

Schnellrecherche der SFH-Länderanalyse vom 14. November 2016 zu Afghanistan: Angriffe von regierungsfeindlichen Gruppen auf Mitarbeitende der Regierung, ausländischer Firmen und internationaler Streitkräfte; Drohbriefe; Rekrutierung; psychische Erkrankungen

Fragen an die SFH-Länderanalyse:

- Werden afghanische Zivilpersonen, die sich für die NATO-Alliierten, für andere ausländische Institutionen oder Organisationen oder die afghanische Armee berufstätig sind, von den Taliban oder anderen regierungsfeindlichen Gruppierungen verfolgt?
- Schicken die Taliban Drohbriefe, um Zivilpersonen einzuschüchtern?
- Rekrutieren die Taliban Mitarbeitende der Regierung, ausländischer Firmen und internationaler Streitkräfte?
- Können Depressionen und posttraumatische Belastungsstörungen in Herat behandelt werden? Sind Anti-Depressiva, Schlaf- und Beruhigungsmittel in Herat erhältlich? Werden psychisch Kranke stigmatisiert?

Die Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche (Schnellrecherche) in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die uns derzeit zur Verfügung stehen.

1 Verfolgung von afghanischen Zivilpersonen, welche für afghanische Regierungsstellen oder internationale Institutionen tätig sind

Zivilpersonen, welche für nationale oder internationale Institutionen arbeiten, gehören einer gefährdeten Personengruppe an. Gemäss Richtlinien des *UN-Flüchtlingshochkommissariats* zur Feststellung des Internationalen Schutzbedarfs afghanischer Asylsuchender (19. April 2016) und dem Afghanistan-Update zur Sicherheitslage der *Schweizerischen Flüchtlingshilfe* (30. September 2016) gehören Personen, welche tatsächlich oder vermeintlich mit der Regierung oder der internationalen Gemeinschaft einschliesslich der internationalen Streitkräfte verbunden sind, einer gefährdeten Personengruppe an. So werden nationale und lokale politische Führungskräfte, Regierungsmitarbeitende, Lehrerinnen und Lehrer und andere Staatsbedienstete, Polizisten ausser Dienst, Stammesälteste, religiöse Führer, Frauen im öffentlichen Leben, Zivilpersonen, die der Spionage für regierungsnahen Kräften bezichtigt werden, Menschenrechtsaktivistinnen und -aktivisten, Mitarbeiter von humanitären Hilfs- oder Entwicklungsorganisationen und Bauarbeiter systematisch und gezielt von regierungsfeindlichen Kräften angegriffen. Entführungen solcher Personen nehmen zu. Afghanische Zivilpersonen, welche als Fahrer, Dolmetscher oder in anderen zivilen Funktionen für die internationalen Streitkräfte arbeiten, werden ebenfalls von regierungsfeindlichen Gruppen angegriffen. Auch ehemalige Mitarbeiter der internationalen Streitkräfte und der Regierung werden gemäss UNHCR Opfer von Angriffen. UNHCR verweist auf Angaben der Taliban, gemäss denen sich ihre Frühlingsoffensive wie bereits in den Vorjahren gegen Personen richtete, die die Regierung vertreten oder

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diese sowie die internationale Gemeinschaft mutmasslich unterstützen. Neben gezielten Tötungen setzen regierungsfeindliche Kräfte auch auf Bedrohungen, Entführungen und Brandanschläge, um Personen, welche ihre Autorität und Anschauungen infrage stellen, einzuschüchtern und ihren Einfluss und ihre Kontrolle auszuweiten.

UNHCR, 19. April 2016:

«Potenzielle Risikoprofile

1. Personen, die tatsächlich oder vermeintlich mit der Regierung und der internationalen Gemeinschaft einschließlich der internationalen Streitkräfte verbunden sind oder diese tatsächlich oder vermeintlich unterstützen

Regierungsfeindliche Kräfte (AGEs) greifen Berichten zufolge systematisch und gezielt Zivilisten an, die tatsächlich oder vermeintlich die afghanische Regierung, die afghanische Zivilgesellschaft und die internationale Gemeinschaft in Afghanistan, einschließlich der internationalen Streitkräfte und der internationalen humanitären Hilfs- und Entwicklungsakteure, unterstützen bzw. mit diesen verbunden sind. UNAMA zufolge fielen 2015 1.335 Zivilisten (790 Tote und 545 Verletzte) gezielten oder versuchten gezielten Tötungen durch regierungsfeindliche Kräfte (AGEs) zum Opfer. Die Taliban übernahmen für 135 Vorfälle mit 336 zivilen Opfern (168 Tote und 168 Verletzte) die Verantwortung. Die Anzahl der zivilen Opfer stieg im Vergleich zu 2014 (mit 716 Toten und 353 Verletzten) um 25 Prozent, die Anzahl der Vorfälle, für die die Taliban die Verantwortung übernahmen, um 59 Prozent. Außerdem führten 2015 17 vorsätzliche und gezielte Angriffe, die UNAMA mit ISIS verbundenen Gruppen zurechnet, zu 26 zivilen Opfern (17 Tote und neun Verletzte). **Zu den primären Zielen solcher Anschläge gehören nationale und lokale politische Führungskräfte, Regierungsmitarbeiter, Lehrer und andere Staatsbedienstete, Polizisten außer Dienst, Stammesälteste, religiöse Führer, Frauen im öffentlichen Leben, Zivilisten, die der Spionage für regierungsnahen Kräfte bezichtigt werden, Menschenrechtsaktivisten, Mitarbeiter von humanitären Hilfs- oder Entwicklungsorganisationen und Bauarbeiter.** Am 22. April 2015 gaben die Taliban bekannt, dass sich die Frühlingsoffensive wie schon in den Jahren zuvor spezifisch gegen Regierungsvertreter und andere Personen richte, die mutmaßlich die Regierung und die internationale Gemeinschaft unterstützen. Trotz des erklärten Ziels der Taliban, Opfer unter Zivilisten zu reduzieren, gibt es weiter hin Berichte, denen zufolge die Taliban Zivilisten und nach humanitärem Völkerrecht geschützte Objekte gezielt angriffen. 2015 räumten die Taliban ein, dass sie für zivile Opfer durch zwei Vorfälle verantwortlich waren, gaben jedoch Berichten zufolge nicht das volle Ausmaß der Auswirkungen dieser Vorfälle auf Zivilisten an. **Über gezielte Tötungen hinaus setzen die regierungsfeindlichen Kräfte Berichten zufolge Bedrohungen, Einschüchterungen, Entführungen und Brandanschläge ein, um Gemeinschaften und Einzelpersonen einzuschüchtern und auf diese Weise ihren Einfluss und ihre Kontrolle zu erweitern, indem diejenigen angegriffen werden, die ihre Autorität und Anschauungen infrage stellen. (...)**

Zivilisten, die mit den internationalen Streitkräften verbunden sind oder diese vermeintlich unterstützen Regierungsfeindliche Kräfte (AGEs) haben Berichten zufolge afghanische Zivilisten, die für die internationalen Streitkräfte als Fahrer,

Dolmetscher oder in anderen zivilen Funktionen arbeiten, bedroht und angegriffen. Aus Berichten geht auch hervor, dass regierungsfeindliche Kräfte (AGEs) ehemalige Mitarbeiter der internationalen Streitkräfte und der Regierung angreifen.» UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees): Richtlinien zur Feststellung des internationalen Schutzbedarfs afghanischer Asylsuchender, 19. April 2016, S. 38-47: www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1471846055_unhcr-20160419-afg-richtlinien-de.pdf.

SFH, 30. September 2016:

«Mitarbeitende von nationalen und internationalen humanitären und Menschenrechtsorganisationen. Sicherheitsrelevante Vorfälle betreffend Mitarbeitende humanitärer und Menschenrechtsorganisationen haben 2015 zugenommen. Gemäss der International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) wurden 2015 über 150 Angriffe auf Mitarbeitende von Hilfsorganisationen registriert. Mitarbeitende der UNO, Strassenarbeiter, Fahrer sowie Minenräumer gehören zu den Zielgruppen regierungsfeindlicher Gruppierungen. Entführungen und Übergriffe haben zugenommen.

Zivile Beschäftigte der afghanischen und ausländischen Sicherheitskräfte. Personen, welche die ANDSF, regierungsfreundliche Gruppierungen oder ausländische Sicherheitskräfte unterstützen oder verdächtigt werden, mit diesen zusammenzuarbeiten (etwa Fahrer oder Übersetzer), werden von regierungsfeindlichen Gruppierungen gezielt bedroht und getötet.» Quelle: Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe, Länderanalyse, Update Afghanistan: Die aktuelle Sicherheitslage, 30. September 2016, S. 20:

www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch/assets/herkunftslander/mittlerer-osten-zentralasien/afghanistan/160930-afg-update-d.pdf.

2 Drohbriefe der Taliban¹

Drohbriefe der Taliban weitverbreitet. Drohbriefe der Taliban an Gemeinden und Individuen werden als «*Night letters*» bezeichnet. Das *Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada* hat im Februar 2015 einen ausführlichen Bericht zu den so genannten «*Night letters*» veröffentlicht. Gemäss einem im Jahr 2015 vom IRB befragten Professor der *Naval Postgraduate School in California*, welcher unter anderem Studien zu den Taliban in Afghanistan veröffentlicht hat, werden in diesen Briefen Forderungen gestellt und mit Gewalt und Tod gedroht, sollten diese nicht erfüllt werden. Laut einem unabhängigen Afghanistanexperten (2015) dienen die Briefe dazu, Angst zu verbreiten und dafür zu sorgen, dass die Bevölkerung sich nicht in irgendeiner Weise mit der afghanischen Regierung oder der internationalen Gemeinschaft einlässt.

¹ Dieser Abschnitt ist dem folgenden Bericht entnommen: SFH, Schnellrecherche zu Afghanistan: Drohbriefe der Taliban, 4. März 2016:

www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch/assets/herkunftslander/mittlerer-osten-zentralasien/afghanistan/160304-afg-drohbrie-fe-taliban.pdf.

Gemäss verschiedenen vom IRB zitierten Quellen sind Drohbriefe eine beliebte und sehr weitverbreitete Taktik der Taliban (Professor, 2015; USDOS, 2014; UNHCR, 2012; Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHCR), 2012). Die Hauptzielgruppe ist gemäss dem befragten Professor (2015) die lokale Bevölkerung, insbesondere in den von Paschtunen dominierten südlichen und östlichen Provinzen Afghanistans. Gemäss verschiedenen vom IRB (2015) zitierten Quellen kommen die Briefe in sehr unterschiedlichen Formen daher (Afghanistan-Experte, 2015; AIHCR 2015; Professor, 2015; EASO 2012). Gemäss einem unabhängigen Experten (2015) sind sie jedoch oftmals kurz (eine Seite lang) und handgeschrieben und enthalten in vielen Fällen einen Briefkopf der Taliban, einige Zeilen mit kurzen klaren Aussagen dazu, was die Person falsch gemacht hat sowie Instruktionen, wie sie sich zu verhalten hat, dazu einen offiziellen Stempel und eine Unterschrift. Diese Elemente sind jedoch nicht immer vorhanden, es gibt grosse Variationen. So schrieb das *European Asylum Support Office* (EASO) im Dezember 2012, zitiert im IRB-Bericht von Februar 2015, dass auf den Drohbrieffen der Taliban in der Kopfzeile das Logo und der Titel «Islamisches Emirat Afghanistan» und eine Unterschrift des lokalen Taliban-Führer figurieren können, aber nicht müssen.

Die meisten Drohbriefe werden nachts an die Türe der betroffenen Person genagelt oder unter deren Türe durchgeschoben. Richtet sich der Brief an die ganze Gemeinde, wird er an der Türe der Moschee festgemacht (Afghanistan-Experte, 2015; Professor, 2015). Verschiedene Quellen gaben dem IRB (2015) an, dass die Betroffenen in vielen Fällen nicht zur Polizei gehen, da diese über ungenügende Ressourcen und Kompetenzen verfügt. Ob und wie die Behörden reagieren, hängt von vielen Faktoren wie den persönlichen Beziehungen und der Position der bedrohten Person ab. Jedoch sind die meisten Bedrohten auf sich alleine gestellt (AIHRC, 2015).

Die Folgen für Personen, welche einen Drohbrief erhalten, können schwerwiegend sein. Sie hängen gemäss verschiedenen von IRB konsultierten Experten von der Region und den verschiedenen lokalen Taliban-Gruppen ab. Die Briefe sind ernst zu nehmen, da es im Extremfall tödliche Folgen haben kann, wenn die darin enthaltenen Instruktionen nicht befolgt werden (Afghanistan-Experte, 2015; Professor, 2015; Danish Immigration Service (DIS), 2012); UNHCR, 2012).

Weitere Quellen berichten ebenfalls von den Drohbrieffen der Taliban. So erhalten Journalistinnen und Journalisten in Afghanistan laut *Journalism is not a Crime* (25. November 2015) zum Beispiel regelmässig Drohungen seitens der Taliban, auch durch Briefe. *Amnesty International* erwähnt im Bericht «*Their Lives on the Line: Women Human Rights Defenders under Attack in Afghanistan*» vom 7. April 2015 verschiedene konkrete Beispiele von afghanischen Frauen, die Drohbriefe von den Taliban erhalten haben.

IRB, 10. Februar 2015:

«Sources describe night letters as

• *a means of communicating general information or specific instructions to the local populace or targeted individuals, which are hand-delivered by night, and contain instructions, threats, or warnings for local Afghan individuals or small community groups (Independent analyst 9 Jan. 2015), and*

• **"threatening letters" to communities or individuals that are usually hand-delivered or posted to a door or mosque by insurgent groups at night and that are "a common means of intimidation and control of local communities by insurgents" (Human Rights Watch July 2010, 25). (...)**

According to the Professor, *night letters are a "primary method of Taliban communication" to rural populations in Afghanistan, as well as in urban areas, to express the group's "desires and demands" (Professor 19 Jan. 2015). The Professor also indicated that night letters "often threaten violence or death if demands are not met" and may also "advise" the audience (which can include an entire district, village, or community leaders) about forthcoming attacks or about expectations of conduct and behaviour (ibid.). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an independent analyst on Afghanistan [2] explained that the intention of a night letter is usually to "spread fear" and that the purpose of the messages is "generally to threaten or to encourage compliance with Taliban instructions, often to ensure the local populace do not engage in any way with the Afghan government or international community" (Independent analyst 9 Jan. 2015).*

According to the Professor, **night letters are "extremely prevalent" in Afghanistan (19 Jan. 2015). According to information provided by the UNHCR to the Danish Immigration Service during a 2012 fact-finding mission to Kabul, night letters are a "common tactic used by the Taliban" and their use is "very widespread" in the intimidation of those employed by the Afghan government or "Westerners" (Denmark May 2012, 31-32). Similarly, according to information provided by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) [a national quasi-governmental body with a mandate to promote and protect the human rights of Afghans and to investigate alleged human rights violations (Canada 9 Feb. 2015)] to the same source, night letters are a "well known tactic used by the Taliban to intimidate people" (Denmark May 2012, 30). The US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 indicates that the Taliban "continued to distribute threatening messages in attempts to curtail government and development activities" (US 27 Feb. 2014, 18). (...)**

Sources report that **the Taliban are the main group that employs the use of night letters (Independent analyst 9 Jan. 2015; Professor 19 Jan. 2015). (...)**

The Professor explained that **the primary "target audience" for Taliban night letters is the "local population," specifically the population in Pashtun-dominated provinces of southern and eastern Afghanistan, regions that have traditionally been the support base of the Taliban (19 Jan. 2015).** According to the independent analyst, the targets of night letters are generally "specific individuals believed by the Taliban to be transgressing Taliban rules or instructions, or more generally to local community groups, such as a small village" (Independent analyst 9 Jan. 2015). He explained that **targets include people that could be perceived as "low-level" targets,**

such as "officials, women, teachers, junior employees working with international organizations," among others (ibid.). Sources report that targets of night letters also include the following

- *Afghan government employees (International Crisis Group 24 July 2008, 12; AIHRC 17 Jan. 2015; Professor 19 Jan. 2015), including police, security personnel and people perceived by the Taliban to be "spies" (ibid.);*
- *people working for international forces (RFE/RL 21 Nov. 2012; International Crisis Group 24 July 2008, 12; AIHRC 17 Jan. 2015) and embassies (ibid.);*
- *religious and intellectual scholars (ibid.), such as Ulema Islamic scholars that do not adopt Taliban religious interpretations (Professor 19 Jan. 2015);*
- *human rights activists, defenders (AIHRC 17 Jan. 2015), and educators and students (Professor 19 Jan. 2015; International Crisis Group 24 July 2008, 12; Pajhwok Afghan News 8 Mar. 2013);*
- *individuals working for national and international de-mining organizations (AIHRC 17 Jan. 2015) or non-government organizations (Professor 19 Jan. 2015);*
- *tribal elders (AIHRC 17 Jan. 2015; Professor 19 Jan. 2015);*
- *political parties (ibid.);*
- *religious "personalities" (ibid.);*
- *"businessmen (for ransom)" (AIHRC 17 Jan. 2015)*
- *women who work outside the home, including those working as teachers, or for the government, or in civil society (RFE/RL 7 Dec. 2012; Human Rights Watch July 2010 25-27); and*
- *in the March 2014 presidential and provincial elections, Taliban night letters were aimed at voters (IWPR 2 Apr. 2014; Killid Weekly 29 Mar. 2014; WSJ 11 Mar. 2014), WSJ 11 Mar. 2014), election workers, and those involved in election campaigning (ibid.; Killid Weekly 29 Mar. 2014).*

5. Appearance and Types of Letters

According to the independent analyst, night letters are "generally short (one page) letters or notes" that are hand-delivered, and it could be argued that each one is basically of a "specific and distinct type" (Independent analyst 9 Jan. 2015). Letters are "very often handwritten and for particular individuals or communities with particular instructions" (ibid.). Also according to the independent analyst, a generic night letter would have a Taliban title and heading, a few lines of very direct and simple instruction (including, if to a particular person, a description of what the individual has been doing wrong) and an official stamp, signature or closing identification. Taliban communiqués at the local level are often rushed,

crude and simplistic. Administrative resources, literacy, drafting skills - and even knowledge of what the official title of the [Taliban] organization might be - are not priority assets for the Taliban. (ibid.)

According to the AIHRC official, night letters sometimes use the Taliban's official letterhead, but mostly they are written on a piece of paper that is stamped, or has the sender's name and signature; they are typically handwritten and "in rare cases" they are printed (17 Jan. 2015). The Professor similarly explained that night letters have a variety of appearances from "very professional" printing, including Taliban symbols such as the logo, and signed by an "authoritative" Taliban official, to night letters that are handwritten and "very rough" (Professor 19 Jan. 2015). He further noted that major differences in night letters are those that are "officially endorsed by Taliban officials or religious figures" and those that are "more adhoc" products of an individual Talib or Taliban commander (ibid.). In a 2012 report on insurgent intimidation strategies in Afghanistan, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) [3] stated that Taliban night letters can include "[t]he heading with the logo and title 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan' and the signature of the local Taliban commander" but also noted that these features are not always present on letters and that "different layouts can appear in different regions and from different insurgent groups" (EU Dec. 2012, 24). Several examples of night letters are attached to this Response.

Sources explain that letters are often written in the Pashto or Dari languages (AIHRC 17 Jan. 2015; Professor 19 Jan. 2015), in a specific local dialect of Pashto/Dari, depending on the target region or locale (ibid.).

6. Delivery of Night Letters

According to the independent analyst, **"most" night letters are still delivered by hand and distributed at night, at which time they might be nailed to a door, wall, tree, or pushed under a door, or left on the street; he noted that "only a few" would be given out at any one time (Independent analyst 9 Jan. 2015).** The independent analyst said further that "it would be assumed by the insurgents that much of the actual information dissemination would be carried out by the local population themselves" (ibid.). **Similarly, the Professor explained that night letters are often posted on the door of the targeted individual, or on mosque doors, or the doors of the literate people in the village who would then read the message to the community at large (Professor 19 Jan. 2015). (...)**

7. Reporting to Police and Actions Taken by Police

According to the independent analyst, whether a person reports a night letter to police depends on "individual circumstances"; however, **"there is frequently little confidence in police ability (or even interest) in investigating and dealing with the threat" (Independent analyst 9 Jan. 2015).** He gave the assessment that police have **limited resources and capacity** and would "only be able" to provide a "limited response" to a threat issued in a night letter (ibid.). Similarly, the Danish Immigration Service reported that, according to Cooperation for Peace And Unity (CPAU), an "Afghan-led non-profit organisation" that works to promote peace and social justice in

Afghanistan (CPAU n.d.), even in Kabul, "people do not usually go to the police" when they receive a night letter or other threatening message, as police "would normally not take any action in these cases" (Denmark May 2012, 31). **The AIHRC official explained that the police commonly register "very serious" types of threats and will advise the victim to keep a low profile and report additional threats; however, "in practice, these actions are not ... effective" and, in most cases, individuals assess the seriousness of the threat themselves and take precautionary measures on their own, such as relocating (17 Jan. 2015).** Similarly, according to a co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), an independent, non-profit research organisation that provides research and analysis for policymakers, journalists, academics and development workers working on Afghanistan (AAN n.d.), [g]enerally, people receiving threats may go to the authorities if there is somebody they know [there]. **Whether and how authorities react to the threat depends on a variety of factors, such as personal relations and the position of the person who is threatened, but often people are left to look after themselves. (ibid. 22 Jan. 2015)**

The AIHRC official also explained that the reporting of a night letter may depend on where the person is living, and that in larger cities where the security situation is better, people report it; however, if they are living in an area where the security situation is "vulnerable" or the government lacks control over it, they do not report it to police (17 Jan. 2015). According to the independent analyst, some local police may have "links to insurgent groups," meaning that, for the recipient, reporting a Taliban threat "might even make the situation worse" (9 Jan. 2015). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

8. Consequences of Receiving Night Letters

According to the independent analyst, the "use, style, and intention" of night letters vary depending on the context (Independent analyst 9 Jan. 2015). He elaborated that **different Taliban local groups will decide and act in different ways, perhaps only loosely following Taliban guidelines and driven largely by the local circumstances in which they operate. Their actions will be different if they are able to operate relatively freely within a broadly pro-Taliban area instead of having to be more covert and aggressive in their activities if the area was perceived as anti-Taliban. (ibid.)**

Similarly, according to comments obtained from a Kabul-based independent policy research group by the Danish Immigration Service, there is **regional variation** in the use of night letters, with the research group explaining that some targets "would normally expect" to receive multiple warning letters before any action against them is taken, whereas there are cases in which physical assaults and murders are carried out without advance-warning letters, or targets may be invited to defend themselves at a Taliban court (May 2012, 32).

According to Minority Rights Group International (MRG), night letters are "followed up with real violence, and in some cases murder," forcing recipients, such as women working in politics or the public sphere, to leave their employment or face risks to their family's safety (July 2011, 139). **Similarly, the Professor explained that threats in**

night letters are "taken seriously" by their Afghan targets, and the consequences for ignoring letters include death (19 Jan. 2015). The Danish Immigration Service reported that, according to information gathered from several sources in Kabul in 2012, the consequences of ignoring threat letters include killings or "physical elimination," kidnappings or "abduction for ransom," hijackings, assault or physical beatings, and torture, among others (Denmark May 2012, 31). The AIHRC told the Danish Immigration Service that there were "different levels of intimidation" and in some cases killings may occur, while in others "the assault is limited to beatings or nothing happens" (ibid.).

The UNHCR told the Danish Immigration Service's fact-finding mission that Taliban intimidation and continued threats can lead to "physical elimination" in cases where warnings are ignored; threats "will mostly be repeated until the victim is silenced by obeying orders" (ibid.). Similarly, according to the independent analyst, "punishments are threatened [in night letters] and often acted upon. The arrival of such letters ... can cause much fear and stress within a local community" (Independent analyst 9 Jan. 2015). The same source indicated that, while the consequences of ignoring a night letter depend on "specific circumstances ... very often the stated threats are carried out" and people can be killed; otherwise, the source notes, "the insurgents would quickly lose their credibility" (ibid.). Family members of individual targets are also often intimidated (Denmark May 2012, 31; RFE/RL 21 Nov. 2012) and given death threats (ibid.). (...)» Quelle: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Afghanistan: Night letters [Shab Nameha, Shabnamah, Shabnameh], including appearance (2010-2015) [AFG105047.E], 10. Februar 2015:

www.irb.gc.ca/Eng/ResRec/RirRdi/Pages/index.aspx?doc=455723&pls=1.

Journalism is not a Crime, 25. November 2015:

«For journalists in Afghanistan, threats are a part of everyday life. The government, warlords and armed groups threaten journalists so much it becomes a matter of routine, so the journalists ignore the threats and continue their work. It's normal for a journalist in Afghanistan to receive 10 threatening phone calls a month. It was the same for me. But sometimes these threats are serious. And it means that some journalists who've not taken the threats seriously are no longer among us. They lost their lives.

Likewise, I didn't take threats over the phone or social media seriously until one morning when I found a threatening letter by my door bearing the seal and signature of the Taliban. The letter accused me of being an infidel and said my writings were against Islam and the Muslim mujahedeen. The letter said they would kill me as soon as they had the opportunity. It also threatened my family. I knew then that it had become serious. They'd found out where I lived and had been to my house.» Quelle: *Journalism is not a Crime*, Afghan reporter: «Threats are a part of everyday life», 25. November 2015:

<https://journalismisnotacrime.com/en/features/727/>.

Amnesty International, 7. April 2015:

«Islam Bibi also received more than a dozen 'night letters' over the years. **Night letters are written threats delivered to the house at night. Islam Bibi received at least four signed by Mawlawi Abdul Bari Mubarez, the Special Representative of the Taliban's supreme leader Mullah Omar, with the last night letter arriving about 10 days before she died.** (...)

Brishna, an ethnic Pashtun medical doctor, originally from a province in eastern Afghanistan but now living in another area of the country, says the problems she faced go back several years to when she was working in a clinic with women and girls who were victims of sexual violence, including some who had been raped by their male relatives:

"They came to my clinic needing help [otherwise they would have been killed by their relatives or members of their community as an 'honour' killing]. **I would receive threatening night letters and phone calls from the Taliban, warning that they would kill me and my family because of my work. We reported [the letters and calls] to the police, but nobody listened to us.** (...)

Hanifa Safi's husband shares a similar experience:

"We are still receiving threats, even after Hanifa was killed. We informed the police and the NDS but they do nothing and ignore us. **The threats come by phone and in night letters.** It seems that human life is very cheap in the eyes of the Afghan government. Here chickens are worth more than humans, because for killing a chicken you have to buy it first. But for humans, [you don't have to buy them first before you kill them], and particularly women's lives are worthless and cheap. (...)

As a women human rights defender explained to Amnesty International:

"There are **three categories of threats** [against me]. **The first is the Taliban. I have received many night letters and telephone threats.** They have also threatened my relatives. I survived two suicide attacks [as part of two larger attacks on elected officials]. The second is the government itself. They create as many obstacles as possible. I received a direct threat from a district governor when I refused to give him a bribe to implement a project. There is also harassment from the police and NDS. The third is the discrimination I face [in general]. Because I am a woman and [an ethnic minority] – there is a lot of character assassination against me.» Quelle: Amnesty International, Their Lives on the Line: Women Human Rights Defenders under Attack in Afghanistan, 7. April 2015, S. 36; 46; 55; 61:

www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/Submitted%20after%202015-05-11T11%2024%2035/ASA1112792015ENGLISH.PDF.

3 Rekrutierungsversuche der Taliban

Rekrutierung durch die Taliban mittels Drohbriefen. Neben dem Zweck der Einschüchterung der Bevölkerung verwenden die Taliban Drohbriefe gemäss dem Bericht des *European Asylum Support Office* (September 2016) auch zur Rekrutierung von

neuen Kämpfern. Dabei wird das Beispiel eines Drohbriefes in Maidan Wardak erwähnt, in dem die Bevölkerung dazu aufgerufen wird, ihre Zusammenarbeit mit der Regierung zu beenden; Männer werden darin ermuntert, sich dem Kampf der Taliban gegen die Regierungstruppen anzuschliessen. *The Telegraph* berichtete am 21. Juni 2015 von einer 24-Stunden-Hotline der Taliban, bei der sich Regierungsangestellte melden können, die zu den Taliban überlaufen wollen. Die Taliban würden jenen, die von der «Marionettenregierung» in Kabul zu ihnen überlaufen wollen, Schutz gewähren. Gemäss einem Artikel von Jami Forbes und Brian Dudley in der monatlichen Publikation des *Combating Terrorism Centre* (26. November 2013), einer unabhängigen Lehr- und Forschungsinstitution des sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Militärakademie in West Point, würden die Taliban seit dem Jahr 2010 vermehrt versuchen, Regierungsmitarbeiter und Angehörige der afghanischen nationalen Sicherheitskräften (ANSF) zu rekrutieren. Die Taliban hätten sich in diesem Zusammenhang mehrmals öffentlich zu Amnestieprogrammen geäussert. Im Rahmen einer Amnestie würde den betroffenen Person die ehemalige Unterstützung der Regierung vergeben und die Möglichkeit gegeben, sich dem Aufstand ohne Bestrafung anzuschliessen. Dabei könnten Regierungsbeamten entweder ihre Position aufgeben oder in der Regierung bleiben und die Taliban von dort aus unterstützen.

EASO, September 2016:

«The Taliban uses night letters to warn, threaten and to try to win over the population. For example in April 2015, UNHCR reported on night letters issued by the Taliban in Maidan Wardak in which it asked ‘local residents to cease their cooperation with the Government and encouraging men to join them in combat against Government forces’.» Quelle: EASO – European Asylum Support Office, Afghanistan: Recruitment by Armed Groups, September 2016, S. 17:

www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1474353951_2019-09-easo-afghanistan-recruitment.pdf.

The Telegraph, 21. Juni 2015:

«The Afghan Taliban have announced a 24-hour telephone “hotline” for any government employees wishing to defect to the group, as the militants try to bolster public support.

“The Islamic Emirate will provide safety to anybody who defects from the Kabul puppet regime,” the Taliban said in a statement on their website on Sunday, using their formal name.

“They can get in touch with us 24/7 through these phone numbers and email addresses,” it added, listing two for each.

The move demonstrates the Taliban’s efforts to boost public support for their resilient but unpopular insurgency following a string of defections to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) in recent months.

It marks a rare attempt by the Taliban to reach out to government officials, frequently targeted in growing insurgent attacks that have sent casualties soaring.»

Quelle: The Telegraph, Afghan Taliban offer government workers 'hotline' number to defect, 21. Juni 2015:

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/11689836/Afghan-Taliban-offer-government-workers-hotline-number-to-defect.html.

Combating Terrorism Centre, 26. November 2013:

«On October 13, 2013, in his annual message marking the holiday of Eid al-Adha, Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar offered an olive branch to Afghans who oppose the Taliban, saying that the Taliban would welcome them into their ranks. Media coverage of the statement largely ignored these words, instead focusing on Mullah Omar's denunciation of the upcoming presidential elections and the prospect of international forces remaining in Afghanistan post-2014. Since 2010, however, the Taliban have increasingly emphasized their efforts to recruit Afghan government officials, particularly members of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This includes repeated public statements detailing an amnesty program, which provides forgiveness for these individuals' previous support for the government and the opportunity to join the insurgency without retribution. The Taliban have not always pursued such initiatives. For instance, in 2006, Taliban public statements indicated that they preferred to bring Afghan government supporters "to justice" rather than offering them an opportunity for engagement. (...)

Taliban Increasing Emphasis on Amnesty and Recruitment

Since 2010, the Taliban have called on government officials to join the insurgency with increasing frequency. This includes offers of amnesty for officials who wanted to either quit their positions, stay in the government to support the Taliban, or seek new positions with the insurgency. This has not always been a tactic emphasized by the Taliban. For instance, in his Eid al-Fitr message in 2006, Taliban leader Mullah Omar said of government officials: "We will never give them exit. They will be brought to Islamic justice."» Quelle: Forbes, Jami; Dudley Brian, Increase in Taliban Efforts to Recruit from Afghan Government and Security Forces, in: Combating Terrorism Centre, Vol. 6, Issue 11, 12, 26. November 2013, S. 12-13: www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/increase-in-taliban-efforts-to-recruit-from-afghan-government-and-security-forces.

4 Psychische Krankheiten²

Posttraumatische Belastungsstörung und andere psychische Krankheiten weit verbreitet. Laut *Guardian* (2. September 2015), *WHO* (ohne Datum) und *Radio Free*

² Dieser Abschnitt ist teilweise dem folgenden Bericht entnommen: SFH, Schnellrecherche zu Afghanistan: Verlobung und Heirat, Zwangsheirat, Schulbesuch von Mädchen, Wahlbeteiligung, Sicherheitslage in der Stadt Herat, psychische Krankheiten, 27. November 2015, S. 25-27:

www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch/assets/herkunftslander/mittlerer-osten-zentralasien/afghanistan/151127-afg-herat-heirat-schulbesuch.pdf.

Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) (3. Mai 2012) stellen psychische Krankheiten wie posttraumatische Belastungsstörung, Depression und Angstzustände, die durch den Krieg hervorgerufen wurden, eine verborgene Epidemie in Afghanistan dar. Gemäss der letzten verfügbaren Untersuchung der Weltgesundheitsorganisation von 2004, zitiert in einem Bericht von *Samuel Hall* (1. Juni 2016), litten 68 Prozent der Befragten an einer Depression, 72 Prozent an Angstzuständen und 42 Prozent an einer posttraumatischen Belastungsstörung. 2005 litten gemäss *Guardian* (2. September 2015) 16,5 Prozent der Afghanen an psychischen Krankheiten, und das Problem dürfte sich seitdem höchstwahrscheinlich noch vergrössert haben.

Stigmatisierung von psychischen Krankheiten. Während alle Provinzspitäler inzwischen psychische Beratung anbieten, kämpfen die Berater selbst in der Hauptstadt Kabul gegen lange Traditionen und eine Kultur der Stigmatisierung von psychisch Kranken an. Gemäss einem Bericht von *Disability World* vom Februar 2005, der in den UNHCR-Richtlinien vom 19. April 2016 zitiert wird, ergibt sich diese Stigmatisierung daraus, dass psychische Erkrankungen gesellschaftlich oft als Bestrafung für Sünden angesehen würden. So sei es üblich, psychisch kranke Familienmitglieder aus der Öffentlichkeit fernzuhalten.

Kaum Kapazitäten zur Behandlung psychischer Erkrankungen. Gemäss einer Studie von *Samuel Hall* (1. Juni 2016) wurden psychosoziale Probleme und psychische Erkrankungen in Afghanistan bisher sehr unterschätzt und daher kaum angegangen, wenn nicht sogar ignoriert. Während die Bedürfnisse wegen der weiten Verbreitung solcher Erkrankungen akut sind, herrscht weiterhin ein Mangel an ausgebildetem Personal (Psychiaterinnen und Psychiater, Sozialarbeitende, Psychologinnen und Psychologen) sowie an angemessener Infrastruktur; ausserdem fehlt das nötige Bewusstsein bezüglich psychischer Erkrankungen. Verglichen mit seinen Nachbarstaaten steht Afghanistan gemäss von *Samuel Hall* zitierten Informationen der WHO von 2014 extrem schlecht da, mit nur einer tertiären Gesundheitseinrichtung zur Behandlung psychischer Erkrankungen (*Kabul Mental Health Hospital*), ungefähr drei ausgebildeten Psychiaterinnen und Psychiatern und zehn Psychologinnen und Psychologen für eine Bevölkerung von mehr als 30 Millionen Menschen.

«Behandlung» durch Drogen oder an Schreinen aus Tradition oder wegen niedriger Kosten üblich. Viele Afghanen greifen laut *Guardian* (2. September 2015) und RFE/RL (3. Mai 2012) bei psychischen Krankheiten aus Tradition oder Kostengründen auf Drogen oder abergläubische Praktiken an Schreinen («*ziyarats*») zurück, die oft mehr schaden als nutzen. Beispielsweise ist eine «Behandlung» am Schrein Mia Ali Baba mit umgerechnet 20 Dollar billiger als Arzneimittel oder der Transport zum nächsten Spital. Die lange Dauer einer psychischen Behandlung in Spital schreckt laut RFE/RL (3. Mai 2012) besonders Patientinnen und Patienten aus entlegenen ländlichen Gebieten wegen der hohen Kosten ab. Psychische Beratung wird ausserdem mit Skepsis betrachtet, da das Mitteilen von persönlichen Themen und Familiengeheimnissen als kulturell nicht angemessen gilt.

Guardian, 2. September 2015:

«Fourteen years of violence have created a hidden epidemic in Afghanistan of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other war-induced illnesses. It is one

of the most enduring damages wrought by the war – one few people understand, and fewer can treat. But **a small army of therapists now seeks to change that.** And they are led by a woman. “We are in a vicious cycle of violence and trauma,” said Dr Fareshta Quedeas, project manager at the International Psychosocial Organisation (Ipsa) in Kabul and the driving force behind **training 280 psychosocial counsellors who work across the country.** (...)

A UN-sponsored survey found that in 2005, 16.5% of Afghans suffered from mental disorders. The problem is likely to have grown since then. The Afghan government has made tackling mental illness a priority and developed a national mental health strategy. All provincial hospitals now offer counselling. Counselling is free, and even available online. (...)

But Quedeas’s counsellors are working against long-held traditions and a culture of stigmatisation of the mentally ill. Faced with mental disorder, many resort to drugs or superstitious practices that often cause more harm than good. Critics claim the treatment at shrines like Mia Ali Baba is a hoax, which sedates patients suffering from hunger and maltreatment rather than curing them. Still, locals maintain a strong belief in their healing powers. One of them, Nasibullah Subara, said the treatment had helped his nephew. “Before, he didn’t sleep. He had a short temper and bothered his family. But now he doesn’t have those problems,” Subara said. The \$20 cost of the treatment at the shrine is cheaper than medicine or a trip to the nearest hospital. As a result, the shrine’s 16 cells are often full. (...) Modern therapy is also at odds with the sense of privacy so paramount in Afghan culture. **“Many people don’t like the concept of counselling. It is not appropriate in our culture to share intimate matters and family secrets,”** said Fatma Dauladzai, a counsellor from Paktia province. But while the idea of counselling has yet to take firm root, **women, especially, are growing more receptive.**» Quelle: The Guardian, Afghanistan tackles hidden mental health epidemic, 2. September 2015: www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/sep/02/afghanistan-tackles-hidden-mental-health-epidemic-therapists.

WHO, Zugriff am 18. November 2015:

«The Afghanistan National Survey on Mental Health 2003–2005 showed that 16.5% of the adult population in the country was suffering from mental health disorders. **In Afghanistan, health care facilities specific to mental health care services are few and far between. The Ministry of Public Health has upgraded mental health from second tier to first tier, thereby making mental health among the top five priorities of the Ministry. Mental health is one of the components of the existing framework of the basic package of health services.** (...) However, it has not been fully integrated at the delivery level because **of financial and human resource constraints.** (...) **The stigmatization associated socially with mental health disorders is the greatest barrier for addressing this important global health issue. The stigma and violations of human rights is not only directed towards people with mental, neurological and substance use disorders, but by extension it affects the mental health care providers in the formal and informal sectors further compounding the problem.**»

Quelle: World Health Organization (WHO), Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, Afghanistan Mental Health, ohne Datum (Zugriff am 18. November 2015): www.emro.who.int/afg/programmes/mental-health.html.

RFE/RL, 3. Mai 2012:

«Among the mental illnesses affecting Afghans most are depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder, but precise statistics are difficult to pin down. (...) With some 30 million inhabitants, Afghanistan has only a handful of mental-health treatment facilities nationwide. In Kabul, the state's main facility has a capacity to treat just 60 patients at a time. There are specialized hospital wards in Jalalabad, in eastern Afghanistan, and Herat, in the west. In the northern city of Mazar-i Sharif a gleaming, private hospital helps fill the void. Other than that there are no other medical facilities to treat mental patients throughout Afghanistan's 34 provinces. Azizuddin Hemat, head of the government-run Society of Mental Health Specialists, says the situation is dire, especially in the country's regions, but that there are positive developments. He singles out the private Alemi Neuro Psychiatric Hospital in Mazar-i Sharif – the administrative center of Balkh Province – as a particular source of pride when it comes to treating patients with mental health-problems. (...) Public awareness of the problem is seen as key to treating it in a country where mental illnesses are seldom recognized as a medical issue, and are often covered up by family members out of shame. (...) Sufferers often turn to holy shrines known as 'ziyarats' for treatment. Prominent 'ziyarats' such as Niali Saheb in Nangarhar, Shams Saheb in Ghazni province, and Shpole Baba in the eastern Mahipar town have become a popular destination for tens of thousands of people suffering from depression. (...) Time and money are a hindrance, according to Alemi [Dr. Nader Alemi, owner of the Alemi Neuro Psychiatric Hospital in Mazar-i-Sharif]. While treatment for depression, for example, usually takes many months, the majority of his patients come from remote rural areas and cannot afford extended hospital stays.»
Quelle: RFE/RL – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Little Succor For Afghanistan's Mentally Ill, 3. Mai 2012: [www.ecoi.net/local link/215746/336402 de.html](http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/215746/336402_de.html).

Samuel Hall, 1. Juni 2016:

«I. National situation at a glance

*In a country where 63% of the population is below the age of 25, the health and well-being of adolescents and youth will partly determine the country's economic and social future. However, while health has been one of the priorities on both international and national agendas, **psychosocial problems or mental disorders have been largely under-estimated and under-addressed – if not ignored. A WHO survey conducted in 2004, the last available, found 68% of respondents suffering from depression, 72% from anxiety and 42% from post-traumatic stress disorders. More than ten years later, Afghan youth are still exposed to conflict, insecurity, domestic violence, extreme poverty, gender disparities, displacement and other potentially traumatic experiences. Yet no data exist on the needs of the displaced.***

While the needs are significant – in a country where symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorders affect the majority after decades of conflict – the

country still suffers from the lack of trained professionals (psychiatrists, social workers, psychologists) and adequate infrastructure and awareness about mental health conditions. A rapid comparison between Afghanistan and its neighbours, as emphasized in the graph below, presents a particularly grim picture of the country, with only one tertiary health facility (Kabul Mental Health Hospital), approximately three trained psychiatrists and ten psychologists 'covering' a population of more than 30 million people.

Figure 1: Number of trained mental-health workers in 2014 (per 100,000 population)

Source: WHO Global Health Observatory Data Repository

	Psychiatrists	Psychologists	Nurses	Social Workers
<i>Pakistan</i>	0.31	1.09	15.43	2.32
<i>Iran</i>	1.76	5.07	8.84	0.72
<i>Uzbekistan</i>	2.68	0.02	8.96	0.02
<i>Tajikistan</i>	2.16	0.01	7.14	NA
Afghanistan	0.01	0.04	0.11	0.01

Quelle: Samuel Hall, Urban Displaced Youth in Kabul Part One: Mental Health Matters, 1. Juni 2016, S. 12-13:

<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UDY-Chapter-1-Mental-Health.pdf>.

UNHCR, 19. April 2016:

«Personen mit Behinderung, insbesondere Personen mit geistiger Behinderung oder psychischer Erkrankung, sind Berichten zufolge Misshandlungen durch Mitglieder der Gesellschaft ausgesetzt, darunter auch durch Angehörige ihrer eigenen Familien, da ihre Krankheit oder Behinderung als Bestrafung für von den Betroffenen oder ihren Eltern begangene Sünden betrachtet wird.

Disability World berichtete, dass die geringe Wahrnehmbarkeit von Problemen durch psychische Krankheiten in Afghanistan hauptsächlich auf die negative öffentliche Wahrnehmung und auf das Stigma psychisch Erkrankter zurückzuführen ist. Psychische Krankheiten werden häufig als Bestrafung von Sünden stigmatisiert. Viele Familien verheimlichen die Existenz psychisch kranker Familienmitglieder, um das Ansehen der Familie und die Heiratsaussichten von Geschwistern zu schützen. Psychisch kranke Menschen werden von der Öffentlichkeit ferngehalten und bleiben eine unsichtbare Gruppe unter den bereits von Ausgrenzung betroffenen Menschen mit Behinderung. [Übersetzung durch UNHCR]. Disability World, Applying the Minority Perspective to Disability in Afghanistan, Februar 2005, http://www.disabilityworld.org/12-02_05/il/afghanistan.shtml.» Quelle: UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees): Richtlinien zur Feststellung des internationalen Schutzbedarfs afghanischer Asylsuchender, 19. April 2016, S. 75 einschliesslich Fussnote 416:

www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1471846055_unhcr-20160419-afg-richtlinien-de.pdf.