20: An executive of an NGO based in Somalia**

1. The source stated that he was in contact with his staff working in northern Mogadishu many times a day, and even took a phone call from Mogadishu at the beginning of the interview. He was last in the city himself in January 2007. The staff number over 150 people.

2. The source confirmed that there were 'taxis' in the sense of battered minibuses, and there were running throughout the city. On security force presence, he began that the TFG had control of the international airport, but the AU forces were controlling the seaport. He said the AU forces had established independence from Ethiopian forces, and had on occasion refused Ethiopian demands on the use of the port, but he felt the AU had a small foot-print.

3. The Ethiopians are keeping a low profile, poorly trained, and thus liable to retaliate with undue force.

4. The source suggested that former war-lords were repositioning, and there may be the re-emergence of a new clan war. When asked about the police force in the city, he suggested that recruits were mainly drawn from the Marjerteen. He added that all ordinary Somalis, particularly the diaspora, are united against the Ethiopians as a common enemy. Ordinary Somalis feel there is no opportunity to speak out. The TFG are "weak because people hate it with a passion, even Mohammed Dheere's extended family does not support him".

5. The source talked about ordinary Somalis wanting peace, and had shown commitment with limited displays of weapon destruction. The majority clans at ordinary member level want a say in the peace process. The source speculated that Ali Mahdi, the founder of the NRC was only interested in the accumulation of revenue. He hopes to retire from the chairmanship soon.

6. The source stated Somalis viewed claiming as a refugee as "trying your luck", and it was an attitude supported by all Somalis. There were mechanisms for getting into western countries, and if caught and deported, then it was just bad luck. He considered there to be no difficulty for a deportee to blend back into any strain of Somali or Mogadishu society: things would be arranged by friends and clan. However, only Somalis know the exact assistance they could obtain from their clan. Clan understanding was traditionally unclear, but during the civil war period it became increasingly important to be able to recite your clan lineage.

7. On the issue of security incidents and retaliation, the source said the security forces would arrest anybody near the scene, and also arrested for extortion purposes as well, with ransom demands sent by phone. "Everybody is in it for the money". It is a time of insecurity and flux, with inflation running at 25 percent over the past three months, with fake shillings being circulated on the market, and security force uniforms for sale.

8. When asked about the Shabaab, the source stated they were in evidence, and there were people trained up.

9. The source stated that in his opinion Somali NGOs were confident that if sufficient resources were made available by the international community, then grassroots democratic organisations could arise and be developed. He talked of the possibility of district and regional elections; of district-based policing in Mogadishu; and of a secular judiciary based on international humanitarian law, with references to customary and Shari'a law. He saw the regularisation of land and property as a key issue. Once the IDPs were secure and basic democratic processes were in evidence, the clans could use Mogadishu as an "open city" within which to discuss matters. There is currently a window of opportunity but this may close as a clique of warlords take control.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## S21: A researcher for a major NGO

1. The TFG and the international aid agencies were in disagreement as to the number of IDPs leaving Mogadishu during the fighting in March – April 2007. The TFG claim that only 30,000 have been displaced whereas UN agencies put the figure at approximately 300,000. From the source's recent experience in Mogadishu at least 200,000 have left the city. In addition to this, approximately 40,000 – 50,000 may be currently displaced within the city.
2. Both males and families were returning to the capital. The main deterrent to returning to the city is the danger due to unexploded devices etc. However some will not return because they hope to find a better life elsewhere in Somalia or outside the country.
3. There are two kinds of life in Mogadishu, the high life and the low life. Some Somalis have their own resources and can afford the prices for food and water; many cannot. However, at present there is "no alarming humanitarian situation in Mogadishu". The source qualified this by asserting that there is enough food and water to go round, the main problem was the distribution of supplies.
4. When asked about the shelter available for IDPs in Mogadishu the source confirmed that many IDPs are struggling because the TFG are currently trying to reclaim old warehouses which many are using for shelter. The government has said that all IDPs are to leave the government buildings or those illegally built by 1 June 2007. The difficulty for the TFG will be enforcing this.
5. The source knew of two functioning hospitals in Somalia: 'Medina' in the south and 'Keysanay' in the north. There is enough medication for the wounded but not enough medical equipment. Many of the hospitals have been damaged in the fighting that took place between March and April 2007. The source further confirmed that some schools have reopened.
6. When asked about the location of the current fighting in Mogadishu the source explained that most of the fighting has taken place around 30<sup>th</sup> street (the main road in Mogadishu), particularly north of the street and some central areas to it. When asked what the situation was like on this street the source said that the road is very hostile, there are few people in the areas where the fighting has taken place and there is little that is still functioning. When asked if it would be possible to avoid this area if one was travelling around the city, the source said that it was certainly possible. This is based on the source's recent experience in Mogadishu in which he was not only able to avoid this street if he wished but even travelled through it at his own will. He did not encounter any hostilities towards him.
7. The TFG does have its own police force: 2,000 have already been trained and a further 2,000 are currently in training. The trained police are from a mixture of clans and most are ex police officers. Most of the 2,000 currently in training are new to the police force.

8. The TFG has a symbolic power but not much power in reality. The TFG actually controls very little in central and southern Somalia: they do not control the 300 – 400km between Belatweyn and Galkayo as this area is mainly controlled by the sympathizers of the Islamic courts. The TFG also do not control the area between Kismayo and the Kenyan border as there is little support for the TFG here.

9. When asked how a Somali could be taken care of upon arrival at Mogadishu International Airport the source said that it would be “madness” to send a Somali to Mogadishu if one were concerned with their safety. He claimed that it physically was not moral to do so. He added that if the person were to be returned to Somaliland or Puntland this would be a different story. When asked to clarify this the source explained: “the problem is, in reality, other than a few hundred people who have arms, government support and their own militia to protect them, you could be shot down/targeted at any time in Somalia, regardless of which clan you are from”.

10. Clan protection was not really the issue when assessing someone’s relative safety. This is because in reality there is little protection from one’s own clan and therefore even if someone were from a major clan they are still at risk. When asked how he reached this conclusion the source said that an acquaintance of his is from a major Somali clan and his own clan attempted to shoot him.

11. When asked if the TFG could ensure the safety of a Somali returnee the source claimed that it was “not possible”. The TFG could not guarantee the safety of an individual because the TFG does not have that much control over the security in Somalia.

12. When questioned on the different Somali checkpoints the source said that the situation has recently changed and that now the main checkpoints were in the south. Outside Mogadishu there are TFG checkpoints and Ethiopian checkpoints. In between these two types of checkpoint one may encounter checkpoints set up by bandits. When asked what the frequency of incidents (hostages/shootings/kidnaps) were at checkpoints the source said it was rare for ordinary Somalis to encounter such difficulties. Long hold ups are much more likely to occur than serious incidents detailed above. When asked what would happen if a Somali was taken through the checkpoints in a government car, the source said that in some southern areas a TFG vehicle would be shot down before it even reached the checkpoint. Those who are manning the checkpoints sometimes hide in trees to determine what cars are approaching the checkpoints. The source said that it is possible that a UK government car may be targeted. This is because “everyone is at risk and no one can predict what may happen at these checkpoints”.

13. When asked if there were taxis available at Mogadishu International Airport the source confirmed that there were but that “you could not trust the people driving them”. It is imperative to prearrange any transport in and around Mogadishu.

14. When questioned if a Somali who had committed crimes in the UK would be targeted for this reason the source said that they would not be because far worse crimes are committed in Somalia on a daily basis. He explained that people would not be interested in a returnee unless they appeared to be wealthy – in that case they may be targeted.

[Return to contents](#)  
[Return to Statements of Sources list](#)

## Annex A – Glossary

---

<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission to Somalia
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FCO</b>	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
<b>FTP</b>	Federal Transitional Parliament
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>NGO</b>	Non–Governmental Organisation
<b>OCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>TFA</b>	Transitional Federal Assembly
<b>TFI</b>	Transitional Federal Institutions
<b>TFG</b>	Transitional Federal Government
<b>UIC</b>	Union of Islamic Courts (also referred to as Islamic Court Union, Supreme of Islamic Courts Council and Islamic Courts Council)
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNHCHR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children’s Fund

[Return to contents](#)

## Annex B – Guide to clans

Clan family	Sub-clans/groupings	Residential location
<b>DIR</b>	Issa (Ise) Gadabursi Bimal	All regions of Somalia. Also Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya
<b>ISAAQ</b>	<i>Habr Awal:</i> Saad Muse Issa Muse  Ayub  <i>Habr Garhadjis:</i> Habr Yunis Aidagalla  Arab <i>Habr Jaalo (Habr Toljaalo):</i> Mohamed Abokor Ibrahim Muse Abokor Ahmad (Toljaalo)	Ethiopia, Djibouti W/Galbed, Togdheer Sanag
<b>DAROD</b>	Marehan Ogaden <i>Harti division:</i> Majerteen Dulbahante Warsangeli	All regions of Somalia. Also Kenya and Ethiopia
<b>HAWIYE</b>	Hawadle Waadani Habr Gedir Abgal Murasadde Gaalgale (Galjael, Galje'el)	Hiran and Gedo Also Kenya, Ethiopia
<b>DIGIL</b>	Dabarre Jiddu Tunni Geledi Garre	Mainly Lower Shabelle, also Middle Juba, Bay, Hiran, Gedo and Mogadishu. Also Kenya and Ethiopia
<b>RAHANWEYN</b>	<i>The "Eight":</i> Maalinweyna Harien Helleda Elai, and others	Bay, Bakool, Gedo. Also Kenya and Ethiopia
	<i>The "Nine":</i> Gassa Gudda Hadama Luwai Geledi, and others	Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Middle Juba, and Hiran. and Ethiopia



## Annex C – Map of Somalia



Map No. 9890 Rev. 6 UNITED NATIONS  
July 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
Cartographic Section

## Annex D – References to source material

**[1] Shabelle media network (Mogadishu) via AllAfrica.Com**

- a. 6 June 2007, Militias set up illegal roadblocks as fighting subsides in Kismayu, <http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200706060482.html>, accessed 8 June 2007
- b. 6 June 2007, Troops seize the chairman of Mogadishu's powerful Hawiye clan, <http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200706060483.html>, accessed 8 June 2007
- c. 6 June 2007, Somalia and Ethiopian troops search houses in Mogadishu, <http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200706060480.html>, accessed 8 June 2007
- d. 5 June 2007, Situation in Berhano calm after a clan gun battle, <http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200706050858.html>, accessed 8 June 2007
- e. 13 July 2007, Mortar explosions rock Mogadishu lull overnight <http://www.shabelle.net/news/ne3289.htm>, accessed 13 July 2007
- f. 13 July 2007, People in Mogadishu begin to flee as violence escalates, <http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200707120945.html>, accessed 13 July 2007
- g. 10 July 2007, Government soldiers take extortion money from bus drivers, <http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200707100644.html>, accessed 13 July 2007
- h. 13 July 2007, UN experts urge action to facilitate food aid deliveries to malnourished Somalis <http://www.shabelle.net/news/ne3287.htm>, accessed 13 July 2007
- i. 11 July 2007, District commissioner wounded in Mogadishu, <http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200707110482.html>, accessed 13 July 2007
- j. 11 July 2007, Three wounded in grenade explosion in Mogadishu's Bakara market, <http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200707110430.html>, accessed 13 July 2007

**[2] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IRIN**

- a. 8 June 2007, Returnees find supplies short in Mogadishu, <http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=72626>, accessed 8 June 2007
- b. 29 May 2007, NGO, civil society leaders discuss reconstruction, <http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=72598>, accessed 8 June 2007
- c. 7 June 2007, Media shutdown silences community voices, <http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=726431>, accessed 8 June 2007
- d. 6 July 2007, Somalia: situation report – 06 Jul 2007, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/YSAR-74UQT2?OpenDocument> accessed 13 July 2007
- e. 18 June 2007, Deteriorating food security in south, <http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=72789>, accessed 22 June 2007

**[3] Agence France-Presse**

- a. 4 June 2007, Seven dead in Mogadishu attacks, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSGZ-73UDJ3?OpenDocument&r6>, accessed 8 June 2007
- b. 5 June 2007, Ethiopian PM pays surprise visit to Mogadishu, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSGZ-73UDJ3?OpenDocument&r6>, accessed 8 June 2007

**[4] Ethiopian Herald (Addis Ababa)**

- a. 6 June 2007, Over 8 million USD secured for Somali national reconciliation conference, <http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200706060770.html>, accessed 8 June 2007

**[5] International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**

- a. 30 May 2007, Somalia: ICRC Bulletin No 02/2007, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSGZ-73UDJ3?OpenDocument&r6>, accessed 8 June 2007

**[6] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**

- a. 1 June 2007, An estimated 90,000 people return to Mogadishu; almost a quarter of those displaced, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSGZ-73UDJ3?OpenDocument&r6>, accessed 8 June 2007
- b. 12 July 2007, United Nations experts deeply concerned about difficulties in

providing food aid to vulnerable populations in Somalia,  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSAGZ-752E8S?OpenDocument> accessed 13 July 2007

**[7] BBC News**

a. 12 July 2007, Heavy shelling in Somali capital  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6294548.stm>, accessed 12 July 2007

b. 25 June 2007, Shooting at Somali food aid crush  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6238046.stm>, accessed 13 July 2007

c. Timeline: Somalia, last updated 17 July 2007  
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country\\_profiles/1072611.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1072611.stm),  
accessed 18 July 2007

**[8] USAID, US agency for international development**

a. 6 July 2007, Factsheet 21 / 2007. Somalia – complex emergency <http://>,  
accessed 13 July 2007

**[9] Global Terrorism Analysis, The Jamestown Foundation**

a. Terrorism Focus, dated June 19, 2007 – Volume IV, Issue 19  
<http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373478>  
accessed 19 July 2007