



# IRAQ

NATIONAL REPORT ON THE STATUS  
OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT  
2008

# Acknowledgment

The National Report on the Status of Human Development in Iraq 2008 is the product of the joint efforts of many experts and institutions. The composition of the team was interdisciplinary, various persons, competent in diverse fields of expertise and professionally involved in different institutions were invited to present their comments. The overall work of the team of authors was reviewed and assisted by readers group. The final version of the report incorporated the important comments made by the peer reviewers.

The Report was prepared in Iraq through the extreme and violent situation that prevailed in 2006-2007. However, the strength of its statistics, analysis and policy directions are made more potent as that they were gathered and produced in unstable and insecure conditions.

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A special thank is also extended to UNDP/Iraq staff for their cooperation and support at all time.



**Oldest Map of the World**  
Babylonian, about 4000 BC  
British Museum collection  
No. ( E153 / 92687 )

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Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation  
And Baytal Hikma  
Iraq

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The views expressed herein are those of the authors of the report and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry of Planning or Baytul Hikma.

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## Foreword

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Iraq has made significant achievements since April 2003 when the new government emerged to lay down the foundations of democratic institutions that are rising again after nearly half a century of suppression. In spite of the difficulties that have accompanied this process the government deeply acknowledges the fact that citizens should enjoy their full rights and at the same time bear the responsibility of participation in the process which, in turn, protects their rights and liberties.

I am pleased with the publication of the Iraq National Report on the Status on Human Development 2008. This report does not hesitate in presenting an objective, albeit worrying, picture of the human development situation in this important period in Iraq's history. Iraq today is moving towards reconstruction and the resumption of development which has been stunted for decades by wars and severe sanctions. At the very appropriate time, the report tells us about the deficiencies and prescribes what needs to be done. It shows us the inherited disparities and structural dislocations, and suggests the possible means to address them. In its review of the past, the report highlights the successes and the failures; and in its outlook to the future identifies the challenges that stand in the way of development.

A foreword to a report is usually aligned with the concerns of the work. Here I find my self in a position of self criticism of the government's performance; the historical responsibility of which I have been honoured to bear at this critical stage in Iraq's history. In its analysis and figures, the report presents indicators of poor performance and regression in human development. This, in fact, increases our determination to adopt the policies and the recommendations it contains. Flattery is no longer accepted at a time when sincere Iraqis are raising the banner to improve human development and catch up with the countries that have moved ahead in this path. Despite the challenges, we cannot afford to be complacent with the current situation. We are looking towards a bright future, and towards the modern and developed state that is suitable for Iraqis and is commensurate with their rich history.

Deficiencies and stagnation in education and health systems are impeding development in Iraq. Geographic and gender disparities are a major concern, and they have to be adequately addressed to build the democratic, participatory, educated, and healthy society that is capable of bringing about the future that will be safe, just, and prosperous to Iraqis.

The economic policies that we have adopted have provided some protection to the deprived and vulnerable groups. However, this report reminds us that the ultimate target should be human development in its broader sense. We are reminded that the objectives of the economic policies, from a human development perspective, should go beyond humanitarian relief and should aim to create productive opportunities for dignified living. The government's fundamental task is to secure equitable development and opportunities for all Iraqis in order that they achieve their capabilities.

We hope that this report will stimulate a broad dialogue on social policies within the framework of our commitment to promote a free economy. We see that it will help us build on what has been achieved and through its recommendations will also help in eliminating violence through the rule of law which will ensure human security and national security as well.

We see that this report will reinforce the government's role and its responsibility to formulate long-term strategies and policies. It presents a broad vision that is characterized by neutrality and objectivity. The report reflects the broad experience resulting from the joint international and national efforts, and it is supported by inputs from government institutions, academic institutions, and the civil society. It thus provides a more comprehensive approach to development and diagnoses the most crucial issues.

The report's comprehensive vision is balanced by a local focus in presenting statistical data at the governorate level. This will help policy makers and planners to achieve equality and equity in resource allocation, and will guide local experts to shape their own vision and to formulate development goals that are more aligned with needs of the local societies and governments.

Moreover, the report establishes a rich and reliable statistical database to measure the human development indicators and to qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the extent of progress achieved in living standards. It is also a means to monitor the performance of the overall policy of the macro economy vis-à-vis the goals of human development. This will assist the government in designing its strategies and defining the priorities. In this respect, we encourage the continual preparation and publication of Iraq National Reports on the Status of Human Development.

Finally, I would like to commend this high-quality effort for both its content and its form. The report's chapters and the important issues covered reflect originality of presentation, objectivity in analysis, and neutrality in its conclusions and recommendations. I wish to thank all those who contributed to the preparation of the report, especially those who took part in its writing, editing, reviewing and assessing. Thanks are also due to the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and to Baytal Hikma – the two national patrons – as well as to the United Nations Development Programme, which provided technical support for the preparation of this report, thus confirmed the role of the international community in supporting Iraq's efforts in reconstruction and the transition from crisis to peace, and in drawing a roadmap towards the future within the framework of the International Compact for Iraq. This report is definitely a bright example in Iraq's relation with the United Nations.

**May God help us succeed**



**Nuri Kamil Al Maliki  
Prime Minister  
Republic of Iraq**

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
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# Introductory Chapter

## Conceptual Framework

Human Development and Human Security



Hafidh Al Durobi

**Blind Man in Market**



# Introductory Chapter: Conceptual Framework

## Human Development and Human Security

### Iraq and Human Development

Iraq was home to one of the world's oldest human civilizations. Its ancient civilizations arose on the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris, and the first forms of social, political and economic organizations flourished here. It was also here that the first centralised authority emerged in response to a growing need for an effective state to oversee the organization of economic life centred on agriculture and a sophisticated network of water management. It was the first historical model of a state that was based on established civic relationships, on a pattern of stable management and official institutions.

It may also have been in Iraq that the first attempt by humanity to establish a system of justice took place. It was here that the first legislative acts known in the world were enforced, the most notable and renowned of which was the Code of Hammurabi (ca. 1792-1750 BC). This included a broad body of laws that was applied throughout the Kingdom of Babylon and established the legal system for the country, forward looking in many respects yet limited in respect of women's rights by the culture of the time.

Iraq also witnessed man's first desperate attempts to find safety from the dangers of floods, beasts and death, as embodied in the Gilgamesh Epic which was written in Iraq around 2000 B.C.

People, as seen by the report, are the makers of development as well being its ultimate

target. They individually and collectively constitute the tools of change. A set of factors interact to empower, or otherwise obstruct, them in this respect. Centuries of backwardness and authoritarian regimes have produced a culture that undermines the ambitions and aspirations of individuals as well as their wishes to participate. In many parts of the world, such regimes give birth to deformed types of development, and the unilateral ideologies generate a vast vacuum in the nation's thinking and strip it from the elements of its development. **The report sees that its goals will be achieved when individuals and communities become the major actors. This focus will be maintained along with the attention of the analysis and the aim of proposing policies and directing the government to prioritize important issues.**

*People, as seen by the report, are the makers of development as well being its ultimate target.*

"The great gods have called me, I am the salvation-bearing shepherd, whose staff is straight, the good shadow that is spread over my city; on my breast I cherish the inhabitants of the land of Sumer and Akkad; in my shelter I have let them repose in peace; in my deep wisdom have I enclosed them. That the strong might not injure the weak, in order to protect the widows and orphans, I have in Babylon the city where Anu and Bel raise high their head, in E-Sagil, the Temple, whose foundations stand firm as heaven and earth, in order to declare justice in the land, to settle all disputes, and heal all injuries, set up these my precious words, written upon my memorial stone, before the image of me, as king of righteousness."

**Hammurabi Code**

[HTTP://WWW.WSU.EDU/NDEE/MESO/CODE.HTM](http://www.wsu.edu/NDEE/MESO/CODE.HTM)

## The Triple Challenge to Human Development in Iraq: Security, Legacy and Transition

The social and economic situation in Iraq is strongly affected by its political problems, and dealing with these requires special care. Neglecting them may result in serious damage to the whole process of human development. Internationally, regionally and locally, the conflict has negatively affected Iraqi society and had devastating effects on the situation of human development. There continues to be high loss of life. Over the last five years, tens of thousands of Iraqis have been killed and a greater number are still suffering from the consequences of violence and insecurity, whether they have been orphaned, widowed, injured or traumatized. Development today faces significant challenges, the most dangerous of which is violence. In addition to this, the country is the scene of ethnic and sectarian conflict, war on terrorism, foreign troops, poverty and inequality, a marked decline in growth, and reversals in human development.

Iraq faces enormous economic, political and social tasks if it is to regain the initiative in designing its own path for development. Even assuming security conditions improve, it is doubtful that it can regain its strength in the foreseeable future without making enormous efforts at reconstruction and rehabilitation, economic reform, improvement in the economic environment and the reorganisation of public and private sectors. Those tasks also need to be associated with improvement in social conditions and the elimination of the effects of the destruction that has characterized past eras. Moreover, it requires the reinvigoration of its citizens who have been exhausted physically and psychologically, culturally and intellectually by the appalling conditions they have lived through, which have deprived them not only of food for the body but also of nourishment for the mind and soul.

The triple challenges in Iraq of insecurity, the legacy of the recent past and the haphazard launch and management

### Box 1

#### A Renewed Commitment to Human Development

It has become clear in today's world that human development and the improvement of human living conditions are the natural start to any real development process. The human being has to be the ultimate aim of development, and any achievements in development should serve human interests. The human race is God's steward on earth and has been assigned the task of managing its resources: **"We have bestowed the sons of Adam"**, as the Quran affirms. God has given human dignity a high value that should not be undermined. So, being bestowed by God with such a status, humanity must already possess the qualifications that are necessary to carry out those tasks.

Unfortunately, the record of the Arab world on human development does not correspond with the Islamic concept of humanity, nor is it in harmony with the tasks that human beings should undertake in their lives. This contradiction arises in part because many societies have not understood their religion properly, nor have they succeeded in identifying the essential characteristics of their faith. Had they done this, they would have concentrated on building the potential of human beings as a supreme goal and given human development the priority it deserves. Arab participation in the construction of a positive contemporary human experience would have been much more extensive than has been observed thus far.

In its present circumstances, Iraq provides a clear example of the interrelationship between human security, welfare and prosperity. When a human being is frightened and threatened, fear and anxiety make aspirations difficult to achieve. The Iraqi Government recognises very clearly the interrelationship between security and development. It also realises that if clear success is not achieved at the security level, then it cannot be achieved in the sphere of development, and that the reverse is also true. Iraq is therefore committed to sustained progress in both these arenas. Here again, reference to the texts of Islam indicate how security and the economy are interrelated. In the Quraish Sura, God says that Islam has considered security an essential and vital requirement for the happiness and prosperity of humanity. **"...Let them adore the Lord of this House, Who provides them with food against hunger and with security against fear"**.

**Ali Ghalib Baban**

Minister of Planning and Developmental Cooperation

of transition are obstacles to achieving human development.

The transitional phase has marked a historical breach, signalling fundamental transformations in structures, institutions and values towards the adoption of new bases in economic and political life. Yet the management of this phase, with all its associated upheaval and adverse effects on political stability and social harmony, has posed additional challenges to human development. It is security that seems to have suffered the greatest erosion and its absence has led to the most extreme violations. Efforts to restore security have so far met with little success, and people have been living in a state of seemingly endless fear and anxiety.

However, indicators and conclusions drawn in this report are related to the time of preparing the report, steps forward are apparent in areas of security and reform in 2008.

## Why the Report is Important

The lack of literature on human development in Iraq is striking. Relevant studies are rare. However, those studies that are available show the urgent need to promote the concept of human development more widely, which has not so far taken place in academic or cultural circles. There is also a need for further studies on the present status and future prospects of human development. More than 14 years have passed since the first NHDR on Iraq was issued in 1995. Momentous changes have taken place in Iraq since that date, which, among many other reasons, indicates the importance of producing this report.

The report has benefited from a participatory process throughout all stages of its preparation. A total of 136 authors, reviewers and statisticians, representing various fields of knowledge, have taken part. Academics, writers, media workers, government officials and civil society activists have joined to form what could be considered as an independent

### Box 2

#### The Persecution of the Educated Class - the Report Team under Fire\*

Louay Haqqi was a careful man. Director General of Technical Affairs and the Assistant Chair of the Support Team for the NHDR at the Central Organization of Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT), he worked on many exacting tasks. He was in the habit of going to work early in order to avoid traffic and street violence in a city that had been witnessing more and more mass bombings and targeted killings of educated professionals. Early in the morning of August 2, 2007, he stopped at a traffic light some 100 meters away from his office. A car pulled by and two shots were fired, killing Louay at the wheel. He was in his early forties, had twins, a boy and a girl, and was also raising a niece whom his family had taken in. His sudden and senseless murder reverberated across the world. Within hours, emails from Chile, Belgium, New York and other locations circulated among his colleagues and friends, mourning the loss to Iraq of yet another of its highly qualified professionals. Louay's death added one more number to the toll of over 800\* Iraqi experts assassinated in the past four years.

Other members of the NHDR Report team were not spared from threats. Several writers and professionals found themselves targeted; a macroeconomist was shot at while in her car. In the hail of bullets. She lost the use of her left hand which had shielded her heart from the bullet aimed at her. The Chair of the Support Team received an envelope containing a bullet. He ignored the threat and stayed the course. A high-level sociologist received threats which forced him to move his family to another town. The Director General of the Human Development department foiled assailants who attempted to kidnap him. After receiving similar threats, the Rapporteur of the Consultative Committee had to leave her home and move to another town. A physician, a statistician at COSIT, an Assistant Researcher and another COSIT employee were driven to join the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced.

Notwithstanding the dangerous gauntlet run by their colleagues, the 136 Iraqi scholars, statisticians, researchers, managers and administrative staff who worked on this report continued undeterred to see it through.

\* For figures on targeted assassinations see Dr Ismail Jalili, Report to the House of Lords, London 2006

Prepared by Alia Al-Dalli and Mehdi Al Alak

national network extending through the governorates, including the Kurdistan region, advocating human development.

## Report Overview

The analysis throughout the report focused on the following issues:

- How the conflict has affected people's lives, their well-being, participation and empowerment.
- How the conflict has affected different areas and different people?
- What are the perceptions of people? How do they foresee their future?
- How transition, war and conflict has hindered capabilities and opportunities?
- How women were caught between insecurity and cultural obstacles?

The report's structure consists of a conceptual framework, a national and sub-national analysis set out in three Parts and a statistical annex.

Part I addresses the situation of human development in Iraq. Chapter 1 deals with the measures and indexes of human development in Iraq and their status in comparison with Arab countries and others in the developing world. Indexes were calculated on a governorate level, including Kurdistan Region, for the first time since 1990. In addition, measurements have been extended to cover human security through the construction of indicators for HS. Moreover, progress towards achieving the Millennium Developmental Goals (MDGs) has been tracked and recorded.

Chapter 2 addresses the question of whether Iraqis are free from want and presents the indicators that reflect standards of living, such as income, impoverishment and its relationship with income inequality, and unemployment. It then goes on to identify the state's systems

of protection. It illustrates, with facts and data, the extent to which Iraqis lead long and healthy lives, with special emphasis on health care for women and children; the extent of progress achieved in levels of school enrolment; whether existing infrastructure provides people with sustainable access to clean water, adequate housing and decent living conditions; and whether the demographic situation helps to accelerate human development rates. Chapter 3 asks whether Iraqis are free from fear. It addresses the manifestations of direct and indirect violence that have inflicted high human costs. Killing, forced displacement, forced emigration abroad and violence against women and children, are investigated. Official data, as well as field studies conducted for this report, were used in preparing this chapter.

In Part II, the report covers the transitional phase. Chapter 4 provides a description and analysis of the transformation from a totalitarian political system to a democratic one. This chapter also identifies challenges and obstacles to security, from the perspective of enhancing people's participation in government and their enjoyment of freedoms.

Iraq's political transformation is moving in lockstep with economic changes towards an open market economy. These are dealt with in Chapter 5. The first section of that chapter discusses macroeconomic policy and its effects on standards of living and economic structure. Its second section analyses the obstacles that restrict economic growth and the creation of opportunities for new investment which could lead to new jobs that would in turn ensure an increase in economic participation. A number of these challenges are interrelated, such as the inherited burdens of debt and reparations, and the lack of security, which have combined to impede reconstruction and the ability to benefit from international donor funding and assistance. The chapter concludes that these restrictions have further affected the economy's capacity to provide

opportunities for human empowerment and to ensure a decent standard of living.

Chapter 6 discusses the social policies appropriate to people's empowerment. The first section shows the inherited imbalances that constrain the admission capacity of educational institutions and consequently restrict attainment of knowledge and empowerment. The second section discusses the structure of the health system and shows its weak response to challenges to security in the transitional period, reflected in a lack of health-care services and people's limited access to them. The third section traces changes in social expenditure policies and compares allocations for human development, notably education and health, with the military spending that characterised state policies for three decades.

Chapter 7 focuses on the plight of women who have been caught between insecurity, transition and a legacy of cultural restrictions. It sees the empowerment of women as an urgent necessity, which has to be achieved through cultural, and not simply legal, change. Women have made political gains during the transition. Yet there are economic losses. Evidence shows that Iraqi women are disproportionately affected by, political instability, insecurity, and the deterioration of economic activities and social structures resulting from the ongoing conflict.

Chapter 8 draws conclusions from the preceding analyses and attempts to define several policy bearings for human development in Iraq. Basing itself on people's views, the chapter outlines priorities for addressing insecurity, the impacts of economic transition and social reforms in education, health and women's empowerment. It suggests distinct roles and priorities for the state and its international and local partners (the private sector and civil society) in a partnership framework that includes the International Compact with Iraq.

As applied to Iraq, the concept of human development provides an appropriate framework for analysis, yet one that is insufficient by itself to cover the legacy of the past or the challenges to human security in the current transitional phase. What is required, therefore, is a compound methodology that combines human development and human security. This theoretical introduction seeks to explore the relationship between human development and human security, as illuminated by academic research and the work of international institutions, in order to utilize this compound methodology to supplement the measurement and analysis of human development in Iraq in the chapters that follow.

## The Human Development Framework

Theories of development have made important strides towards repositioning human beings at the centre of the development process and in improving the tools for measuring progress. Previously, prevailing theories sought to maximize the role of economic growth. After it became clear that growth, though necessary, is insufficient to advance human well being, the comprehensive concept of human development emerged as a more relevant alternative.

Thus, development theory now counts economic growth as just one element in an ongoing and sustainable development process. The concept of human development has gained a special position in thinking on the subject, as is evident in UNDP literature since the first HDR was issued in 1990. The concept has been further enriched with successive periodical reports as well as over 600 national and regional reports, which have broadened the debate and created an intellectual trend that embraces thinkers and writers from various cultures and societies.

*The objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy a long, healthy and creative life.*

**Mahbub ul Haq**  
Founder of the Human Development Report, 1990

*“Human Development ..., in concerned with..., advancing the richness of human life, rather than the richness of the economy in which human beings live, which is only a part of it”*

**Amartya Sen**  
*Nobel Laureate in Economics, 1998.*

## **Economic Development and Human Development**

Human development emphasizes that development is about expanding people’s capabilities and choices. Human development calls for the protection of people’s options for present and future generations. Such options include a healthy and extended life, the acquisition of knowledge, and access to the resources necessary to enjoy an appropriate standard of living, in addition to political freedom, human rights and basic human dignity (*Human Development Report 1990*).

Concepts of development have a long history. Since ancient times, intellectuals, philosophers and reformers have discussed the importance of improving societal conditions. The achievement of a decent quality of life has been the true aim of much human activity. It captured the interest of the earliest philosophers. With the birth of economics as a science, concern with the

quality of people’s lives and the formulation of theories for enhancing development became the focus of various schools of economics, each with its own approach to philosophy, benchmarks and programming.

The establishment within economics of a separate branch specifically concerned with development goes back to the 1940s. Initially, the main focus was material progress, that is, the expanded production of commodities and services, guided by the principle of utility and the notion that production generates income and increased income leads to greater benefit, thus to economic prosperity. It was assumed that growth of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) would decrease poverty and increase the well-being of society in general. Many economists believed that the relationship between increased production and poverty alleviation was close and direct: their focus therefore concentrated on economic growth as the object of development. In

### **Box 3**

### **The Islamic Perspective on Human Development**

The concept of development, in the Islamic sense, covers the essential core of the human being and relates to matters of the heart, psyche, feelings, emotions, conscience, body and spirit. It extends beyond that to include improvement in physical living conditions and increase in material assets, together with enhanced opportunities for social activity and production. The human being takes responsibility for development. The Almighty says, **‘Verily never will Allah change the condition of a people until they change it themselves (with their own souls)’**. At the same time, the concept of development in Islam is understood to be an investment in building the capacities of the individual and the nation (‘Umma’), as well as the material resources enabling the individual and Umma to progress.

The Islamic faith calls for the release of each person’s energies, and makes the individual the prime instigator in production and development, by emphasizing human will and choice. It believes the human being is selective and responsible for personal choices. The individual is at liberty to choose work and income earning, or laziness and dependence. The individual is also bound to behave responsibly towards others. In the Holy Quran, Allah says: **‘When the prayer is finished, then may you disperse through the land and seek of the bounty of Allah ...’ (Al-Jum’a, 10) ‘...and seek for after life but never forget your share in this life; be good to others as Allah blessed you and never seek corruption in the land, as Allah does not love spoilers’ (Al-Qasas, 77).**

Furthermore, human effort, with its entire range of energies, is a prerequisite to development. The effort of the whole Umma is another condition for the success of any development process and any comprehensive struggle against backwardness. If the Umma does not grow, it is not possible to achieve development.

The Islamic view of development is centred on the preparation of a righteous human being, who is productive and strives for improvement, at an individual and social level. The Prophet says: **‘Attainment of knowledge is a must for each Muslim, man or women.’**

Above all, Islam has encouraged and valued labour and production, and has linked work with human dignity and status in the eyes of God. Thus Islam has prepared the ground for people to increase production and wealth, while also providing moral standards for judging work and indigence. Work is rewarded, and a bread-earner is considered better than an idle worshipper; laziness and apathy are seen as human defects.

**Shemran Al Ajly**

Head of Board of Trustees, Bayt alhikma



this sense, growth became the principal end of development and not just one means to achieve it.

By the mid-1950s, it had become clearer that development economics could not focus on material well-being alone, but should be extended to include a broader definition of personal enrichment, thereby enabling people to lead happier lives, exercise their talents and develop their abilities.<sup>(1)</sup>

In the 1970s, the ideology of pure economic growth came in for sharp criticism for its failure to take into account the effects of growth on the local and international environment. It also became obvious that widespread poverty in the world was not being eradicated and that the growth achieved since the Second World War had further widened the gap between rich and poor countries. New standards for economic growth, such as meeting basic needs, improving social equity and human development, began to emerge. With that, developmental thought shifted to issues of justice in the distribution of income, poverty analysis and the satisfaction of basic needs in society. Theorists began to discuss the accumulation of 'human capital'.<sup>(2)</sup> Many studies have demonstrated that expenditure on education creates economic returns equal to or exceeding those on investments in physical capital. However, the concept of human capital extends beyond spending on education alone. It includes expenditure on research and development, nutrition programmes and family planning services. Investing in the human was seen as a productive measure because it ultimately leads to the expansion of human capabilities.

This shift towards valuing human capital as a means of development, noticeable in early World Bank thinking, was not entirely free from the utilitarian bias of earlier development theory, since the notion of people as "capital" still treated

human beings as *inputs* to development, rather than as its main *subjects*.

In the early 1970s, the World Bank set forth a strategy for redistribution through growth, using part of the additional production resulting from the growth process for the benefit of the poor through investment in assets of particular importance to them.<sup>(3)</sup> Also, in the mid-1970s, the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted the concept of 'basic needs' and called for changes in development priorities to the benefit of job creation and the satisfaction of basic human needs, such as food, shelter, clothing, primary and secondary education and primary health care.<sup>(4)</sup> Despite an emphasis on the importance of redistribution of income to meet basic needs, however, an integrated approach to human development did not materialise. It was not until the late 1980s that the human development approach emerged to counter the hypothesis and rationale that had previously formed the basis of development economics. People were now at the heart of the concept of development. Human beings were at last understood to be the principal agents of development and their well being its sole end. The limited results achieved by economic growth experiments in most developing countries, and their negative impact on the conditions of the poor, made it clear that development is altogether broader than a simple increase in average per capita income.

The central argument of human development has evolved; as noted, it now emphasizes that development is about expanding people's capabilities and choices, not merely increasing economic benefits, or satisfying basic needs. The ultimate goal is to enable human beings to expand their options to live a longer life, free from disease and want, and to have access to knowledge. All this is closely

(1) Lewis, W. Arthur, 1955, *The Theory of Economic Growth*, p 422

(2) Schultz, T. W. 1961. "Investment in Human Capital," *American Economic Review*, Vol, 1(2), pp 1-7.

(3) Chenery, Ahluwalia, Bell, Duloy and Jolly, 1974, *Redistribution with Growth*, The World Bank, Oxford University Press.

(4) ILO, Geneva, 1976. "Meeting Basic Needs: Strategies for Eradicating Mass Poverty and Unemployment."

linked to human freedom, since neither capabilities nor choices can be developed in its absence.

### The Dimensions of Human Development

Given the choice, any individual will undoubtedly prefer a longer life, a higher level of education and adequate resources to enjoy a decent standard of living. These choices represent the basic potential outcomes provided by human development along with full social and political participation.<sup>(5)</sup> There are other dimensions of human development that are not included in the basic model, a reflection of doubts about the validity of the indexes used to measure them and the degree of success in adequately reflecting these dimensions, which include 'human freedom', 'environmental life conditions' and 'human security'.

The basic human development model includes several dimensions. As treated in the global HDRs, these can be defined as follows:

**Empowerment:** The significance of empowerment is that it liberates people

to take responsibility for developing their own potential as individuals and as members of their societies. The capacity of people to act on their own behalf and for the benefit of others is important for the achievement of human development. In this sense, development must be achieved by the people and not only for them. Empowered people are better able to participate in decision-making and in the processes that shape their lives. Civil society organizations occupy particular importance in this area (*UNDP, 1995*).

**Equity:** The concept of human development emphasizes equity in capacity building and the provision of equal opportunities for all. This is not restricted to material income only, but extends to the elimination of all barriers based on gender, race, nationality, class origin or any other factors preventing access to economic, political and cultural opportunities (*UNDP, 1997*).

**Sustainability:** This means providing for the needs of the present generation without mortgaging the capacity of future generations to be free from

#### Box 4

#### Amartya Sen - Development as Freedom

"Expansion of freedom is viewed, in this approach, both as the primary end and as the principal means of development... The intrinsic importance of human freedom, as the pre-eminent objective of development, lies in the instrumental effectiveness of freedom of particular kinds to promote freedoms of other kinds... Development can be seen... as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. Focusing on human freedoms contrasts with narrower views of development... Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over-activity of repressive states."

"But political liberty and civil freedoms are directly important on their own, and do not have to be justified indirectly in terms of their effects on the economy. Even when people without political liberty or civil rights do not lack adequate economic security (and happen to enjoy favorable economic circumstances), they are deprived of important freedoms in leading their lives and denied the opportunity to take part in crucial decisions regarding public affairs."

"The ends and means of development call for placing the perspective of freedom at the center of the stage. The people have to be seen... as being actively involved and be given the opportunity of taking part in shaping their own destiny, and not just as passive recipients of the fruits of cunning development programmes. The state and the society have extensive roles in strengthening and safeguarding human capabilities. This is a supportive role, rather than one of ready-made delivery. The freedom-centered perspective on the ends and the means of development has some claim to our attention."

Source: extracted from *Development as Freedom*, Amartya Sen, Oxford University Press, 1999.

(5) UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, p. 18

poverty and deprivation and to exercise their basic options (UNDP, 1996). It also means achieving a balance between ecosystems and economic and social systems. Therefore, opportunities for human development must be provided for both current and future generations, while the accumulation of burdens to be transferred to future generations must be avoided. Such burdens include: financial debts arising from long-term foreign or local loans; social debts arising from neglect of human capacities; and environmental debts arising from the depletion of non-renewable resources or contamination of the environment. Furthermore, sustainability involves justice in the distribution of opportunities between present and future generations and within each generation. Justice, from this perspective, means equality of opportunities not equality of final results, because the achievement of opportunities is a matter of the choices made by each generation (UNDP, 1996).

**Participation:** It is important that people be afforded consistent opportunities to participate in decision-making, in order to contribute effectively to the economic, social, cultural and political processes that affect their lives. Participation, from the perspective of human development, is a means and an end at the same time. Under democratic systems, society enjoys a high level of participation and individuals are able to form patterns of social and political solidarity that protect them from tyranny and oppression. Also, democracy flourishes in societies that provide extensive economic opportunities and in which education, health care and proper shelter are accessible to all citizens (UNDP, 1993).

**Freedom:** Human development is essentially concerned with freedom and capacity building for human beings. But people are constrained in what they can do with freedom if they are ill, poor, illiterate, victims of discrimination,

threatened with violent conflicts or deprived of political voice. Accordingly, development can be seen as expanding the real freedoms enjoyed by people. These freedoms include freedom from discrimination, freedom from poverty, freedom for self-realization, freedom from fear, freedom from injustice, freedom of expression, participation and political affiliation, and freedom to find work without fear of exploitation (Human Development Report 2000).

### An Evolving Concept

Human development as a concept will continue to evolve. This is not to diminish in any way the importance of current thinking on the subject and its methodology or of its contributions to development today. If changing conditions influence thinking on the subject, they will extend the dynamics of human development. Political and economic issues posed by global realities will play a role in guiding the concept to new outcomes, as they have done in the past. Theorists will seek to address new global, regional and local problems in order to identify the effects on the conditions of human development in all these areas. The future direction of human development will necessarily seek to address problems actually experienced, while trying to maintain the permanent human dimension that has distinguished this approach and earned it popularity and centrality in development thought.

One area of evolution is the need to refocus on issues concerning women, children and youth in countries experiencing violent conflict. Another is a reflection on the glaring disparities and the widening gaps in wealth among the countries of the world. There is also room to reconsider the concept of good governance as a means to alleviate the perceived bias towards market ideology, and the view of the state as an apparatus that is unable to overcome corruption or underdevelopment. We should not forget the importance of

human security in all countries, whether they are witnessing conflict or not, and pay attention to the problems of forced migration and displacement, and “the impact of terrorism and anti-terrorism measures on human development”.<sup>(6)</sup>

An important development would be one that links human development methodology (which is focused on long-term analysis and structural issues) with an analysis of human security (which monitors immediate events and devotes special attention to their specific context). This will provide an integrated framework to identify the key issues on which any human development strategy must be formulated. In the past, the analysis dealt with disputes and/or lack of security as external obstacles or barriers to development. But attention has now shifted to a new understanding that sees conflict and development as interrelated. Conflicts frequently reflect the failure of development to resolve structural problems; solutions to conflict cannot last long unless underlying development issues are dealt with effectively in a sustainable manner. In other words, this understanding underlines the role of development in conflict prevention.

## The Human Security Framework

The traditional concepts of security are not sufficient to respond to the many new threats to human security, which are no longer restricted to conflicts between states. The *Human Development Report 1994* introduced a new concept of human security and has identified for it new dimensions, with a clear set of indicators, and an early warning system to assist in averting crises. Thus, the concept of human security, besides being a useful tool for analysis, description, interpretation and

policy making, has become a concept that accommodates par excellence a linkage between violence or conflict, and human development. It has been a central subject in more than 16 national human development reports, especially those of countries that recently emerged from conflict or that have a situation of insecurity within their borders. Reports such as those from Afghanistan (2004) and Albania (1998), Latvia (2003) and Macedonia (2001) have all contributed valuable additions to the conceptual framework and methodologies of analysis and measurement. These reports and other studies, as well as declarations, and international conventions, have helped to develop and refine the concept of human security and particularly to clarify its connections to issues such as disarmament, peace and development. The concept has helped illustrate the interdependent nature of many threats to human security and has shown how their effects often spread outside the borders of the country initially involved, a fact that underscores the importance of responses at the global level.

It should be pointed out that the Millennium Report of the UN Secretary-General stressed the need to place people more and more at the centre of attention as the means of establishing the security necessary to the creation of conditions that allow them to live without fear or want.<sup>(7)</sup> Based on this report and the Millennium Summit, the Commission on Human Security (CHS) was established in 2001.

The CHS defines human security as the protection of the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and self-realization. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – those freedoms that are the very essence of life. It also means protecting people from situations involving critical and widespread threats. It involves the use of processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political,

(6) Jolly and Basu Ray, UNDP, May 2006. *The Human Security Framework and NHDRs: A Review of Experiences and Current Debates*

(7) Annan, United Nations, New York, 2000, ‘We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century’.

social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihoods and dignity. Human security “complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development” as it aims to protect people from a wide range of threats to individuals and societies.<sup>(8)</sup>

As UNDP points out, in the Commission’s original definition, the “vital core of the individual” is that which affords a minimum level of survival. However, the CHS subsequently extended its definition beyond issues of survival. In its revised definition, mere existence is not a sufficient goal of a truly human-centred view of security. The “vital core” of human security extends beyond just helping people to survive threats. Put simply, the objective of securing vulnerable people’s lives should not merely be to return them to their previous state of existence. Rather, it should encompass the defence of people’s basic human rights and the protection of their livelihoods and natural human dignity from preventable reversals, as well as empowering them to withstand and avoid further threats through individual and collective action. Human security, by this definition, is not merely about survival; it is about re-launching people at risk on a better course, one that has been secured against the preventable recurrence of risk.

There is a close link between human development and human security. While human development enables people to expand their choices, human security allows them to exercise those choices safely and freely, and be reasonably confident that the opportunities available to them today will not be lost tomorrow. Concrete progress in human development leads to the achievement of human security, which in turn protects the gains of human development from sudden, severe or extended downturns. Progress in the one

bolsters progress in the other, and failure in either area increases the risk of failure in the other. The two concepts are also closely linked to human rights, which guarantee the freedoms and rights of development.

As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said, “Not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other... Accordingly, we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed.”<sup>(9)</sup>

### Towards a Definition of Human Security<sup>(10)</sup>

*“Human Security is not a concern with weapons: it is a concern with human life and dignity.”*

(UNDP, 1994)

Just as Amartya Sen introduced ethics into economics, arguing that freedom is at the same time the primary goal of development and the main means to achieve it, Mahbub ul Haq and his team, in the Human Development Report 1994, brought security into the realm of development by focusing the concept on the welfare of the individual. Previously, security had usually meant the security of the state from external aggression and the protection of national interests. Now, it was understood that security at the global, national and societal levels rested on the security of individual human beings. (Tadjbakhsh, 2008)

In the Human Development Report 1994, human security was broadly defined as “freedom from fear and freedom from want” and characterized as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression as well as protection from sudden

(8) Human Security Now, Commission on Human Security, New York, 2003, p 2

(9) Report of the Secretary General to the United Nations General Assembly, 2005, “In Larger Freedom: Towards development, Security and Human Rights for All, paras 16 and 17

(10) The Analysis of HS in this section relies heavily on Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, “Human Security”, HD Insights Issue 17 UNDP HDR Networks February 2008

Table 1

## Human Security and State Security

	State Security (national/international)	Human Security
1) Security for whom?	For sovereign states, for the international system.	For individuals and communities, as well as states.
2) Security from what?	From direct organized violence or threats (military aggression, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, etc.) from other states and from non-state actors.	From <i>direct violence</i> to individuals (death, drugs, dehumanization, discrimination, conflicts, WMD, gender-based violence, natural disasters), as well as <i>indirect and structural violence</i> (deprivation, disease, underdevelopment, population displacement, environmental degradation, poverty, inequality, ethnic/sectarian oppression, etc.)
3) Security by what means?	Through retaliatory force or threat of its use, balance of power, military means.	Not just through police and military means but also through development and human rights and policies that protect, empower and provide personal safety, well-being and individual freedom.

(Tadjbakhsh, 2008)

and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities”. The report outlined the four basic characteristics of human security as being universal, interdependent in its components, people-centred and best ensured through preventive measures.

Since 1994 there has been a healthy debate over the definition of human security, both in academia and in policy circles. Some focus on a narrow definition of “freedom from fear” that concentrates on physical violence and threats, while others endorse freedom from fear, but also include issues of development – “freedom from want” – and of human rights – “freedom to live in dignity”. As noted earlier, the CHS proposed the most expansive definition of human security around protecting the “vital core of all human lives” in its Human Security Now Report of 2003.

Interest in human security has been pursued in at least two different fields. First, when discussed in the context of international or national security, human security covers non-military threats such as environmental degradation, forced displacement, extreme poverty, and HIV-AIDS and other pandemics. The concept also refers to actors other than the state, namely communities and people. In this debate, therefore, human security is contrasted with state-centred

paradigms of security. The differences can be seen in the table below.

Secondly, when discussed in the context of development, human security refers to the assurance that the progress and outcomes of development are risk-free. It seeks to draw attention not just to levels of achievement but also to security of gains made, by focusing on risks of reversal, such as conflicts, wars, economic fluctuations, natural disasters, extreme impoverishment, environmental pollution, ill health and other threats.

It is, therefore, similar to human development, as both an objective (a destination) and a methodology (the means to achieve it). Human development, however, has travelled a different path from that of human security.

One difference is that human security has become more officially accepted as a policy instrument and, in this sense, has become more of a political tool than the human development approach. Some states, such as Canada (which supports international projects in line with human security such as “Freedom from Threats to Human Rights, Security or Life”) and Japan, officially adopted human security as a foreign policy objective, albeit with different definitions. Japan has created the largest trust fund in the

history of the UN to fund human security projects. Regional organizations such as the European Union (EU), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Arab League have also engaged with the concept, each adapting it to their own normative interests. In addition, the term is being used increasingly in official documents of international organizations in the context of peace building, conflict prevention and international interventions undertaken as part of the still-controversial “responsibility to provide protection”.

At the same time, however, unlike human development, no single definition of human security has yet been accepted globally. The United Nations in its 2005 Summit Outcome Document stated that the General Assembly would “soon” debate and define the concept.

### The Contribution of Human Security to the Human Development Framework

If human development is about people and expanding their choices to lead lives they value, human security recognizes the conditions that threaten survival,

the continuation of daily life and the dignity of human beings, such as extreme impoverishment, environmental pollution, and ill health. Thus, human security is a prerequisite for human development as well as the guarantor of its continuation and a means to prioritize its most urgent goals.

### The Sources of Human Insecurity

The Human Development Report 1994 distinguished between two sets of threats.

**First**, it identified more localized threats that are specific to different societies or regions of the world. The report listed seven components or specific values of human security: economic security, where the main threat is poverty; food security, where the threats are hunger and famine; health security, where the threats include injury and disease; environmental security, where the threats are pollution, environmental degradation and resource depletion; personal security, which includes various forms of violence against individuals; community security, where the threat is to cohesion and cultural diversity; and political security, where the

Table 2	Human Development and Human Security Compared	
	Human development	Human Security
Essence of definitions	Widening the range of human choices, whether economic, social, cultural or political (Mahbub Ul Haq). Enlarging people's freedoms as the means and the end of development (Amartya Sen).	Enabling people to exercise choices safely and freely, while also guaranteeing that the opportunities brought today by development will not be lost tomorrow (UNDP 2004). Freedom from fear, freedom from want and a life of dignity.
Values	Well-being.	Security, stability, sustainability of development gains
Orientation	Moves forward, is progressive and aggregate: "Together we rise."	Looks at who was left behind at the individual level: "Divided we fall."
Timescale	Long term.	Combines short-term measures to deal with risks with long-term prevention efforts.
General objectives	Growth with equity. Expanding the choices and opportunities of people to lead lives they value.	Insuring against reversals to security. Identification of risks, prevention to avoid them through dealing with root causes, preparation to mitigate them and cushioning when disaster strikes.
Policy goals	Empowerment, sustainability, equity and productivity.	Protection and promotion of human survival (freedom from fear), daily life (freedom from want) and the avoidance of indignities (human dignity).

(Tadjbakhsh, 2008)

threat arises from political repression.

**Second**, the HDR identified threats that were global in nature because they could rapidly spread beyond national frontiers. These transnational threats included, for example, unchecked population growth, increasing disparities in global income, international migration as a function of population growth, poverty, environmental degradation, drug trafficking and international terrorism.

The CHS, on the other hand, preferred not to make a list of threats, leaving their identification to the specificity of the context. This approach is preferable intellectually, ethically and in terms of policy-making. It cannot be assumed, for example, that the threats to human security are the same for dissatisfied rioters in urban suburbs, for those dying of hunger during famines, for those subject to terrorism and acts of violence during warfare, for those subject to environmental degradation where they live off the land, for those subject to the humiliation of occupation and for those without access to proper shelter.

### The Metrics of Human Security

Unlike the Human Development Index (HDI), which chose the most basic, universal and quantifiable variables in the concept to create a composite index, a universal and satisfactory human security index has proven virtually impossible to build. Indeed, the enterprise is fraught with difficulties, which arise in four inter-related areas:

- The lack of consensus on one definition. Those proponents of a narrow approach would prefer to establish a threshold at critical levels (such as death, extreme violence, life-threatening injury, etc). Proponents of the broad approach want to include indicators of underdevelopment and human rights in the index.

- Even for those who would prefer to limit the definition of human security to the narrow approach, data on death, injury and violence are usually very hard to come by.
- If human security is context specific, it should engage with qualitative indicators that bring out perceptions of insecurity or risk in addition to quantitative ones. Not only would such indicators be extremely difficult to select and tally, but subjective perceptions, real as they may be, are difficult to quantify.
- Absolute thresholds would also not do justice to the idea of human security as a universal concept, applicable both to people in industrialised societies as well as to those living in developing countries. Such thresholds would undoubtedly fail to recognize human insecurities in situations of relative stability and wealth.

These challenges do not mean that measuring human security is a futile exercise. On the contrary, to become a useful concept, especially for policy makers, there must be a way to recognize and measure it. If the construction of a composite human security index may be an idealistic and perhaps even flawed exercise, measuring human security and insecurity through discrete indicators should be attempted, bearing in mind that these need to be context-specific and both qualitative and quantitative.

### The Implications for Policy and Programming

Human security, ultimately, is a redefinition of traditional understandings of security and development to refer to a positive state of being and sense of security in daily life. It requires policies that are:

- **People-centred:** This implies proper consideration of the needs of people



(as beneficiaries) as well as their contributions and aspirations (as agents).

- **Holistic:** The recognition that the means to guarantee security can no longer be through military and policing power, but must also and more importantly be through favourable social, political and economic conditions. This is especially true, for example, in situations of conflict, where military responses often fail to address the genuine grievances that provoked the violence in the first place.
- **Intersectoral:** The recognition of inter-linkages between development, security and human rights requires intersectoral solutions that address together the root causes of problems, including externalities. For post-conflict countries, for example, this requires an integrated peace-building construct linking military, political, economic and social strategies.
- **Context specific:** This demands in-depth knowledge of the situation at hand, a difficult requirement for decision makers, who are usually eager to identify priorities quickly and are thus drawn to more generic approaches. It is however a more sustainable – and ethical – approach to dealing with real problems.
- **Preventive:** Ultimately the most effective, but difficult, policies are those that develop and integrate preventive measures, both to avoid conflicts and to prepare for reversals.

## Measuring Human Security in Iraq

### Why Human Security?

In times of war and conflict, people's preoccupations and priorities shift towards

considering security as the top priority. Similarly, the priorities of governments change their course in the same direction. As the means to achieve security differ, interest in achieving human development is marginalized. Taking this into consideration, this report has endeavoured to address the impact of the lack of human security on human development in Iraq, within the framework of Human Security which relates human development with human conflict. The Human Security framework enables the differentiation between the impact of conflict on human security in the short term and its impact on human development in the long term. Therefore, it provides an analysis of threats to people which result from conflicts and the way investment in human development can influence threats and causes of conflict. Furthermore, the adoption of Human Security extends the issue of people's security beyond the scope of state security and positions it within the central interest of institutions and individuals. The report attempts to stress the close interrelationship between the two.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of separating the impact of transition from the effects of emerging conflict, the report has tried to analyse the two and highlight their consequences on human development. The conceptual framework of Human Development is a convenient methodology, but it is not enough. What is needed is a compound methodology that combines Human Development and Human Security. As just noted, the measurement of human security faces several inherent and extrinsic difficulties. The methodologies of both the Afghanistan NHDR 2004, and the Latvia NHDR 2002, were instructive, but the ongoing conflict in Iraq, and the prevailing sharp limits on data availability, calls for a different methodology. Such considerations have led this report to adopt an analytical framework that integrates human development with human security and human rights, and to base measurement

on discrete subsets of qualitative and quantitative indicators.

## Human Security Indicators

The UNDP-based definition supports the subdivision of indicators into two general classifications: political (freedom from fear), and economic, environmental and social (freedom from want), yet the list of possible indicators and measures under each is still long. Moreover, the application of indicators is highly context-sensitive. Gauging the severity of threats in a specific regional, country or local setting and selecting an appropriate measure, is often more revealing than trying in every case to apply all components of the concept, whose contextual relevance will vary. In addition, the concept implies an equation with two sides of measurement: the extent of threats and the extent of capabilities to withstand those threats. The first in fact measures human insecurity; the second assesses the degree of security in place.

Given different definitions of the concept, and the issues mentioned above, it is not surprising that, at the global level, no satisfactory composite index of human security has been developed. Statisticians underscore the large gaps in existing datasets on human security, especially in the political dimension of the concept. They also point to real problems of subjectivity, comparability and weighting in aggregating the various measures in available datasets. Indeed, the Uppsala Human Security Centre, which publishes an annual human security report, concludes that a composite human security index is neither feasible nor desirable at this time.<sup>(11)</sup> The Centre argues that the simplicity of use offered by composite indexes has real downsides in this field and that presenting the data from different sets separately is more accurate and informative.

This report attempts to gauge levels of human security in Iraq through quantitative and qualitative indicators that relate to fears, threats or actual reversals caused by direct and indirect acts of violence, general political and social instability and economic downturns. The analysis of perceptions recorded through a special Opinion Poll conducted for this report underlines the value of human security as an operational approach to people-centred security. The analysis has also identified priorities and conclusions for policy making.

The Opinion Poll was conducted by the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT). It took a random sample of 3,375 households in the 15 governorates, excluding the Kurdistan region, and investigated the most important insecurities they subjectively felt or objectively experienced. The opinion poll was conducted in the period February 20 to March 6, 2007 and so reflects insecurity and instability in the midst of conflict. The results were ranked and rated to obtain values that cover most of the seven values of security (UNDP, 1994). These were utilized in the construction of three subsets: firstly, factors threatening human security; secondly, factors relating to the impacts of insecurity; and thirdly, factors contributing to the establishment of human security. (For the methodology and calculation, see the technical note in the Annex).

The first set of HS values is made up of threats, risks and fears, subdivided into political and economic factors


The second set includes the loss of people's opportunities to exercise their basic options as human beings and the violation and confiscation of their human rights. It covers the loss of personal, socio-economic and political security.

(11) The first part of this section draws on 'Understanding the Concept of Human Security in the Arab World', a Note from the UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2007.

This report believes that the framework of human development, broadened to include human security and freedom in their most comprehensive senses, is the most appropriate perspective in which to begin addressing these specific challenges. The concept of human security is an important contribution to the goal of ensuring freedom from fear and want, yet recent events have shown that its lack of specificity leaves it open to appropriation for narrow political ends. The basic test of the validity of a human security approach is that:

- It empowers people to make choices;
- It does not rely on military force and is not imposed by one people on another;
- It is not achieved for one party or nation at the expense of the human security of others.

An approach that does not pass these tests is likely to be a travesty of the concept and its principles.<sup>(12)</sup>



(12) Understanding the Concept of Human Security in the Arab World, a Note from the UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States.



# 1



## Part 1

### The State of Human Development in Iraq

#### Chapter 1

##### The Metrics of Human Development in Iraq



Rafea Nasiri

**Homage to Al-Mutanabi**

## Introduction

The indicators set out in this chapter illustrate the state of human development in Iraq. The chapter also introduces the special opinion poll conducted for this report, which gauged people's perceptions of the types and sources of insecurity they face. In addition, it provides indicators of Iraq's progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Up to 2003, data shortages prevented a comprehensive assessment of the country's human development situation, making it impossible to calculate indices comparable to those used in the global and Arab human development reports. Since 2004, new surveys conducted by the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT), including Iraqi Living Conditions Survey (ILCS) and the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), Household Social and

Economic Survey (IHSES 2008), have permitted the better measurement of national HD indicators and their comparison across the country's regions and governorates, the samples covered over 18000 households including Kurdistan region, (Annex, *Technical Note*), lists recent surveys. These initiatives will allow policy-makers to prioritize their development goals on the basis of systematic rather than anecdotal evidence.

## The Human Development Index and its Supplements

Although the concept of human development encompasses far more than a single composite figure signifies, the Human Development Index (HDI), adopted by the United Nations Development Programme in 1990, provides a powerful alternative to the income measures usually presented to illustrate human well-being. The basic purpose of measuring human

### Box 1.1

#### Measuring Human Development Means More than Calculating the HDI

The HDI has not escaped criticism: First, it is restricted to limited components whose integration into a synthetic index raises many questions. Second, these components do not adequately reflect all the dimensions of human development, and therefore require supplemental data and other information on other critical elements of human life. Third, the HDI does not reflect differences and disparities in the conditions of human development within a particular country. Fourth, questions have arisen as to the relative weighting of the components of the index.

For all of these reasons, human development specialists have developed supplementary indices, notably the Human Poverty Index (HPI), the Gender Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure. The same methodologies have also been used to disaggregate the HDI and the GDI at the sub-national levels in order to compare, for example, municipalities, governorates and provinces. For the calculation of the HDI, proxy indicators have also been used to reflect more closely the priorities of particular countries. A number of National Human Development Reports have also proposed alternative composite indicators to measure progress on specific themes, such as for example, a Capability Poverty Measure, Sustainable Human Development Index, Environmental Index, Human Deprivation Measure, Human Freedom Index, Index of Social Responsibility, Quality of Life Index, Social Development Index, Vulnerability Index, People's Participation Index and so forth.

*Among all the countries that enjoy comparable oil and human wealth, Iraq recorded the lowest HDI*

development is to assess progress, identify gains and shortfalls and quantify the extent to which the country has moved towards human development goals. This process can, in part, also answer questions as to how far policies have succeeded or failed in raising living standards so that policy-makers can take specific decisions and adjust their particular approaches accordingly. Applying the HDI can also illuminate those substantive areas that call for particular work.

Measuring development has other purposes, including drawing comparisons between countries and taking advantage of these comparisons to see where and how other countries have moved forward or regressed. The process also provides essential tools for researchers and actors who seek to influence decision-makers through recommendations in particular areas such as health or education. Finally, measuring development with the indicators we now have deepens our understanding of the various human development goals and their multiple interactions.

The HDI has produced a new classification of countries that captures dimensions far beyond the traditional concept of GDP per capita. This, in turn, has transformed thinking about what human progress means, and has evolved into a new ranking of states worldwide that rates the quality of life their citizens enjoy.

The human development index covers three dimensions of human well-being: life expectancy, level of knowledge attainment,

and income. The HDI is based on the following logic: These dimensions of life relate to one or more human capabilities that expand the range of individual choice. Longevity serves as a proxy for the ability to live a long and healthy life, free of disease, while the education indicator reflects the degree to which individuals have acquired the knowledge and skills required to make informed choices in their private lives and participate actively in their own development (UNDP, 1993). The index consists of three components: life expectancy at birth; adult literacy and the rate of enrolment in primary, secondary, and higher levels; and real income measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). Taken together, the HDI's component indicators reveal broadly the extent of the choices available to people.

### **Iraq's Human Development Index: An Analysis of its Components**

The Iraq HDI has been calculated according to the amended measurement adopted by UNDP, since 1990 (see Annex, *Technical Note* for measurement). Table 1 annex shows that life expectancy is estimated at 58.2 years, which reflects a decline from the 1980s level of over 65 years. The school enrolment rate for people 15 years and above, at all stages of education, is 62%, while the literacy rate is 78%, a level as high as in the late 1970s notwithstanding subsequent policies for reducing the rate through compulsory primary education and literacy campaigns. The third component is per capita income, estimated at \$3,757

#### **Box 1.2**

#### **Iraq's HDI among Arab HDI Values, 2007**

Most of the oil-rich Arab countries have markedly raised their levels of human development. With the exception of Algeria and Iraq, all six major oil-rich Arab countries, notably the Gulf States, and Libya, have moved into the category of high human development. The index rose, for example, to 0.891 in Kuwait and 0.875 in Qatar, which are now ranked globally at 33 and 35 respectively. In the Arab States of medium human development, HDI in eight countries – Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria, Palestine, Syria, Egypt and Morocco – rose over 0.640. The low HDI Arab countries are Comoros (0.561), Mauritania (0.550), Sudan (0.526), Djibouti (0.516), and Yemen (0.508) HDR 2007/2008, in addition to Iraq (0.627), UNDP.



(PPP), which is considered low compared to other oil-producing countries.

Based on the values of the three components, Iraq's 2007 HDI value is calculated at 0.623.


### The HDI Disaggregated by Governorates

Among Iraq's governorates, the Kurdistan region ranked the highest, as the HDI values in Table 1 of the Annex indicate; Suleimaniya came first at 0.676, Erbil second at 0.652, and Duhuk fourth at 0.638. The two main governorates Anbar and Basrah -- held the third and fifth ranks, their HDI values being 0.652 and 0.634 respectively. The governorates with the smallest populations -- such as Missan, Al-Muthanna and Al Qadisiya came last. Bagdad ranked tenth with HDI value of 0.625.


The disparities between the governorates can be attributed to the impact of insecure conditions affecting life expectancy at birth, income levels, and education attainment rates (Figure 1.2).

On the education indicator, Anbar, Diala and Baghdad scored highest 0.82, 0.80 and 0.77, respectively, while the lowest score was recorded in Al-Muthanna governorate 0.50 and Missan 0.45. Suleimaniya took first place on income with a value of 0.69, while the governorate of Al-Muthanna came last, at 0.55.

**Figure 1.1** Comparing the Components of HDI - Iraq\* and other Countries



**Figure 1.2** The Human Development Index by Governorates and its compnents




**Governarates with low HDI, and components:**

- Human development index:** Al-Qadisiya, Missan, Al-Muthanna.
- Life expectancy index:** Diala, Baghdad.
- Education index:** Duhuk (Kurdistan region), Al-Qadisiya, Missan, Al-Muthanna.
- Per capita GDP index:** Al-Muthanna.

\* These distributions have been prepared in line with HD indexes and components contained in the statistical file. Figures in the three coloured rectangles indicate the number of governorates at each of the three levels (low, medium, high).  
\* Provinces with a low level of development are those with an index value lower than medium by one normative deviation. Districts with a high development level are those whose index value is more than medium by one normative deviation.

Source: Table 1, Annex

**Figure 1.3** Iraq's Gender Gap, by HDI Component (%)




## The Gender Development Index

Globally, it is noticeable that, when the human development index is supplemented by the Gender Development Index (GDI), overall HDI declines, even in the highest-ranking countries. This means that no country has attained true equality between men and women and boys and girls. With few exceptions, this situation worsens in countries with declining human development levels.

To measure the gap between the situations of males and females in human development, social scientists posit male rates as the equivalent of 100%. In general, females have higher life expectancy rates at birth than men, but enjoy only two thirds of the male adult literacy rate or the male rate of school enrolment in primary, secondary and university education combined. Consequently, women are generally worse off overall.

**Figure 1.4** Index of Gender Equality (ratio of females to males) in primary and secondary schools, 2006




The value of GDI in Iraq reached 0.548, lower than its human development index of 0.627. Figure 1.3 reflects the gender gap. As just noted, while women have higher life expectancy at birth than men, a phenomenon observed worldwide, gender discrimination limits their educational opportunities and, far more markedly, their income.

Discrepancies in gender equality are considered one of the most important indicators of social progress, stasis or regression. Gender inequality prevails in most Arab societies, to varying degrees. It is an observable fact in countries worldwide that, the lower the gap, the higher the level of development. Education is one of the most important areas that show this variance. In Iraq, net enrolment in the education of females compared to that of males drops markedly when going from primary to secondary schooling. The net enrolment of girls in primary education was 80.4% in 2006, representing 88% that of boys. However, in secondary education, the female enrolment rate declined to 34.3%, or 75 % that of males (Table 13, Annex). Only in Sulaimania, GEI for high schools scored 100%, while it was less than 50% in Nineveh and Salah Aldeen. In 2006-2007, net enrolment of females in higher education approached a meagre 10.3%, rate of enrollment of girls to boys in post graduate studies approached 59.3%.

### The GDI Disaggregated by Governorates

As shown in Table 2, Annex, the governorates of Erbil, Suleimaniya, Al-Qadisiya, Al Muthanna and Najaf ranked almost the same in terms of their HDI and GDI, while in Basrah, Al-Anbar, Kerbala, Baghdad and Thi-Qar the GDI fell. Basrah governorate fell by 13 grades to the eighteen position and the Thi-Qar governorate by 3 to fifteenth place. The governorates that improved their rank in

**Figure 1.5** The Gender Development Index and its Component by Governorates



**Table 1.1** The Number of Countries where Women hold more than 27% of Parliamentary Seats (Iraq ratio)

Human development lever	Total number of countries	Number of countries where women's share of parliamentary seats exceeds 27%*	Percentage of countries
High	70	15	21
Mediem	85	4	5
Low	22	4	18
Others**	17	3	18
Countries of the world	194	26	13

\* The percentage is limited to participation in the parliament. It does not include the proportion of seats held by women in the councils of senates or any Council above the Parliament.

\*\* Includes States listed in the Global HDR 2007/2008 but not included in any of the groups of States ranked among the three levels of human development (high, medium, low).

Source: UNDP, Global HDR 2007/2008

GDI are Nineveh, Babil, Salahuddin and Diala.

Table 2, Annex reveals that female life expectancy was better than that of males in all governorates. The largest differences recorded for this indicator were in Baghdad and Diala, where female life expectancy was significantly greater than that of males. The figures for each governorate respectively were 62.6 and

57.2 years compared with male life expectancies of 47 and 49.5 years. The other indicators (adult literacy and gross enrolment in various stages of education, plus earned income) show an absolute bias in favour of males. However, the size of these differences varies among governorates.

## The Gender Empowerment Measure

Almost all over the world, the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), like GDI, has a lower value than the HDI except in Iraq, where it is higher.


Table 1.1 shows that in only 15 of the 70 countries with high human development do women hold at least 27% of parliamentary seats. Of the 85 countries with medium levels, only 4 have women at the same level. Iraq leads all the other Arab states in this regard, followed by Tunisia (19.3%), Sudan (16.4), and Syria (12.0%).

## The Gender Empowerment Measure by Governorates

The GEM ranking of governorates clearly differed from that on the HDI scale. Baghdad, which had ranked 11<sup>th</sup> in HDI, moved to sixth place according to its GEM, a finding expected in view of the political and professional opportunities it offers women. Other governorates also moved up, including in particular Wasit and Al-Muthanna, which advanced to first and second place compared to the 14<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> positions they had occupied on the HDI scale. In still other governorates, political and security conditions contributed to a drop in the level of GEM. The Salahuddin governorate retreated from eighth place in the HDI to 18<sup>th</sup>, the very last, in terms of GEM, while Kirkuk fell from sixth place in HDI to 17<sup>th</sup> in GEM.

In terms of parliament representation, GEM values increased over 0.5 in all

**Figure 1.6** Gender Empowerment Measure and its Component by Governorate



governorates except for Salahuddin, where it decreased by 0.332. The highest achievement in women's parliamentary representation – 0.961 – emerged in Al-Muthanna governorate. However, on income, the empowerment of women is low in all the governorates (Table 3, Annex) although the Kurdistan region does slightly better than the others. The income indicator stood at 0.533, 0.400 and 0.386 in the governorates of Erbil, Suleimaniya and Duhuk respectively, compared with very low levels in Missan, Nineveh, and Al-Muthanna (0.099, 0.108 and 0.226 respectively). The economic participation indicator for women, meanwhile, drops below 0.5 in the governorates of Babil, Thi-Qar, Salahuddin, Wasit, Al-Najaf, Al-Qadisiya and Al-Muthanna. *In short, Iraqi women are better represented in parliament than in the economy.*

### The Human Poverty Index

The Human Poverty Index (HPI) focuses on deprivation rather than achievement within the framework of the three components of HDI: sharp curtailment of life expectancy; a dearth of educational opportunities; and diminished living standards, notably in such areas as the availability of safe drinking water and sufficient nutrition to ensure children's health. The common denominator of these variables is their measurement of negative factors: thus, the higher the HPI rating, the worse the score.

Iraq's HPI was estimated at 18.8% in the light of the subsidiary components depicted in the pie charts of Figure 1.7


In comparing the Iraq HPI with that of other Arab states, ten other countries had a figure higher than Iraq's: Tunisia 45%, Algeria 51%, Syria 31%, Egypt 48%, Morocco 68%, Comoros 61%, Mauritania 87%, Sudan 69%, Djibouti 59% and Yemen 82% (UNDP HDR 2007 /2008)

### The Human Poverty Index Disaggregated by Governorate

The HPI of 3 governorates is lower than the national average of 18.8%. These include Basrah 17.5%, Al-Anbar 16.4% and Kerbala 16.2%. The poorest governorate according to the HPI was Minnan 30.2% and Al-Muthanna at 30.0%. Perhaps the greatest problem of this governorate is severely limited access to drinking water; the deprivation rate was 46.9%. In addition, Al-Muthanna had the second highest adult illiteracy rate, 37%. The Governorates of Duhuk and Salahuddin took positions 16 and 15 respectively in HPI. Duhuk's adult illiteracy rate of 41% and Salahuddin's low life expectancy 36.2 years were the main factors in their fall from higher standards in 1990.

*GEM in Iraq is 0.696 higher than the national HDI by 0.069. One reason is the number of women in the Parliament, where a quota system puts female representation well above that of other Arab and neighbouring countries. In Iraq's parliament, women hold 75 seats, 27% of the total number.*

**Figure 1.7** Components of the Human Poverty Index (%)



Source Table 4 - Annex

A comparison between the HDI level in Kurdistan, a relatively stable region of Iraq, and the overall HDI level for Iraq, demonstrates the importance of security in raising overall levels of human development.

Kurdistan's high HDI standing appears to derive directly from its relatively stable situation. However, deeper analysis reveals other factors:

- The importance of the income component in HDI: high per capita income in Kurdistan Province relative to its counterparts and to Iraq's overall average raises HDI in three governorates: Suleimaniya (0.676), Duhuk (0.638) and Erbil (0.652) compared to Iraq's overall score (0.627).
- The impact of the other index elements seems clear. Average life expectancy is highest in Kurdistan, while acts of violence probably contribute to high general mortality in Baghdad and other governorates. In addition, school enrolment rates (primary, secondary and higher) increased throughout Iraq, raising its overall HDI, in large measure because of government policies for improving education and health conditions.
- GEM also raises the overall rate of in Suleimaniya, Duhuk and Erbil, where values reached 0.672, 0.745 and 0.742 respectively, compared to the general average of 0.696. This reflects local efforts to integrate women into development and, in particular, to promote their participation in politics.
- The HPI reveals the long-term effects of policies affecting the social sector. High illiteracy rates in Kurdistan compared with Iraq overall reveal the cumulative effect of those policies, which may take decades to rectify.
- The same analysis applies: these are wider throughout Iraq than in Kurdistan because of losses in education and infrastructure in particular. That is not to deny evident disparities between the governorates of the province. Erbil has achieved marked improvements in health, education and income compared with Duhuk and Suleimaniya. The high rate of enrolment in education in Suleimaniya, especially among girls, is a trend that now surpasses the achievements of Erbil and Duhuk – and may eventually deepen current disparities, unless planning bodies in the province encourage those lagging to catch up.

The Index	Iraq	Suleimaniya	Erbil	Duhuk
HDI	0.623	0.676	0.652	0.638
GDI	0.584	0.620	0.594	0.675
HPI	18.800	22.9	26.4	28.9
GEM	0.696	0.672	0.742	0.745

Source: Table 1,2 ,3, 4 - Annex

## Beyond HDI: Other Measures of Human Well-Being

As noted earlier, the concept of human development is broader than its measurement through just the HDI. The indicators used in calculating indexes of health, education and income cannot capture the full richness of the concept or the specific challenges to its realization under conditions of conflict. This section thus seeks to expand measurement of well-being through two approaches: the first addresses the dimension of human security, the second tracks Iraq's progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

### Human Security through People's Perceptions


Expanding the measurement of development in present-day Iraq to include human security is a necessity. While this may be obvious in light of the country's current situation, there are technical reasons for this as well.

Its components deal with cumulative, long term measures, which do not capture the impact of short-term changes caused by violence, because it is difficult to isolate the specific effects of conflict on such longer-term variables.

In order to calculate life expectancy accurately under conditions of conflict, specific data is needed on mortality attributable to violence by age and sex, as well as the rate of school enrolment specifically affected by conflict. The importance of such indicators in violent circumstances is apparent yet data of this kind may not be readily available under those very conditions.

As our conceptual framework outlined, human security (HS) is a fundamental element of well-being. In the absence of other data, this section attempts to measure HS in Iraq through people's perceptions of threats, fears and risks.

**Figure 1.8** Human Poverty Index by Governorates



#### Governorates with low HPI and components:

**Human Poverty Index:** Basrah, Al-Anbar and Kerbala

**Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40:** non

**Adult literacy rate:** Kirkuk and Duhok (Kurdistan region)

**People without safe drinking water:** Muthanna, Babil Thi\_Qar

**Proportion of under-weight child:** Kerbala and Suleimaniya (Kurdistan region)

\* These distributions have been prepared under human poverty index and components contained in the statistical file. Figures in the coloured rectangles indicate the number of governorates at each of the three levels (low, medium, high).

\* Provinces with a low level of development are those with an index value more than medium by one normative deviation, and districts with a high development level are those where the index value is lower than medium by one normative deviation.

Source: Table 4, Annex

The report team has constructed three indexes to reflect those perceptions as recorded in the results of a special opinion poll conducted for this report. The three indexes relate to:

- Factors threatening human security
- Impacts of insecurity
- Factors favouring human security

Table 1.2 depicts the three indexes, their components and indicators. (For the method of construction, see notes on

*The HDI alone cannot adequately detect the effects of conflict on human development.*

the opinion poll in the Annex, *Technical Note*). Most of the results of the poll are referred to in the chapters that follow. However, the first and the second index are explained below, while the third index,

factors favouring human security, is set out in chapter 8, which defines a vision for achieving human security in Iraq as seen through the eyes of its people.

## Factors Threatening Human Security

The threats, risks and fear are divided into two factors economic and political. Among respondents in the opinion poll, political security had a slender edge over economic security by 51% - 49%. In unstable and insecure governorates, the relative importance of political threats was considered much higher, as in Kirkuk (72.1%), Al-Anbar (76.3%), Nineveh (77.3%), Salahuddin (81.1%). (Table 5, Annex).

## Impacts of Human Insecurity

In assessing the relative importance people gave to the components of human security, we find that political insecurity (38%) counted for more than either economic and social insecurity or personal security. This concern for political insecurity is almost the same in most governorates, and points to the common factor behind feelings of insecurity, namely violence. Table 6, Annex show that the impact of political insecurity was higher in Salahuddin and Diala than in the other governorates.

Index	Components	Indicators
Factors threatening human security	Political security	Terrorism Rapid democratization does not strengthen security Abolition of conscription Political repression and despotism
	Economic security	Work opportunities are unavailable Work opportunities are unequal Unsafe economic future Deteriorating living conditions
Impacts of insecurity	Loss of personal security	People feel safest at home Household members exposed to kidnapping and terrorism People consider moving abroad People consider moving elsewhere in Iraq
	Loss of socio-economic security	Spread of crime Lack of health care Drop in household income level Social restrictions on women Young people delay marriage Social relations decline Household members drop out of school Households break up
	Loss of political security	Spread of financial and administrative corruption Lack of performance Trust in political parties erodes Trust in state institutions erodes Change in convictions regarding freedom Objections to how democracy is practised
Factors favouring human security	Secure basic rights	Absence of terrorism Forced displacement ended Absence of sectarian violence Freedom of religious worship and practice Absence of gender-related violence and marginalization
	Secure socio-economic rights	Rationing system in place Social services provided Educational opportunities provided Suitable work opportunities provided Suitable household income level assured Suitable housing provided Preventive and curative health services provided Social safety nets available Compulsory education restored Religious institutions strengthened
	Good governance	Existence of strong government Effective judicial institutions Stability of the political system

See table 5, 6, 7 in the Annex

### What Forms of Security are Iraqis Most Concerned About?

Political Security	Economic and Social Security	Personal Security
38%	36%	26%

### What Type of Threats Affect Iraqis Most?

Economic Threats	Political Threats
49%	51%



## Is There a Relationship Between Deprivation and Human Security?

It is important to clarify that the relationship between the deprivation index (according to a 2006 COSIT study on deprivation) and the human security indices seems to be nonspecific.

A high deprivation index in terms of unsatisfied basic needs, poverty and deprivation is not necessarily linked to factors assumed to threaten human security, i.e. an environment that generates violence or armed conflicts. The governorates of Baghdad, Al-Anbar, and Nineveh represent reverse situations in this regard where, as the deprivation index declines, the index of human security threats rises. As Map 'A' of Maps 1.1 shows, this suggests that deprivation may not be the only, or most useful, indicator of threats to human security in formulating an early warning system for conflicts.


The same conclusion may be drawn from Map 'B'.

In all governorates, the index of factors favouring human security takes an upward trend regardless of whether the deprivation index is high or low. This suggests that peoples' living conditions do not greatly influence their attitudes towards the factors that would increase their security during times of conflict (Map 'C'). These results indicate that, in times of war and civil disturbance, people may fear political threats and value political security even more than losses and gains in their economic and social status.

### The MDGs as Milestones

The United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted by the Member States in 2000, is one of the most important decisions taken by the General Assembly. It organizes a number of commitments aimed at bettering living conditions worldwide. Its objectives commit Member

**Map 1.1** Deprivation Index and HS Indices by Governorate (%)



*Deterioration should come as no surprise, given the devastation caused by three wars in Iraq in just 25 years.*

*All these regressions have undermined progress towards the achievements desired for the year 2015 and will continue to do so unless extensive efforts are made to reverse these trends.*

States to development, security, peace, gender equality and the elimination of the multiple dimensions of poverty in pursuit of sustainable development.

To monitor progress towards these goals and targets, the agencies of the United Nations system, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, together with the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC) agreed on what have become known as the “Millennium Development Goals” or MDGs -- 8 general goals with a total of 18 time-bound targets and 48 indicators for the progress to be achieved by the year 2015 at the global level.

The MDGs are multifaceted tools that contribute to monitoring economic and social changes within a country. By following these indicators, the development plans are prepared in accordance with national needs and priorities. The indicators give citizens a concrete picture of the realities in which they live so that they can voice their own demands for development. Worldwide, indicators that can be compared internationally can guide decisions in such varied areas as environmental regulation, trade and dealing with external debt. Monitoring progress under these goals allows donor countries and organizations to take decisions on development assistance, emergency assistance and direct financial aid in line with the performance of developing countries.

The analysis of progress to date in Iraq draws on the latest statistics and surveys available and is followed by an attempt to diagnose what needs to be done in the short term.

### **Iraq's Progress towards the MDGs**

Taking into account available data on

MDG indicators, Table 1.3 summarizes the values of these indicators for the base year 1990, or the earliest date possible, and compares them to the values of the latest indicators monitored in order to ascertain achievements under each. The final part of the table sets the target indicators for 2015. When the goal of monitoring an indicator is a very high percentage, the target indicator value is set at 100%, and when the goal is low, the value of the target indicator is 0%. Earlier field surveys carried out in Iraq, even some undertaken years ago, provided a significant database for monitoring.

The 1970s had witnessed many achievements in health, education and general living standards. Rates of infant and under-5 mortality and morbidity declined markedly, along with the incidence of many common deadly diseases. In education, compulsory schooling had been implemented at the primary level, together with strong enforcement measures, and a programme to combat adult illiteracy had also been launched. During the 1980s, the unemployment rate had fallen to less than 4%. For more than a decade, hundreds of thousands of expatriates had been recruited to compensate for shortages in the labour force, especially during the eight-year war with Iran.

Setbacks in all these areas and others have inevitably produced declines in the MDG indicators.

The following assessments illustrate these trends:

- Indicators of poverty, still high, have declined only slightly over two decades
- No change has taken place in nutritional status.
- The provision of some educational and health services has fallen;
- Unemployment rates have risen significantly.

By contrast, some indicators have risen considerably during the 15 years between 1990 and the current level, among these:

**Table 1.3** Iraq's Performance on MDG Indicators

Indicators	Base Number	Base Year	Current Number	Available Year	National Target for 2015 <sup>a</sup>	Global Target for 2015
Proportion of population below one \$(PPP) per day %	27.5	1990	3.1	2007	13.8	11.6
Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty) (%)	88. / urban				43.9 / urban	
	86.0 / rural	1993			43.0 / rural	
Proportion of underweight children under - five years of age (%)	9.0	1991	7.6	2006	4.5	6.0
Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)	20.0	1991	22.0	2007	10.0	
Proportion of food insecure population			3.1	2007	5.5	
Net enrolment ratio in primary education (%)	90.8	1990	89.3	2007	100.0	100.0
Proportion of pupils starting grade 1, who reach grade 5 (%)	75.6	1990	80.2	2007	100.0	100.0
Literacy rate of (15-24) year olds (%)	78.6	1990	83.9	2007	100.0	100.0
Ratio of girls to boys in primary education (%)	79.5	1990	88.0	2007	100.0	100.0
Ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education (%)	64.1	1990	75.0	2007	100.0	100.0
Ratio of girls to boys in university education (%)	50.9	1990	75.4	2007	100.0	100.0
Ratio of girls to boys in higher education (%)	25.3	1990	62.0	2007	100.0	100.0
Ratio of literate females to males among 15-24 year-olds (%)	75.6	1990	91.4	2007	100.0	100.0
Share of women in wage employment in non-agricultural activities (%)	10.6	1990	9.3	2008	50.0	50.0
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)	13.2	1990	27.3	2006	50.0	50.0
Under-five mortality rate	62.0	1990	41.0	2006	21.0	16.7
Infant mortality rate	50.0	1990	35.0	2006	17.0	13.3
Proportion of 1 year-old children immunized against measles (%)	80.0	1990	75.0	2005	100.0	100.0
Maternal mortality ratio	117.0	1990	84.0	2006	29.0	29.0
Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (%)	50.0	1990	89.0	2006	100.0	100.0
Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate (%)	0.7	2000	1.1	2006	58.0	29.3

**Table 1.3  
Cont.****Iraq's Performance on MDG Indicators**

Indicators	Base Number	Base Year	Current Number	Available Year	National Target for 2015 <sup>a</sup>	Global Target for 2015
Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures			18.3 / treatment		100 / Effective	100.0
			7.4 / sleeping under net	2000	100 / sleeping under net	
Prevalence associated with malaria per (100,000)	26.8	1995	0.1	2006	0.0	0.0
Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis (100,000)	2.0	2000	12.4	2006	0.0	0.0
Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment (DOTS) (%)	86.0	2000	86.0	2006	100.0	100.0
Proportion of land area covered by forest (%)	4.0	1990	4.0	2003	10.0	10.0
Carbon dioxide emissions per capita) and consumption of ozone - depleting CFCs (odp tons )			3.08 / Ton		1.5 / Ton	1.5
			111.8 / m3	2000	55.9 / m3	
Proportion of population using solid fuels (%)	35.0	2003b	4.6	2006	0.0	0.0
Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural (%)	81.3 / total		81		90.6 / total	100.0
	96.3 / urban		96.0 / urban		98.2 / urban	
	47.1 / rural	1990	45.9 / rural	2007	73.6 / rural	
Proportion of urban & rural population with access to improved sanitation (%)	71.5 / total		83.7 / total		96.3 / total	100.0
	95.0 / urban		89.6 / urban		100.0 / urban	100.0
	48.0 / rural	1990	70.3 / rural	2007	88.9 / rural	100.0
Proportion of households with access to secure tenure, owned or rented (%)	60.8 / owned		78.6 / owned		80.4 / owned	
	23.7 / rented	1990	11.5 / rented	2007	11.6 / rented	
Net ODA (million dollars)	2265	1990	4658	2004	0.0	0.0
Unemployment rate of 15-24 year-olds by gender and total (%)	7.1 / total		30.0 / total		3.6 / total	21.9
	7.2 / male		30.1 / male		3.6 / male	23.0
	6.3 / female	1990	29.7 / female	2008	3.2 / female	18.6

- Enrolment in education has increased slightly.
- The gap between male and female achievements in education has narrowed.
- Child and maternal mortality rates have gone down.
- More individuals and families have acquired telephones, radios, television sets, PCs, Internet connections and other tools of modern communication.
- Encouraging local communities to use the HDI and related findings in lobbying the central government to support participatory and decentralized development.
- Using the HDI and related indexes to hold government officials and governorate representatives accountable for their performance in power.

These changes in MDG indicators (course, policy option, etc.) will be explored more fully in subsequent chapters.

## Conclusions

This chapter reflects efforts to achieve one of the report's fundamental goals, namely the compilation and analysis of dependable statistical data and indicators on human development in contemporary Iraq. It is hoped that the results will find their way into the international reports, thus filling major gaps on Iraq which continue to the present day.

The chapter concludes that:

- The HDI calculated at the national level conceals disparities at the regional and governorate levels. The causes of these gaps vary. They include an accumulating backlog of deprivation and the misallocation of resources. The identification of these disparities and their causes may help guide policies and plans to rectify problems at the regional and local levels by:
  - Targeting international grants.
  - Restructuring public budgets and increasing the share in public funding of low-ranked governorates and districts.
  - Encouraging local development through partnership with local councils.
- No approach or policy that targets human development will achieve results if it ignores or neglects the rural people who constitute one third of the population. This requires attention to calculating life expectancy at birth, educational attainment and income levels for people in rural areas. That, in turn, entails prioritizing the collection of such data in household surveys which have not so far included these geographic areas. Although agriculture does not add significantly to Iraq's overall economic growth, which continues to depend on oil exports, raising HDI levels in rural areas will contribute to local economic productivity and lift the living standards and quality of life of Iraq's rural citizens.
- In respect of the MDGs, some indicators, such as mortality rates and education enrolment rates, show a degree of progress, but not sufficiently so to realize targets. On several other indicators, notably poverty, income equality, health and nutrition, progress is slow. Achieving all the goals by 2015 remains highly problematic, and the obstacles involved must be examined and addressed.
- In terms of human security, the opinion poll found that, while people generally viewed political insecurity and economic and social insecurity as almost equal threats, they were inclined to give more importance to political stability under current conditions in Iraq. This finding is hardly surprising in light of the turbulent situation of

many Iraqis today and does not at all imply that social and economic security can be relegated. Rather, at a time when political security constitutes the highest priority of the government and the international community, the policy implication is that social and economic security should receive equal attention in order to guarantee Iraqis an effective resumption of normal life under more stable political circumstances. To neglect the social and economic dimensions of their condition is to risk perpetuating other sources of instability that could gravely undermine political solutions in the future.

- Lastly, in reference to the poll, it may be asked: can we hope to tell a good story based on “soft” data? Undoubtedly, hard facts would be preferable. Yet in their absence under present conditions, we believe nonetheless that well-organized opinion polls can tell an important story. After all, the views of the Iraqi people on what makes them feel safe will decisively influence whether any future policies for making Iraq secure reach their target or not. Such views have long been imputed to the people or crafted for them; less frequently have they been ascertained through direct, open and independent consultation.



## Chapter 2

Are Iraqis Free from Want?



Nizar Selim

**Fish Market**



## Introduction

This chapter attempts to answer the question in its title by examining living standards, poverty, income inequality and unemployment. After illustrating these economic aspects of how people are currently placed, the chapter turns to other measures of the quality of life in the country. These range from life expectancy, child mortality rates and women's health through literacy and educational enrolment to access to water, sanitation and adequate housing. The chapter concludes with a look at key demographic trends that affect the ratio between the working population and its dependants and the balance between Iraq's human and natural resources. Together, these factors bear directly on the country's prospects for sustaining a decent level of development.


## Income and Living Standards in Iraq Today

Iraq's per capita GDP, at current prices, has improved since 2003. However, the rate of inflation is high and food and fuel subsidies have declined. Thus, actual living standards in 2007 are below those of 1980.

Rising oil revenues during the late 1970s lifted average annual per capita GDP to \$3,812 by 1980. But with the onset of the Iraq-Iran war that same year, this achievement could not be kept up. In 1990, economic sanctions, and the war on Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait, caused living standards to plunge. Per capita GDP collapsed, hitting an all-time low of \$180 in 1994. By 2002, this average had risen to \$770 before falling once more, to \$580, when war broke out again in 2003. Nonetheless, as Figure 2.1 shows, a degree

*Oil revenues generate more than 70% of Iraq's GDP and finance 92% of the country's annual budget. Yet oil prices are volatile, and no economy that leans almost entirely on this sector can be sustainable.*

**Figure 2.1** Into the Morass - Trends in Per Capita GDP, 1980-2007 (US\$)



Source: Table 20, Annex

\* Sharp Decline in 1988 is due to changes in exchange rate of ID

of recovery began and per capita GDP reached \$2,848 in 2007.

When income capacity bottomed, most household income went to cover basic needs, notably food. For several decades previously, families had spent about 50% of their available income on food and other essential commodities, leaving a fair proportion for other purchases, even small luxuries. However, economic sanctions cut living standards steeply; families felt lucky if they spent no more than 62% of their income on food. After supplies of oil derivatives began to shrink, and following negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and Paris Club in Dec. 2004, the State decided to adjust oil prices, with enormous effects on family spending patterns. Household spending on rent, fuel and energy increased from less than 20% to 29% in 2007; expenditure on transport and communication tripled to 12%, (IHSES 2008) as Figure 2.2 indicates.

## Poor in a Rich Country


### *Security for All?*

*The state guarantees to the individual and the family - especially children and women- social and health security and the basic requirements for leading a free and dignified life. The state also ensures for the above a suitable income and appropriate housing.*

*Iraqi Constitution (2005), Article 30*

As noted above, the years of economic sanctions saw GDP per capita plunge. Low and middle-income individuals and households were hardest hit. According to 1995 estimates by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the living standards of two thirds of Iraqis had fallen drastically; household income had become approximately one third of the 1988 average.<sup>(1)</sup>

**Figure 2.2** Percentage of Households Income Spent on Primary Goods and Services (1979-2005)



(1) Ali Hannoush, Iraq: Today's problems and tomorrow's options (An analytical study on levels of pollution affecting the environment and society) Dar Al Konouz Al-Adabiya, Beirut 2000, P. 157.

## Box 2.1

## Iraq in the International Comparison Programme (ICP)


The International Comparison Programme is a global statistical initiative begun in the early 1970s. It aims to facilitate cross-country comparisons of economic aggregates by producing internationally comparable price levels, expenditure values and purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates. Through purchasing power parity exchange rates, (the number of units of a country's money required to buy the same quantity of goods and services as \$1 buys in the United States), countries can be compared in real terms, free of price and exchange rate distortions. This is particularly important when studying differences in income, poverty, inequality and expenditure patterns among countries.

Since 2005, Iraq has participated in the ICP despite the country's extraordinary circumstances. Several other Arab states preceded Iraq in preparing for the programme, and have made great strides that include the selection of a commodity basket for some important aggregates, notably for a group of food and beverage items and for clothing. National statistical personnel in these countries have been familiarized with the ICP tool pack for treating price data. Yet in just three years, Iraq has been able to place itself at the forefront of those Arab countries with compiled and computerized data on the prices of consumption and non-consumption commodities. It now sends this data to the ICP Regional Office at regular intervals.

Iraq's PPP estimates are benchmarked against the household consumption groups of the ESCWA states. Real household spending is converted into a special regional currency, which allows a true comparison of average per capita household consumption in different countries. In 2005, among Arab states in the ICP, Kuwait had the highest per capita household consumer spending in the regional currency. At the other

end, Yemen, Iraq and Syria had the lowest per capita expenditure on household goods, reflecting falling living standards in these countries.

#### Consumer Price Index, Real Capita Household Consumption for The Year 2005



### Measures of Poverty

Although it is difficult to measure the true extent of poverty in Iraq, available indicators suggest that it is widespread in rural areas and that the current fragility of the country's social structures threatens to push more and more households into the ranks of the poor.

<sup>(2)</sup> The newly published results of Household Social and Economic survey 2008 (IHSES, COSII) shows that poverty is 23%.

Despite Iraq's oil riches, average income is considered low in comparison with neighbouring countries. Unequal income distribution, as highlighted by the Gini coefficient, is manifest in the vast differences between the richest and poorest groups. The poorest 20% receive less than 7% of total Iraqi income, while the richest 20% receive 44% -- more than six times the former figure. Using the dollar or two dollar-per-day measure would mask the actual poverty level.<sup>(3)</sup>

(2) Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, "Food Security Assessment Survey", 2005

(3) Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, "Rapid Assessment Household Budget Survey, 2005"

## Marked Disparities between Regions and Among Households

High levels of income inequality slow the pace at which growth can help to alleviate poverty. Income inequality limits other opportunities for living a decent life. The mere birth of an individual to a poor family reduces his range of choices and in some cases, threatens her or his survival.<sup>(4)</sup>

Rates of deprivation show that poverty afflicts some 31% of families and 34% of individuals. However, these figures conceal a marked disparity between rural and urban areas. Rural deprivation is roughly three times greater than its urban counterpart: 65% as compared with 21%. Nonetheless, at the level of the 18 governorates, poverty trends vary significantly, driven during the 1980s and 1990s by the impacts of the Iraq-Iran war and thereafter of the long sanctions era. The southern governorates - Al-Muthanna, Babylon, Al-Qadisiya, Thi-Qar, Diala, Kerbala, Wasit, Al-Najaf and Missan – remain worst off.<sup>(5)</sup>

## Does inequality exacerbate poverty?

Where the disparity in the income distribution signals a poverty-generating environment, Gini coefficient (The Gini coefficient is a number between 0 (absolute equality) and 1 (extreme level of inequality) is a measure for income inequality) is adopted to detect it. Total Gini coefficient value reached 42% of households in the rural and urban areas out of which 43% in the urban and 39% in rural areas 36.3% in 1988. Such values reflect that disparity in incomes is considered relatively low namely in the rural areas where households in the first three groups receive an average monthly income below 120 thousand Dinars constituting 9% of the total number of households and receive 1.7% of total household incomes, whereas the households in the three groups whose average monthly income ranges between 1.1-1.8 million Dinars and above constitute a percentage of 3.7% of the total number of households and receive 15.9% of the total households income.

The results of the “Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES) 2008” revealed an improvement in income distribution as expressed by Gini coefficient. 28.0% for urban and 25% for rurals.

## Unemployment and Poverty: A Recipe for Disaster

Unemployment is undoubtedly one of the most serious problems facing Iraq – not only because of its high rate and the large human waste this represents in social and economic terms, especially among young people. High unemployment also means lack of livelihoods, which results in greater insecurity and lower living standards – which in turn plunge ever-larger numbers of people into poverty.

**Figure 2.3** Rates of Unemployment in Iraq and Selected Arab States



Source: Iraq Indicators for the year 2006 (Table 25, Annex), other countries indicators, ILO and estimates of World Bank Experts for the year 2004

(4) UNDP, Global HDR, 2005, P. 6.

(5) Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, Study of Deprivation and Living Standards in Iraq for the year 2006.

Several factors contribute to Iraq's high unemployment rate. They include: population growth, a mismatch between labour market requirements and the skills of job seekers graduating from educational institutions, state decisions not to appoint graduates to public service and a lack of jobs in the sluggish private sector. A recent study indicates that moves towards privatization may increase negative trends in the labour market in the short term<sup>(6)</sup>. A 2008 unemployment survey in Iraq showed that the unemployment rate for the age group 15-24 is around 30.0%, of which the male rate is about 30.1% and the female rate 29.7<sup>(7)</sup>, total unemployment rate was 18% (table 25 - Annex).

The poverty issue is closely and clearly linked to rising unemployment. This relationship poses a significant challenge for human development in Iraq because the country's economic growth to date has derived largely from oil exploitation, which employs only those trained for work in this sector. This leaves many without employment, especially among the growing numbers of young people. In the wake of the war's devastation, work opportunities – especially for young people with low skills – will have to be created largely by the public sector, a solution that however is likely to lower productivity unless such employment is coupled with accelerated skills development and in-service training.

### Unemployment and Oil Revenues

As indicated above, there is a close connection between oil revenues and unemployment. The oil sector depends on capital intensive, labour-saving patterns of production. *Consequently, the sector that generates over 60% of Iraq's GDP employs less than 1% of the country's available workforce.*

The rehabilitation of the oil sector and a boost in production and exports from two million barrels a day to six million in the mid-term may provide additional resources for the central budget. However, this will aggravate unemployment unless these additional resources are translated into productive jobs rather than sheer bureaucratic expansion. Moreover, even in the short term, oil revenues are subject to sharp fluctuations due to price variations. This, in turn, influences the State's revenues and its capacity to sustain the population. Oil is a non-renewable resource, however large the income it generates may be. Such time-bound revenues spread the illusion among Iraqis and others alike that the country is a wealthy oil-producer able for all time to provide its citizens with prosperity, government employment and semi-free public services. Nothing could be more misleading in the light of the real impacts of oil on unemployment and the large task of economic diversification on which Iraq's lasting prosperity must be based.

### No Cushion for the Poor

Iraq's current economic policies appear to acknowledge the steep rise of poverty, but make little or no provision for pro-poor growth. The ongoing restructuring of the economy targets cuts in public spending. It aims to fix budget deficits through trade liberalization and foreign investment and through smaller but publicly sensitive measures such as restricting or cancelling the ration card system. Such measures would negatively affect the poor in three major ways:

- Higher prices on commodities and services essential to family welfare.
- Impacts on the labour market.
- Impacts on distributional equity.

Economic policy priorities should instead be directed towards the protection of the

*Iraq's dilemma is similar to that of several other developing countries around the world that suffer from a "resource curse" – large endowments of strategic, non-renewable mineral wealth whose specialized extraction dominates the labour market.*

(6) Yahia Mahmoud Hasan, Iraq's Future Labour Market in the Light of Privatization, Economic Science Magazine (Faculty of Administration and Economy/ Basrah Univ.), volume (4) number (15) May 2005, P. 50-72.

(7) Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (IT), Indicators Report of Millennium Development Objectives, 2005 p.14, and 135, Schedule (8-29).

*privatization will tend to increase unemployment, at least initially; the public sector cannot impose what it considers its labour needs on the private sector, especially in a country whose public sector workforce is considered one of the world's most bloated. Lastly, cost-paring measures that affect the ration card system will further skew whatever distributional equity that now exists.*

poor by providing stronger and better targeted social safety nets. Such measures might cushion the negative effects of the package agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the framework of the Iraqi debt reduction agreement concluded with the Paris Club. The latter package included freezing wages, cancelling food and transport subsidies and reducing public spending on education, health, drainage, water and electricity.

Despite promising some commendable effects on macro-economic equilibrium and on resource appropriations, ending price controls will raise the costs of the very commodities consumed by the poor. It will also increase production costs and service charges in such areas as food and transport. As has happened in many other countries, developing and developed alike.

### The Social Protection System

Social protection measures sponsored by the Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs consist of:

- Employment services (vocational training, co-operative mediation, professional consulting, and on-the-job training) for those seeking work.
- Conditional cash subsidies based on tests. The amount of subsidy is determined by the number of family members.
- Small grants.


The cash subsidies scheme has concentrated on four main groups: a) the elderly, b) the disabled or handicapped, c) the unemployed and d) people with low or no income. The total number of families that received subsidies up to July 2006 was 610,520.


Figure 2.4 indicates that the Baghdad Governorate has received the greater share of allotments - 15.3%. Basrah and Nineveh came in second and third place with 11.5% and 11.4% respectively. The figure indicates that, overall, the disabled constitute the largest recipients of subsidies (28.1%), followed by the elderly (26.0%) and low-income groups (23.7%) respectively and, lastly, by the unemployed (22.2%). However, these proportions vary from one governorate to the next. In Baghdad, for example, the elderly loomed largest among recipients.

#### Box 2.2

#### The Opinion Poll on Human Security - What Factors Iraqis Think Most Reflect their Economic and Social Insecurity

Respondents believed that the spread of crime, low family income, the loss of health care, high school drop-out rates, and the weakening of social relations and family cohesion, are all direct and indirect threats that extend well into the future. Their immediate manifestations represent only a fraction of the long-term consequences that people interviewed expect will befall them.



**Figure 2.4** Number of Families Benefiting from Cash Subsidies, by Governorate and Type of Family, 2006

Source: Social Care Department, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

## Monitoring the MDGs

The percentage of people living on one dollar a day decreased from 27% in 1993 to 3.1% in 2007. The level of deprivation among the people was 34%, with increasing discrepancies between governorates and varies with variation of unemployment rate (table 25 - Annex). Overall levels of poverty will remain high unless economic and social policies become actively pro-poor and reflect appropriate measures.

## Do Iraqis Live Long and Healthy Lives?

### Health Protection

*“Every citizen has the right to health care. The state takes care of public health and provide the means of prevention and treatment by building different types of hospital and medical institutions.”*  
Iraqi Constitution (2005), Article 31.

### Box 2.3

### The Opinion Poll on Human Security – The Effectiveness of Social Protection

#### Do Current Social Safety Nets Protect Personal Security?

Of the respondents surveyed, 78.9% believe that the current social protection system helps protect personal security compared to 12.2% who did not think so. Views differed considerably among governorates. While Al-Najaf heads the list of those who support the current system (98.4% of respondents), the lowest proportion of supporters (3.6%) is in Al-Qadisiya Governorate, notwithstanding the fact that both governorates enjoy similarly secure conditions, which can be explained by the difference in administration efficiency of the SSN system in the two governorates.

#### Do Current Social Safety Nets Help Families of the Unemployed?

Of those surveyed, 84.4% believe that the social protection system has eased the plight of families suffering from unemployment. Those disagreeing account for 8.8%. Babylon leads governorates supporting this view by 100%, along with the majority of provinces. However, those surveyed in Kirkuk expressed far less satisfaction (69.2%), followed by Salahuddin (48.8%). In the three governorates of the southern region, the approval rate was 75%. This is due perhaps to the relatively low effectiveness of the system in these areas.

**Figure 2.5** Tracking Progress Toward The Millennium Development Goals



### Life Expectancy

The decline of health conditions in Iraq since the early 1990s has lowered average life expectancy at birth -- from 65 years in 1987 to 58.2 years in 2006, in comparison with life expectancy in Arab states. (UNDP 2007/2008). The figure drops below that in only three cases: Sudan (57.4 years), Djibouti (53.9 years) and Somalia (47.1 years). In those Arab countries where life expectancy exceeds 58.2 years, it ranges from 78.3 years in the United Arab Emirates to 61.5 years in Yemen. In addition to the high averages of Iraq's geographic neighbours in the Arab world -- Kuwait, 77.3 years; Saudi Arabia, 72.2 years, Jordan 71.9 years and Syria, 73.6 years --, average life expectancy at birth in its non-Arab neighbours - Turkey and Iran -- is 71.4 years and 70.2 years respectively. In short, the difference in the average between Iraq and neighbouring states is over 10 years, a significant gap. (UNDP, NHDR, 2007/2008).

With this fall in life expectancy, (See Table 2, Annex) chances of not surviving to the age of 40 place Iraq among the three least healthy Arab countries. Indeed, Iraq's rate of 19.4% falls lower than that of Sudan (26.1%) and Djibouti (28.6%).

### Child Mortality

Several health indicators improved during the 1970s and 1980s, when the percentage of infant deaths declined from 80 per 1000 live births to 40 by the late '80s. The percentage of deaths of children under five years of age also declined from 120 to 60 per 1000 live births for the same period. But these indicators worsened significantly in the 1990s after the imposition of economic sanctions in 1991. Additionally, the country's health system suffered from an erosion of human and material resources that particularly affected child and maternal health.

The results of the Multi-Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS3) for 2006 showed that the spacing of successive births has a direct

#### Box 2.4

#### Child Mortality Rate 1984-2006 (per 1000)

The deterioration of the health situation, scarcity of medicines, vaccinations, and food insecurity, during the years of economic sanctions 1990-2003, had affected child's mortality rates badly:

	Infant Mortality Rate	Under 5 Mortality Rate
1984-1989	30	50
1990-1994	50	62
1999	101	122
2004	32	40
2006	35	41

Source: 1984-1999 statistics of Ministry of Health, 2004 and 2006, COSIT

impact on infant and child mortality levels. The rate is highest (58 per thousand live births) when the period between two births is lower than two years. The rate decreases to 30 when that period reaches two years and drops to 22 when that is prolonged to three years. The lowest rate

*Life expectancy at birth for men decreased strikingly because of widespread and continued killings and other violence: in 2006, the figure was 55 years for men, against 61.6 years for women*



of mortality occur among births spaces three years apart. The death rate rises as the inter-birth gap decreases, as Figure 2.6 demonstrates. The age of the mother also impacts child mortality. It becomes more frequent at an advanced maternal age (40-49 years), where the rate rises to 64 deaths per thousand live births and declines to its lowest when the mother is between the ages of 20 and 29 years.

**Table 2.1** Vital Health Indicators in Iraq, 2006


Indicators	Reference Period	Features	Value of Indicator	Source
Life expectancy at birth (year)	2006	Male and Female	58.20	Table 1 - Annex
		Males	55.00	Table 2- Annex
		Females	61.60	Table 3- Annex
The infant mortality rate (per thousand live births)	2001-2005	Male and Female	35.00	Results of a multi-indicator cluster survey MICS3, 2006
		Males	37.00	
		Females	32.00	
The rate of under - five mortality (per thousand live births)	2001-2005	Male and Female	41.00	Results of a multi-indicator cluster survey MICS3, 2006
		Males	44.00	
		Females	37.00	
Adult mortality rate (per thousand in inhabitants)	2002-2006	Male and Female	1.83	Household Health Survey in Iraq, 2007/2006.
		Males	2.70	
		Females	0.96	
Crude death rate (per thousand inhabitants)	2002-2006	All causes	4.98	Household Health Survey in Iraq, 2007/2006.
		Causes other than violence	4.36	
		Caused by violence	0.62	
Maternal mortality rate (per hundred thousand live births)	1992-2005		84.00	Household Health Survey in Iraq, 2007/2006.
Total fertility rate (birth / woman)	2006	Rural and urban	4.30	Results of a multi-indicator cluster survey MICS3, 2006
		Urban	4.00	
		Rural	5.10	
Crude birth rate (per thousand inhabitants)	2006	Iraq	31.00	Results of a multi-indicator cluster survey MICS3, 2006

## The Child's Right to Health

*“The child has a right to the highest standard of health and medical care attainable. States shall place special emphasis on the provision of primary and preventive health care, public health education and the reduction of infant mortality. They shall encourage international cooperation in this regard and strive to see that no child is deprived of access to effective health services.”*

*The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 24*

**Figure 2.6** Mortality Rates of Children Under Five, 2006



The 2006 MICS3 results showed a decrease in the mortality rate of children under five to 41 deaths per thousand live births -- lower than comparable average mortality rates in the developing countries (83), other Arab countries (58), countries of moderate development (59), and the world average (76). In addition, the Iraqi infant mortality rate decreased to 35 deaths per thousand live births. This means that one child in 25 dies before reaching the age of five and that infant mortality constitutes 85% of deaths among children under five. Among Iraq's Arab neighbours, this number is significantly lower: 11 in Kuwait, 15 in Syria, and 26 each in Saudi Arabia and Jordan (Global Human Development Report 2007/2008).

### The Health Risks of Children and Women

Indeed, health care for children and women has suffered generally from deteriorating security conditions and the current conflicts in Iraq since 2003.

For almost two decades, the children of Iraq have been prone to under-nourishment. The results of the 2006 MICS3 and the 2005 survey of nutritional status, pictured in Figure 2.7, showed that rates of stunting among children under the age of five fell slightly -- to 21.4% in 2006 (Table 5, Annex) from 22.1% in 2000. This still means that more than one in every five Iraqi children is under-nourished. The trend is more pronounced in rural areas than in urban centres -- 26.3 and 24.4 in 2000 and 2006 respectively in the rural areas compared to 19.8 and 19.4 in towns and cities. These rates of stunting exceed those of Iran (15% in 1998), Syria (18%), and Jordan (9% in 2002). Yemen recorded the highest ratio in the region, 53%.

According to the latest survey on Food Security and Vulnerable groups 2007, stunting among boys was 22.9% and girls 22.8%, underweight 9.6% and 8.6, Emaciation 5.1% and 4.4% respectively.

Under-nutrition and stunting among children have negative effects on their

mental and intellectual capabilities, posing substantial difficulties for human development in Iraq for decades to come. Iraq will not be able to forestall these effects unless it undertakes a thoroughgoing review of the causes of malnutrition among children and develops plans to address this challenge.

One fifth of households are disadvantaged in terms of basic health. Statistics also show that the most disadvantaged areas lie in the countryside; the proportion of families deprived of health care is 2.5 times higher in rural than in urban areas – 39.2% in the former compared to 15.3% in the latter areas. Moreover, households headed by men enjoy better basic health than those headed by women, where rates of deprivation were 20.2% and 24.8% respectively (table 16 - Annex). Certain cultural and social obstacles damage women's health prospects; social practices such as early marriage continue even now. The MICS3 for 2006 showed that 22.6% of women aged 15-49 were married before the age of 18, and this phenomenon threatens the physical and mental health of young girls. Two out of every three births in Iraq take place in health care facilities. Yet only just over half of all maternity hospitals can provide emergency care for the delivery; the rest cannot respond effectively to life-threatening complications.

## Are Iraqis Free from Ignorance?

A pervasive impediment to human development in Iraq is the unsatisfactory level of knowledge acquisition among its people, whether compared to substantial past achievements or to other countries in the same HDI group. While this chapter focuses on quantitative trends in literacy and enrolment, which are of evident importance, there is little doubt that the pre-eminent challenge to knowledge in Iraq, as in other Arab countries, often stems from the low quality of education.

Rote-learning, didacticism, unimaginative pedagogy and obsolete curricula are found at all levels of the education system. They tend to encourage passivity and inhibit the development of cognitive abilities and critical thinking. Modern concepts of child- and pupil-centred learning, or of lifelong education for continuous skills development, are not widely assimilated and few teachers are familiar with their new methodologies. Standards of educational quality in key subjects such as mathematics and science are not kept up through benchmarking against best practice in educational establishments in other regions. The persistence of these deficiencies, which originate in earlier

**Figure 2.7** Child Malnutrition Rates (Male and Female), 2006




periods, is understandable in the present-day context of Iraq. Yet they will continue to compromise knowledge acquisition and hold back Iraq's rich human resources until the question of quality is addressed head-on as a policy priority.<sup>(8)</sup>

### Literacy: Women Left Behind

The results of the 2006 Employment Survey (COSIT) indicated that 78% of adults in Iraq were functionally literate. There are however significant gender disparities, 86% of males being literate compared to 70% of females.

The availability of basic education for adults in some governorates is high, most notably Diala (89%), Baghdad (85%), Basrah (81%) and Kirkuk (81%). This level falls in Duhuk in Kurdistan (57%) and Al-Muthanna (63%). Compared with other Arab countries, the rate of literacy in Iraq is considered acceptable; Jordan does better at 86%, Syria is about the same at 75% and Yemen, with a rate of 53%, is noticeably worse off.

**Figure 2.8** Illiteracy Rate of Iraqis Aged 15 Years and Over, by gender (1997 and 2006 compared)



### Trends in Educational Enrolment

Enrolment at various levels of education between 1995/1996 and 2005/2006 shows the following trends:

*Pre-school education (kindergarten):* The number of children enrolled in kindergarten decreased from 88,000 in 1995/1996 to about 82,000 in 2005/2006, an annual compound growth rate of just 0.3% over 10 years. The results of MICS3 for 2006 indicate that only 3% of children aged 36-59 months attend pre-school (see Table 14, Annex), which is very low. Governorates such as Duhuk in Kurdistan, Nineveh, Kirkuk, and Diala have the lowest rates of attendance.

*Primary education (first grade to sixth grade):* the number of students enrolled in primary education rose from about 2.9 million pupils in 1995/1996 to about 4.1 million in 2006/2007, an annual compound growth rate of 3.1%. Table 12, Annex indicates that the net enrolment rate in primary schools reached 86% in 2006.

*Secondary (seventh grade to twelfth grade):* Enrolment increased from approximately 861,000 students in 1995/1996 to about 1,019,000 in 2005/2006, an annual compound growth rate of 1%.

*Preparatory education (between tenth and twelfth grades):* the number of high school students enrolled increased from approximately 293,000 students in 1995/1996 to about 472,000 in 2005/2006, an annual compound growth rate of 4.1%.

The net enrolment rate in secondary schools (primary and secondary) was estimated at 40% in 2006 (Table 12, Annex).

The enrolment of girls at various stages of education showed some advances between 1995/1996 and 2005/2006, rising in

(8) The Arab Human Development Report 2003 offers an important diagnostic of regional trends in education.

primary education by 3.1% and in secondary education by 3.7%. But female enrolment in vocational education dropped by 3.1% in the same period. The ratio of females' to males' in primary and secondary schools amounted to 91% and 79% respectively in 2006 (Table 13, Annex).

*Vocational education:* The number of students dropped from around 99,000 to about 59,000 between 1995/1996 and 2005/2006, an annual decline of 3.8%.

*University education (undergraduate):* The number of college students enrolled increased from approximately 233,000 in 1995/1996 to about 353,000 in 2006/2007, rising annually by 3.8%.

*Post-Graduate education:* The number of post-graduates enrolled increased from around 8,000 students in 1995/1996 to 15,500 in 2006/2007 - an annual compound growth rate of 6.0%.


Among college and post-graduate students, the rate of female enrollment surged

noticeably in the past ten years, growing by 5.3% at the undergraduate level and by 8.4% at the post-graduate level.

Enrolment at the preschool level is not satisfactory, especially given the formative importance of this stage. During early childhood, the individual develops mental habits, social behaviours and attitudes to learning and problem-solving whose influence lasts a lifetime. Notwithstanding observable improvements in enrolment, the rate of increase falls below that which would have resulted had trends before 1990 continued. Post-sanctions progress has also followed a distorted pattern, in which primary school enrollment grew at 2.7%, secondary school at 3.4%, and university at 5.1% -- while vocational educational fell by 4%.

These discrepancies and shortcomings will be discussed further in Chapter 6 in relation to the structural impediments that affect the capacity of the education sector.

**Figure 2.9** Distribution of the Population aged 10 Years and over, by educational level and gender (1997 and 2006)



Source: Population census for year 1997, Employment and Unemployment Survey, 200 COSIT

## Patterns in Access to Water, Sanitation and Housing

Infrastructure vitally supports people's aspirations to human development. In that respect, Iraq is at an evident disadvantage following deteriorations in basic public services that result from the physical damage and lack of maintenance incurred under conditions of war and economic sanctions.

Among public services, the availability and quality of drinking water are critical to human health, especially among children, where polluted water is a source of such diseases as dysentery and diarrhoea, the latter being the leading cause of child mortality in Iraq.

The proportion of Iraq's population that has sustainable access to improved sources of water was estimated at 83.3% in 2000, and rose to 84.2% in 2006. That still leaves 15.8% of Iraqis without access to clean drinking water.


In the Arab world, the percentage of people with access to clean drinking water was 86% in 2005 and in medium human development countries it was 83%. This figure compares favourably with that for all developing countries, which is 79% (Human Development Report, 2006). However, despite the relatively high level of access

in Iraq overall, significant disparities persist between urban and rural areas: (Figure 2.10), 97.5% of the urban population had access to safe drinking water in 2000, falling to 96.0% in 2006. But the rate in rural areas rose from only 51.5% in 2000 to about 96% in 2006, underlining once more the continuing rural-urban divide in the country (see Table 14, Annex).

Basrah Governorate lacks drinkable tap water. Only 1.5% of families rely on this source, although the local authorities have emphasized the quality of this water for drinking. Potable water is available to approximately 96% of the population of the capital and the Kurdistan region, but this rate declines in some governorates: one third of the population in Babylon and fully half in Al-Muthanna governorate lack drinkable water at home. Such disparities are not captured by figures for improved sanitation services between governorates.

This has led to considerable fall-offs in the provision of potable water. Large segments of the population in affected governorates complain of severe interruptions of water flow in summer. Additionally, indicators of water availability do not reflect realities on the ground that arise from the erosion of old pipeline systems, and their intersection with heavy water streams, which, in 2004, led to the spread of viral hepatitis in Sadr City.

**Figure 2.10** Availability of Improved Sanitation Facilities and Potable Water, rural and urban areas compared, 2006



Source: Table 14-Annex

Iraq is among those Arab countries that enjoy an acceptable level of improved sanitation facilities; this rate reached 92% of the total population in 2000. The current percentage has remained close to this level, estimated at 92.% in 2006. While adequate, this situation indicates that no further progress has been made in either rural or urban areas since the decade began.

The central and southern governorates clearly suffer from insufficient sources of drinking water. Moreover, their highest rate, 80%, is lower than those of the governorates of Baghdad, Kerbala, Al-Anbar, Al-Najaf and those of the Kurdistan region.

The population covered by waste collection service amounts to 55.6%, the highest rate emerging for the Baghdad municipality (92%). However, the nationwide rate of sewage coverage is only 25.7%, with Baghdad again benefiting the most (75% coverage), together with Suleimaniya (80%). In the remaining governorates, coverage is low and, in some cases, almost nonexistent as in Wasit, Diala, Al-Muthanna and the outskirts of Baghdad (Table 14 Annex).

## Housing for All?

Although a planned housing development scheme exists in Iraq, with procedures for building units and distributing lots at nominal prices, together with affordable real estate loans, the circumstances of the last two decades have kept this ambitious plan from moving ahead. The IHSES survey 2008 indicated that 81.3% of the general populations in Iraq live in independent single family housing units, 11% in units that include two families, and 7% in units accommodating three families or more. In urban areas, these percentages are 79%, 14% and 8%, respectively, as compared with 89%, 8% and 2% in the rural areas.

This means that if we take into account replacements for inadequate accommodation, such as mud houses and old buildings, or the requirements of urban expansion, the housing gap becomes much greater.


A 2004 survey of household conditions in Iraq showed the extent to which people were satisfied with their houses according to certain measures of quality. It indicated that more than 60% of families consider the quality of their homes acceptable or better, based on those standards. This leaves a large

*After 2003, the repeated vandalism of infrastructure and power plants led to wide and prolonged outages. Baghdad and the majority of governorates only have electricity for a few hours each day.*

*The deficit in housing is estimated at 14% of the number of families throughout Iraq.*

*Considering the need for new construction and expected rates of population growth, Iraq requires about 750,000 new units by 2010.*

**Box 2.5** Where Iraq's Drinking Water Comes From



While 76% of families depend on piped supplies for drinking, 2% rely on wells or protected springs and 7% on rainfall. The remaining 15% use unsafe water

Source: COSIT, MICS3, 2006

*More than half a century will probably have to pass before the population pyramid, pictured in Figure 2.13, approaches that of high HDI countries. Clearly, a strong population policy is critical for modern Iraq, one that also aims for a balance between its human and natural resources.*

group of families either somewhat or very dissatisfied with the quality of their housing.

## Demographics and Human Development in Iraq

Demographics and population policy heavily influence the pace of economic and social transition in society. A large population, carrying many economically inactive children and elderly people, progresses more slowly than one with fewer dependants and more workers. In the latter case, people have greater scope to exercise human choice in matters of work, general living standards and the quality of life. Yet national policy in Iraq has so far paid scant attention to the importance of population matters, as this section illustrates.

### The Overall Picture

The population of Iraq was 12 million in 1977. It increased to 22 million in 1987 and 30 million in 2007. In short, the country's population has more than doubled in just a quarter of a century. Baghdad has the highest population of all the governorates, with an estimated population of 7 million in 2007. This constitutes almost 23.6% of the entire country. Next in size are Nineveh, with 9.5% of the people, and Basrah with 8.1%. The governorates of Suleimaniya, Erbil and Duhuk in Kurdistan region, all in Kurdistan, had a population of about 3.9 million people in 2007, representing 13.1% of the population of Iraq. (Table 8 - Annex)

Among the population, those below age 15 represent 43% of the people. This contrasts with 19.6% in countries with high HDI and 44.9% in countries with low HDI (2006-2007). Children below the age of five constitute 13.7% of the population. The number of children under five is higher than the number of those between 5-9 years, owing to the large number of women of reproductive age. These figures translate into high social spending, in health, education

or child nutrition, and into constraints on development across the board because the under-15 population does not contribute to productivity or income.

### Can Iraq's High Fertility Rates Fall to Replacement Levels?

The fertility rate in Iraq has fallen in the last 10 years yet, at 4.3 birth in 2006, it remains among the highest in the world. This rate is roughly 65% higher than the global average of 2.6 birth. Meanwhile, the overall fertility rate for developing countries and medium human development countries has decreased to 2.9 birth and 2.6 birth respectively (Human Development Report 2007/2008). Moreover, despite sharing similar socio-cultural values, the overall rate for the Arab States fell faster than that of Iraq, dropping to 3.6 birth (NHDR 2007/2008 between 2000 and 2005).

These comparisons underscore the urgency of developing a clear population policy for reducing the fertility rate to the minimum. Because of the close correlation between women's education and declining fertility rates, this policy, and the programmes for implementing it, must emphasize marked improvements in the status of women.

### Country in the City


The worsening socioeconomic situation in rural areas during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the varied attractions of cities at the beginning of industrialization drew much of the rural population of Iraq to its towns and cities. Several negative consequences of the Agrarian Reform Act of 1958 led this trend to continue.

However, during the 1990s, Iraq briefly experienced a pattern of reverse migration, from the city to rural areas. A rise in the prices of agricultural commodities, caused by the economic sanctions of that decade, led some landowners to return to investing in farming so as to take advantage of the situation. Low wages in the cities, especially



**Figure 2.11**

**The Drift to the Towns - From a Rural to an Urban Society**




in the government sector, state subsidies for the purchase of agricultural commodities and the compulsory delivery of crops resulted in high levels of inflation, making a move to the countryside attractive for some. But this trend was relatively short-lived and did not signal any significant changes in Iraq's main demographic patterns.

**Marriage Trends**

The average age at marriage has risen gradually over the last three decades -- from 25.5 years in 1977 to 28.3 years in 2004 for men. For women, it rose from 21 years in 1977 to 25.3 years in 2004. The trend points to an eventual decline in fertility rates.


**Figure 2.12**

**The Average Age at which Iraqis Marry**




**Figure 2.13**

**Population Pyramid (by age 5) in 1965 and the results of Census 1987, MICS3 for 2006**



The demographic gift refers to the initially favourable effects of falling fertility rates on the ratio of the economically active population to the dependent population (children under 15 and the elderly over 65). The gift is said to be accessed when the size and growth rate of the former group exceeds that of the latter. The benefits associated with this transition include reduced unemployment rates, fewer dependants per family leading to higher income and living standards, and improved educational status and health.



\*Arab states that have entered the demographic gift cycle; Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates.

\* Arab states that have entered the scope of the demographic gift: Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.

\*Arab states outside the demographic gift cycle: Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania, Palestine, Comoros, and Djibouti.

Making the public aware of the important gains associated with the demographic gift, and of the steps required to access it, will be part of any far-sighted population policy. In Iraq, the required steps include elevating the educational and social status of women, and increasing their economic participation; promoting family planning in all governorates; integrating population dimensions into development policy; and revamping the quality of education while aligning its output with labour market signals and needs.

**Mehdi Al Alak**  
Head of COSIT  
2008

## Conclusion

Human development celebrates the role that people's choices and capabilities play in shaping their lives and future. This lofty view reminds us that human beings, by virtue of their humanity, are at the centre of development and, to a considerable degree, make their own destiny. Yet choices do not present themselves equally in a weightless void. Capabilities are not developed and exercised outside the gravitational pull of material circumstances. The necessary condition for developing capacities and options is freedom, including freedom from material constraints.


This chapter has considered several material underpinnings of human welfare that partly define how free the Iraqi people are to make choices and develop as they see fit. Over the past three decades, economic policies and political conditions have curtailed Iraq's scope for achieving human development. A legacy of insufficient investment in health, education, infrastructure and basic services, skewed in geographic and social terms and undercut by the ruinous effects of war

and sanctions, has left many challenges unaddressed. Although, on basic indicators, Iraq overall is freer from want than many other developing countries, this relative position conceals marked and growing urban-rural inequalities. Moreover, the country has hardly tapped the full potential of its abundant human capital and natural endowments.

Among the underpinnings of human development, this chapter has emphasized the demographic situation of the country, which has a direct bearing on the direction in which its people can develop. The size of the population, its profile in terms of age, composition and dependants, how it is distributed geographically and whether its natural environment can support its numbers today and tomorrow – these factors have defining implications for the choices that the Iraqi people will be able to make in future. The chapter has thus advocated policy attention and action to place Iraq on a sustainable development path that will secure brighter prospects for its entire people.



# 3



## Chapter 3

Insecurity in Daily Life -  
Are Iraqis Free from Fear?



Nuri Al Rawi

**Town**

*Life, Security and Liberty*

*Article 29/4: "All forms of violence and abuse in the family, school and society shall be prohibited".*

*Article 15: "Every individual has the right to enjoy life, security and liberty.*

*Deprivation or restriction of these rights is prohibited except in accordance with the law and based on a decision issued by a competent judicial authority."*

*Iraqi Constitution, 2005*

**Introduction**

Chapter Two demonstrated that falling living standards and declining infrastructure have been unable to provide economic and social security to the Iraqi people. The current chapter addresses the impact of reduced personal security on the everyday lives of the people. In line with most studies of this nature, it uses indicators of direct violence against vulnerable groups, such as children and mothers, as well as other primary caregivers. The chapter also examines what people think about the origins and consequences of violence. Thus we believe it is not possible to ignore subjective perceptions and popular opinion.

This chapter adopts a compound methodology, which monitors a number of overlapping direct and indirect human security violations. Various aspects of violence are addressed through an

analysis of the phenomenon of forced displacement inside Iraq and the seeking of refuge abroad. The chapter then analyses violence against women and the situation of children, using the results of two special surveys conducted for this report.

**Violence: A Violation of the Right to Life**

The rights to life and to personal safety are fundamental human entitlements. Conflict constitutes a direct threat to these rights, resulting in civilian suffering, displacement and high rates of illness and mortality<sup>(1)</sup>. The violence inherent in conflict causes both visible and invisible wounds, some being of a physical nature and others psychological<sup>(2)</sup>. Moreover, especially in times of war, violence does not discriminate.

Chapters 4 and 5 will show that Iraq's transition to democracy and a market economy involves enormous institutional and cultural changes that could lead to violence in the future if their implementation is not managed carefully. At this moment, however, the country is undergoing open warfare. Despite established international agreements on civilian protection in times of armed hostilities, death far outpaces the rule of law in the daily life of Iraq. Violence takes multiple forms: direct physical threat and injury, terrorism, kidnapping and assassination. It traps individuals in a vicious circle of dangers and fears. It can – and often does – paralyse human will, even the will to survive.

*In preparing this analysis, we have in mind the opening words of the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed."*

*Insecurity affects everybody. It not only threatens human development in the present; it mortgages future prospects and wipes out many achievements of the past.*

(1) Toole MJ, Waldman RJ - The Public Health Aspects of Complex Emergencies and Refugee Situations. American Review of Public Health 18:283-312. 1997.

(2) Mollica. Richard F. MD. MAR, Keith McInnes, MS, Narcisa Sarajlic, MD, PhD, James Lavelle, MSW, Iris Sarajlic, MD, and Michael P. Massagli, PhD. Disability Associated with Psychiatric Co-morbidity and Health Status in Bosnian Refugees Living in Croatia. JAMA, August 4, 1999, Vol. 282. No. 5

Since physical violence is the greatest threat to human security and a violation of the fundamental right to life, how do people regard this phenomenon and its results?

#### Is the source of violence in Iraq internal or external?

The majority of those interviewed identified the source of violence as both internal and external. Only 32% considered the source of violence purely external. Views, however, varied greatly among governorates. Most of those interviewed in Al-Anbar (83.7%), Babil (98.4%) and Salahuddin (86.6%), which were considered insecure at the time of the survey, believed that Iraq's violence stemmed equally from external and internal sources. This contradicted a previous perception that the violence originated only abroad, suggesting that inhabitants of these specific provinces felt they risked suffering more cycles of violence in future.

Source of Violence (respondents %)				
External	Internal	Both	Don't Know No Response	Total
32	3	61	4	100

#### Do manifestations of violence in Iraq have historical roots? Is violence consonant with the social values of Iraqi society?

The majority of those interviewed did not support the view that the violence in Iraq has historical roots, including (or especially) in those governorates considered relatively unstable. At the same time, however, this question also evoked the greatest degree of confusion and non-response, indicating that the idea of internal violence is relatively new to today's Iraqis. The great majority (95%) of the sample members stated that violence in Iraq was not consistent with the values of Iraqi society. Hence, the majority of individuals also believed that the phenomenon was alien to their culture and society.

Interpretation of Violence (%)	Yes	No	Don't Know No Answer	Total
Violence has historical roots	18	67	14	100
Violence consorts with social values	1	95	4	100
Violence is alien to Iraqi society	88	5	7	100

#### Possible causes of violence

Those interviewed were asked to identify and rank in order of importance their views on the causes of violence in Iraq today. The main potential causes identified, in order of importance, were:

1. Occupation and the loss of national independence;
2. Unrest stemming from marginalization and exclusion;
3. Low standards of living and wide unemployment;
4. Provocation by the media;
5. Opposition to perceived imposition of alien values.
6. Threats to National Identity.

The occupation emerged as most important factor in Nineveh (99.7%) and in Dhi Qar (85.1%). By contrast, in Al-Najaf, low standards of living and unemployment (55.1%) and marginalization and exclusion (36.8%) were ranked highest. In Babylon, opposition to alien values was considered the most important cause of potential violence (43.5%).

Unrest from Marginalization and Exclusion	Loss of National Independence Under Occupation	Threats to Urban National Identity	Alien Value	Low Living Standards and Unemployment	Provocation by the Media	Total
13.1	59.2	4.4	5.0	11.2	7.1	100.00



Though armed conflict does not necessarily cause all the violence now prevalent, it creates an environment conducive to other violent behaviour, much of it committed with impunity. Similar conclusions emerge from the analysis of the National Human Development Reports for Somalia in 2001 and Sierra Leone in 1998. Identifying the causes of violence, and even reducing its threats, may not bring an end to conflict itself. As a report from Colombia in 2003 states, peace agreements often fail to terminate violence: violations of public security continue through drug smuggling, criminal networks, the abundance and spread of weapons among civilians, and a general atmosphere of lawlessness.

Previous experience leads to the conclusion that transitional periods of change, both institutional and cultural, can give rise to violence.<sup>(3)</sup> Anarchy resulting from the weakness of governments and a lack of restraint by individuals sometimes causes the eruption of violence (Human Development Report, Albania, 1998).

The security situation in Iraq since 2003 requires analyzing both the security of the state, measured through governance indicators, and the security of people, measured through both statistical indicators and subjective perceptions. Box 3.2 sets out the results of an opinion poll conducted for this report among a random sample of 3,327 households.

### Threats to Survival

In the midst of violence and conflict, it is always difficult to obtain accurate data on mortality and injury among combatants. In Iraq, there is also no consensus on the accuracy of the figures available on civilian casualties, whether those that result from bombings and other military action or from

random violence, including premeditated murder, manslaughter and fatal accidents. Significant disparities exist in the numbers provided by formal and informal sources.

According to a study conducted on mortality rates in Iraq published in the October 2006 Report of Lancet Magazine<sup>(4)</sup>, in the summer of that year, 654,964 people had been killed in Iraq. Of this number, 601,027 deaths were attributed directly to acts of violence perpetrated since the beginning of the occupation in April 2003.

These figures, however, were contested by many. Shortly after their publication, the Minister of Health, for example, claimed that the number of civilians killed through acts of violence since 2003 had not exceeded 150,000. A report from the Ministry of Health had put the number at 50,000. However, the morgue in Baghdad had officially received 30,204 bodies between 2003 and mid-2006, 18,933 of these officially associated with warfare and terrorist attacks. In December 2006, UNAMI stated that 34,452 civilians had been killed by 2006 alone, drawing their numbers from hospitals across Iraq. In a joint survey (IFHS) conducted by the Ministry of Health and WHO on family health and issued in December 2007, it was stated that 151,000 were killed by acts of violence.<sup>(5)</sup>

Even allowing for discrepancies, these figures cannot represent the full picture. Most international sources estimate the rate of those injured at three times that of those killed during fighting and through acts of violence. Violence undoubtedly increases the number of physical and psychological injuries as well, to say nothing of the disintegration of educational and health services, the collapse of welfare systems, and the personal trauma and tension created by these institutional breakdowns.

*It is the first time since the deterioration of security that an official field survey was conducted, covering random sample of 3375 households. The questionnaire was designed to reveal with objectivity and transparency, the insecurities that Iraqi people felt.*  
<http://www.cosit.org.iq>


(3) Jolly, Richard and Ray, Deepayan Basu, The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports: A Review of Experiences and Current Debates, HDRO, NHDR Series, NHDR Occasional paper 5, May 2006

(4) (<http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf>)

(5) Ministry of Health and WHO, Iraq family health survey (IFHS), 2007

### Box 3.2 The Opinion Poll on Human Security – Loss of Personal Security

The opinion poll for this report gauged people's perceptions of the impact of violence and conflict in their everyday lives; 30 % of those interviewed had been directly exposed to violence. Many felt that in view of the risks posed by terrorism, as well as by endemic day-to-day violence, home was the safest place to be. At the same time, many were considering a move to safer havens, either abroad (30%) or, within Iraq, to governorates considered safer or, at the very least, other neighbourhoods of their current towns and cities (24%).



#### Forced Displacement: Multiple Violations

Migration, forced displacement and evacuation are different features of the same grim reality, as the Iraqi tragedy becomes more complex demographically, socially and politically. Consequently, forced displacement can be viewed as a flagrant violation of human security. It deprives human beings not only of personal security and privacy, as well as their homes and other property, but their entire social and professional networks – along with all the symbolic values associated with these dimensions of life, for which no measurement has yet been developed.

With forced displacement, individuals or families feel compelled to leave their homes in physically threatened areas or because of other justified fears of being exposed to harm or death. The displaced person must move to another area inside the country or seek refuge in another country. Yet the rights to shelter, the choice of place of residence, the right to free movement, and the right

to own property, are all fundamental human rights implicit in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These rights, coupled with the freedoms of conscience and expression, the right to work, and access to a decent living standard, are amongst those set out in the Universal Declaration, and collectively make up the principles of human security. The prevalence of conflict, insecurity and violence in Iraq contravenes all these basic rights and fundamental freedoms.

#### *Internally Displaced Persons*


*“...people who were forced to escape or leave their homes or usual residence, especially as a result of armed disputes or general acts of violence, or due to violations of human rights, or natural or human disasters, to avoid the effects of these situations, but did not cross the known international borders of the country”.*

*Source: United Nations Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons, UN document E/CN.4/1998/53/ADD2, preamble paragraph 2, 17 April 1998*

## Box 3.3

## The Opinion Poll on Human Security - Forced Displacement Within Iraq

One of the most traumatic effects of the insecurity and instability has been the internal displacement of families owing to political, religious, ethnic or sectarian problems. The results of the poll showed that 24 % of individuals were thinking of moving to another location inside Iraq to avoid the problems of insecurity in their areas. Within this group, those residing in areas threatened by sectarian strife were more inclined to consider moving. These came largely from the governorates of Diala (60.4%), Baghdad (46.8%), and Salahuddin (57.3%). On the other side of the spectrum, inhabitants of what are considered stable governorates, where sectarian violence is low or non-existent, think far less about moving, among these Dhi Qar (0.4%), Maysan (1%) and Al-Najaf (2%). In the Al-Anbar governorate, despite the prevalence of armed conflict, only 7.8% of people were thinking of moving because the conflict is non-sectarian in nature.



For decades, Iraqis have been continuously denied access to their rights with varied “justifications”. Consequently, many either chose to leave their homeland or were forcibly displaced internally. Today, thousands are now leaving their country once again or are being forced to leave their residences and homes, albeit for different reasons. The fall of the regime, following occupation, led to a parallel collapse in the official control of the country’s security forces and its legal and penal institutions charged with preserving personal safety. These developments have merged the phenomenon of forced displacement and forced migration in a manner and to a degree unprecedented in the history of modern Iraq.

The scope and nature of violence have increased considerably after the bombing of the shrines of Askari Imams in Samarra

in February 2006. This does not mean that forced displacement began only then, but the Samarra incident did accelerate the trend.

### Whose numbers reflect the facts?

Displacement in Iraq has reached dangerous levels. The international community has recognized publicly that a grave human disaster is in the making throughout the region. The crisis cannot be contained within the country, and has already spilled over its borders.

Antonio Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for example, drew attention in August 2007 to the contrast between media attention to the war itself and the almost total disregard for the situation of refugees and the displaced<sup>(6)</sup>.

(6) Source: “Iraq, Crisis of Evacuation and Displacement, Search for Solutions”, Forced Displacement newsletter August 2007, the Center for Refugee Studies, Oxford.

According to the latest UNHCR figures, by January 2007, a total of 1.7 million people had been displaced within Iraq<sup>(7)</sup>. An additional 2.2 million refugees had fled to neighbouring countries. This exodus is considered the largest long-term movement in the region since the displacement of the Palestinians after the creation of Israel in 1948. Millions of Iraqis now need humanitarian aid.

Although general consensus exists on the swelling numbers of displaced people caused by the war in Iraq, both the figures themselves and their geographical distribution are widely disputed.


- According to the Organization for International Migration (IOM), by 7 January 2007, the total number of families forced to leave their homes was 45,029, two thirds of whom came from Baghdad. UNHCR claimed the largest numbers: some 1.5 million internally displaced people in Iraq by October 2006, of whom 425,000 had been displaced after the Samarra events.
- According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the figure

became 1.7 million evacuees. More specifically, the centre estimates the number of the displaced after Samarra at 625,000, i.e., more than 104,000 families.

- The International Medical Corps (IMC) put the number of internally displaced people by January 2007 (including Kurdistan governorates, but excluding Suleimaniya) at 91,013 families, that is, 546,078 persons.
- The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has provided the figure of 78,349 families (470,094 persons) as the number of those internally displaced in its report for 11 November - 31st December 2007.

Numbers provided by government bodies and non-governmental agencies on the magnitude of internal displacement also differ<sup>(8)</sup>. According to the bulletin of the Ministry of Displaced People and Migrants issued by the Information Section in November 2007, the number of those internally displaced between February 2006

**Figure 3.1** Number of Displaced Families for the period Feb. 2006 - Nov. 2007




Source: Report by the Ministry of Displaced People and Migrants, November 2007

(7) BBC, UN makes \$60m Iraq refugee appeal, Tuesday, 9 January 2007, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/6243335.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6243335.stm)


and November 2007 was 163,574 families -- 999,772 individuals. 36% of this number came from Baghdad (BBC, 9 January 2007, Al Amal Society of Iraq).

Figure 3.3 shows that Baghdad has absorbed the largest numbers of displaced (around 36%); at the same time, the city of Baghdad has witnessed the migration of 12-15% of its own people.

Discrepancies also appear in the areas in which the displaced have settled. In Kerbala, the reports on the number of displaced people varied between 8,350 and 2,075 families. Other reports about the number of displaced persons moving to Kurdistan, considered a relatively safe governorate, show similar disparities. The International Medical Corps (IMC) reports indicate that 3,800 families moved to the Kurdish city of Duhuk, while the IOM gives a figure of 7,000 families and an estimate of 83,333 for Kurdistan as a whole.



**Figure 3.3** Displaced Families according to their Current Residence (%)



Source: Iraq Indicators for the year 2006 (Table 23, Annex), other countries indicators, ILO and estimates of World Bank Experts for the year 2004

### *Strangers in Strange Lands*

*The refugee is an individual "outside his homeland due to a justified fear from persecution based on race or religion or nationalism or affiliation to certain social sect, or political opinion and accordingly, does not like to seek shelter in that country..."*

*United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951*

(8) Iraqi Al-Amal Society, "Internally Displaced People and Refugees", Background paper to Iraq NHDR 2008

These statistics or estimates point to one certainty: the high number of migrants has continued to mount with no sign of stabilization, let alone a decline.

### Forced Emigration: Iraqis Abroad

Throughout the turbulent history of the past 30 years, numbers of Iraqis have left their country to escape political repression and dwindling economic opportunities. This should be considered “forced migration” abroad. Since April 2003, these numbers have grown for a very different reason: the need to escape the violence that broke out immediately after the war began. The numbers increased further as military operations escalated, bringing with them an increase in organized crime and sectarian violence.

While numbers are available on the internally displaced, they often differ by source. Reliable documentation of the number of Iraqi refugees abroad is much harder to obtain. Even the Ministry of Displaced Persons and Migrants, which is responsible for all matters related to Iraqi refugees and displaced persons, has not yet issued official data or statistics.

#### Box 3.4 The Opinion Poll on Human Security - Forced Migration Outside Iraq

The results of the poll showed that an increasing number of people are contemplating a move abroad (29.6%) rather than to safer places within Iraq (24%). Over 58% of those interviewed in Salahuddin, 52% in Baghdad and 49.4% in DIALA were considering moves to other countries. The geography of violence in Iraq also emerged as a factor: 35% of those interviewed in urban areas were willing to move abroad in contrast to 19.5% of those in the countryside. However, in view of the fact that rural people tend to be more conservative than their urban counterparts, a figure as high as 19.5% is surprising. People who held secondary school diplomas and higher degrees (46.4 %) were more inclined to want to move abroad than those with only basic education or none at all (16 %).

UNHCR, in the meantime, estimated the number of Iraqi refugees at 2 million by 2007, up from 1.6 million in November 2006. The accuracy of these figures aside, the ascending trend -- approximately 200,000 migrants per month -- reflects the gravity of the situation. By early 2008, Jordan was estimated to have taken in as many as 1 million refugees, and Syria, up to 1.5 million<sup>(9)</sup>. Neither of these governments, however, has released data on the subject. These omissions stem from the fact that most host countries do not recognize Iraqi refugees as such, pursuant to the 1967 Protocol of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, either because they have not signed the Convention or its Protocol, or because they disagree with UNHCR on designating civilians escaping from conflicts as refugees.

#### On Going Home

*“The settlement of Iraqis in a third country is a solution to vulnerable groups only. The best solution for the majority is their voluntary return to their home safely, with dignity as soon as circumstances allow.”*

Antonio Guterres, UNHCR

Source: “Iraq, Crisis of Evacuation and Displacement, Search for Solutions” Forced Displacement newsletter, August 2007, the Centre for Refugees Studies, Oxford.

### Return of Displaced People

As the security situation started improving since the start of the year 2008, the pattern of displaced people took a positive turn. Many exiled families and internally displaced families returned to their homes. The number of families that returned to Baghdad alone in the first half of 2008 reached 5658.

(9) [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/7248962.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7248962.stm)

## Iraqi Migration Abroad: A Different Pattern

These migration figures are particularly striking for a country that had earlier witnessed little outflow of its people. Among those leaving there is a disproportionate number of highly qualified professionals. This has enormous negative implications for both the total population of Iraq and the quality of life or scope of possible attainment of those who remain, as so many doctors and teachers at all levels have fled.

According to the study released by the General Statistics Department in Jordan, more than 50% of the Iraqis in that country are considered members of high or very high income groups, 14% are at the middle-income level and 35% within the low or very low range. Approximately two thirds of heads of families now in Jordan hold a diploma or university degree, many in the sciences, while few have lower than technical or secondary school certification. They practice their professions where they can in Jordan. Moreover, 25.4% of the educated refugees own the housing in which they live. Further, the study shows that most families still rely on the remittances they receive from those relatives who have remained in Iraq. Only the poorest of them need to earn money. However, how much longer this state of affairs can continue is a vital question – not only for the refugees


themselves, but for the countries that have received them.

## The Implications of Displacement

### The Sociology of Forced Displacement

Against large odds, the modern state plays an effective role in establishing a national identity as opposed to more localized loyalties, largely by means of both educational and military institutions. Educational institutions target modification of the traditional pattern of family dynamics, and consequently enhance the national identity structure, expanding social participation and life opportunities. Military institutions, on the other hand, develop the notion of citizenship, which is placed ahead of any other affiliation. Yet, the state in Iraq, despite the success achieved in creating urban and legal systems and various means of control, has failed to create a national culture that all can belong to. This failure intensified as the state clung to mechanisms of control, without recognizing the plurality that characterizes Iraq, and was further compounded through Iraq's participation in a series of conflicts and internal/external wars. As a result, development attempts have been hindered,

**Figure 3.4** Iraqis in Jordan, by Income Group



Source: Department of General Statistics/ Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and FAFO. Field study on the situation of Iraqis in Jordan, 2007

especially in rural areas. This in turn led to a high level of internal migration that gave more of a rural character to urban areas, and created random settlements of a tribal nature in rural areas, which were not easy to integrate into mainstream society.

At the same time, popular values and traditions remain active within migrant communities. Alongside the continuation of phenomena like revenge and honour killings, which persist, tribal loyalties have retreated, and social connections have been strengthened through coexistence, intermarriage, and mutual interests. For decades, religious and sectarian affiliations and their resulting practices and rituals provoked no disputes or conflicts among people; yet, they were a source of difference between people and the state. Therefore, government decisions have long taken into account the external and internal migrations of the Iraqi peoples.

This sort of review increases our understanding of the important role a centralized authority has in the integration of diverse elements in a society. Through a solid sense of national identity, a government is able to derive its legitimacy and guarantee its continuity. A consistent notion of national identity in society can sustain the individual citizen's feeling of safety.

When the contrary takes place, we commonly witness unresolved tensions that can erupt into civil wars or internal disputes. The authority of the State, when impartial and fair, is responsible for establishing a basis for common citizenship, which liberates individuals from more limited loyalties.

Since the institutions of authority guarantee unity of identity, their collapse led to a fragmentation of national identity and a shift towards more localized loyalties. This breakdown of a centralized authority weakened the government's ability to ensure a safe environment. Forced migration is a behavioural and emotional expression of this breakdown and the continuation of forced displacement, or its retreat, is related

to a centralized power's authority to establish law and order.

### Post-Displacement Suffering

The trauma of forced displacement is especially acute for families that have experienced the arbitrary seizure of their property or those that have had to abandon their belongings and flee for their lives.

Both the United Nations Guidelines on Internal Migration (E/CN4/1998/53/Add.2, 19 April 1988) and Article 33/a) of the Iraqi Constitution affirm that every person has "the right to sound environmental conditions". However, neither text is in fact being followed. A study conducted in 2006 by the Al-Amal society of Iraq pointed to evidence of discriminatory practices encountered by the internally displaced in certain areas. Authorities in Kurdistan, for example, have restricted their movement and denied them housing on their territory. The Governorate of Kerbala stopped the registration of internally displaced persons in November 2006. In October 2007, UNHCR reported that 11 out of 18 governorates were refusing entry to displaced people because the authorities lack the resources to look after them.

Despite the importance of housing to the internally displaced persons (IDPs), the Ministry of Displaced People and Migrants has been unable so far to provide a sufficient number of camps, let alone camps with decent living conditions. In Baghdad, only two camps exist, while in all the other governorates, there is a total of 12 camps with 45-100 tents. No camps exist in DIALA, Kirkuk, Babylon or Salahuddin. According to IOM statistics, 22% of those displaced to the governorate of Al-Qadisiya, 11% to Baghdad and 30% to Al-Anbar are living in public buildings that are either significantly damaged or abandoned.

In terms of food provision, the majority of Iraqi families depend on ration cards. However, according to IOM, as many as



70% of displaced people have no access to ration cards in their new settlements in Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Al-Najaf and Thi-Qar. The same is true for more than two thirds of IDPs in the governorates of Babylon, Basrah and Kirkuk. The opinion poll conducted for this report confirmed that only 18% of the families displaced to the governorate of Thi-Qar were able to transfer their food quota to their new locations even though they had lost all means of livelihood.

It should therefore come as no surprise that IDP health has declined steeply, resulting in outbreaks of diseases, even some formerly eradicated, including measles, whooping cough and tuberculosis, especially among children.<sup>(10)</sup> According to a survey conducted by the IOM, even when displaced persons have access to health facilities in camps, medicines are not affordable. Access to health care is particularly difficult for women and children. Indeed, reproductive health services for women simply do not exist, in large measure because there are few female medical professionals near the camps -- despite the fact that pregnant women make up 25.1% of these populations. In Al-Muthanna, some 60% of camp inhabitants reported having seen no health worker for a month or more. By contrast, at one Al-Muthanna camp, more than half the IDPs stated that they had seen a doctor or nurse for vaccination. In fact, the vaccination programme appears to have been the only health service that has succeeded in reaching vulnerable families.

As for education, many children in displaced families have had no schooling since leaving their homes. The reasons range from lack of access to schooling facilities for those in camps or abandoned houses, to family decisions to suspend their education out of hope that their displacement was temporary. In some

cases, schooling was not considered a priority under adverse circumstances --- in part because parental loss of livelihood made payment of school fees impossible. This has made prospects for child labour in and around the camps more attractive than school attendance. This situation is particularly difficult for girls. A number might otherwise be pursuing training for skilled occupations in later life.

The schooling situation is no brighter for children of Iraqi refugees abroad. According to a UNHCR report published in January 2007, in Syria, 30% of Iraqi children do not go to school. Thousands of Iraqis now outside the country have been unable to send their children to school, indeed a larger proportion than the number of school dropouts inside Iraq as a whole.

### Outflows of Minorities

The problem of displacement is also acute among the religious minorities living in Iraq. As a result of escalating acts of violence -- among these, attacks on their places of worship -- many have had to flee either to the governorates of Kurdistan or abroad. Such attacks and threats have mounted with the intensification of sectarian violence after the Samarra events of 2006. Christian minorities, along with the Sabian, Shabak and Yazidi minorities, have been threatened, displaced and killed in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Kirkuk and Diala. Some have been ordered to change their religion, as was the case with the Mandaean Sabians, who were accused of practising a "pagan" faith. In addition, minority women have been targeted for not abiding by the Islamic dress code imposed by extremist groups. A significant number have been attacked for not complying with this code. Many more have been harassed at work or during social or recreational activities outside their homes.

(10) Chichester, John Wiley & Sons on behalf of WHO: 323-334

Assyrians in Iraq are as old as its history. Evidence of the pioneering role they played in Assyria, Babylon, and Sumer is displayed in museums all over the world. Two thousand years of Christian history in Iraq is ignored by history books and literature. Saliq Taysaphon was once the Patriarchy chair for centuries. A revision of history will reveal the neglect of ethnic and religious cultures which are the constituents of Iraq's society, and which established its history, language and culture.

*Emanuel Johanna, 28-10-2007*

*The suffering of Iraqi children severely violates their human rights today and constitutes a major hurdle for the future of Iraqi society.*

Accurate figures for the number of minority IDPs are scarce. In a March 2006 report, UNAMI drew attention to persecution among minorities in Basrah, in this instance the migration of approximately 400 Christian families from Mosul to villages with Christian majorities in the north. By April of that same year, 3,140 Christian families were reportedly displaced from Baghdad and Mosul to Duhuk and another 400 to Erbil. The Report of June/August spoke of the migration of some 1,000 Shabak to villages away from Mosul, while that of September/October stated that according to the International Relief and Development Programme, 7,502 Christian families were displaced to Duhuk. In addition, citing UNHCR, UNAMI reported that more than 44% of asylum applicants to both Jordan and Syria are Christian. In October/November. Reports by the international medical groups speak of the Ein Kawa area in Erbil receiving more than 2,700 Christian families displaced from Baghdad and Mosul, along with

#### Multi-culture Society

Tolerance in Iraqi society was not produced through constitutional legislation; it was the fruit of ancient and well-established historical relations that were shaped many centuries ago. This is a fundamental feature of Iraqi society that earned it a high degree of cultural success, with contributions from a variety of religious and ethnic groups over a long period of time.

1,680 other families in Nineveh and 3,800 evacuees in Duhuk, though their specific sect was not identified.

Whatever the precise figures, the minorities that had given Iraqi society so much of its diverse character over centuries -- especially the Christians and Sabians -- have been forced to leave. Whether this history of co-existence can be restored is an open question.<sup>(11)</sup>

### Children Caught in a Cycle of Violence

The rights of children in Iraq are legally guaranteed through the 1990 Convention of the Rights of the Child, ratified by Iraq in 1994, and the two optional protocols annexed to the Convention, which have not yet been ratified. The imposition of UN sanctions in the 1990s had their impact in terms of death, disability, starvation and illiteracy, which have been adequately documented by international organizations such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

In addition to the indirect impacts of institutional breakdowns, since April 2003, children have been subject to direct violence. During armed conflicts, vulnerable groups such as children are seldom protected; they fall prey not only to gunfire, bombs and other overt physical violence, but to kidnapping, trafficking, or conscription by criminal networks waging their own particular wars. Consequently, children have been doubly victimized: they are forced to serve as tools of violence against others, and they find criminal activities along with other forms of delinquency their major if not sole means of survival. Thus conditioned to violence by daily life as well, they become incapable of imagining that mutual understanding and dialogue are the means of resolving conflict or achieving

(11) Al-Amal society of Iraq, background paper to NHDR 2008.

a better life. In short, for these children, human development as understood from 1990 onward -- as the development of people's options -- becomes violently truncated in a literal sense. Communities that have only a minimal awareness of children's rights, and also discriminate on the bases of age and gender, multiply the exorbitant costs of war by an unknown but evidently immense factor.

Despite limited psychological investigation to date into the situation of Iraqi children, international literature on the costs of war to vulnerable groups in communities, most notably children, is almost unanimous. Its observations correlate with the findings of one of the most important studies conducted on children in Iraq, a 2006 survey of 600 elementary school children aged 6 to 15 in Baghdad. Approximately half (47%) had been exposed to great trauma and 14% were suffering from various forms of post-traumatic stress syndrome. Overall, those most affected (22%) were 12 year-olds.

### Victims of Forced Displacement

The children of displaced persons also suffer a variety of complex problems, several of them psychological. These begin with the trauma of being cut off from their roots, where they formed their initial social relationships. These problems grow as the children realize that the family is unable to fight back or protect them. The trauma multiplies as children are forced to leave school and enter the labour market, when the family becomes unable to provide adequate health care and welfare, and when the new domicile fails to provide supportive friends and neighbours.

In a survey conducted for this report on 411 out of 4,879 families displaced from conflict areas to Nassriya governorate, the number of children in the displaced group as a whole was estimated at 1,243 (58% girls and 42% boys). The ages of those children

ranged from 1-16 years; 61% are school age children. Only 27% were enrolled in schools during the school year 2005/2006, while 73% were forced to drop out of school against their wishes<sup>(12)</sup>.

Children live with their families below acceptable standards of living in unsuitable places where the percentage of overcrowding (more than three individuals per room) reaches 88%. The problem is worse among families residing in city centres, since they are obliged to live in one room with their relatives, rent part of a house (one room and a bathroom, for example), or live in partially destroyed State buildings. Some families have built shanties in urban areas, while in the countryside, other families live in mud and cane huts. 22% of the children are orphans following the death of their parents or older siblings who died violent deaths. Most of the families confirmed that they had abandoned their houses and property.

The most troubling finding was that 72% of the children in the displaced group were engaged in manual labour inappropriate for their age, including cleaning streets or working as porters; some were selling contraband goods or were engaged in other illegal activities. Some children reported that they were spending more than seven hours a day working for returns ranging between three and five thousand Iraqi dinars (about US\$2.40). Disease afflicted many of them largely from unsafe drinking water, sub-standard environmental conditions, and from the remoteness of health care centres. A random sample of 100 boys and girls in this group showed that approximately 20% were suffering from some form of malnutrition, in some cases acute and/or chronic.

### The Insecurity of Street Children

Although only about 250 children have found places in the shelters provided

(12) Abdul Bari Hamdany, Survey of children of displaced families in Nasyria, conducted for the Iraq NHDR, 2008

by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, this figure cannot begin to suggest the magnitude of the problem, considering the spread of disintegrating families, extent of displacement and the rising numbers of unemployed and poor people. So far, only seven such shelters exist, all of them located in Baghdad, despite the need in all governorates.<sup>(13)</sup> The Ministry, in collaboration with civil society organizations, has also launched a family integration programme for orphans.

A distinction should be made between the concept of “children in the streets” and “children of the streets”. The first means children who work all day in the streets, but return to their families at night. In Iraqi society, thousands of such children are their

families’ main breadwinners. By contrast, “children of the streets” refers to waifs – those for whom the street itself, including abandoned open spaces and empty, usually damaged buildings, have become home. Here we cover both as “street children”. Some of these children are as young as eight and have minimal, if any, adult protection or guidance. New to Iraq, this phenomenon has only begun to be studied, let alone addressed.

The total number of street children in Baghdad to date may be as high as 4,000 – many as young as eight years old- all caught in some phase of the vicious circle of displacement: dropping out of school, joining an informal labour market and participating in criminal activity, including drug trafficking, theft and prostitution.<sup>(14)</sup>

### Box 3.5 Hardened on the Streets, Cut off from Society

From a study conducted for this report among street children in Rasafa in Baghdad in the summer of 2007, the following findings emerged:

All children of age 11 had either left school or had never been enrolled in one – 37.5 % of the boys and half of the girls; 43.7% of the boys and 25% of the girls had reached the fifth grade; all those who had some school experience insisted that education was unimportant.

Half the boys had spent as long as 12 months in the streets; a quarter had spent less than 6 months there.

The majority are war orphans: only 10% have parents who are still alive.

Many have become habituated to lying and degrading themselves in order to survive: they introduce themselves with false names, conceal information concerning their families, greet one another in terms of their disabilities and invoke their mothers in disparaging, even humiliating terms.

Many (40%) sleep in deserted spaces in central Baghdad, 15% percent of these in garages, and 10% near religious shrines; 20% seek the protection of an older child, 10% from thieves and 10% percent from pimps.

Their occupations, notably begging, are a travesty of children’s rights and further endanger not only their security and future, but that of their country too.

Source: Karim Mohammad Hamza, Case study prepared for the Iraq NHDR 2008

## Women’s Multiple Insecurities

Iraqi women are subject to direct or indirect threats to life, dignity, social relations and their status in the family or local community. Humiliation can well undermine their human rights partially or completely. In many households the voicing of a threat is usually followed by its physical fulfilment. Shame, physical violence and/or verbal abuse can have domestic or external sources. In short, women’s security has cultural and social dimensions as well as physical ones.

Iraqi women have fallen prey to four levels of violations since the outbreak of nationwide conflict:<sup>(15)</sup>

- General insecurity resulting from the collapse of law and order.
- General consequences of the armed conflict, whether subject to direct acts of violence (beating, rape, torture, displacement, death) or indirect threats (the targeting of members of their family or living in continuous fear for their safety).

(13) Karim Mohammed Hamza, background paper for Iraq NHDR 2008

(14) Lili Bibling, Iraqi children Pay the Cost of War, Forced Displacement bulletin, volume August 2007, Oxford University, p. 43

(15) Asma’a Jamil Rashid, Iraqi Women: Progress Preceded by Retreat, background paper for the NHDR 2008 p. 9.

- Absorbing the burden of family care when social services falter and public institutions cease to function.
- Intimidation by extremist groups that drive them into seclusion.

The total number of women killed during the first ten months of 2006, according to statistics of the Ministry of Health and Forensic Medicine, was 1,190. The Ministry for Women claims to have officially recorded 206,082 widows,<sup>(16)</sup> perhaps itself an indication of increasing danger to women.

Hundreds of women in Iraq have been targeted by armed groups, either because of their professions (political figures or their employees, journalists or others in the media and in translation enterprises), or as revenge against their male relatives (for example, the sisters, wives or daughters of political party leaders or government officials). Those women killed since April 2003 represent 5% of professors and other academic staff and 7% of journalists – a very high proportion, given the total number of women in these two domains.

Fear has become an integral element of the daily lives of Iraqi women and has led to circumstances not witnessed for decades. Families use escalating violence to justify preventing their daughters from going to school. Social and political chaos reinforces a return to traditional culture in Iraq today. Girls are no longer able to go to school or work unless accompanied by a family member. Providing private transport to ferry girls to school and women to work is an added load on family budgets.

A large number of girls have had to drop out of school because their parents cannot provide adequate protection. According to official figures<sup>(17)</sup>, the number of children leaving elementary school prematurely has

increased from 39,266 during the 2001/2002 school year to 76,795 during 2003/2004. During 2003/2004, 12,753 young women gave up their studies at university.

As streets come to be considered unsafe, women are fast withdrawing from public life. With increasing attacks against them on the streets, many have resorted to wearing the *hijab* as a means of protection, which does not necessarily reflect adherence to traditional Islamic values<sup>(18)</sup>. With the breakdown of the state apparatus, the rise of extremist groups in some parts has led to the imposition of gender segregation in institutions. At the beginning of the 2004/2005 school year, several Iraqi universities received bomb threats demanding that men be separated from women on campus. One ministry has designated segregated elevators for women. In many schools, the veil has been imposed on young girls at the elementary level <sup>(19)</sup>.

Apart from their shaken personal security, women have also fallen victim to economic insecurities as a direct consequence of the conflict. They have had to shoulder the entire burden of maintaining their households because of the unemployment or loss of their husbands and sons while dealing simultaneously with cutbacks in, or the destruction of basic services, including fuel, water and electricity.

## Conclusions

As the conflict continues, it is difficult to draw accurate conclusions about freedom from fear in Iraq. The relevant information is thickly scattered across the contending, and at times, contentious databases of international and national agencies, and is sometimes affected by their respective institutional preoccupations. Yet however confusing this wealth of data may be, especially for Iraqis, it is quite evident that levels of violence are appalling.

(16) Al Sabah Newspaper, civil society and family, No. 843, dated 25/5/2006.

(17) Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, central organization of statistics and IT, survey of living conditions in Iraq 2004, volume 2, analytical report, p 107

(18) Asma'a Jamil Rashid, *ibid.*

(19) Asma'a Jamil- Social Picture and Self Image of Women in Iraqi Society – unpublished PhD Dissertation, Sociology Department, faculty of arts, 2006, p 94.

This chapter has dealt only with the effects of violence in a limited way. It has directed attention to particular segments of the population, notably migrants, minorities, children and women, because of their particular vulnerabilities. One can only say that, judging by the experience of other war-torn countries, anxiety, if not outright trauma, will persist well into the adult lives of today's children, some of whom may have been lost to the streets for a generation.

The relationship between human security and human development in Iraq seems to be clear. Human development is defined as the expansion of people's choices and the fulfilment of their capabilities. The insecurities presented in this chapter suppress people's options (freedoms and rights) and disrupt the exercise of their capabilities (through education, employment and good health). The ongoing violence in Iraq directly affects the basic constituents of human development by depriving people of:

- The capacity to live healthy and extended lives.
- The choice to acquire knowledge.
- The right to a basic livelihood.
- The opportunity to participate in shaping their own development.

The risk exists that short-term impacts on human security may have longer-term impacts on human development. Reducing that risk begins with two basic policy directions:

- Careful, holistic and preventive interventions: Of utmost priority are the return of displaced people and refugees, with adequate provision for their reintegration, and the protection of minorities women and children.
- A re-evaluation of the reciprocal relationship between state security, which is established through good governance, and the well-being of people, built on human security. These are equal parts of a complex equation yet, under present conditions, it has so far not been possible to give due weight to both. The security of the State, upheld by force and accomplished through institutional change, appears to be the pre-eminent concern at this time, one which, under conditions of lawlessness, strife and conflict, is not unfounded. Yet unless the rule of law co-exists with genuine and thoroughgoing efforts to protect and build people's personal, political, economic and social security, the foundations of a durable social contract with citizens may not come into place. Events since 2003 indicate the urgency of rebuilding such a contract in recognition of the mutually reinforcing relationship between a strong yet tolerant State and citizens who feel secure in their identities and prospects within it.









4

## Part 2

### The State in Transition

#### Chapter 4

##### A Troubled Move Towards Democracy



Salim Abdullah

**Brass**

## The Importance of Political Transformation to Human Development

Part I showed that, since the 1980s, human development in Iraq has undergone a sharp decline on almost all key indicators. The gains from years of hard work were lost as a result of wars and economic sanctions. Subsequent to the occupation of Iraq on 9 April 2003, which marked a turning point in the history of the modern state, a radical process of political transformation began. Such sudden changes were not easily assimilated, and created a climate of chaos which in turn led to a general state of insecurity. According to this report's opinion poll on human security, this insecurity is largely attributed to political upheaval.

The transformation from a totalitarian regime to a democratic system based on political pluralism demands a transitional phase. Such a phase serves as a historical cut-off point. It provides a breathing space in which to leave the past behind, to initiate the formation of new institutions and value systems and to bring the people on board. Iraq since the invasion in April 2003 has had no such intermediate stage. This may partly explain why the transformation into which it was catapulted has been accompanied by social, political, economic and security problems, which pose serious challenges to sustainable human development. The transformation has come with high costs, both in human and material terms.

This chapter falls into two sections. The first section describes the process of laying down democratic foundations indispensable to fuller participation by all the people. The second section analyses obstacles which have hindered the democratic process. It focuses, in particular, on insecurity, which both as a cause and an effect, has conspired to abort what might otherwise have emerged spontaneously from the process of transformation itself.

## The Establishment of Democratic Institutions

### More Haste Equals Less Speed

The strategy for administering Iraq, once military objectives had been achieved, was never clear. The situation led to the establishment of a civil administration which commenced its work through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), assembled in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1483. On 23 May 2003, amid wide surprise and concern, the American civil governor, Ambassador Paul Bremer, abruptly issued orders to dismantle existing state structures.<sup>(1)</sup>

The CPA established an Iraqi Governing Council in July 2003 and, hastily, the nucleus of an Iraqi government. Then came the first steps in the establishment of the new government.<sup>(2)</sup> The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) created a

(1) Paul Bremer III, "My Year in Iraq", 2006, chapter 4.

(2) For discussion on American policies and the emergence of the Iraqi political class during the difficult transition process, see former Minister of Trade in the first cabinet of 2003, Minister of Finance in the 2nd cabinet, Ali A. Allawi, "The Occupation of Iraq, Winning the War, Losing the Peace", Yale University Press, 2007.

timetable for the implementation of urgent and crucial measures in record time, including National Assembly elections as a prelude to the setting up of the transitional government and the Constitutional Committee. On 30 June 2004, sovereignty was transferred to an interim Iraqi government, the first task of which was to prepare for elections.

Security Council resolution (1546) in 8 June 2004 blessed the transfer of sovereignty. Willing to end occupation and Iraq gets its independence but it allowed the presence of Multi-National Forces (MNF) according to the request of Iraqi government, which was extended by resolutions: (1637) 2005, (1723) in 2006 and (1790) in 2007 to 31 December 2008 as a final date where a new Treaty will be in place which determine the future of MNF in Iraq.

## Empowerment through Political Participation

Freedom is at the heart of human development, with democracy as the institution which safeguards this freedom. Democracy is the only means that enables people to choose a political system and take part in decision-making processes. Democracy protects basic human rights,


particularly those pertaining to citizenship, equality before the law, development, individual belief, freedom of expression, and the right to live in security.

Free and fair elections are the means by which citizens are able to participate in selecting a government. Elections are responsible for establishing and consolidating the foundations of the political system, which should in turn protect the rights and freedoms of the people. Freedom is political, economic and social. It refers to both groups and individuals within them. The freedom to live unharmed can come about only when the security of the individual in any group is ensured, and when basic needs for food, clothing and shelter can be met.

In spite of many difficulties, and for the first time in more than fifty years, the Iraqi people successfully implemented the various tasks associated with a true democratic process, one that abides by an established set of rules and conforms to international standards. Iraqis reached this kind of political system without having laid the necessary foundations of democracy. True democracy is an ongoing and long-term process, but time for such a gradual change was not available. Indeed, Iraq saw *three major elections at the national level in one single year*.

First, the Interim National Assembly was elected in January 2005. This body was charged with drafting the country's permanent constitution. This was followed, on 15 October 2005, by the referendum on the Constitution. Finally, on 15 December 2005, parliamentary elections were held. Out of a total of 15,568,702 registered voters, 12,191,133 Iraqis cast their votes in 31,348 polling stations – employing some 200,000 officers – distributed among the different governorates of Iraq. Some 126,125 Iraqi observers, 494 international observers, and 272,295 agents representing the various political groups, monitored the parliamentary elections. The result led to 275 Members of Parliament being elected

**Figure 4.1** Participation in the Electoral Process in 2005 (%)



Source: AbdulHussein Hindawi, background paper for Iraq NHDR 2008

after more than 7,655 candidates competed for parliamentary seats under 307 registered political entities including 19 coalitions. In addition, no fewer than 300,000 Iraqis resident abroad were able to cast their votes at 95 polling centres in 15 countries. A remarkable feature of the elections was the systematic increase in the number of voters as the process unfolded (Figure 4.1).

The road towards elections was not an easy one, and Iraqis sacrificed a great deal on the way. Nevertheless, with the boycott of these first elections by a significant sector of the Iraqi population, the results indicated a new political polarization that further complicated the political scene. It delayed the formation of the interim government until 28 April 2005 when a majority of 180 MPs (out of a total of 185) in the Interim National Assembly finally gave the new government a vote of confidence.<sup>(3)</sup>

## Widening Participation: The Formation of Political Parties

Ever since the establishment of the modern Iraqi state in 1921, the relationship between the state apparatus and the political parties has been turbulent. While successive Iraqi constitutions provided on paper for the formation of political parties, numerous orders were issued over the years either to suspend the activities of certain parties, to dissolve them or to deem joining them a criminal offence punishable by law, sometimes resulting in a death sentence. By the end of the 1970s, this tense relationship led to the breakdown of the multi-party system and the de facto acceptance of a one-party state.

This political landscape ended abruptly on 9 April 2003, the date when numerous political parties emerged in record time, their number eventually exceeding 160. This figure cannot be exact since there was no specific Party Act, which would stipulate that, before a party can be

### Box 4.1

### History Matters

Human development in Iraq should be founded on the essential consideration of many crucial issues that were glossed over in the past. These issues include democracy, participation, and human rights. Iraq is in possession of the material and moral resources that should theoretically enable it to create one of the most active democratic systems in the Arab world. These resources include huge oil wealth which, wisely managed, could support an economic renaissance led by a dynamic, progressive and outward-looking middle-class. This wealth also offers ample means for building social equity. Iraq also has a strong agricultural sector, and historical treasures that could promote an open and flourishing tourist industry. Moreover, the country possesses rich intellectual traditions that can be put to good effect in rebuilding the new Iraq. By its very nature, Iraqi society is open and tolerant.<sup>(1)</sup>

Contrary to widespread misperceptions, the Iraqi Nationalist Movement, which began after the Young Turks Revolt in 1908, was characterized by extensive cross-ethnic cooperation between Sunni and Shi'i Arabs, Christians, Jews, Kurds and other ethnic groups. The Movement catalyzed a rich profusion of associations that brought the different groups together: programmatic political parties, professional associations, women's and student's organizations and labour unions. It also stimulated the growth of a large and vigorous press that pushed for greater democratization and the expansion of civil society.

This democratic political culture grew vigorously during a period of parliamentary rule and constitutional monarchy lasting from 1920 to 1958...the political system offered a modicum of democracy, in the form of negotiation and dialogue among political parties... Even if the Iraqi populace were not addressed.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, innovative literary and artistic movements challenged traditional forms of authority and drew upon Iraq's multi-civilization heritage, emphasizing tolerance and cultural pluralism.

The policy implications of this historical perspective are threefold.

First, Iraq's modern history suggests that the sectarian politics that currently confront Iraq are not primordial - a function of 'ancient hatreds' - but rather historically contingent. That is, they are the outcome of the economic, social and political decay that begun during the Iran-Iraq war, but dramatically increased once sanctions were imposed in 1990 during the Gulf War.

Second, if Iraq's ethnic groups were able to engage in cooperative political participation in the past, and then such cooperation is possible again in the future.<sup>2</sup>

Source: (1) Eric Davies. "Support Strategies for Democracy" in Iraq ([http://www.usip.org/pubs/reports\\_arabic.html](http://www.usip.org/pubs/reports_arabic.html))

(2) Eric Davis, "Rebuilding a Non-Sectarian Iraq", *Strategic Insights*, Volume VI, Issue 6, December 2007, Center for Contemporary Conflict, The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

(3) Abdul Hussein Hindawi, Background paper for Iraq NHDR, 2008

*The freedom to form political parties is the only safety valve for any multi-party system, and is one of the basic elements of democracy. But such freedom remains a mere abstraction unless supported by a mindset that is genuinely informed by the needs of society as a whole and is removed from ethnic or sectarian polarization. Such polarization is the hallmark of many a political party in Iraq today.*

allowed to operate, a formal permit must be obtained or the appropriate authorities at least informed. Thus, quite a few parties were merely ill defined gatherings with no specific aims and objectives. In fact the majority of these did not even have Rules of Procedure or a Programme of Action, let alone a register of members. These anomalies became glaringly clear when the Political Parties and Entities Law (part of Order 97 of 7 June 2004, which represented the legal framework for elections) stipulated that political entities including political parties must all be registered, and that a party wishing to participate in the elections must first submit its Rules of Procedure. In no way can this large number of parties be seen as a quantitative reflection of the ideological contours of the political map, nor as a response to societal needs. Rather, the explosion originated in a chaotic and emotional reaction to the previous forcible suppression of multi-party activities by the state. It can thus be viewed as an expression of nostalgia for a lost multi-party ethos.

The results of the last election (15 December 2005) clearly indicate how this huge number of parties simply failed to win the confidence of voters. This outcome cannot be explained merely in terms of the atmosphere of minority identity assertion dominating that election. Almost all of the parties involved based their ideologies on the principle of identity. A better explanation for the results might lie, on the one hand, in the average Iraqi voter's less-than-perfect knowledge of these new parties and, on the other, in the residual public mindset following years of acquiescence in the one-party state, particularly among the generation which had grown up under it. Pluralism had become a reality, even before the approval of the 2005 Constitution, which, in Article 39, provides that "the freedom to establish political parties and associations or to belong to any of them shall be guaranteed".

## Writing the Constitution: the People's Opportunity to Exercise their Choice

Given timetable constraints, one of the most difficult problems faced by the National Assembly was the process of drafting the Constitution. This did not go according to the plan drawn up by the State Interim Administration Act. Disparate opinions and interests added to the difficulties, and the draft constitution could not be delivered on the target date of 15 August 2005. This forced the National Assembly to amend the State Interim Administration Act to allow for a postponement until 22 August 2005. Even by this date, the draft was not completely ready, as there were differences still to be resolved between the major players.

The hurried drafting of the Constitution led to two major problems. The first was the failure to achieve popular consensus over its text. The contributions of certain parties to the deliberations in preparing the draft were not taken into consideration. The second shortcoming had to do with the text of the Constitution itself. Key paragraphs, such as those dealing with the issue of the 'federation' and with the levy and collection of taxes, were awkwardly worded and gave rise to ambiguity, with all its risks of future disagreement and misinterpretation.

In fact, the Constitution as a whole lends itself to interpretations that can fuel ethnic and sectarian divisions. The Constitution could have better handled increasing divisions in Iraqi society through a more adequate treatment of the following points:

- The idea of federation (Article 140 pertaining to Kirkuk, the governorate in dispute between the Kurds and the Turkmen).
- The principle of natural resource exploitation (Article 111) and (Article 112) concerning the right of each

region to draw up contracts and exploit its own resources.

- The freedom of the individual to choose a religious creed (Article 41).


Had these matters been addressed more effectively, a document of national consensus would have emerged and could have become the political bedrock of national unity. Unfortunately, this was not the case.

Participation in the referendum over the Constitution reached a level of 63 % nationwide. The number of those who cast their votes was particularly high in six governorates (72 %), with eleven governorates recording above average turn out, ranging between 54 % and 66 %, and only one governorate at just 38 percent, a particularly low percentage. The results of the referendum were in favour of the Constitution.

This endorsement paved the way for legislative parliamentary elections. The various political groups were quick to prepare for the date set, 15 December 2005, regrouping into new coalitions or updating existing lists of candidates. And now that all groups and sects were taking part, the scope for new possibilities was much wider than in the interim assembly elections. Thus, new groups emerged with a diverse range of allegiances: national, pan-Arab, sectarian and religious, each claiming its share of constituencies and basing its attraction on 'identity'.

After the announcement of the parliamentary election results, an acute political crisis erupted over the formation of the government. Negotiations continued among the various political blocs and parties in parliament, and a cabinet was formed, the largest ever in the history of Iraq. The new government won a vote of confidence on 20 May 2006, that is, five months after the announcement of the election results. But the hoped-for

**Figure 4.2** Political Participation of Women in the World



*The constitution may be commended for its affirmative action favouring women. It is stipulated that the proportion of women's participation shall not be less than 25 percent of parliamentary seats (Article 49:4).*

**Box 4.2** The Opinion Poll on Human Security - What Elements Constitute a Threat to Political Security?

Violence, the sudden, unprepared shift to democracy, oppression, political despotism and the abolition of military conscription are all closely bound up with human security. People's opinions on these matters are important indicators of what poses a threat to current security and what they see as the way to curb such threats: 95% of respondents agree that defeating terrorism is a sure way of promoting individual security, a belief that places them alongside the general public worldwide.

*These organizations suffered from serious weaknesses regarding awareness of their roles, their relationship with the state and their ideological and organizational make-up. This of course does not mean that there were no serious, active and effective organizations out to raise awareness and advocate for democratic transformation.*

stability of the political process remained elusive. Differences continued to rage within and between the different political blocs, leading to the withdrawal of some from the cabinet, which had already started addressing the urgent and thorny issues of security, the economy and political life.

## Civil Society Organizations in Transition

The notion of a civil society emerges from social, economic and political transformations that, for the past three centuries, have taken place across the Western world. The concept is part of a historical chain of events. As a result, there have been numerous philosophical and ideological attempts to distinguish between the state and society, and between the public sphere and the private sphere. The state and the political authority are seen in terms of a social contract, while the people serve as the sole source of all powers. In the Arab world, civil society, as it exists in the West, is in its infancy. For that reason, and given the range of actors and activists loosely organized outside the formal sphere of officialdom, it may be more accurate to refer to such groups as non-state actors.

In a number of developing countries, including Iraq, the relationship between the state and society has always been unclear and ill-defined. These countries tended to adopt the nation state model after independence and, in the formative stages, their experiments suffered from a number of flaws, notably excessive state power over society. The state frequently over-extended its authority, exercising strict control, restricting the scope of other structures and enlarging its dominion to such an extent that the growth of a parallel civil society was significantly thwarted. This tendency was exacerbated in many countries by the rise of autocracy as a political system. Autocratic rule is characterized by the

predominance of a single voice, the ruling party in a one-party state. At the level of development, the result has, in varying degrees, been damaging to vital structures. Since its inception in 1921, the modern Iraqi state has veered in the direction of such an autocratic model, culminating in the previous regime. This tendency towards an inflated state apparatus was reinforced by a rentier economy and by the nature of successive political systems which obstructed the foundations of civil society.

## Laying Down the Foundations of Civil Society: Promoting Participation

After April 2003, there was what might be called a declared political will – albeit at variance with the popular will – to correct the relationship between the state and society, particularly at the legislative level. The process was not without irregularities which involved the attempted imposition of restrictions such as the freezing of bank accounts, an intransigent and unhelpful attitude towards granting permits, the suspension of permits granted, and other forms of obstructionist bureaucracy. Nevertheless, subsequent years saw the emergence of a huge number of non-state institutions, which numbered 5,669 registered entities by the end of October 2007.

Overall, the following summary may shed better light on the problems:

- A large number of these organizations failed to perform their most important tasks adequately. These included overseeing the performance of the state or local authority, monitoring adherence to the constitution and the law, ensuring protection of human rights, supporting the new climate of a multi-party state and protecting freedom of expression. In fact, many of these organizations tried to justify and make more palatable some of the violations in these areas.



- Some organizations owed their existence to the support of religious parties and institutions, which exploit the symbolic identity of certain well-defined groups. This created a conflict between the interests of these groups and the notion of a civil society.
- The fact that some of these organizations were built on national, ethnic, religious, tribal or other traditional bonds led to conflicts both within and between them. This often distorted the very idea of what a civil society stands for.
- The majority of these organizations were politicized, with strong links to influential political parties with their own ideological agendas. This effectively disempowered them and limited their ability to speak for civil society as a whole.

How these organizations were funded imposed real restrictions on their operations. Their independence was frequently compromised by their obligations to their donors, and this often put them in conflict with the real needs of society. In general, these organizations began to appear in an atmosphere of confusion, lack of experience and in some cases a poor understanding about what civic organizations are supposed to accomplish. Consequently, the majority suffered from structural weaknesses in the areas of institutionalization, organization, administration and strategy development.

## Entering the Media Age

After April 2003, restrictions were removed on satellite receivers, mobile phones and the Internet. Bans were also lifted from satellite TV stations, radio stations, the publication of newspapers and magazines, and the import of foreign newspapers and magazines<sup>(4)</sup>.

At the political level, the integration of Iraq into the media age symbolized that a transformation towards democracy was taking place. It signaled the end of the autocratic regime, with its restrictions on communication with the modern world. From a more general perspective, media participation in Iraq conveyed the message that the country had re-joined a global network and was determined to remain within it. After all, freedom of expression constituted a crucial element in the political culture which pervaded Iraq following the fall of the dictatorship<sup>(5)</sup>, illustrating its opening up to the world after many years of isolation. The number of Internet users shot up from 4,500 before 2003 to 261,000 by April 2007.

Despite the absence of comprehensive and accurate statistics on the new newspapers and magazines, radio and satellite stations and web sites established after April 2003, some basic figures are available and can be reported.

In the first three months after the fall of the totalitarian regime, more than 180 newspapers were published for the first time. Mosul alone saw the publication of more than 40 newspapers in one month,

*A free media is one of the basic elements of democracy. Iraq entered the media age rather abruptly.*

**Table 4.1** Communication and Information Technology for 1990, 2007

Indicators	1990	2007
Telephone lines per 100 people	5.6	5.1
Mobile phones per 100 people	0.0	39.1*
No. Internet users per 100	0.0	11.3%
Personal computers in use per 100 people	3.6	5.1
Satellite use per 100 people	32	69

Source: Department of Transportation Statistics Reports, COSIT  
\* This number refers to the value of indicators for 2004

(4) Hayder Saeed, background paper for Irq NHDR, 2008.

(5) Hayder Saeed, op. cit.

in stark contrast with the days of the single newspaper (Al Hadbaa'), which had been published for some 25 years by the Information Office of the Governorate<sup>(6)</sup>. However, out of the 180 news papers published nationwide, more than 130 ceased publication soon after they started, and today there are only about 30 daily and weekly newspapers<sup>(7)</sup>, with 14 dailies published in Baghdad alone<sup>(8)</sup>.

As for regular magazines and periodicals, there are now 40, nearly half of them published by non-governmental institutions<sup>(9)</sup>. In TV broadcasting, both terrestrial and satellite, Iraqi official statistics report that by September 2007, 31 satellite TV stations were operational, 17 with broadcasting permits pending<sup>(10)</sup>, and some 80 radio stations were operating

legally. A study by the Brookings Institute, "Trends in Iraq, 1 March 2008", pointed out that there were 54 commercial satellite TV stations and 114 commercial radio stations in existence at that time.

An interesting media phenomenon is the emergence of independent news agencies, which replaced the official government-run news agencies. Eight such independent agencies are now in operation, although only two of these are in fact proper agencies; the rest are freelance, drawing on news reports provided by other agencies and are thus functioning more like syndicated agencies than real news sources<sup>(11)</sup>.

More exciting, and more of a mystery at the same time, however, is the number and variety of websites focused on Iraq that can now be browsed. It is difficult to assess the character of these sites methodically or confirm their Iraqi identity or audiences, but some preliminary statistics are available. To ascertain whether these sites are in fact Iraqi, researchers look at the identity of their personnel and the nature of the content and interests addressed.

A study commissioned by the present report surveyed 1,100 Iraqi websites and concluded that<sup>(12)</sup>:

- About 264 sites (24% of the total) belong to institutions.
- About 133 sites (12%) are news-oriented.
- Most, but not all, Iraqi newspapers do not update their sites on a daily basis.
- About 396 sites (36%) are put up by individuals.
- There are 324 Iraqi blogs, a large proportion of which have adopted English as the language of the site.

#### Box 4.3 Prohibitive Cost Slows Internet Use in Iraq

A fact-finding questionnaire has shown that a lack of access to Internet providers and the prohibitive cost of Internet services are the main obstacles to the spread of Internet use in Iraq. The questionnaire, conducted by the General Corporation of Internet Services on a population sample of 3,000, 66% of whom were males, showed that 68% see the cost of this service as unaffordable. According to the questionnaire, 35% of Internet users are aged 25-40, 3% under age 12, and 32% have a secondary school certificate. Internet users in the government sector account for 44% of all users, 45% of whom stated that they had no Internet service at home. The questionnaire, which covered several Iraqi cities including Al-Najaf, Diwaniyya and Fallouja, inquired into the reasons for Internet use. It revealed that 39% of those surveyed use the Internet to acquire general or specialist scientific knowledge, and the rest for entertainment, networking and chatting. On the issue of access, 50% of those questioned said that they use Internet cafes, while 33% said that they use wireless access from their homes.

Source: Public company for internet services, Nov. 2007.

(6) "The Iraqi Press, The Heritage of the Past and the Challenges of the Future", Zuhair Al-Jezairy, p.19.

(7) Op. cit. p. 19

(8) Hayder Saeed, op. cit.

(9) Hayder Saeed, op. cit.

(10) According to Seyamend Othman, Executive director of National Committee for Information and Telecommunication in Iraqi Press, The Heritage of the Past and the Challenges of the Future, Zuhair Al-Jezairy, p.20.

(11) Interview by Hayder Saeed with Zuhair Al-Jezairy, Chief Editor of "Iraq Voices" in 23/7/2007.

(12) Hayder saeed, op.cit.

- There are 42 religious sites (3.8%).
- There are 162 cultural, artistic or literary sites (15%).
- About 80 sites (4%) are goods-and-services oriented, offering a range of services including medical advice, folk medicine, religious fatwas (or so-called Quranic medicine) and so on.
- About 48 (5 %) are chat sites.

Traditional sources of knowledge, particularly printed books, do not seem to have witnessed the same kind of radical expansion as the media. Publishing in Iraq was previously managed by a state-run central publishing house – Dar Al Shu'un Al Thaqaifiya (General Cultural Affairs) – and by other establishments such as Dar Al Ma'amun, Bayt Al Hikma, Baghdad University, Basrah University and Mosul University. Dar Al Shu'un, however, was a general publishing house, and the only organization with such status. The other outlets functioned as establishments which happened to do some publishing in certain areas and with a particular focus of interest. Nonetheless, all of them were state-run, underscoring the fact that all publishing in Iraq belonged to the state and came directly under its auspices.

The publishing situation after 9 April 2003 saw no improvement and remained the same as in the 1990s. This may be explained in terms of the continuous setbacks incurred in reconstructing the state, as well as a deficient publishing infrastructure, inadequate funding, poor marketing and restrictive publication laws. Whatever the root causes, over the years Iraq has not seen the founding of independent publishing houses, except for a few publishers who previously operated outside the country.

During 2004, 2005 and 2006, the average number of books published by Dar Al Shu'un was fewer than 100 per year. However, in the four years prior to the invasion (1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002), some 170 books were published each year.

These figures pale into insignificance when compared to the output of the 1980s, with a peak of 523 books published in 1986 alone.

In terms of freedom of expression, three serious setbacks have pushed Iraq to the lower ranks internationally during the past few years. The first was the attempt by an increasingly controlling state to place firm

**Table 4.2** Iraqi Websites (September 2007)

Type	Number	Percent
Institutional websites:	264	24
Government institutions	42	3.8
Civil society organizations	50	4.54
Political parties and entities	81	7.36
Tribal groups	4	0.36
Newspapers and magazines	60	5.45
Other	31	2.81
News sites, including	148	13.45
Electronic editions of newspapers	40	3.63
Magazines/periodicals	20	1.81
News	73	6.45
News agencies	8	0.72
Individual websites:	396	36
Blogs	324	29.45
Religious	42	3.8
Other	30	2.72
Cultural, artistic and literary	162	14.72
Services	40	3.63
Chat	48	4.36
Particular political leanings	42	3.8
Total	1100	100

Source: Hayder Saeed, background paper for the Iraq NHDR, 2008.

*The media is a crucial element in any democracy, and as long as a true democratic movement is not in place, the media will remain weak and dependent.*

*Democracy is a long-term and complex process. Even in established democracies, democratic systems are subject to continual modification and at times face setbacks.*

clamps on the media. The second was the transfer of censorship from the state to society, which explains why Iraq has seen such a large number of journalists killed in the performance of their duties. The Brookings Institute's report indicates that, by March 2008, 126 journalists had been killed in Iraq. The third is connected with a traditional view of the media's mission to which Iraqi journalists subscribe, namely that the media has a galvanizing role to play on issues of identity, which is partly responsible for the emergence of sectarian and ethnic journalism.

The attempt to build the media in Iraq into watchdogs of state performance and promoters of democratic values, has led to two curious results. Firstly, independent media have ended up as government-run media. At first, the noticeable and significant transformation that the Iraqi media underwent seemed to be one of the salient features of the transition towards democracy. Now, five years after the fall of the dictatorship, these aspirations have

been frustrated. Secondly, removing official constraints on the media has not succeeded in setting it free because a large number of media outlets (newspapers, magazines, radio and satellite TV and websites) are controlled by owners who have no democratic objectives.

The prospects for establishing free media in Iraq are closely linked to the progress of real democracy in that country. Success on that front has been compromised by adverse conditions, both social and political.

## Challenges to Democracy in Iraq

Today, Iraq is still in transition towards democracy, and has not yet progressed beyond this phase simply because democracy cannot be achieved in a hurry. Democracy does not end at the ballot box, nor is it a mere catalogue of institutions and measures. It is a process with its own conditions, time-frame, requirements

### Box 4.4 The Legal Framework for Media Freedom

Article 38 of the Iraqi Constitution (2005) states:

"Without prejudice to public order and moral decorum, the State shall guarantee

- i. Freedom of expression through use of all media;
- ii. Freedom of the press, printing, advertising, information and publication."

The article does not touch on any of the rights related to seeking or publishing information and other forms of mass communication, or to obtaining information and news from any desired source. In other words, it does not address the principle of public disclosure or the individual's right to information.

Yet the right of the masses to knowledge and the principle of the free flow of information and ideas are central to any representative democratic system. They are essential components of any legislation claiming to show respect for human rights. The freedom to express views and ideas entails the freedom to have access to, obtain and transfer information. This is essential for upholding the culture of open government, which builds on a number of basic rights and freedoms including the right to vote and to ensure that the election process is not in any way tainted. Furthermore, freedom of information upholds transparency and thus combats corruption. It ensures the public's interest in general development and in the conduct of business transactions.

Public institutions tend to keep a great deal of information, which, if revealed, can be useful to the individual. In any democracy, such institutions of public service act on behalf of the individual and are as such authorized to keep information. But this should also come with a provision for full disclosure giving the citizen complete and unimpeded access to information pertaining to that individual, including economic assets, whether from data banks, public or private records. Such information must be constantly updated, corrected or amended as and when necessary. So long as the public interest is being served, such information must not be held in secret no matter how serious or sensitive the information happens to be. The right to information must therefore be safeguarded at all costs.

Source: Hayder Saeed, background paper for the Iraq NHDR, 2008

and cultural dimensions. To ensure that a transition to democracy is successful, it is important to generate and promote political and ideological tolerance, to encourage acceptance of diversity, difference and compromise, to promote respect for the law and to foster a genuine desire to take part in political life, with an active commitment to all that true democracy entails.

One of the most serious threats to an emerging, fragile democratic system lies in the degree of stress to which the political process is subject, and in the extent to which that process can withstand adverse conditions such as rampant violence, deteriorating security and widening differences between the political parties involved. It is however clear that democracy means more than enjoying and exercising the right to vote. For Iraq, there are many more challenges to a peaceful and smooth transition.

### 1. The Fragmented State

Any state taking on new roles in transitional periods and relinquishing traditional hegemonic leadership, indeed sometimes leading its own transformation, risks becoming fragmented (Human Development Report, Bulgaria, 2002).

In Iraq, the speed with which the authority of the state was weakened and fragmented rendered it unable to carry out the critical tasks associated with a transitional phase. Large numbers of the professional staff whose competence and experience could have been counted on in this sensitive period were thoughtlessly disbanded. The tasks that continue to need careful guiding hands include: safeguarding security and stability; institution-building on a democratic basis; eradicating remnants of the autocratic state; combating manifestations of sectarian discrimination and bigotry; mediating polarization along sectarian and ethnic lines; ending population dislocation and eviction; ensuring the return of refugees and displaced persons; and last but not least, respecting

#### Box 4.5

#### The Opinion Poll on Human Security – Building a Strong State

Iraqis take seriously the idea that the State should be strong. According to the poll on human security, the essence of good governance, which is the cornerstone of any attempt to protect the security of the individual, is a strong government (99%), a stable political regime (96.4%), and an independent legal and judicial authority (98.5%).

human rights. The question posed by these challenges is: how can a weakened authority be expected to cope with such enormous challenges?

### 2. Institution Building

Although the logic which governs the political process in Iraq seems to conform formally and legally to basic democratic criteria, the process itself lacks any democratic content. For example, a government artificially formed by sharing power among all groups goes against a basic principle of democratic governance, namely that of encouraging ‘opposition’, which would provide for checks and balances and thus accountability.

The nascent experiment has exposed the impotence of democratic institutions, such as political parties, non-state actors and the media, when called on to represent or mobilize effective expressions of public opinion. As a result of this failure, people are unaware of their political options or right to accountability by the state - important elements in the exercise of

#### Box 4.6

#### The Opinion Poll on Human Security – Ending Sectarian Violence

There was general agreement over the importance of a stable political system and of the absence of sectarian violence, as factors that contribute to a general atmosphere of security and stability. This was attested to by 98% of those who took part in the survey, across the boundaries of governorates, socio-cultural strata and gender. It reflects a general awareness of the dangers posed by sectarian violence and of the need to combat its outbreaks as a precondition for the achievement of security and stability.

political and civil rights that transcend the ballot box.

Ultimately, the Constitution of a state is a social, political and legal contract which regulates power- and wealth-sharing among the various sectors of society. In a society such as Iraq's, with its three main demographic elements, alongside a number of others, it would have been prudent to heed the seriousness of this heterogeneous mix and the implications for the way the entire political process might develop. That such prudence was not exercised is clear from significant demographic variations, an unprecedented rise of minor ethnic and sectarian identities, and the replacement of democratic consensus with the 'numerical majority' principle, all of which plagued the working out of the interim state administration Act. In the event, that process entailed hegemony, marginalization and exclusion along demographic lines, thereby rendering democratization almost meaningless.

Article 142 of the Constitution, which was added at the last minute to the draft Constitution, is perhaps the provision that can most effectively overcome omissions in the document. These omissions include the articles pertaining to the establishment of the Federal Council, the High Federal Court and its function, and the Supreme Judicial Council, as well as those measures relating to regional division. There are other

important matters such as cases of deficient performance, conflicts of authority and the distribution of economic and political power between the central government and the regions. The exercise of powers and performance of tasks assigned to the central government could be strengthened by giving it priority through the federal parliament, and by abolishing Article 115 of the Constitution, which gives priority to the regions. The matter of federalism as opposed to devolution or confederalism is yet to be settled by the Constitution. Despite the preference of all parties for devolution, and the unqualified rejection of a return to a single, centralized government, it came as no surprise that the majority of Iraqis buried their differences and stood firmly against the non-binding decision issued by the U.S. Congress recommending the division of Iraq into three parts along ethnic and sectarian lines.

### 3. Absence of Security and Trust

The causes and the effects of insecurity overlap in a remarkable way. The absence of security puts obstacles in the way of democratic transformation and, at the same time, it is one of the most important consequences of democratic transformation. This is a serious challenge and one that calls for exceptional abilities to deal with the adverse effects on the security of the individual.

*The report's opinion poll has indicated that people attribute the absence of security to the weakness of governmental authority, lost confidence in political parties, and corruption, amongst other factors.*

#### **Widespread Administrative and Financial Corruption**

Among respondents in the poll, many agreed that widespread administrative and financial corruption is a major source of insecurity. This view was shared by 89.7% of those surveyed, with 5.4% rejecting the proposition, and 4.9% abstaining. Interestingly, this almost unanimous conviction that administrative and financial corruption does harm did not vary among the different governorates unlike response to other questions in the poll. The extent of this conviction weakens in Dhi Qaar (down to 64%). As for Al Al-Muthanna and Missan, the percentage is also fairly low, but there was a high number of abstentions or 'no response' (28.6% and 33.9% respectively).

#### **Weak Functional Performance**

Of those surveyed, 75.1% endorsed the notion that absence of security has led to weaknesses in the functional performance of the authorities. The feeling is accentuated in responses from Diala (97.8%), Baghdad (89.6%), Salahuddin (93.3%), and Al-Najaf (94.5%). Governorates where fewer than 50 percent of respondents shared this view were Kerbalaa' (48.4%), Wasit (28.4%) and Al-Muthanna (31.0%, with 44.9% not responding to the question). In assessing functional performance, the educational level of respondents was a significant factor.

#### **Shaken Trust in Political Parties**

The events of 2003 led to the emergence of numerous political parties and trends in the Iraqi political arena. The increase in violence and insecurity, however, was often the prime mover of political confrontation. Of those surveyed, 70% felt that their trust in political parties was shaken by the deterioration in the security situation. This is a particularly significant result since, whereas 12.3% refrained from answering this question, only 17.6% of those surveyed disagreed with the proposition.

A shaken trust in political parties was most visible in responses from Kirkuk, Salahuddin, Al-Najaf and Dhi Qaar. It is important to note that a lack of trust in political parties shown by respondents from urban areas (72.9%) surpassed that found in rural areas (64.1%). Equally noteworthy is the correlation between the educational level of respondents and their shaken trust in political parties. The increase was systematic, with the percentage going up from 55.9% among illiterates, gradually reaching 67.6%, 68.6% and 73.8% among those at the first three basic levels of education, then 75.5% among those holding secondary school certificates, and finally 77% among holders of Diplomas or above. Trust in political parties was also weakest among the unemployed, with the figure reaching 83.2%.

#### **Shaken Trust in State Institutions**

Another adverse effect of insecurity in Iraq, according to the report's opinion poll, is a shaken trust in state institutions as a result of a general failure to solve security problems. Of those surveyed, 56.7% felt that their trust had been weakened, while 33.8% claimed the opposite, with 9.5% abstaining.

While clear inter-governorate variations appear in the opinions expressed, these differences require some reflection on how each governorate reacted. In 3 governorates, the lack of trust was sweeping: Diala (92.6%), Salahuddin (88%) and Al-Najaf (80%). Although armed conflict and an almost total loss of security may well be the reason behind Diala's responses, in Salahuddin and Al-Najaf other factors such as administrative and financial corruption, or party, religious or tribal loyalties may have been responsible.

#### **Faith in Freedom**

Despite the turbulence affecting most Iraqis and their livelihoods, more than half of those surveyed confirmed that the loss of security did not change their belief in freedom (53.1% as opposed to 37.9% arguing the opposite).

Here also, there was a clear inter-governorate variation. More than 50% of those surveyed in Diala, Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Babil, Al-Najaf, Al-Qadisiya, Missan, and Basrah stated that the loss of security did not change their belief in freedom. In Nineveh and Wasit, on the other hand, more than 50 percent said the opposite. But it is important to note that quite a large number of respondents refused to answer this question: 22.2% in Kirkuk, 17.8% in Kerbalaa, 36.3% in Al-Qadisiya, 61% in Al-Muthanna, 35.1% in Missan and 20.4% in Basrah refrained from answering, which may be explained by a general lack of awareness of what freedom involves both as a concept and a right in practice.

#### **Opposition to Democratic Practices**

A similar explanation may apply to answers about democracy. 58.8 percent of those surveyed maintain their support of democratic practices, despite the absence of security. This may be compared with 31.8% opposing the practice of democracy on the grounds of weakened security. Of those surveyed, 9.4% abstained.

No major differences of opinion were detected over this issue, although there was some inter-governorate variation. More than 50% of those surveyed in Baghdad, Babil, Kerbalaa', Wasit, Salahuddin, Al-Najaf, Qadisiyya, Missan, and Basrah expressed opposition to democratic practices, which they believed had caused a loss of security. On the other hand, in Nineveh, Kirkuk, Diala and Al-Anbar, which have suffered badly from instability and the absence of security, more than half did not agree that democracy was the cause.

The transitional phase in Iraq offers important lessons, which serve to illustrate the relationship between progress and individual security, and how these two elements interact with the past, posing new challenges for sustainable human development.

Semi-democratic regimes and those moving towards democracy tend to be more vulnerable and thus more likely to face conflicts in the process. The history of wars and peace in any country is a good predictor of impending conflicts and civil wars. The longer the periods of peace in a society, the less likelihood that conflict will erupt. Peaceful relations create a collective sense of confidence. Conflict and hostile relations, on the other hand, increase lack of trust and the real danger of a setback. Thus, the eruption of armed conflicts in Iraq might have been predicted if recent history, and the lessons from the three wars which the region saw in less than 25 years, had been heeded.

## Conclusions

The unprepared, hasty and at times careless manner in which democratic transition has been imposed and conducted has not been beneficial to the process of human development. Conflicts and tensions inherent in the society that could have been anticipated and addressed by constitutional and political means have reduced the security of the people and risk undermining the important process of transition. Violence not only threatens human development and security; it reverses previous achievements.

The management of this accelerated transformation has proven costly in terms of the loss of human life. Senseless violence continues to claim the lives of innocent people, threatens the unity of the country and indicates the likelihood of future sectarian conflict. The human cost may also be seen in the large number of refugees fleeing the country in search of safe haven.

The transitional phase has witnessed different forms of violence, some of it in the guise of demands for democratic rights. When a society does not yet possess a culture of human and civil rights, the rapid development of such a culture, through struggle, has wide human impacts. It is not yet clear whether the shock produced by the violent imposition of democracy will actually prove the undoing of democracy by unleashing regressive forces and fanning popular discontent.

## A Changing Horizon?

Despite the problems and difficulties which accompanied the process of transformation, there has been undeniable, if slow progress towards a new horizon. The move towards democracy has raised awareness of what the concept of freedom entails, and has expanded the scope of political and civil freedoms, as the country has moved away from central control and dictatorship. But it has to be acknowledged that, like rights, freedoms are indivisible and complement one another. This is precisely what the general framework of the political process failed to provide for the emerging democracy. Other freedoms did not materialize: freedom from need, from fear, and from discrimination. Nor have freedom of expression, freedom of development, freedom from injustice, and the freedom to work come into place to satisfy the new appetite for democracy in many quarters.

This turbulence has, despite all odds, made room for the principle of effective political participation, has succeeded in securing a reasonable level of participation by women, and has produced political elites that can be relied upon to acquire experience through participation and become leaders in the process of change. Despite its fragility, the experience has laid the foundations of a civil society that is becoming aware of its role and functions. It has also begun to unshackle a media that, although still short of enjoying all the privileges granted by the constitution, can still engage in effective dialogue with its international counterparts.



Iraq is undergoing some radical transformations and it is a country where many contradictions still exist. This inevitably means that trust has to be rebuilt, on the one hand, between one ethnic or religious group and another and, on the other hand, between society and the state. Shattered trust is a reflection of general insecurity, widespread corruption, functional deficiencies in the performance of institutions, and failed public services. A consensus involving the agreement of the various political parties involved must now become a priority as one of the most important pillars in the construction of a democratic system.

Political parties must be formed to ensure participation on non-ethnic and non-religious lines, with due participation by women. There must be room for independent institutions of civil society, and independent media to give voice to effective and strong public opinion.

Urgent attention is needed and efforts must be exerted by all national and international parties, not merely to extend humanitarian aid, but also to deepen peace and reconciliation within Iraqi society. Whether Iraq's inscrutable horizon really changes for the better in the near term will depend heavily on such efforts.





5

## Chapter 5

**Economic Transition -  
A Challenging Ride to Market Economy**



Jewad Selim

**Monument of Freedom** (study)

## Economic Transition - A Challenging Ride to Market Economy

### Introduction


This chapter sets out, in two parts, how the process of economic transition in Iraq has affected human development. The first part analyses the macro-economic policies and measures accompanying an accelerated political transition that is assumed will enlarge people's participation and opportunities. The second part discusses obstacles to the move towards a market economy in the context of human development and human security. It shows that transition has had short-term effects that, if managed correctly, should diminish with time. However, the chapter's analysis also raises questions about current economic policies and whether

they can deliver sustainable development. It considers whether total trade liberalization, delayed reconstruction, stability-biased monetary policy and expenditure-biased budgeting are likely to succeed in that respect. Its critique also takes into account that long-term distortions, total dependence on oil revenues and an enlarged public sector are not conducive to sustainable growth, investment promotion, productivity, employment generation and private sector initiatives.

Political transition has been associated with insecurities since the emergence of the new regime, while the economy remains overloaded with heavy burdens as a legacy

#### Box 5.1 The Opinion Poll on Human Security: Jobs, Income and Security

While people put personal and political security slightly ahead of economic security, they continue to look to the state for welfare services and equal job opportunities. Their attitudes bear directly on how rapidly the state can move to create a market economy through privatization and the removal of subsidies.



Unemployment and a lack of equal access to job opportunities are perceived to threaten human security directly. Along with growth in income to support better living standards, employment prospects evidently underpin most people's outlook on the future.

*Short-term policies to protect the poor such as social safety nets are not always efficient, nor do they constitute an adequate alternative to building capacities through education, health and human security.*

of the past. Comprehensive UN sanctions<sup>(1)</sup> that lasted 13 years (1990–2003) left the people of this generation burdened with debilitating debt. Long-term distortions related to heavy dependence on oil revenues is another inherited major problem. The latter in turn paved the way for state hegemony, excessive centralization, an enlarged public sector, an undiversified economy and distorted patterns of sector development.

The report's opinion poll on human security (Box 5.1) revealed that people's concerns about their economic security come second in importance to concerns over their political security (49 % compared to 51 %). However, the impact of political insecurity has overshadowed the constraints on the economy which work against the kind of expansion, income growth and stability required for investment promotion and employment generation. Such developments would create opportunities for people to make choices in life, have a decent standard of living and enjoy their freedoms. The factors that threaten economic security include the unavailability and inequality of employment opportunities, which are related to the macroeconomic policies discussed in this chapter.

### **Economic Transition: Instant Liberalization**

The Iraqi economy on the eve of the occupation had been ravaged by harsh conditions dating from the beginning of the 1980s. It was an economy ruined by years of wars, sanctions, economic mismanagement, interrupted development, infrastructural and institutional collapse and diminished opportunities for private activity.

In the first weeks after the war, ambitious goals were set for reconstructing Iraq on a free market economic model. The Civil Administrator moved quickly to issue orders that aimed to turn around the ailing centralized economy and transform it

under market principles. No clear vision or solid programme was apparent then.<sup>(2)</sup> The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) adopted 'shock therapy', focusing efforts on the banking sector and emphasizing the independence of the Central Bank of Iraq. It introduced the 'new Iraqi dinar', which completely replaced the old currency by 15 January 2004, passed a law that opened the door to foreign investment, abolished tariffs on imports, tried to reform the oil sector in an attempt to regain pre-war production rates and adopted employment programmes to address worsening unemployment.

Meanwhile, the United States Administration hastened to obtain Security Council approval to reduce from 25 % to 5 % the annual deductions from the proceeds of Iraqi oil exports for the settlement of accounts, foreign debt and reparations for the 1991 war. Security Council resolution No. 1483 (22 May, 2003) stipulated that oil revenues (as well as the credit set aside by the UN 'Oil-for-Food' Programme) must be deposited in a fund called the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) and used to pay the costs of reconstruction. Disbursements from this Fund were to be controlled by the United States and the United Kingdom.

However, the resolution lacked guarantees for its transparent operation. It did not contain a "provision that authorizes the establishment of a mechanism for complaints or a measure of this kind by means of which the Iraqis can challenge the legality of certain projects or the way contracts are made". In a more hopeful development, the appointment by the UN Secretary-General of a special representative to work with the coalition forces in rebuilding Iraq opened the way for the practical termination of economic sanctions and the resumption of oil exports. It also terminated the Oil-for-Food Programme within six months and authorized the transfer of responsibility for the remaining activities of the programme to the CPA.

(1) The Campaign Against Sanctions web site for the variety of NGO's working on Iraqi humanitarian aspect prior to the war: <http://www.casi.org.uk/reader>

(2) See Ali A Alawi, War on Iraq, op.cit

## Monetary and Fiscal Policies

At the level of monetary policy, the so-called rules-based informatics or signals to generate stability in the financial market were adopted. These are a substitute for direct intervention in the market, which can disrupt efficient financial brokerage. Money growth rates are determined in line with the real flows of goods and services, in order to maintain a balance between the goods and services market and the money market. The goal is to realize the highest rates of GDP growth with the lowest levels of annual inflation (no more than 3%). This is a staple international indicator of macroeconomic stability. Within the financial sector, the Central Bank acts as a seller of bonds in the money market in order to control liquidity to counter inflation.

After the replacement of the old currency, and in order to prevent possible repercussions from this and limit administrative and financial corruption, the state cancelled multiple exchange rates. There had been more than 16 different rates in 2003, ranging between \$3.37 per dinar as the official exchange rate and 2,000 dinars per dollar in the commercial exchange markets.<sup>(3)</sup> After the adoption of a unified commercial exchange rate, the monetary authority was able to keep this stable at 1,465–1,480 dinars per US dollar in 2005 and about 1,250 dinars per US dollar in 2007. This was achieved through daily auctions in the banking system for the purchase of Iraqi dinars and by selling the state's dollar revenues from oil exports.

In the spirit of *laissez-faire*, interest rates were allowed to float and banks were left to determine interest rates offered to depositors or imposed on credits provided to borrowers. This increased the efficiency of resource distribution between economic sectors and reduced some distortions in the capital market. This is, on the one hand,

because the volume of credit provided to the non-commercial productive sectors is still small compared with the needs of the national economy or investors. On the other, it is because interest rates are still low and largely negative when compared with the rates of inflation, which have amounted to about 36% annually during the past two years. Thus, it is not clear that the best policy instrument was selected.

## Raised Salaries and Rising Imports

The employee salary system – in which the salary of a newly appointed employee, including all allowances, cash aids and gratuities did not exceed 40,000– 60,000 dinars (between \$20–30) per month – was abolished. A new system was introduced under which the minimum monthly salary of a new employee with a B.A. was about 157,000 dinars (\$107). Retirement pensions were increased from 8,000 dinars per month (\$4) to 300,000 dinars (\$204). These changes have led to tangible increases in the incomes of all employees and retirees, who number close to 3.6 million people. If the dependency ratio is taken into account, the proportion of the beneficiaries from these increases could rise to about 50 % of all Iraqi people. The increases in salaries and pensions as well as in purchasing power have revitalized consumer markets and domestic and foreign trade.

However, increases in income will have no effect if they are not reflected in the expansion of people's capacity to satisfy their needs and in sustainable growth rates in the long run. This will depend largely on macroeconomic policies.

On the other hand, the policies of the CPA brought about a rise in imports owing to the lack of domestic supply and an increasing demand for new goods and services. Imports grew by about 65.6 % in 2004 compared with 2002 without affecting the situation of domestic, particularly industrial

*It should be remembered that, in the Iraqi economy, interest rates do not play an important role in the distribution of capital between the different productive sectors.*

(3) Mudher M. Saleh, Background paper to Iraq NHDR2008

*The sudden liberalization of prices, exchange rates and the market did not lead to improved efficiency in the allocation of resources. Rather, it led to decreased demand for domestic products as a result of the uncontrolled influx of foreign goods with the abolition of customs tariffs.*

production. This remained stalled because of the devastation industries had suffered during the war and through the subsequent plundering and looting. Other factors included the obsolescence of production lines and production equipment, lack of security and stability and lack of electric power.<sup>(4)</sup>

Moreover, demand for oil products increased as national power generating capacity proved unable to meet the minimum consumption needs of houses, shops, factories and farms. A large increase in the number of imported cars also contributed to higher demand. These factors led demand for gasoline to rise from 11 million litres per day in 2002 to about 24 million litres per day in 2004, according to reports by the Ministry of Oil. However, it should be noted that a significant part of this increase was not in fact due to local demand; “it is estimated that approximately 20 % of imported gasoline and diesel is smuggled to neighbouring markets, where prices are higher”.<sup>(5)</sup>

There is little doubt that the economic difficulties that confronted the new authority in Iraq precluded the achievement of reform objectives, or that political and economic mistakes led to further economic chaos. Important goals such as increasing public welfare, attracting foreign investment and strengthening the foundations for economic growth were simply not met. Moreover, the reforms exacerbated some existing problems such as unemployment and energy shortages. It also caused a further deterioration of non-oil GDP because most of the increase in output came from crude oil production and exports.<sup>(6)</sup>

## Faltering Living Standards

Macroeconomic stability is considered to be the cornerstone of the reconstruction of Iraq, the foundation of human development and a basic guarantee of the welfare of its

citizens. Monetary policy is in the forefront of policies to provide stability and low inflation and to maintain public confidence in the Iraqi dinar as a basis of dealings, a unit of account and a major wealth-preserving reservoir. Initial results included a relative moderation in prices and maintenance of a relatively stable inflation rate, especially from 2003 to early 2006, when the inflation rate was 32 % annually. However, after Iraq saw its average annual inflation rate fall to 20 % in January 2006 – the lowest in the previous three years – a fundamental adverse change set in during February that year.<sup>(7)</sup> At the end of May 2006, the consumer price index, an indicator of inflation, recorded an average rate of 53 % compared with May 2005, thus showing that the Iraqi economy was experiencing inflationary trends previously only witnessed during the period of sanctions. This level of inflation has continued under conditions of accelerating insecurity since February 2006.

## Impact of inflation

The sources of this astronomical inflation include the following:

- Partial liberalization of the prices of some goods and services provided within a programme of government subsidy has sent prices soaring. Further, the relative prices of some dominant commodities have impacted the overall level of prices, thus controlling the direction of inflation. In particular, ration cards, fuel and any related government services are provided free or almost free of charge.
- Confused government administrative intervention, whether at the level of managing the ration card system or in the distribution of fuel at official distribution outlets and stations, has led to sharp price fluctuations and spawned black or grey markets. A rapid survey conducted by the Central Organization for Statistics and Information

(4) Faik A AlRasool, “The Challenges Facing Iraqi Progress: General framework of the conditions of development in Iraq.” Background paper to “Unsaturated Basic Needs” [UBN] COSIT 2006

(5) Ali A Alawi. Ex Finance Minister in the 3rd Cabinet, “Statement on the federal budget of the Republic of Iraq 2006.” 15 November 2005, p. 6

(6) Usra Alsamarai, Background paper to Iraq NHDR2008

(7) Mudher M. Saleh, op. cit




Technology (COSIT) in mid-2005 showed that fuel costs consumed 30–60 % of the monthly disposable income of the Iraqi citizen, and that what was actually spent on fuel and lighting exceeded the consumer price index tenfold.

- Discontinued production of many local industrial, agricultural and other products that had formerly proved quite competitive in foreign trade, and their replacement by similar products imported from abroad. This has led to a record number of commodities being traded in the local market at international price levels. This has deprived the Iraqi products of the so-called price difference with other countries of the world, which had greatly benefited some local producers in the past.
- The costs of local services, which had been slowing down for years, have rapidly caught up with the prices of local and imported goods. With the costs of housing, shelter services and rents approaching commercial levels, there

has been a decrease in the demand for housing units.

- Falling levels of oil products since 2003, which forces Iraq to import these products from neighbouring countries. Coupled with the lifting of subsidies in 2005, this has caused high inflation in the two categories of fuel and electricity and transport and communications, which now account for a major portion of citizens' expenditure, having been priced low before 2003. While the inflation rate in fuel and electricity during 1996–2002 did not exceed 18 %, it rose to a staggering 71.6 % in 2007. Surveys of family budget for three decades showed that an Iraqi family used to spend around 50 % of its budget on food (60 % for poor families). However, a decrease in the Iraqi family's expenditure on food to one third of the total expenditure at present has been noticed. Figure 5.1 illustrates the rise in the consumer price index between 1994 and 2007.

**Figure 5.1** Fuel Prices Through the Roof - Consumer Price Index for the Years 1994–2006



Source: COSIT, Index Numbers Report (1994–2006)


## What removing subsidies on oil derivatives means for families

The high increases in oil derivative prices have a significant impact on the fall in living standards in Iraq. While the individual obtains oil derivatives, notably petrol and cooking or heating fuel, at nominal prices, the cost of such commodities has increased due to successive increases of the official price list. Subsequently, prices began to fluctuate in the local market from month to month, affected by variations in the quantities of imported derivatives and, consequently, scarcity in supplies as well as by normal seasonal effects on prices. Fuel and energy expenses surged by an unprecedented 590% during 2002-2005. They jumped again at the rate of 186% for 2005-2006. In the transportation and communications sectors, prices exploded by 113% and 129% during these two periods respectively. Current family expenditures are presented in Figure 5.2. Household expenditure on fuel increased from 11% to 35% after subsidy cut.

## Propping up human security: ration cards and subsidies

The kinds and quantities of subsidized food items now available through the ration card system constitute Iraq's most important social protection network. This programme, begun as a response to the sanctions following the 1991 Gulf War, now covers more than 90% of the population and is implemented by some 50,000 food sale agents. A survey on the food security of vulnerable groups for the year 2007 showed that 95.3% of families prefer to receive the food items card rather than the cash compensation, and that some 930,000 people -- 3.1% of the survey community -- lack food security. They badly need humanitarian assistance, *including food*. The survey also indicated that 2.8 million people (9.4% of the survey community) will be added to the food insecurity group if they are deprived of the current allocations. All in all, 47% of Iraqis will face serious food insecurity unless the central government conducts a careful evaluation of their needs. It should be borne in mind that without the ration card, 25.5% of Iraq's families live on less than \$1 per day. Loss of the ration card alone increases that proportion by 20%.<sup>(8)</sup>

**Figure 5.2** Share of Spending on Fuel of Energy in Household Expenditure %



Source: COSIT, Field Study on the Impact of Raising Prices of Oil Derivatives on Household Expenditure, 2006

## Economic Transition: Five Stumbling Blocks

### 1. A Legacy of Skewed Development

The past years have deepened the imbalance between commodity production sectors and service and distribution sectors. The oil sector now makes up the lion's share of GDP at 70%. Next is the services sector at 22% of GDP<sup>(9)</sup>. The industrial sector's contribution has gone down from 9% of GDP to less than 1.5%. The agricultural sector (more than 8 million people live in rural areas) now contributes only 6.5% of GDP, while it was 35% three decades ago.

While the oil sector dominates the economy, it contributes no more than 2%

to the make-up of the Iraqi work force. This means that 98% of the labour force is employed in sectors that contribute no more than 30% to GDP, mostly engaged in fragile service activities. In effect, if oil production is excluded, the Iraqi economy is now a weak service economy, with an even weaker production sector. These skewed developments have serious impacts reflected in the following trends<sup>(10)</sup>:

- The lopsided role of the services sector in an economy which lacks a sophisticated and flexible production system has led to an accumulation of cash income that has increased consumer demand, but not the means to satisfy it.
- Increased consumer expenditure, without an appropriate response from the local production system, has become the driving force for the growth of

**Table 5.1** Breakdown of Direct and Indirect Subsidies, 2005-2007

Subsidy	Beneficiaries	Type of subsidy	Amount in US \$		% of Total Budget Allocations	
			2005	2007	2005	2007
<b>Direct</b>						
Ration card system	All Citizens	Foodstuffs	4000	2618.7	21.1	8.44
Social Safety Net System	Needy /poor families	Cash	—* <sup>*</sup>	635.0	—* <sup>*</sup>	1.5
<b>Indirect</b>						
Electricity and fuel	Household, Transport, Industry	Under valued real prices/ not shown in Budget unless replaced by imports	6793.9	8989.9	35.9	29.1
Agriculture	Farmers and land owners	Prices, subsidies on seeds, fertilizers, machinery, fuel	200	259.9	1.1	0.84
State owned enterprises	Employees and part-time workers	Salaries and wages	597	1188.8	3.2	3.85
Imported oil products and electricity	Households and factories	Subsidized prices of fuel and electricity	2863.6	761	15.1	2.47
Public services: water supply, sewage	Families and sick people	Free	181.2	507	1	0.67
Medicine			578	575.3	3.1	1.86
Other			210.9	283.9	1.1	0.92
<b>Total</b>			<b>15424.6</b>	<b>15184.5</b>	<b>81.6</b>	<b>48.2</b>

\* The SSN system was applied in 2006  
Source: General Budgets for 2005-2007, Ministry of finance.

(8) Atif Marzook, Background paper to Iraq NHDR2008

(9) Mudher M. Saleh, background paper to Iraq NHDR 2008.

(10) Mudher M.Saleh, Opicit.

*An apparent paradox in Iraq's move to a market economy: the transition has seen a significant expansion of state organs and of the number of state employees*

inflationary pressures. These pressures have further restricted domestic production and lowered living standards and individual purchasing power.

- As noted, Iraq's physical infrastructure, one of the basics of fixed capital formation, has been wrecked by the effects of wars, sanctions and negligence dating from the early 1980s. Its rehabilitation would cost, in current international prices, five times its value in 1980, estimated at \$35 billion which makes the total needs around \$150-\$200 Billion, which makes the total needs around \$150-\$200 Billion.

## 2. A Fat State in a Thin Economy

Observers are frequently surprised by an apparent paradox in Iraq's move to a market economy: the transition has seen a significant expansion of state organs and of the number of state employees, which have grown at rates above that of the economy. The explanation lies in two factors: first, the new state inherited an overstuffed apparatus

compared with the resources it runs; second, the CPA and the successive governments had to maintain and enlarge this overstaffing chiefly to absorb high unemployment. This increased the number of unskilled people in public sector jobs and, while it solved some problems of unemployment, it also created disguised unemployment since worker productivity in the sector is consequently very low.

Perhaps this case finds its clearest expression in Kurdistan Region, where the number of regional government employees has multiplied and the number of its ministries has risen from 24 in the fourth cabinet (1999–2006) to 45 in the present cabinet. Similarly, the number of ministries of the central government increased from 23 in the last cabinet before the occupation to 31 in the interim government and then to 34 in the current cabinet. The transitional years have increased the inflation of the state apparatus and increased the special weight of the new state bureaucracy in the community. No observer of the situation in Iraq can

**Table 5.2** Share of public service expenditures in total public expenditure (2007–2008)

Item	2007		2008	
	\$ in Billions	%	\$ in Billions	%
Security service	7,399	18.02	9,000	19
Other services	6,779	16.51	8,090	17
Kurdistan Region expenditures	4,752	11.57	5,394	11
Development of regions and acceleration of development in governorates	2,189	5.33	4,157	0.84
Salaries and pensions	2,879	7.03	3,630	7
Ration card system	3,117	7.6	3,273	7
Education sector services	2,686	6.54	2,927	6
Oil sector services	3,387	8.25	2,770	6
Electricity sector services	2,336	5.69	2,627	5
Health services	1,819	4.43	1,956	4
Kuwait war reparations	1,551	3.77	1,768	4
Municipal service	980	2.38	1,464	3
Subsidies for public companies (state-owned)	0.543	1.32	0.691	1
Social protection network	0.635	1.54	0.677	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>41.054</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>48.426</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Kamal Al Basri, Comments on Estimated General Budget for 2008, 18/10/2008

overlook the phenomenon of bureaucratic inflation after the occupation. The growth of a disorganized administrative apparatus has continued. Employment within the bureaucracy is still growing at a time when increases in salaries and wages exert pressure on the state budget. According to data on the state budget for 2004–2006, the number of employees working in government departments increased from 1,047 million in 2004 to 1,143 million in 2005 and then to 1,913 million in 2006. This is an increase of 866,000 employees during the past three years, which means that the government sector is growing faster than the economically active labour force.

The public sector imposes additional burdens on an already pressured state budget. Budget allocations to public sector companies for the years 2004–2006 were

about \$2.44 billion, at a time when the proceeds of these companies (excluding oil companies) did not exceed \$700 million, of which 66.7% was realized in 2005. And despite the fact that one third of projects in the public sector make accounting profits, they incur very large economic losses. The estimated number of workers and employees registered with public sector companies in 2004 was half a million. They were working in 192 government companies with total salaries of around \$533.3 million. Between 2007 and 2008, their number increased to 660,000 employees whose salaries amount to \$838 million, an increase of 2.5% (Table 5.2).

The rehabilitation and reform of public sector companies requires substantial financial resources that are difficult to provide. To solve part of the problems of

#### Box 5.2

#### Pondering Privatization

In order to unify state procedures for dealing with the public sector companies found in all economic sectors, in 2004 the transitional government formed a commission to study privatization. This body prepared a database on public sector companies and a draft law on privatization. However, a decision in April 2005 abolished the commission without mentioning the reasons.

The Council of Ministers at its meeting on 29 August 2005 re-examined the issue and decided to form a committee to study ways of reforming and rehabilitating public sector companies. It was headed by the Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation and included as members the Ministers of Finance, Industry and Minerals, the Governor of the Central Bank, the President of the Commission of Financial Control and the Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister. The committee submitted nine recommendations, the most important of which are:

- Formation of a Rehabilitation of Government Companies Agency that would take on the task of rehabilitation on behalf of all line ministries through a national programme supervised by a board of directors.
- The Agency would compensate unsatisfactory workers for their services and resignations, and would encourage them to invest these compensations in micro projects. The committee recommended a budget for economic rehabilitation for 2006 from which some 50,000–70,000 separating workers might benefit.
- Enactment of a law for the rehabilitation of government companies under which the ownership of state companies would be transferred from sector ministries and concerned agencies to the Agency. The draft law also provides the Agency the necessary powers to accomplish its tasks, including the sale of company shares and protection for their holders. It stipulates that all Agency programmes and tasks should be conducted transparently and professionally for the public benefit.
- The Agency's board of directors would comprise representatives from the concerned ministries as well as a representative of the Ministry of Planning and of the Office of Financial Control. The duration of the Agency's work would be limited to 3–6 years.

These recommendations have not yet been considered, however, because agreement has not been reached on the mechanisms for the process or its timing.

Source: Faik A. AlRasool. Background Paper to UBN, COSIT, 2006.

*Since the middle of the last century, the distribution of economic activity between the private and public sectors in Iraq has not taken a settled pattern.*

the public sector, the Ministry of Industry and Minerals hastened to lease out some of its facilities to the private sector. The issue of privatizing public sector companies has been studied and recommendations have been put forward, though not yet enacted (see Box 5.2).

### 3. The Dilemma of the Private Sector

Since the middle of the last century, the distribution of economic activity between the private and public sectors in Iraq has not taken a settled pattern. Increasing state intervention and moves to nationalize private activity in the mid-1960s drove most industrialists and owners of large businesses in Iraq to invest in imports, rather than in industry and business management where the state also had interests. The former offered lower levels of risk a short trade cycle and continuing demand, especially for basic foodstuffs. However, in the mid-1970s, the Ministry of Commerce started once again to compete with the private sector by taking on trade in foodstuffs and cereals and monopolizing their imports. The volume of private commercial business therefore declined, especially during the 1980s. However, the picture changed again in 1987 with the initiation of what was known as the administrative revolution when the state

re-considered its vision of restructuring the economy and its relationship with the private sector. The trend was enhanced in the 1990s to counter the deficit in supplied goods arising from sanctions, the weak capabilities of the state and the inflexibility of public sector companies. Consequently, the commercial sector prospered significantly.

Private activity played an important role in the national economy following a decline in the contribution of oil as a result of the economic sanctions. The value-added of the private sector formed 24.4% of GDP in 2002. Despite this, however, total private investments were small and their contribution to the formation of fixed capital was no more than 2.2 trillion dinars in 2002. The majority of these investments went into building residential and commercial units.

The transitional phase after 2003 witnessed a setback for the Iraqi private sector when industrial projects ground to a halt owing to the destructive impact of war, high production costs and the dumping on the domestic market of imported goods. Another factor was widespread insecurity and the targeting of businessmen and their families by kidnappers and killers. The flight of capital to neighbouring countries in search of more stability and security added to the problem. The volume of investments

#### Revitalization of the Private Sector and Economic Reform

One of the major tasks assumed by the state in the transitional phase is the revitalization of the private sector. Its instruments for this task include: streamlined and market-friendly government procedures; regulatory reforms to create a simplified and transparent institutional and legal framework conducive to private sector growth; and steps to rehabilitate state-owned enterprises in preparation for their transfer to the private sector. The task also requires addressing a comprehensive agenda that covers encouraging the private sector to take part in implementing projects at the national level; the restructuring of state banks to encourage mergers and privatization; expanding lending by granting small loans and credit to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); completion of the requirements for accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO); the revival of regional trade ties; increasing access to telecommunications; and finally the rehabilitation and expansion of air and rail transport and reconsideration of their sale to the private sector.

Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, (MOPDC) the National Development Strategy 2005–2007

In Iraq, the human potential and natural resources exist for a real economic renaissance. Sound investment in, and effective management of these assets would help Iraq to cross transitional hurdles and regain its former position among middle-income countries.

1. This transformation requires success on several fronts:
  - Settling internal conflicts and restoring security, stability and economic progress. The latter calls for the repair of infrastructure, the modernization of economic structures and utilization of modern technology.
  - Progress in completing economic reforms and moving to a free market economy, led by the private sector, while seeking to increase economic growth, encourage investment and expand the size of the national economy.
  - Liberation from excessive dependency on oil export revenues and an immediate start on diversifying the national economy and expanding sources of income. This entails developing other productive sectors and basic services, such as industry, agriculture and tourism, and stimulating the growth of non-oil exports.
2. These challenges demand meaningful choices at the public policy level, an integrated economic vision with clear strategic priorities and a pragmatic approach to implementation grounded in Iraq's realities. Priorities would include:
  - Developing the productive capacity of the oil sector and expanding forms of investment in order to increase exports to new levels, oil being the primary engine for boosting economic growth in the country and the main source of public finances.
  - Developing non-oil economic sectors as a prelude to the creation of a diverse and balanced economy capable of satisfying local demand for agricultural and industrial products and services, and of generating exports in future.
  - Creating a supportive investment environment by reforming institutional frameworks and laws in finance, trade, banking, insurance and related areas.
3. Widespread unemployment and poverty constitute a major impediment to economic growth. This trend is exacerbated by persisting distortions in the labour market, most notably the lack of job opportunities and the rising number of entrants to the labour market annually (some 200,000 persons per year). This is an emerging social category over and beyond the relatively inactivate youth sector, whose productive capacity is not being tapped. Moreover, the participation of women in the labour force, at 19 %, remains low. These are all serious imbalances that require concerted action.
4. Adoption of an effective strategy for private sector development. That task is directly linked to the reform of the public sector through economically feasible privatization policies. It requires improving the investment environment, the labour market and economic growth. This strategy should provide a foundation for rebuilding the social structure by rehabilitating the middle class and expanding its social and economic role. The growth of a new middle class will support democratic and liberal currents and actively foster a liberal political system responsive to the needs of development and modernization.
5. Economic growth must address issues of social equity. It must be pro-poor, leading to improved incomes for the majority of citizens, higher living standards for all and the provision of social, health, cultural and other services, especially for marginalized and vulnerable groups.

**Mehdi Al-Hafedh**

Member of Parliament,

ex-Minister of Planning and Developmental Cooperation.

*Political instability, lawlessness, absence of an adequate investment climate, the weak financial status of Iraqi investors and the lack of financial rules for the banking system largely account for the limited role and importance of private activity in financing development in Iraq.*

by Iraqis in neighbouring countries confirms this.<sup>(11)</sup>

Figures released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) point to the small role of the private sector in investment activity in Iraq. Private investment (Iraqi and foreign) is estimated to have been \$1,080 million (4.2% of GDP) in 2004, rising to \$1,161 million (3.5% of GDP) in 2005. The IMF estimated the level of foreign direct investment at \$200 and 300 million during those two years, respectively.

#### 4. Lagging Reconstruction and the Need for International Support

The World Bank estimated Iraq's needs at \$55 billion over four years to restore public services, including \$1.6 billion for the health sector, \$6.8 billion for water and sewage and \$12 billion for electricity, provided that the structural reforms of the Iraqi economy are implemented. The huge oil reserve will be unable to provide the money needed to rebuild and revitalize economic growth. Iraq will need tangible and significant financial support from the international community. If half the capital stock needs rebuilding, this implies investment needs of \$800 per capita<sup>(12)</sup>, or a total of \$21.5 billion.

All states and numerous international and regional organizations and private companies were invited to participate in the Madrid Donor Conference that was held on 23–24 October 2003. Reports of the cost of reconstructing Iraq were presented to representatives of 73 states, 20 international organizations and representatives of 322 companies from 46 states. States and organizations undertook at the conference and following it to provide assistance in the reconstruction of Iraq in the form of grants and loans amounting to \$35 billion as a minimum, including \$22 billion as grants and \$12.2 billion as loans.

A committee of donors – the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) – was formed at the conference. Its task was to follow up on the undertakings of states and international organizations, to ensure continued support for the reconstruction of Iraq from the international community and explore new contributions, and to keep up with economic and political developments in Iraq. The committee held several meetings of international donors: in Abu Dhabi in February 2004, Doha in May 2004, Tokyo in October 2004 and the Dead Sea in February 2005.

The resources of the IRFFI were distributed to two separate accounts, the first to be administered by the UN and the second by the World Bank. The total contributions paid by states to the Fund were \$1,358 billion by the end of 2006, of which \$903.4 million was deposited in the UN-administered account and \$454.4 million in the account of the World Bank. It is noted that donor nations prefer to implement their commitments bilaterally. Therefore, the total contributions to the resources of this Fund are only 5.5 % of the total of grants pledged for the reconstruction of Iraq at the Madrid conference. It is worth mentioning that the total amount actually cashed by the IRFFI was about \$477.0 million up to the end of 2006, which constitutes 35.1% of the amount deposited. Funds from the IRFFI have contributed to the health and education sectors (see Box 5.4).

The reconstruction campaign started slowly in the period 2003-2004, and was launched to implement 200 reconstruction projects. One year after that, there were more than 2,500 projects under construction at a cost of \$5.7 billion. Since the assumption of sovereignty in June 2004, there have been more than 2,300 construction projects employing more than a 155,000 Iraqi workers<sup>(13)</sup>.

(11) Abd A AlMamoury, op. cit.

(12) The reports of the UN and the World Bank on the Iraqi economy were a vital resource for the CPA the letter become part of the UN/world bank "joint Iraq needs Assessment", report October 2003.



According to a U.S. report, until the end of October 2004 the coalition authorities had spent only \$1.3 billion on reconstruction out of \$18.3 billion that had been allocated by the Congress for this purpose. Table 5.3 illustrates that, in terms of the American grant, it is not possible to determine the nature and type of 65 % of the projects so financed because detailed information, such as a description of the project or its activities, is not provided. These are therefore classified under 'unspecified'. Most of them fall under the heading of infrastructure and many are in the problem-stricken electricity sector. Thus the nature of most reconstruction projects in that sector is unknown. Capacity-building projects, which represent 10 % of the total projects, focused on the governance sector and democracy as well as on the agriculture sector, while construction projects were concentrated in the health and housing sectors.

In fact, the majority of projects in Iraq that had spending commitments were selected.

Priorities projects listed in the national development strategy have not been taken into consideration. Also, many of the projects undertaken were referred directly by the donor country or agency supervising the disbursement of the grant to foreign companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), administrative authorities in the provinces or even companies and local contractors. Many have not involved competitive bidding or announcements or


*The majority of reconstruction projects were very small and did not provide stable employment for Iraqi workers*

**Table 5.3** Direct contributions of the American grant, by type of projects

Project Type	Percentage
Unspecified	65%
Capacity Building	10%
Construction	9%
Rehabilitation	8.2%
Supplies	5.2%
Rebuilding	0.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: (MOPDC), ISRB, "Report on donor contributions in the efforts to reconstruction up to 30/6/2007".

**Figure 5.3** Direct contributions of international grants, by sectors



Source: MOPDC, ISRB, "Report on Donor Contributions to the Efforts to Iraqi Reconstruction", 30/6/2007.

(13) MOPDC, Iraq strategy review Board (ISRB), "Report on donar Contributions in the efforts to reconstuct" opcit. p.3.

## No Task Left Unfinished

"One day, the just King showed signs that he was sick. He asked for an old brick to be brought to him from a ruined village, which he said would heal him. His subjects scoured the Kingdom but returned empty handed, saying: we did not find in the Kingdom one ruined place or a single old brick. The King rejoiced and thanked God, saying: but I wanted to try my mandate, and test my Kingdom to know whether there remains even one ruined place to rebuild".

One Thousand and One Nights, Part 4 Page 134 (Arabic)

*A substantial part of project expenses comprises the security and insurance costs of foreign experts and their protection, in addition to high administrative costs.*

even transparent declaration to the Iraqi bodies concerned.

As regards the estimates of expenditure on security, reports submitted to the U.S. Congress indicate that the cost of security constitutes 30% of the cost of projects and that there are 40 foreign companies operating in this area. The salary of a security worker is \$33,000 per month. If we add to this the administrative and other transaction costs of projects, which are estimated to form 20% of the total, there remains, at best, 50% of the grants for expenditure on the projects themselves, including fees and travel of foreign experts, missions by delegations, shipping, broker commissions and other expenses. What then is spent on the actual reconstruction of Iraq? It would appear perhaps 25–30% of the total grants disbursed for this purpose.

Reconstruction has relied mainly on the state's resources accruing primarily from oil revenues, which financed 95% of the total government expenditure. According to government data, on which the IMF relied in estimating government investment expenditure, total expenditure allocations in 2004 amounted to \$5.6 billion (26.4 % of GDP) and they rose to \$8.3 billion (33.2 % of GDP) in 2005. However, the ratio declined in 2006 and 2007 to about 24 % of GDP.

Nevertheless, the results of spending this huge amount remain very modest and intangible in all sectors of the national economy except oil, which was able to restore a large part of its pre-war production capacity. The other sectors are still suffering from the devastation they experienced during the era of sanctions, war, looting and destruction. No indicators relating to standards of living or the satisfaction of citizens' basic needs show a significant improvement when compared with their counterparts before the war, except for average per capita income.

### Box 5.4

### Donor Contributions to Human Development

The distribution of international funding for areas of human development reflects the orientation of individual donors and trends in the reconstruction process in terms of the distribution of projects at the sector level. The preferences of each donor must be taken into consideration when determining which sectors qualify for the development assistance of such countries, a process requiring coordination between the Iraqi Government and the donor community to direct such aid.

**Health sector:** Contributions in this sector constituted about 6 % of the total international donor funding for Iraq, covering almost all branches of public and private hospitals and medical centres, etc. It is clear, however, that – given the current situation – assistance to the health sector is not able to make up for the negligence it has suffered or meet the increasing need for health improvement in general. Almost all donor countries have contributed, while the US and UN Reconstruction Fund contributions have been the highest (43 % and 16 % respectively).

**Education Sector:** Seven donors have contributed to this sector: USA, UK, Japan, the European Union, Sweden, Korea, Spain, as well as the two Iraq Reconstruction Funds. Contributions involved all stages of education, including higher education. Contributions in this sector amount to 5 % of overall international donor funding.

Source: Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, ISRB, "Report on donor contributions to the efforts to Iraqi reconstruction 30/6/2007.

## 5. The Weight of Debt and War Reparations

Iraq's heavy external debts and war reparations inherited from the previous regime are a major challenge to human development and limit the pace of transition. The Standby Agreement with the IMF (annexed to the Paris Club Agreement) on debt rescheduling directly affects the people's standard of living. As a result of this agreement, Iraq will follow a standard IMF recipe during the coming four years to correct structural imbalances in its national economy, despite the disrupted living conditions of citizens, political instability and insecurity.<sup>(14)</sup> UN Security Council resolution No. 1483 (2003) called on Iraq's creditors to assist the government in restructuring its debt to a sustainable level, and the government has taken steps to secure better arrangements (see Box 5.5).

The UN Compensation Commission is still reviewing claims resulting from the Second Gulf War, most submitted by rich countries. These claims have so far approached about \$400 billion, while the Commission has claimed additional amounts payable by Iraq of almost \$50 billion. Reparations for damages caused by the Kuwait war since August 1990 are also considered part of Iraq's foreign commitments as stipulated by international resolutions. They undoubtedly represent one of the most odious forms of debt as they exact a heavy price on generations who are not responsible for decisions taken by the previous regime.

War reparations came to existence under paragraph E of Security Council Resolution No. 687 in April 1991. Accordingly, a UN war reparations commission was set up for

### Box 5.5 Dealing with the Debt Overhang - Restructuring, Repayment and Relief

Saddled with inherited external debts of \$140 billion, and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 600%, one of Iraq's most pressing challenges has been how to attract new investment and international support for reconstruction in that position.

UN Security Council resolution No. 1483 dated 22 March 2003, called on Iraq's creditors, public and private alike, to assist the Iraqi Government in restructuring its debt to a sustainable level. To that end, Iraq sought access to the Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance programme of the IMF. The ratification of this programme has enabled Iraq to have direct negotiations with The Paris Club members, to whom debts of nearly \$51 billion represent a large proportion of the burden. The agreement with the Paris Club sets conditions applicable to other creditor countries who are not members of the Club and provides a guide for negotiations with private creditors.

An IMF debt sustainability analysis indicated that Iraq needs an exceptional level of debt reduction. This analysis was the basis for negotiations with the Paris Club, which decided in November 2004 on a reduction of 80%, a key development for a middle income indebted state. It was agreed to reduce the debt in three stages: first, 30% of the debt stock immediately; second, another 30% once the agreement between Iraq and the IMF on supportive arrangements was signed (completed on 23 December 2005); and third, a final portion of 20% after the three-year period to implement these arrangements is over (end-2008).

In terms of present value, the reduction, together with the payment conditions for the residual rescheduled amount, has provided Iraq with a reduction of 89.75% of the accumulated debt. The United States has cancelled 100% of its debt and other countries such as Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia have followed suit. In terms of bilateral debt, so far, settlements have been made with 53 out of 73 countries that have shown that Iraq is indebted to them.

In July 2005 Iraq declared it would settle with private sector creditors. For a debt that exceeds \$35 million, the creditors would receive either new Iraqi bonds, which will mature in 2028 or carry a 5.8% interest (designed to cancel immediately 80% of the concerned debt and to equate financially with the Paris Club agreement), or a new loan similar to the bilateral agreements of the Paris Club. Creditors owed less than \$35 million were offered a cash settlement equivalent to 10.25% of the total amount of debt. All claimants have obtained a uniform rate of interest for late payment since 1990 up to the deadline of the settlement. Creditors willing to accept Iraq's offer agreed to abandon pending lawsuits against Iraqi public sector institutions, provided Iraq recovers (via the Development Fund for Iraq) its assets that were held back during the period of sanctions. These policies have saved Iraq more than \$5.5 billion.

The eventual removal of Iraq's debt burden will not only liberate significant resources for development but will also support financial stability and allow flexibility for the formulation of appropriate economic policies.

**Sinan Al-Shabibi,**  
Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq

(14) Faik A Alrasool, op.cit.

(15) Mudher M Saleh, Background paper for the Iraq NHDR, 2008

the payment of war damages. A special fund was established for that commission to pay compensations for losses and damages. Iraq's contribution to the fund was established then at 30 % of its oil revenues, without reflecting its needs or ability to pay the amounts stipulated. The compensations that were authorized for payment up to November 2005 totalled about \$52.5 billion, of which Iraq paid about \$20.0 billion from its oil revenues during the period 1997–November 2005, at a rate of 30% during the first two years. This was reduced to 25% of total oil export revenues under the Oil-for-Food Programme and then to 5% under paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution No. 1483 in 2003.

The cancellation of Iraq's remaining debts and reparations would enhance the climate for foreign investment in Iraq by enabling the country to sustain its credit capabilities and thus attract international funding for its reconstruction and sustainable economic transition.<sup>(15)</sup>

## Conclusions

The experience of other countries that have made the hard transition to a market economy indicates that how rough the ride turns out to be depends on:

- The pace, quality and duration of transformational policies;
- The efficiency of governments in managing the transformation process; and
- The implementation of social policies that cushion negative effects in the short term in anticipation of higher welfare levels in the future.

The climate for economic transition in the country since 2003 has not been favourable. Continuing insecurity, disrupted reconstruction, lagging domestic private sector growth and slow-moving foreign investment and international donor funding have all weighed down the process.


But the economic transition programme faces some intrinsic problems as well. Conceived with little clarity about its design or destination, and embarked on hastily, with a sweeping disregard for social equity and facts on the ground, its flaws have become the source of other political and economic crises. The latter, in turn, would prolong transition itself with all the exorbitant costs, financial and human, that a drawn-out process would impose.

It is well known that market liberalization and structural adjustment can have negative effects in the short term. However, the problem lies in the possible extension – perhaps exacerbation – of those effects in the long term. For example, in Iraq.

Unmanaged trade liberalization has caused considerable pressure by opening unprepared local markets to competition. It has contributed to demolishing the remnants of a private industrial sector that had managed to survive the waves of fragmentation and downsizing that had buffeted it for decades under the totalitarian socialist regime. Or, to take another example, monetary policies focused on exchange rates and interest rates have discouraged local investment and caused capital to leak abroad.

Concerns about the design of budget policies also need attention. The risk is great that public budgeting will:

- Continue to link public spending, including social expenditure, with oil proceeds (at least 90 %), which will make reconstruction and transition hostage to future earnings determined by world market factors. That would merely continue the pattern of economic growth that has characterized the structure of the Iraqi economy since the end of the 1970s.
- Reduce public spending on human development in order to spend more on the military sector, for security



reasons, after the withdrawal of the multinational forces. Total government expenditure on security claims high allocations, representing 1 % of total public expenditure in 2004 and 19 % in the 2008 budget.

As this chapter noted, transition has encountered the paradox of an even larger state. Yet this burgeoning state is not a secure state or even a charismatic one. It does not inspire the confidence or win the trust of its citizens, reeling under the effects of violence and instability and confronted, after years of being accustomed to state-provided services and jobs, with scarcities, unemployment and collapsing living standards. It is a weak state that has added a large apparatus to the other challenges it must address through the process of economic transition, the most important of which remains the assent and participation of the people.

Lastly in the present environment, it becomes extremely difficult to apply the usual models and mechanisms of development planning, which underscores the need for flexible mechanisms with short-term impact. The day-to-day situation transcends even the best-designed plans and this, in turn, is a challenge to sustainable human development, which requires long-term projects (especially in the areas of health, education and the empowerment of women).

Where events change very quickly, following unexpected political changes in the government or in the policies and responses of donors, keeping development on track calls for solid mutual understanding between the government and its external and domestic partners. This too is a task that can only be accomplished by a state whose credibility and competence have been firmly established on the basis of economic performance and a substantial remit from the people.





## Chapter 6

### Social Policies for People's Empowerment During Transition



Iman Abdullah Mahmud

**Old Document**



*Education for All?*

1. Education shall be a basic factor in the progress of society, a right guaranteed by the State. It shall be compulsory in the primary stage. The State shall guarantee elimination of illiteracy.
2. Free education, at all stages, shall be a right of all Iraqis.

Article 34  
Constitution of Iraq, 2005

**Introduction**

In Iraq, personal insecurity has been associated with political insecurity, which in turn is linked to the turbulence accompanying hasty democratic and economic transition. In general, people feel secure and are empowered when sound and participatory social policies underpin their basic welfare. Such policies lay the foundations of a brighter future while also protecting people in times of crisis. Despite the relevance of this evident truth to Iraq, its social sector has been neglected through decades of wars and conflicts.

For thirty years, education and health have received the lowest level of state attention and funding. In the current situation, with the state withdrawing from welfare services, the social sector has shouldered additional loads. Post-2003 budget allocations (as we shall see), while providing some improvement in social sector funding, are not sufficient for achieving people's empowerment now or in future. Resources available are simply unequal to the immense backlog of inherited problems and the impacts of conflicts and insecurity.

This chapter analyzes the causes and impacts of this deficit in support to these two vital sectors and suggests solutions. Laid out in two parts, it considers policy and institutional failures in the distribution of resources and the consequences of insecurity, as they affect capacities in the two systems.

**Spending on Education and Health: A Legacy of Neglect**

Budgets are substantive documents that reflect, and affect, policy. Beginning in the 1960s, spending on health, education and culture in Iraq enjoyed a special place under three national economic plans (1965-1980). These areas were prized as among the most important investments in human capital, in line with developmental thinking at the time.

In the five-year plan for 1965-1969 the share of education and health in other social spending increased, a trend that continued up to 1980. With the start of the Iraq-Iran war that year, education bore the brunt of cutbacks in social spending. The sector continued to be marginalized during the years of economic sanctions such that, as

*Illiteracy and ignorance reflect the education system's failure to expand people's options. In times of war and crises, this failure exposes children and young persons to risks that threaten them and their societies even more than impoverishment and deprivation.*

table 6.1 shows, the share of spending on education reached a low of 11.6% in 1995. Health expenditures remained unchanged for eight years, in order provide for the treatment of injuries and health problems associated with the war (1980-1988). This lasted until economic sanctions were imposed in 1990, when the share of expenditure on health fell to 4.2%, during 1991-1995.

The rate of per capita spending on education and health went into steady decline. In education, it decreased from 7 dinars during 1965-1969 to less than one dinar in 1991-1995. The same picture is reflected in the health sector where the per capita rate dropped from 1.5 dinars during 1965-1969 to a dismal 0.2 dinars during 1991-1995.

Notwithstanding comprehensive economic sanctions, expenditure on the military sector - as figure 6.11 shows – remained high until 2003. It then fell for two years, starting to rise again with the deterioration of the security situation and the growth of Iraqi armed forces, until military spending accounted for 4.93% of GDP in 2006. In the same periods, expenditure on education remained low until 2003, seldom exceeding 1% of GDP. It then increased to 2.6% in 2006. Health spending did not exceed 0.38%, rising to 3.02% in 2004 and then falling again in 2005 and 2006 to 2.25% and 1.99%, respectively.


**Table 6.1** Expenditure on Education and Health as % of Public Social Expenditure, 1965-2006

Period	Spending in 1980 prices (millions of IQD)	Per Capita Spending (IQD)	Spending on Education %	Per Capita Spending (IQD) Education	Spending on Health %	Per Capita Spending (IQD) Health
1965-1969	240.6	28.1	63.4	7.4	13.1	1.5
1970-1975	604.4	58.0	54.2	5.2	13.1	1.3
1976-1980	17760.0	1480.0	47.2	3.9	11.2	0.9
1981-1985	4337.9	287.7	37.9	2.5	13.4	0.7
1986-1990	4116.4	243.8	28.7	1.7	12.4	0.7
1991-1995*	2134.9	109.7	11.6	0.6	4.2	0.2
1997-2001*	2083.7	88.6	4.8	0.8	5.0	0.9
2002-2006	14752.5	535.0	4.9	4.9	4.9	5.0

\*Data Covers 15 Governorates except Kurdistan Region, up to 2003.

Source: Years 1965-2001 Salim Al-Najafi, background paper for Iraq NHDR 2008; Years 2002-2006 calculated by COSIT.

**Figure 6.1** Public Expenditure on Education, Health and the Military as (%) of GDP, 1965-2006



Source: Annex, Table 18.

## Government Spending on Education: a Measure of Investment in Iraq's Future

Falling budget allocations for education have created severe deficits, not only in absorbing the impact of population growth or in expanding people's access to education, but also in the condition and capacity of existing infrastructure. This has led to a shortfall in buildings for an estimated 4,731 schools and a situation where 70% of existing buildings need rehabilitation. There are still 791 schools made of mud all over Iraq.


Iraqis looked on the year 2003 as the start of a transformation in government social policies, underpinned by appropriate financial allocations. Yet a glance at the public budget since then hardly indicates that a vigorous revival of the hard-pressed educational sector is under way.

### The Defective Structure of Public Financing

Analyzing how the current budget is structured, and comparing it to the investment budget, is instructive. It shows that the structural formation of the current budget clearly affects patterns in the direction of education. The current budget is several times the size of the investment

budget, which, for education, means that the capacity to admit students is fixed at the outset by the very modest investment in infrastructure. A look at the allocation for education by type of cost for the three years 2004-2006 shows other imbalances as well. It favours, very distinctly, the payroll component (wages and salaries for employees), which accounts for more than 93% of the allocation. The remaining 7% is for the remaining six components dealing with commodity and service needs in the sector, which offers little hope of being able to implement the ambitious reforms required to renovate the quality and coverage of public education. The current budget has almost no flexibility to address

**Figure 6.2** The Relative Importance of Spending on Education in the General Budget (%), 1980-2007



**Table 6.2** Distribution of Allocations in the Budget for Education by Type of Cost, 2004-2006 (in million dinars)

Component	2004		2005		2006	
	Allocated Amount	Percentage	Allocated Amount	Percentage	Allocated Amount	Percentage
Personnel Expenses	894416	95.6	1210231	96.6	1405522	92.7
Supplies and maintenance	18094	1.9	36713	2.9	83911	5.5
Capital expenses	3473	0.00.4	4331	0.3	4128	0.3
Transformational Expenditures	55	0.0	70	0.0	25	0.0
Special Programmes (Reconstruction)	19783	2.1	1934	0.2	22806	1.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>935821</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1253279</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1516392</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Ministry of Finance, Annual General Budget Tables

*While individual spending on health is associated with income levels and living standards, it also depends on policies aimed at meeting people's health needs through a balanced and consistent relationship between the public and private sectors.*

the variables and emerging trends that arise in education, or to support the redirection of the system horizontally or vertically. It may be a balanced budget in fiscal terms; in any sense meaningful for education, it is markedly unbalanced.

### Government Spending on Health: a Measure of Human Care

Health conditions in Iraq sank during the last four decades, particularly after the eruption of the Iraq-Iran war. The economic sanctions of the 1990's also produced catastrophic effects on the health sector. Financial allocations for public health decreased, as did imports of medicines and medical supplies. Political, economic and social conditions deteriorated, and people's purchasing power declined, resulting in a situation where large segments of society have found the cost of medicines, medical necessities and medical care beyond reach. Figure 6.13 shows the general decline in the share of health service expenditure in total public spending. The increase that began around 2003 was not sustained and should not mask the fact that the Ministry of Health's current budget, like those of other ministries, is dominated by salaries and wages, curtailing any real scope for expanding and improving health services for the population.

Per capita expenditure on health did not change for almost two decades, amounting

to about 2% of a person's total consumer expenditure. However, it declined dramatically under economic sanctions, hitting a low of 1.1% in 1993. It then rose to 4.2% in 2002, falling back to 2% in 2005. This task is part of the state's responsibility within the general context of social policy. However, it has not so far crystallized into any plans or measures that would meet people's urgent needs.


This chapter has illustrated the downward trends and structural imbalances which characterize the public budgets for education and health in Iraq. Its criticisms should not be taken to mean that improved allocations since 2003 and the larger share of GDP these sectors now claim are thought insignificant. On the contrary, it is only by sustaining these new, hopeful directions that Iraq will be able to overcome past and present trends to deliver education and health for all.

### Education: Society's Crumbling Building Block

Up to the early 1980s, Iraq's educational system was considered one of the best in the Middle East. As a result of its drastic and prolonged decline since then, it is now one of the weakest. Indicators show that Iraq's educational system is no longer able to fulfil its main goals, namely to empower individuals, equip them with lifelong capabilities and broaden their access to knowledge. The damage affects the very foundations of the education system: previous chapters have illustrated a drop in primary school enrolment and a rise in illiteracy rates (while also revealing significant disparities between governorates).

While female enrolment in various stages of schooling and the balance between male and female students has improved, trends overall reflect a noticeable regression. In 2006, the net enrolment rate in primary schools was down to 86.0% whereas in 1990 it was 90.8%.

**Figure 6.3** The Relative Importance of Spending on Health in the General Budget (%), 1980-2007





The journey to targets under the Millennium Development Goals looks long and is unlikely to be completed on time, unless intensive measures are taken. (Table 1.4)  
In 2006, the literacy rate among 15-24 year-olds fell to 70.0%. In 1990 it was 78.6%

The educational system faces several capacity constraints. Some are old legacies; others arise from the recent state of insecurity. The most acute are inadequate infrastructure, wide disparities among governorates, declining public expenditure, the collapse of education in the government's priorities, and hesitant participation by the private sector.


A country can be said to offer equal access to education when enough schools are equitably distributed among its regions. In Iraq, the multiple-attendance school (the same building used by more than one school) has become a common sight, a sorry reflection of the gap between facilities and actual needs. Instead of building more schools to meet rising demand, the state has crowded educational services into available buildings.

As figure 6.6 illustrates, that number has more than doubled in just over 10



years, going from 2,097 in the academic year 1994/1995 to 5,069 in 2006/2007. Comparing the ratio of schools to population for 6-19 year-olds reveals that, at the national level, there is one school for every 52,797 students; Kurdistan however has one school for every 19,984 students – a substantial difference.

**Figure 6.6** The Growth of Schools in Kurdistan



Source: Background Paper on Kurdistan for the Iraq NHDR 2008

*Kurdistan region has enjoyed a different and more favourable pattern. Its number of school buildings is higher than the national average.*

### Box 6.1


## The Opinion Poll on Human Security - Does Insecurity Reduce the Importance People Give to Educations

In Iraqi culture, even today, education is considered a bedrock value and a basic necessity, as reflected by the report's opinion poll. Forcibly displaced families struggle to maintain schooling for their children throughout their dislocated circumstances. Several such families said their reason for moving was to ensure uninterrupted schooling for their children (displaced families interviewed in Nasyria and Syria).

### Dropping out of School

70% of people who answered "Children drop out those polled don't agree," that insecurity has led family members to drop out of school, while 28% believe it has done so. Strikingly, in Al-Anbar governorate, with its extremely difficult security situation, 98.7% of respondents do not link insecurity to school drop-out rates. In Kirkuk and Salahuddin, which are also troubled areas, 54.8% and 85.2% respectively do think that insecurity has led to the problem.

#### Do children drop out of school because of insecurity?



### Education and Social Security


50% of respondents see that primary compulsory education is very important, another 30% see it is important.

#### Is it important to restore compulsory education?



There are differences among governorates in the relative perception of the importance of access to education at various stages. In Kerbala and Meesan, 100% of those polled think that this factor is very important to their sense of security and stability, whereas in Kirkuk, Babylon, Al-Qadisiya and Thi-Qar, the relative importance given is lower.

#### How important are educational opportunities to your sense of security?




- Very important
- Important
- Relatively important

## Box 6.2

## Makeshift Schools in the 21st Century

The existence in Iraq of schools built of mud is a shameful symbol of the neglect of education and constitutes a low-water mark of attention to human development. In 2005/2006, there were 791 such schools, including 4 kindergartens, 772 primary schools and 15 secondary schools. Among the governorates, Thi-Qar had the most (212 schools), followed by Nineveh (126), then by Salahuddin (115). These kinds of schools are typically found in villages and remote rural areas. There are no such schools in the governorates of Kerbala, Al-Muthenna, Al-Najaf and Babil. Oddly enough, the capital, Baghdad, still had 8 mud schools in the Karkh district.



The Ministry of Education has begun a joint project with UNICEF, HABITAT and other agencies for demolishing and re-building 75 such primary schools, each containing 6 classrooms plus a seventh one dedicated to a special programme of accelerated education. With international funding of \$33 million, the project will be implemented over three phases and will also cover teacher training as well as health and social interventions in order to raise rates of student enrolment and support continuous attendance.


Source: Al-Zubaidi, background paper for the Iraq NHDR 2008.

### Scarce Schools Lead to Exclusion

The inadequate supply of schools has reduced enrolment, prevented pupils from continuing with their schooling and left large numbers of would-be learners outside the educational system. The disparity in educational opportunities among governorates now resembles that in economic and social opportunities, and curbs the efficient and equitable development of Iraq's human resources.

It is thus hardly surprising to find that illiteracy has grown. A 2004 Survey of Living Conditions in Iraq showed that the illiteracy rate had risen to 35%. Among adults 22% had not been to school, 15% did not finish primary education and 29% finished primary school but went no further, 14% completed secondary education, and 11% went on to higher education. This indicates an increase in deprivation among those educationally

**Figure 6.7** School Level Capacity



marginalized groups who have simply been pushed outside the educational system.


Admissions capacity at different stages of schooling must stretch to cover each year's graduating classes so that students can move steadily from one level to another. Yet in 1995/1996 the proportion of intermediate schools to primary schools was just 31%, and 29% in 2006/2007, turning the former's meagre capacity into a tourniquet on the numbers of primary pupils able to continue. Such bottlenecks create artificial obstacles to academic empowerment.

As a result, families are often obliged to send their children to distant schools, incurring higher costs to keep them in education. This is particularly detrimental to the education of girls. Figure 6.7 shows the successive restrictions that crop up in the school cycle. Noticeably, in 2006-2007, the secondary-school stage offered the narrowest entrance, its capacity amounting to only 13%.

### Gaps in Supplies Undercut Educational Opportunities

In Iraq, the distribution of educational equipment and supplies (for laboratories, libraries and classrooms) is haphazard and deficient.

**Figure 6.8** Laboratories and Libraries - The Gap between Supply and Needs, (2006/2007 and 2009/2010)





The budget for education has often been blind to conditions or numbers of schools in the regions. Consequently, large disparities exist in the distribution of supplies and facilities among governorates. For example, in 2004-2005, the percentage of libraries in Nineveh was 70%, the highest, while in Missan it was a paltry 5% a vast disparity for which no rational explanation exists.

Coverage of computer laboratories is insignificant for the information age, amounting to 28% at the national level, and again with wide differences among governorates. For instance, in Al-Anbar coverage was 77% in 2006/2007, while Thi-Qar achieved only 5%. Such challenges cannot be addressed solely by raising the share of education in the general budget; this measure should also be coupled with planning and adjustment mechanisms that allocate funds in line with needs, costs and efficiency.

## Reforming Education to Enhance Empowerment

### The Private Sector Attempts to Step In

Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides for “making primary education compulsory, accessible, free to all”. The Millennium Development Goals have made compulsory primary education a global target. Indeed, out of 196 countries in the world, 172 have ratified laws that make primary education compulsory.

The logic of the state’s funding of education is unquestionable. Since its establishment, the Iraqi state has been responsible for financing public education, and, since 1976, for compulsory primary education. However, there has been a trend to encourage the private sector’s participation in certain educational services, as can be seen at pre-university level. Encouraging the private sector, as a general trend in economic policy after 2003, and amending government decisions to permit private education should, in principle, have created conditions for increasing private investment in the educational sector. Figure 6.6 shows the start of private education as expressed in the initial numbers of schools and students.

As shown, the number of kindergartens is large compared to the total number of private educational institutions, which reflects a trend in educational policy since the mid-1980s towards relinquishing kindergartens to the private sector. The decrease in private kindergarten enrolment in 2006-7 reflects the deteriorating security situation.

Unfortunately, private sector education has not so far proved competitive enough to stimulate the state education sector to upgrade its performance. The number of private schools in the educational arena has not attained sufficient critical mass. In 2005/2006, their number was 159, (132 kindergartens and 19 primary and secondary schools), and in 2006/2007 this rose to 182 (142 kindergartens, 33 primary and 7


*By contrast, in Kurdistan Region, with its stable security situation and relative improvement in living standards, the initiation and encouragement of private investment in education has made steady progress.*

**Table 6.3** Private Education in Kurdistan Region

Study stage	Academic year	No. of Kindergartens/ schools	No. of children/ students
Kindergartens	1998/1998	1	120
	2007/2008	19	1,214
Primary	2001/2002	1	68
	2007/208	10	2,037
Secondary	1994/1995	1	72
	2007/2008	8	2,112

Source: background paper on Kurdistan for the Iraq NHDR 2008.

**Figure 6.9** Initial number of private schools and students, by level of education, 2005/2006, and 2006/2007



Source: Al-Zubaidi, Background Paper for the Iraq NHDR 2008.

secondary schools). Admissions however declined: in 2005-2006, the number of enrolled private students was 10,217. In the next two years, that total decreased to 8,865. Social and security factors account for the drop; in particular, the number kindergarten pupils shrank because families feared kidnappings.

So far, indicators show that the private sector has not found the space to effectively take part in trying to solve educational problems. It remains captive to government instructions and regulations to an extent that may discourage it from taking further initiatives.

Private education, as a new trend, deserves more attention and support. It not only encourages the private sector to share responsibilities with the government but also provides investment and employment opportunities to many educators, including early retirees and those who have quit their public posts - especially women. Significantly, all kindergartens (142 in 2007) were administered and owned by women.

## Sharing Responsibilities: Interaction between Educational Institutions and Civil Society

Civil society organizations (CSOs), albeit newly born (after 2003) and with modest experience, are expected to help fill the vacuum created following the state's withdrawal from many tasks in the service sector. Many such organizations are keen to work in education. If so far the results of their activities in terms of numbers of beneficiaries are limited compared to the size of the problem, these early efforts nevertheless offer a model that can be repeated or upgraded. The seriousness and commitment of some organizations make public sector-CSO partnerships entirely feasible, especially at the grassroots level where several organizations possess greater influence and a high level of motivation. In a process of democratic transition, providing scope to fledgling CSOs to demonstrate civic responsibility, enlarge their experience and develop their organizational capabilities is a public good in its own right, however much the problems may call for other resources and efforts as well.

### The Iraqi al-Amal Society

At the end of 2005, the Iraqi al-Amal Society launched its Challenge Project for Education and the Elimination of Illiteracy. It opened 26 classes to teach reading and writing, to raise levels of health and social awareness, and to provide vocational training in handicrafts. 773 female and 20 male beneficiaries joined the Society's classes. By early 2007, the basic stage of illiteracy elimination lasting nine months was completed in Nejaf, Al-Qadisiya, Basrah and Kerbala.

The ages of participants ranged between 10 and 50. The project covered three villages in the countryside of Al-Qadisiya governorate and two in the countryside of Nejaf governorate. The project aimed to equip learners to achieve passes in grades one, two and three of primary education.

The society also opened three classes in Al-Alam village in Salahuddin governorate, from December 2005 to September 2006. These enabled 67 young girls to sit for the unified intermediate and secondary examinations set by the Ministry of Education. Students were among those who had quit studying for social and personal reasons. Seven of them passed the intermediate examinations and eleven passed the secondary examinations successfully. Most of them joined secondary, technical institute or university studies.

### The "Culture for All" Society

Three years ago, the 'Culture for All' Society launched projects in Al-Sadr city, the most impoverished and most highly populated district in Baghdad. It opened classes to attract drop-outs back to school and held successive meetings with their families to convince them of the importance of education, schools and literacy. The Society also channelled modest funds provided by a humanitarian organization for these purposes. A number of children responded positively. Authorities in Al-Sadr city permitted the Society to use a school building in sector 43. Daily attendance amounted to some 70 students. The "School for Drop-Outs" is supervised by a member of the Society's board of trustees, a resident of Al-Sadr city.

Sources: Comprehensive reports by these societies on their programmes and activities, 2007

## Attracting Drop-outs Back to School

The rate of school drop-outs is associated with the deterioration of human development. The majority of drop-outs come from the poorest strata of society, with rates increasing as income falls. The trend disempowers individuals and limits their interaction with their social environment. It also leads to anti-social behaviour as many drop-outs become juvenile delinquents.

The education system in Iraq has adopted a number of non-formal approaches in order to coax drop-outs back to school and to help those that do return to continue.


- *Special primary schools for youngsters:* these are primary schools for older pupils aged 10 - 15. The period of study lasts four years, during which school-leavers receive the equivalent of a primary education and, at the end, an equivalent certificate. This pattern ensures that all students obtain the essential minimum

of education for life while allowing certificate holders to continue into formal education if they choose. However, such special schooling is narrowly based in Iraq: Ministry of Education statistics indicate that, in 2005/2006, only 6,689 pupils were enrolled in these schools, a very low percentage of the total primary pupils in that year. The number of such schools is small, around 69, and many governorates do not have any.

- *Evening schools:* these schools have the same aim as the previous type, but differ inasmuch as they resemble formal day schools in terms of curriculum and duration of study. However, once again, such evening schools are few and far between, with limited scope and capacity. The number providing primary education in 2005/2006 was no more than 15, with 1,386 enrolled pupils, in all governorates. Evening schools offering secondary education totalled 206, with 56,336 pupils (91% of them males and only 9% females).

*Reversing the current direction of education would allow Iraq to begin building a vigorous, skilled and competitive society able to contribute to, and benefit from the perpetually growing stock of global knowledge. Yet Iraq today is far from that prospect.*

#### Box 6.4 Dealing with Illiteracy in Kurdistan Region



The Kurdistan Region government has adopted a strategy for the elimination of illiteracy as part of an overall plan to reform the educational system. This strategy is based on two principles: the right to education, and society's obligation to guarantee that right in practice. This strategy responds to the negative findings of an educational survey in 2000, which showed that illiteracy rates among persons over 15 years of age were 34% in Erbil and Duhuk governorates and 27% in Suleimaniya governorate.

Source: background paper on Kurdistan region for the Iraq NHDR 2008.

- Accelerated education:** In 2005, UNICEF in collaboration with the Ministry of Education carried out an educational project in the name of accelerated education, i.e. non-formal education targeting 12-18 year-old drop-outs in all governorates including Kurdistan Region. The project aims to condense the primary stage curriculum into a three-year capsule, with those completing the course earning a certificate equivalent to that from primary school. Since its inception, the project has expanded to include 144 schools in 2006/2007, among which 123 are in urban areas and 21 in the countryside. 76 are for boys and 52 for girls. The female share in the total number of pupils was not more than 36.5% - out of 9,633 pupils, 3,513 were female.


is a holistic system whose elements are not only intertwined among themselves, but also with the political, social and economic systems. This ought to be self-evident because education completes these other systems and determines their capacity and capabilities. Thus, the development of education demands a comprehensive vision matched by an integrated, multi-sectoral and adequately financed programme of change that recognizes the opportunity costs of inaction.

Time is essential in the reform process. Any delay in tackling a particular deficit will be costly or, later on, may make other reforms impossible. Figure 6.10 shows the estimated needs for additional schools, buildings, and teachers at all stages of education for 2009/2010.

### Wanted: A Holistic Vision

In reforming education Iraq's decision-makers need to understand that education is a system that is horizontally integrated by study stages and vertically integrated by curriculum, teachers and teaching aids. It

As Chapter 2 observed, the quality of education in Iraq at all levels has for some time been beset with issues, from weak analytic and innovative capacities to outmoded teaching methodologies, low academic standards and obsolete curricula.

**Figure 6.10** Estimated Needs for Additional Schools, Buildings and Teachers at All Levels, 2009/2010

Source: Al-Zubaidi, Background Paper for the Iraq NHDR 2008.

Knowledge acquisition, as measured by the average of schooling years, is deteriorating. These trends threaten to undermine the very potentials that could extricate Iraq from the morass into which it has fallen. Reversing the current direction of education dramatically would place future generations on the road to participating effectively in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, where knowledge, more than capital or labour, accounts for most of the value added in advanced economies.



## Health: An Overstretched and Under-supported System

### Introduction

Health care is a challenge and a responsibility in all societies, given that health is a human right. But in some cases, governments make no attempt to provide universal health coverage, leaving matters largely to the individual, employers, private

health providers and insurance companies, with some national provision for the elderly and disabled. In other cases, governments take the lead in administering and regulating the performance of the entire health system and in providing a full range of services for the majority. Iraq has an under-supported public health care system for the majority of citizens and a fairly sophisticated private health sector which caters mostly to the wealthy. This Chapter is primarily concerned with evaluating the state of the public health system since it is the bedrock of health care for most Iraqis. It is however a system encountering many challenges in attempting to reconstruct its institutions and reform its services to reach all segments of the people under extraordinary pressures.

Chapters 1 and 2 illustrated the deterioration in public health as a result of successive wars, and the subsequent retreat in health indicators compared to previous levels and to other, more fortunate countries. The chief impact of this deterioration is reflected

**Figure 6.11** Child Mortality Rate**Figure 6.12** Infant Mortality Rate

in Iraq's falling HDI in which lower life expectancy is a principal factor.

Going forward from that analysis, this second section of Chapter 6 considers the impact of security challenges and transition on the capacity of the health system to provide for the health needs and empowerment of the people. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines a health system as comprising all activities that enhance and preserve health. Evaluating a health system requires measuring several dimensions: the overall level of health in the country, the distribution of health services among the population, the capacity to respond (which is, in turn, distributed among areas) and the allocation of financial resources. This section will consider these aspects in turn, beginning with a look at indicators of child health.

### Child Health: Meeting Goal 4 of the Millennium Development Goals

In 2006, the mortality rate of children under five was 41 per 1000 live births, which puts the target of 21 per 1000 by 2015 within range (Figure 6.11).


In the same year, 2006, the infant mortality rate was 35 per 1000 live births, giving some hope that the international target of 17 per 1000 might be reached by 2015 (Figure 6.12).

The hopeful state of these two indicators may be considered remarkable in light of the circumstances of the health system, as shown in the following pages.

## Box 6.5

## The Opinion Poll on Human Security - Has Insecurity Affected Health Care?

Percentage of respondents who answered yes to the question, 72% of polled individuals emphasize that lack of security has resulted in lack of health care. 99.5% in Nineveh, 96.1% in Diala, 97.3% in Al-Anbar and 97.4% in Babylon (all of which are either totally or relatively unstable security-wise) emphasize that security conditions in their governorates have cut down health care services.



## The Challenges of Insecurity

Present conditions have heavily taxed the capacity of Iraq's health system and services following a steep rise in violence, deaths, injuries, trauma and other impacts on public health. The situation has increased people's need for health services while crippling their access to them. Vulnerable segments of society, especially the aged, women and children, are at even greater risk under these conditions. Armed conflicts trigger abrupt and enormous needs for health care, quickly exhausting even strong health systems and weakening their capacity to respond. In Iraq, the limitations of the health system have become acutely apparent, notably in emergency medical services and emergency childbirth and infant care.

The study on deprivation and living standards (COSIT 2004) shows that, at the national level, 21% of families and 22% individuals are deprived of health care. In terms of maternal health care, about 85% of families come low on the scale of deprivation and 13% are at the high end. The level of deprivation of access to a public hospital or primary health care centre is 28.7% in urban areas, while in rural areas it goes up as high as 68.1%.

## Battered Buildings, Under-equipped Facilities and Overloaded Services

The fall of the regime in 2003 effectively removed the state's capacity to provide basic services. It is difficult to overstate the difficulties faced by a health system that was run down at the outset, further disabled and then confronted with the multiple impacts of a massive collapse in security. Meeting immediate health needs under these conditions pressures the health services to breaking point. Even if the security situation were to improve, it would still be extremely difficult for the health system to regain its equilibrium after the battering it has taken.

Damage, neglect and unrelenting violence since 2003 have wrought havoc in the health sector. Public hospitals suffer from chronic systems failures: elevators, heating systems, air conditioning and sewage systems all frequently break down, decrepit kitchens and laundry rooms cannot keep up with mounting needs, and a lack of medicines, equipment and materials sometimes brings emergency wards and operating theaters to a halt. These are common challenges in all health institutions in Iraq, even those formerly well equipped. For example, at Medical City Complex, Iraq's biggest

teaching hospital, whose buildings rise to 16 stories, water and power outages are all-too-common, cutting off elevators and the central air-conditioning system during the country's extremely hot summer.<sup>(1)</sup>

A report by the Committee of the International Red Cross<sup>(2)</sup> confirms that this picture is all-too-common. Hospitals in Iraq, it states, are overloaded with high numbers of patients, swollen further by victims of recurring violence and explosions. Many lack sufficient medicines and medical supplies. It is estimated that half of those admitted to hospitals following outbreaks of violence die because specialized medical teams and blood are unavailable.

The security situation leaves its impact on both citizens and health workers. Ambulance assistants, drivers and paramedics run into grave difficulties in trying to respond to emergency calls during hazardous episodes, especially at night. They often encounter delays and obstructions in aiding pregnant women with complications, or reaching injured people. Many first-aid workers have died while trying to transport and help the injured simply because a central, detailed emergency plan with clear procedures for dealing with explosions and other violent events did not exist before mid-2007. In most cases, response to emergencies depends on individual initiatives and the patriotism, compassion and professionalism of health service providers.

### Deterioration at all Levels

The health system in Iraq assumes that citizens must reach out for services rather than that services should reach them. There is no referral system or social security network to save citizens the exorbitant costs of private health care. Many factors affect access to health services, the most important of which are distance, red tape and improper care.

As in other countries, in Iraq health care is available at three levels; primary health care, provided by health centers, secondary health care, provided by public hospitals and tertiary health care, at public hospitals and specialized centers.

#### Primary health care (health centres):

Primary health care is considered a human right (Article 25 of the Universal Declaration) yet Iraqis do not enjoy this right equally. In rural and remote areas, families find it very hard to obtain access to health centers. The rural deprivation rate in primary health care amounts to 69.8%, compared to 33.5% in urban areas.<sup>(3)</sup>

Primary health care used to be provided through 1,884 health centers, spread all over Iraq. On average, each center provided health services to 35,000 citizens, with at least one physician in 48% of them. The other centers were managed by health assistants or nurses. The geographical distribution of these centers is uneven. For example, in 37 districts across the marshlands of southern Iraq, health services are primitive or non-existent, affecting 150,000 Iraqis.<sup>(4)</sup>

Since 2003, the functioning of some primary health care centers has been disrupted by insecurity and chaos. Medical personnel, especially female physicians and nurses, are frequently absent. These conditions have generated wide disparities in service provision. Stable governorates enjoy relatively good services, while troubled ones endure large gaps, worsened by a lack of supervision, assessment, control and follow-up.

#### Secondary and tertiary health care (hospitals)

More advanced health care is provided through 210 hospitals spread among all governorates, most of which are concentrated in urban areas. There are also

(1) Naira Al awqati, paper presented to Iraq NHDR2008

(2) International Red Cross, Iraqis Suffer, April 2007

(3) Iraq Living Conditions Survey, 2004, COSIT, op.cit.

(4) Naira Al Awqati, background paper for Iraq NHDR, 2008.



**Table 6.4** The Fitful Growth of Health Care

Indicators	1990	1999	2004	2005	2006
Public Hospitals	146	136	155	156	144
Private Hospitals	31	62	63	68	64
<b>Total</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>218</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>208</b>
Beds per 1000 of population	23086	35486	29339	28493	28822
Hospitals per 1000 of population	1.3	1.3	1.2	1,7	1,2
Primary Health Centers per 1000 of population	101,073	103,212	108,073	108,331	120,159
	<b>16088</b>	<b>15061</b>	<b>15940</b>	<b>16264</b>	<b>17025</b>

Source: MOPDC (COSIT), Annual Statistical Abstract, different years

**Box 6.6** No Treatment for Shock

In Iraq, psychiatric services have been neglected for decades. Indeed, only two hospitals treat mental diseases, both are in Baghdad. There are just 91 practicing doctors and 140 nurses (male and female) in the field, which means there are 3 psychiatrists for every million people. The number of practitioners may actually be lower today as a result of emigration. Medicines for psychiatric treatment are rarely available and there are no special psychiatric services for children and adolescents. Amid endemic violence, strife and tension, psychological illnesses are on the increase yet the country is ill-prepared to deal with the spread of trauma and post-traumatic disorders among the general population.

Source: AlAwqaty, N, Background paper for Iraq NHDR 2008

80 expensive private hospitals. The number of beds in government hospitals is 30,000, 23% of which are in Baghdad governorate. Average bed occupancy is 54.8%.

Many public hospitals are acutely short of human and material resources. A 2007 survey carried out by the Ministry of Health has shown that about 40% of consulting and specialized physicians, and a similar percentage of nurses were forced to leave one of the largest teaching hospitals in Baghdad during 2006-2007 as a result of recurrent assaults, kidnappings and direct personal threats. In Al-Qadisiya governorate, 16 physicians have left the maternity hospital as a result of insecurity and threats or because some felt they had been assigned to duties that did not match their specializations.

Iraq's health system is based on a

hospital-oriented, capital-intensive model which requires large-scale investments and imports of medicines, equipment and even specialists. The system focuses on curative medicine and is unsuited to supporting sustainable health development or preventive health care on a broad front, which has led to the neglect of common chronic diseases and their impacts.

### Unequal Health Care Distribution

As several examples mentioned previously illustrate, health and medical services among Iraq's governorates vary both in quality and quantity. The security situation in each governorate is a decisive factor, followed by the availability of personnel, supplies and medicines. Governorates considered safe, such as those in the south and in Kurdistan Region, benefit from the movement of

Since 2003, 221,065 doctors, nurses and health workers have carried out 8 national campaigns to vaccinate children across Iraq against fatal and handicapping diseases. They succeeded in inoculating more than 5 million children under five. The teams often had to move on foot from one house to the next, sometimes under dangerous conditions. In Basrah, the leaders of one medical team had first to intervene to end an armed tribal conflict before the team could enter the area. They persuaded the two clans to stop fighting for five days, during which time all children in the area were vaccinated.

In Baghdad (Karkh), a member of a vaccination team was killed, but the teams working in that area insisted on continuing the child vaccination campaign - which they successfully accomplished.

At one point, in Al-Anbar governorate, when vehicles were barred from entering the town of Fallujah, the health team, aided by townsfolk, shouldered their boxes of medical supplies and carried their loads tens of kilometers to make sure the children of Fallujah were vaccinated.

In Diala governorate, all four members of a vaccination team and their driver were killed while trying to deliver vaccines to the town of Al-Khalis. Once again, the other teams carried on their work in tribute to those who died performing their patriotic duty – out of sight of the public and ignored by the media.

Source: Al Awqati, N, Background paper for the Iraq NHDR, 2008

experienced physicians and nurses away from 'hot' spots in the center of the country, notably Baghdad. In these more fortunate areas, the level and quality of health services has actually risen. Governorates such as Missan, Al-Nasiriya and Babylon have even been able to open new specialized branches.

### The Exodus of Medical Staff

Doctors and health workers have been targeted for killing and kidnapping. Many of them have been victims of such acts inside and outside their institutions. This, coupled with the deterioration of the general state of security, has driven many doctors and health personnel to migrate to safer areas of Iraq (Kurdistan in particular) or abroad. Female doctors in particular have been forced to stay away from working in rural or remote areas, aggravating existing shortages of medical services in such districts. The targeting of female doctors has also led to further decline in reproductive health services.<sup>(5)</sup>

Insecurity has impacted the total number of medical staff working in Iraq's health institutions between 2004 and 2006.<sup>(6)</sup> The exodus of doctors and medical staff reduced their number each year, and added to their

unequal distribution among health centers. For example, while Thi-Qar governorate's minimum need is 147 doctors, the number of those available at present is 74 (almost half the required cadre). Health services are not available to those most in need of care. For instance, only 62% of pregnant women and only 73% of children under one are registered in the governorate's centers. Across Iraq, registration in urban areas is higher than in rural areas.

### The Challenges of Transition

In countries undergoing transition, health systems tend to carry out hurried changes, often disregarding normal procedures for supervision, assessment and institutional accountability. Usually, the direction of the system is in the hands of a few decision makers.

### Poor Appointments and Poorer Performance

The performance of the Ministry of Health has been affected by the political situation and a flurry of fast-changing provisional and transitional arrangements for governance. Criteria used in appointing officials to high

(5) UNAMI "Human Rights in Iraq", monthly report, June 2006

(6) Source: COSIT, Annual Statistical Abstract 2005-2006

ranking administrative positions have little to do with professionalism, experience or academic qualifications. Political instability and incompetent appointments have weakened the efficiency of health management projects and services, and left services fragmented and under-supported. The health system overall lacks a mechanism for assessing the performance of health institutions – an essential requirement for maintaining a proper level of services. Without established standards and rules in hospitals and medical/health teaching institutions, quality and efficiency will continue to suffer – as the current situation attests.

### Rushing to Decentralize Chaos

Health services in Iraq are provided mainly by the Ministry of Health. The private sector participates in health care through small hospitals in all governorates, but at higher costs. Historically, the health system in Iraq has relied on tight centralization, with limited delegation of authority to the administrations of health departments in governorates. As noted earlier, this system is characterized by its concentration on curative medicine and hospitals, and by lack of concentration on sustainable health development. Thus, preventive medicine has been neglected, in both primary health care and the management of general and chronic diseases to which many citizens are exposed. The gap between the supply of health services and actual needs remains wide. Furthermore, financial resources are not allocated on the basis of local needs assessments.

Iraq's long-standing centralization of the health system weakened the capacity of local health administrations to draw plans and set up mechanisms for delivering services responsive to people's needs. Centralization also excluded local citizens' groups from health planning and monitoring. Yet the rush to loosen central health controls after 2003 has produced haphazard patterns of decentralization. Unplanned measures and unexamined assumptions

have created chaotic conditions in local health administrations. After being directly responsible to the Ministry, directors of health departments in governorates have suddenly found themselves answering to local authorities with little understanding of health interventions and no prior experience in their administration. The governorates themselves lack the technical capacity and administrative experience required. Indeed, most new appointees in local health departments are young people with insufficient education and training.

Iraq needs to adopt a realistic and gradual course in applying new health policies. A prerequisite for effective decentralization is a prior phase of careful planning, training and assessment. The alternative is to incur the kinds of setbacks experienced by countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, which skipped this vital stage. Health experts have advocated the gradual and phased introduction of decentralization under the supervision of the Ministry of Health – which should continue to be responsible for specialist services, medical supplies, support and training. The entire operation needs to be planned, transparent and open to monitoring.

Good health is not only about freedom from diseases and handicaps; it is also a state of physical, mental, social and psychological integration. This in turn requires the integration of economic, social and human factors to achieve an acceptable level of public health. Seen in that light, health is a measure of the state's concern for the standard and quality of life among citizens. Iraq's health system has been seriously affected by armed conflicts, violence and the collapse of the rule of law as well as by poor coordination between the center and its peripheries. These conditions make efficient, accountable administration and cost-effective expenditure difficult to achieve or monitor. Yet institutional failures in the health sector can only weaken public confidence in the government and its concern for the welfare of citizens. Moreover, no amount of damage sustained

under current conditions of insecurity can conceal the inherent limitations of a health system starved of adequate financing – a subject that this Chapter turns to next.

## Conclusions

This chapter has illustrated how a legacy of damage, continuing insecurity and hasty transition combine to constrain the capacity of public health and education to empower Iraqis. The chief constraints are:

- The deficient student-admission and student-flow capacity of schools and school buildings prevent children and young people, both male and female, from receiving a basic education or continuing with their schooling.
- Abandonment of the principle of compulsory primary education in most parts of Iraq. By contrast, Kurdistan Region's government extends the compulsory phase to 9 years in order to expand empowerment opportunities.
- An unbalanced relationship between the public and private sectors in shouldering responsibility for social services whereby the state carries the heaviest load. This relationship fluctuates, but remains weak. It reflects a lack of encouragement by the government as much as reluctance by the private sector under present conditions of instability.
- Health policies and systems are unequal to public needs; health institutions have been crippled by damaged or inadequate infrastructure, and medical facilities and supplies are sorely lacking;

hospitals and health centers have been further undermined by insecurity and overwhelmed by rising public demand for health care under conditions of violence and frequent emergencies.

- Doctors and health workers perform miracles in these circumstances yet many have been demoralized by threats to their personal safety and by bureaucratic ineptitude; as a result, health institutions have lost more than half of their doctors, many of whom have emigrated. The poor distribution of health services among governorates leaves some towns in the south without any doctors.
- The financing of education and health still prevents their expansion to meet people's needs. The current budgets for these two sectors are lopsided in their allocations. Their investment budgets are insufficient and cannot support the required overhaul and expansion of services.
- On top of all this, transition has imposed its own challenges, many associated with the dismantling of the central state. Unplanned and mismanaged decentralization has created an unstable relationship between the center and governorates, and weakened the performance of the health system.

These constraints prevent Iraq's education and health systems from making the kind of decisive contributions to human development that their counterparts elsewhere in the world are known for.





# 7



## Chapter 7

Women Caught Between Insecurity, Transition  
and a Legacy of Cultural Restriction



Faeq Hassan

**Women in Abaya**



## Introduction

As the 1995 *Global Human Development Report* states, development that is not ‘en-gendered’ is development endangered. In Iraq, gender equality is both a human right and a national imperative, since the political economic, social and cultural changes for transforming the country cannot be completed without women’s empowerment and participation. Moreover, women need their own voice in this transition. Experience shows that no group is capable of representing the interests of other groups effectively, however sincere their intentions may be. Women are best qualified to represent their own interests.

The empowerment of women has fluctuated during the past three decades in Iraq but at no time has it done them the justice promised by human development. Long-standing cultural and social discrimination, coupled with a new sense of insecurity resulting from different forms of direct and indirect violence, present formidable challenges to Iraqi women today.

As other countries have shown, transition to democratic rule can provide historic breakthroughs in the removal of institutional and cultural obstacles to women’s empowerment. However, a basic requirement for this is that transition must empower women to become their own advocates for equality and human rights. Moreover, while emerging democracies have the opportunity to reform societies by establishing basic freedoms, democratic government, free markets and human rights,

the insecurity associated with times of struggle can nevertheless undermine such important outcomes. When transition takes place within a surrounding conflict, the need for a stable democratic system becomes the main priority and can eclipse the imperative of equality. If that happens, political transformation in the transitional phase may sometimes increase, rather than decrease, the prevalence of gender inequality. (Many Arab women who participated in their countries’ struggles against colonialism learned that the fight for political independence does not guarantee women’s independence and can indeed become a pretext for denying it).

This chapter will examine how women in Iraq have been caught between conflict, transition and their legacy of cultural restrictions.

## Empowerment:

### A Misunderstood Process

Since its establishment, the Iraqi State has been inclined to create opportunities for the institutional empowerment of Iraqi women, by providing wider access to education, health services, and job training. Yet the State has shown no real awareness that empowerment is not achieved solely through enacting legislation; but rather, that it only comes about when society puts laws into practice, which in turn demands changes in the culture of discrimination. Women’s empowerment requires a culture of equality of access and opportunity, with all its attendant values and psychological and legal dimensions. Moreover, such a culture must provide for the

*In Iraq, the imposition of sanctions and the growing political and economic crisis, with the insecurity and conflict it has bred, have meant that women have not fared well*

rights of both women and men, for there can be no rights for women where there are none for citizens as a whole.<sup>(1)</sup>

The argument this chapter presents is that empowerment is a process that requires more than institutional mechanisms and technical training. It should lead to a culture of equality beyond the formal means of empowerment, as provided through education and health services, legal acts and decrees. For example, an increase in expenditure on education may amount to nothing if the educational programmes themselves promote inequality. Similarly, expenditures on health may not yield positive outcomes if traditional practices and values prevail over the health system. Iraq has spent much on education and health programmes and passed many laws supporting the advancement of women. However, changes in societal values conducive to equality have not been pursued in parallel.

Thus, a narrow focus on instituting social, educational and health services, which ignores the cultural aspects of empowerment and the problems of insecurity, can reverse the impact of such progress. This implies that women's empowerment goes beyond control of resources, the capacity building of existing and new institutions, or inclusion in decision-making processes. It necessitates the removal of cultural stereotypes in order to challenge inherent discrimination, inequality and violations of human rights, including and especially those of women.

Compared to men in recent decades, Women are worse off on several key human development indicators. In 2006, although women's life expectancy (62) was altogether higher than that of men (55), 30% of women aged 15 and up were illiterate, compared to a rate of 14% among men. Combined school enrolment rates (primary, intermediate and secondary) were 55% for females and 68% for males. Unemployment rates were also higher among women: 23% compared to 16% for men (Table 25, Annex). Women's

earned income is only 11% of men's (Table 3, Annex). Agricultural work constitutes 60 % of total working hours per week for women and only 22% for men (Table 27, Annex). This fact helps explain their low income, as agricultural work for women is known to be mostly unpaid, or of lower productivity. The value of HDI was 0.627, while that of the GDI was 0.584 (Table 1, Annex).

## Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals


### Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women

The percentage of women in paid jobs in non-agricultural sectors was 15.3% in 2006, while it was 10.6% in 1990, a situation which requires a much greater commitment to progress and accelerated measures to reach the internationally set goal of 50% in 2015 (fig. 7.1 / first).

The proportion of seats held by women in parliament was 27% in 2006, up from 7% in 1997, pointing to significant progress in the promotion of equality and the empowerment of women, with a reasonable chance of achieving the goal set for 2015 (fig. 7.1 / second).

- The ratio of girls to boys in primary education in 2007 was 0.89 compared with 0.80 in 1990. This represents progress towards the goal set (fig. 7.1 / third a).
- The ratio of girls to boys in secondary education in 2007 was 0.75 compared with 0.64 in 1990, which indicates progress towards the defined goals (fig. 7.1 / third b).
- The ratio of women to men in university education in 2007 was 0.75 compared with 0.51 in 1990. This represents some progress, though it

(1) Kareem M.Hamza, Paper presented to Iraq NHDR2008

**Figure 7.1** Progress Towards the MDGs - Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women


will need to improve faster if gender equality at this stage of education is to be achieved (fig. 7.1 / third c).

- Ratio of women to men in tertiary education in 2007 was 0.62 compared to 0.25 in 1990. Clearly, deeper policy changes are necessary to ensure that gender equality is achieved by 2015 (fig. 7.1 / third d).

### Education as a Tool for Empowerment

Evidently, there is still much progress to be made towards the achievement of the MDGs, although women have scored remarkable gains in political participation. Education on the other hand continues to exhibit stubborn problems in female illiteracy, dropout rates, and inequality.

Iraqi women have achieved remarkable levels of education during the past decades as a result of the modernization of the economy

and the need to fill jobs left vacant following the mobilization of men in the military sector. Women's professional levels have risen, especially in the more socially accepted fields of education and health services. In 1997-2004, 68% of teachers were women, and the overall rate of women's participation in the medical professions represented 30-60% of the total, as Table 7.1 below shows.

Solutions to continuing gender inequality in education are currently limited, as complicated living and security conditions

exacerbate the problems. Commitment to compulsory education, as the text of the Constitution declares, will provide an opportunity to stop the decline in school attendance. In this connection, a paradox can be observed. While the proportion of women attending universities has gone up, many families are reluctant to send their younger daughters to primary school. Obviously, this trend would undermine the gains that women have secured in education so far. Furthermore, although education is considered essential for extending women's


### Box 7.1

### Gender Equality in Universities

One positive outcome of previous policies that deserves notice is the rise of female enrolment in university education. The rate of enrolment for women for the academic year 2006-2007 was 59% for morning classes, 30% for evening classes and 30% for technical education. In Baghdad's four public universities alone, the rate of female enrolment is 52.2%, which represents 35% of total female enrolment in all Iraqi universities. In other governorates, such as Kufa (61.2%), Thi-Qar (68.3%), Maysan (63.6%), these rates are even higher. In Al-Anbar, however, the rate declined to 31.8%. By contrast, the enrolment rate for women in private colleges was only 5.4% of the total number of students. This shows that enrolment rates are resistant to crisis and conflict situations, as long as education is free. This provides an added rationale for enhancing the role of the state in providing education for the empowerment of women.

Admissions policies at the universities and higher institutes were changed after 2003. Those that discriminated between males and females have been dropped so that instruction at Engineering and Medical Colleges is now equally available to all, where previously men were granted preference.

Ratio of Women to All Students at Universities 2006-2007



Source: Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, 2006/2007

**Table 7.1** Women's Participation in Medical and Health Professions %

Professions/Years	1997	2000	2004
Physicians	36.3	38.4	34.3
Specialized Physicians	30.2	33.4	30.2
Dentists	58.7	59.4	57.1
Pharmacists	76.0	69.4	57.1
Total	44.5	45.5	39.3
Paramedics	35.8	34.7	27.0

Source: Annual statistical abstract, different years COSIT, (Kurdistan Region not included)

options and empowerment, cultural and traditional factors still make many urban families force their educated daughters to stay at home and not practise any profession. This restriction will undoubtedly curtail women's economic independence and participation in society. Thus while society may offer both sexes the same opportunities for empowerment in principle, the hurdles women have to surmount to reach and retain those opportunities are higher and more numerous.

## Political Transition: Gains and Challenges for Women

### Women in Positions of Power

Since the introduction of the quota system on September 4, 2003, political life has been enriched by affirmative action for women. In the 2005 elections, for example, 87 women gained seats out of 275 in the National Assembly, or 31% of the total. In local council elections from closed electoral lists they gained 28% of seats. Additionally, adherence to the quota system significantly raised the number of women elected to governorate councils. At the same time, the system of lists can lead to a decline in the rate of representation by women, when winning lists increase in elections. This was noticed

in the parliamentary elections, where the number of women elected decreased from 87 in 2005 to 78 in 2007.

A strong turnout of women was noted in the 2005 elections, especially in rural areas and low-income neighbourhoods, though this showing has been attributed to the impact of a fatwa issued by high-ranking clerics. Indeed, one should not underestimate the role of traditional culture in shaping behaviour and attitudes in Iraq and the strong influence of religion in creating new images of socially accepted women's roles. Religious institutions therefore need to step up to the responsibility of helping to strengthen women's advancement.

Such results place a question mark over the future of women's political participation in Iraq when the application of the quota system (which is confined to two parliamentary elections) comes to an end, or in the event that the electoral law is changed. As the experience of neighbouring countries shows, the position of women in politics is vulnerable. In 2007, Kuwaiti women failed to win any seat in parliament, and Omani women lost their seats on the Advisory Council in the most recent elections.

Despite real progress in Iraq, women rarely achieve high office. Among 23 parliamentary committees, women chair only two, and traditional ones at that: The Women's and Children's Affairs Committee and The Civil Society Committee. There is a clear role for machinery to encourage women's empowerment, but the Ministry for Women is under-resourced and under-staffed, and has thus had minimal impact. At the same time, some argue that the very existence of such an institution has led to the isolation of women's concerns rather than their mainstreaming into the portfolio of all ministries. Among political parties in Iraq, not one is led by a woman nor is there a single woman among any of their leading positions.

Notwithstanding the quota system, women continue to be absent from negotiations leading to the formation of government

structures, despite the fact that the Constitution guarantees equality between men and women in political life. Also, despite extensive lobbying efforts by women politicians and women's organizations, the appointment of a woman to the position of deputy Prime Minister was not accomplished. These limited achievements can also be explained by the fact that, while Article 49 of the new constitution establishes a quota of women for parliamentary seats, there is no such provision for a minimum representation of women at the executive and judicial levels.

Before 2003, women had certainly not been properly represented in the Iraqi government. After that, six female ministers were appointed in the 2004 interim government. However, no woman was appointed to the position of governor or deputy governor, with the exception of the Kurdistan Region.

## Has The Gender Gap

### Narrowed?

Since 2003, the number of women in administrative decision-making positions has also increased, from 12.7% to 22.4%. Although women represented only 2% of the judiciary in 2006, they fared better in the executive. In 2006, there were four female cabinet ministers, plus a total of 342 high-ranking officials, including undersecretaries, counsellors and inspectors general, directors general, and assistant directors general. However, this improvement does not necessarily reflect progress towards narrowing the gap between men and women. The number of women in primary school administration decreased slightly in 2005, a field where women constitute the majority of staff. At the secondary school level, the number declined after 2005. This was largely due to the reinstatement of previously dismissed male staff, and, more specifically, to the increase in salaries which encouraged men to return to positions which they had left in

#### Box 7.2

#### Women in Decision-Making Positions

No gender-based proportional representation was taken into consideration in the formation of committees set up by parliament. Such committees are responsible for submitting reports on the performance of the executive body in the public institutions and for formulating bills and proposals in this regard. It is noticeable that, among the 22 committees elected on 21 June 2006, women are largely absent or poorly represented in sensitive committees, especially those related to questions of sovereignty. On the other hand, they are much better represented in some less sensitive committees, a situation that restricts women's activities to such areas as education and nursing, including 2 women.

- Security and Defence Committee. 15 members, no women.
- Oil and Gas Committee. 9 members, no women.
- Legal Committee: 13 members, including only one woman.
- Financial Committee: 7 members, including only one woman.
- Foreign Relations Committee: 15 members including 2 women.
- Economy, Investment and Reconstruction Committee: 12 members, including 2 women.
- Health and Environment Committee: 12 members, including 4 women.
- Education Committee: 15 members, including 7 women.
- Women's Committee: 7 female members, no men.

Source: Observation of Women's Rights and Freedoms in Iraq for 2006, Nahla Naddawi, *Civilized Dialogue* – volume 2075-21/10/2007.

**Figure 7.2** Women's Participation in Secondary School Administration

Source: Annual Statistical Abstracts, different years, COSIT

the 1990s.

### Does Legislation Guarantee the Protection and Empowerment of Women?

Reforms to legislation in the context of democratic transformation are essential to the achievement of equality among citizens, notably between men and women. These should be followed by institutional mechanisms, interventions and procedures to ensure the solid establishment of a sound democratic society. If disparity in capabilities restricts options for women and limits their opportunities in economic or social activities, a state's legislation should under no circumstances exploit this to promote discrimination between men and women.

In Iraq, there are a number of relatively progressive laws still in force, like the Personal Status Law No. 188 for the year 1959, Labour Law No. 71 for the year 1987, Minors' Welfare Act No. 78 for the year 1980 and Social Welfare Act No. 126 for the year 1980. As far as the last Act is concerned, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is endeavouring to formulate an alternative law for the purpose of organizing the activities

of social protection. All these laws could be considered as a solid basis on which to guarantee equal rights for women. <sup>(2)</sup>

The most important instrument that can be referred to as a foundation for women's empowerment – regardless of the criticism it often draws – is the new Iraqi Constitution of 2005 which strove to include a number of positive measures for women. The preamble of the Constitution states:

“We, the people of Iraq..., men and women ...have resolved... to respect the rule of law, to realize justice and equality...and to pay adequate attention to the woman and her rights.”

Under Article 20, the Constitution bestows on men and women equally the right of inclusion in public affairs and the exercise of political rights. It emphasizes the value of education and the role of the State in promoting and protecting this right for all the people (Article 34). Articles 31, 32 and 33 guarantee the rights of all Iraqi citizens to health services. In accordance with Article 18, women may pass on their nationality to their children. The Constitution also provides for affirmative action, granting in

(2) Iraqiyat Studies Centre, Review of Iraqi Legislations and Laws, 2007

Article 49 a quota for women of no less than 25% of the seats in Parliament. The Electoral Law No. 6 of 2005 also stipulates that election candidate lists should abide by this quota.

Yet the Constitution contains some articles, clauses and implications that could be considered discriminatory or unfavourable to women. For example, the preamble contains a total of 85 words specifically relating to men out of a total of 316 words, against only 4 for women. Furthermore, Clause 'A' of Article 2 states that Islam is the essential source of all legislation: thus, it is not permissible to enact a law that contradicts the tenets of Islam. Article 41 states that "Iraqis are free to abide by their personal status according to their religion, beliefs, doctrines or choices...," which has also raised concerns. It is feared that such provisions may allow for different interpretations of the Islamic Sharia, resulting in barriers to legal equality, especially in matters of civil code, such as marriage and divorce. Varying interpretations could set up different practices in different provinces, or between rural and urban populations and between members of different religions.

These provisions are seen as a step backwards when compared with provisions of Law No. 188 for the year 1959. The rationale behind the legislation of this 1959 law was the multiplicity of the sources of judicial power. It was feared that variations would lead to unstable family life and the lack of universal guarantees of individual rights. This was the motivation for formulating a law which combines the most important legislative provisions agreed upon by all. <sup>(3)</sup>

Indeed, Article 41 of the Constitution contradicts Article 14, which is considered to be a fundamental guarantee, namely: "Iraqis are equal before the law with no discrimination because of gender or race." Such a contradiction compromises the unity of universally applicable legislation. There could well be cases of non-correspondence or incompatibility between certain laws. This situation in turn removes the individual

from the status of citizenship to the status of religious affiliation and further revokes the general rule of law with its comprehensive application to all people.

When it comes to providing protection for women and prohibiting violence against them, constitutional and legal provisions alike may be inadequate. The Constitution, for example, avoids referring specifically to women when it addresses the issue of violence in the chapter on rights. Article 4, for example, offers a general prohibition against "all forms of violence and abuse in the family, school and society"<sup>(4)</sup>. Yet even though this provision covers women implicitly, the current Penal Law in Iraq is at odds with it, providing a legal cover for violence against women since it does not consider marital violence as a specific crime. Article 41 states "there is no crime if the act has befallen in exercise of an established right under the law and shall be considered as a use of the right, for example a husband's disciplining of his wife... within the extent of what is established by Sharia law or tradition".

Again, a reference to men in the Constitution does not necessarily mean the inclusion of women. For example, Article 44 states that "the Iraqi is free to move, travel and reside inside or outside Iraq". Yet freedom of movement and travel for a woman under the age of 40 is not in practice guaranteed as the law does not allow her to obtain a passport without the permission of a guardian.

Article 45 states that "the State shall adhere to the advancement of the Iraqi tribes and clans... and promote their noble human values..., and shall prevent those tribal traditions that conflict with human rights". This wording is another source of concern for women's empowerment. The reference to the tribes recalls certain traditional violations to which women's rights and freedoms could be exposed. The unspecific wording of the Article could well lead to the continuation of such violations. It allows for various interpretations of "noble human values"

(3) Nahla AlNadawi, Observation of Women's Rights and Freedom in Iraq for 2006, *Civilized Dialogue* - volume 2075-21/10/2007.

(4) Amal Kashif Algitaa, Background paper to Iraq HDR, 2008.



as they concern the rights and freedoms of women, which could perpetuate traditions notorious for violating the human rights of women without fear of any consequences from the powers regulating tribal authority. Amnesty International referred to this issue in its Document No. 14-23 for the year 2005 <sup>(5)</sup>.

The law has never provided a binding deterrent or any form of punishment to put an end to honour killing. While local and international reports continuously decry the existence of honour crimes in Iraq, this form of murder is often registered as suicide.

Thus, even where the Iraqi Constitution provides for *de jure* non-discrimination against women, legal, social and cultural factors often represent *de facto* obstacles in the way. For instance, women have the right to equal wages, but the law does not provide binding provisions to guarantee equal promotion. This paves the way for discrimination between men and women.

Indeed, gaps and contradictions between constitutions and the laws which supposedly give effect to them are common throughout the Arab world, and are especially troublesome on matters of women's rights.

The legal and legislative climate in the Kurdistan Region seems to be more positive towards women. For example, the Personal Status Act No. 188 for the year 1959 is being applied there. The Commission on Women's Affairs in the parliament of Kurdistan has succeeded in introducing amendments to the Personal Status Law. In 2007, additional conditions were imposed in cases of polygamy, female circumcision was prohibited and other regulations concerning divorce were changed to make them more favourable to women. The same commission succeeded in changing some laws that allowed for extenuating circumstances in cases of honour crimes <sup>(6)</sup>.

In 1986, Iraq ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

### Box 7.3

#### Are Human Rights Centred on the Individual or the Family?

The collapse of the totalitarian regime in the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of 12 transitional countries from its break-up are sometimes taken to illustrate how new societies establish individual human rights.

The former Soviet Union never considered the individual outside of the family context. Contrary to widespread belief, this is not an inherent and unique feature of Islamic society. Rather, it is a view associated with totalitarian regimes that consider the rights of the individual to be group rights, with the State representing the best way to express and protect those rights. From this conceptual framework of individual rights, social structure is formed. In these resulting structures, many individual civil rights are forfeited, such as the right of participation, the right to establish civil society organizations, women's rights, and sometimes minority rights. The desire for a unified common culture underpins the framing of constitutional articles and the rights of the individual may be sacrificed to the desire for a strongly unified nation.

Yet in fact the power of the group is based on the power of the individual. In times of transition, the strength of the group is not nearly as important as human capital based on the equal rights of men and women.

In Iraq, the 2005 Constitution's treatment of men and women within the family framework, and not as individuals with human rights granted by God, or as individual actors in public life, is inconsistent with the view expressed at the beginning of its preamble ("We honoured sons of Adam"), and with the transition from a totalitarian system to a democratic one that respects the rights and freedoms of the individual.

The Egyptian Constitution shows a better understanding of this issue as is shown below:

Article 29 of the Iraqi Constitution (A): "The family is the foundation of society and the State preserves its entity and religious, ethical and national values".

Article 49 of the Kurdistan Constitution: "The family is the natural and basic social unit in the society; it has the right to enjoy the protection of the society and government".

Article (5) of the Egyptian Constitution: "The dignity of the individual is a reflection of the nation's dignity in that the individual is the corner stone in building the nation, and it is on the individual's value, work and dignity, that the nation's prestige, strength and standing are built".

(5) Nahla AlNadawi, *ibid.*

against Women (CEDAW), with reservations at the time on clauses (w) and (k) of Articles 2, 9, and 29. Those reservations effectively nullify the Convention's provisions for equality between men and women. Since the beginning of the transition in 2003, women's organizations have striven to remove these reservations, without success. The Constitution further does not include any article acknowledging that ratifications of international conventions are binding on the state. In any case, the new regime has rejected commitments to international conventions ratified by its predecessor, in particular CEDAW, on the basis of contradiction with Islamic Sharia. The same rejection applies to UN Security Council Resolution No. 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

In sum, it can be agreed that the Constitution

and a host of other legislative initiatives together provide a basis for the empowerment of women in areas such as education, health and social services. Yet at the same time, these provisions often do not correspond with realities experienced by Iraqi women today. Despite the existence of anti-discriminatory laws and the Constitution, such provisions are often limited by traditional and cultural practices, all the more so in times of ongoing violence.

## Economic Transition: Losses and Sacrifices of Women

### Shrinking State Responsibilities

Transitional stages often entail a review of the role of the state in order to better adjust to realities and enhance equality among citizens, including between men and women, through institutional mechanisms and government interventions. Yet such reforms often weaken the state when its strength is most crucial. In Iraq, while reforms resulted in a number of new legislations, they were also accompanied by the dismantling of the State, which could then no longer fulfil its responsibilities or provide key services in the transitional economy. These abrupt changes adversely impacted gender equality in Iraq.

Before 2003, the State was the main employer of women in Iraq. Women represented 46% of public sector employees, and were the main providers of services and social benefits in the domains of health and education, especially in areas benefiting women.


The State also provided legal protection against all forms of abuse against women and encouraged women's economic participation. However, during the transitional period, neither the private sector nor civil society has so far been able to fill the void created when the State was dismantled.

As a result, women have lost most of the

#### Box 7.4 Relationship Between Women's Political Participation and Child Care

The Scandinavian countries lead the world with their extensive social welfare policies and in the great importance attached to women's representation in parliament. This supports the theory that increased women's parliamentary participation leads to greater provision of child care services. In 1996, 85% of Swedish women aged 25-49 years were in the workforce, 45% of these being part-time workers. Women's participation rate in the parliament is 34%.

Women in parliament, European Countries (1970-1998)



Source: Women in Transition, The Monee project, Unicef, 1999.

social benefits hitherto provided by the State. For example, state-sponsored child care, which had seen serious disruptions under economic sanctions in the 1990s, continued to decrease, with the number of child care centres falling from 202 in 1987 to 103 in 2004. The number of children in nurseries was cut by half during this period and the quality of care suffered. Women today can no longer find safe places for their pre-school children. At the same time, the cost of private nurseries is beyond the reach of many wage earners.<sup>(7)</sup>

### Unequal Access to Assets

One of the foundations of human development is to ensure women's access to, and control over resources such as land, means of production, and loans. Yet in Iraq women do not enjoy equality with men in that important respect. Although no data exist to measure ownership of such assets as land, property and businesses, it is safe to say that women in general possess fewer financial assets than men. For example, the vast majority of land and housing units are registered in the names of men, and men clearly dominate in private sector ownership and management. Female heads of household also own fewer assets.

Article 23 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution guarantees "the right of the Iraqi to ownership" without any discrimination based on gender. The Constitution does not, however, mention joint ownership of the family dwelling, as is stipulated in the constitutions of other Arab countries such as Tunisia and Morocco.

Small micro-credit projects led by women represent an effective strategy for supporting women's empowerment in a market economy. Yet women are often unable to have access to these opportunities, given the prevailing insecurity, adverse family pressures, and, especially, lack of access to loans and collateral which banks require.

Expanding access to micro-credit projects and home-based work could be a favourable solution for women with limited education and training, rural women, the elderly, and widows supporting families. This is especially so given that evidence points to the willingness of women, especially those with higher education, to engage in such activities. Yet at the macro level, opportunities for such initiatives are restricted. The Ministry of Industry provides operational loans to industrial entrepreneurs who were licensed before 2004, and not to new projects which could be beneficial for creating employment among women. The Ministry of Labour launched a plan for micro-credit projects in 2007, but the opportunities this initiative provided were limited in scope and favoured mostly men.

The government could open up new opportunities through reform of the lending system in public banks, by lifting the requirement for real estate as collateral and by encouraging women-friendly banking services such as those that distinguish the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh.

The 2004 living conditions survey in Iraq

#### Box 7.5

#### The Predicament of Households Headed by Women

The loss of state-sponsored support for women is especially felt among the growing number of households headed by women in Iraq today. In these households, the main breadwinners (fathers, husbands and sons) were lost as a result of continuous wars. The spread of armed conflict and the escalation of violence after 2003 have led to an increasing number of widows, although statistics vary on their precise number. A survey conducted by Iraq's Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology in 2004 showed that 11% of Iraqi families were supported by women and 73% of these families were headed and supported by widows. The survey also pointed to a difference between the income of families supported by women and that of male-headed families. 40% of families headed by women were unable to earn 100,000 Dinars per week (about \$85), compared to 26% of the families headed by men.

Source: Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004, COSIT

(7) Hana Alsamarai, Background paper to the Iraq NHDR

pointed out that the sectors of trade, service industries, agriculture, education, health, social services and public administration tend to absorb the largest number of women workers, accounting for 79% of employed women. It is noticeable that the number of women in the educational sector is higher than that of men. This sector employs 292,000 women and 197,000 men. Women represent almost one third of the workforce in the agricultural sector, known for its low wages.

### Unequal and Insecure Job Opportunities

The labour laws in Iraq guarantee equality, as is evident in the public sector, but in the private sector, they are not properly applied to ensure fairness and equal remuneration for women and men. This discrimination is not only due to a biased attitude in the labour market, but also to women's low level of skills, which in turn leads to poor productivity compared to men whom the education system favours.


In general, the rate of women's participation in Iraqi economic activity (21% in 2004) is considerably lower than men's participation

(79% in 2004). At the same time, however, the female rate of economic activity in rural areas is higher than in urban areas. This can be explained by two factors: first, economic activity in the rural areas depends on family cooperation to satisfy basic needs; second, the menial tasks rural women perform are more socially acceptable and it is thus easier for them to find work in agricultural production inside their homes. Furthermore, agricultural work requires less education and training, thus providing more opportunities to a larger number of women.

Unemployment rates are strikingly high among women. Figure 7.4 indicates that the unemployment rate among females rose to 22.7% in 2006 compared to 14.1% in 2005, while that of males dropped to 16.2% in 2006 compared to 19.2% in 2005. Measures taken to reduce unemployment in general have met with limited success.

The transition towards an open market economy in Iraq may provide both more opportunities and more challenges for women. The opening of the market may provide new opportunities in the private sector, but will undoubtedly increase competition for jobs and require skills which the education system imparts unequally.

**Figure 7.3** Distribution of Women in Spheres of Economic Activity, 2004 (%)



It will also lead to fewer jobs in the public sector<sup>(8)</sup>.


In the meantime, the insecure conditions in Iraq after 2003 have led to a decline in employment levels in the private sector. Women employed by the private sector account for 32% - 38% of all workers in agriculture, health, financial institutions and other areas. However, women in the private sector have been more vulnerable to job loss when the current economic situation forces companies and institutions to restructure. The private sector prefers to employ men citing that, unlike women, they do not take maternity leave and are less likely to need time off for family reasons.

Social traditions and stereotypes regarding males, females and “the nature of women” sometimes determine the kinds of job opportunities women are given. For example, women are seen to be more suited to jobs like sewing and dress making. The worsening security situation has

forced many factories that were employing numerous women to close down. Even the few remaining factories still face difficulties arising from a lack of infrastructure and the consequences of an unhealthy work environment with its attendant hazards for female workers.

Since the 1990s, scattered work patterns have spread in the informal sector known for accommodating a large numbers of women in various trades involving the manufacture and marketing of home-made products such as foodstuffs, clothing and traditional handicrafts. Other means of livelihood in this category are household service and peddling, which women pursue in the absence of alternative options in more productive sectors. Informal sector employment opportunities of this kind have expanded, drawing even women with high levels of education and skills. Women resort to this sector in circumstances of unemployment, professional discrimination and family need for additional income. Female heads of

**Figure 7.4** Unemployment Rates for Men and Women, 2003-2006



(8) Kareem M Hamza, Op.cit.

household turn to it to provide for their families. Such work is marginal and does not provide financial, social or psychological stability for women. The disadvantages of working in this sector for women are many, not least the absence of benefits and rights that are guaranteed by law for workers in the public and private sectors.

## The Influence of Cultural Tradition in Violence against Women

It was hoped that deliberations over the restructuring of institutional and administrative bodies in Iraq after 2003 would include serious consideration of women's issues. Unfortunately, the worsening security situation led to continued discrimination and inequality between the sexes. The mounting insecurity during the transition has thrown up new barriers preventing the majority of women from participating in the labour market, in political activities, and in gaining adequate access to medical care and educational opportunities. Women have not only suffered from discrimination and marginalization, but also from violent assault and sexual abuse during the crisis.<sup>(9)</sup>

Tension and open conflict in Iraq have affected family relations. Violence in the street has been reproduced in the form of self-inflicted violence or violence against women and children. A sample study of 250 women showed that all respondents had been exposed to some sort of violence, and over 37% of them to physical violence. Other forms of violence include cursing, insult, harassment, and false accusations. Physical violence was inflicted on about 63% of women, while 24% of the total number had been threatened by their husbands with divorce, desertion, expulsion, the taking of another wife or being kept from going to work. A disturbing outcome of the survey was that some 65% of the women interviewed blamed themselves for being the cause of the violence they

suffered (through their own negligence, for example); the majority agreed that keeping silent about the violence perpetuated the phenomenon. However, only 16% of those surveyed stated that men had no right to practise violence against women, against 84% who stated that men had the right to inflict violence on their wives, whether occasionally or on a regular basis. The role of traditional culture in conditioning women to accept male domination is quite clear.

Some conservative families justify their unwillingness to allow their daughters to go to school or work by pointing to prevailing conditions of violence in the country. This justification is most commonly found in social contexts dominated by religious leaders, where the head of the family feels obliged to fall in with community leaders opposed to women's socialization even if he privately disagrees with their views. Forcing women to wear traditional clothes, or to quit school or work, has become the reflex response of male household heads to current trends in Iraqi society. The reluctant patriarch may not himself be convinced that these restrictions are valid, but he does seek to bring peace to tense situations by not going against prevailing attitudes.

The cycle of violence against women under conditions of insecurity largely continues a pattern of suffering to which women are accustomed under other social conditions. The present cycle amplifies that pattern and reproduces it with new justifications. The woman, at an early stage of her life, is forced to wear a certain type of dress and her movement is limited. Moreover, she may be compelled to marry at an early age. Girls in the most troubled areas often quit school, especially when conflict intensifies. In fact, the Iraqi family sees the conduct of its female members as a reflection, either positive or negative, of the family's honour and status. A kidnapped girl, for example, therefore represents a serious problem to the family: members may feel they have to

(9) Amal Kashif Algitaa, Background paper to Iraq NHDR 2008

kill her even if she was not raped or exposed to sexual abuse. Usually bodies of women killed in this manner are left in the morgue unclaimed by families fearing damage to their reputation.

The evidence generated by the GDI and GEM shows a generally progressive trend in the status of Iraqi women but these indexes fail


to reflect the realities of women's lives on the ground because their few components cannot capture the multiple dimensions of inequality. For a more accurate assessment of women's empowerment in Iraq, additional dimensions need be measured: violence against women, advocacy for equality, personal security and individual dignity.

#### Box 7.6

### The Opinion Poll on Human Security – the Impact of Insecurity on Attitudes toward Discrimination against Women


#### Does an Absence of Discrimination and Violence Against Women Increase Human Security?

In 10 out of 15 governorates covered by the poll, 85 % of the people believed that absence of violence against women was an important factor in overall feelings of security. In three governorates only, where the level of violence was high and general feelings of insecurity were widespread, the absence of violence against women was not considered as important: Nineveh (39%) Kirkuk (27.3%) and Baghdad (16.7%).



Political and civil violence in Iraq has gravely affected women's safety, making them unwilling to be full participants in society and driving many to disappear from public life.

#### Social Restrictions on Women



A majority of respondents in all governorates agreed that the security situation has aggravated social restrictions on women. It is obvious from the figure above that "hot" governorates such as Diala, Al-Anbar and Babil have fared worse compared to more stable governorates such as Al-Najaf and Thi-Qar.

Cultural traditions transmit values, create life styles and guide human conduct. They are influenced by the social and economic environment, and exert influence on that environment in equal measure. There can be little doubt that the most formidable cultural constraint facing Iraqi women is the deep-seated value of family honour which is almost obsessively associated with the conduct and situation of female family members.

Threatening to kill a woman to remove shame is a punishment and deterrence at the same time. It is supposed to make women more committed to family values, with their concomitant emphasis on reputation and honour. These traditions allow younger males to call older females to account in the event they are suspected of unacceptable conduct. Worse, those traditions allow them to kill those females if they succeed in marrying against the will of the family or if they perpetrate what is considered a sin.

Judging women and their conduct draws legitimacy from social standards. In traditional societies, the individual is connected with heritage more than with the present or the future. For women, cultural heritage, which is formed by traditions rather than by religion, is one of the basic references in forming standardized notions of acceptable conduct. This becomes lodged in the collective consciousness and informs each individual's behaviour. These inherited traditions which guide individual perceptions see women as inferior and dependent beings. This view simply ignores the transformations that have taken place in women's contemporary lives. Women are still seen as inferior by nature. Honour killing, for example, is a phenomenon that has lasted for centuries. As far back as 1700 BC, the Codes of Hammurabi, the sixth king of old Babylon, stipulated that an adulterous woman should be thrown into the river.

This stereotypical image of women has lasted for centuries because the State, throughout its

history, has helped to perpetuate it, to avoid entering into conflict with society and its religious and cultural leaders. So ingrained has this image become that, as several studies have shown, the view some women themselves hold of their own sex is not altogether different from that held by men.

Women's acceptance of this false image imposed by tradition provides the State with all the justification it needs to delay enacting legislation that would improve their situation. The seclusion of women is also justified by society as a means of ensuring their protection. Here too, women's acquiescence in such practices serves to reinforce the stereotypical image. In this way, the family remains the most resistant pocket of cultural bigotry against women, where male violence against women is accepted as a disciplinary or preventive right.

A report by the Ministry of Human Rights in Kurdistan Region indicated that 239 women were driven to set fire to themselves during the first 8 months of 2006. The authorities in Suleimaniya recorded during November of the same year an even higher number of cases, resulting from psychological trauma. These cases are normally recorded as suicides or accidents. The Ministry report states that the majority of women exposed to violence live in the rural areas and their ages range from 13-18 years. In the centres of governorates, their age is usually over 15. Women in Kurdistan are exposed to multiple forms of violence; these most often take the form of beatings, sexual abuse, threats to their lives, kidnapping and forced marriages<sup>(10)</sup>.

The situation is not very different in other areas of Iraq. A report on human rights indicates that honour-related murders are common in the centre and south of Iraq, indicating that women remain vulnerable<sup>(11)</sup>. It is probable that such practices have been under-reported owing to the undeveloped monitoring capabilities of women's organizations and media biases.

(10) Al Zaman Newspaper, No,2663, 7/4/2007



In January 2008, the Ministry of Interior established a special police department for “Family Protection” to take care of reported violence issues. Kurdistan Region had this initiative earlier. There is an urgent need for a legislation that deals with family violence.

Some harmful traditional practices are condoned or officially encouraged by the authorities. Polygamy is seen as a remedy for the aggravated problem of the increasing number of widows. However, killing has become more widespread under conditions of conflict which have made the sexual exploitation of women more likely. The practice of female genital mutilation has also seen resurgence in some rural areas of the Kurdistan region. Such practices are no less reprehensible for being met with indifference or silence on the part of the State.<sup>(12)</sup>

## Conclusions

The empowerment of Iraqi women during the transitional period should be an overarching goal, not a side objective, as women have an equal part to play in overall economic, political and social development. Yet evidence shows that Iraqi women are disproportionately affected by the shrinking of the state’s power, the insecurity arising from political instability, the breakdown of economic activities and the deterioration of social structures, all resulting from ongoing conflicts.

Increased violence against women is currently the most dangerous consequence of the transitional phase and requires urgent interventions from all actors in society. The State should face its responsibilities for the provision of human security for women, as well as empowerment and protection, and the abolition of all forms of discrimination. Seeking protection, women have been forced to endure the norms of their community, sect or tribe, away from the state, thus reversing the

gains of almost a full century of modernization undertaken by the State itself.

Through long decades of wars and conflicts, the state neglected or condoned, intentionally or otherwise, all forms of discrimination against women, young and old, from all sects and minorities, whether workers, rural residents, housewives or widows. Women became victims of traditional practices with no recourse to the State and its laws for protection and care.

The role of the State has weakened since 2003 while the transition to a market economy has been fraught with problems in the short term and questions about opportunities in the future. In these conditions, the State has seemed to pull back from its commitment to the empowerment of women through education and health care, the guarantee of security and the firm establishment of legal, social, economic, and cultural rights.

At the same time, the lack of security has hampered progress in human development and damaged mechanisms for genuine empowerment. However, there is still an opportunity to improve the situation of women. The transitional phase, when regulations and laws are being restructured, grants a historic opportunity to accomplish many tasks on the road to achieving equality. Yet what has been gained under the law in terms of political participation since 2003 may not be a lasting achievement since legal provisions expire or change. To nourish and protect those rights, women face a long and challenging road ahead. The State has specific responsibilities to help them complete their journey that should not be neglected. These will be recommended in the next chapter.

(11) UNAMI, Human Rights in Iraq, monthly report, December 2006

(12) Asma Rasheed, Background paper to Iraq NHDR 2008





## Chapter 8

### Conclusions and Policy Directions



Suad Al Attar

**Summerian Garden**

For the past thirty years, the economic and political environment in Iraq has not been conducive to human development. Skewed and unsustainable patterns of growth and social development have undercut earlier gains and opportunities, setting back the development efforts of more than half a century.

The principal lesson for Iraq is that national wealth, as measured by per capita GDP, is not the most significant factor in expanding people's options and choices. Rather, it is the way that national wealth is used, not its size, that most influences how far people actually benefit from the material assets of a nation. Iraqis often say that they are poor people in a rich country, an irony that underlines the failure to utilize the country's wealth for the good of its citizens.

During the last three decades, Iraqis have lost out on public welfare and personal security, attributing their reversals to political instability, unplanned and abrupt economic changes and unresponsive social policies. As a result, present, and probably future, generations face a triple crisis of long-standing neglect, chronic insecurity and flawed transition.

## The Status of Human Development

### First: Deteriorating Human Development

The statistics and analyses behind this report confirm the general impression that national

human development has fallen back, as reflected in the deteriorating material and moral well being of the Iraqi peoples.

- Iraq's HDI, at 0.623, still places it at the lower end of medium human development countries.
- The proportion of Iraqis living on one dollar a day has decreased from 27% in 1993 to 3.1% in 2007.
- Student enrolment at all stages of education remains unsatisfactory. Despite some expansion in student numbers, the rate of growth in enrolment does not approach that achieved before 1990.
- Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals is slow, jeopardizing the attainment of several targets by 2015. Progress on indicators of poverty and child malnutrition is unsatisfactory, while other negative indicators such as unemployment are actually higher than in the base year (1990). These areas are clear and urgent priorities for economic and social policy intervention.

### Second, Development Without Equity

Applying the HDI has exposed disparities among the various regions within Iraq. The case of Kurdistan Region, where indicator levels are higher than the national average, has provided an opportunity to analyze which components of the index are most responsible for producing the greatest improvement overall, and what factors beyond the HDI

**Table 8.1** The Centre and the Periphery – Priorities for Regional Development

Index	Components	Lowest Scoring Governorates *	Policy Priorities
<b>Human Development Index(0.623)</b>		Al-Qadisiya, Missan, Al-Muthanna	Give resource allocations priority over other governorates
	Life expectancy at birth (0.55)	Diala, Baghdad	Target security and health
	Education (0.71)	Duhuk (Kurdistan Region), Al-Qadisiya, Missan, Al-Muthanna	Target expanded education
	GDP per capita (0.61)	Al-Muthanna	Stimulate growth
<b>Human Poverty Index (18.8)</b>		Basrah, Al-Anbar, Kerbala	
	Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (%) (19.4)	None	
	Adult literacy rate % <sup>a</sup> (22)	Diala, Al-Anbar	Undertake literacy campaigns
	People without safe drinking water % (15.8)	Kirkuk, Duhuk (Kurdistan Region)	Improve public services
	Proportion of under -weight child at birth % <sup>b</sup> (7.6)	Kerbala, Suleimaniya (Kurdistan Region)	Target health and nutrition programmes
<b>Gender Development Index (0.584)</b>		Basrah, Salahuddin, Missan, Al-Muthanna	Promote women's empowerment
	Equally distributed life expectancy (0.55)	Baghdad, Diala	Target security and health
	Equally distributed education (0.72)	Basrah, Erbil (Kurdistan Region), Al-Qadisiya, Al-Muthanna	Focus on education and women's economic participation
	Equally distributed income(0.8)	Salahuddin	Stimulate growth, economic empowerment
<b>Gender Empowerment Measure (0.696)</b>		Kirkuk, Al-Anbar, Kerbala, Salahuddin, Diala	Target women's empowerment
	Parliamentary representation (0.27)	Suleimaniya (Kurdistan Region), Kirkuk, Diala, Kerbala, Salahuddin	Women's empowerment
	Adjusted & equally distributed economic participation (22.4)	Nineveh, Al-Anbar, Salahuddin, Kirkuk	Women's empowerment, economic participation
	Equally distributed income (0.11)	Kerbala, Al-Muthanna, Missan	Women's empowerment, economic participation

\* Lower scoring governorates are better off in HPI  
Source: Annex, Tables 1,2,3,4.

are involved. Kurdistan's achievements can be attributed to its relative security and stability, its policies for enhancing education, and its relatively high growth in per capita income.

Disparate levels of development among governorates, and the recurrence of those such as Al-Qadisiya, Missan and Al-Muthanna at the bottom of HD tables and other rankings of poverty, living conditions and women's empowerment, offer evidence of ineffective policy. Identifying these differences helps to identify priorities and matching policies at the level of governorates, as Table 8.1 illustrates.

### Third: Insecurity Threatens Human Development

The security situation in the country under its new challenges of democratic and economic transition has thrown progress off track.

#### 1. The curtailment of long and extended lives

It needs no emphasizing that wars and acts of violence cut lives short. Vulnerable groups - children, women, minorities - are at greater risk under such conditions because they have less access to health services, education and means of personal protection. Moreover, the impacts of life-threatening violence spill over into the post-conflict period where such groups remain at chronic risk.

#### 2. The eclipse of knowledge

When armed groups overturn normal social and community life, knowledge and education recede in perceived importance. In these circumstances, youth and other marginalized groups soon discover that taking up arms confers more power than picking up a book, and that a life of violence seems more viable than one of study.

While the perceived value of knowledge has dropped, those who embody it represent a threat to armed groups. The educated classes (doctors, teachers, writers, journalists, artists and scholars) have become targets of opportunity for armed gangs and bandits. Many of the former have fled abroad; those who remain shun public life and thus do not contribute to finding solutions to ongoing crises. With moderate voices missing, the public arena succumbs to the rhetorical firestorms of extremist ideologues that further aggravate the climate of confrontation.

The distorting impacts of violence can be monitored in the diversion of resources from social services, including education, to the military and security sector, in both the State budget and international donor allocations.

#### 3. The destruction of living standards

Violence and instability have reduced the accumulated wealth of the people through the loss of property and savings. Damage to housing and infrastructure, forced migration and displacement have cost Iraqis dearly. It is difficult to put numbers to people's combined material losses, but any estimate of the damage should consider the following:

- productivity lost by an economy paralyzed by constant threats;
- the high opportunity costs of lost foreign investment, aid, export earnings, and tourism, and the cost of losing trained professionals and workers to emigration;
- the cost of ruined infrastructure (roads, bridges, energy and water systems, public buildings etc.).

No monetary value can be set on Iraq's destroyed social structure or fragmented national unity. Nor can any figure be put on how much faltering leadership and public demoralization have cost the nation. The cost, quite simply, has been immeasurable.

### *Chronic Insecurity: a Fourfold Blow to Human Development*

#### 4. The foreclosure of public choice

Iraq's experience of democratic transition has shown that imposed and hasty policy and institutional changes are threatening to society. People perceive themselves as having lost control over how such changes should be managed. The violent societal backlash that can ensue from this curtails public dialogue and participation, and undermines the transition process itself. Despite the promised benefits of democracy, people have come to feel that insecurity is its most apparent manifestation.

### Forth: Retrieving Economic Policy from a Triple Blow

As Chapter 5 noted, the climate for economic transition in the country since 2003 has not been favourable. Insecurity, disrupted reconstruction, sluggish domestic private sector growth and slow-moving foreign investment and international donor funding have all affected rates of progress. Iraq's economy struggles to cope with a triple blow in the form of past damage, present instability and uncertainty about the impacts of macro-economic policy in future. None of these conditions is conducive to human development.

**1. Iraq's economic legacy**, the result of destructive wars and sanctions, has curtailed its growth prospects and limited the scope for people's empowerment. Its rural sector has suffered serious neglect, while the lopsided structure of its oil-based economy leaves key questions of dependency and diversification unanswered. The new Iraq also inherited a bloated public sector, which has continued to grow.

**2. Insecurity** has been associated with the political and economic transformations during the transitional stage that began with the dismantling the totalitarian state. Poverty and unemployment have risen (as shown in

Chapter 2), creating social insecurity and fear.

**3. Macro-economic policies** in place since 2003 have helped to fix budget deficits while creating deep human deficits. Their short-term negative effects are considered the source of new social tensions and economic crises. However, the greatest fear is that these short-run trends may continue, and possibly worsen in future. Trade liberalization policies have opened up unprepared local markets to foreign competition, creating enormous pressures on the remnants of a private sector that had previously survived punishing treatment by former regimes. Monetary policies focused on exchange and interest rates have neither encouraged local investment nor been able to dispel uncertainties surrounding the economy, which has not attracted any significant foreign investment.


In addition:

- The discontinuation of infrastructure repair and the postponement of reconstructions projects hamper the resumption of development, which has already been suspended for two decades, especially in the agricultural sector which represents a large space for private sector investment. The sector is a priority for the expansion of job opportunities and the utilization of Iraq's non-oil resources.
- Budget trends since 2004 raise two concerns: a) public expenditure (including social expenditure) remains highly dependent on oil revenues (more than 90%), which leaves Iraq's future over-exposed to world market factors; b) public spending on human development could drop further if military expenditure for security goes up after any withdrawal of multi-national forces. In this regard, military expenditure increased to 19% of total government expenditure in the 2008 budget.



### 1. Secure Basic Rights

Respondents were asked to indicate which of the following basic rights they considered to be most important in establishing security: eliminating crime and terrorism, ending forced displacement, eliminating sectarian violence, freedom of worship and practice, and eliminating gender-based violence or discrimination.




### 2. Secure Economic and Social Rights

Respondents were asked to rank the following economic and social provisions in order of importance in establishing security:


The ration-card system, social services, educational opportunities, suitable employment opportunities, adequate income, adequate housing, medical treatment and disease prevention, social protection networks, reintroduction of compulsory education, and a stronger role for the religious establishment.

The ration-card system, jobs and adequate income topped people's list of choices.



### 3. Good Governance

Respondents thought that strong government, effective laws and courts, and a stable political system are, in that order, the key elements of good governance.



#### Strong government:

Respondents gave particular importance to the role of a strong government in creating the public's sense of security and stability. Indeed 99% of the sample rated this as the most important factor. There were no salient differences among the views of respondents from different demographic, economic and social contexts.

#### Effective judicial institutions:

Next in relative importance came the existence of effective judicial institutions, with 98% rating these high in importance.

#### Stability of the Political System:

96% of the sample thought that a stable political system is either very important or important to their sense of security. There were relative variations in the intensity of importance in some governorates. Muthanna was a case in point, with 39.2% rating this as very important and 33.6% considering it important.

*The empowerment of Iraq's people and its institutions needs to be a cross-cutting priority in all future development interventions.*

- Government measures and programmes are implemented sluggishly, and the lack of coordination and harmony between the central government and regional authorities complicates many matters of transition.

## Human Security in the Eyes of the People

The indicators constructed for this report's opinion poll associate security with the guarantee of people's basic, social, economic and political rights within the framework of good governance, which establishes the freedom to practice those rights. Respondents largely agreed that good governance is the main cornerstone in building security.

### Relative importance of factors favouring security

Good Governance	Secure Socio-Economic Rights	Secure Basic Rights
35%	32%	33%

## Which institutions are most important in providing protection and security?

Respondents were asked to grade five types of institution according to which offered the greatest protection in times of armed violence and civil disturbance: the army; the police; their clan; religious institutions; neighbourhood groups.

The relatively lower importance of the last three institutions (clan, religious institution, neighbourhood group) shows that citizens still look to the army and the police for their protection despite the fact that the performance of both has been compromised by reductions in numbers and equipment since 2003.

- At the governorate level, there were clear variations among answers about the most important source of protection. Residents of Kirkuk, Diala, Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Kerbala, Salahuddin and Missan opted for the army, while those of Nineveh, Babylon, Al-Najaf, Al-Qadisiya, Thi-Qar and Basrah chose the police. In Wasit, the clan topped the others and in Muthanna, it ranked second.
- There was a distinct difference between urban and rural areas in the importance attached to clan protection, 4.1% and 14.8 % respectively.

### Box 8.2

#### The Opinion Poll on Human Security Where Would You Turn for Protection from Armed Violence? (% of respondents)

	Army	Police	Clan	Religious Institutions	Neighbourhood Groups
Percentage Respondents	56.7	51.7	36.3	36.2	34.1
Ranking	1	2	3	4	5

## Meeting Iraq's Challenges A Vision for Policies

### A Vision for Partnership Policies

This report has identified several institutional obstacles that restrict people's empowerment. Concerns about the impact of violence and flaws in the transitional phase should not divert attention from pronounced institutional failures to respond to the requirements of human development, notably in education, health and the empowerment of women and the poor.

The report's vision of the way forward assumes a high degree of partnership and cooperation among major national players and between them and the international community. The goal must be to replace conflict and competition with complementarity. Within Iraq, there are emerging roles for the state, civil society, and the private sector. Externally, bilateral and multilateral donors and agencies can make substantial contributions by providing resources, experience and expertise to help solve problems and build capacities associated with restoring Iraq to the world community of nations.

The transformations of the last five years show the importance of interaction and harmony among these parties to retrieve Iraq's fledgling democratic process from the instability that threatens it. There is

little doubt that democracy is the only suitable environment for achieving human development in the long run.

### International Agencies: A Larger Role for the UN

Since 2003, United Nations agencies have made serious and accelerated efforts to enhance the potentials of the government and create partnerships with national and international NGOs inside Iraq. UN agencies have also been requested to consider devolving their assistance from the level of central government to that of the governorates, districts and leaders of local communities, in order to tailor interventions to varying local circumstances.

UN agencies have done much to draw the international community's attention to the plight of Iraqi refugees outside Iraq, and to define responsibilities for their well being. However, there still remains a vital area for rapid intervention, namely in helping to find solutions to the unhappy conditions of forcibly displaced people inside Iraq. As discussed in this report, the situation of these groups seriously affects human development in Iraq, and will permanently affect the country's demographic and social development patterns in future.

Iraqis also look to the international community in general and the UN in particular, to play a greater role in renewing social stability and consolidating development efforts, in accordance with

#### Box 8.3

#### The International Compact with Iraq

In 2007, the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) initiative was introduced. An example of international partnership, its objective was to set a framework for a commitment by the Iraqi government and its international partners to work together to complete transition and reconstruction. The Compact thus includes a programme of government tasks, drawn from the national development strategy, which addresses the management of public revenues, initiation of economic and social reforms and investment in agriculture. A timetable was set for the work of the international partners, including their concrete financial commitments enlisted within the government's reform efforts under the ICI, which will, in turn, help to identify Iraq's future needs.

UN Security Council resolution No. 1770. It is clear that short-term emergency interventions are not sufficient for this. Aid efforts need to be coupled with sustained efforts to solve conflicts and establish peace.

### Civil Society: Expanding the Public Space

Civil society organizations are the watchdogs of human development. In Iraq, these organizations are learning how to play effective roles yet their scope for action is quite clear. CSOs can contribute to deepening public knowledge of development trends and their significance and results. They can help hold the government to account for its commitments, decisions and actions. They are well placed to act as channels for political participation in both decision-making and implementation processes. In their advocacy role, they can help to shape pro-democratic trends in public opinion and lead a civic dialogue on policies and decisions that directly affect people's lives. As service delivery agents, they can channel aid and assistance at the grassroots level where community action is often better received than government or donor intervention. While a few non-state organizations may have overt or covert agendas, and should be screened out, the majority of such entities have remarkable records and capacities in delivering charitable, targeted and effective social assistance.

Iraqi civil society needs to establish its independence of government and foreign interests and demonstrate robust capabilities of its own in finance, administration and organization. The relationship with the State should be based on the mutual understanding that the State provides the political and legal framework for civil society, while the latter is free to operate in a larger public space in the interests of consolidating development at all levels of society.

### The Private Sector: An Emerging Prospect

In Iraq, as in other Arab countries, a fair partnership between the public and private sectors is a work-in-progress, one where clear roles and lines of responsibility are not always distinguishable. Indeed, in the region what is public and private is itself not always apparent. (For example, the 10 largest listed companies in the Gulf Cooperation Council area are all state-owned). In Iraq, the state needs to maintain a positive and encouraging role in the development of the private sector to the point where the latter can participate in joint projects and share in social responsibility. Small and medium enterprises and family businesses engaged in trade, services and construction require a supportive regulatory environment, access to capital and technology and efficient production and marketing linkages, which partly depend on state-provided infrastructure and services. The reciprocities in this relationship will assume new dimensions in the medium and longer term.

The private sector in Iraq is expected to play a part in democratic development by establishing an economic sphere independent of state control, which is able to counter-balance tendencies towards authoritarianism and lack of transparency associated with *rentier* state economies. This too is a role that a nascent private sector can only fill over time and if its own dealings are not hampered by corruption. In terms of social responsibility, the participation of the private sector in health and education is entirely feasible and has important precedents in Iraq's recent social history.

### Transition and Human Development

This chapter has referred to the report's principal findings about the often negative impacts of hasty transition on human

development. A principal challenge is to turn this situation around so that the two processes become mutually supportive.

Human development is a holistic process; it is thus not easy to separate those policies which contribute most to it from general economic and social policies, yet in Iraq's situation it is possible to address human development dimensions in three broad policy areas: security and peace; economic transition; and social development. Each area presents ample scope for intervention by all partners in Iraq's transition.

### Reconciling Security Policies: The State and the Citizen

Development will only be restored in Iraq within a culture of compromise and peace-building. Promoting participation on its own will not be enough. In the short term, mediation, consensus building, the restoration of public trust and national reconciliation are overarching priorities in every field of endeavour, requiring a high degree of patience, skill and sensitivity from all key players. These efforts are the necessary prelude to restructuring social relations, facing the legacy of the past, avoiding further fragmentation and division and approaching the future positively.

In that respect, a major conclusion to be drawn from the report's analysis is that human security cannot be realized in isolation from state security and, conversely, that state security rests on the security of individual citizens. Managing this equation is the greatest challenge facing Iraqis, the new regime and the international community.

#### Enhancing the State

It is the responsibility of the state to ensure its citizens' security and protection from crime, violence, and aggression. The state should also create an environment of public and personal freedom under the rule of law. These

tasks can only be shouldered by a responsible and responsive state that operates through competent, well-trained administrations, supported by effective judicial, civil and social institutions that guarantee and implement people's rights under the law. The quality of leadership at the top is a decisive factor, together with a strong, shared commitment in government to broadening people's participation in decisions that affect them.

A strong state grows from a strong society and the two must find a judicious balance of power. A dominant state that annuls the rights and freedoms of its citizens may appear strong, but it rests on brittle foundations. Iraq requires a central state that is strong in the sense defined in the preceding paragraph, one that has secured the public's trust and is able to share its power and responsibilities with local governments that are equally strong and effective.

#### Prioritizing human development in building peace and security

Human development, human security and human rights are inseparable concerns. Military, economic and political strategies for building security must emphasize this close interrelationship, integrating preventive measures for avoiding conflicts with 'rearguard' measures for dealing with possible failures.

If development, security and conflicts are interrelated, post-conflict policies should recognize the preventive role of human development in avoiding recurrences and supporting peace. Purely military or diplomatic solutions are not sustainable on their own, and can even be counter-productive if they ignore the development dimension. Experience shows that it is invariably more effective, and cost-effective, to launch development rather than land troops. Conflict prevention is a basic

element in the structure of development itself, and is best pursued in that context<sup>(1)</sup>.

### Reprioritizing Economic Policies

Economic policy has to be informed by the fact that security is generated under social, economic and political conditions that are conducive to peace, and not by coercive disciplinary measures which achieve a fragile and unsustainable break in conflicts.

The state should exercise its natural role as a protector and guarantor of development. It should exercise its economic and social role in a way that instills public service as a supreme virtue among cultural values. This service will be associated in the public mind with the concepts and values of statehood and citizenship. The latter can only flourish in a united society that exercises its rights and fulfils its obligations as enshrined in the trust established between the individual and the state.

### Better Economic Management

In managing Iraq's economic transition, the state needs to prioritize economic stability, growth with equity and human development, supported by efficient and fair resource allocation mechanisms.

**Enhancing economic stability:** stable prices, exchange rates and interest rates are an urgent priority in supporting human development, poverty eradication and social equity. Oil production and revenues require effective, efficient, transparent, and accountable management. The state's role in framing sound macroeconomic policy needs a strong legislative and legal foundation in addition to efficient economic management systems.

**Enhancing sustainable growth:** oil has been, and will remain, an economic and political source of

power in Iraq for some time. It will continue to be the driving force of the Iraqi economy. However, the oil sector is a weak employer that gives little stimulus to local production factors. Its revenues should not be used merely to operate the state apparatus and finance public expenditure, most of which goes to consumption. A great challenge for the government is to transform oil revenues into sustainable human development for the sake of generations to come.

### Targeting Social Policies: Safety Nets or Human Development?

Thus, sustainable growth policies should aim at building human capital, modernizing infrastructure; diversifying the local production base and lowering dependency on oil revenues. Public spending should target the expansion of school enrolment in all stages of education and the provision of basic health services to the population.

From this starting point, the state needs to create an economic environment that is more attractive to public, private, and foreign investment, and to implement policies that motivate the private sector. Reforming government subsidy policies would decrease price and cost distortions and create market incentives; however the transitional social costs of such measures have to be understood and kept low. Targeted safety nets are important yet do not address root causes.

The ICI provides a comprehensive framework for external support to the implementation of Iraq's development policies and for benchmarking overall progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. The framework also covers management and institutional capacity-building, anti-corruption measures, and civil society reforms, all of which are relevant to more effective social services delivery.

Yet it must be said that the ICI only addresses human development and human security from the limited standpoint of social protection and basic services. This perspective does not adequately encompass the development requirements that this report has identified in health, education, and the empowerment of women. This limitation suggests that the next iteration of the ICI could be more responsive to specific issues of human development.

## The Top Three Areas for Social Policy Reform

Undeniably, progress in human development rests on the reform of flawed social policies that partly account for the long-standing failure of development in Iraq. Reforms need to concentrate in particular on *education, health and women's empowerment*.

### Why Education Comes First

A key challenge in framing pro-human development policies is to identify the most critical priority - that on which other breakthroughs will turn. Development resources are usually scarce. At the same time, human capabilities are broad and values differ from one person to the next, from one society to another and from one time to another. Thus, defining which investments of limited resources will produce the most significant results is an unavoidable necessity. In Iraq, the aspirations, values and circumstances of the people point to education as the topmost priority, one that could make a more substantial difference to human development than any other. This is not to belittle the importance of health, income, or women's empowerment; rather, it is simply to underline that knowledge, relatively speaking, takes precedence because it is an *instrumental* capability, in the sense defined by Amartya Sen. As the *Arab Human Development Report 2003* showed, education is the single most decisive factor in shaping the region's future.

### Oil for School?

In Iraq, the cost of building one school with six classrooms is about \$400,000, according to estimates for demolishing and building 75 schools under a joint project between the Ministry of Education and international donors. If it were decided to replace Iraq's 716 remaining mud schools with buildings fit to provide the right environment for education in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the total cost would be under three hundred million dollars – or just two days of Iraq's oil income.

There are several grounds for applying this argument in Iraq:

1. If one removes the positive effect of income on Iraq's current HDI, the education indicator is clearly responsible for dragging the overall value and ranking of the index down. This is evident in all governorates. The benefits of raising education's contribution to HDI are likely to be considerable.
2. Education is instrumental in enabling people to exercise their political, civil, social and economic rights and to utilize development opportunities.

### Education – The First Line of Defence

Ignorance is not less dangerous than poverty. In addition to reflecting the failure of development in the past, it forfeits development opportunities in the future. The state, the private sector, civil society and the international community need to rededicate themselves to fighting ignorance as hard as poverty. People excluded from knowledge are vulnerable to threats in times of conflict that are even more dangerous to them and their society than poverty, hunger and deprivation.

3. Education represents a prized core component of Iraq's national culture. Present conditions, marked by high levels of illiteracy, ignorance and unemployment reflect the inefficiency and problems of the education system, not the values of the people. Nonetheless, these conditions reinforce regressive social and cultural trends in general and discrimination and violence against women in particular.

4. Education is a cornerstone of the middle class, which plays a leading role in building democratic traditions in the country. The failures of the education system in Iraq are among the reasons why many middle-class citizens consider moving abroad.

### Repairing the budget for education:

Starting in the 1980s, government investment in education entered a decline. More and more resources went to pay for the militarization of the regime and successive wars. Together with cuts under economic sanctions, this left education, at the beginning of the 1990s, with half the level of funding it had enjoyed a decade earlier. The sector has never recovered from this deficit, which, combined with deteriorating quality, tight centralism and restricted admissions capacity, has all but wrecked the system.

#### Box 8.4 Requirements in Education (primary and secondary) up to 2009 – 2010

School buildings	5,159
Libraries	3,700
Labs	4,105
Computer Labs	4,196
Teachers	41,402

As it exists today, the education system cannot sustain adequate rates of enrolment. The deficient student-admission and student-flow capacity of schools and school buildings prevent children and young people, both male and female, from receiving a basic education or continuing with their schooling. By way of illustration, in 1998-99, for example, 2,556 intermediate schools in Iraq were faced with absorbing the output of 8,367

primary schools. A mere 320 secondary schools had to deal with the graduates of those 2,556 intermediate schools.

As a consequence of such pressures, the principle of compulsory primary education has been abandoned in most parts of Iraq. The trend towards overcrowded multi-school buildings, noted in Chapter 6, is another discouraging sign of the pressures on an under-resourced and neglected system.

The fragile rally of education in the State budget that began in 2003 (Chapter 6) must be strengthened, and the upward trend accelerated. A minimum target is to return the relative share of public expenditure on education to pre-1980s percentages in the next three years. Beyond that, the goal should be to recover the prominent place that education held in social spending during the 1960s, when the State knew the value of knowledge.

In the absence of adequate resources, the gap between supply and needs in education disables the system and blocks students' potentials. Box 8.4 projects basic needs for the year 2009/2010.

**Redistributing educational services:** wide discrepancies exist among the various governorates in terms of schools, buildings, educational supplies and teachers. Science and computer laboratories are unequally shared out, and generally under-provided. This misdistribution of educational services leads to disempowering large segments of the people. A modern educational strategy must balance out the requirements of the entire population, which implies a large task of redistribution and reallocation for the Ministry of Education.



### Institutional change:

This report has commended the education strategy for Kurdistan Region on two essential initiatives that should be extended to the entire nation:

- The extension of compulsory education from 6 to 9 years, which, among other results, reduces the number of dropouts seeking work at an early age.
- The review of curricula to include more applied subjects that prepare students better for employment.

### Bringing in private partners:

The introduction in 2003 of laws permitting private educational institutions was intended to bring private investment into the educational sector, but the response has been rather weak. In 2006–07, there were 7 secondary schools, 33 primary schools and 142 kindergartens owned privately. In that year, the number of students in these schools dropped compared to 2005, as a result of the security situation.

More incentives are required to motivate the private sector to participate in education and to share the responsibility for its growth and management with the State. Would-be investors and those seeking work among retired or unemployed educators, notably women, are still looking at the sector as an opportunity. All Iraqi kindergartens (142 in 2007), for example are owned and administered by women. In Kurdistan, as a result of the stable security situation, the investment-supporting environment and the relatively high level of income, private education is advancing rapidly. The number of students enrolled in it rose from 260 before 2000 to 5363 in 2007/2008.

### Health Policy: Reaching the Under-Served

Iraq has an under-supported public health care system for the majority of citizens and a sophisticated private health sector which caters mostly to the wealthy. Next to education, the rescue of public health services, which are overloaded, under-staffed and unequally distributed, will have the greatest impact on levels of human well being in the country.

- The basic orientation of a system that waits for the sick, the aged and others in need of attention to approach it for help has to be reversed. Iraq's health system needs to become proactive, preventive and people-centered. Reaching the under-served in various governorates is a priority.
- Malnutrition rates among Iraqi children must be brought down: the rising incidence of malnutrition and stunting among under-five year-olds points to faltering human development and underlines the importance of expanding primary health centers and treating family health.
- Diarrhea is one of the main causes of death of children under the age of 5, the rate was 12 per thousand in 2006. The health care for children under 5 should be treated as an urgent priority. The current "Programme for Comprehensive Care" should be extended to all primary health care centres in Iraq.
- The health sector requires proper staffing: doctors, nurses, paramedics, health technicians and health administrators are all in short supply. While some human resources gaps result from emigration, others reflect inadequate wage policies, poor conditions of service and other benefits that are necessary for the development and retention of qualified personnel. Little short of a complete overhaul of the battered health apparatus will suffice to restore levels of service.

In the health sector, future planning and budget priorities need to focus on:

- Restoring a balance between allocations for low-cost primary health care and high-cost tertiary (specialized) health care. The former generally offers higher social returns for the same level of investment.
- Expanding the middle professional health cadres (health assistants and nurses) whose training is less costly and requires less time than is the case with physicians.
- Devoting special attention to health services in the countryside where more than one third of the population lives.
- Expanding emergency services, and improving the quality of emergency medicine as an urgent response to current security challenges.

### More Efficient Social Spending

The experience of other countries has shown that rates of economic growth are less important than how such growth is managed and distributed. The same lesson applies to public budgeting. By itself, the percentage of expenditure on health and education is not sufficient to prove that governments are paying proper attention to these services, or that this expenditure contributes to human development. In fact, that percentage has risen in Iraq, without improving the quality or coverage of health and educational services.

A more important measurement is the efficiency of expenditure. Chapter 6 illustrated the unbalanced relationship among types of spending by comparing Iraq's current or operational budget with its investment budget. The comparison showed a distorted relationship between financing and services, with central payroll costs outweighing spending on actual health care.

Budget policy should be changed to reallocate resources to the social sectors not only at the macro-level, but at the micro-level of the sector itself. The present state of affairs indicates an

institutional deficiency in the preparation of budgets. Financing policy in the last three years (2004, 2005, 2006) raised the volume of the educational budget (both current and investment), which however did little to repair the deficiencies of the educational system by normal standards of quality and coverage. The number of 'multiple-attendance' schools is still high, student intake is still low relative to demand, and the quality and supply of teachers, facilities and materials remain large issues. Above all, the neglected conditions in some governorates result directly from making volume budget allocations without any unifying vision of planned reforms or attention to facts on the ground.

### Women's Empowerment: No More Waiting for Change

This report has argued that cultural transformation, and not solely legal change, is necessary to secure women's rights and full social and economic participation.

Women's empowerment has to be affirmed in all programmes of change, from the political process to society, the economy, education, health and the home.

Lastly, the report has referred to the effects of violence and insecurity on the resurgence of defunct traditional practices restricting women and on their retreat from society.

Transition should be seized as an opportunity for renovating the public space and all imposed limits on women's empowerment. Action is required to:

- Replace the culture of male dominance and female marginalization with a culture of peace and tolerance. Leadership by example from the top, accompanied by a broad-based programme of public education are essential.
- Amend constitutional provisions and change laws that offer a basis for discrimination against women.

- Guarantee freedom of expression under the law to promote dialogue and debate on sensitive issues. Adjusting media stereotypes of women and conducting media campaigns to improve perceptions of women's roles will help project a proper image of women in society.
- Create a new labour environment that balances the division of labour between men and women, and which removes artificial limits on women's employment and their restriction to low productivity sectors.
- Implement and enforce compulsory primary education, as provided for by the Constitution. This will prevent the decline in girls' enrolment at the primary stage, bringing it in line with the growing number of female students at university.
- Revamp educational curricula to change society's perception of women and to demonstrate that women are well able to shoulder higher levels of responsibility. The promotion of concepts such as human rights and equality of access and opportunity will help to counter the culture of discrimination and violence at its source – the minds and values of future citizens.

## Epilogue

In view of the foregoing, many challenges face the human empowerment, others are facing human environment improvement. Chapters of the Report have moved between these two dimensions. If the quest to explore future visions that strengthen the two structures is considered a springboard

for the creation of a promising human development, then what we are about to set on is a development that is concerned with building the human being, releasing his /her underlying strength of creativity, a continuous development that does not confiscate the options of future generations as has been done by the previous generations that confiscated many of the above options that would otherwise have been opened to the present generation. It is a development which is based on the entrenchment of the culture of compromise and peace because the building of peace culture in Iraq may not be realized through the expansion of participation only, but it also requires the restoration of national spirit, building of relationships linkages and the extending of the bridges of trust between the groups, as well as striving towards the success of national reconciliation as a prelude to the restructuring the social relations, facing the legacy of the past through methods which lead to building a peaceful and cooperative future as well as avoiding further fragmentation and division.

Given the exceptional importance of the dire effects of violence on the course of human development, it is the institutional impediments that were the product of decades of wars and sanctions that stand to be the major challenge which necessitates dealing with the legacy of the past, by resorting to those means that will lead the way to the construction of a peaceful, cooperative future which will witness economic prosperity and an end to further disintegration and conflicts that threaten human security and confiscate human right to development.





Annexes





## Annex: Technical Notes on the Statistical Content of the National Human Development Report for Iraq, 2008

### Introduction

The statistical work conducted for this report has several notable features:

- This is the first substantial attempt to provide a broad national database on human development in Iraq since the launch of the global Human Development Reports in 1990, and the first exercise aimed at institutionalizing the statistical analysis of human development indicators in the country.
- This is also the first attempt to provide integrated data at the governorate level in Iraq, as a basis for constructing sub-national human development indexes.
- The exercise was conducted in close coordination with statistical departments in Kurdistan Region in order to include data on human development in that region for comparative and analytical purposes.
- The work brings together two qualitative methodologies in the analysis.

**First:** the statistical analysis of human development indicators and indexes based on the annual statistical reports and latest field surveys of official statistical establishments.

**Second:** the development of new statistical indicators based on a special Opinion Poll on Human Security conducted for this report. The latter has provided a range of qualitative indicators, hitherto unavailable, which will be useful in constructing various indexes. The results of this research are presented throughout the report to illustrate public perceptions and views on its central themes.

The compilation of a broad range of human security indicators relevant to Iraq has been pursued in more than 16 national and regional reports. The work done for this report simply adds another experimental and practical dimension. Its results have provided information that can be used to test various methodologies for measuring human security, whatever the limitations of indicators of public attitudes and views at one particular point in time may be.

We believe that such qualitative indicators are relevant and necessary supplements in measuring human development in countries under armed conflict, adding dimensions of security not reflected in the customary package of four basic indexes (HDI, GDI, GEM and HPI). We hope that our efforts to provide indicators that respond to these circumstances in Iraq, and which are based on direct hypothesis and straightforward calculations, may be useful to those interested in developing HDI methodologies further. These efforts also represent an attempt to ascertain the views of the Iraqi people on matters vital to their well being which are seldom elicited directly and independently.

The collection, compilation and analysis of field data for this report entailed dealing with acute challenges and several difficulties. First, risky security conditions added to the usual problems associated with data collection in developing countries, requiring the statistical team to enter and operate in hot spots and other unsafe situations. Some governorates had to be excluded from certain field surveys as being altogether too risky. Second, while statistical coordination with Kurdistan Region was good, in some

respects it was incomplete, which prevented the implementation of other field surveys deemed necessary. Third, Iraq has not implemented a general population census since 1997, in spite of large demographic and structural changes in the interval. The team had to resort to recognized statistical treatments to overcome this gap.

The Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT) was keen to achieve greater decentralization, an important goal that brought its own challenges. Decentralized data collection, data entry and data processing were facilitated by modern technology, while the exercise was deliberately opened up to women and local cadres with the goal of inclusion. Some aspects of the planning process, training and staff development, results extraction and report preparation had to be handled outside Iraq with the help of international organizations and expatriate Iraqi experts.

An effort was made to supplement and extend the traditional methodology of human development analysis by looking at other relevant classes of data and indicators. In its demographic analysis, the report takes up the theory of three-stage demographic cycles, referring to the window of opportunity presented by the 'demographic gift' to account for growth trends in future. The report also includes an analysis of household spending patterns to substantiate its comments on living standards, and uses the Lorenz curve to explicate disparities in income distribution.

**The NHDR for Iraq 2008 rests on three statistical pillars:**

### **Pillar One: Efforts to Rebuild Statistical Work in Iraq**

Those who work on preparing indexes, indicators and other metrics of human development know that, in many developing countries, the relevant data is seldom up-to-date, comprehensive or free from gaps in

time. Yet the accurate analysis and projection of trends demands this kind of data.

Although institutional statistical work in Iraq began in the early twentieth century, it took place under severe official restrictions until 2003, reflected in its shrinking funding and independence. Starved of resources and closed off by official discouragement, it was unable to keep pace with global developments in statistical methods and applications. This led to a significant deterioration in statistical capabilities and production over a prolonged period.

The 2003 war destroyed government establishments and infrastructure and disrupted the functioning of most public institutions. In the turbulence surrounding the downfall of the former regime, COSIT's operations in Baghdad and in many other governorates were destabilized. Central records, files and data were lost except for whatever materials staff retained at home by way of documents, reports and CD-ROMs. These meager surviving data sources formed the basis for the resumption of statistical work for which demand increased rapidly with the advent of urgent real-time needs for indicators of the situation in the country.

Statistical work is nourished by extensive cooperation and interaction with regional and international organizations - an environment not available to Iraq until 2004.

#### **Box A-1**

#### **The Constant Clock**

If the wheel of time can wind up or down in various spheres of human activity during times of war and conflict without completely destroying the base of those activities, its motion affects statistics differently. Almost uniquely, statistics demands constancy: in establishing and investigating facts, in recording events and in monitoring economic, social, demographic and environmental variables. A stable statistical enterprise is needed as much during transition and reconstruction as in the circumstances of mass destruction and retreat.



**Table A-1** Number of current statistical studies and field statistical surveys, 2004-2007\*

Sector	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
Agriculture	15	15	15	19	64
Building & construction	3	3	3	6	15
Human Development	1	1	1	3	6
Trade	8	7	6	5	26
Industry	10	10	10	5	35
Social and Educational	12	12	12	12	48
Living conditions	1	1	-	1	3
Environment	3	3	-	2	8
Transport and Communications	6	8	12	14	40
Population and Manpower	1	2	2	1	6
Index Numbers	30	60	72	68	230
National Accounts	8	8	13	8	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>518</b>
<b>Completed Statistical Field Surveys</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>64</b>

\* "Current" refers to statistical work carried out by the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology within its annual work plan, which relates to the systematic recording of statistics from different sources.

**Table A-2** Basic field statistical surveys conducted in Iraq during the period 2003-2007

Survey	Year Implemented	Sample Size (household)	Governorates Covered	Associated Bodies	Most Important Survey Outputs
Assessment of household nutritional status in Iraq survey	2003	28500	All governorates except (Erbil & Duhuk in Kurdistan region)	In coordination with nutrition research institute in MOH in collaboration with WFP	To provide quantitative indicators on nutrition status, measure the level of food, measure and diagnose areas of food insecurity
	2005	22050			
	2007	25825			
Employment & unemployment survey	2003	24900	All governorates except Al-Anbar and 2 of Kurdistan region (Erbil & Duhuk)	National efforts	To provide a system of statistics about the employed and unemployed according to basic economic and social characteristics, and disclosure of the size of shortages of manpower and features thereof
	2004	24900			
	2005	24900			
	2006	15228			
Iraq Living Conditions Survey, 2004 <sup>(1)</sup>	2004	22000	All governorates including Kurdistan Region	Supported by UNDP and FAFO	To provide detailed and comprehensive indicators to develop integrated system about the living standard of individual and Household in Iraq
Iraqi Rapid household	2005	3160	All governorates except Al-Anbar and 2 of Kurdistan (Erbil & Duhuk)	Supported by DFID	To provide information about the household income and expenditure
Environmental survey in Iraq 2005	2005	Comprehensive <sup>(2)</sup>	Erbil and Duhuk in Kurdistan Region	National efforts	To provide indicators on water, sewage and main municipal services
Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey, 2006	2006	18144	All governorates including Kurdistan Region	In coordination with MOH and supported by UNICEF	To provide updated information on the situation of children, and monitor progress in achieving the Millennium development goals
Iraq Household Socioeconomic Survey, IHSES 2007	2007	18144	All governorates including Kurdistan region	World Bank	To provide detailed indicators about economic, social, health, educational and environmental characteristics of households in Iraq, to provide needed data construct a new consumer prices index number, and build the national accounting system and analyze and measure poverty

Source: Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (see <http://www.cosit.gov.iq>)

(1) Analytical study "Unsatisfied Basic Needs and Living Standards in Iraq" was prepared in three parts, resorting to the results of the living conditions survey, included important indicators about living standards and deprivation rates on the main domains levels, refer to the COSIT and UNDP, Unsatisfied Basic Needs and Living Standards in Iraq, Baghdad 2006.

(2) The survey included all municipal departments on the county (Nahia) level. Total number of counties involved in the survey was 284.

Subsequent analytical efforts have tried to re-establish such links, while focusing on building up national statistical capacities weakened by the lack of exposure to methodologies and concepts elsewhere, and by a disconnect in the availability and use of state-of-the-art information technology.

**In Kurdistan Region**, the Kurdistan Region Statistical Office worked to secure the requirements for preparing and tabulating basic human development indicators, through special field surveys conducted in close coordination with COSIT, and by referring to available data in periodic and current reports.

Table A-2 lists the basic studies and surveys that were found useful in preparing the NHDR for Iraq 2008.

### **Pillar Two: The annual and periodic reports and surveys of Iraqi ministries concerned with human development statistics.**

The cornerstones of the report's statistical analyses were provided by the Central

Organization for Statistics and Information Technology and the Statistics Office of Kurdistan. These contributions were buttressed in turn by data and indicators from other public institutions and civil organizations. Departments of statistics in the Ministries of Health, Education, Immigration and Displaced Persons were instrumental in completing the required information. Statistical surveys carried out by those bodies were useful in securing additional indicators. These included the non-infectious diseases survey, the family health survey, conducted by the Ministry of Health in collaboration with COSIT and supported by the World Health Organization, and statistical records of births and deaths, which come under the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Immigration and Displaced Persons contributed updated data on internal displacement. The Ministry of Education provided the major indicators on enrolment trends at all stages of education and on the staffing and supply of education services. In addition, the results of some surveys and polls carried out by civil society organizations were used, particularly on the subject of violence and its impacts.

#### **Box A-2**

#### **Hope Makes all the Difference**

The preparation of statistics for this NHDR, including indicators used to track progress toward the Millennium Development Goals, would not have been possible without the conduct by COSIT of more than 15 field statistical surveys. The census currently being implemented under its action plan also furnished valuable data.

The journey to the field often led through remote, unstable and inaccessible areas. Undeterred, the teams of researchers, supervisors and support personnel forged on to interview and consult the individuals and institutions they intended to reach.

These few images of their difficult trek impart a heartening message - the loss of security does not mean the loss of hope. Thus they walked to their fields, thus they worked.



A field researcher inviting a family to write down data



Researchers in Iraq's countryside, a rainy day in 2007




Crossing to reach families taking part in the field survey, 2007

The Iraq Household Socioeconomic Survey constitutes the first phase of a project to strengthen poverty alleviation policies funded by the World Bank, with technical support (experts, methodologies) for building statistical capacities. The project consists of three stages:

- ñ First Phase/ Implementation of the Iraq Household Socioeconomic Survey.
- ñ Second Phase/ Measurement and analysis of poverty indicators in Iraq (based on survey data).
- ñ Third Phase/ Strategies and plans to reduce poverty and build a social protection network.

A high-level national consulting committee, comprising representatives of the ministries and agencies concerned, oversees implementation.



Source: Central Statistical Organization for Statistics and Information Technology  
(see <http://www.cosit.gov.iq>)

### Pillar Three: Calculation of human development indexes - methodology and measurement

#### Human Development Index

The Human Development Index is regarded as a concise measure of human development, which rates average achievements in the three basic dimensions of human well being:

1. A long and healthy life, measured by average life expectancy at birth.
2. Acquisition of knowledge, measured by the adult literacy rate among individuals aged 15 years and older (which represents two thirds of the weighting here) and the total enrolment ratio in primary, secondary and higher education (which represents a third of the weighting). Thus:

$$\text{Index of Education} = 2/3(\text{index of literacy}) + 1/3(\text{index of total gross enrolment ratios})$$

3. A decent standard of living, measured by average per capita of GDP, adjusted for purchasing power parity.

Before calculating the human development index itself, the preparation of a sub-index for each of these dimensions is required. To calculate these indexes for each governorate and for Iraq as a whole, that is, life expectancy index, education index (literacy index and gross enrolment ratio), and GDP per capita, minimum and maximum values of each indicator have been relied on. This is the same method used in the Global Human Development Report.

The performance in each of the dimensions is expressed in a value between zero and one by applying the following general formula:

$$\text{Dimension index} = (\text{Actual value} - \text{minimum value}) / (\text{maximum value} - \text{minimum value})$$

HDI is then calculated as the simple average of the dimension indexes. Sub-

The methodology of measuring human development indexes is no longer a dilemma, when the work group of the Global Human Development Report that has decided that and devoted a part of its annual report to state this methodology including technical details and statistical treatments to overcome the calculation problems weak data or lack of data. What is shown in this, part in preparation for the presentation of human development indexes calculated for Iraq and the necessary indicators to describe the human development, does not sink in the inclusion of steps of calculation and formulas. After it has become clear and sponsored, by all national work teams that address calculation of human development indexes within their National reports.. But it will be restricted to reference to the specifics of problems or treatments of the index calculation process in the light of what the statistical backing team has performed for the National Human Development Report in Iraq.

**Table A-3** Maximum values and minimum values of the human development sub-indices

Sub-index	Maximum value	Minimum value
Life expectancy at birth (in years)	85	25
The literacy rate (%)	100	0
Gross enrollment ratio in primary, secondary and higher schools (%)	100	0
Per capita of GDP, average purchasing power of the Dollar <sup>(3)</sup>	40000	100

indexes are calculated both for each Region of Iraq and the whole country in accordance with the table (A-3).

ñ Data on life expectancy at birth were obtained from a report by the Department of Health and Life Statistics in the Ministry of Health and is presented under tables titled “Life tables with demographic indicators by governorates for 2006”. The data relies on the registration of deaths by age groups and the Regions<sup>(4)</sup>. For Kurdistan Region, life expectancy was estimated based on MICS3 for 2006. This estimated death prospects for under one year-olds from the survey results for the three governorates of the region. The estimate used the software MORTPAK to obtain model life tables equivalent to the likelihood of death referred to above. It was not possible to adopt the same method in other Regions where there was no ready way to adapt the model

life tables for stable communities to the prevailing security conditions which are associated with unusual risks. Therefore, life tables from the Ministry of Health have been adopted as having taken into consideration the security situation and the resulting deaths in the unusual circumstances of the Regions (with the exception of Kurdistan Region).

ñ The index of literacy, on the other hand, has relied on a survey of living conditions in Iraq in 2004, while enrolment ratios in primary, secondary and higher education have been calculated from the results of the first half of The Iraq Household Socioeconomic Survey (IHSES) 2007. In the latter, total enrollment ratios have been calculated by dividing the number of enrolled in primary, secondary and higher institutions (universities and institutes) by the number of population of school age for these respective educational stages.

- The per capita GDP PPP based for Iraq is estimated at USD 3202 per year (according to 2007 World Bank Report of Global Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures 2005, ICP). To estimate 2006 GDP per capita PPP, the figure of 2005 is multiplied by the factor of 1.173, which represents the rate of increase 2006/2005 GDP per capita and current prices. The figures at fixed prices were not prepared at time of calculation,

(3) The per capita GDP index calculation is done as follows:

GDP per capita index = (the logarithm (actual value) - the logarithm (100)) ÷ (the logarithm (40000) - the logarithm (100)) where natural logarithm are used (Ln) What is meant by Purchasing Power Parity; is the specific value of a basket of goods and services that can be obtained, and which can be purchased in one country compared to their value in another country.

(4) Life tables reflect mortality rates prevailing in the society and thus provide information on the numbers of deaths, the prospects of death, the prospects of living and life expectancy in any age group of the population.

and the preliminary estimates show larger than 17% increase (approximately 30%), therefore, it was excluded from the calculations. The GDP per capita PPP based for 2006 therefore is 1.173 x 3202 - 3757 USD. Box 5 shows the method of calculating the annual GDP per capita for the governorates.

### Gender-Related Development Index

While the human development index measures average achievements, the GDI adjusts average achievements to reflect inequalities between men and women in the following dimensions:

1. A long and healthy life, measured by average life expectancy at birth.
2. Acquisition of knowledge, measured by the rate of literacy among adults, the total enrolment in primary, secondary and higher schools.
3. A decent standard of living, measured by estimated income.

The calculation of GDI involves three steps;

**First;** indexes of males and females are calculated in each of the following three dimensions which are calculated in accordance with the following general formula:

$$\text{Dimension index} = \frac{(\text{actual value} - \text{minimum value})}{(\text{maximum value} - \text{the minimum value})}$$

**Second;** indexes of females and males are collected in each dimension in a way that captures differences in achievements between men and women, resulting in an index referred to as the equally distributed index, which is calculated according to the following general formula:

$$\text{Equally distributed Index} = \frac{((\text{ratio of the female to population} (\text{female index} - 1)) + (\text{male ratio to population} (\text{male index} - 1))) - 1}{2}$$

### Box A-5 How per capita GDP was calculated at the National and Governorate Level

Method of Calculating the Average GDP per Capita Adjusted to the Purchasing Power in US Dollars at the Governorate Level

ñ The GDP per Capita adjusted to the Purchasing Power in US Dollars for Iraq in 2006 was 3,757 per year

ñ As GDP figures are not available at the governorate level, a correction factor that represents the result of dividing the average monthly expenditure per capita for goods and services according to the Household Economic and Social Survey (IHESI) 2007 at the governorate level by the national average expenditure. The result being greater than 1 indicates that the income level of the governorate is higher than the national income level, and therefore the GDP per capita income for this governorate exceeds the national GDP per capita income, and vice versa.

ñ The correction factor was calculated regardless of the price variation among governorates, because the consumer price index is not available at the governorate level. However, it is not expected to find significant differences in the price levels among governorates for many reasons, especially; the high dependency on Public Distribution System, which is almost free of charge, to provide a number of essential consumption items. The local markets depend heavily on imports providing commodities that approximately have the same prices throughout the country.

ñ Per Capita GDP at the governorate level = Annual National Per Capita GDP x governorate correction factor.

ñ For example, the correction factor for Baghdad governorate is 2088000 / 2508000 which equals 0.832. The per capita monthly expenditure in Baghdad is ID 2,088,000, while the national per capita expenditure is ID 2,508,000. The per capita GDP adjusted by the purchasing power parity in USD for the governorate of Baghdad will then be 0.832 x 7357 = 3128 USD.

**Table A-4 Maximum values and minimum values for the GDI**

Indicator	Maximum value	Minimum value
Life expectancy for females at birth (in years) %	87.5	27.5
Life expectancy for males at birth (in years) %	82.5	22.5
The literacy rate among adults (%)	100	0
Gross enrollment ratio (%)	100	0
Estimated earned income (USD)	40000	100

The result is a harmonic mean of female and male indexes.

**Third;** GDI is calculated by collecting the three equally distributed indexes in one weighted average.

Table (A-4) contains the maximum and minimum values for the calculation of GDI which is the same as that adopted by the global Human Development Report;

#### Human Poverty Index

While the human development index measures average achievements, the human poverty index measures deprivations in the three basic dimensions of human development as contained in the HDI:

1. Long and healthy lives - exposure to the risk of death in a relatively early age, measured as the probability at birth of not surviving to the age of 40.
2. Acquisition of knowledge-exclusion from the world of reading and communications, measured by the rate of illiteracy among adults.
3. A decent standard of living, measured by average-non-weighted for 2 indicators, the percentage of the population who do not have sustainable access to improved water source and the percentage of underweight children compared to their age, as in the following equation.

*Average-non-weighted= 2/1 (the percentage of population who do not have sustainable access to improved water source) + 2/1 (the proportion of children below the normal weight for their age).*

The calculation of the human poverty index is more direct than the calculation of the human development index, as the indicators used to

measure deprivations have been standardized to fall between zero and one hundred (since they are expressed as percentages) and therefore, there is no need to prepare normalized indexes as is the case with the HDI.

After providing the necessary indicators, the human poverty index is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Human Poverty Index} = \sqrt[3]{(P_1^3 + P_2^3 + P_3^3)1/3}$$

Note that:

$P_1$  = Probability at birth not to live to the age of 40 (times a hundred)

$P_2$  = The average of illiteracy among adults.

$P_3$  = Non-weighted average of population without sustainable access to an improved water source and children below the normal weight for their age.

#### Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)

By focusing on women opportunities rather than their abilities, GEM highlights gender inequality in three key areas:

1. Political participation and decision-making power: measured by percentages of women and men shares of parliamentary seats.
2. Economic participation and decision-making power: measured by 2 indicators - percentages of men and women among legislators, senior officials and managers, as well as the percentage of women and men among professional and technical positions.
3. Control over economic resources: measured by estimated earned income for both women and men.

In each of these three dimensions, an equally distributed equivalent percentage is calculated as a weighted

average of the population, according to the following general formula:

$$\text{Equally distributed equivalent percentage} = \left( \left( \frac{\text{female ratio of the population}}{\text{female index} - 1} \right) + \left( \frac{\text{ratio (male to population male index} - 1)}{\text{index} - 1} \right) \right) - 1$$

For participation and decision making at the political and economic levels, the equally distributed equivalent index is divided by 0.50 based on assuming an ideal society characterized by gender empowerment on an equal footing, with equal shares of women and men in each variable.

Data of positions of legislators, senior officials and managers and technical and professional positions have been collected from the employment and unemployment survey in 2006. Population data available in the Directorate of Population Statistics and Manpower has also been adopted. For the data on parliamentary representation, the documents of the Iraqi Parliament were consulted.

With the three indexes available - parliamentary representation index, economic participation (calculated as a simple average from both equally distributed equivalent percentage for the posts of legislators, senior officials and managers, and equally distributed equivalent percentage for technical and professional positions), and the equally distributed equivalent percentage income - GEM is calculated as a simple average of the three.

## The Opinion Poll on Human Security

The Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology conducted an opinion poll for the purposes of this report, which covered 3375 households in the 15 governorates. The opinion poll

was conducted between March - April 2007. Indicators from the poll were used to illustrate the contents of Chapter 1 and were also used in other chapters to supplement conclusions drawn from using the HDI and other indexes.

For full information about the Opinion Poll on Human Security, see 'Procedure, Questionnaire, and Tables of Results' at [www.cosit.gov.iq](http://www.cosit.gov.iq)

### Method of Calculation

**First:** Calculating the Human Security sub-indexes at the governorate level by using the mathematical mean of the indicator values of each of the sub-indexes components.

**Second:** Calculating the three main Human Security indexes at the governorates level by using the mathematical mean of the sub-indexes' values for each main index.

**Third:** Calculating the national level sub-indexes and the main indexes by using the weighted mathematical means for each index. The weights used are the portion of population size of each governorate.

The relative importance of each sub-index is the product of dividing its value by the summation of the sub-indexes values.

Table 1

## Human Development Index

Governorate a	Human Development Index (HDI) b		Life expectancy at birth (years) 2006	Adult literacy rate (% aged 15 years and more) 2004-2006	Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education (%) 2006-2007	GDP per capita (PPP US\$) 2006-2007	Life expectancy index	Literacy index	Combined gross enrolment ratio index	Education index	GDP per capita index US \$	GDP per capita rank minus HDI rank
	rank	Value										
Nineveh	7	0.626	63.3	71	54	3361	0.64	0.71	0.54	0.65	0.59	2
Kirkuk	9	0.625	58.2	77	57	3998	0.55	0.77	0.57	0.71	0.62	-4
Diala	11	0.615	53.3	87	68	3007	0.47	0.87	0.68	0.80	0.57	5
Al-Anbar	3	0.652	57.5	88	69	3518	0.54	0.88	0.69	0.82	0.59	4
Baghdad	10	0.625	54.7	86	59	3936	0.50	0.86	0.59	0.77	0.61	0
Babylon	6	0.629	61.7	78	55	3066	0.61	0.78	0.55	0.70	0.57	7
Kerbela	8	0.626	59.0	82	58	3104	0.57	0.82	0.58	0.74	0.57	10
Wasit	14	0.600	58.4	73	54	3165	0.56	0.73	0.54	0.67	0.58	-6
Salahuddin	13	0.600	58.5	75	53	2985	0.56	0.75	0.53	0.67	0.57	-9
Al-Najaf	15	0.600	57.2	72	55	3548	0.54	0.72	0.55	0.67	0.60	-4
Al-Qadisiya	16	0.591	58.2	70	52	3132	0.55	0.70	0.52	0.64	0.58	-2
Al-Muthanna	17	0.570	58.2	66	50	2728	0.55	0.66	0.50	0.61	0.55	0
Thi-Qar	12	0.612	60.5	74	54	3086	0.59	0.74	0.54	0.67	0.57	0
Missan	18	0.568	56.7	67	45	3214	0.53	0.67	0.45	0.60	0.58	-3
Basrah	5	0.634	60.4	82	58	3155	0.59	0.82	0.58	0.74	0.58	1
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>		0.659	62.9	64	70	6017	1.39	0.64	0.70	0.66	0.68	
Duhuk	4	0.638	63.2	59	71	4886	0.64	0.59	0.71	0.63	0.65	-1
Suleimaniya	1	0.676	63.4	68	71	6637	0.64	0.68	0.71	0.69	0.70	0
Erbil	2	0.652	62.2	63	69	6042	0.62	0.629	0.69	0.65	0.69	0
<b>Iraq</b>		0.623	58.2	77	59	3757	0.55	0.77	0.59	0.71	0.61	
<b>Arab states c,d</b>		0.699	67.5	70	66	6716	0.71	..	..	0.69	0.70	
<b>Developing countries c,d</b>		0.679	66.1	77	64	5282	0.68	..	..	0.73	0.66	
<b>Medium human development countries c,d</b>		0.698	67.5	78	65	4876	0.71	..	..	0.74	0.65	
<b>World c,d</b>		0.743	68.1	79	68	9543	0.72	..	..	0.75	0.76	

## notes:

- a. Governorates are arranged according to Annual Statistical Abstract.  
b. The mean of the indices may not be equal to HDI value due to rounding.  
c. Data are from HDR 2007-2008, UNDP.  
d. Data refer to another year different from that stated in the report, 2005.  
e. Appositive figure indicates that HDI rank is higher than GDP per capita rank, a negative the opposite.

## Source:

- Column 1: determined on the basis of the HDI values in column 2.  
Column 2: calculated on the basis of data in columns 7 -11.  
Column 3 : All Iraq except Kurdistan region, Ministry of Health, Planning and Resources Development Department " Life Tables and Demographic Trends 2006" , Kurdistan region data based on COSIT, MICS3, 2006.  
Column 4: COSIT, Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004 for (Duhouk, Erbil and Anbar) and Employment and Unemployment Survey 2006 for others.  
Column 5: COSIT, IHSES 2007 semi annual data.  
Column 7: calculated on the basis of data in column 3.  
Column 8: calculated on the basis of data in column 4.  
Column 9: calculated on the basis of data in column 5.  
column 10-: calculated on the basis of data in columns 8 and 9.  
column 11: calculated on the basis of data in column 6.



Table 2

## Gender Development Index

Statistical Annex

Governorate	Gender Development Index		Life expectancy at birth (years)		Adult literacy rate (% aged 15 years and older)		Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary, tertiary, high education (%)		Annually earned income US\$		Equally distributed life expectancy index	Equally distributed education index	Equally distributed income index	HDI rank minus GDI rank <sup>a</sup>
	Rank	Value	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	2006	2006	2006	2006
			2006	2006	2004 - 2006	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007
Nineveh	3	0.603	59.9	66.8	84	60	62	45	6257	788	0.64	0.69	0.48	4
Kirkuk	7	0.595	55.0	61.4	86	68	64	50	7538	870	0.55	0.73	0.50	2
Diala	9	0.601	49.5	57.2	93	80	73	63	5227	758	0.47	0.83	0.50	2
Al-Anbar	8	0.597	56.3	58.8	95	82	76	62	6655	993	0.54	0.72	0.53	-5
Baghdad	13	0.583	47.0	62.6	90	81	64	54	6207	630	0.48	0.77	0.50	-3
Babylon	4	0.577	59.7	63.7	86	71	61	49	5798	961	0.61	0.69	0.43	2
Kerbela	12	0.617	57.9	60.2	90	73	62	55	4467	524	0.57	0.73	0.56	-4
Wasit	11	0.565	57.9	58.9	84	62	62	46	6297	901	0.56	0.66	0.48	3
Salahuddin	6	0.506	53.9	63.2	85	65	62	41	8451	1316	0.56	0.67	0.29	7
Al-Najaf	14	0.555	55.1	59.3	80	66	57	53	6181	757	0.54	0.68	0.45	1
Al-Qadisiya	16	0.544	57.6	58.8	79	62	58	47	5616	772	0.55	0.63	0.45	0
Al-Muthanna	17	0.524	57.5	59.0	78	55	59	42	4690	457	0.55	0.57	0.45	0
Thi-Qar	15	0.549	55.8	65.2	86	62	63	44	6079	537	0.59	0.66	0.40	-3
Missan	10	0.443	57.3	63.6	89	75	65	50	7104	603	0.59	0.74	0.00	-5
Basrah	18	0.528	53.4	60	81	54	52	38	5575	307	0.53	0.64	0.42	0
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>		0.636	61	64.833	77	56	76	70	6035	834	0.63	0.60	0.45	
Duhuk	1	0.594	61.7	65.1	80	57	73	68	16039	2840	0.64	0.72	0.67	0
Suleimaniya	2	0.675	58.7	65.7	77	50	74	65	13247	1321	0.62	0.68	0.56	0
Erbil	5	0.620	63.4	63	70	48	74	68	10393	1099	0.63	0.62	0.53	-1
<b>Iraq</b>		<b>0.584</b>	<b>54.9</b>	<b>61.6</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>7468</b>	<b>851</b>	0.55	0.72	0.48	

## Notes:

a. A positive figure indicates that GDI rank higher than HDI rank, a negative the opposite.

## Source:

Column 1 : determined on the basis of the GDI values in column 2.

Column 2: calculated on the basis of data in columns 11, 12 and 13.

Columns 3,4: all Iraq except Kurdistan region, Ministry of Health, Planning and Resources Development Department, Life Tables and Demographic Trends 2006; Kurdistan region data based on COSIT, MICS3- 2006.

Columns 5,6: COSIT, Employment and Unemployment Survey 2006, Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004.

Columns 7, 8: COSIT, first quarter IHSES 2007 .

Columns 9, 10: calculated on the basis on IHSES 2007, GDP and Employment and Unemployment Survey 2006 .

Columns 11-13: calculated by methodology of HDI form UNDP.

Table 3

## Gender Empowerment Measure

Statistical Annex

Governorate	GEM		Seats in parliament held by women (% of total of governorate)	Female legislator, senior officials and managers (% of total)	Female professional & technical workers (% of total)	Ratio of estimated female to male earned income
	Value	Rank				
Nineveh	13	0.626	25.0	12.1	34.2	0.16
Kirkuk	17	0.567	15.4	12.1	40.3	0.10
Diala	16	0.567	16.7	12.1	40.9	0.14
Al-Anbar	14	0.618	21.4	12.1	37.4	0.17
Baghdad	6	0.731	32.5	29.7	37.0	0.12
Babylon	5	0.731	27.3	29.3	45.7	0.05
Kerbela	15	0.613	16.7	29.3	39.7	0.09
Wasit	1	0.760	33.3	29.3	45.3	0.12
Salahuddin	18	0.511	9.1	12.1	33.2	0.14
Al-Najaf	9	0.687	22.2	29.3	46.4	0.14
Al-Qadisiya	7	0.701	25.0	29.3	41.1	0.12
Al-Muthanna	2	0.745	40.0	29.3	45.4	0.10
Thi-Qar	10	0.673	30.8	15.7	50.0	0.15
Missan	12	0.638	33.3	15.7	36.6	0.06
Basrah	8	0.696	35.3	15.7	41.2	0.08
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>	7	0.714	27.5	17.0	44.5	0.13
Duhuk	3	0.745	37.5	17.0	40.6	0.11
Suleimaniya	11	0.672	16.7	17.0	48.9	0.18
Erbil	4	0.742	33.3	17.0	42.1	0.10
<b>Iraq</b>		0.696	27.0	22.4	61.8	0.11

## Notes:

a. Since Al-Anbar, Duhuk and Erbil did not participate in the Employment and Unemployment Survey, indicators have been estimated by using those of neighbouring governorates.

## Source:

column 1: calculated on the basis of data in columns 8 and 10.  
column 2: determined on the basis on GEM values in columns 1.  
column 3: calculated on the basis on parliamentary seats in columns 4 and 5.  
column 4, 5: COSIT, Employment and Unemployment Survey 2006.  
column 6: calculated on the basis of expenditure data 2007.

Table 4 Human Poverty Index

Governorate	Human Poverty Index		Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 years (%)	Adult illiteracy rate (%) a	People lacking safe drinking water (%)	Proportion of Children under - weight for age(%) b	HDI rank minus HPI rank
	Rank	Value	2006	2004	2006	2006	
Nineveh	8	21.4	15.4	29	16.3	5.1	-1
Kirkuk	5	19.4	21.4	23	2.3	7.0	4
Diala	7	20.7	27.0	13	27.5	6.3	4
Al-Anbar	2	16.4	22.3	12	5.8	8.3	1
Baghdad	4	18.8	25.8	14	4.4	6.4	6
Babylon	6	20.1	16.2	22	36.1	6.2	0
Kerbela	1	16.2	17.8	19	9.7	4.1	7
Wasit	10	22.7	19.0	27	29.0	12.0	4
Salahuddin	15	28.3	36.2	25	27.5	6.2	-2
Al-Najaf	12	25.0	28.8	28	11.9	8.1	3
Al-Qadisiya	13	25.2	25.3	30	25.5	8.5	3
Al-Muthanna	17	30.0	26.1	34	46.9	10.8	0
Thi-Qar	9	21.9	19.8	26	30.1	6.5	3
Missan	18	30.2	34.5	33	24.9	11.1	0
Basrah	3	17.5	17.4	18	20.3	13.9	2
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>		25.6	15.6	33	3.2	7.7	
Duhuk	16	28.9	15.1	41	1.4	8.7	-12
Suleimaniya	11	22.9	15.0	32	4.5	4.6	-10
Erbil	14	26.4	16.5	37	2.8	10.4	-12
<b>Iraq</b>		18.8	19.4	22	15.8	7.6	

Notes:

- a. Adult: persons aged 15 and more.
- b. Children under 5 years of age, their weight to their age is more than 2 standard deviation below the median.

Source:

column 1: determined on basic HPI value in column 2.  
 column 2 : calculated on the based of data in columns 3-6.  
 column 3: all Iraq except Kurdistan region, Ministry of Health, Planning and Resources Development Department, Life Tables and Demographic Trends 2006; Kurdistan region data based on COSIT, MICS3, 2006.  
 column 4: COSIT, Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004.  
 column 5,6: COSIT, MICS3 2006.

Table 5

## Factors Threatening Human Security Index

Governorate	Peoples perception on political security					Peoples perception on economic security					Factors threatening human security index (%)
	Terrorism	Rapid democratization does not strengthen security	Abolition of conscription	Political repression and despotism	Political risk index	Work opportunities are unavailable	Work opportunities are unequal	Unsafe economic future	Deteriorating living conditions	Economic risk index	
Nineveh	96.8	97.4	58.7	6.2	64.8	99.2	98.7	66.8	94.6	89.8	77.3
Kirkuk	95.5	74.6	68.3	87.4	81.4	83.6	74.2	53.4	39.7	62.7	72.1
Diala	99.5	71.7	56.6	46.8	68.7	52.5	51.8	45.6	33.3	45.8	57.2
Al-Anbar	53.8	98.3	96.9	54.6	75.9	97.5	100.0	68.0	41.2	76.7	76.3
Baghdad	99.3	69.9	48.0	35.0	63.0	84.3	78.0	27.9	21.8	53.0	58.0
Babylon	99.0	69.7	72.0	4.3	61.3	86.4	94.1	22.9	3.7	51.8	56.5
Kerbela	98.8	50.6	19.1	24.2	48.2	69.8	73.5	22.5	14.0	44.9	46.6
Wasit	98.8	39.0	37.9	32.7	52.1	92.8	92.4	8.5	5.6	49.8	51.0
Salahuddin	75.6	83.9	75.2	95.1	82.5	97.3	95.1	69.6	56.7	79.7	81.1
Al-Najaf	99.1	54.3	76.3	12.0	60.4	94.5	96.9	27.8	8.6	57.0	58.7
Al-Qadisiya	100.0	39.6	15.6	13.3	42.1	62.6	80.7	19.9	10.4	43.4	42.8
Al-Muthanna	97.9	32.5	18.1	25.9	43.6	92.9	60.2	9.5	5.1	41.9	42.7
Thi-Qar	93.6	44.5	57.0	39.6	58.7	68.5	69.3	41.3	23.5	50.7	54.7
Missan	98.8	8.6	33.2	4.3	36.2	77.5	76.3	1.9	3.9	39.9	38.1
Basrah	97.7	34.2	15.5	41.4	47.2	76.6	87.0	32.6	3.6	49.9	48.6
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>											
Duhuk	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suleimaniya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Erbil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>94.6</b>	<b>64.6</b>	<b>51.5</b>	<b>33.6</b>	<b>61.1</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>82.6</b>	<b>36.6</b>	<b>28.5</b>	<b>57.8</b>	<b>59.4</b>
<b>Relative weight for all index (%)</b>	<b>38.7</b>	<b>26.4</b>	<b>21.1</b>	<b>13.8</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>36.1</b>	<b>35.8</b>	<b>15.9</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Relative weight for sub-index (%)</b>					<b>51.4</b>					<b>48.6</b>	<b>100</b>

Notes:  
- Kurdistan region was not included in the Human Security Survey 2007.

Source:  
column 1-4: COSIT, Human Security Survey 2007.  
column 5: Calculated on the basis of columns 1-4 data.  
column 6-9: COSIT, Human Security Survey 2007.  
column 10: Calculated on the basis of columns 6-9 data.  
column 11: Calculated from columns 5 and 10.

**Table 6** Human Insecurity Impact Index

Governorate	Loss of Personal security					Loss of socio-economic security				
	• People feel safest at home	Household members exposed to kidnapping and terrorism	People consider moving abroad	People consider moving elsewhere in Iraq	Loss of personal security index	Spread of crime	Lack of health care	Drop in household income level	Social restrictions on women	Young people delay marriage
Nineveh	99.5	36.3	28.7	10.5	43.8	100.0	99.5	97.6	55.0	88.6
Kirkuk	82.2	43.3	21.7	9.7	39.2	99.2	63.9	83.7	55.4	44.1
Diala	94.8	50.3	49.4	60.4	63.7	99.6	96.1	95.2	98.3	98.7
Al-Anbar	99.2	8.7	9.2	7.8	31.2	100.0	97.3	68.2	97.4	82.1
Baghdad	91.8	29.7	52.0	46.8	55.1	96.9	78.3	75.9	76.1	76.0
Babylon	99.5	49.5	6.7	2.6	39.6	99.0	97.4	73.6	90.7	60.1
Kerbela	97.6	10.0	23.4	14.0	36.3	93.4	55.5	61.9	85.4	68.8
Wasit	44	15.1	5.3	3.7	17.0	92.0	29.3	15.1	69.5	16.6
Salahuddin	92.8	91.5	58.1	57.3	74.9	99.5	83.4	85.8	60.3	76.8
Al-Najaf	97	19.7	0.5	1.9	29.8	98.3	8.1	95.7	6.8	3.1
Al-Qadisiya	73.3	4.3	19.5	12.7	27.4	98.1	86.1	35.5	44.9	82.8
Al-Muthanna	89.6	3.5	12.2	7.5	28.2	98.8	42.8	72.5	74.6	47.9
Thi-Qar	58.6	1.8	4.9	0.4	16.4	62.6	54.1	59.0	37.6	45.4
Missan	37	3.4	2.1	0.9	10.8	89.1	3.4	4.5	49.1	11.5
Basrah	77.9	43.2	29.6	16.5	41.8	96.9	57.6	61.3	68.6	40.2
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>										
Duhuk	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suleimaniya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Erbil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>86.3</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>29.6</b>	<b>24.1</b>	<b>42.5</b>	<b>95.3</b>	<b>72.0</b>	<b>71.3</b>	<b>67.9</b>	<b>64.2</b>
<b>Relative weight for all index (%)</b>	<b>50.7</b>	<b>17.7</b>	<b>17.4</b>	<b>14.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>15.7</b>	<b>15.6</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>14.0</b>
<b>Relative weight for sub-index (%)</b>					<b>26.6</b>					

Notes:  
- Kurdistan region was not included in the Human Security Survey 2007.

## 6

Human Insecurity Impact Index *continued*

(%)

Loss of socio-economic security				Loss of political security							
Social relations declin	Household members drop out of school	Households break up	Loss of socio-economic security index	Spread of financial and administrative corruption	Lack of performance	Trust in political parties erodes	Trust in state institutions erodes	Change in convictions regarding freedom	Objections to the practice of democracy	Loss of political security index	Impacts of insecurity index
21.0	35.5	3.8	62.6	95.8	67.6	65.3	66.6	53.8	56.5	67.6	58.0
54.4	54.8	25.1	60.1	94.3	76.6	89.3	65.6	47.8	53.6	71.2	56.8
76.1	22.9	16.7	75.5	99.6	97.8	71.3	92.6	47.4	52.4	76.8	72.0
24.6	1.3	11.0	60.2	100.0	67.2	70.0	60.4	21.9	70.1	64.9	52.1
78.7	32.7	7.3	65.2	91.6	89.6	73.2	53.6	46.7	19.3	62.3	60.9
24.8	38.2	1.8	60.7	97.4	68.8	50.3	16.5	7.1	5.1	40.9	47.1
29.0	22.2	18.1	54.3	77.9	48.4	45.7	45.8	37.1	20.4	45.9	45.5
1.8	9.5	1.3	29.4	89.5	28.4	69.5	39.1	52.2	40.7	53.2	33.2
61.7	85.2	55.1	76.0	99.1	93.3	95.5	88.0	48.5	41.3	77.6	76.2
8.9	18.3	4.4	30.4	98.6	94.5	85.8	80.6	34.6	31.7	71.0	43.7
51.2	12.8	27.9	54.9	90.0	77.8	55.8	46.0	11.1	6.8	47.9	43.4
53.5	4.7	6.9	50.2	69.2	31.0	50.5	18.9	16.9	15.6	33.7	37.4
6.7	0.9	2.7	33.6	64.4	55.6	80.9	64.9	38.2	41.8	57.6	35.9
0.0	3.1	0.0	20.1	60.6	50.6	59.2	13.7	11.9	0.9	32.8	21.2
66.0	35.0	32.8	57.3	82.9	80.1	68.2	63.3	28.2	25.9	58.1	52.4
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>46.5</b>	<b>28.0</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>57.2</b>	<b>89.6</b>	<b>75.1</b>	<b>70.0</b>	<b>56.7</b>	<b>38.0</b>	<b>31.8</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>53.3</b>
<b>10.2</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>24.8</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>15.7</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
			<b>35.8</b>							<b>37.6</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source:  
columns 1-4: COSIT, Human Security Survey 2007.  
column 5: calculated on the basis of columns 1-4 data.  
columns 6-13: COSIT, Human Security Survey 2007.  
column 14: calculated on the basis of columns 6-13 data.  
columns 15-20: COSIT, Human Security Survey 2007.  
column 21: calculated on the basis of columns 15-20 data.  
column 22: calculated from columns 5, 14 and 21.

Table 7

## Achieving Human Security Factors Index

(%)

Governorate	Secure Basic Rights						Secure Socio-economic Rights			
	Absence of terrorism	Forced displacement ended	Absence of sectarian violence	Freedom of religious worship and practice	Absence of gender-related violence and marginalization	Secure basic rights index	Rationing system	Social services provided	Educational opportunities provided	Suitable work opportunities provided
Nineveh	100	100.0	99.2	93.3	25.1	83.5	100.0	97.1	96.5	100.0
Kirkuk	100	97.7	96.9	68.3	43.3	81.2	96.9	85.1	61.4	99.2
Diala	99.1	99.1	99.5	65.5	96.9	92.0	99.5	99.5	98.6	99.5
Al-Anbar	100	99.6	100.0	98.2	100.0	99.6	98.9	77.8	98.9	100.0
Baghdad	99.8	100.0	99.8	97.2	77.0	94.8	95.8	93.3	90.9	97.3
Babylon	100	100.0	99.6	97.3	63.0	92.0	100.0	100.0	80.8	100.0
Kerbela	100	99.1	97.3	99.4	94.2	98.0	98.2	92.4	100.0	100.0
Wasit	100	98.5	98.6	96.7	69.9	92.7	100.0	100.0	96.6	99.6
Salahuddin	97.4	98.2	88.6	81.0	53.7	83.8	90.3	74.8	94.6	99.1
Al-Najaf	100	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.5	99.9	100.0	99.5	100.0	99.5
Al-Qadisiya	100	100.0	98.4	99.1	43.4	88.2	99.5	96.7	81.5	97.7
Al-Muthanna	100	94.6	96.3	99.5	75.3	93.1	99.6	84.0	94.6	100.0
Thi-Qar	100	100.0	97.7	99.1	85.8	96.5	100.0	98.2	89.6	98.6
Missan	99.7	100.0	96.7	97.9	61.6	91.2	100.0	99.1	99.1	99.1
Basrah	96.3	94.8	93.3	93.6	65.5	88.7	98.1	91.6	93.1	93.1
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>										
Duhuk	..	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suleimaniya	..	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Erbil	..	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Iraq</b>	99.5	<b>99.1</b>	<b>98.1</b>	<b>93.3</b>	<b>69.8</b>	<b>92.0</b>	<b>97.9</b>	<b>93.3</b>	<b>91.9</b>	<b>98.4</b>
<b>Relative weight for all index (%)</b>	21.6	<b>21.6</b>	<b>21.3</b>	<b>20.3</b>	<b>15.2</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>10.7</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>10.8</b>
<b>Relative weight for sub-index (%)</b>						<b>32.7</b>				

Notes:

- Kurdistan region was not included in the Human Security Survey 2007.

## 7

Achieving Human Security Factors Index *continued*

(%)

Secure Socio-economic Rights							Good Governance				
Suitable household income level assured	Suitable housing provided	Preventive and curative health services provided	Social safety nets available	Compulsory education restored	Religious institutions strengthened	Secure socio-economic rights index	Existence of strong government	Effective judicial institutions	Stability of the political system	Good governance index	Factors favouring human security index
100.0	99.2	100.0	95.7	94.6	95.1	97.8	100.0	98.4	95.7	98.0	93.1
93.9	78.3	80.3	69.2	50.4	55.1	77.0	98.5	97.5	98.8	98.3	85.5
99.5	99.5	96.0	99.1	99.5	13.4	90.4	97.3	99.5	99.5	98.8	93.7
100.0	100.0	96.9	92.6	65.9	79.8	91.1	99.5	100.0	100.0	99.8	96.8
97.6	97.2	92.1	84.8	70.6	63.0	88.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	94.3
99.6	100.0	98.4	100.0	82.9	74.1	93.6	100.0	100.0	99.2	99.7	95.1
100.0	99.7	99.1	96.7	99.1	98.8	98.4	98.5	98.5	93.6	96.9	97.8
99.6	99.5	98.1	98.7	78.4	98.6	96.9	100.0	99.5	97.3	98.9	96.2
97.8	93.3	95.1	48.8	70.9	91.1	85.6	97.8	96.9	96.0	96.9	88.8
100.0	100.0	99.5	98.5	100.0	100.0	99.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
94.2	83.8	96.1	86.7	91.6	79.6	90.7	99.2	92.8	95.4	95.8	91.6
100.0	100.0	98.3	80.1	40.5	82.1	87.9	97.9	89.3	72.7	86.6	89.2
97.2	97.7	95.8	56.8	80.4	98.2	91.3	99.5	99.1	84.8	94.5	94.1
100.0	99.7	100.0	73.5	100.0	96.6	96.7	100.0	99.4	90.9	96.8	94.9
94.1	92.7	93.4	71.4	93.6	87.8	90.9	94.9	94.4	95.0	94.8	91.4
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>98.1</b>	<b>96.7</b>	<b>95.3</b>	<b>84.5</b>	<b>80.7</b>	<b>76.7</b>	<b>91.3</b>	<b>99.1</b>	<b>98.5</b>	<b>96.4</b>	<b>98.0</b>	<b>93.8</b>
<b>10.7</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>10.4</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>33.7</b>	<b>33.5</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
						<b>32.5</b>				<b>34.836</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source:

Columns 1-5: COSIT, Human Security Survey 2007.  
 Column 6: Calculated as the mean of columns 1-5 data.  
 Columns 7-16: COSIT, Human Security Survey 2007.  
 Column 17: : Calculated as the mean of columns 7-16 data.  
 Columns 18-20: COSIT, Human Security Survey 2007.  
 Column 21: Calculated on the basis of columns 18-20 data.  
 Column 22: Calculated from columns 6, 17 and 21.



# Table 8 Demographic Trends

Governorate	Total population <sup>a</sup>			Annual population growth rate	Proportion of urban population	Dependency rate <sup>d</sup>	Population under age 15	Youth population aged (15-24)	Population aged (25-64)	Population aged 65 and older	Total fertility rate <sup>e</sup>
	000			%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	1977	2007	2017	1987/1997	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2006
Nineveh	1106	2820	3803	3.2	60.7	86.2	43.5	20.1	33.6	2.8	5.4
Kirkuk	495	1129	1142	2.3	69.1	84.4	42.9	20.0	34.2	2.8	3.3
Diala	588	1323	2093	1.7	41.4	90.4	44.8	20.2	32.4	2.7	3.6
Al-Anbar	466	1427	2057	2.2	51.7	88.1	44.1	20.1	33.0	2.7	3.7
Baghdad	3190	6995	9397	3.5	86.7	80.8	41.8	20.0	35.3	2.9	3.8
Babylon	592	1574	2239	0.6	46.9	89.2	44.4	20.1	32.7	2.7	3.9
Karbela	270	902	1254	2.4	64.8	85.3	43.2	20.1	33.9	2.8	4.8
Wasit	415	1056	1427	3.3	52.1	88.0	44.1	20.1	33.1	2.7	4.8
Salahuddin	364	1158	1734	2.2	45.9	89.4	44.5	20.1	32.7	2.7	5.1
Al-Najaf	390	1113	1477	2.7	68.6	84.5	43.0	20.0	34.1	2.8	4.8
Al-Qadisiya	423	1033	1307	2.9	51.9	88.1	44.1	20.1	33.1	2.7	5.0
Al-Muthanna	216	650	836	3.2	44.0	89.8	44.6	20.1	32.5	2.7	5.3
Thi-Qar	623	1688	2174	2.5	58.0	86.8	43.7	20.1	33.5	2.8	5.0
Missan	373	944	1083	2.7	64.8	85.3	43.2	20.1	33.9	2.8	5.4
Basrah	1009	2408	2462	5.8	78.2	82.5	42.3	20.0	34.8	2.9	4.9
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>											
Duhuk	251	895	656	3.2	73.2	83.6	42.7	20.0	34.4	2.9	4.9
Suleimaniya	691	1574	2584	3.6	70.1	84.2	70.1	84.2	84.2	2.8	2.9
Erbil	542	1409	2123	3.5	75.9	83.0	42.5	20.0	34.6	2.9	4.1
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>12001</b>	<b>30098</b>	<b>39848</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>66.5</b>	<b>85.0</b>	<b>43.1</b>	<b>20.1</b>	<b>34.0</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>4.3</b>
<b>Arab states <sup>b,c</sup></b>	<b>144,4</b>	<b>313,9</b>	<b>380,4</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>55.1</b>	-	<b>35.8</b>	-	-	<b>3.8</b>	<b>3.6</b>
<b>Developing countries <sup>b,c</sup></b>	<b>2,972,0</b>	<b>5,251,0</b>	<b>5,956,6</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>42.7</b>	-	<b>31.2</b>	-	-	<b>5.5</b>	<b>2.9</b>
<b>Medium human development countries <sup>b,c</sup></b>	<b>2,514,9</b>	<b>4,239,6</b>	<b>4,759,8</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>39.3</b>	-	<b>29.3</b>	-	-	<b>5.8</b>	<b>2.6</b>
<b>World <sup>b,c</sup></b>	<b>4,076,1</b>	<b>6,514,8</b>	<b>7,295,1</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>48.6</b>	-	<b>28.3</b>	-	-	<b>7.3</b>	<b>2.6</b>

## Notes:

- a. Population projections were used to estimate population for 2007-2017. Projections are used to estimate future population on the basis of assumptions regarding fertility trends, mortality and immigration.
- b. Data are from HDR 2007 - 2008, UNDP 2007
- c. Data refer to another year different from that stated in the report, 2005.
- d. Dependency rate: sum of population (0-14 ) age and population 65 age and older divided by total population (15-64) age.
- e. Total fertility rate: average number of infants per woman during the age of (15-49) age.
- Data not available 2006 (Al-Anbar, Duhuk and Erbil ) because these governorates did not participate in the Employment and Unemployment Survey 2006.

## Source:

- column 1: COSIT, Population census 1997.  
column 2: Ministry of Trade, Rationing system 2007.  
column 3: population estimates are forecasts.  
columns 5, 7, 8, 9, 10: COSIT, Iraq Population Estimates 2007.  
column 4: COSIT, Population censuses 1987 and 1997.  
column 6: COSIT, Iraq Population Estimates 2007.  
column 11: COSIT, MICS3 2006

## Commitment to Health

Governorate	(18-29)-month- olds fully immunized (%)			Physicians (per 100,000 people)
	against measles	against tuberculosis	Contraceptive prevalence rate (%of married women 15-49)	
	2006	2006	2006	
Nineveh	80	97	41.6	75
Kirkuk	68	98	56.4	70
Diala	80	98	48.1	35
Al-Anbar	76	98	45.3	52
Baghdad	59	85	53.0	87
Babylon	74	95	40.0	65
Kerbela	84	99	49.6	77
Wasit	75	96	52.0	47
Salahuddin	76	97	40.8	53
Al-Najaf	68	91	55.0	70
Al-Qadisiya	65	85	39.8	54
Al-Muthanna	51	88	42.3	52
Thi-Qar	44	83	50.0	35
Missan	60	77	55.6	42
Basrah	60	86	56.1	73
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>				
Duhuk	64	94	40.6	78
Suleimaniya	64	95	65.5	26
Erbil	83	97	62.1	62
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>49.8</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>Arab states a,b</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>86</b>	-	-
<b>Developing countries</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>83</b>	-	-
<b>Medium human development countries a,b</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>59.0 c</b>	-
<b>World a,b</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>60.0 c</b>	-

## Notes:

- a. Data are from HDR 2007 - 2008 UNDP 2007.  
b. Data refer to another year different from that stated in the report, 2005.  
c. UNICEF, the State of the World's children, Women and Children, The Double Dividend of Gender Equality.

## Source:

columns 1-3: COSIT, MICS3 2006.  
column 4: COSIT with Ministry of Health, 2006 Health Services Statistics Report, 2004.  
Statistical Index for the KRS. Indicators.

Table 10 Inequalities in Maternal and Child Health

Main Characteristics	Maternal Mortality Ratios (years)	Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live birth)	Under-five mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	Natural breastfeeding (%) <sup>c</sup>		Births attended by skilled health personnel (%) <sup>d</sup>			
				age 0-3 months		Physician	Nurse	Qualified midwife	Total
				2006					
<b>Sex</b>									
Male	-	37	44	31	24	-	-	-	-
Female	-	32	37	37	27	-	-	-	-
<b>Governorate</b>									
Nineveh	63.3	35	43	50	37	51	7	16	<b>74</b>
Kirkuk	58.2	15	21	41	30	43	0	32	<b>76</b>
Diala	53.3	34	39	23	16	57	3	31	<b>90</b>
Al-Anbar	57.5	28	30	46	38	54	7	33	<b>94</b>
Baghdad	54.7	29	35	32	23	59	1	33	<b>94</b>
Babylon	61.7	55	58	45	38	52	16	22	<b>91</b>
Kerbela	59.0	47	53	70	62	51	20	26	<b>97</b>
Wasit	58.4	35	45	36	30	41	14	23	<b>78</b>
Salahuddin	58.5	57	70	18	12	64	7	11	<b>82</b>
Al-Najaf	57.2	38	42	13	11	51	20	27	<b>98</b>
Al-Qadisiya	58.2	33	38	38	32	59	12	25	<b>95</b>
Al-Muthanna	58.2	34	43	14	9	47	14	23	<b>85</b>
Thi-Qar	60.5	31	35	35	27	51	11	25	<b>87</b>
Missan	56.7	32	35	29	21	55	21	55	<b>55</b>
Basrah	60.4	27	34	26	19	50	17	30	<b>97</b>
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>									
Duhuk	63.2	33	45	26	15	59	18	7	<b>84</b>
Suleimaniya	63.4	26	31	17	13	63	7	22	<b>92</b>
Erbil	62.2	42	46	11	7	54	8	25	<b>87</b>
<b>Area</b>									
Governorate Centre	-	32	37	34	26	64	8	25	<b>96</b>
Urban Rest	-	38	46	30	21	54	11	28	<b>93</b>
Rural	-	35	41	36	27	46	9	23	<b>78</b>
<b>Mother Educational Level</b>									
Uneducated	-	42	49	26	19	45	9	25	<b>79</b>
Primary	-	32	40	36	25	53	9	26	<b>87</b>
Secondary and Above	-	33	37	34	25	62	10	24	<b>96</b>
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>58.2</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>89</b>
<b>Arab states<sup>a,b</sup></b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>58</b>	-	-	-	-	-	<b>74</b>
<b>Developing countries<sup>a,b</sup></b>	<b>65.5</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>83</b>	-	-	-	-	-	<b>60</b>
<b>Medium human development countries<sup>a,b</sup></b>	<b>66.9</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>69</b>	-	-	-	-	-	<b>63</b>
<b>World<sup>a,b</sup></b>	<b>66.0</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>76</b>	-	-	-	-	-	<b>63</b>

## Notes

- a. Data are from HDR 2007 - 2008 UNDP.  
b. Data refer to another year different from that stated in the report, 2005.  
c. Natural breastfeeding: infant having only mother milk and vitamins, medicine and minerals.  
d. Skilled health personnel are physicians, nurses and qualified midwives.

## Source

Column 1: all Iraq except Kurdistan region, Ministry of Health, Planning and Resources Development Department, Life Tables and Demographic Trends 2006; Kurdistan region data based on COSIT, MICS3, 2006.  
Columns 2-8: COSIT, MICS3- 2006.

Table 11 Under-Five Malnutrition

Main Characteristics	Malnutrition		Stunting		Waist			Weight at birth less than 2500 gram %
	under weight for age 2006		Low height for age 2006		Under weight for height 2006			
	-2SD <sup>a</sup>	-3SD	-2SD	-3SD	-2SD	-3SD	+2SD	
<b>Governorate</b>								<b>2006</b>
Nineveh	5.1	0.6	21.9	6.8	3.4	0.7	7.1	13.6
Kirkuk	7.0	1.3	18.8	7.6	6.4	1.4	6.2	11.8
Diala	6.3	1.0	24.4	8.8	4.2	0.5	11.0	12.4
Al-Anbar	8.3	2.2	21.1	11.1	7.2	2.6	16.3	11.1
Baghdad	6.4	0.8	21.4	6.9	3.0	0.9	11.6	15.8
Babylon	6.2	1.0	20.4	7.5	4.6	0.8	10.4	13.7
Kerbela	4.1	0.6	16.3	3.9	3.2	0.5	5.9	20.4
Wasit	12.0	3.7	25.7	7.6	6.6	2.3	8.2	16.9
Salahuddin	6.2	0.4	19.2	6.3	4.4	1.2	7.5	12.1
Al-Najaf	8.1	2.4	20.1	7.1	5.9	1.9	7.2	17.0
Al-Qadisiya	8.5	1.9	25.8	10.0	5.2	1.0	12.9	17.6
Al-Muthanna	10.8	2.3	23.6	7.9	6.5	0.9	10.0	22.4
Thi-Qar	6.5	1.2	25.2	9.2	3.3	1.6	16.5	16.8
Missan	11.1	1.8	27.8	10.7	4.5	1.3	8.7	12.5
Basrah	13.9	2.9	27.2	12.3	10.4	2.1	9.4	11.3
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>								
Duhuk	8.7	0.8	15.1	3.7	5.3	1.0	5.3	1.0
Suleimaniya	4.6	0.9	7.8	2.0	1.5	0.5	2.2	14.3
Erbil	10.4	3.2	16.2	5.9	7.8	2.1	5.2	13.5
<b>Area</b>								
Urban	7.1	1.2	19.4	6.4	4.8	1.1	8.5	14.9
Rural	8.4	1.8	24.4	9.2	4.8	1.3	10.7	14.6
<b>Mother Educational Level</b>								
Uneducated	9.4	1.8	24.0	8.9	5.3	1.3	8.6	14.3
Primary	7.7	1.4	22.3	7.4	4.7	1.3	9.7	15.4
Secondary and Above	6.2	1.2	18.0	6.8	4.6	1.0	9.5	14.1
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>21.4</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>14.8</b>

## Notes:

SD<sup>a</sup> Stander deviation from median.

-2SD weight to age of a child which is more than 2 standard deviations below reference median is considered severe or medium malnutrition. For height, stunting is considered to be severe or medium and for weight, wasting is considered to be severe or medium.

-3SD weight or height of a child which is more than 3 standard deviations below population median is considered severe.

+2SD A child with weight relative to height more than 2 standard deviations above population median is considered to be overweight.

## Source:

COSIT, MICS3 2006.

Table 12 Literacy and Enrolment

Statistical Annex

Main Characteristics	(%)									
	Early education rate (36-59) months <sup>b</sup>	Children enrolled in primary schools with secondary school age (12-17 years)	Percentage of children 7 years of age or less enrolled in first grade primary schools	Literacy rate (aged 15 and older)	Net primary school enrolment rate	Children reaching grade 5 (% of grade 1 students)	Net secondary school enrolment rate <sup>d</sup>	Net primary school completion rate <sup>e</sup>	Rate of transfer to secondary school	University enrolment rate (age 18-25)
<b>Sex</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2006</b>
Male	2.2	16.4	85	-	91	96	46	47	76	6.5
Female	2.7	7.4	79	-	80	94	34	40	82	5.5
<b>Governorate</b>										
Nineveh	0.9	11.7	77	58	82	95	27	31	75	3.4
Kirkuk	0.7	8.4	86	57	86	98	39	49	81	7.0
Diala	1.3	7.6	84	65	90	99	48	60	91	8.5
Al-Anbar	1.5	8.3	88	63	89	93	49	53	79	-
Baghdad	3.7	5.9	91	78	92	96	45	59	85	7.0
Babylon	1.9	8.0	83	70	82	96	39	44	90	6.2
Kerbela	2.5	12.4	89	68	89	96	34	34	65	6.1
Wasit	1.5	10.8	76	60	80	95	31	33	68	8.6
Salahuddin	2.2	8.0	69	56	78	94	35	30	46	4.8
Al-Najaf	4.0	10.2	81	63	85	94	38	40	77	5.3
Al-Qadisiya	2.0	8.6	68	59	73	93	30	27	73	5.6
Al-Muthanna	3.8	16.6	69	49	78	99	24	32	79	2.5
Thi-Qar	1.7	13.6	76	63	80	98	32	36	67	8.1
Missan	0.3	13.0	67	56	71	89	23	25	62	7.2
Basrah	3.1	8.1	87	68	90	98	90	98	98	7.2
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>										
Duhuk	1.3	22.0	87	45	94	93	50	41	78	-
Suleimaniya	6.1	15.0	91	57	96	90	54	55	85	7.0
Erbil	3.4	17.9	84	58	93	94	52	49	90	-
<b>Area<sup>a</sup></b>										
Centre Governorate Urban	4.3	8.9	88	-	92	94	51	55	85	8.4
Rest Urban	2.6	10.8	86	-	91	96	47	50	78	7.2
Rural	0.9	11.4	75	-	87	96	24	32	70	2.6
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>6.0</b>

Notes

- a. Centre governorate urban :all areas inside municipality boundary
- rest urban: all urban areas outside municipality boundary.
- rural: all rural areas outside municipality boundary.
- b. Children under age 6
- c. Persons aged (6-11) enrolled in primary school to all persons of the same category.
- d. Persons aged (12-17) enrolled in secondary school to all persons of the same category.
- e. Net primary school completion rate: children of primary school age completing primary school
- .. No indicators for the governorates of Al-Anbar, Duhok and Erbil because they didn't participate in the employment & unemployment survey in Iraq for the year 2006.

Source:

- Columns 1,2,3,5-9: COSIT, MICS3 2006.
- Column 4: COSIT, Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004.
- Column 10: COSIT, Employment and Unemployment Survey in Iraq 2006.

Table 13 Gender Inequality in Education

	Primary School Enrolment (%)		Secondary School Enrolment (%)		Women literacy rate (aged 15-24) (%)
	Female enrolment rate	Female enrolment to male rate	Female enrolment rate	Female enrolment to male rate	
<b>Governorates</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2006</b>
Nineveh	74.9	0.84	16.9	0.44	51.9
Kirkuk	78.1	0.85	28.6	0.59	67.3
Diala	85.9	0.93	42.1	0.79	67.0
Al-Anbar	83.7	0.90	38.0	0.63	76.7
Baghdad	90.9	0.98	41.6	0.84	79.1
Babylon	73.8	0.83	32.6	0.72	68.0
Kerbela	84.7	0.92	31.4	0.84	72.1
Wasit	72.4	0.84	25.4	0.70	60.4
Salahuddin	69.3	0.81	21.2	0.46	52.1
Al-Najaf	80.4	0.89	35.7	0.87	62.5
Al-Qadisiya	65.5	0.81	27.8	0.85	56.5
Al-Muthanna	65.9	0.73	20.3	0.72	47.3
Thi-Qar	72.6	0.84	26.9	0.74	59.8
Missan	56.2	0.67	19.4	0.73	48.0
Basrah	86.3	0.92	38.5	0.75	70.9
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>					
Duhuk	92.3	0.97	47.5	0.92	52.5
Suleimaniya	94.3	0.96	56.4	1.08	73.6
Erbil	89.9	0.93	47.9	0.84	60.3
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>80.4</b>	<b>0.88</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>65.6</b>

Source:  
COSIT MICS3 2006.

Table 14 Water Condition and Sewage System

Main Characteristics	(%)					
	People having safe drinking water <sup>c</sup>		People having improved sanitation		People having garbage collection	People served with sewage system
	2000	2006	2000	2006	2006	2006
<b>Governorates</b>						
Nineveh	83.0	83.7	93.6	93.3	59	2.3
Kirkuk	85.2	97.7	94.5	93.6	18	1.0
Diala	78.0	72.5	94.7	95.8	24	0.0
Al-Anbar	79.7	94.2	96.5	99.4	34	2.6
Baghdad/ Greater Baghdad					92	75.0
Baghdad/ Outside Greater Baghdad	94.4	95.6	98.0	99.5	62	0.8
Babylon	73.7	63.9	83.7	83.4	36	3.2
Kerbela	78.2	90.3	88.3	91.8	65	18.3
Wasit	63.5	71.0	82.2	94.1	35	0.0
Salahuddin	67.1	72.5	83.8	92.8	40	7.4
Al-Najaf	84.5	88.1	93.4	93.2	59	17.8
Al-Qadisiya	65.2	74.5	77.4	63.5	45	5.3
Al-Muthanna	64.0	53.1	81.0	81.0	35	0.7
Thi-Qar	60.6	69.9	84.4	80.8	45	6.3
Missan	67.8	75.1	87.5	83.1	23	9.6
Basrah	90.2	79.7	99.3	87.6	54	24.3
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>						
Duhuk	95.7	98.6	94.6	98.1	-	-
Suleimaniya	89.9	95.5	94.0	97.1	67	80.0
Erbil	92.4	97.2	91.7	98.2	-	-
<b>Environment</b>						
Urban	97.5	98.0	99.1	98.2	-	-
Rural	51.5	59.9	77.8	81.9	-	-
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>84.2</b>	<b>92.5</b>	<b>92.3</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>25.7</b>
<b>Arab Countries <sup>a,b</sup></b>	-	<b>86.0</b>	-	-	-	<b>71.0</b>
<b>Developing Countries <sup>a,b</sup></b>	-	<b>79.0</b>	-	-	-	<b>49.0</b>
<b>Medium Human Development Countries <sup>a,b</sup></b>	-	<b>82.0</b>	-	-	-	<b>48.0</b>
<b>World <sup>a,b</sup></b>	-	<b>83.0</b>	-	-	-	<b>59.0</b>

## Notes

a-Data from Human Development Report 2007-2008, UNDP.

b-Data refer to another year different from that stated in the report, 2005.

c-Safe drinking water refer to water transferred by pipes to houses, public tap, protected well, well connected to pipes, protected spring &amp;rain water.

## Sources

Columns 1&amp;3: COSIT, MICS2, 2000.

Columns 2 &amp;4 :COSIT, MICS3, 2006.

columns 5&amp; 6: COSIT, Iraq Environment Survey, 2005.

Table 15 Housing and Infrastructure

Main characteristics	Overcrowding (% households) <sup>a</sup>	Electricity sources % <sup>b</sup>					Safe water supplying %				
		National grid	Private generator	Shared generator	Solar	No electricity	Piped to dwellings	Piped water in other ways	Tanker	Unprotected natural water sources	Others
<b>Household head gender</b>											
Male	10	96	8	23	1	0	77	4	8	6	5
Female	5	97	6	23	1	0	84	4	5	4	5
<b>Governorate</b>											
Nineveh	12	97	7	58	1	1	83	1	2	1	13
Kirkuk	5	98	3	69	1	0	94	1	0	4	2
Diala	13	96	7	44	1	1	74	1	10	9	6
Al-Anbar	10	98	6	52	0	0	84	3	3	7	3
Baghdad	4	98	12	10	1	0	97	1	0	1	1
Babylon	17	98	5	43	1	0	70	6	0	20	5
Kerbela	15	98	7	27	1	0	78	7	1	10	2
Wasit	11	96	6	14	1	2	71	1	0	21	6
Salahuddin	10	92	11	42	1	2	72	0	11	7	10
Al-Najaf	10	98	2	50	1	0	87	3	2	7	1
Al-Qadisiya	13	96	6	14	1	1	78	0	0	19	3
Al-Muthanna	21	96	1	3	0	2	62	1	25	6	6
Thi-Qar	12	98	1	0	1	0	70	0	7	23	0
Missan	10	97	1	2	1	1	85	2	0	12	2
Basrah	6	99	4	7	1	0	62	1	25	6	6
<i>Kurdistan Region</i>											
Duhuk	19	89	7	51	1	1	74	4	1	7	14
Suleimaniya	9	90	3	6	1	0	72	10	1	2	14
Erbil	16	95	23	4	1	0	65	33	0	0	2
<b>Environment</b>											
Urban	16	93	7	17	1	2	88	4	6	0	1
Rural	8	98	8	25	1	0	43	3	13	26	14
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>

## Notes:

- a. Overcrowdings is when over 3 people occupy one room in a housing unit.  
b. The total doesn't equal to 100% because some households depend on several sources.

## Source:

COSIT, Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004.



Table 16 Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index (% Deprived Households)

	(%)						
Governorate	Education	Health	Infrastructure	Housing	Dwelling neighborhood <sup>b</sup>	Household economic status	Level of living deprivation
Nineveh	33.2	25.6	50.7	17.2	22.0	57.2	29.0
Kirkuk	29.4	27.6	41.9	10.5	22.0	42.8	20.4
Diala	39.8	27.3	76.4	33.6	66.8	47.1	47.4
Al-Anbar	34.6	17.1	48.9	6.9	33.5	48.1	22.9
Baghdad	19.3	16.5	46.8	11.5	39.7	54.2	20.4
Babylon	46.8	29.6	83.3	31.3	71.3	63.8	55.5
Kerbela	44.4	19.4	75.0	27.7	60.8	58.1	45.6
Wasit	45.9	23.8	74.5	33.0	56.2	49.1	43.5
Salahuddin	39.8	17.6	74.9	11.7	22.7	49.5	28.5
Al-Najaf	32.9	21.1	63.2	22.4	47.5	66.3	38.8
Al-Qadisiya	45.2	28.1	84.8	39.7	50.2	62.6	51.6
Al-Muthanna	55.9	31.7	79.2	34.4	42.2	80.4	56.4
Thi-Qar	35.8	21.8	71.8	27.0	68.1	62.7	49.7
Missan	38.5	12.4	74.7	19.3	41.2	54.9	33.1
Basrah	23.3	7.6	93.1	27.9	36.9	54.0	28.2
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>							
Duhuk	35.6	25.8	27.4	26.6	18.7	58.9	28.6
Suleimaniya	35.1	32.7	29.6	19.6	31.3	57.9	29.4
Erbil	34.6	15.7	27.0	18.3	14.7	43.9	15.5
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>31.8</b>	<b>20.7</b>	<b>58.2</b>	<b>20.1</b>	<b>40.4</b>	<b>55.1</b>	<b>31.2</b>

## Note:

a. Unsatisfied basic needs index: This index measures the degree of satisfaction of basic needs. The percentages in the table indicate the percentages of deprived households for each of the six fields of the index and for level deprivation in general. For more information regarding its indicators and how it is calculated see COSIT & UNDP, Unsatisfied Basic Needs Mapping and Living Standards in Iraq 2006.

b. Dwelling neighborhood: environment surrounding the house.

## Source:

COSIT & UNDP, Unsatisfied Basic Needs Mapping and Living Standards in Iraq 2006.

**Table 17** Gross General Expenditure and Gross Domestic Product

Year	Gross public expenditure			Gross domestic product		
	Billion ID	Annual growth rate (%)	Current prices (billion ID)	Fixed prices 1988 (billion ID)	Annual increase rate in fixed prices	
1997	1335.5		15093	26	0.0	
1998	3051.9	128.5	17126	36	38.5	
1999	3916.2	28.3	34464	42	16.7	
2000	5997.7	53.2	50214	42	0.0	
2001	6517.2	8.7	41315	43	2.4	
2002	7964.3	22.2	41023	40	-7.0	
2003	3642.7	54.3	29586	27	-32.5	
2004	13705.2	276.2	47959	33	22.2	
2005	14689.3	7.2	64000	34	3.0	
2006	40580.4	176.2	77367	36	5.9	

## Notes:

Expenditure data for 1997-2002 represent actual expenditure.  
Expenditure data for 2003-2006 represent allotments.

## Source:

COSIT, GDP & National Income report 1997-2004 (adjusted series).  
COSIT, GDP & National Income report 2005.  
COSIT, GDP & National Income report 2006.

**Table 18** Commitment to Education and Health: Expenditure on Education, Health, Security and Military

Year	Public education expenditure distribution by stage (%)				Public expenditure distribution by field (%)				Public expenditure to GDP (%)			
	Primary and kindergarten	Secondary	University	Total	Education	Health	Security and military	Total	Education	Health	Security and military	
1997	48.2	21	30.9	100	5.2	5.5	87.7	98.4	0.5	0.22	4.75	
1998	40.4	19	40.6	100	4.0	4.5	86.0	94.5	0.7	0.51	9.96	
1999	46.2	23.7	30.2	100	5.0	3.7	82.3	91.0	0.6	0.27	5.91	
2000	40.4	21.4	38.3	100	4.0	5.3	80.4	89.7	0.5	0.51	6.05	
2001	37.4	21.9	40.7	100	6.1	5.8	79.0	90.9	0.5	0.76	8.75	
2002	23.2	11	65.8	100	5.0	3.9	83.8	92.7	1.0	0.58	8.31	
2003	30.0	12.7	57.3	100	9.2	5.3	83.8	98.3	1.1	0.38	0.02	
2004	53.0	21.9	25.1	100	11.0	11.5	60.0	82.3	3.1	3.02	0.66	
2005	53.1	25.2	21.7	100	10.0	10.6	24.4	45.0	2.2	2.25	1.1	
2006	49.8	25.3	24.9	100	10.8	8.0	19.6	38.4	2.6	1.99	4.93	

## Notes:

Expenditure data for 1997-2002 represent actual expenditure.  
Expenditure data for 2003-2006 represent allotments.

## Source:

COSIT, GDP & National Income report 1997-2004 (adjusted series).  
COSIT, GDP & National Income report 2005.  
COSIT, GDP & National Income report 2006.

## Table 19 Economic Performance

Gross domestic product by economic activities at current and constant (at 1998) prices for 2002-2006

Economic Activities	2002 <sup>a</sup>		2003 <sup>a</sup>		2004 <sup>a</sup>		2005 <sup>a</sup>		2006 <sup>b</sup>	
	Current	Constant	Current	Constant	Current	Constant	Current	Constant	Current	Constant
	Billion ID	Million ID	Billion ID	Million ID	Billion ID	Million ID	Billion ID	Million ID	Billion ID	Million ID
1 Agriculture, forests and hunting	3513	5433	2487	3850	3539	3785	4249	4320	4133	4203
2 Mining and quarries	29045	22123	20372	13930	30543	19057	39367	17967	50302	17743
2-1 Crude oil	29021	22099	20350	13917	30496	19035	39317	17942	50240	17711
2-2 Other kinds of mining	23	24	23	13	48	22	50	25	62	31
3 Manufacturing industries	624	1740	304	1244	771	895	1221	956	1289	1009
4 Electricity and water	79	504	65	200	263	424	393	451	368	516
5 Building and construction	674	1078	217	258	468	494	2932	1187	616	249
6 Transport, transportation and storage	3238	2368	2284	1260	3688	1602	4911	1812	5562	1214
7 Wholesale, retail trade and hotels	2546	1862	1915	1056	3071	1334	4084	1295	4630	2003
8 Financial, insurance and real estate	478	1189	391	1120	663	1201	932	1259	840	1294
8-1 Banks and insurance	255	187	161	89	322	140	521	167	372	171
8-2 Real estate dwellings	222	1002	230	1031	341	1061	411	1092	468	1124
9 Social and personal development service	1047	4209	1859	4242	5200	4501	614	5149	9983	8226
9-1 General government	594	3868	1332	3891	4542	4140	5253	4777	9002	7924
9-2 Private service	453	341	527	351	658	361	887	371	981	303
<b>Total by activities</b>	<b>41243</b>	<b>40506</b>	<b>29895</b>	<b>27161</b>	<b>48207</b>	<b>33293</b>	<b>64228</b>	<b>34396</b>	<b>77724</b>	<b>36457</b>
<b>Minus: service fees</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>357</b>	<b>162</b>
<b>Gross domestic product</b>	<b>41023</b>	<b>40345</b>	<b>29586</b>	<b>26990</b>	<b>47959</b>	<b>33186</b>	<b>64000</b>	<b>34268</b>	<b>77367</b>	<b>36296</b>
<b>Per capita GDP (000)</b>	<b>1605</b>	<b>1.578</b>	<b>1123.2</b>	<b>1.024</b>	<b>1767</b>	<b>1.223</b>	<b>2289</b>	<b>1.225</b>	<b>2685</b>	<b>1.259</b>

## Notes:

- a. Provisional estimations.  
b. Quarterly estimate.

## Source:

COSIT: GDP and National Income 1997-2004 (revised edition).  
COSIT: GDP and National Income 2005.  
COSIT: GDP and National Income 2006.

Table **20** GDP Per Capita (1980-2007)

Year	Per capita GDP by current prices ID	Per capita GDP by fixed prices ID	US \$	
			Official price	Equivalent price
1980	1191.3	1438.8	3812.2	3812.2
1981	830.1	1383.3	2656.3	2656.3
1982	901.1	1333.0	2883.5	2883.5
1983	865.3	1165.5	2769.0	2769.0
1984	965.0	1110.8	3088.0	3088.0
1985	963.2	1090.3	3082.2	3082.2
1986	909.5	1103.7	2910.4	2910.4
1987	1077.4	1189.8	3447.7	3447.7
1988	1151.1	1151.1	3683.5	3683.5
1989	1171.0	1080.2	390.3	390.3
1990	3108.2	1660.8	9946.2	777.1
1991	2304.7	579.9	7375.0	230.5
1992	6074.6	747.5	19438.7	289.3
1993	16513.3	947.4	52842.6	223.2
1994	82887.3	957.9	265239.4	180.1
1995	326036.4	953.0	1043316.5	194.8
1996	307750.6	1028.6	984801.9	263.0
1997	684621.0	1194.9	2190787.2	465.4
1998	754376.0	1564.8	2414003.2	465.7
1999	1473955.0	1786.5	4716656.0	747.4
2000	2084767.0	1758.6	6671254.4	1026.5
2001	1665037.0	1746.5	5328118.4	819.8
2002	1604652.0	1578.1	5134886.4	769.6
2003	1123227.0	1024.7	592.4	580.2
2004	1767106.0	1223.0	1216.2	1216.2
2005	2288741.0	1225.5	1558.0	1554.9
2006	3274233.0	1639.1	2245.7	2231.9
2007	3582698.0	1596.4	2854.7	2847.9

Table 21 Consumer Prices Index

(100=2000)

## Consumer prices index (1995-2007)

Year	Foodstuffs	Fuel & lighting	Rent	Transport & Communications	Others <sup>a</sup>	General index number
1995	104.2	34.1	6.8	40.5	60.0	71.4
1996	80.3	41.0	12.0	39.8	58.2	59.9
1997	92.7	57.2	21.7	55.6	77.5	73.7
1998	103.2	71.4	38.5	63.1	85.0	84.6
1999	103.2	111.4	67.0	87.6	96.2	95.2
2000	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
2001	108.2	98.4	165.1	105.4	106.1	116.4
2002	118.0	97.9	268.2	104.7	112.2	138.8
2003 <sup>b</sup>	137.5	516.9	380.0	128.9	112.7	185.5
2004	149.5	339.9	644.9	145.6	125.9	235.5
2005	182.9	676.7	918.6	223.6	136.8	322.6
2006	237.4	1935.5	1240.9	512.7	163.7	494.3
2007	270.4	3320.9	1538.1	663.0	181.0	646.7

## Notes:

a. Other index numbers: these represent the index numbers for the groups (tobacco and alcoholic beverages, clothing and cloths, furniture, medical service & medicine and others).

b. The index number for August 2003 is calculated for Baghdad only.

## Source:

COSIT

Table 22 Index Numbers by Main Group

(Year 100=2000)

## Index numbers by main group (1995-2007)

Year	Foodstuffs	Fuel & lighting	Rent	Transportation	Others <sup>a</sup>	General index number
	63.0	2.1	11.5	4.9	18.3	100
1995	74.1	2.9	3.6	3.5	16.0	100
1998	37.6	2.7	46.8	3.5	9.3	100
2001	37.0	-0.2	53.4	1.9	8.0	100
2003	41.0	35.4	18.9	4.5	0.3	100
2004	35.3	-4.6	51.5	4.1	13.7	100
2005	55.8	8.2	19.3	10.4	6.3	100
2006	51.3	10.6	11.0	17.3	9.8	100
2007	53.5	9.2	16.8	8.7	11.8	100

## Household Expenditure by Commodities Groups

(%)

Year	Foodstuffs	Tobacco & alcoholic beverages	Cloth, clothes & footwear	Household commodities & furniture	Total rent, fuel & electricity	Transport & communication	Entertainment, education, luxury and culture	Medical service & medicines	Miscellaneous service and commodities	Total
1971 - 1972	54.0	3.7	10.5	5.1	14.6	5.0	1.3	2.1	3.7	100
1976	48.2	2.9	11.8	9.5	11.7	6.9	2.5	1.9	4.6	100
1979	46.3	2.6	10.6	8.8	15.4	8.3	1.9	1.8	4.3	100
1984 - 1985	42.8	2.1	12.0	7.6	20.7	8.2	0.9	1.7	4.1	100
1988	50.2	1.4	10.6	6.7	19.9	6.5	0.8	1.6	2.3	100
1993	61.7	3.6	10.0	4.0	13.0	5.0	0.4	1.1	1.2	100
June, July, August 2002	43.8	2.3	10.9	6.1	19.5	4.0	2.3	4.2	6.9	100
2005	40.0	1.0	6.0	8.0	20.0	17.8	1.2	1.5	4.5	100

Source:  
 COSIT, the Annual Statistical Abstract 2005, 2006.  
 COSIT, Iraq Rapid Household Budget Survey 2005.

## Table 24 Economic Activities

Governorates	Revised economic activity rate 2006% <sup>a</sup>											
	Governorate center			The rest of urban			Rural			Total		
	Male	Female	Male & Female	Male	Female	Male & Female	Male	Female	Male & Female	Male	Female	Male & Female
Nineveh	80	20	51	80	10	45	86	17	52	82	17	51
Kirkuk	68	15	40	74	16	45	82	31	56	73	20	46
Diala	79	12	46	77	18	48	83	10	47	81	12	47
Al-Anbar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baghdad	74	15	45	79	82	44	86	69	79	77	19	49
Babylon	78	27	52	75	22	48	86	60	73	82	45	63
Kerbela	79	16	48	79	16	48	76	9	43	78	13	46
Wasit	73	18	46	80	13	46	88	41	65	82	27	54
Salahuddin	74	23	49	72	11	42	82	33	57	77	24	50
Al-Najaf	77	14	45	80	17	47	83	22	53	79	17	48
Al-Qadisiya	78	20	48	78	17	48	81	23	53	79	21	50
Al-Muthanna	79	18	49	77	13	44	82	14	46	80	15	47
Thi-Qar	72	16	45	73	20	46	79	9	46	75	18	46
Missan	74	13	45	79	11	46	85	18	52	78	14	48
Basrah	76	17	46	79	12	46	78	7	44	77	13	46
Kurdistan Region:												
Duhuk	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suleimaniya	74	21	46	75	22	48	77	54	65	75	29	51
Erbil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>50</b>

## Notes:

a- Economic activity rate is defined as the ratio of number of economically active persons aged 15 years and more.

Economically active persons are those who are employment and the unemployment looking for work aged 15 years and more.

..No data available for the governorates Al-Anbar, Duhok and Erbil 2006, because they didn't participate the employment and unemployment survey 2006.

## Source:

COSIT, Employment and Unemployment Survey, 2006.

Table **25** UnemploymentUnemployment among population aged 15 years and more by gender %<sup>a</sup>

Governorates	2003								
	Urban			Rural			Urban & rural		
	Male	Female	Male & Female	Male	Female	Male & Female	Male	Female	Male & Female
Nineveh	26	10	25	43	6	41	33	9	31
Kirkuk	19	22	19	25	5	20	21	17	19
Diala	32	20	30	8	8	32	33	13	31
Al-Anbar <sup>c</sup>	38	12	36	34	10	31	36	10	33
Baghdad	37	30	36	20	1	16	35	27	33
Babylon	31	26	30	25	2	17	27	7	22
Kerbela	15	17	16	12	6	11	14	13	14
Wasit	28	17	26	17	1	10	22	4	16
Salahuddin	34	13	32	26	5	22	29	7	25
Al-Najaf	18	15	17	24	2	20	20	10	18
Al-Qadisiya	33	18	31	19	2	17	26	9	24
Al-Muthanna	30	24	29	33	5	28	32	11	28
Thi-Qar	45	30	43	54	28	51	49	26	46
Missan	35	29	35	21	15	20	31	25	31
Basrah	17	14	16	13	7	12	16	13	16
Kurdistan Region:									
Duhuk <sup>b,c</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suleimaniya <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Erbil <sup>b,c</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iraq	31	22	30	29	7	25	30	16	28

## Notes:

a-Rate of unemployment: is the number of persons unemployed and looking for work aged 15 years and more to the number of economically active persons aged 15 years and more.

The number of economically active persons is the number of employed persons aged 15 years and more plus the number of unemployed persons.

b-In the year 2003 the governorates of Kurdistan Region didn't participate in the employment and unemployment survey.

c-In the year 2006 the governorates of (Erbil, Duhok and Al-Anbar) didn't participate in the employment and unemployment survey.

## Source:

COSIT, Employment and Unemployment Survey 2006.



## 25 Unemployment *continued*

Unemployment among population aged above 15 years by gender % <sup>a</sup>

2006								
Urban			Rural			Urban & rural		
Male	Female	Male & Female	Male	Female	Male & Female	Male	Female	Male & Female
26	68	34	23	2	20	25	40	27
6	25	10	6	3	6	6	13	8
40	14	37	12	33	14	18	24	19
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
23	35	25	3	5	4	15	20	16
20	42	25	12	2	8	17	12	15
18	30	20	17	13	16	17	27	19
13	41	18	3	2	3	7	14	9
42	39	41	20	3	15	21	10	18
15	48	20	17	12	16	16	33	19
19	46	25	20	2	16	19	22	20
18	36	21	27	12	25	23	22	23
25	27	26	26	53	29	25	44	28
14	31	16	13	43	18	15	38	18
12	30	15	15	12	15	12	21	13
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	9	9	3	24	12	6	33	14
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>20</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>18</b>

Table **26** Under-Employment RateUnderemployment rate due to short working hours among population aged 15 years and more % <sup>a</sup>

Governorates	2003								
	Urban			Rural			Urban & rural		
	Male	Female	Male & Female	Male	Female	Male & Female	Male	Female	Male & Female
Nineveh	9	22	11	23	83	26	15	37	17
Kirkuk	8	44	12	57	82	64	23	57	28
Diala	17	24	18	21	51	25	20	36	22
Al-Anbar <sup>c</sup>	21	32	22	25	75	33	23	48	28
Baghdad	12	19	13	12	32	21	12	22	14
Babylon	28	31	28	56	87	68	46	77	56
Kerbela	9	25	12	29	75	38	17	46	21
Wasit	9	37	14	16	51	31	13	49	25
Salahuddin	12	27	14	19	50	29	16	41	23
Al-Najaf	18	21	18	34	88	48	23	45	28
Al-Qadisiya	14	37	17	41	70	46	29	59	34
Al-Muthanna	20	19	20	34	73	43	28	55	33
Thi-Qar	22	54	28	41	54	43	29	60	34
Missan	17	29	18	24	26	26	19	28	21
Basrah	15	32	17	28	41	30	18	35	20
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>									
Duhok <sup>b,c</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suleimaniya <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Erbil <sup>b,c</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>24</b>

## Notes

a-Underemployment rate: % of persons working for wages, self employed or doing voluntary work who are working less than normal working hours (35 hour/week) and are looking for or ready to do additional work to the total labor force size (employed+ unemployed) during the reference period.

b- In 2003 the governorates of Kurdistan Region didn't participate in the employment and unemployment survey.

c- In 2006 the governorates of (Erbil, Duhok and Al-Anbar) didn't participate in the employment and unemployment survey.

## Source:

COSIT, Employment and Unemployment Surveys 2003,2006.

Table **26** **Under-Employment Rate** *continued*

Underemployment rate due to short working hours among population aged 15 years and more % <sup>a</sup>

2006								
Urban			Rural			Urban & rural		
Male	Female	Male & Female	Male	Female	Male & Female	Male	Female	Male & Female
21	6	20	33	93	44	26	65	32
15	32	17	51	80	59	30	62	37
39	81	47	30	83	34	32	70	36
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
37	39	37	34	94	58	40	69	46
22	40	25	36	69	51	32	67	45
35	58	39	35	65	39	34	62	38
11	7	10	33	78	47	25	64	34
1	1	1	35	84	51	36	76	46
19	32	21	22	53	28	20	42	23
31	42	33	35	76	46	32	66	39
19	37	21	28	84	38	25	68	32
24	65	31	41	83	43	34	78	39
22	47	25	33	81	38	25	56	28
9	44	15	15	61	19	13	59	19
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26	64	35	39	85	56	38	37	45
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>26</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>38</b>

Table 27 Gender, Work and Time Use 2006<sup>a</sup>

Governorates	Total working hours (H/Week)		Female working hours (% of male working hours) <sup>b</sup>	Total male working hours by sector(%)				Total female working hours by sector(%)			
	Male	Female		Agriculture	industry	Services	Total	Agriculture	industry	Services	Total
Nineveh	38	24	62.0	25	20	55	100	63	11	27	100
Kirkuk	40	25	62.0	28	14	58	100	65	3	32	100
Diala	35	27	76.7	27	18	55	100	23	2	74	100
Al-Anbar <sup>c</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baghdad	33	26	78.1	14	24	63	100	51	5	43	100
Babylon	42	28	67.5	46	12	42	100	86	1	13	100
Kerbela	40	27	69.3	13	31	56	100	27	11	62	100
Wasit	39	28	70.8	34	18	48	100	77	1	21	100
Salahuddin	38	26	69.4	32	21	47	100	83	3	14	100
Al-Najaf	43	32	75.4	20	20	60	100	53	2	45	100
Al-Qadisiya	41	29	69.8	33	17	50	100	66	1	33	100
Al-Muthanna	48	28	58.7	27	24	50	100	65	2	33	100
Thi-Qar	39	25	62.3	16	22	61	100	21	7	72	100
Missan	39	29	75.7	28	20	53	100	42	4	54	100
Basrah	45	29	65.2	6	29	65	100	5	11	84	100
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>											
Duhuk <sup>c</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suleimaniya	37	26	70.5	14	20	66	100	46	3	51	100
Erbil <sup>c</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>69.9</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>57</b>		<b>60</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>36</b>	

## Notes:

- a. The data in the tables concern production work & don't include other kinds of work such as house work.  
b. Total daily working hours for females divided by total daily working hour for males.  
c. NO data for 2006 for Al-Anbar, Duhuk & Erbil governorates because they didn't participate in the Employment and Unemployment Survey 2006.

## Source:

COSIT, Employment and Unemployment Survey 2006.

# Table 28 Household Ownership of Housing Units and Durables

(%)

Main characteristics	Housing unit <sup>a</sup>	Private car	Refrigerator	Stove	Fan	Washing machine	Vacuum cleaner	Radio-tape recorder	Colored TV	Satellite receiver	Computer	Air conditioner
	2005	2005	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004
<b>Household head gender</b>												
Male	-	-	77	62	92	28	11	62	89	41	5	34
Female	-	-	73	61	90	23	10	56	84	33	4	31
<b>Governorate</b>												
Nineveh	80	24	79	69	90	34	11	53	90	42	5	22
Kirkuk	74	38	85	61	94	31	13	61	94	58	3	6
Diala	87	27	71	49	95	13	4	46	89	29	2	50
Al-Anbar	85	30	88	64	95	30	8	56	90	50	5	9
Baghdad	72	9	83	74	96	35	15	67	91	45	9	42
Babylon	90	37	70	42	95	15	6	62	88	30	2	31
Kerbela	82	19	71	58	97	20	6	58	87	32	3	37
Wasit	83	25	81	54	92	16	4	60	87	25	3	45
Salahuddin	86	49	70	48	93	24	9	49	82	56	2	8
Al-Najaf	87	27	63	53	96	22	4	56	83	23	3	50
Al-Qadisiya	93	17	68	46	92	15	3	66	84	31	2	9
Al-Muthanna	93	26	69	55	93	14	4	52	84	29	1	14
Thi-Qar	85	18	74	63	95	12	3	56	88	25	1	9
Missan	82	19	83	38	96	13	2	76	93	37	2	11
Basrah	70	25	68	63	94	23	6	70	80	44	3	29
<b>Kurdistan Region</b>												
Duhuk	b	b	70	47	86	39	12	45	84	49	5	26
Suleimaniya	68	26	70	73	71	30	24	49	93	37	7	63
Erbil	b	b	79	55	85	44	18	76	90	49	6	53
<b>Environment</b>												
Urban	-	-	79	67	93	33	13	64	91	45	6	37
Rural	-	-	68	47	89	7	2	51	82	24	1	21
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>33</b>

## Notes:

- a. Housing unit: any building or part of a building designed for living with a separated entrance; it may consist of one room or more with its sanitary facilities.  
 b. Data not available for Erbil and Duhuk because these governorates did not participate in the Household Nutritional Status Assessment Survey in Iraq

## Source:

columns 1-2: COSIT, Food security and Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq 2005.  
 columns 3-12: COSIT, Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004.

Table **29** Communication: Diffusion and Creation

Governorates	Internet cafes activity in the private sector					
	No. of telephones per 1,000 persons	Telephone density per 100 persons	No. of internet cafes	No. of houses having internet service	No. of daily internet browsers per 10,000 person	Average for internet browsing (hour / person)
	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006
Nineveh	106	4	18	c	2.2	1.0
Kirkuk	53	6	31	4356	3.1	1.3
Diala	44	3	11	3624	4.9	1.5
Al-Anbar	71	5	39	1179	6.4	1.0
Baghdad	514	7	50	6506	1.0	1.9
Babylon	71	4	25	5077	2.9	1.2
Kerbela	36	4	12	2973	2.6	1.4
Wasit	40	4	21	4515	3.6	1.4
Salahuddin	41	4	12	119	0.9	1.0
Al-Najaf	82	8	7	1848	1.5	1.0
Al-Qadisiya	47	5	5	44	1.4	0.8
Al-Muthanna	27	5	9	1416	0.6	1.8
Thi-Qar	35	2	34	1272	3.1	1.5
Missan	26	3	7	1980	0.3	1.2
Basrah	87	5	77	27618	17.0	1.6
<i>Kurdistan Region:</i>						
Duhuk	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suleimaniya	-	-	-	-	-	-
Erbil	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Iraq a,b</b>	<b>1278</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>358</b>	<b>62527</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>1.5</b>
<b>Arab countries a,b</b>	-	<b>11</b>	-	-	-	-
<b>Developing countries a,b</b>	-	<b>13</b>	-	-	-	-
<b>Medium human development countries a,b</b>	-	<b>14</b>	-	-	-	-
<b>World a,b</b>	-	<b>18</b>	-	-	-	-

## Notes:

- a. Data from Human Development Report 2007-2008, UNDP.  
 b. Data refer to another year different from that stated in the report, 2005.  
 c. In Nineveh houses join the net work directly from companies in the governorate.  
 - No data available because it was not included in the survey.

## Source:

Columns 1 & 2: COSIT, Communication and Post Statistics report.  
 Columns 3 & 6: COSIT, Internet Cafes activates survey 2007.  
 Column 7: COSIT, Car Registration (temporary) Statistics Report 2003-2004.

Table **30** Trade Structure

Year	Import of commodities and services (from GDP)	Export of commodities and services (from GDP)	Produced exports (% of commodities exported)	Manufactured commodities export (% of commodities exported) d,e	Billion ID		
					Import of commodities and services at current prices f	Export of commodities and services at current prices f	Export of commodities and services at fixed prices f f
	%	%	%	%			
2001	62	65	66	34	25411	26967	21420
2002	49	71	81	19	20180	28950	25597
2003	77	77	a	a	22734	22897	a
2004	70	62	84	16	33412	29634	20023
2005	61	62	84	16	39145	39634	20252
2006	46	59	66	34	35270	454986	177868
<b>Arab countries b,c</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>75</b>		-	-	-
<b>Developing countries b,c</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>71</b>	-	-	-
<b>Medium development countries b,c</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>69</b>	-	-	-
<b>World b,c</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>75</b>	-	-	-

## Notes:

- No data exist on total, primary and industrial exports due to the of war, 2003.
- Data from Human development report 2007/2008, UNDP, 2007.
- Data refer to another year different from that stated in the report, 2005.
- Fluctuations during 2001-2006 are due to decline in domestic production in Iraq because of lack in primary materials caused by security conditions and to removing imports restrictions
- Manufactured commodities export: All processes on raw materials or semi manufactured products regarding its form, composition or appearance to transform them to manufactured or semi manufactured products, including combining, mixing, purifying, assembling, recomposing, repackaging or wrapping products.
- includes the oil exports and imports by 1988 prices.

## Source:

COSIT: GDP and National Income 1997-2004 (revised edition).  
 COSIT: Imports and Exports of goods and services 2005.  
 Iraq Central Bank provisional estimate (3rd quarter) of imports and exports goods and services 2006.  
 COSIT: Total, primary and manufactured exports 2001-2006.

Table **31** Balance of Payment

Year	Market price rate	Auction price rate	Current Account	Paid debt services	Total exports	Total import
1980	3.2	..	10662.1	5981.8	24921	11538.4
1981	3.2	..	-11931	10710	10831	15866.1
1982	3.2	..	-19417	9721.5	9897.1	21463.5
1983	3.2	..	-5509.3	5087.8	9297.5	10601.9
1984	3.2	..	-3851.9	5248.4	11501.1	10803.3
1985	3.2	..	-4544.2	4959.2	11788.3	11327
1986	3.2	..	-7197.2	4972	7396.3	9844
1987	3.2	..	-4182	5748.3	12812.9	11387.5
1988	3.2	..	-3717.4	6165.2	12387.6	10193.7
1989	3.2	..	-2872	6223.1	15017.1	11785.4
1990	3.2	4	-2418.1	6487.2	13710.1	9909
1991	3.2	10	-3407	2719.9	1730.4	3034.2
1992	3.2	21	-7076.2	5370.9	2108	4254
1993	3.2	74	-8451.1	7335.5	1794.4	3418.3
1994	3.2	458	-9128	8575.6	1720.4	2681.9
1995	3.2	1674	-10547.3	10050.2	1963	2891.3
1996	3.2	1170	-10046.1	10264.8	2764.9	2943.1
1997	3.2	1471	-10129.7	11674.5	6385.2	3682.7
1998	3.2	1620	-12045	12989.5	7427.8	4986.2
1999	3.2	1972	-14527.8	14632.7	13067	9097.4
2000	3.2	1930	-8169	10148.4	18742.6	11008.6
2001	3.2	2031	-15410	14062	12872.1	11152
2002	3.2	2085	-782	494.4	12218.8	9817.3
2003	1896	1936	-934.5	1809.4	9711.1	9933.5
2004	1453	1453	-2404.6	972.3	17810	21302.3
2005	1469	1472	1694.1	6094.5	23697.4	20002.2
2006	1467	1475	7095.6	5520.5	30529.4	18707.5
*2007	1255	1267	3070.7	2807.5	15368	9173.3

## Notes

a. Semi annual

1. Period 1980-2001 by fourth edition, period 2002-2007 by fifth edition.

2. Imports (2002-2004) evaluated on the basis of (SIF) and the rest on the basis of (FOB).

3. Market price is equivalent to the price of dollar against Iraqi dinar for period (1980-2002) and the opposite in the subsequent term.

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Central Bank of Iraq



Table **32** Women's Political Participation in 2007

Governorates	Parliament		Governorate Councils	
	Women	Total	Women	Total
Ninewa	5	20	10	39
Kirkuk	2	13	9	41
Diala	2	12	13	41
Al-Anbar	3	14	7	49
Baghdad	26	80	12	48
Babylon	3	11	11	39
Kerbala	1	11	10	41
Wasit	3	9	12	41
Salahuddin	1	11	10	41
Al-Najaf	2	9	11	41
Al-Qadisiya	2	8	11	41
Al-Muthanna	2	5	10	36
Thi-Qar	4	13	11	41
Missan	2	6	10	41
Basrah	6	17	10	41
<b>Kurdistan region</b>				
Duhok	3	8	13	41
Suleimaniya	3	18	13	41
Erbil	5	15	13	41
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>744</b>

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